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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

17 MAR 1992

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LIBBY

SUBJECT: Comments Received on Draft DPG -- Potential Issues

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(U) I would note that this draft's Strategic Deterrence section could use strengthening, particularly re: defenses.

(U) We may wish to review the concurrency references (p. 29, 51, and perhaps implied, p. 57) for specificity/consistency.

(U) We received several comments on the Total Force text in the Crisis Response section. The reference to combat forces for "initial" contingency response would both describe the force most accurately and remain consistent with the current NSSR if we did not insert the descriptor "most" (p. 29). Yet no one commented on the total force text now at p. 50 (perhaps because of the qualifier "primarily" in the RC sentence, which actually could also be dropped).

(U) The Reconstitution bullet at p. 21 drops SecDef's focus on a "renewed global" threat, which USD/P repeatedly affirmed when asked.

Dale A. Vesser
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary
(Resources & Plans)

Attachment: a/s

Prepared by: Rod Fabrycky, x79478

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

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# Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999

This Defense Planning Guidance implements the President's new defense strategy. This strategy guides U.S. security policy and military strategy in a dramatically changed global security environment, one marked by a significant reduction in the resources we will devote for defense and a focus on regional security challenges of concern to us, rather than on the global challenge we faced in the Cold War.

Our strategic position and choices today are very different from those we faced in the past. A fundamentally new situation has been created by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external Soviet empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The United States has responded decisively to reduce its conventional and strategic forces to levels consistent with the promise and uncertainties of the changing environment. The passing global threat challenges U.S. leadership to preserve and strengthen the wide-ranging security relations we have developed over the last forty years with friendly nations and allies, including leading industrial democracies, and to include new democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in a prosperous and democratic "zone of peace." The new international environment also reflects the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression -- the first major post-Cold War conflict.

Our regionally-oriented defense strategy and this Defense Planning Guidance seek to achieve our national security objectives while facilitating the reduction and restructuring of our defense establishment. As a Nation we have never before succeeded in reducing the defense establishment while retaining necessary capabilities. Our planning should preserve our ability, albeit at

lower levels of forces, to shape the future strategic environment -- to foster positive trends and preclude the renewal of major challenges and thereby to avoid having to return to the more costly defenses requirements of the past. The choices we make in this more benign international environment will set the Nation's direction into the next century.

## I. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE 1990S

In the August, 1991 *National Security Strategy Report*, the President identified four basic national security interests as a framework for a number of national security objectives in the decade ahead:

- *The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.*

  The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies, to:

  - deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and, should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies;
  - effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism;
  - improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities;
  - promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to new quests for military advantage;
  - foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism;
  - prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology means of delivery; and
  - reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home.

- *A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.*

  National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to:

  - promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy;
  - ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space;

- promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes; and

- achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.

• *Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.*

To build and sustain such relationships, we seek to:

- strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights;

- establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities;

- strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress;

- support Western Europe's historic march toward greater economic and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community; and

- work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security and democracy in a Europe whole and free.

• *A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.*

Our interests are best served in a world in which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure. We seek to:

- maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance;

- promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;

- promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress;

- aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; and

- support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress."

In consonance with those broad interests and objectives, the President has approved the new regional defense strategy. This edition of the Defense Planning Guidance articulates the regional defense strategy -- from which the National Military Strategy is also derived -- and develops from it defense policy guidance for the next several years and the attendant guidance to the military

services and defense agencies for their preparation of program proposals for the FY 1994-99 planning period implementing the Base Force.

## II. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

### A. Regional Focus

The collapse of a global military threat to the United States presents an unprecedented opportunity to achieve our enduring national objectives with fewer forces and lesser resources for defense than was required during the Cold War. We can take advantage of the more benign environment now developing to shift our planning from a focus on global conflict to one on regional threats and challenges, and in this way work to preclude the emergence of new, non-democratic threats that could challenge our interests more broadly. As we reduce the resources we spend on defense, we must not squander our position of relative strength and security achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape the environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our democratic and free market values.

### B. Underlying Strategic Concepts

The Department does not decide when our Nation will commit force, but our recommendations on the design of defense forces and programs for the next six years may not only determine a future President's options when a crisis occurs, but actually shape the course of events, preclude potential challengers, and make such crises less likely. As we design our defense program, it is important to appreciate four concepts that underlay the potential roles that U.S. forces can play in furthering our security in this new environment.

1. Defense Planning Horizon and Uncertainty. An unavoidable challenge for defense planners is that we must start

development today of forces to counter threats still so distant into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events of the last few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and unexpectedly political trends can reverse themselves. Our ability to predict becomes even worse as the time frame becomes longer.

Given the magnitude of recent changes in the security environment, we build defense forces today for a future that is particularly uncertain. Fundamentally, we are striving to provide a future president with the capabilities 5, 10 or 15 years from now to counter threats or pursue interests that cannot be defined with precision today.

2. Shaping the Future Security Environment. Our strategy seeks to anticipate and to shape trends to advance U.S. security objectives in the future. This is both within our means and critical to our future security. America cannot base its future security on just a shaky record of prediction or a prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks to help shape the future. That is what the President's regional defense strategy seeks to do.

The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully shaped the world we see today. There are many causes for the favorable changes in the world that we have enjoyed in the last three years, including the fundamental flaws of Communism. But a necessary foundation for the liberation of Eastern Europe or the phenomenal changes under way in the former Soviet Union was the commitment of the United States and our allies through forty years of Cold War. Our refusal to be intimidated by the enormous build-up in Soviet military power during the Cold War, our willingness to match that buildup, our joint efforts with our friends and allies to build a democratic security community, and our deployment of forces forward in Europe and the Pacific that allowed democracy to develop and flourish in so many parts of the


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world, all these contributed to the very substantial peaceful changes that we see occurring today in the world.

We can now reduce the overall size of our forces and defense budget in light of those changes. But it's important for us to remember that our future security will continue to depend in large measure upon our willingness to build strong alliances, deploy forces overseas in Europe, Southwest Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and to retain high-quality forces here at home. These forces are critical to allow us to defend our national interests and to come to the aid of our friends as right and our interests should demand. The future may also come to depend on others' perceptions of our will and capability to reconstitute forces and to deter or defend against strategic attack, should that prove necessary. Among other elements that will help shape our future are continued efforts to prevent proliferation of advanced military-related technologies to irresponsible states; a robust military-technical lead of our own; verifiable arms reductions, not just to make war less destructive, but to make war less likely; and a highly effective, world-wide network of military intelligence capabilities. A defense posture based on these capabilities will be crucial for strengthening a democratic security community, heading off future crises or arms races, and precluding future aggressors from challenging our vital interests. These are main purposes of the regional defense strategy.

The regional strategy has already shaped our future for the better in the first major conflict of the post-Cold War era. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead of a more radical Middle East under Saddam's influence, Saddam and Iraq's dangerous military have been weakened, our ties with moderate states are stronger, and Arabs and Israelis have for the first time in many years met to discuss peace.

One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying old alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into close security relationships. If other leading democracies and we continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely. If we part, many other problems can result. If we can assist former Warsaw Pact countries, including republics of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine, into a steady course of democratic progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible civilian control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty-years effort. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence in our tradition of civil-military relations and in our commitment to use our significant military power only as a force for peaceful democratic progress.

We must plan to help shape our future environment and hedge against both anticipated threats and uncertainty. This can be done at the reduced resource levels provided in the current fiscal guidance. We stood by freedom through forty painful years of the Cold War, and we stood by it again in the first crisis of the post-Cold War world. The defense programs for 1994-1999 should build upon our strengths to preserve our ability to shape the future.

3. Strategic Depth. With the end of the Cold War and the passing of the Soviet threat, America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades. Today we face no global challenger. No ideology challenges the primacy of democratic values. There are no significant alliances hostile to our interests. No region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile, non-democratic domination. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world are our friends. Near-term threats in regions critical to our interests are small relative to our capabilities and those of our allies. In Europe,

a threat once poised at the inner-German borders was first pushed hundreds of miles eastward and has since transformed into the promise of a new era of strategic cooperation. Except with respect to strategic nuclear forces, no country is our match in military technology or the ability to apply it. A challenger to our security would have to overcome our formidable alliances and the qualitative advantages that we displayed so impressively in Desert Storm. We have in fact won great depth for our strategic position.

The events of the last three years have provided America with strategic depth in which to defend our national interests. Because we now face neither a global threat nor a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs. We can seek to preclude hostile, non-democratic domination of a critical region, and hence the reemergence of a global threat, through political and economic means, as well as through our security efforts. Through forward presence, sustained crisis response capabilities, and a continued technological edge, we can help to preclude potential aggressors from beginning regional arms races, raising regional tensions, or gaining a dangerous foothold toward hostile, regional domination. We can maintain the military capabilities and strengthen the alliances necessary to our regional strategy. Together with our allies, we can provide more security at a reduced cost.

As a nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict that, once lost, cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of combat. Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Four short years after our resounding global victory in World War II, we were nearly pushed off the Korean peninsula by a third rate

power. We paid dearly in the past for our rush to disarm and our failure to accept a leadership role befitting our role in the world.

Our defense program for FY 94-99 must provide the ready forces, the mobility, the forward presence and strength to preserve our alliances, the means to fight proliferation of advanced weapons and the many other elements that will help to preserve at lower cost the hard-won depth to our strategic position.

4. Selectivity

The Cold War required the United States and its allies to be prepared to contain the spread of Soviet power on a global basis. The former Soviet Union supported challenges in various regions as part of a global challenge to us and our allies. This meant that developments even in some relatively remote parts of the globe could affect the balance of power between us. The United States remains a nation with global interests, but the demise of the Soviet Union and the increasing strength of our allies permit us to define our interests more selectively and to safeguard those interests in separate regional contexts and at lower resource levels. The end of the Cold War has given us substantial flexibility in determining which regional challenges engage our vital national interests and therefore merit a U.S. military role.

Our new defense strategy therefore allows us to be more selective in deciding where and to what extent our military will be involved. Deterring or defending against a direct attack upon the United States remains our foremost objective. We must also be prepared should the United States deem it necessary to respond militarily to a hostile, non-democratic threat to dominate a region critical to our interests. Such regions include Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia, whose hostile, non-democratic domination could come to pose a threat to U.S. security. We also

need to be prepared to respond selectively to other areas of historic or alliance commitment.

We should plan to remain capable to protect American citizens in pursuit of their legitimate interests abroad. This includes the capabilities to evacuate U.S. citizens from areas of crisis, and to protect them from terrorist attack. We should also plan to assist as a high priority national security mission in the interdiction of narcotics into the United States.

U.S. preference and steady policy is to address international security issues wherever possible in a collective context. The increasing strength of our allies and friends and our common interests in many areas present widening opportunities for common efforts in the context of the United Nations, existing alliances, or ad hoc coalitions, such as that involved in the Persian Gulf. We should plan forces and programs to operate in conjunction with others and to take advantage of the strength of our allies and friends where possible. We should press others to share more fully the burden of responsibility within the framework of collective defense arrangements.

Nevertheless, there may be instances where only firm U.S. leadership backed by significant U.S. capabilities can bring a coalition together and there are likely to be instances where we cannot count in advance on the international community to provide the preponderence of forces necessary to protect our vital interests. Therefore, for potential crises engaging our interests in regions critical to our national well-being, we must plan sufficient forces and programs to provide a future President the options he will need to provide such leadership and protect our interests. Having such capabilities will enhance deterrence, make the need for the use of military force less likely, and will increase the likelihood of effective international cooperation. Failing to have such capabilities for leadership would endanger our critical interests.

In some areas we may be called upon by friends and by states seeking to strengthen their own security through democratic and economic reforms to help them address sources of regional instability in ways that promote adherence to international law and limit international violence. Where critical U.S. interests are not threatened, the countries involved will have to play the leading role and our support will consist primarily of non-military programs; but DoD can play a supporting role through security assistance, military-to-military contacts, and humanitarian assistance. We should look for innovative, low cost ways of providing such assistance. If such preventive measures fail, U.S. involvement will generally take the form of participation in collective responses. In such instances, American commitments will have to balance our concern for a just international order with due regard for our lesser interests in this case and limited resources. We should plan forces to participate in such missions; but we must not assume that we will carry the sole, or even preeminent, international burden in these areas.

## C. Enduring Requirements

The new defense strategy with its regional focus continues the need to pay special attention to four enduring requirements of our national security posture. Each requires careful, long-term attention, the investment of defense resources, and supportive operating practices; each represent key strengths that cannot be readily restored should they be lost.

1. Alliances and Coalitions. Maintaining our alliances continues to be an essential part of our strategy. In many respects, our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since World War II. It represents yet another victory, a "Silent Victory" of building longstanding

alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented "zone of peace" that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy. The U.S. will maintain and nurture its alliance commitments in Europe, the Far East, Latin America and elsewhere.

The growing strength of our friends and allies will make it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests. We will work with them towards this end. More reciprocal, more mature security relationships will be more sustainable over time and will advance our interests. As alliance partners and other friendly nations acquire more responsibility for their own defense, the U.S. will be able to reduce its military forces overseas without incurring significant risks. These changes, however, must be managed carefully to ensure that they are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of U.S. commitment. We will in any case wish to continue to have a significant forward presence, as discussed below.

Certain situations, like the crisis leading to the Gulf War, are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions, that may include allies, nations with whom we have longstanding defense relations, and perhaps some with when we have not previously cooperated. Some coalitions may entail only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others and techniques for rapidly coordinating efforts with forces of nations with whom we have less prior dealings.

We should recognize that it will not always be incumbent upon us to assume a leadership role. In some cases, we will encourage that leadership be taken by others, perhaps through mechanisms such as international or regional organizations. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the United States will remain postured to act independently in defense of our interests where necessary. This

may happen when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary presage to a larger or more formal collective response. This requirement will affect the type and level of forces and forward presence we maintain.

Events in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union over the last year or more have greatly advanced the prospects for dramatically expanding our cooperative defense efforts with others. Some of the strongest advocates for strong trans-Atlantic bonds and a continued U.S. presence in Europe are the newly emerging democracies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. We have begun international cooperative training programs with these nations and started military-to-military exchanges and a regular defense dialogue. Liaison relations exist between them and NATO. We should plan to encourage and continue such efforts. Each of these nations faces economic, ethnic or regional security challenges; but there is progress being made.

If democracy matures in Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union, there is every possibility that they will be a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other critical regions. Such democratic states will have more in common with us than in conflict. We could well imagine that in a crisis like Operations Desert Shield/Storm years from now, we will have not merely political, but military support from Russia, Ukraine, or other states of the former Soviet Union. We have begun security discussions with states of the former Soviet Union, as well as cooperative efforts to stem proliferation of weapons and technology and to lessen future risks by destroying nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of the former Soviet Union. We must plan to build on and expand these and other early efforts at cooperation with these nations.

Recent events have affected our critical security relations in Asia, as well. For decades, the very real security threat from the Soviet Union had served as the primary rationale for the U.S.-

Japan security relationship. Even as the Soviet threat passes, however, the need for strong U.S.-Japan ties persists; and the U.S. remains committed to Japan's security. This strong relationship helps to counter remaining security threats, to further enhance regional peace and stability, and to protect the wide-ranging U.S. interests in East Asia and beyond. Japan contributed to the Persian Gulf defense cooperation fund and subsequently dispatched mine sweepers to the Gulf. Our forces stationed in Japan and generously supported by it played an important role in the Gulf War. In addition to Japan, we have active mutual security agreements with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and have established non-treaty security relationships with several other countries. These ties will be important as the demise of Soviet Communism begins to affect China, Vietnam, and North Korea. North Korea's disturbing nuclear program, coupled with its record of support for international terrorism, and the tremendous military establishment it continues to support make it the most serious single threat to peace in Asia. But the seven largest armies in the world are in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Given our historic commitment to the region and its growing importance to us, continued security ties will be vital.

Finally, the Gulf War has greatly enhanced the nature of our security relations in that region and underscored their continued importance. Taken together, many facets of this experience -- combat forces, logistical support and financial participation -- and our subsequent cooperation on forward presence of U.S. forces promise continued close ties with nations of the region on which we can build.

2. Quality Personnel. Our victory in the Gulf War reminded us again of the importance of high-quality personnel and effective leaders. The highly-trained, highly-motivated All-Volunteer Force we have worked so hard to create is the key to maintaining our future military competence. We also require quality career

DUSD/A

- (U) Section II.E.1., Page 29, Para 2: The directive that U.S. forces must continue to be "at least a generation ahead ..." is much too opaque to provide useful program guidance. In particular, the concept of a technology "generation" has no commonly understood meaning and is, therefore, not useful. The general call for technological superiority is adequate without trying to quantify superiority.

Recommendation: Delete this paragraph.

civilians in the managerial, scientific and technical fields, to maintain the pace of innovation and perform many of the challenging tasks of the Department.

Many aspects of the Gulf War tested the training, discipline, and morale of our military forces and they performed superbly. To continue to attract the highest quality people, we must provide challenging and rewarding career opportunities. This includes realistic training and the benefits of advanced training techniques such as interactive simulation. We must also provide the personnel tempo and quality of life they and their families deserve.

Quality personnel also require quality leadership. Our success in the Gulf reflected outstanding military leadership. We must continue to train our military leaders in joint operations and, as noted above, in cooperative efforts with the forces of many different nations. They must also be given the opportunity and encouragment to pursue innovative doctrine for operations and new approaches to problems arising under the regional defense strategy, as discussed below.

3. Technological Superiority. The onset of a new military-technical regime presents continued challenges not only in the realm of technological superiority but also in the way we organize, train, and employ our military forces. The Gulf War made clear the early promise of this new regime, emphasizing the importance of recent breakthroughs in low-observable, information, and other key technologies.

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continue to be at least a generation ahead.

PA+E

Comment: Add at end of paragraph: "Finally, while advanced technologies should be furthered and exploited, the absolute levels of capability to be fielded must take into account tradeoffs among capability, quantities, and costs. As demonstrated in the initiation of our new acquisition policy in the President's Budget, some of the most capable systems are now not needed in the absence of specific threats warranting their development." N.B. p.58 has more this tone.

Rationale: While some previous policy statements have endorsed advanced technology very broadly, the recent decision to terminate programs such as the Seawolf submarine and recast programs such as the RAH-66 Comanche shows that increased capability no longer can be justified for its own sake.

See also opening statement of this paragraph; i.e., "...without necessarily maintaining absolute superiority in all areas."

OUSD/A

- (U) Section II.E.1., Page 29, Para 3: Change paragraph to read: "Robust research and development is needed to maintain our qualitative advantage. New technologies must be integrated and evaluated in simulations and exercises and used to develop doctrine and tactics. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real technology demonstrations on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges; including competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to optimize our allocation of resources and reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field. We must create incentives for the defense industry to develop technologies that will improve our production processes, facilities and equipment. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines."

OUSD/A

- (U) Section II.E.1., Page 29, Para 3: The notion of "reducing the time to get technology from the lab into the field" is no longer a major goal of U.S. defense acquisition policy.

must have at least the same qualitative advantages over their opponents as our forces did in the Gulf War.

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Our investment in innovation must reach and be sustained at levels necessary to assure that U.S.-fielded forces dominate the military-technological revolution.

Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces through simulation before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges and competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must encourage defense industry to invest in new manufacturing processes, facilities, and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines.

To make certain the best technology is available

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4. Core Competencies. Core competencies are the leadership, doctrine, and skills needed to retain mastery of critical warfare capabilities. Examples include armored warfare, maritime and aerospace superiority, and forcible entry operations.

Identifying the key core military competencies of the future and retaining the lead in them will be among our highest priorities.

