International Pipeline

Yilber Diaz is expected to make his major league debut tonight. It’s been a meteoric rise, to be sure. Prior to this season, I doubt that anyone would have expected him to appear in the majors this year, and the jury was definitely out on whether he would appear at all. He needed to improve his control just to have a good chance at a bullpen shot.

He’ll be the third of Mike Hazen’s international signings to appear for the Diamondbacks this season, joining Justin Martinez and Jorge Barrosa. Barrosa was part of Hazen’s original international signing class, and Martinez signed the following year. Diaz, on the other hand, has moved through the system at a lightning pace; he signed in 2021. He was 20. He cost $10,000. He’ll turn 24 next month. He’ll become the 91^st international signing 25 or younger to appear in the major leagues this year.

One criticism that has been leveled against the Diamondbacks is the lack of success in the international market. This is an unfair criticism, for multiple reasons. Only three teams have more homegrown international players either on the major league roster or in AAA than do the Diamondbacks, and that’s not counting Deyvison De Los Santos, who is now listed as “R5 (Ret)” on RosterResource, and so is not counted as an international signing. The Diamondbacks have seven such players; the Yankees have eight, the Blue Jays nine, and the Astros 11. (In addition to Diaz, Barrosa, and Martinez, there’s Christian Montes De Oca who was also signed by Hazen; Geraldo Perdomo and Luis Frías were signed by the Dave Stewart regime, and Jose Herrera dates all the way back to Kevin Towers.) Furthermore, the four players the Diamondbacks have signed and kept and are at least as advanced as AAA is only exceeded by the Guardians and Giants, each of whom have five.

The issue is a matter of the way that human reasoning works. We have a tendency to notice only the successes of others. And because the Diamondbacks have not developed a Ronald Acuña Jr., a Juan Soto, or an Elly De La Cruz, we view this as a failure. Our best international player was signed by the Blue Jays. That’s an understandable statement. But it’s also unfair.

It’s only from 2017 on that Hazen has had the opportunity to sign international players. (Yes, the previous front office was also working with penalties preventing them from signing the best, but that was their own fault, and the restrictions weren’t preventing them from signing future big league players for $10,000, either.) How has the NL West fared signing and developing players from Latin America in this time? (Again, this is using the RosterResource depth charts, which are not entirely accurate.)

Among players signed since Hazen took over, the Diamondbacks (when counting Diaz) have had just as many placed on the 40-man and will have as many reaching the major leagues. They also have substantially more international players on domestic rosters than do the other teams in the division. But this table illustrates what a crapshoot prospect development is. The Rockies are the only team in the division that has managed to develop an international star all the way from prospect to the majors. Ezequiel Tovar has been more valuable than all of the other signings by the other teams, combined. That’s highly unlikely to continue to be the case, as there will be many more prospects coming through.

In fact, Hazen has done well with his international signings, particularly given the lack of investment on that front left over from the previous front office. International signings take a long time to work out; you cannot “win-now” with international signings, with the exception of Japanese or some Korean signings. (And the Diamondbacks aren’t signing that caliber of player, anyway.) How long does it take the international market to bear fruit? The 2017 international signing class included Kristian Robinson, Neyfy Castillo, Wilderd Patiño, and Jhosmer Alvarez. Alvarez is making a case for being in the short-term bullpen plans, let alone the long-term. The others look closer to washing out, but the oldest of that group is Robinson. He’s 23. That’s the same age as Andrew Pintar, who was enjoying a bit of a breakout season and hopefully will pick up where he left off when he comes back. The fact is, that while it seems unlikely that Robinson, Castillo, or Patiño become regular major leaguers, they are depth pieces who have been developed through the system, and they are young enough that they could still break out, although it would be unwise to hold one’s breath.

One area at which Hazen has excelled is finding the players who were passed over when they were younger. These “late bloomers” were signed by the Diamondbacks at 18, 19, 20, or even 22 like Christian Montes De Oca. Some times won’t even look at them because their model penalizes age to that extent. But apart from Diaz and Montes De Oca, the Diamondbacks have found Ricardo Yan, Modeifi Marte, and some guy named Deyvison De Los Santos with these later signings.

When Hazen took over, he had a farm system with a few high-level talents but very little developmental talent. Tony La Russa’s focus on winning in the immediate backfired spectacularly. Hazen, in contrast to some general managers, doesn’t target the big-ticket international amateurs. Sure, he’ll sign a couple of the big bonus players, but He’s much more interested in high-ceiling players on the international market than he is in “can’t miss” talents.

Becoming competitive in the international market was one of Hazen’s first priorities. He hired Cesar Geronimo Jr. away from the Cardinals. Under Geronimo’s leadership, Latin America has turned from a weakness to a strength; there is now a steady pipeline of talent coming from all over the region. Building that pipeline has brought a few players to the big league level already (as well as some trade chips like Liover Peguero) and the flow has only started. It would not be surprising to find, in five years, Geronimo as the most valuable signing Mike Hazen ever made.

When Yilber Diaz takes the mound tonight, it will be the culmination of a surprising journey, but it will also be an illustration of how the Diamondbacks have changed from one of the weakest organizations as far as the Latin American pipeline is concerned to one of the strongest.