Future challenges may require different capabilities, perhaps replacing or possibly supplementing those core competencies that are critical to today's military requirements. A critical task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow's competencies, while gaining an appreciation of those we need no longer emphasize.

Maintaining and refining our core competencies is a responsibility that resides primarily within the Service organizations. But the Service leaders must search broadly for inputs and understanding; static approaches to warfare will not serve our longer-term interests. It is not enough to simply buy new equipment or develop new prototypes. Our understanding of warfare and the way we intend to defend our interests as a Nation must continually develop and evolve in the military-technical revolution that lies ahead.

## D. Goals and Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy

The core goals of the regional defense strategy are to protect American interests and to promote a more stable and democratic world. We want to preclude hostile, non-democratic powers from dominating regions of the world critical to us and thereby coming to pose a serious global challenge. Threats to our critical interests could arise with little notice in various parts of the world, including Europe, Asia, Southwest Asia and Latin America. To accomplish these goals, we must preserve U.S. leadership, maintain leading-edge military capabilities, and enhance collective security among democratic nations.

The regional defense strategy rests on four essential elements:

ASD/RA

(U) Add a new paragraph after the 3rd paragraph, bottom of page 6 to read:

The new strategy provides a basis for re-sizing active and Reserve forces within the objectives of the Total Force Policy. These basic objectives remain: 1) to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit; and 2) to integrate the capabilities and strengths of active and reserve forces in a cost-effective manner.

(U) Reason for change: Since the Department has made a strong case that overall reductions in active and reserve forces are based on requirements, it is important to reemphasize the Total Force Policy early-on in the Guidance. It is very important to describe how the Department's highly successful Total Force Policy--the effectiveness of which was clearly demonstrated in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM--relates to the new "Base Force" and the new military strategy. Also, this is consistent with the discussion of active and reserve roles in the Total Force at the bottom of page 32.

- Strategic Deterrence and Defense — a survivable strategic nuclear deterrent capability, and strategic defenses against limited strikes.

- Forward Presence -- forward deployed or stationed forces (albeit at reduced levels) to strengthen alliances, show our resolve, and dissuade challengers in regions critical to us.

- Crisis Response -- forces and mobility to respond quickly and decisively with a range of options to regional crises of concern to us.

- Reconstitution -- the capability to generate wholly new forces to hedge against future threats emerging.

## 1. Strategic Deterrence and Defense

Even though the threat of strategic attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, deterring nuclear attack will remain the highest defense priority of the Nation. It is one area where our survival could be at risk in a matter of moments. Strategic nuclear forces are still essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that will exist even under a modified START regime. Our strategic nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat. U.S. nuclear targeting policy and plans have changed, and will continue to change, to account for the welcome developments in states of the former Soviet Union.

Fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have all but eliminated the danger of large-scale war in Europe that could escalate to a strategic exchange. We have entered a new era in our thinking about nuclear forces. This was evidenced in the President's recent nuclear initiatives, which made major unilateral changes in our tactical nuclear posture and strategic nuclear deterrent forces.

If the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union agree to the President's bilateral proposals, both sides will make even more dramatic changes to their nuclear deterrent forces. For us these include earlier reductions to START levels; fewer ICBMs, with only one warhead apiece; and fewer warheads on our ballistic missile submarines. In addition, a substantial number of bombers would be oriented primarily toward conventional missions. In the end, the actual number of warheads would be roughly half of what we planned to have under START. The military departments should undertake measures now to prepare for this outcome. We must also examine more innovative ways of providing strategic deterrent forces. We must ensure the survivability of our strategic deterrent forces.

We must also find ways of ensuring that strategic forces are increasingly capable of conventional missions.

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The reform leaders of the newly independent states have clearly voiced their interest in reducing strategic forces inherited from the Soviet Union. They recognize we are not a threat and rightly view these forces as diverting scarce resources from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating the improvement of relations with the West. We hope to give the new Commonwealth leaders impetus to make substantial reductions in these strategic forces to a level consistent with the absence of any threat from the West.

We can foresee the possibility of a time when Russian nuclear weapons no longer pose a threat to the United States and its Allies, and we no longer need to hold at risk on a day to day basis what future Russian leaders hold dear. A transformation of Russia along these lines should clearly be our goal. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of

democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that they might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.

The threat posed by the global proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles has grown considerably and the threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch remains. The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves and our forward deployed forces but also to have the ability to extend protection to all nations that are part of the broader community of democratic values. Like "extended deterrence" provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of "extended protection" for friends and allies. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we are seeking to move beyond the ABM Treaty toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing liberal democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles.

Limited deployment of defenses will also be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses undermine the military utility of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles.

Collective defense allows countries to rely on the contributions of others for elements toward protecting their mutual interests in ways that lessen the risks and the costs for all. The nuclear umbrella that the U.S. has extended over our allies has defended the nuclear peace and lessened the risks of war without requiring our allies themselves to match the threat posed by the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. This has been a risk-reducing and cost-saving measure for us all; it is one we can

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See also p. 31, last line

afford fiscally to continue and one that our interests cannot afford to let lapse.

Strategic nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role with respect to countries other than the Soviet Union.

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Strategic forces will also continue to support our global role and international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO.

With the major reductions we have made and are prepared to make in our Base Force, it is critical that we ensure the effectiveness of our remaining systems. This entails completing procurement of 20 B-2 bombers -- a limited force for specialized missions, particularly in conventional operations--and continued upgrades to our B-1B fleet, to ensure safety of operations, to design effective countermeasures, and to increase its conventional capabilities. It entails extending the service life of our Minuteman III force and planning for future upgrades as it transitions to a single-warhead system. And it entails outfitting the last Trident submarines while planning how best to sustain the 18-boat force well into the next century. In addition to these important investments, we must adequately support the operation and training of these forces, the airmen and sailors who operate them, and a readiness posture which is appropriate to the reduced threat, but does not put our deterrent at risk in a tumultuous world.

2. Forward Presence

Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability,

promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the U.S. has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition.

We should plan to continue a wide range of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges and visits. Important too are host nation arrangements to provide the infrastructure and logistical support to allow for the forward deployment of forces when necessary. Our maritime and long-range aviation forces enable us to exert a presence in areas where we have no land-based forces. Special operations forces can help resolve conflict peacefully or deal effectively with selected low-intensity and terrorist threats. Presence forces also provide the mainstay of our counter-drug operations.

Our forward forces should increasingly be prepared to fulfill multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional ones, rather than being prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. Moreover, as in the Gulf war, our forward presence forces must be ready to provide support for military operations in other theaters.

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Reference: Page 12, end of 1st partial para.

Comment: Add following sentence:

"The timing of implementing reductions beyond those currently planned will need to be carefully considered and should be phased, taking into account future regional stability."

Rationale: Clarity.

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The changing security environment suggests significant adjustments to our forward presence in four critical regions discussed below.

The changes in Europe allow us to scale back our presence significantly to a smaller, but still militarily meaningful contribution to NATO's overall force levels. In this new environment, a substantial American presence in Europe will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe and possibly some states of the former Soviet Union seek to be integrated into a larger and evolving security architecture. It provides options for selected action should future American leaders decide it to be in our interest. Notably both our new friends in Eastern Europe and the leaders of the states of the former Soviet Union consider a continued U.S. presence in Europe and a strong NATO to be essential to overall European stability. American presence will also allay Western European concerns as those countries seek a new identity through integration and possibly the emergence of a common foreign and security policy.

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[redacted]

In East Asia and the Pacific, the peace we have helped to secure has facilitated long-term economic growth and [redacted]

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These contributions have allowed us to initiate a plan for carefully reducing our level of forces in the region, and to work successfully with our allies to increase their own role in providing for regional security and stability -- provided we avoid a disengagement or abrupt drawdown that would weaken that stability. We anticipate that more than 25,000 U.S. troops will be pulled out of bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. However, plans to remove additional forces from South Korea have been suspended while we address the problem posed by the North Korean nuclear program. U.S. forces have a unique role to play in this region. The changes in our defense posture in the Pacific will be far less extensive than in Europe, because the threat has changed much less here. The US does not intend to withdraw from Asia and will keep substantial air and naval forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future.

In the Persian Gulf region, we are striving with friends and allies to build a more stable security structure than the one that failed on August 2, 1990. We have major interests in that part of the world and, consistent with the wishes of our local friends, we must remain engaged to protect those interests. [redacted]

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We will face new difficulties maintaining a ground presence in Latin America. In accordance with the provisions of the Panama Canal treaty, we would retain no major bases in Latin America beyond the turn of the century. Despite the general trend toward democratization and peace in Latin America, dramatic reductions of former Soviet and East European aid to Cuba, drug cartels, and prospects for continuing instability in Haiti and elsewhere will continue to demand a forward role for our peacetime forces.

Precipitous reductions in forward presence may unsettle security relations. Planned reductions should be undertaken slowly and deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

3. Crisis Response

The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of the regional defense strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges and achieving decisive results once there has been a decision to commit U.S. forces.

Reference: Page 14, 1st partial para., lines 2-3. PA+E

PA+E

Comment: Insert "single" between "initially to any" and "regional contingency" and insert to ", to the extent possible," between "with combat and" and "most support forces".

Rationale: Clarity. Guidance later in the same paragraph and elsewhere indicates that a second, concurrent regional conflict would have to draw extensively upon Reserve Component personnel. Additionally, although the guidance is moderated, the instruction to increase the relative share of active component support for crisis response would demand a significant increase in resources for that purpose over the FY 1993 President's Budget. It is not clear in the draft DPG that such a goal has overriding priority. Given that the military departments' force structure is being mandated in DPG programming guidance and manpower capped at the same time, the shift of resources implied here may not even be feasible. Moreover, this passage seems to contradict the Total Force statement on p.32, directing that forces be kept in the component "in which they can maintain required readiness to effectively accomplish required missions at the least cost." A question that needs resolution is as follows: How should the military departments handle crisis response units that are far enough back in the deployment sequence that they could be maintained in the Reserve Components? A possible alternative approach is as follows:

"We must have the capability to respond initially to any single regional contingency with combat forces drawn wholly from the active component and support forces--active or reserve--that can meet the demanding timelines inherent in the planning scenarios."

Air Force (Staff)

AF-20. (S) Page 14, Para 1, Line 1. Delete remainder of paragraph following "over time. . ." and replace with: Initail response to a regional contingency will be with combat and support forces drawn from the active component, and a limited number of combat, support, and mobility assets from Reserve forces. Reserve forces will be responsible for augmentation of active combat forces and for providing combat forces in especially large or protracted ontingencies. Mobilizing Reserve combat forces will provide the force expansion needed to enhance the US capability to respond to another sizeable regional or local contingency.



Jt. Staff

See 2-MRC reference. top of p. 51

(S) Our response to regional crises must be decisive, requiring the quality personnel and technological edge organized to win quickly and with minimum casualties. In regional conflicts our stake will be less immediate than we faced against a Soviet threat, and political and strategic considerations will require a decisive outcome, which in certain instances will mean the overwhelming use of force. When we choose to act, we must be capable of acting quickly and with the appropriate level of force. We must be confident of the outcome before an operation begins. We must be prepared to make regional aggressors fight on our terms. This requires maintaining a broad range of capabilities and a continuing emphasis on technological superiority and doctrinal innovation.

(S) The short notice that may characterize many regional crises require highly responsive military forces. Most combat and most support forces for the initial response to such contingencies will be drawn from the Active Component, with exceptions to include notably support and mobility assets. Reserve Component forces will be responsible primarily for supporting and sustaining active combat forces and for providing combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve Component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the U.S. capability to respond to another contingency.

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There are an array of other potential challenges to peace that require our forces to respond, including the challenge of halting the drug trafficking that fuels instability abroad and drains our own domestic vitality. We must continue humanitarian assistance efforts, and security assistance to aid positive developments abroad. We cannot ignore the reality of terrorist organizations targeting American citizens and interests around the globe. We have to anticipate instability and resulting threats to American citizens. We need the capability to respond quickly anywhere in the world to rescue American citizens endangered by political instability. The threat of regional challengers introducing nuclear weapons could greatly further complicate future regional crises. U.S. nuclear forces may have to play a role to help deter third party use of weapons of mass destruction.

(U) Finally, the Gulf War provides a host of lessons that should guide future crisis response planning. Our crisis response forces must incorporate the relevant lessons of the Gulf War as identified in the Conduct of the War Study and other subsequent reports. Our understanding of the war and its implications for forces will continue to evolve for some time to come.

4. Reconstitution (U)

(S) With the demise of the Cold War global threat, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now very distant--so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision. The new strategy therefore prudently accepts risk in this lower probability area of threat, in order to refocus resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the long-term foundations of our strategic posture.

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~~(S,NF)~~ Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new antagonistic single threat or some emergent alliance of hostile regional hegemons. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy must refocus on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of any potentially

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hostile entity that could pursue regional or global domination in competition with the U.S. and our allies.

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E. Regional Goals and Challenges (U)

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(U) Overall, we face a significantly more benign environment, with greater prospect that our vital interests will not get entangled in local conflicts. There are many reasons for this. The USSR is no longer fueling conflicts, either through the provision of either an alternative world view, or, more concretely, money and arms, and similarly the support of Cuba and Vietnam to foreign insurgencies largely has dried up. Thus local conflicts are less likely to originate or persist, and even if they do, they are less likely to engage the interests of the United States, because their outcome is less likely to affect the larger regional balance. The potential for local conflicts is increased overall probably only in the territories of the former Soviet Union itself. The demise of the Soviet Union has resulted in increasingly desperate conditions for former Soviet client states, which may lead to dramatic, unexpected shifts in their policy. However, these states will no longer be able to count on the possibility of support from their former Soviet allies, and

ASD/RA

(U) Recommend the following information be inserted as a separate category immediately prior to Section II A 4, page 5.

**4. Counterdrug Activities (U)**

(U) The Department has a crucial role in defending the United States from the scourge of illegal drugs. In order to accomplish that, the Department will employ the resources at its command to accomplish that mission effectively. Further, the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs continues to be a high-priority national security mission. The plans and programs of the Department constitute an important and integral part of the President's multi-national and multi-agency approach to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and fulfills a key and essential role in our nation's fight against illegal drugs. The Department's strategy is a multi-pronged approach supporting the accomplishment of the national objectives. It depends upon action at every phase of the flow: in the countries that are the sources of drugs, in transit from the source countries to the United States, and in the distribution and use within the United States. The Department will work to advance substantially the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States through the effective application of available resources consistent with our national values and legal framework. This is a long-term commitment and will remain a high-priority objective within the Department for future planning and programming.

therefore no longer have the capability to precipitate crises that could turn into global conflict.

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1. Europe (U)

(U) We confront a Europe in the midst of historic transformation, no longer starkly divided into East and West. We are hopeful but not yet certain of achieving a Europe "whole and free."

We must strive to aid the efforts in the former Eastern bloc to build free societies. Over the long term, the most effective guarantee that the Soviet Union's successor state does not threaten U.S. and Western interests is successful democratization and economic reform. In doing this, we must recognize what we are so often told by the leaders of these new democracies -- that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an essential part of the West's overall efforts to maintain stability even in the midst of

such dramatic change. NATO remains the essential means by which the U.S. remains involved in Europe's security future.

(S) The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold War into a relationship characterized by significantly greater cooperation. It already has reduced significantly our defense requirements. The U.S. has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation and peaceful relations between Russia, Ukraine and other republics of the former Soviet Union. A democratic partnership with Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics would be the best possible outcome.

(U) If democracy matures in Russia there is every possibility that it will be a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other critical regions where previously Soviet policy aggravated local conditions and encouraged unrest and conflict. A democratic Russia will have more in common with us in the pursuit of peace and democratic order than in conflict. It may even open the door to future military cooperation. Our military-to-military contacts with Russia, Ukraine and the other republics should help in fostering democratic philosophies of civil-military relations, transparency, and defensive military doctrines and postures.

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OUSD/A

- (U) Section II.C.1., Page 17, Para 3, Line 5: Add the words "chemical and biological" after "nuclear".

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(S) For the immediate future, key U.S. concerns will be the progress in Russia and the other republics toward demilitarizing their societies, converting their military industries to civilian production, eliminating or, in the case of Russia, radically reducing their nuclear weapons inventory, maintaining firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and preventing leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries. Military budget cuts in Russia and other republics will significantly improve the chances of democratic consolidation by reducing the influence of forces and institutions with vested interests in aggressive policies abroad and authoritarianism at home, and freeing up resources for more productive investments and thus improving the chance of economic success.

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AF-2. (S) Page 3 , Para 1 , Line 15. General Comment: Text uses terms "East, Central, and Western Europe" here and through following passages. Definition of East & Central Europe is unclear and should be made explicit to avoid confusion here and in other passages.

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(S) The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have eliminated the large-scale military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in Russia is creating a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe. However, the U.S. must keep in mind the long history of conflict in Eastern Europe, as well as the potential for conflict between the states of Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union.

(S) The emergence of democratic, increasingly Western-oriented states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. The liberation of Eastern Europe significantly reduces our most urgent defense requirements in this region. It is, therefore, critical to U.S. interests in Europe that we assist the new democracies in East/Central Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions and national independence.

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**2. East Asia/Pacific (U)**

(S) East Asia, long an area of great interest to the U.S., is growing in its strategic and economic importance to us. It has as much potential to seriously engage U.S. security interests as any in the world. We have a long history of involvement in the region because of key economic, commercial and political interests. Fundamentally, East Asia is of vital importance because its economic resources, if controlled by a hostile power, could generate a global challenge, and because it is an area of potential competition among great powers. Japan and Korea alone represent almost 12 percent of the world economy. In addition, East Asia remains an area of enormous concentration of military power, actual and latent, including some of the largest armies in the world: those of China, India, the two Koreas, and Vietnam, as well as deployed U.S. and Russian forces.

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does the missing p. 43 address PRC?

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should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking.

3. Middle East and Southwest Asia (U)

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We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate

standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

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(S) The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons, slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

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(S) The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of international terrorism in the Middle East and Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.

4. Latin America and the Caribbean (U)

ISA/IA (replace with):

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the US seeks a stable security environment. The focus of US security policy is strengthening and preserving fledgling democracies, supporting economic development as a foundation of national and regional security via the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, by sustaining the capability of nations to resolve narcotrafficking and internal security issues, and by preventing the spread of ballistic missile technology by encouraging nations to observe the Missile Technology Control Regime for exports, and by preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons into the hemisphere by encouraging full adherence to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

(N.B.: highlights of Sec Def trip)

ASD/RA - Replace paragraph with:

(U) A major component of the National Drug Control Strategy is to work with the host source country governments to disrupt and destroy the growing, processing and transportation of coca and coca products and their associated precursor chemicals, with the long-term goal of effecting a major reduction in the supply of cocaine from these countries to the United States. Pursuant to the National Drug Control Strategy, near-term efforts of the Department of Defense will focus primarily on the Andean nations from which most cocaine entering the United States originates. Effective implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy requires that the Department of Defense provide counterdrug operational support to the forces of cooperating countries. This support and assistance can be provided in the form of training; reconnaissance; command and control systems and equipment; intelligence; planning, logistics, and medical support; and civic action. In addition to this support of the foreign forces, the U.S. military will undertake ship and aircraft counterdrug detection and monitoring activities and authorized intelligence sharing in concert with cooperating nations. As pressure is brought to bear on the cartels that operate within these countries, drug production, processing, and trafficking are likely to continue expanding to other countries in the region.

(U) As a second line of defense against the transit of illegal drugs, the U.S. Armed Forces' support for interdiction efforts focuses on detection and monitoring, and the eventual interception by law enforcement agencies, of drug smugglers and their shipments, so that their trafficking operations can be consistently disrupted. Air interdiction efforts center principally on small, privately owned aircraft. The main goal of air interdiction is to deter general aviation aircraft pilots from transporting illicit drugs towards or into the United States. The detection and monitoring of airborne smugglers will be accomplished primarily by both airborne and surface based radars. In order to deny drug smugglers the use of transfer points and to prevent the undetected aerial penetration of U.S. borders and coasts, the radar system and associated communications system must be integrated and capable of rapid target acquisition, correlation, and information transfer. The primary air smuggling routes to the United States from the source and transshipment countries are over the Caribbean Sea, over the Gulf of Mexico, over the Central American isthmus and Mexico, as well as over the adjacent Eastern Pacific. The maritime interdiction remains focused on deterring drug smugglers, denying seaborne smuggling routes, and assisting law enforcement agencies in detecting and seizing drug-smuggling vessels and arresting their crews. Most drugs that are smuggled by sea to the United States pass through the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, or the Pacific Ocean.

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. seeks a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering the development of democratic institutions. In addition, the U.S. must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

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(S) The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we seek the successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we seek to foster stability. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

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Reference: Pages 23-24 (Latin America and the Caribbean).

PA+E Comment: Recommend rewording last paragraph on page 24 as follows:

1) Move third sentence (on Peru) to become last sentence of first full paragraph on page 24.

2) Substitute language below for last paragraph page 24.

"Countering drug trafficking remains a major problem in this region. As the lead agency of the U.S. government for detection and monitoring, DoD's activities in Latin America must be geared toward attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and in transit to the United States. In support of the National Drug Control Strategy, the Department of Defense will focus its counterdrug activities on the Andean nations which are the initial source of cocaine entering the United States. The Department's counterdrug activities will provide support to cooperating countries as well as to U.S. law enforcement agencies engaged in interdiction activities."

Rationale: (1) While many of Peru's problems may stem from the drug trade, the objective of stabilizing the government fits better in the earlier paragraph, furthermore the National Drug Strategy focuses on the entire Andean Ridge, not just Peru.

(2) Completeness.

PA+E (general)

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SecAF (general)

(U) Overall, my impression is that our fiscal guidance probably cannot be stretched to cover all that the programming and force structure guidance requires us to do.

(U) Countering drug trafficking remains a high priority. Our programs will focus on attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the U.S. In particular, we should assist Peru in its efforts to overcome a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency. Our programs must provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to the U.S., and for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.

5. Sub-Saharan Africa (U)



## III. Programming for the Base Force (U)

### A. Introduction (U)

1. (U) Guidance. Formulation of the FY 1994-99 Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) will use the guidance of the Secretary of Defense on policy and strategy in the preceding sections and on programs in this section, and in the Illustrative Planning Scenario annex, and the Fiscal Guidance published on 14 February 1992.

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2. (S) Overall Program Priorities. We will profoundly reduce our defense establishment, yet think beyond mere equal across the board cuts to restructure our forces and programs to support our regionally oriented defense strategy for shaping the future environment. Under current plans, force structure reaches minimum acceptable "base force" levels (for strategic deterrence, crisis response forces, and forward presence levels alike) by around FY 1995 for most of the force, so retaining adequate levels of force structure is a strategic imperative. Programming and managing this base force at levels of readiness (training, manning, equipping and maintenance) adequate for deterrence and timely regional crisis response is similarly imperative. Sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of regional crisis response operations is also of great importance. We must give high priority to selected research and development to keep our qualitiative edge in systems and in doctrine. However, a profound slowing in the former Soviet modernization that long drove our programs enables greatly reduced emphasis on production; hence our new approach to defense acquisition. Finally, we will vigorously pursue reductions and management efficiencies in defense infrastructure and overhead to reduce the Department's cost of doing business.

## B. Strategic Nuclear Deterrence and Defense (U)

1. (S) Nuclear Deterrent Forces. Program for base force levels as follows, pursuant to the President's Nuclear Initiatives of September 1991 and January 1992. This force would provide sufficient capability to support US deterrent strategy, assuming CIS forces are reduced to START levels, the strategic environment continues to improve, and our modernization goals are attained. With partial downloading of the Minuteman ICBMs, this force will conform with the START treaty.

vice "Offensive Forces" per [illegible] May 92 comment

Dir. SBIO

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2. (S) Defenses. Within a refocussed SDI program, develop for deployment defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.

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[redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

(S) Ensure that strategic and theater defense systems, as well as offensive and defensive systems, are integrated.

SDI program moved to modernization; no force structure in it.

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C. Conventional Forces for Forward Presence and Crisis Response (U)

~~(S)~~ Program for overall base force levels as follows while meeting readiness and sustainability guidance and remaining compliant with arms control agreements.

~~(C/NF)~~ Program forward presence forces to retain the flexibility to adapt rapidly to changes within regions, and to provide joint support and reinforcement among regions. CJCS commission a study in consultation with USD(P) to review forward presence policy and guidance, to be completed by 1 Nov 92.

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1. Army. Within total end strength of 536,000 AC, 550,800 RC:

- ~~(S)~~ Program for 12 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre divisions; sufficient AC combat support and combat service support forces

ARMY

AR-4 (S) CRITICAL Page 33. para 1. Army. Change as follows:

"Commit to ~~Retain in~~ Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with CS capability and a base for reception and onward movement."

Rationale. Presents a more realistic and flexible way of meeting NATO commitments.

USMC:

k. (S) The programming for 2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift has previously been accepted because it is a credible measure of the footprint required to execute forcible entry. The requirement is to provide credible forward presence, not simply a lift profile. Preliminary analysis shows the number of ships required to meet the lift footprint does not equate to the number needed to meet optempo/forward presence requirements. A J-3 brief dated 1 Aug 91 identified 52 amphibious ships as the current requirement for forward presence averaging. The current SCN profile does not meet this criteria. Therefore, revise the text on page 33, Section III, discussion of amphibious shipping requirements to read:

Program for 2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift tailored to support the National Military Strategy and current operational and optempo guidance)

N.B.: Base Force says "2.5 MEBs"; previous paragraph says need exceed OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. →

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for a fully deployed corps (3 divisions) for 30 days, and sufficient support forces (AC and RC) for two concurrent major regional contingencies that develop sequentially.

-- (S) Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with combat support capability and a base for reception and onward movement.

-- (S) Retain one heavy division (-) in Korea, including associated support.

2. Navy/Marine Corps. Within total end strength of 501,000 AC, 118,200 RC (Navy) and 159,000 AC, 34,900 RC (Marine Corps):

- (S) Program for 12 carrier battle groups based on a force of 12 aircraft carriers (plus one training carrier) and 13 airwings (11 AC/2 RC). Program for about 150 major surface combatants.

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- (C) Program for 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces. Program for amphibious lift for 2.5 MEBs.

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3. Air Force. Within total end strength of 430,000 AC, 200,500 RC:

- (C) Program for 26.5 FWEs (15.25 AC/11.25 RC, including recce/SEAD).

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4. Special Operations Forces.

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D. Mobility and Prepositioning (U)

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(U) Implement the Secretary of Defense-approved mobility and prepositioning recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study as follows.

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2. (S/NF) Sealift (Navy). Acquire through new construction or conversion in U.S. shipyards additional large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships with a capacity of 3 million square feet of cargo space (which, plus the current SL-7 fast sealift ships, will provide the capability to surge 2 heavy divisions from CONUS).

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Support implementation of the Merchant Mariner Reserve program to provide for availability of manning.

3. Prepositioning.

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Air Force

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- ~~(S/NF)~~ Navy/Marine Corps: acquire through new construction or conversion in US shipyards additional ships for afloat prepositioning providing at least 2 million square feet of capacity for Army combat equipment (at least a heavy brigade equivalent) and support. Support the current 3 Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons.

4. (U) CONUS Infrastructure (Army). Program CONUS infrastructure improvements per the approved Mobility Requirements Study recommendations, including a West Coast containerized ammunition facility and capabilities to move units "from fort to port."

**E. Readiness (U)**

~~(S)~~ Forward Presence and Crisis Response generally require high levels of readiness for most forces, given short warning times for regional threats; but readiness must be higher for certain missions and forces than for others, as reflected below. Readiness programming will reflect the "first to fight" principle. Specifically, priority for resources to maintain manning, training and equipment readiness will be accorded to units, regardless of component, according to each unit's peacetime deployment roles and the most demanding of its deployment or employment time(s) for the regional conflicts depicted in the Illustrative Planning Scenarios at Annex A.

1. ~~(S)~~ Readiness Levels. Program resources necessary to maintain unit readiness levels as follows:

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- Other RC combat forces, and their associated support forces, will maintain readiness levels commensurate with their contingency missions.

2. (U) Personnel Quality. Structure and resource robust recruitment, retention and quality of life programs at levels expected to maintain roughly current high levels for the major aggregate personnel quality indicators across the force. Provide adequate resources for military institutions of higher education.

3. (C) Training. Place increased emphasis on joint and combined exercises that stress interoperability, joint warfighting

doctrine, and rapid deployment (including use of prepositioned materiel). Provide programs of realistic instrument-evaluated joint training such as "Red Flag" and the National Training Center. Increase emphasis on use of simulators in training to most efficiently provide a well-trained force. Maintain requisite proficiencies for selected forces necessary to deliver limited theater nuclear strikes, and for forces that could have to operate in a nuclear/biological/chemical environment.

4. (U) Maintenance. Do not permit Intermediate and Depot maintenance unfunded requirements (as adjusted for programmed force reductions) to exceed levels in the FY 93-97 defense program. Retain sufficient core maintenance infrastructure to sustain future programmed forces after initial deployment.

**F. Sustainability (U)**

1. War Reserve Inventories.

(C) For the near term, particularly in light of the need to restore our sustainability posture following Operation Desert Shield/Storm, war reserve material objectives are to (1) repair critical assets that would be needed for a near-term contingency, (2) reposition returned assets to maxmize contingency responsiveness at minimal cost, and (3) procure only those assets demonstrably required in addition to existing assets to meet sustainability requirements below.

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Svcs may be able to do more than GF

Reworded for clarity + appropriateness

2. Industrial Surge

(S) Program for industrial preparedness measures to permit surge production of munitions, critical troop support items and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to full war reserve

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inventories for a portion of the above guidance. Program for support and spares surge and mobilization requirements for each major defense acquisition program achieving Milestone III during the program period.

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G. Modernization and Investment (U)

1. New Approach to Defense Acquisition.

a. (S) Threat/Requirements. The end of the Soviet threat and the expected pronounced slowdown or even halt in Russian modernization programs profoundly alter US modernization requirements. For our new strategy, investment requirements must reflect the different nature and sophistication of regional threats, and resulting changes in priority among defense missions and means of executing them, as well as the enduring strategic requirement for technological superiority.

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The USD(P) description of "new" Acquisition Strategy in the Modernization and Investment Section is seriously at odds with that of the official representation for defining and executing the strategy. In particular, the draft DPG allegation that the acquisition process "must be fundamentally altered" is incorrect. Additionally, the DPG notion that a high-low mix of systems should be an explicit planning goal has no basis in current acquisition policy or procedures. What the Department is doing is building on its currently sound acquisition process to increase the emphasis on the early stages of the process including additional technology demonstrations. We have rewritten this section (Attachment 1) which we call "A Shift in Acquisition Emphasis" and recommend that it replace your section.

1. "A Shift in Acquisition Emphasis (U) UNCLASSIFIED

(U) In response to the dramatic changes in the national security environment, the Department is embarking on a major shift in emphasis in the way it develops and produces weapons systems within the existing defense acquisition system.

(U) The disintegration of the Soviet Union has reduced both the size and the rate of technical improvement of the military threat to U.S. interests, making the need to produce advanced weapon systems less urgent. DoD can afford to take more time in developing and evaluating new technologies before making decisions on weapons production. Regional instabilities now pose the most significant threat to U.S. interests and largely determine future equipment inventory requirements. While the Gulf War increased concerns about the ability of regional powers to acquire and employ some advanced weapons, the broad advances of hostile weapons technology previously driven by Soviet military R&D investments is radically slowing. With proper investment in our own research and development efforts, the Department can preserve the U.S. technological capability to counter the full range of likely threats to U.S. interests.

(U) While DoD will put fewer new advanced weapon systems into production in the future, the aggressive pursuit of new technologies will still be essential to maintaining the advantages U.S. armed forces need to prevail in future conflicts. A new weapons program will move to production only after DoD has verified the need for and cost-effectiveness of producing the system and after technical, manufacturing, and operational risks have been reduced to acceptable levels. In addition, DoD will emphasize upgrades of existing weapon systems using proven technologies whenever operational needs can be met in this manner. The principal objective of the defense acquisition system remains, ensuring that we have the best-equipped armed force in the world. The important difference is that the new security environment lessens the urgency to rush systems into production.

(U) The management keys to meeting this new environment will be: (1) disciplining the weapon systems development process so that first rate options are constantly available to force planners in the form of both upgrades and potential new starts; and (2) a vigorous science and technology (S&T) program that emphasizes ongoing experiments and technology demonstrations in accordance with a comprehensive S&T strategy that is tied to projected user requirements; and, (3) a disciplined mechanism for overseeing the interface between technology base efforts and the systems development process. DoD will adapt its fundamentally sound acquisition process to maintain a technically and operationally superior defense capability, while keeping the overall defense program flexible and affordable. DoD will fund the demonstration of a broad and robust range of technology options in a way that will be less costly than full engineering and manufacturing development. DoD will remain alert, through this dynamic science and technology effort, to the emergence of "leap-ahead" technologies. At the same time, oversight overhead is being reduced to the greatest extent possible.

(U) The revised defense acquisition approach will incorporate a range of different technology-level efforts, including experiments and basic research, advanced technology demonstrations, and advanced technology transition demonstrators. These efforts shall support subsequent technology insertions through systems upgrades as well as serve as hedges against the need to respond to currently unforeseen challenges to U.S. national security. Moreover, when a valid operational need results in a DoD commitment to pursue a systems acquisition program (i.e., demonstration/validation and full development/production), system and subsystem prototyping shall be an integral component of the acquisition strategy."

(U) Recommend the following changes to Section II B 3, Crisis Response, pp 13-14: (Bold sections added.)

ASD|RA

~~(C)~~ The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of ~~our~~ the regional defense strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. One trait most share, however, is that they have the potential to develop on very short notice. These conditions require highly responsive military forces available with little or no notice, ~~a role best suited to the active component.~~ Over time, we must have the capability to respond initially to any regional contingency.

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64

inserted insert

From NSSR 8/91 FYI:

Over time we will move to a Total Force that permits us to respond initially to any regional contingency with units — combat and support — drawn wholly from the active component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Since many support functions can be more economically maintained in the reserve component, we will still rely on reserve support units in any extended confrontation. The primary focus of reserve combat units will be to supplement active units in any especially large or protracted deployment. To hedge against a future need for expanded forces to deal with a renewed global confrontation, which — though possible — is less likely and clearly less immediate than previously calculated, some reserve combat units will be retained in cadre status.

This approach will allow us to maintain a Total Force appropriate for the strategic and fiscal demands of a new era: a smaller, more self-contained and very ready active force able to respond quickly to emerging threats; and a reduced but still essential reserve component with emphasis on supporting and sustaining active combat forces, and — in particularly large or prolonged regional contingencies — providing latent combat capability that can be made ready when needed.

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b. (U) R&D Emphases. Aggressively pursue advanced technologies for application in future weapon systems, to preserve our science and technology base and our forces' technological advantage, and to reduce system life cycle costs and lengthen service lives. Increase development and evaluation of prototypes and technology demonstrators, to demonstrate and validate advanced technologies and, where warranted, producibility, operational performance and associated doctrine. Incorporate advanced technology into existing or new systems only when the technology and subsystems are thoroughly proven; technical, production and operational risks are minimized; the production program is cost-effective; and the system is absolutely needed. Greatly reduce concurrency among the acquisition stages. Emphasize government-supported R&D as necessary to support our technology base. More effectively and efficiently evaluate systems and subsystems using such tools as modeling and simulation to augment system field testing.

removed at DDR&E language for T&E "thrust"

c.

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ASD/SO/LIC

4. p. 39, 2a., 2nd para. Add new entry. "- long-range, high-speed, infiltration/exfiltration capability." Rejected

RATIONALE: This unsatisfied requirement remains the top priority on USCINCSOC's Integrated Priority List. Due to the V-22 cancellation, an alternative solution must be developed to provide an essential capability for counterterrorism, special operations, and contingency response.

PA+E

Reference: Page 39, section 2.a., second paragraph.

Comment: [Deletions are indicated by strike outs and additions by italics.]

"...the following specific thrusts which contribute directly to high priority defense needs:

...

- All weather air superiority and defense against very low observable cruise missiles, *and* ballistic missiles ~~and aircraft~~. Done

- ~~Sea control and undersea superiority against open ocean, coastal and regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and~~ *Shallow water ASW against* non-nuclear submarines ~~and stealthy cruise missiles, and by undersea mine warfare.~~ Instead dropped "open ocean, coastal"

- *Rapid and high confidence neutralization of undersea mine threats, both shallow and deep water.* Not done, included in orig mod...

- Global surveillance and communications, focused on a theater of operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets.
- All-weather day/night precision strike against 21 century critical mobile and fixed targets.
- Air superiority and all-weather defense against very low observable cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and aircraft.
- Sea control and undersea superiority against open ocean, coastal and regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and by undersea mine warfare.
- All-weather, day/night, survivable, mobile, and lethal ground combat capability.
- Technology for Training and Readiness, including embedded training, distributed simulation, and virtual environment depiction.
- Application of advanced technology for improving design, test and manufacturing processes to improve performance and reduce life cycle cost and schedule thruput time.

2. Defense-Wide Investment Programs.

a. (U) Science and Technology:

(U) Fund the science and technology program (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a, exclusive of SDI funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1993 President's Budget. In devising the S&T program, take into account the potential European and Japanese contributions.

Preserve increases made in FY93 budget per new acquisition approach per overall tab

~~(S)~~ Balance the S&T program between (1) a core of broad sustaining programs, and (2) the following specific thrusts which contribute directly to high priority defense needs:

- Global warning, navigation, surveillance and communications, focused on a theater of operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets.
- [redacted]
- All-weather air superiority and defense against very low observable cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
- Sea control and undersea superiority against potential regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and stealthy cruise missiles, and by undersea mine warfare.
- Rapidly deployable, all-weather, day/night, survivable, mobile and lethal ground combat capability.
- Technology for Training and Readiness, including embedded training, distributed simulation and virtual environment depiction.
- Application of advanced technology for improving design, test and manufacturing processes to improve performance and reduce life cycle cost and schedule throughput time.

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OUSD/A - (kept portions not lined out)

"(U) Test and Evaluation: In the FY 94-99 program: OUSD/A

~~1) (U) Invest in T&E resources to:~~

- Fund test capability investment needs ~~(6.5 and related 6.4 and 7.8 funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1992 President's Budget.~~
- Reduce operating and maintenance costs for new T&E capabilities by ~~15%~~ when compared to similar existing facilities.
- Optimize investment strategy to support high priority defense S&T ~~and T&E threats.~~
- Enhance susceptibility, vulnerability, and lethality assessment programs for combat systems and munitions.

~~2) (U) Manage T&E processes to:~~

- ~~Harmonize weapon system requirements documents, the COEA, and test documents.~~
- Evaluate more effectively through the use of modeling and simulation to augment system field testing.
- ~~Develop early evaluation plans with emphasis on result-driven decisions, measurable operational and technical issues, explicit definition of the operational environment, and operational suitability.~~"

picked up @ p.59

b. (U) Manufacturing Technology Program. Program not less than zero percent real growth per year from a baseline predicated upon the FY 1992 funding level. ManTech technical priorities should be based upon thrust areas identified in the National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan.

c. (U) Test & Evaluation Assets: In the FY 94-99 program:

- Fund test capability investment needs and optimize investment strategy to support R&D emphases, including the high priority defense S&T thrusts, identified above, recognizing the increasing complexity of weapons systems to be tested.
- Reduce operating and maintenance costs for new T&E capabilities significantly when compared to similar existing facilities. Reduce or eliminate duplication or overlap in test capabilities and efforts.
- Enhance susceptibility, vulnerability and lethality assessment programs for combat systems and munitions.