Yilber Diaz Scouting Report

I collect baseball cards. Too many of them, at least according to some people. Baseball cards are also ubiquitous again; there are too many of them, and prospects seem to get most of them. You might have to pay hundreds of dollars to have a good chance of getting an autographed card from Jordan Lawlar, Deyvison De Los Santos, Druw Jones, or even Kevin Sim. Yilber Diaz has exactly one card available, according to tcdb.com. It’s part of the team set from Hillsboro.

That’s kind of rough for him. Given that his signing bonus was all of $10,000, he probably could use whatever money Fanatics and Panini and Onyx and Leaf are giving out these days. I wonder if he is the only player in recent years to make his major league debut with such a scant number of cards?

I’ve written about Diaz at some length already, but with his making his debut today, a more formalized scouting report might be a good idea. I ranked him atop my right-handed starting pitcher rankings, ahead of Cristian Mena, and I’ll copy what I wrote, followed by a more exact report.

Diaz has earned his spot on the top of these rankings with a great start to his season, showcasing the improved control he needed. He’s found AAA a bit harder so far, but he has the best fastball in the system, with the potential to touch triple digits and sit around 95 until he tires. His curveball provides him with a second plus pitch, and his slider is a useful weapon as well. His changeup has improved this year, but still lags well behind his other offerings.

After I wrote this, Diaz turned in his best start of his career, and was able to maintain fastball velocity throughout. That features into what I write below.

Diaz is listed at 6’0”, 190. His slight build could remind one a bit of Pedro Martinez, but that is the limit of the comparisons. Partially because of his build and lack of control, people have regarded him as primarily a reliever prior to this season. It has only been this year, as he showcased better control and pitched deeper into games, that his being a starter in the future became a reasonable option. He can throw four pitches, but three of them are his major offerings, and each of those pitches has the ability to induce swing-and-miss.

He throws from a high angle, which can accentuate the movement on both his fastball and his curveball, as well as being different from what batters are used to seeing.

Fastball: With Diaz, the fastball has been the calling card. It was the fastball that caused the Diamondbacks to take a chance on him. It is also his primary pitch; he threw it 46 times out of his 88 pitches his last time out. It averages in the upper 90s, with the capacity to touch triple digits, although that is rare (he topped out at 98.1 last time out.) At its best, it has elite-level carry (rise). He has that in common with Dodgers’ prospect Landon Knack, who the Diamondbacks faced last week. However, he averages 3-4 MPH more on the pitch than does Knack. In fact, for a combination of velocity and movement, his fastball is better than Justin Martinez’s. The issue is that it is inconsistent. When he is on his game, the pitch will be hitting just above the zone at 97 MPH with arm-side movement. He does tend to pull the ball sometimes.

Curveball: The curveball isn’t quite a 12-to-6 curve like some describe it, in that it does possess some glove-side movement (more, in fact, than the slider). It’s a high-70s pitch, occasionally reaching 80, but it’s all about the movement. Of the 13 curveballs he threw his last time out, the one with the least vertical movement moved 57 inches. It could be Aaron Civale’s or Simeon Woods-Richardson’s curveball. But the issue with it is simple: it doesn’t fool hitters enough. Of the 13 curveballs he threw last time out, two were called strikes, one was a swinging strike, and one was a groundout. The rest were taken for balls. The pitch seems to be most effective when it is missing the zone high and then drops into the zone, as this tunnels better with the fastball; when it is low, it is too easy for batters to lay off of it, and major league hitters should have no difficulty with that.

Slider: The slider is often mis-labled by Statcast as a cutter, for the reason that it moves a lot like one. It’s not a big sweeping slider. Instead, it’s a mid-80s pitch that tunnels well with the fastball, then breaks down and slightly glove-side. In that way, it is basically the opposite of his fastball. It is his greatest weapon against left-handed bats, because rather than burying the slider below the zone, he pushes it in on their hands. The lack of horizontal movement actually serves him well in this regard, because a pitch started over the middle of the plate will only break to the corner, and so it’s not as easy to just lay off of it.

Changeup: The changeup is still a work in progress. Diaz did not throw one last time out. Statcast has stripped it out of the data, re-classifying most of those pitches as slower fastballs and possibly a few as sliders. But it does exist. If perfected, it could be a weapon to go along with the slider, as it does produce similar vertical movement but basically the opposite horizontal movement. I expect that Diaz stays away from the changeup tonight.

The slider is his most important pitch. Diaz has performed as well against left-handed bats as right-handed bats throughout his career, and the slider is the main reason. If he can learn Zac Gallen’s changeup, he might be unhittable.

There are still some concerns about his control, but not as many. Through his first nine starts this year, he struck out 70 and walked just 19. He then had his worst three starts, all of which came in a row, during which he allowed 13 of his 34 runs, walked 15, and struck out just eight. His last three starts, he’s been back on his game again, striking out 27 and walking four. It wasn’t moving up the level that caused the bad starts; two of them happened in Amarillo, so arguably it was moving up to Reno that fixed things.

Yilber Diaz was on the roster for the Spring Breakout game earlier this year. He followed that up by breaking out, and finally breaking into the big leagues. Chances are, he’ll get a baseball card next year, if not in the update series later this year.