Remove paragraph; retains some RDT&E language

d.

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e. (U) Facilities and Infrastructure. Installations not required to support the reduced force levels will be closed in accordance

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"Installations not required to support reduced force levels, training, and reconstitution will not be retained. Facilities will be resourced according to Service priorities. We must not make resourcing decisions in anticipation of future BRAC closures. Fund investment for environmental stewardship to attain and sustain full compliance with federal and state environmental laws. ~~Accordingly, plan to resource new facility investment and backlog reduction only at those...guidance above.~~

Rationale. Expands list of factors to consider when closing bases. It also removes language that contradicts Congressional language that precludes reducing resources for installations in anticipation of BRAC closing. P+L + BC Staffs interpret otherwise (so do I) -RF

NAVY

(U) Page 40, Section III.C.2.d., delete direction referring to core and non-core installations.

Reason: Making a list of core and non-core bases is contrary to the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

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AF-47. (U) Page 40, Para 2, Line 2. Delete sentence which reads: "Accordingly, plan to resource new facility. . .and environmental conditions."

RATIONALE: As written, could be viewed as potentially prejudging the base closure process, which is illegal.

with Title XXIX of PL 101-510. Accordingly, plan to resource facility investment only at those "core" installations which have a very high probability of retention, as documented by the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment process. Confine facility investment at non-core installations to that required to address life/safety and environmental conditions. Fund environmental compliance, restoration and pollution prevention sufficient to achieve sustainable compliance with federal and state environmental laws and governing standards overseas; and to minimize negative mission impacts and future costs and to provide federal leadership in environmental protection. To maintain access to space and enable spaced-based support to terrestrial forces, provide necessary space launch capabilities and infrastructure.

reword per PA&E & GC consultation

3. Force Modernization Programs

(U) Fully fund all acquisition programs continued or initiated in the POMs, in accordance with the baseline approved by the DAB. In particular, fully reflect any agreements between the Defense Acquisition Executive and a Military Department Secretary that resulted from the Under Secretary for Acquisition's and the Deputy Secretary's affordability initiative.

a. Strategic Deterrence and Defense

(S) Program resources to maintain the adequacy of strategic deterrent forces consistent with postulated threats and arms control constraints, and to develop the capability to defend against accidental launches and third world ballistic missile threats. Also program for expected implementation costs of arms control agreements and initiatives.

(1) Nuclear Deterrent Forces.

vice "offensive forces" per J-5 Staff, Navy, & OSD comment

(S) Bombers: Ensure the viability of the B-1B as a key component of our future bomber force. [redacted]

DSDIC
- language
per Libby
mention.

moved
AOI language
here from
Forces section

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b. Conventional Forces.

(1) (S) Priority Mission Areas. Selectively focus investment on and within the following high-priority areas, which derive from assessment of programmed regional contingency capabilities (including evaluation of Persian Gulf War experience):

- Deployable anti-armor: air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility

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- Combat Identification Friend or Foe (IFF): enhanced capability to identify friend, foe, allied and neutral ground combat vehicles, aircraft and ships, particularly in support of air/land battle doctrine, with joint exercises to refine interoperability procedures.

- Mine Warfare: improved naval and land mine clearance ability (including rapid minefield location and improved killing mechanisms, including against scatterable mines), with emphasis on support of amphibious operations, particularly in shallow water and beach areas; also, assault obstacle-breaching

capabilities, and advanced force-multiplying offensive land and naval mine capabilities.

- Chemical/biological: improved chemical and biological detection and warning systems (ground vehicles and air recon), protection systems (individual and collective) and medical support and decontamination systems; and consideration of CB effects in development of equipment that may be used in a CB environment; also necessary are implementation of expected CW agreements and destruction of chemical munitions.

- Anti-tactical ballistic missile: improved timely intelligence and operational capabilities to track, identify, target and strike mobile ballistic missiles/launchers. (See also the related guidance in the strategic sections.)

- Precision Air Strike: improved all-service joint air operations planning systems and procedures, including timely selective target assignment; increased ability, particularly munitions stocks, for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft to use precision guided munitions against ground targets, during day or night and in all weather;

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- Tactical C3I: improved integration of national, theater and tactical intelligence and C3 systems; better and more survivable all-weather day/night reconnaissance and target identification capabilities (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles); improved sensor-to-shooter integration and near-real-time weapon targeting; forward deployable C3I assets minimizing lift requirements; modernized secure, interoperable and jam-resistant tactical communications (including for SOF); improved C2/management of combat service support operations.

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## B. Reconstitution Capability (U)

1. General Principles.

(C) Reconstitution should be an "economy of resources" area of the defense program; higher priority should go to base force capabilities and to preserving our enduring strategic requirements of alliances, technology, quality personnel and core competencies. Programs for the base force will also provide considerable latent reconstitution potential. Still, modest but high-leverage reconstitution-specific investments can provide a valuable low-cost hedge, particularly as our Cold War investments become opportunities for selective "smart lay-away" of long-lead elements of forces or production capability.

(U) Active and reserve units would take part in deterring or responding to any threat that might require reconstitution. Such

J-8 (not in Jt Staff official pkg.)

44. (U) Page 43, paras 2 & 3. Recommend "reconstitution" be substituted for the word "regeneration."

REASON: Regeneration is currently defined as the capability to generate additional military power within the base force and differs from reconstitution in that it does not involve the creation of new units.

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units (particularly the RC) would require "generation" to reach combat readiness; additional new forces beyond these could be reconstituted from the following types of assets:

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c. (C) Manpower Assets. From the outset of any reconstitution effort, plan to use reassigned active component personnel and Ready Reserve training or volunteers, and place maximum reliance on increased recruiting and retention (including civil service support, and retention of personnel in recallable statuses). Plan

precision
clarity

"Update projections of IRR....guidance below, plan program for measures to increase the size of the IRR."

Rationale. The word "program" implies direction to commit funding to an initiative which still requires additional analysis.

for maximum recall and use of retired military personnel for reconstitution. Plan for necesary use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Use annual IRR screening and training authority to ensure members' availability. Update projections of IRR size and of requirements for IRR members to fill AC, SelRes, and cadre-type units and, if necessary to support reconstitution guidance below, program for measures to support an enlarged IRR. Maintain plans for use of conscription to meet an extreme and imminent threat.

2. ~~(S)~~ Force Reconstitution Programs. Reconstitution choices must reflect both "smart lay-away" opportunities and long-term reconstitution needs, and must reflect the relative likelihood of various reconstitution threats, focussed on long-term threats that may not now be precisely definable. "Regeneration" assets offer relatively short response times and availability in the immediate future, yet would also be useful for projected long-response reconstitution requirements at generally low cost. Production restart capability likely could prove a timely and longer-term reconstitution approach given expected warning times, and could offer enhanced capabilities, but likely at greater investment costs. Reconstitution investment must reflect these tradeoffs.

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a. (S) Land Forces: [redacted]
using the most cost-effective combination of:

- The 2 reserve component heavy cadre divisions, each with mission essential equipment for training and minimal SelRes O&M and manning (including minimal necessary full-time support);

- Equipment exiting active or reserve units and placed in long-term storage; and/or

- Industrial restart, surge and/or new production capability including, if appropriate, lay-away of production facilities and perhaps component stockpiling or other industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for M1A1).

Include in the POM a study/evaluation of, and as warranted resources for, the ability for reconstituted units to use equipment left by units deploying to POMCUS sets previously identified in the prepositioning section. (These units would contribute to meeting the above guidance.) Include exploration of innovative training measures to prepare reconstituted units in advance of POMCUS units' vacating their equipment sets.

avoid repeating list...



b. (S) Naval Forces: [redacted]
using the most cost-effective combination of:

- An Innovative Naval Reserve including up to 32 frigates and up to 8 training frigates with minimal necessary full-time support/training crews and augmentation/nucleus crews and O&M;

- The training carrier, backfilled in the training role by a deactivated but recallable carrier within an acceptable time; and/or

- Other ships in inactive but recallable status.

c. (S) Air Forces: [redacted] using the most cost-effective combination of:

- Airplanes exiting active or reserve units and placed in inviolate storage;

- Industrial restart, surge and/or new production capability including, if appropriate, lay-away of production facilities and perhaps industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for F-16, F-117); and/or

- Particularly for airlift/tanker squadrons, innovative measures involving, as appropriate, dual-use and/or refittable airframes, and possibly civil reserve status.

d. (S) Support and Training: If necessary for timely training and support for reconstituting units, program for selected training assets and cadre-type support units or stored support equipment; however, wherever possible identify and plan to draw such assets from the civil sector, defense production base, or government holdings or otherwise use resources made available after strategic warning.

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

**PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000**

18 FEB 1992

In reply refer to:
I-91/28291

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 94-99 Defense Planning Guidance Sections for Comment (U)

(U) Attached for your review and comment is the draft FY 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance. Please provide your response by COB Friday, February 21st.

(U) We ask that you focus your comments on major substantive concerns, and encourage you to highlight those you deem of greatest importance. Also, please recognize that this draft is probably at about the desired length and level of detail; therefore, lengthy inserts are unlikely to be workable. Finally, we ask that you consider both the policy and program planning implications of the overall guidance in your comments. It is very important that the guidance be fiscally realistic.

(U) We envision the DPG including these sections, plus an illustrative planning scenario appendix. To facilitate handling of future DPG-related drafts and documents, please identify a member of your staff as a single point of contact; OUSD/Policy contacts are Mr. Andrew Hoehn (Policy and Strategy section) and Mr. Rod Fabrycky (Programming section), 1C469, x79478. By prior arrangement the Joint Staff (J-8) will provide this package to the CINCs and assemble and forward their responses.

Dale A. Vesser (Acting)

Attachment:
a/s

CC:
Chief of Staff of the Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

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18 February 1992

# Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999

(S) This Defense Planning Guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression--the first post-Cold War conflict and a defining event in US global leadership. In addition to these two victories, there has been a less visible one, the integration of Germany and Japan into a US-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic "zone of peace."

(U) Our fundamental strategic position and choices are therefore very different from those we have faced in the past. The policies that we adopt in this new situation will set the nation's direction for the next century.

## I. Goals and Objectives (U)

### A. National Security Policy Goals (U)

(S) In the midst of a new era of fundamental worldwide change, ongoing U.S. leadership in global affairs will remain a constant fixture. In support of our international commitments, we will implement defense policies and programs designed to further essential national security policy goals:

- As a first order of priority, we will ensure the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

- We will seek to promote those positive trends which serve to support and reinforce our national interests, principally, promotion, establishment and expansion of democracy and free market institutions worldwide.

- We will maintain our security vigilance against national, regional or global threats (whether ideologically- or technologically-based) which undermine international stability and order.

- We will continue to support and protect those bilateral, multilateral, international or regionally-based institutions, processes and relationships which afford us opportunities to share responsibility for global and regional security while also allowing for selective engagement when and where required.

## B. Defense Strategy Objectives (U)

(U) These national security policy goals can be translated into two broad strategy objectives that lend further clarity to our overall defense requirements.

~~(S)~~ Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.

~~(S)~~ There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. An effective reconstitution capability is important here, since it implies that a potential rival could not hope to quickly or easily gain a predominant military position in the world.

~~(S)~~ The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law; limit international violence; and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems. These objectives are especially important in deterring conflicts or threats in regions of security importance to the United States because of their proximity (such as Latin America), or where we have treaty obligations or security commitments to other nations. While the US cannot become the world's "policeman," by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of US interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; threats to US citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict; and threats to US society from narcotics trafficking.

## II. Defense Policy and Strategy (U)

### A. Trends and Prospects in the International Environment (U)

#### 1. Soviet Threat Reduction (U)

(S) Central to these new objectives is clear recognition that we no longer will focus on the threat of a short-warning Soviet-led, European-wide conflict leading quickly to global war and perhaps escalating just as quickly to nuclear war. We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the states formerly comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others. However, for the foreseeable future the continued fragmentation of the former Soviet state and its conventional armed forces have altered so fundamentally the character of the residual threat as to eliminate the capacity to wage global conventional war or even to threaten East/Central Europe without several months of warning. A limited objective attack against Western Europe appears beyond Russia's capabilities without several years of reconstitution. Further erosion of the former Soviet defense industrial base and continued evolution of separate national armies will make the likelihood of a future attack even more remote.

#### 2. Increasing Regional Challenges (U)

(S) As the threat posed by the defunct Soviet Union decreases in magnitude, other threats become more important in the context of defense planning. In most cases, this is because they appear greater relative to the residual Soviet/Russian threat and thus are more likely to drive actual requirements. In other cases these threats may have become greater in absolute terms because of the end of the Cold War. Some regional powers, freed of the constraints of the Cold War, may feel more entitled for historical, cultural or other reasons to use of force to establish local hegemonies --although the decisive nature of our victory in the Persian Gulf will hopefully discourage such actions.

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(S) The disintegration of the Soviet Union also affects the dynamics of low-intensity conflict. We no longer have the Soviets fueling and exploiting low-intensity conflict to the detriment of US security. However, the demise of the Soviet Union has not put an end to destabilizing national and ethnic antagonisms in regions where the US has important security interests. Regional actors determined to pursue anti-American agendas may choose to use indirect and unconventional means. Moreover, there are trans-national security problems such as drug trafficking and terrorism which, along with unfavorable demographic and economic trends, undermine the security of the US, friendly governments and emerging democracies.

(S) Clearly, he passing of the Cold War reduces pressure for US military involvement in every potential regional or local conflict. Indeed, absent a global ideological challenge, we have opportunity to exercise far greater selectivity in our commitments, to rely more heavily on multilateral efforts to resolve regional or local crises that do not directly threaten our interests, and to draw more fully on non-military instruments as a means of conflict resolution. This applies in a variety of conflict situations. Nevertheless, if current trends hold, it is clear that DoD may be called upon during the FY 1994-1999 period to respond to regional challenges. The nature of that response may vary from humanitarian assistance to "presence" or peacekeeping missions to the use of force. In most cases, it is likely that the

US will not be acting alone, but will be part of multinational coalitions, possibly under the auspices of the UN or other international organizations. Thus, DoD must have the capability to act flexibly in conjunction with coalition partners, some of whom may not be traditional partners or allies. While enabling us to build down to lower force levels, this calls attention to forward presence and crisis response capabilities as the new basis for planning.

**3. Proliferation (U)**

(U) The proliferation of advanced weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction, poses a different challenge. Proliferation can take many forms and can include state and non-state actors. It might embody specific types of technology, including technologies necessary for the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons along with their means of delivery; it can also include a full array of ground, sea, and air platforms and supporting command and control systems necessary for the execution of successful combined arms operations. Moreover, proliferation increasingly will include the means of producing advanced weapons, either through original development or licensed production of new systems, or reverse engineering of existing or copied systems. Proliferation cannot be limited in context to major regional powers either; several smaller or lesser powers or even non-state actors are likely to possess advanced weapons and technologies that have potential to disrupt operations or substantially increase the risks to a military operation. Even the presence of relatively old technology, which will in fact characterize the vast majority of cases, can represent a tremendous challenge, as evidenced by the Iraqi use of short-range missiles in the Gulf War.

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**4. Warning Considerations (U)**

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


**5. New Military Technical Regime (U)**




(U) We must maintain superiority in key areas of technology, but this does not mena we must maintain absolute superiority in all areas of technology. It is critical, therefore, that we identify the highest leverage technologies and pursue these with vigor. Staying ahead of potential competitors will help shape the future security environment by giving us capabilities to deter future aggressors as well as the capacity to reconstitute forces as necessary.

## 6. Alliances, Coalitions and Responsibility Sharing (U)

(S) Our alliances will continue to provide an essential component of our national security structure. The US will maintain and nurture its alliance commitments in Europe, Latin America and in the Far East. Unlike the period of the Cold War, however, the US will play a qualitatively new role in these relationships --the role of leader and galvanizer of the world community. As alliance partners acquire more responsibility for their own defense, the US will confidently be able to reduce its air, land, and naval force commitments overseas without incurring significant risks. As these changes occur, however, they must be managed carefully to ensure that they are viewed as a new expression of responsibility sharing with our regional partners, rather than mistakenly perceived by either allies or potential adversaries as a withdrawal of US commitment.

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(S) In the new international environment, leadership in responding to threats to world order will, in some cases, be taken by others, such as international or regional organizations. We must recognize, accept, and encourage this reality. Nevertheless, the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary presage to a larger or more formal collective response. This requirement will affect the type and level of presence we maintain in key areas of the world to offset the potentially destabilizing effect that emerging powers may have in a region.

## 7. Arms Control (U)

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**B. The Regional Defense Strategy**

(U) The regional defense strategy marks officially the passing of the Cold War era. It retains the enduring character of our strategic deterrent posture while placing new emphasis on forward presence and crisis response as the basis for the decisive application of military power. It is an adaptive strategy that aims to leverage US military potential in a changing security environment. It is a strategy that will shape the reduction of US military forces by maintaining attention on those core activities necessary to advance US security interests.

(U) On the broadest level, the regional defense strategy recognizes that we cannot ignore our enduring interests or neglect our responsibilities in key regions of the world. To do so will only invite danger, foster instability, and, ultimately, require a greater commitment of resources in the future. We remain committed to maintaining the strength of the NATO alliance, as well as our other alliances and friendships; to deterring and, when necessary, defending against threats to our security and interests; and to exercising the leadership needed, including the decisive use of military forces when necessary, to maintain a world environment where societies with shared values can flourish. We see also that we have opportunity to provide for our security at less risk than in previous eras, but we must do so while staying focused on the balance between risk and opportunity, maintaining only that capability necessary to secure our nation's interests.

(U) In defense terms, this strategy requires an effective strategic deterrent capability, including strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces and strategic defenses. It necessitates a robust and capable forward presence of air, ground, and naval forces, although reduced significantly from earlier levels and changed in many instances to reflect basing arrangements and reasonable expectations concerning force availability. Further, the new strategy requires the ability to act quickly and decisively with a range of options against regional or local threats on short notice with modern, highly capable forces. It requires also that we remain mindful of future or emerging threats by providing the wherewithal to reconstitute additional forces, if necessary, or to refocus investment priorities to offset the challenge of a resurgent global threat or general remilitarization of the international environment.

## 1. Strategic Deterrence

(U) Deterring nuclear attack remains the highest defense priority of the nation, even though the threat of strategic attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the political collapse of the Soviet Union. Strategic nuclear forces are essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that Russia will retain even under a modified START regime and implementation of the nuclear initiative announced by the President Gorbachev in the fall of 1991. Our nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of a revitalized or unforeseen global threat, while at the same time helping to deter third party use of weapons of mass destruction through the threat of retaliation.

(U) The START agreement, signed in July 1991, imposes equal aggregate ceilings on the strategic offensive arsenals of both countries, with reductions are carried out in three phases over seven years after the treaty enters into force. After the seven year implementation period, each country will be allowed 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and no more than 6,000 accountable warheads. The four republics of the Commonwealth where nuclear forces remain and declared START-related facilities are located --Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan-- have all declared their intent to observe and implement START treaty obligations.

(U) The President's unilateral initiatives September 1991, which reduced the alert status of 45 percent of our ICBM launchers, took the bomber force off alert, and removed naval nonstrategic nuclear forces from our fleets, encouraged the former Soviet Republics with nuclear weapons to reduce thier force levels and go to lower states of alertness. In addition, in his State of the Union Address, the President announced major reductions in our strategic modernization programs. These reductions in, and changes to the Base Force reflect confidence that we can achieve deterrence at levels below those agreed in START.

(U) Notwithstanding continued modernization of Russian offensive forces, positive changes in our relationship with the Commonwealth states and the fundamental changes in Eastern Europe have all but eliminated the danger of large-scale war in Europe that could escalate to a strategic exchange. At the same time, the threat posed by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles and by an accidental or unauthorized missile launch resulting from political turmoil has grown considerably. The result is that the United States, our forces, and our allies and friends face a continued and even growing threat from ballistic missiles.

(U) The Gulf War raised the specter of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation and their delivery by missiles from hostile and irresponsible states like Iraq. A secure

retaliatory capability should deter their use by a rational enemy but does not protect against accidental, miscalculated or irrational use. The President called upon Russian leaders in his September speech to join in taking "immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited missile strikes --whatever their source."

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(U) It is possible that Russian nuclear weapons would no longer pose a threat to the United States and its allies sometime in the future. This would require unambiguous evidence of a fundamental reorientation of the Russian government: institutionalization of democracy, positive ties to the West, compliance with existing arms reduction agreements, possession of a nuclear force that is non-threatening to the West (with low numbers of weapons, no MIRVed ICBMs, and not on high alert status), and possession of conventional capabilities that are not threatening to neighbors. It is far from clear whether it will be possible to achieve this objective. As a result, we continue to face the possibility of robust strategic nuclear forces in the hands of those who might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Hence, our efforts must leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations.

(U) In the decade ahead, we must find the right combination of offensive forces while creating the proper balance between offense and defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction from any source. For now this requires retaining the readiness of our remaining strategic offensive forces. In addition, we must complete the offensive modernization and upgrades for the forces we have retained. These offensive forces need to be complemented with early introduction of an appropriately sized GPALS system.

**2. Forward Presence (U)**

(U) The regional defense strategy emphasizes the criticality of maintaining US presence abroad, albeit at reduced levels. This is another enduring, though newly refined principle of US security

policy. In the new strategy forward presence provides a key basis for sizing active and reserve forces.

(U) The historic success of our forward presence strategy--and the critical need to continue it for the future--should carefully be recognized. US forward presence forces send an unmistakable signal to allies and adversaries alike of our enduring commitment to a region. It helps prevent the emergence of dangerous vacuums that have potential to incite historical regional antagonisms or suspicions and which fuel arms races and proliferation or tempt would-be regional and local aggressors--especially in this era of fragile and changing regional balances. Forward presence is critical to maintaining a strong network of relationships, to helping shape the future strategic environment in ways favorable to our interests, and to positioning us favorably to respond to emerging threats. It supports our aim of continuing to play a leadership role in international events.

(U) Forward forces also provide a capability for initial rapid response to regional and local crises or contingencies that may arise with little or no warning. Indeed, our forward forces should increasingly be capable of fulfilling multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional roles, rather than deterring in a more limited sense by being trained and prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. These capabilities will require high degrees of readiness and availability, which means generally those capabilities resident in the active forces, for the reduced levels of forward presence that we maintain. It also will require a more flexible lift posture to be capable of moving forces to areas where they are most needed.

(S) Forward basing, of necessity, must become more flexible to accommodate changing regional configurations and to allow for a more dynamic character in our alliance relationships.

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(C) Europe is experiencing fundamental transformation. In security terms, the challenge of a Soviet-inspired Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe has disappeared, and the countries of Eastern Europe are seeking to reposition themselves back into the larger political and economic fabric of Europe. They have been joined more recently by several states of the former Soviet Union. A substantial American presence in Europe and continued cohesion within the western Alliance remain vital. This presence will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe and possibly some of the former Soviet Union are integrated into a larger and evolving security architecture. American presence will also allay Western European concerns as it seeks a new identity through integration and possibly the emergence of a common foreign and security policy. While its

mission may be changed in this new era, the North Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in the region. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the ongoing withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and force reductions associated with the CFE accord allow us to scale back our presence significantly to a smaller, but still militarily meaningful contribution to NATO's overall force levels.

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(U) In the Persian Gulf region, as an aftermath of the Gulf War, traditional maritime presence, including carrier battle group presence. We will focus on substantially upgraded strategic lift and mobility to improve contingency response time and permit rapid deployment to the region; more prepositioning of munitions and materiel in-theater through additional maritime prepositioned forces or POMCUS provided by friendly states; increased ABM defenses; and improved in-theater command, control, and communications. Longer-term US presence in the region will depend upon a host of factors, including the evolving regional balance and the prospects for a lasting Middle East accord. The Persian Gulf region will remain vital to US interests for the indefinite future indicating an enduring requirement to maintain long-term presence in the theater, both ashore and afloat.

(U) In other regions, as the need for our military presence continues or as we see that some new or additional form of

presence might introduce a new level of stability, we will increasingly rely on periodic visits of air, ground, and naval forces, training missions, access agreements, prepositioned equipment, exercises, combined planning and security, and humanitarian assistance. These more subtle but no less important forward presence operations most tangibly reflect the evolving commitment of US military forces that we can expect in a dynamic global environment. This implies a more fluid role for our presence forces rather than an appreciable increase to the overall level of activity. Indeed, absent a global challenge, we might broadly anticipate a general decline in the overall level of activity recognizing a more selective use of military forces in overseas missions.

(U) Finally, as we reduce our forward presence, we must remain mindful that there exists no reliable mechanism for evaluating precisely the exact levels of forward presence necessary to promote our objectives. Reductions in forward presence involve risks, and precipitous actions may produce unanticipated and highly costly results from which it is very difficult to recover. The potential for increased risks can take several forms, not all necessarily related to decreases in our presence, but they certainly can be exacerbated by lack of attention in this area. Planned reductions should be undertaken slowly and deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

### 3. Crisis Response (U)

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(S) The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of our the regional defense strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. One trait most share, however, is that they have potential to develop on very short notice. These conditions require highly responsive military forces available with little or no notice, a role best suited to the active

component. Over time we must have the capability to respond initially to any regional contingency with combat and most support forces drawn wholly from the active component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Reserve forces will be responsible primarily for supporting and sustaining active combat forces and for providing combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the US capability to respond to another sizeable regional or local contingency.

(U) As we learned from the Gulf War, a regional crisis can also mean mounting a very large military operation against a well armed, highly capable adversary. Proliferating unconventional threats of ballistic missiles and chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons raise further the specter of risk. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges. We must be ready to deploy a broad array of capabilities, including heavy and light ground forces, tactical aviation forces, naval and amphibious forces, and special operations forces.



(U) US forces must be able to conduct operations supportive of global humanitarian and stability objectives, including disaster relief, refugee assistance, non-combatant evacuations, counter-narcotics, and peacekeeping. The NATO Rome Summit imparted special significance to joint disaster relief and peacekeeping activities between NATO and former Warsaw pact members.

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(C) Ultimately, crisis response capabilities depend on our ability to secure the global posture necessary for timely regional action. This demands that all forward presence forces be structured in a way to support major regional crises, even outside their traditional theaters of operation.

**4. Reconstitution**

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### C. Regional Threats and Risks

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(U) To appreciate the applicability and relevance of our strategy to specific regional situations requires a more detailed analysis of the linkages and cross-currents within and among various regions. This also requires a more complete discussion of how the regional defense strategy will accomplish its dual mission of both protecting U.S. national interests and concurrently sustaining our commitment to stability and order in a complex, interrelated world.

### 1. Former Soviet Union (U)

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


**2. Western Europe (U)**



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### 3. East/Central Europe (U)

(S) The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have gone a long way toward increasing stability and reducing the military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in the Russian Republic, should this process continue, is likely to create a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe.

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4. East Asia/Pacific (U)

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(S) We must endeavor to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures, but we must avoid proposals that would erode U.S. naval strength critical to our forward deployed posture. We need better intelligence yielding improved strategic warning to permit us to benefit from greater economy of force. We should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking.

**5. Middle East and Southwest Asia (U)**

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We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region . We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of

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defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire capabilities such as anti-tank weapons, integrated air defense systems, and improved intelligence and communications systems.

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~~(S)~~ The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons, slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

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~~(S)~~ The presence of drug production and trafficking in Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade..

**6. Latin America and the Caribbean (U)**

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the US seeks a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of US security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering the development of democratic institutions. In addition, the US must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit

narcotics, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

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(U) Countering drug trafficking remains a national security priority of the Department of Defense. Our programs must be geared toward attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the US. In particular, we need to help stabilize and bolster the counter-insurgency capabilities of the government of Peru, which is facing a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency. DOD is the lead federal agency for detection and monitoring of drug traffic destined for the United States. Our programs must therefore

provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to the US, and for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.

**7. Sub-Saharan Africa (U)**

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**D. Reconstitution (U)**

(U) With the demise of the Cold War global threat, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that the potential global-scale reconstitution threats to our security are now very distant--so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision.

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(S) Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new antagonistic superpower or some emergent alliance of hostile regional hegemons. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy must refocus on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of any potentially hostile entity that could pursue strategic aims of region-wide or global domination in competition with the U.S. and our allies.



(U) For the near- and long-term, reconstitution strategy will require that we take care to preserve in adequate measure the longest-lead elements of our overall security posture: alliance structures, forward deployments and access; the advantages in both military technology and doctrine that come from vigorous innovation and development; the high quality of our military personnel pool; and our military core competencies.

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(U) Force reconstitution includes activities analogous to the three "phases" of graduated mobilization response activity (peacetime planning and preparations, measured responses to a crisis, and large scale force expansion). However, reconstitution strategy subsumes and expands upon such established concepts and capabilities as full and total mobilization and graduated mobilization response. The potential of reconstituting new types of forces is one such difference. We should investigate innovative reconstitution measures that may become increasingly useful in the future, such as new types of more producible but militarily useful equipment (and accompanying doctrines), and abilities to rapidly move next-generation systems into production. Also, reconstitution focusses on the opportunity we now have to reduce our defense establishment--active and reserve units, industrial capacity, etc.--in ways that take advantage of our past investments by retaining access to some of those long-lead elements of our capacity to build back up. We can retain some equipment of disestablished units in laid-up or cadre-type status, lay away military production capabilities, and tap the pool of trained personnel exiting units but still accessible in reserve manpower categories.

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**E. Strategy Foundations (U)**

(U) Our ability to implement the regional defense strategy will depend on preserving our technological superiority, quality personnel, core military competencies, and a robust alliance structure. Once lost, these foundations would take a very long time to rebuild --at least a generation. Our alliances, once lost, may never be regained.

## 1. Technological Superiority (U)

(U) Technological superiority was critical to our success in the Persian Gulf. A primary goal of our defense programming is to maintain that superiority in key areas in the face of reductions in force structure and the current defense industrial base, and in a global environment of technological proliferation. Our programs through the end of the FY1994-1999 period must be focused on two key objectives:

- Relentless pursuit of technological innovation; and,

- Operational experimentation with and fielding of these innovations by the Base Force as part of our strategy for the reconstitution of future forces.

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(U) Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. The best technology in the world cannot alone win battles. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges and competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must create incentives and eliminate disincentives for the defense industry to invest in new processes, facilities and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines.

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## 2. Quality Personnel (U)

(U) The Gulf War demonstrated that the quality of our military personnel is the key factor in success in war. The success of the Base Force concept will depend on our ability to

attract and retain the best qualified personnel through an appropriate incentive structure as we transition to lower force levels. The US military will attain the Base Force force structure by FY 1995. In the subsequent years, we will seek to preserve the quality of our force at a level 25 percent lower than in FY 1990 in what may be an austere budgetary environment. Continued efforts will be required to terminate unneeded programs; close, coordinate or realign military bases; streamline our defense infrastructure and procedures; and maintain a proper balance between active and reserve forces.

### 3. Core Competencies (U)

(U) Core competencies are the leadership, doctrine, and skills needed to retain mastery of critical warfare capabilities. Retaining the lead in core military competencies will be a high defense priority for the FY 1994-1999 period.

## F. Attaining National Security Goals with the Regional Defense Strategy (U)

(U) The Regional Defense Strategy seeks to protect American interests and promote a more stable and democratic world. The objectives of the strategy are two. First, ensuring that a hostile power does not dominate a critical area of the world, including Western Europe, East Asia, Southwest Asia, or Russia or mount a global challenge. Second, the strategy seeks to achieve enduring US security interests, such as protecting the US from direct attack, ensuring the security of our borders and nearby regions, maintaining access to world markets, protecting our citizens overseas, and meeting our political and moral commitments. The new strategy seeks to achieve these goals through alliance relationships, forward presence, and crisis response capabilities.

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## III. Programming for the Base Force

### A. Introduction

1. (U) Purpose. This section constitutes definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense for formulation of the FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda. It is to be used in conjunction with the FY 94-99 Fiscal Guidance published by the Secretary on 15 February 1992. This section establishes minimum military capabilities to be provided within available resources to support national objectives and strategy.

2. (C) Overall Program Priorities. In making the difficult decisions necessary to formulate the defense program in the current strategic and fiscal environment, the Department must maintain effective strategic deterrence; continue adequate though reduced levels of forward presence; provide robust capabilities for regional crisis response; and provide reconstitution capabilities to forestall or counter any future global challenger. Under current plans, force structure reaches minimum acceptable "base force" levels (for strategic forces, crisis response forces, and forward presence levels alike) by around FY 1995 for most areas of the force, so we must give priority to retaining adequate levels of force structure. Under no circumstances, however, will we maintain a larger structure than we can support with levels of readiness (training, manning, and equipping) adequate for deterrence and timely crisis response. Sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of crisis response operations is also imperative. For modernization, both strategic and conventional, a profound slowing in modernization by the formerly program-driving Soviet threat enables a new acquisition strategy, focussed on selected research and advanced development to keep our qualititive edge in systems and doctrine, with greatly reduced emphasis on procurement.

### B. Strategic Forces




2. (S) Defensive. Within a refocussed SDI program, develop for deployment defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source. Also, pursue complementary capability against bombers and cruise missiles.




~~(S)~~ Ensure that strategic and theater defense systems, as well as offensive and defensive systems, are integrated.

### C. Conventional Forces and Forward Presence

~~(C)~~ Program for base force levels as follows while meeting readiness and sustainability guidance and remaining compliant with arms control agreements. However, do not preserve force structure at the cost of leaving forces undermanned, under-trained, or under-equipped.

(U) Required military personnel will be maintained in that component of the Total Force -- active or reserve -- in which they can maintain required readiness and effectively accomplish required missions at the least cost. The various components will operate cohesively in peacetime and in wartime in their respective roles as an integrated and effective Total Force. Forces for forward presence (including an associated CONUS rotation base) and combat forces for response to regional crises and contingencies must be predominantly in the active components. Reserve

components' contingency roles will focus primarily on providing mobility and selected critical support for initially deploying forces; increasing increments of support forces for continuing and expanding deployments; and increasing increments of combat forces as well, especially for large, protracted and/or concurrent contingencies.

1. Army.

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- (S) Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with combat support capability and a base for reception and onward movement.

- (S) Retain one heavy division (-) in Korea, including associated support.

2. Navy/Marine Corps.

- (S) Program for 12 carrier battlegroups based on a force of 12 aircraft carriers (plus one training carrier) and 13 airwings (11 AC/2 RC). Program about 150 major surface combatants and about 70 attack submarines as part of the battle group complement and for various other missions. Maintain sufficient ASW, surveillance and combat logistic support forces.

- (S) Program for 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces including 6 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (5 AC/1 RC). Program for amphibious lift for 2.5 MEBs.

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3. Air Force.

- ~~(C)~~ Program for 26.5 TFWEs (15.25 AC/11.25 RC, including recce/EW). Maintain sufficient tanker and CONUS air defense forces.

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4. Special Operations Forces.

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**D. Mobility and Prepositioning**

(U) Program for the mobility and prepositioning requirements found in the Secretary of Defense-approved recommendations of the recent Mobility Requirements Study (MRS).

1.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ Sealift (Navy). Acquire through new construction or conversion in U.S. shipyards large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships (which, plus the current SL-7 fast sealift ships, will provide the capability to surge 2 heavy divisions from CONUS), and ships for enhancement of the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). Provide readiness enhancements for the RRF. Also, implement the Merchant Mariner Reserve program.

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3. Prepositioning:

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- ~~(S/NF)~~ Navy/Marine Corps: acquire through new construction or conversion in U.S. shipyards 9 ships for afloat prepositioning providing at least 2 million square feet of capacity for Army combat equipment (at least a heavy brigade equivalent) and support. Support the current 3 Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons.

4. (U) CONUS Infrastructure (Army). Program CONUS infrastructure improvements per the approved MRS recommendations, including a West Coast containerized ammunition facility and capabilities to move units "from fort to port."

**E. Readiness**

(U) Forward Presence and Crisis Response requirements preclude any broad reductions in readiness, given short warning times for regional threats, but readiness must be higher for certain missions and forces than for others, as reflected below. Under no circumstances will we maintain a larger force structure than we can support with adequate levels of readiness.

~~(C)~~ Readiness programming will reflect the "first to fight" principle. Specifically, priorities among units for providing resources to maintain manning, training and equipment readiness will be based, regardless of component, on each unit's peacetime roles and the most demanding of its deployment time(s) for the contingencies depicted in the Illustrative Planning Scenarios at Annex A.

1. ~~(C)~~ Readiness Levels. Program resources necessary to maintain unit readiness levels as follows:

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Reserve component reinforcing forces associated with these AC forces (i.e. associated roundout and support units) will maintain similar readiness ratings.

- Other RC combat forces, and their associated support forces, will maintain readiness levels commensurate with their contingency missions.

2. (U) Personnel Quality. Maintaining the high quality of U.S. military personnel is a strategic imperative, but will involve particular difficulties during the large reduction in the size of the force. Structure and resource robust recruitment and retention programs at levels expected to maintain roughly current high levels for the major aggregate personnel quality indicators across the force. Provide adequate resources for military institutions of higher education.

3. (U) Training. Place increased emphasis on joint and combined exercises that stress interoperability, joint warfighting doctrine, and rapid deployment (including to prepositioned materiel). Increase emphasis on use of simulators in training to most efficiently provide a well-trained force.

4. (U) Maintenance. Do not permit Intermediate and Depot maintenance unfunded requirements (as adjusted for programmed force reductions) to exceed levels in the FY 93-97 defense program. Retain sufficient core maintenance infrastructure to sustain future programmed forces after initial deployment.

## F. Sustainability

1. War Reserve Inventories.

(S) For the near term, and particularly with an eye to recovering our sustainability posture from the demands of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and taking advantage of lessons learned in that operation, objectives are to (1) fix sustainability assets that are reparable, (2) make the best distribution of available assets, and (3) procure mission essential critical items with proven war reserve deficiencies that directly impact warfighting capabilities. (For munitions, the Conventional Systems Committee - Munitions is responsible for identifying such mission critical items and providing appropriate recommendations.)

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2. Industrial Surge

~~(C)~~ Program for Industrial Preparedness Measures that would permit surge production of munitions, critical troop support items and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to maintaining a full complement of war reserve inventories for meeting a portion of the above guidance, and short-notice need is a real possibility (e.g., airlift spares). Program the capability for stated support and spares surge and mobilization requirements for each major defense acquisition program achieving Milestone III during the program period.

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## G. Modernization and Investment

### 1. New Acquisition Strategy.

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b. (U) R&D Emphasis. These requirements and resources will warrant moving programs through full-scale development and procurement much less often, or at least less than immediately. Nevertheless, maintaining our technological edge in both potential military technology and fielded systems will remain a strategic imperative. To replace the private sector R&D for which follow-on procurement profits were once the sure incentive, we will increase emphasis on government-supported R&D as necessary to support our technology base. We will emphasize taking the time to prototype systems and prove out concepts before proceeding, and greatly reduce concurrency in the stages of the acquisition process. We will also increase emphasis on system producibility and on manufacturing processes.

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e. (U) Full Funding. Ongoing and any new acquisition programs will be funded fully in accordance with the baseline approved by the DAB. In particular, the Program Objective Memoranda will fully reflect any agreements between the Defense Acquisition Executive and a Military Department Secretary that resulted from the Under Secretary for Acquisition's and the Deputy Secretary's affordability initiative.

2. Defense-Wide Investment Programs.

a. (U) Science and Technology:

(U) Each Military Department and DARPA shall fund the science and technology program (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a, exclusive of SDI funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1992 President's Budget. In devising the S&T program, take into account the potential European and Japanese contributions.

(C) Balance the S&T program between (1) a core of broad sustaining programs, and (2) the following specific thrusts which contribute directly to high priority defense needs:

- Global surveillance and communications, focused on a theater of operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets.
- [redacted]
- All-weather air superiority and defense against very low observable cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and aircraft.
- Sea control and undersea superiority against open ocean, coastal and regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and stealthy cruise missiles, and by undersea mine warfare.
- Rapidly deployable, survivable, and lethal all-weather day/night ground combat capability.
- Training and readiness including embedded training, distributed simulation and virtual environment depiction.
- Integration of warfighting and training requirements with manufacturing and production technology, aimed at rapid prototyping and efficient low volume production.



b. (U) Manufacturing Technology Program. Program not less than zero percent real growth per year from a baseline predicated upon the FY 1991 funding level. ManTech technical priorities should be based upon thrust areas identified in the National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan.

c. (U) Test and Evaluation: In the FY 94-99 program:

- Fund test capability investment needs (6.5 and related 6.4 and 7.8 funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1992 President's Budget.
- Reduce operating and maintenance costs for new T&E capabilities by 15% when compared to similar existing capabilities.
- Optimize investment strategy to support the high priority defense technology thrusts identified above.
- Enhance susceptibility, vulnerability and lethality assessment programs for combat systems and munitions.

d. (U) Facilities. Installations not required to support the reduced force levels will not be retained. Accordingly, plan to resource new facility investment and backlog reduction only at those "core" installations which have a very high probability of retention through future Base Closure and Realignment Commission processes. Confine investment at non-core installations to that required to address life/safety and environmental conditions. In allocating resources for facility investments and maintenance give priority to supporting essential readiness and high-priority RDT&E areas as reflected in the guidance above.

3. Force Modernization Programs

a. Strategic Deterrence

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(1) (U) Offensive Forces.

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construction, and ensure the viability of the 18 SSBN force well into the next century. To do this, for FY 94 and beyond determine and program for the most cost-effective means to equip the 18 Trident SSBNs through their useful life -- either backfitting those not initially equipped with D-5, or remotoring/extending the life of the currently deployed C-4 missiles before the end of their service lives.

~~(S)~~ ICBMs: Enhance the effectiveness and extend the life of the Minuteman III force. Retain the option to equip MM III with the MK 21 warhead should the Peacekeeper be retired as a result of agreement with Russia to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs.

~~(S)~~ Command, Control and Communications (C3): Continue to improve the strategic C3 system, keeping it at least as survivable as the forces it supports. Develop a follow-on to the current DSP tactical warning/attack assessment system that provides global coverage, increased survivability, and better discrimination, particularly for short-range ballistic missiles. MILSTAR remains DoD's highest priority C3 program.

(2) (U) Defenses. Program for the following, consistent with a refocussed SDI program:

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b. Conventional Forces.

(1) (U) International Cooperation. Ongoing and new acquisition programs will look to international participation to offset risk, reduce cost, and enhance alliance ties.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Mission Area Priorities. Assessment of programmed contingency capabilities, and evaluation of Persian Gulf War

experience, indicate the following high-priority areas of critical investment needs:

- Deployable anti-armor: air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility (e.g. motorized light armor with beyond-line-of-sight anti-tank weaponry).

- Tactical C3I: better and more survivable day/night reconnaissance and target identification capabilities (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles); enhanced Army/Air Force tactical intelligence interoperability (e.g., Air Force acquisition of JSTARS data line ground stations); enhanced theater and tactical communications and intel dissemination systems, and associated procedures, that are interoperable, more flexible and capable of supporting joint and combined operations.

- Identification Friend or Foe (IFF): enhanced air/land battle IFF systems, for both air-to-ground and ground-to-ground applications (also, joint exercises to refine interoperability procedures).

- Aero-space campaign: improved Air Force/Navy/Marine tactical air operations integration and joint planning systems and procedures; improved tactical intelligence dissemination; increased ability, including munitions stocks, for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft to use precision guided munitions against ground targets, during day or night and in all weather, to an extent comparable to other Services.

- Anti-mine: good naval and land mine clearance capability (including rapid minefield location systems and improved killing mechanisms), with emphasis on mine countermeasures for support of amphibious operations, particularly in shallow water and beach landing areas, and on capability for offensive use of advanced land and naval mines as force multipliers.

- Chemical/biological: improved chemical and biological detection and warning systems (ground vehicles and air recon), protection systems (individual and collective) and medical support and decontamination systems; and consideration of CB effects in development of equipment that may be used in a CB environment; also necessary are implementation of expected CW agreements and destruction of chemical munitions.

- [redacted]

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- Anti-tactical ballistic missile: (see guidance in the strategic sections).

## H. Reconstitution Capability

1. General Principles.

(S) Overall resource allocation should give priority to base force capabilities and to preserving such longest-lead elements of security as alliances, technology, and quality personnel. Also, the defense program includes many elements that are needed for forces in being but provide latent potential for reconstitution, and must be evaluated accordingly. Still, modest but high-leverage investment in reconstitution-specific programs will be important.

(U) Extant active and reserve units would be available to take part in deterring or responding to any threat that might also require reconstitution. Such units (particularly the RC) would require "generation" measures to bring them to combat readiness. Additional new forces beyond these could be created from "regeneration" assets, industrial/technology base assets, and manpower assets.

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b. Industrial/Technology Base Assets.

(U) Industrial Planning/Preparedness: Maintain robust production base analysis and industrial preparedness planning to support reconstitution. Prepare plans as required with industry to start or restart production for reconstitution, including appropriate industrial preparedness measures, and procurement rules/practices to be waived. Reconstitution will not be a predominant factor in deciding to maintain production of a major platform; however, the production restart time for reconstitution will often be a consideration in deciding the long-term shutdown status.

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c. Manpower Assets.

~~(S)~~ For early reconstitution efforts, plan to use reassigned active component personnel and Selected Reserve annual training or volunteers. Plan and prepare for maximum reliance on increased recruiting and retention (including additional civil service support personnel, and keeping increased numbers of exiting personnel in recallable categories).

~~(S)~~ For relatively rapid reconstitution, plan for use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Plan for maximum recall and use of retired military personnel to man and train reconstituting units and for other needs. Use annual IRR screening and training authority to ensure IRR availability.

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- 2 reserve component cadre divisions, each with a full heavy division equipment set and about 20% SelRes O&M and manning (including minimal necessary full-time support), focussed on long-lead maintenance and leadership cadre;

- Equipment exiting active or reserve units and placed in long-term storage;

- Industrial production restart capability, including if appropriate lay-away of production facilities and perhaps component stockpiling or other industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for M1A1)

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b. (S) Naval Forces: using the most cost-effective combination of:

- The Innovative Naval Reserve of 32 frigates supported by 8 training fri-gates with full-time support/training crews and augmentation/nucleus crews

- The training carrier, backfilled in the training role by a deactivated but recallable carrier within an acceptable time

- Other ships in inactive but recallable status

Also, conduct a Navy study of placing some SSNs in a non-operating cadre-like status with nucleus crews to maintain reactor operation and any necessary skilled/leadership cadre. Incorporate an implementation plan, including layup and regeneration timelines and end strength and funding required, in (or if appropriate as an addendum to) the POM, involving approximately 15 SSNs or more, including as appropriate some of the 70 SSNs cited in the base force guidance above.

c. (S) Air Forces: using the most cost-effective combination of:

- Airplanes exiting active or reserve units and placed in inviolate storage;

- Production restart capability, including if appropriate lay-away of production facilities and perhaps industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for F-16, F-117)

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- Particularly for airlift/tanker squadrons, innovative measures perhaps involving dual-use and/or refitable airframes, possibly in a civil reserve status.

d. (S) Support and Training: Program for selected cadre-type support units (particularly non-divisional support units) or storage of support equipment if/as necessary for timely support to reconstituting combat units; however, wherever possible plan to draw support assets from the civil sector or defense production base, using resources made available in response to strategic warning. For expanding the training base for reconstitution, identify and if necessary program selected assets; however, plan to rely primarily on assets that could be made available quickly, e.g. retired military personnel, and laid-away bases or other DoD or non-military U.S. or allied land and facilities.

# Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy

## Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
## January, 1993

# INTRODUCTION

The past four years have seen extraordinary changes abroad as the Cold War drew to a close. We have entered a new strategic era. The collapse of the Soviet Union -- the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence -- fundamentally altered, but did not eliminate, the challenges ahead. The integration of the leading democracies into a U.S.-led system of collective security, and the prospects of expanding that system, significantly enhance our international position and provide a crucial legacy for future peace. Our national strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to one on regional challenges and opportunities. We have moved from Containment to the new Regional Defense Strategy.

The changes made over the past four years have set the nation on a solid path to secure and extend the opportunities and hopes of this new era. America and its allies now have an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. Where once a European-wide war, potentially leading to nuclear exchange, was perhaps only a few weeks and miles away, today such a threat has fallen back and would take years to rekindle. With the end of the Cold War, there are no global threats and no significant hostile alliances. We have a marked lead in critical areas of warfare. Our alliances, built during our struggle of Containment, are one of the great sources of our strength in this new era. They represent a democratic "zone of peace," a community of democratic nations bound together by a web of political, economic, and security ties. This zone of peace offers a framework for security not through competitive rivalries in arms, but through cooperative approaches and collective security institutions. The combination of these trends has given our nation and our alliances great depth for our strategic position.

Simply put, it is the intent of the new Regional Defense Strategy to enable the U.S. to lead in shaping an uncertain future so as to preserve and enhance this strategic depth won at such great pains. This will require us to strengthen our alliances and to extend the zone of peace to include the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as these now-fragile states succeed in their struggle to build free societies and free markets out of the ruin of Communism. Together with our allies, we must preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to our interests and otherwise work to build an international environment conducive to our values. Yet, even as we hope to increasingly rely on collective approaches to solve international problems, we recognize that a collective effort will not always be timely and, in the absence of U.S. leadership, may not gel. Where the stakes so merit, we must have forces ready to protect our critical interests.

Our fundamental strategic position and choices as a nation are thus very different from those we have faced in the past. The choices ahead of us will reset the nation's direction for the next century. We have today a compelling opportunity to meet our defense needs at lower cost. But as we do so, we must be guided by a strategy that recognizes that our domestic life cannot flourish if we are beset by foreign crises. We must not squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape an uncertain future security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our values.

Guided by the new strategy, we are restructuring our forces to meet the essential demands of strategic deterence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. As we do so, we are reducing our forces significantly -- by more than a million military and civilian personnel. These reductions will reduce force structure to its lowest level in terms of manpower since before the Korean War and spending to the lowest percentage of GNP since before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet even as we reduce our forces in size overall, we must not carelessly destroy their quality or their technological superiority. Along with alliances, high-quality personnel and technological superiority represent capabilities that would take decades to restore if foolishly lost in this time of reductions.

Even in this time of downsizing, we must retain capable military forces. For the world remains unpredictable and well-armed causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve their ends. We have sought through the Regional Defense Strategy to anticipate challenges and opportunities yet to come, to shape a future of continued progress, and to preclude reversals or the emergence of new threats. This document

discusses the new strategy in some depth and is intended as a contribution to a national dialogue that very much needs to continue as we look to protecting the nation's interests in the 1990s, and beyond.

# I. DEFENSE POLICY GOALS

The national security interests of the United States are enduring: the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

These national security interests can be translated into four mutually supportive strategic goals that guide our overall defense efforts:

Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever source, against the United States, its citizens and forces, and to honor our historic and treaty commitments.

The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, avoids the renationalization of security policies, and provides security at lower costs and with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our Regional Defense Strategy.

The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the United States and our allies. These regions include Europe, East Asia, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Latin America. Consolidated, nondemocratic control of the resources of such a critical region could generate a significant threat to our security.

The fourth goal is to help preclude conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and to limit violence should conflict occur. Within the broader national security policy of encouraging the spread and consolidation of democratic government and open economic systems, the Defense Department furthers these ends through efforts to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, and other threats to internal democratic order, assistance to peacekeeping efforts; the provision of humanitarian and security assistance; limits on the spread of militarily significant technology, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with the means to deliver them; and the use of defense-to-defense contacts to assist in strengthening civil-military institutions and encourage reductions in the economic burden of military spending.

To reach these goals, the United States must show the leadership necessary to encourage sustained cooperation among major democratic powers. The alternative would be to leave our critical interests and the security of our friends dependent upon individual efforts that could be duplicative, competitive, or ineffective. We also must encourage and assist Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states of the former Soviet Union in establishing democratic political systems and free markets so they too can join the democratic "zone of peace."

But while we favor collective action to respond to threats and challenges in this new era, a collective response will not always be timely and, in the absence of U.S. leadership, may not gel. While the United States cannot become the world's policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on international mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different from our own. Where our allies' interests are directly affected, we must expect them to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play the leading role; but we must maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems tat threaten our own interests. Such capabilities are essential to our ability to lead, and should international support prove sluggish or inadequate, to act independently, as necessary, to protect our critical interests. History suggests that effective multilateral action is most likely to come about in response to U.S. leadership, not as an alternative to it.

We cannot lead if we fail to maintain the high quality of our forces as we reduce and restructure them. As a nation we have never before succeeded in pacing reductions without endangering our

interests. We must proceed expeditiously, but at a pace that avoids breaking the force or sending misleading signals about our intentions to friends or potential aggressors. An effective ability to reconstitute our forces is important as well, since it signals that no potential rival could quickly or easily gain a predominant military position.

At the end of World War I, and again to a lesser extent at the end of World War II, the United States as a nation made the mistake of believing that we had achieved a kind of permanent security, that a transformation of the security order achieved in substantial part through American sacrifice and leadership could be sustained without our leadership and significant American forces. Today, a great challenge has passed; but other threats endure, and new ones will arise. If we reduce our forces carefully, we will be left with a force capable of implementing the new defense strategy. We will have given ourselves the means to lead common efforts to meet future challenges and to shape the future environment in ways that will give us greater security at lower cost.

# II. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

The demise of the global threat posed by Soviet Communism leaves America and its allies with an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. We have shifted our defense planning from a focus on the global threat posed by the Soviet Union to a focus on the regional threats and challenges we are more likely to face in the future. At the same time, we can work to shape the future environment in ways that would help preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to us. This same approach will also help to preclude the emergence of a hostile power that could present a global security threat comparable to the one the Soviet Union presented in the past. Precluding regional threats and challenges can strengthen the underpinnings of a peaceful democratic order in which nations are able to pursue their legitimate interests without fear of military domination.

In this more secure international environment there will be enhanced opportunities for political, economic, environmental, social, and security issues to be resolved through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United Nations, or regional arrangements. But the world remains unpredictable and well-armed, causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve their ends. We must not stand back and allow a new global threat to emerge or leave a vacuum in a region critical to our interests. Such a vacuum could make countries there feel vulnerable, which in turn could lead to excessive military capabilities and an unsteady balance of one against another. If we do stand back it will be much harder to achieve the enhanced international cooperation for which we hope.

## Underlying Strategic Concepts

The Department of Defense does not decide when our nation will commit force. However, decisions today about the size and characteristics of the forces we are building for tomorrow can influence whether threats to our interests emerge and, if they do emerge, whether we are able to defeat them decisively. Four concepts illustrate this relationship.

### Planning for Uncertainty

An unavoidable challenge for defense planners is that we must start development today of forces to counter threats still so distant into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events of the last few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and unexpectedly political trends can reverse themselves. Our ability to predict political alignments and military capabilities weakens as we look farther into the future.

Yet decisions about military forces cannot be based on a short-term planning horizon. The military capabilities that we have today and the ones we will have for the next few years are largely the product of decisions made a decade or more ago. Much of the capability that we are eliminating now cannot be restored quickly, and precipitous cuts would do long-lasting damage, even to the capabilities that we retain.

Thus, we must reduce and reshape our forces not only to respond to the near-term threats that we can measure clearly today, or even to the trends most likely to continue. We also must hedge against the emergence of unexpected threats, the reversal of favorable trends, or even fundamental changes in the nature of our challenges. Risk can never be entirely eliminated. The limits on our ability to predict the future must be recognized, and flexibility to reduce the consequences of being wrong must be built into even our current forces and programs.

We are building defense forces today for a future that is particularly uncertain, given the magnitude of recent changes in the security environment. Fundamentally, we are striving to provide a future President with the capabilities five, ten or fifteen years from now to counter threats or pursue

interests that cannot be defined with precision today. While we can safely reduce force structure and the pace of modernization, we must retain the ability to protect our interests and, by so doing, to help deter unwanted reversals.

## Shaping the Future Security Environment

America cannot base its future security on a shaky record of prediction or even on a prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks as well to help shape the future. Our strategy is designed to preclude threats and to encourage trends that advance U.S. security objectives in the future. This is not simply within our means; it is critical to our future security.

The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully shaped the world we see today. By our refusal to be intimidated by Soviet military power, we and our allies molded a world in which Communism was forced to confront its contradictions. Even as we and our allies carried the defense burden required in the Cold War, democracy was able to develop and flourish.

One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying long standing alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act separately, many other problems could result If we can assist former Warsaw Pact countries, including the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine, in choosing a steady course of democratic progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible, civilian democratic control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty years of effort. Our goal should be to bring a democratic Russia and the other new democracies into the defense community of democratic nations so that they can become a force for peace, democracy, and freedom not only in Europe but also in other critical regions of the world.

Cooperative defense arrangements enhance security, while reducing the defense burden for everyone. In the absence of effective defense cooperation, regional rivalries could lead to tensions or even hostilities that would threaten to bring critical regions under hostile domination. It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might eventually force the United States at much higher cost to protect its interests and counter the potential development of a new global threat.

Maintaining highly capable forces also is critical to sustaining the U.S. leadership with which we can shape the future. Such leadership supports collective defense arrangements and precludes hostile competitors from challenging our critical interests. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence that our significant military power threatens no one's aspirations for peaceful democratic progress.

Our forces also can shape the future environment by performing the "nontraditional" roles of humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. Generally such situations are of international concern, and we would expect to be part of a commensurate multinational effort; however, U.S. leadership may be crucial to catalyze such action, and we may have unique capabilities that would appropriately complement others' forces.

Our ability to shape the future rests not only on our efforts to keep closed the door to aggression and military intimidation; it rests also on our ability to provide the example necessary for others to take positive, reciprocal steps. The President's nuclear initiatives of the fall and winter of 1991-92 induced the former Soviet Union to take positive reciprocating steps that will help reduce the remaining threat posed by nuclear forces on the territory of the former Soviet Union. These initiatives made possible the U.S.-Russian agreements of June 1992 and subsequent signing of the START II treaty in January 1993. Similarly, NATO's new strategy not only reflects an adjustment to the reduced threat environment in Europe but equally it reassures our former adversaries of the truly defensive nature of the NATO alliance. Through such initiatives we can solidify the gains achieved through START, START II and CEE and go beyond them.

Our ability to reduce sources of regional instability and to limit violence should conflict occur also is critical to shaping the environment This includes, for example, updating our strategy to counter the

proliferation of militarily significant technology, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with the means to deliver them. Our traditional export control efforts must not only be updated and strengthened in this new era, but supplemented by political dissuasion, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and inspection and destruction missions, as illustrated in the case of Iraq.

## Strategic Depth

America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades. Today, there is no challenger to peaceful democratic order similar to that posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact There are no significant hostile alliances. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world remain our friends. The threat of global, even nuclear war, once posed by massive Warsaw Pact forces poised at the inter-German border, first receded hundreds of miles east and has since been transformed into the promise of a new era of strategic cooperation.

Not only has our position improved markedly with respect to the passing of a global challenge, but our strategic position has improved in regional contexts as well. For the near-term, we and our allies possess sufficient capabilities to counter threats in critical regions. Soviet Communism no longer exacerbates local conflicts, and we need no longer be concerned that an otherwise remote problem could affect the balance of power between us and a hostile global challenger. We have won great depth for our strategic position.

In this regard, it is important to reflect in our strategy the fact that the international system is no longer characterized by Cold War bipolarity. The Cold War required the United States and its allies to be prepared to contain the spread of Soviet power on a global basis. Developments in even remote areas could affect the United States' relative position in the world, and therefore often required a U.S. response. The United States remains a nation with global interests, but we must reexamine in light of the new defense strategy whether and to what extent particular challenges engage our interests. These changes and the growing strength of our friends and allies will allow us to be more selective in determining the extent to which U.S. forces must be committed to safeguard shared interests.

The first major conflict of the post-Cold War era preserved our strategic position in one of the regions of the world critical to our interests. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead of a more radical Middle East/Persian Gulf region under Saddam's influence, Saddam struggles to retain control in Iraq, Iraq's dangerous military has been greatly damaged, our ties with moderate states are stronger, energy resources are secure, and significant progress has been made in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Our strategy is designed to preserve this position by keeping our alliances strong and our threats small. Our tools include political and economic measures and others such as peacekeeping operations, security assistance, defense-to-defense contacts, humanitarian aid and intelligence assistance, as well as security measures to prevent the emergence of a nondemocratic aggressor in critical regions. We bring to this task our considerable moral influence as the world's leading democracy. We can provide more security at a reduced cost. If a hostile power sought to present a regional challenge again, or if a new, antagonistic global threat or alliance emerged in the future, we would have the ability to counter it. But the investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we won through forty years of the Cold War are much smaller than those it took to secure this strategic depth or those that would be required if we lost it.

## Continued U. S. Leadership

U.S. leadership, essential for the successful resolution of the Cold War, remains critical to achieving our long-term goals in this new era. The United States continues to prefer to address hostile, nondemocratic threats to our interests wherever possible through collective security efforts that take advantage of the strength of our allies and friends. However, sustained U.S. leadership will be essential for maintaining those alliances and for otherwise protecting our interests.

Recognition that the United States is capable of opposing regional aggression will be an important factor in inducing nations to work together to stabilize crises and resist or defeat aggression. For most countries, a general interest in international stability and security will not be enough to induce

them to put themselves at risk simply in the hope that others will join them. Only a nation that is strong enough to act decisively can provide the leadership needed to encourage others to resist aggression. Collective security failed in the 1930s because no strong power was willing to provide the leadership behind which less powerful countries could rally against Fascism. It worked in the Gulf because the United States was willing and able to provide that leadership. Thus, even when a broad potential coalition exists, leadership will be necessary to realize it.

The perceived capability – which depends upon the actual ability – of the United States to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor even in those cases where we do not actually use it. It will not always be incumbent upon us to assume a leadership role. In some cases, we will promote the assumption of leadership by others, such as the United Nations or regional organizations. In the end, there is no contradiction between U.S. leadership and multilateral action; history shows precisely that U.S. leadership is the necessary prerequisite for effective international action. We will, therefore, not ignore the need to be prepared to protect our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited additional help, or even alone, if necessary. A future President will need options allowing him to lead and, where the international reaction proves sluggish or inadequate, to act independently to protect our critical interests.

As a nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict. Once lost, that moment cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of combat. Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Five years after our resounding global victory in World War II, we were nearly pushed off the Korean peninsula by a third rate power. We erred in the past when we failed to maintain needed forces. And we paid dearly for our error.

## Enduring Requirements

The new defense strategy with its regional focus reflects the need to pay special attention to three enduring requirements of our national security posture. Each requires careful, long-term attention, the investment of defense resources, and supportive operating practices; each represents key strengths that cannot be readily restored should they be lost.

### Alliances

Our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. It represents a "silent victory" of building long-standing alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy. Defense cooperation among the democracies has not only deterred external threats, it has provided an environment in which we and our allies have peacefully developed and prospered. The United States will maintain and nurture its friendships and alliances in Europe, East Asia/Pacific, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, Latin America and elsewhere.

The growing strength of our friends and allies will make it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests. We will work with them towards this end, including reductions in U.S. military forces stationed overseas, particularly as our friends and allies are able to assume greater responsibilities. There will remain, however, a significant role for U.S. forward presence, including stationed forces, and changes must be managed carefully to ensure that reductions are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of U.S. commitment. In addition, certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others. Specific issues concerning alliances and coalitions are treated in detail in Part III, "Regional Goals and Challenges."

## High Quality Personnel

Our victory in the Gulf War demonstrated impressively the importance of high-quality personnel and effective leaders. The highly trained, highly motivated all-volunteer total force we have worked so hard to build is the key to maintaining our future military leadership and capabilities. We also require high-quality career civilians, especially in the managerial, scientific and technical fields. Our challenge for the future is to preserve the high-quality active, reserve, and civilian force we have worked so hard to build.

The Gulf War tested the training, discipline, and morale of our military forces and they performed superbly. To continue to attract the highest quality people, we must provide challenging and realistic training supplemented by advanced training techniques such as interactive simulation. We also must provide the quality of life they and their families deserve, including keeping the amount of time military units are deployed away from home at reasonable levels.

High-quality personnel require outstanding military leadership. Our success in the Gulf reflected such leadership. We must continue to train our military leaders in joint operations and in cooperative efforts with the forces of many different nations. They also must be given the opportunity and encouragement to pursue innovative doctrine for operations and new approaches to problems.

Identifying the core military competencies that will be most important in the future will be among the highest priorities of our military leadership. New equipment is not sufficient. Innovation in its use also is necessary. Our understanding of warfare and the way we intend to defend our interests as a nation must continually develop and evolve in the ongoing military-technological revolution. Future challenges will require the continued mastery of critical areas of warfare, but we also require mastery of evolving capabilities, perhaps replacing some that are critical today. An essential task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow's challenges while making hard decisions about capabilities we need no longer emphasize.

## Technological Superiority

The onset of a new military-technological revolution presents continued challenges not only in the realm of technological superiority but also in the way we organize, train, and employ our military forces. The Gulf War made clear the early promise of this revolution, emphasizing the importance of recent breakthroughs in low-observable, information gathering and processing, precision strike, and other key technologies. Our investment in innovation must be sustained at levels necessary to assure that U.S.-fielded forces dominate the military-technological revolution.

We must maintain superiority in key areas of technology. It is critical, therefore, that we identify the highest leverage technologies and pursue those with vigor. U.S. forces must retain a decisive lead in those technologies critical on future battlefields. To provide such high quality forces for tomorrow, we must, in the first instance, maintain a robust science and technology program, balanced between a core of broad sustaining programs and selected "thrusts" that contribute directly to high priority needs. This must be complemented by technology safeguards and export control regimes targeted, in coordination with our friends and allies, on particular proliferation concerns.

Robust science and technology alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems that are provided in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the technology testing process. Through simulation, we can investigate before we buy new weapons or systems how well they may perform on the battlefield. In addition, we must encourage new manufacturing processes, facilities, and equipment. This will be increasingly important over time.

All of this, however, does not mean we will move rapidly into large-scale production of numerous new weapons systems. We will be procuring less because our armed forces will be smaller, and because the need for modernization is reduced with the demise of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, time and production pressures created by Soviet weapons developments resulted in a defense acquisition process geared to early production of new systems, often without as thorough a prior development as desired. Science and technology can be a much more important factor in the overall acquisition process -- doing more than before to "prove out" new technology and components before programs enter the formal acquisition process. These concepts provide the basis for a new acquisition approach. Nevertheless,

development of new technologies and their incorporation into weapons systems through a more efficient acquisition process will be essential to provide the advantages smaller forces will need to deter or prevail in future conflicts.

## Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy

The Regional Defense Strategy seeks to protect American interests and to shape a more stable and democratic world. It does so by adopting a regional focus for our efforts to strengthen cooperative defense arrangements with friendly states and to preclude hostile, nondemocratic powers from dominating regions of the world critical to us. In this way also the strategy aims to raise a further barrier to the rise of any serious global challenge. To accomplish these goals, we must preserve U.S. leadership, maintain leading-edge military capabilities, and enhance collective security among democratic nations.

The Regional Defense Strategy rests on four essential elements:

Strategic Deterrence and Defense — a credible strategic nuclear deterrent capability, and strategic defenses against limited strikes.

Forward Presence — forward deployed or stationed forces (albeit at reduced levels) to strengthen alliances, show our resolve, and dissuade challengers in regions critical to us.

Crisis Response – forces and mobility to respond quickly and decisively with a range of options to regional crises of concern to us.

Reconstitution – the capability to create additional new forces to hedge against any renewed global threat.

### Strategic Deterrence and Defense

Even though the risk of a massive strategic nuclear attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, deterring nuclear attack must remain the highest defense priority of the nation. It is the one area where our survival could be at risk in a matter of moments. U.S. nuclear targeting policy and plans have changed, and should continue to change, to account for the welcome developments in states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless, survivable and flexible U.S. strategic nuclear forces still are essential to deter use of the modern nuclear forces that will exist in the former Soviet Union even after START and START II reductions have been implemented. Our strategic nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat emerging.

Fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have eliminated the threat of massive Soviet aggression launched from the former East Germany that required heavy reliance on the threat of nuclear weapons for deterrence. This permits us to move into a new era in nuclear forces. This was evidenced in the President's nuclear initiatives in 1991 and 1992, which made major changes in our tactical nuclear posture and strategic nuclear deterrent forces designed to enhance stability while eliminating weapons, to further reduce the possibility of accident or miscalculation, and to encourage corresponding reductions in the nuclear posture of the former Soviet Union.

The leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have stated their readiness to eliminate strategic offensive forces, while Russia is significantly reducing its force levels. (These four new states of the former Soviet Union are the only ones with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory. Russian authorities assure us that all tactical weapons are now on Russian territory.) They recognize the United States is not a threat and rightly view strategic forces as diverting scarce resources from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating the improvement of relations with the West We have been working with these leaders to provide financial and technical assistance to reduce and dismantle these nuclear forces. We already have some programs underway to assist with the safe and secure transportation, storage, and destruction of weapons and the prevention of their proliferation. We should actively seek additional ways to further these ends.

Both the U.S. and Russia have now agreed in START II to even more dramatic changes to their nuclear deterrent forces that will significantly enhance stability. For us these include, in addition to

reductions to START levels, fewer intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with the remaining ICBMs having only one warhead apiece; and fewer warheads on our ballistic missile submarines. In addition, a substantial number of bombers will be oriented primarily toward conventional missions. In the end, the actual number of warheads will be roughly half of what we planned to have under START.

As we reduce the size of our offensive nuclear forces, we must ensure the survivability -- and therefore the essential stability -- of our strategic deterrent. This will limit reductions in the overall number of strategic platforms. Our planning also should take account of the greatly reduced likelihood of a deliberate massive attack in the present international situation and consider the danger of an accidental or unauthorized attack.

A successful transformation of Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union to stable democracies should clearly be one of our major goals. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that these new states might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.

Strategic forces also will continue to support our global role and international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO. Collective defense allows countries to rely on the contributions of others in protecting their mutual interests in ways that lessen the risks and the costs for all. The nuclear umbrella that the United States has extended over our allies has helped deter attack successfully for four decades. This has been a risk-reducing and cost-saving measure for us all; it is one we can afford fiscally to continue and one that our interests cannot afford to let lapse.

Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and the threat of nuclear proliferation, despite our best efforts, persists. Other countries -- some of them, like Iraq, especially hostile and irresponsible -- threaten to acquire nuclear weapons. Some countries are also pursuing other highly-destructive systems, such as chemical and biological weapons. These developments require us to be able to deter use of such weapons, and to improve our defense capabilities.

The threats posed by instability in nuclear weapons states and by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles have grown considerably. The threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch may increase significantly through this decade. The new technology embodied in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program has made ballistic missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves and our forward deployed forces, but also to have the ability to extend protection to others. Like extended deterrence provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of extended protection for friends and allies and further strengthen a democratic security community. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act, we have sought to move toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles who may not be deterred by offensive forces alone. It is this vision that is reflected in our commitment to developing a Global Protection System (GPS) not only with traditional friends and allies but also with the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Deployment of defenses against limited strikes also should continue to be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses undermine the military utility of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles. (Further discussion of weapons of mass destruction issues is found in the Crisis Response section.)

The strategic command, control and communications system should continue to evolve toward a joint global structure, ensuring that its capabilities and survivability remain appropriate to the evolving threat and the smaller forces it will support. We also should take advantage of the potential of our strategic C31 investments to support conventional crisis response.

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In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of deterrent forces, tactical and strategic, while creating the proper balance between offense and active defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, whatever the source. For now this requires retaining ready forces for a survivable nuclear deterrent, including tactical forces. In addition, we must complete needed force modernization and upgrades. These deterrent forces need to be complemented with early introduction of ballistic missile defenses against limited strikes.

## Forward Presence

Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition. The roles that forward presence plays in specific regions under the Regional Defense Strategy are treated in detail in Part III, "Regional Goals and Challenges."

While we are prudently reducing the levels of our presence very substantially, it is increasingly important to emphasize our intent to retain adequate presence. We should plan to continue a wide range

of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but prepositioning and periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges or visits of forces. Forward basing of forces and the prepositioning of equipment facilitate rapid reinforcement and enhance the capability to project forces into critical regions.

Forward bases and access agreements must become more flexible as the security environment evolves. But they must remain oriented toward providing visible, though unobtrusive, presence and a forward staging area for responding to crises large and small. Forward bases are critical to successfully implementing our strategy at reduced force levels.

In regions of the world where we lack a land-based presence, maritime forces (including afloat prepositioned equipment), long-range aviation, and other contingency forces allow us to exert presence and underscore our commitment to friends and allies, and, when necessary, aid our response to crises. Exercises, occasional deployments, prepositioning, defense exchanges and visits build trust, cooperation and common operating procedures between militaries. Important, too, are host nation arrangements to provide the infrastructure and logistical support to allow for the forward deployment or projection of forces when necessary.

Our forward forces should increasingly be prepared to fulfill multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional roles, rather than being prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. Moreover, as in the Gulf War, our forward presence forces must be ready to provide support for military operations in other theaters. In addition, through forward presence, we can prosecute the war on drugs; provide humanitarian and security assistance and support for peacekeeping operations; evacuate U.S. citizens in danger abroad; and advance defense-to-defense contacts to strengthen democratic reforms.

Forward presence is a crucial element of the new regional strategy, and a major factor in overall conventional (including special operations) force size. Generally forces for forward presence (including associated CONUS-based forces for rotation) must be predominantly in the active components. As we reduce force structure to base force levels, each military department must seek innovative ways to continue providing the crucial benefits of forward presence -- both political and operational -- with acceptable impact on the smaller force. This calls for exploring new ways of operating forces in peacetime. Areas to consider include increasing the use of periodic visits of forces, possibly both active and reserve, for training or exercises; innovative manning or maintenance practices; additional overseas homeporting; combined planning; and security and humanitarian assistance.

Precipitous reductions in forward presence may unsettle security relations. Where forward bases are involved, due attention must be paid to minimizing the impact of dislocations on military families. Planned reductions should be undertaken deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

## Crisis Response

The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of the Regional Defense Strategy. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including forcible entry forces, remain key means of precluding challengers, of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges, and of achieving decisive results if the use of force is necessary.

During the Cold War, Americans understood that national survival was at stake and that a long, drawn-out and costly war could result in regional conflicts, our stake may seem less apparent. We should provide forces with capabilities that minimize the need to trade American lives with tyrants and aggressors who do not care about their own people. Thus, our response to regional crises must be decisive, requiring the high-quality personnel and technological edge to win quickly and with minimum casualties. A decisive force will not always be a large-scale force; sometimes a measured military action can contain or preclude a crisis, or otherwise obviate a much larger, more costly operation. But when we

choose to act, we must be capable of acting quickly and effectively. We must be prepared to make regional aggressors fight on our terms, matching our strengths against their weaknesses.

Consequently, crisis response requires maintaining a broad range of capabilities, particularly emphasizing high readiness forces sufficient to enable response to short-warning contingencies; sufficient munitions and spares; adequate intelligence capabilities; enhanced mobility to enable us to deploy sizable forces long distances on short notice; and a number of specific enhancements growing out of lessons learned from the Gulf War.

Our strategy further recognizes that when the United States is engaged, perhaps in concert with others, in a substantial regional crisis or is committed to a more prolonged operation, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to exploit our preoccupation. Under these circumstances, our forces must remain able to deter or to respond rapidly to other crises or to expand an initial crisis deployment in the event of escalation, also on short notice.

The short notice that may characterize many regional crises requires highly responsive military forces. Required military personnel will be maintained in that component of the Total Force -- active or reserve -- in which they can most effectively, including with minimum casualties, and most economically accomplish required missions. This generally requires forces for forward presence (including associated COWS-based forces for rotation) and combat forces and initial support forces for crisis response to be predominantly in the active components. Reserve components will fulfill vital contingency roles, primarily including mobility and selected critical support for initially deploying forces; increasing increments of support for continuing and expanding deployments; and increasing increments of combat capability as well, especially for large, protracted and/or concurrent contingencies.

The crisis response element of the strategy also has important implications for our inter- and intra-theater mobility posture. Our crisis response forces will be drawn largely from COWS, or possibly from forward deployed locations in other theaters. Our mobility posture must be able to supplement forward presence forces quickly and provide the bulk of necessary combat power and support.

Future regional conflicts will be complicated by increases in both the conventional and unconventional capabilities of potential adversaries. During the Gulf War we had to prepare to handle an adversary holding chemical weapons and biological agents. We remain concerned that a number of potentially hostile nations are working to develop nuclear or other unconventional weapons. The threat of regional adversaries introducing nuclear weapons would greatly complicate future regional crises. As we learned from our experience with Iraq, it can be extremely difficult to know how far such efforts have progressed. Even relatively old technology, which in fact will characterize the vast majority of cases, can represent a tremendous challenge, as demonstrated by the Iraqi use of ballistic missiles in the Gulf War.

The global diffusion of conventional military and dual-use technologies will enable a growing number of countries to field highly capable conventional weapons systems, such as stealthy cruise missiles, integrated air defenses, submarines, modern command and control systems, and even space-based assets. Third World countries attempting to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons will undoubtedly attempt to take advantage of economic distress in the former Soviet Union. We have worked multilaterally to strengthen international regimes intended to halt the diffusion of these weapons and technologies, and bilaterally to stop unauthorized leakage.

U.S. forces must be capable of operating against adversaries who possess weapons of mass destruction. Active defenses (including existing theater missile defense assets and future assets for global protection against limited strikes), passive defenses (including detection capabilities, more effective vehicle crew-compartment protective systems, and vaccines), and specialized intelligence will be needed. If the use of weapons of mass destruction is threatened, we may need to win even more quickly and decisively, and we would still want to retain the advantages necessary to keep our own losses as low as possible. (Further discussion of WMD issues is found in the Strategic Deterrence and Defense section.)

The Gulf War provides a host of lessons that should continue to guide future crisis response planning. The Department should selectively focus investment on the following high-priority areas: rapidly deployable anti-armor capabilities; enhanced combat abilities to identify friendly forces and thus reduce casualties from misdirected friendly fire; improved naval and land mine and countermine capabilities; defenses against chemical and biological weapons and agents; defenses against tactical ballistic and

cruise missiles; improved capabilities for precision air strikes; improved integration and flexibility of tactical command, control, communications and intelligence; and improved national-level intelligence. More generally, the Department also should apply the relevant lessons of the Gulf War identified in the Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War and other subsequent reports. A complete understanding of the war and its implications for U.S. forces will continue to evolve for some time to come.

Finally, we must be prepared for crises and contingencies stemming from low-intensity conflict, which includes terrorism, insurgency, and subversion. In response to these threats to our interests, we must be prepared to undertake smaller-scale operations that require forces using specialized skills, equipment, or approaches. Such operations include non-combatant evacuations, peacekeeping missions, hostage rescues, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

## Reconstitution

With the demise of the Cold War, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now very distant -- so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision. The new strategy, therefore, prudently reduces spending and accepts risk in this lower probability area of threat in order to refocus reduced defense resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the enduring requirements of our strategy.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has made it much less likely that a global conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will reemerge from the Eurasian heartland for many years to come — at least for the balance of this decade. Even if, for example, some future Russian leadership were to adopt strategic aims threatening a global challenge similar to that presented by the Soviet Union in the Cold War, current estimates are that such force reconstitution efforts would allow several years or more of U.S./allied response time, and could only happen after an authoritarian reversal and systemic realignment itself spanning several years.

Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new global threat or some emergent alliance of hostile, nondemocratic regional powers. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy focuses on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of a global threat contrary to the interests of the United States. Should such a threat begin to emerge, we would use the available lead time to forestall or counter it at the lowest possible levels of militarization. Our reconstitution strategy seeks to provide sufficient capability to create additional new forces and capabilities to deter and defend our interests as necessary, drawing on "regeneration" assets (cadre-type units and stored equipment), industrial/technology base assets, and manpower assets.

Reconstitution should use low-cost assets to provide an inexpensive hedge. As we draw down the force, Cold War investments present opportunities for "smart lay-away" of long-lead elements of force structure or production capability that offer a high-leverage reconstitution hedge at quite modest cost, or might become useful to a friendly nation facing a major threat.

Measures planned and used for response to early indications of a specific reconstitution threat must strike a careful balance between, on the one hand, the needs to demonstrate resolve, strengthen deterrence, and begin enhancing military capabilities, and, on the other hand, the imperative to avoid provocative steps and to maintain the ability to arrest or reverse our steps without creating military vulnerabilities.

## Translating the Elements into Forces and Programs.

Our forces and programs have been designed and sized as a coherent whole to support the elements of our new regional defense strategy, carefully weighing present and future challenges. The restructuring needed to support our new strategy also calls for a shift from program planners' traditional four "pillars" of military capability (readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure) to six pillars. We have divided the modernization pillar, distinguishing science and technology from systems acquisition, to make explicit the higher relative priority of science and technology in this new era. We have designated infrastructure and overhead as a new pillar, to explicitly focus on the need for cuts in overhead in this time of major cuts in fighting capability.

Accordingly, we have adopted these relative priorities among the new six "pillars" of defense resources:

Readiness

Force Structure

Sustainability

Science and Technology

Systems Acquisition

Infrastructure and Overhead

Specifically, it is of utmost importance to maintain forces of high readiness and adequate size. Of lower but still high priority is the sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of regional conflicts. The new strategy also gives high priority to selected science and technology to keep our qualitative edge in systems and in doctrine. By contrast, a profound slowing in former Soviet modernization that long drove our programs enables greatly reduced emphasis on systems acquisition, and a fundamentally new approach to overall defense acquisition. Finally, the Department must vigorously pursue reductions and management efficiencies in defense infrastructure and overhead, continuing the vigorous pursuit of savings initiated under the Defense Management Review. This relative priority among the new "six pillars" aims to reduce our cost of doing business and direct our shrinking resources to ensuring very high quality, ready forces and rigorous technical and doctrinal innovation.

# III. REGIONAL GOALS AND CHALLENGES

We can take advantage of the Cold War's end and the dissolution of the Soviet Union to shift our planning focus to regional threats and challenges. The future of events in major regions remains uncertain. Regional and local actors may pursue hostile agendas through direct confrontation or through such indirect means as subversion and terrorism. The new defense strategy, with its focus on regional matters, seeks to shape this uncertain future and position us to retain the capabilities needed to protect our interests. With this focus we should work with our friends and allies to preclude the emergence of hostile, nondemocratic threats to our critical interests and to shape a more secure international environment conducive to our democratic ideals.

## Europe

We confront a Europe in the midst of historic transformation, no longer starkly divided between the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and the Western Alliance. We have made great strides toward a Europe "whole and free." We are striving to aid the efforts in the former Eastern bloc to build free societies. Over the long term, the most effective guarantee that the former Soviet empire's successor states do not threaten U.S. and Western interests is successful democratization and economic reform.

The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold War into a relationship characterized by cooperation as articulated in the Washington Charter signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in June of 1992. But we must recognize what we are so often told by the leaders of the new democracies -- that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an essential part of the West's overall efforts to maintain stability even in the midst of such dramatic change. History has demonstrated that our own security is inseparably linked to that of Europe. It is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. engagement and participation in larger European security affairs, even as we work increasingly with the other institutions emerging in Europe.

Our common security and European stability can be enhanced by the further development of a network of interlocking institutions that, in conjunction with NATO, constitute the emerging security architecture of Europe. We should work within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and with the European Community (EC) and the Western European Union (WEU) to promote security and stability. Emerging frameworks of regional cooperation also will be important

Even as European institutions grow, we need to strengthen Alliance cohesion, and to develop new common understandings of how the Alliance can respond collectively to future challenges. Our European friends and allies should be encouraged to assume a greater share of the burden in maintaining world order and protecting common interests worldwide. Important security interests are at stake for both the Europeans and for us in many areas, including notably Eastern Europe, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean, including North Africa.

In June 1992, the North Atlantic Council of NATO agreed to support CSCE peacekeeping activities on a case-by-case basis. In the former Yugoslavia, NATO has deployed its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea to assist with UN sanctions, while NATO AWACS are helping to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO defense ministers in December 1992 agreed to refine NATO's capability for such peacekeeping operations. They announced that support for UN and CSCE peacekeeping should be included among the missions of NATO forces and headquarters and tasked their permanent representatives to identify specific measures to enhance NATO's peacekeeping capabilities.

As NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO's integrated military command structure. While U.S. forces will continue to be stationed on the continent and contiguous maritime areas, the new threat environment will enable us to reduce their number, and they may, in part, play more specialized roles. But our objective should be to preserve a substantial level of U.S. forces in Western Europe with sufficient organic combat and support capabilities to maintain the viability of the Alliance; promote peaceful

progress in Europe; permit the timely reinforcement of Europe should there be a reemergence of a significant threat; and support out-of-area contingencies. The peaceful defense-to-defense contacts between our forces in Europe and the militaries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union also can be a force for peace.

To retain meaningful operational capabilities, our objective for U.S. ground forces in Western Europe should be a capable corps. We can also reduce our tactical fighter wing presence by half or more. We have eliminated ground-based nuclear forces in Europe and withdrawn U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at sea, but U.S. dual-capable aircraft and their nuclear weapons remain based in Europe; this preserves the alliance's historic emphasis on extended deterrence. These reductions translate to a presence of less than half the level of our forces at the beginning of the decade. NATO itself has adapted, through a new strategic concept that proposes smaller and multinational forces with increased mobility and an emphasis on crisis management. As U.S. forces stationed in Europe become smaller, they must remain capable of responding to crises throughout and outside of the region.

The end of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of democratic states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. It is critical to U.S. interests in Europe and those of our allies that we assist the new democracies in Eastern Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions, establish free market economies and safeguard their national independence. Regional security challenges work to divert their efforts from these ends and endanger their progress. The continued ascendancy of democratic reformers in Russia, Ukraine and other states of Eastern Europe would be the surest counter to concerns raised by the long history of conflict in the region.

Security and democratization in the former Eastern Bloc also would be enhanced by mutual cooperation among the Eastern Europeans as well as with the United States, NATO and other Western Allies. NATO can assist the Eastern Europeans in reevaluating their defense postures. We must increase our defense-to defense contacts with countries of both the former Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. These contacts should strive to underscore to the military leaders of these new democracies the importance of civilian control of the military through the institutions of democratic government. We also must assist the Eastern Europeans in reforming their military institutions as they institute new national defense doctrines to replace the offensive posture associated with the Warsaw Pact.

The United States has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation within and peaceful relations among Russia, Ukraine, and other new states of the former Soviet Union. A democratic partnership with Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states would be the best possible outcome. If democracy matures in Russia and Ukraine there is every possibility that they will be a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other regions where previously Soviet policy aggravated local conditions and encouraged unrest and conflict.

Our increasing defense-to-defense contacts with Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states should support the peaceful resolution of differences among them and help in fostering democratic philosophies of civil-military relations through the institutions of democratic government, transparency, and defensive military doctrines and postures. We also can further our concerns and those of our allies by assisting the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states to reduce dramatically the military burden on their societies, further reduce their forces, convert excess military industries to civilian production, assist efforts to dismantle and dispose of nuclear weapons safely and maintain firm command and control over those that remain, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries. Military budget cuts in Russia and the other new states will significantly improve the chances of democratic consolidations and demilitarization by freeing up resources for more productive investments and thus improving the chance of economic success.

At the same time, as we work to strengthen democracy, we must consider the possibility that undemocratic regimes could emerge in some of the new states and seek to remilitarize their policies and societies. Our challenge and that of our allies is to maintain our collective capacity to defend against an aggressive regime in such a way that we do not disrupt future cooperation with a democratic state or weaken the chances of successful reform. Overall, we strengthen the hand of democracy if our opposition to aggression is clear and there is a common understanding that the potential remains for strong collective response to aggression.

## East Asia/Pacific

East Asia and the Pacific hold enormous strategic and economic importance for us and our allies. Japan and Korea together represent almost sixteen percent of the world economy; China alone holds a quarter of the world's population. U.S. two-way trade with the region stands at $310 billion, approximately one third more than the total of our two-way trade with Europe. In addition, East Asia remains an area of enormous concentration of military power, actual and latent, nuclear and conventional. The area contains either within it or on its periphery many of the largest armies in the world, including those of Russia, China, India, the two Koreas, and Vietnam.

To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain a significant military presence in the area, which even before current reductions in Asia represented only a small proportion of U.S. forces worldwide. We must maintain sufficient forward deployed forces and power projection capability to reassure our regional allies and friends, to preclude destabilizing military rivalries, to secure freedom of the seas, to deter threats to our key political and economic interests, and to preclude any hostile power from attempting to dominate the region. A strong U.S. military position, welcomed by leaders throughout the region, promotes conditions conducive to realization of objectives we share: democratization, protection of human rights, peaceful political change, and the spread of market economies and prosperity. Our forces in the region also support other of our U.S. security objectives, as recently demonstrated by the reliance on Pacific military facilities and forces to help project power into the Persian Gulf.

We must work to preserve our vigorous security alliances, especially with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. We should continue to encourage Japan and South Korea in particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities to deal with threats and responsibilities they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for U.S. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security. Japanese contributions in securing maritime approaches is one example. We also should persist in efforts to ensure an equitable, two-way flow of technology in our security cooperation with advanced allies such as Japan. We must plan to continue to safeguard critical sea lines of communications linking us to our allies and trading partners.

As our Pacific friends and allies are assuming greater responsibility for their defense, we can restructure our forces and reduce the number of ground and support forces forward deployed there. An appropriate framework for adjustments to our forward-deployed forces in the region is outlined in the East Asia Strategy Initiative as reported to Congress. In Phase I of our planned withdrawals more than *25,000* troops were withdrawn from bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. Plans to remove additional forces from South Korea have been suspended while we address the problem posed by the North Korean nuclear program. In time we should look to implement Phases II and III of the East Asia Strategy Initiative, with the objective of keeping substantial forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future.

Despite recent positive trends toward political liberalization and market-oriented economic reforms, the East Asia and Pacific region continues to be burdened by several legacies of the Cold War. the Soviet annexation of the Northern Territories of Japan, the division of the Korean Peninsula, and the civil war in Cambodia. The end of Communism in Europe is likely to bring pressure on remaining Communist regimes with unknown consequences for regional stability. We should continue to advance our relations with China on a realistic basis but also should ensure that Taiwan has the armaments needed to defend itself as provided by the Taiwan Relations Act, while taking into account the August 1982 Communiqué with China on Taiwan arms sales. We should work to curtail proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to advance democracy, freedom, and human rights in the countries of the region that lack them.

Our most active regional security concern in Asia remains the military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. Although we have begun some reductions in our forces as part of shifting greater responsibility to our ally, we must maintain sufficient military capabilities together with the Republic of Korea to deter aggression by the North or to defeat it should deterrence fail. Our overall objective with regard to the Korean peninsula should remain to support its

peaceful unification on terms acceptable to the Korean people which foster democracy, freedom, and observance of human tights.

The emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an increasingly influential regional actor has been an important positive development. ASEAN's population of 320 million is almost twice that of Japan and Korea combined. Southeast Asia is a region of increasing economic strength. By the end of the century, the combined ASEAN economies are forecasted to reach $800 billion, over $100 billion larger than China's. The United States shares an interest with the ASEAN countries in precluding Southeast Asia from becoming an area of strategic competition among regional powers.

With regard to U.S. bases in Southeast Asia, we have withdrawn our forces from the Philippines, consistent with the desires of the Philippine government. At the same time, we have sought to broaden our network of access agreements similar to the recently concluded Singapore access memorandum in lieu of permanent bases throughout Southeast Asia. These kinds of agreements will facilitate bilateral training, exercises, and interoperability, thereby enhancing our ability to work with allies and friends in crisis.

The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance relationship remains an important component of our security architecture in the Pacific, although security guarantees to New Zealand are presently suspended because of New Zealand's failure to live up to its alliance obligations. Our goal should remain to strengthen our partnership with Australia and work to remove obstacles to reintegrating New Zealand as a full partner in ANZUS.

As is the case in other regions, proliferation remains a central concern in Asia. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures that enhance stability. We should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

## The Middle East/Persian Gulf and South Asia

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, we should seek to foster regional stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways and to the region's important sources of oil. We should strive to encourage a peace process that brings about reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel in a manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's security. Some near-term dangers are alleviated with the defeat of Iraqi forces, but we must recognize that regional dynamics can change and a rejuvenated Iraq or a rearmed Iran could move in this decade to dominate the Gulf and its resources. We must remain prepared to act decisively in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region as we did in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm if our vital interests there are threatened anew. We also must be prepared to counter the terrorism, insurgency, and subversion that adversaries may use to threaten governments supportive of U.S. security interests.

The Gulf War has greatly enhanced our security relations in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region and underscored their continued importance. Taken together, many facets of this experience -- cooperation in combat, logistical support, and financial participation -- and our subsequent cooperation on forward presence of U.S. forces promise continued close ties with nations of the region on which we can build.

To discourage the rise of a challenger hostile to our interests in the region, we must maintain a level of forward military presence adequate to reassure our friends and deter aggressors and present a credible crisis response capability. In consultation with our regional friends, we should increase our presence compared to the pre-Gulf War period. We will want to have the capability to return forces quickly to the region should that ever be necessary. We also should strengthen our bilateral security ties and encourage active regional collective defense.

We can strengthen stability throughout the region by sustaining and improving the self-defense capabilities of our regional friends. The United States is committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to Israel's security. Israel's confidence in its security and

U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation contribute to stability, as demonstrated once again during the Persian Gulf War. At the same time, our assistance to our Arab friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region, including for Israel

We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military and commercial sales without jeopardizing power balances m the region. We should tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable our regional friends to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

We should build on existing bilateral ties and negotiate needed agreements to enhance military access and prepositioning arrangements and other types of defense cooperation. These protocols will strengthen and broaden the individual and collective defense of friendly states.

The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the potential danger from future wars throughout the region. We should continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons and reverse the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles. We also should continue to work with leading suppliers of conventional weapons to the region (as called for in President Bush's 1991 Middle East arms control initiative) to prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

We should seek to maintain constructive, cooperative relations with India and Pakistan, strive to moderate tensions between them, and endeavor to eliminate nuclear arms programs on the subcontinent. In this regard, we should work in South Asia as elsewhere to have all countries adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of international terrorism complicate our relations with regional countries. The Department should continue to contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and support the efforts of U.S. agencies in the region.

## Latin America and the Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States seeks to sustain the extraordinary democratic progress of the last decade and maintain a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy should remain assisting democratic consolidation and the efforts of the democratic nations in the region to defend themselves against the threat posed by insurgency and terrorism. In addition, the United States must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

Cuba poses an area of special concern for the United States. The end of Warsaw Pact subsidies has added to Cuba's economic decline. Over the near- to mid-term, Cuba's tenuous internal situation and its disproportionately large military could generate new challenges to U.S. policy, particularly because Castro retains the hostile intent that has for decades sought to undermine democratic progress in Central and South America.

The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we should seek the continued successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also should seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we should seek to strengthen their democratic institutions. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

The small island-states of the eastern Caribbean remain vulnerable to destabilization. Assistance in economic development is key, but we also should explore ways of strengthening the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System to strengthen democracy in these nations.

Following implementation of the Panama Canal treaty, we will have no permanent bases on the Latin America mainland. The general wend toward democratization and peace in Latin America and the dramatic reductions of former Soviet and East European aid to Cuba are long-sought developments. Nonetheless, potential regional problems remain, including the potential for instability in Cuba and elsewhere, and the continuing challenge of stopping trafficking in illegal drugs from this region.

Countering drug trafficking remains a high priority. Our counterdrug programs in the region must focus on stemming the flow of drugs by attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the United States.

## Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa has made encouraging progress toward democratization and economic liberalization. While seeking to facilitate these trends wherever possible, our continuing military role should be to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens, including undertaking noncombatant evacuation operations when necessary; alleviating disaster and distress with humanitarian assistance; strengthening the security, stability, and economic development of friendly states and supporting their democratic development and extending support to international peacekeeping efforts. Our commitment to alleviating distress can be seen particularly in our role in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, striving to create a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian relief operations. Out of the turmoil in South Africa we hope to see emerge a fully representative government still friendly to the United States and supportive of Western interests in the area.

# CONCLUSION

We must preserve the extraordinary environment that has emerged from the challenges of the Cold War – an environment within which the values of freedom that we and our principal allies hold dear can flourish. We can secure and extend the remarkable democratic "zone of peace" that we and our allies now enjoy, preclude threats, and guard our national interests.

The Gulf War is a vivid reminder that we cannot be sure when or where the next conflict will arise. In early 1990, many said there were no threats left because of the Soviet commitment to withdraw from Eastern Europe; very few expected that we would be at war within a year. The experience of the past century is replete with instances in which enormous strategic changes often arose unexpectedly in the course of a few years or even less. This is not a lesson that we should have to keep learning anew.

As we reshape America's military and reduce its size, we must be careful that we do so in accordance with a defense strategy and a plan that will preserve the integrity of the military capability that we have so carefully built. If we choose wisely today, we can do well something America has always done badly before –we can draw down our military force at a responsible rate that will not end up endangering our security. The new Regional Defense Strategy has set a course to ensure our ability to deal with potential threats and shape the environment in ways favorable to our security.

(Signed)

Dick Cheney