Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses

Sec. 53a-25. Felony: Definition, classification, designation. (a) An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year is a felony.

(b) Felonies are classified for the purposes of sentence as follows: (1) Class A, (2) class B, (3) class C, (4) class D, (5) class E, (6) unclassified, and (7) capital felonies under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012.

(c) The particular classification of each felony defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section defining it.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 25; P.A. 73-137, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 9; P.A. 12-5, S. 17; P.A. 13-258, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 73-137 added capital felonies classification in Subsec. (b); P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsecs. (a) and (c) and amended Subsec. (b)(6) to delete “for which the sentence of death may be imposed as provided in sections 53a-46a and 53a-54b”; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (b)(6) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re capital felonies, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 13-258 amended Subsec. (b) to add new Subdiv. (5) re class E felony and redesignate existing Subdivs. (5) and (6) as Subdivs. (6) and (7), designated provision of Subsec. (c) re unclassified felony as Subsec. (d) and amended same to make applicable to any felony offense defined in any section of the general statutes for which a particular classification is not expressly designated, add Subdiv. (1) re class E felony, and designate existing reference to unclassified felony as Subdiv. (2) and amend same by adding provision re felony offense where maximum term of imprisonment is otherwise within definition in Subsec. (a).

See Secs. 53a-35 and 53a-35a re sentences for felonies.

See Sec. 53a-41 re fines for felonies.

Cited. 170 C. 601. Police officer may arrest without previous complaint or warrant any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony. 171 C. 105. Cited. 196 C. 305.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 11 CA 11; 28 CA 91.

Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.

Sec. 53a-26. Misdemeanor: Definition, classification, designation. (a) An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year is a misdemeanor.

(b) Misdemeanors are classified for the purposes of sentence as follows: (1) Class A, (2) class B, (3) class C, (4) class D, and (5) unclassified.

(c) The particular classification of each misdemeanor defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section defining it.

(d) Any offense defined in any section of the general statutes which, by virtue of an expressly specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection (a) of this section, but for which a particular classification is not expressly designated, shall be deemed: (1) A class A misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is one year; (2) a class B misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is six months; (3) a class C misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is three months; (4) a class D misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is thirty days; and (5) an unclassified misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is a term other than a term set forth in subdivision (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this subsection.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 26; P.A. 92-260, S. 10; P.A. 12-80, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 12-80 amended Subsec. (b) to add new Subdiv. (4) re class D misdemeanor and redesignate existing Subdiv. (4) as Subdiv. (5), designated provision of Subsec. (c) re unclassified misdemeanor as Subsec. (d) and amended same to make applicable to any offense defined in any section of the general statutes for which a particular classification is not expressly designated and add Subdivs. (1) to (5) re deemed classification of misdemeanors.

See Sec. 53a-36 re sentences for misdemeanors.

See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.

Cited. 202 C. 443.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 41 CA 476; 43 CA 1.

Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.

Sec. 53a-27. Violation: Definition, designation. (a) An offense, for which the only sentence authorized is a fine, is a violation unless expressly designated an infraction.

(b) Every violation defined in this chapter is expressly designated as such. Any offense defined in any other section which is not expressly designated a violation or infraction shall be deemed a violation if, notwithstanding any other express designation, it is within the definition set forth in subsection (a).

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 27; P.A. 75-577, S. 4, 126.)

History: P.A. 75-577 excluded offenses expressly designated as infractions from consideration as violation.

See chapter 881b re infractions.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 27 CA 225; 40 CA 762; 41 CA 454.

Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.

PART II*

SENTENCES AND SENTENCING PROCEDURE

*Cited. 207 C. 152; 240 C. 639.

Cited. 34 CA 1; 39 CA 722. Court properly considered evidence of defendant's criminal history in its determination to revoke defendant's probation. 58 CA 275.

Sec. 53a-28. Authorized sentences. (a) Except as provided in section 17a-699 and chapter 420b, to the extent that the provisions of said section and chapter are inconsistent herewith, every person convicted of an offense shall be sentenced in accordance with this title.

(b) Except as provided in section 53a-46a, when a person is convicted of an offense, the court shall impose one of the following sentences: (1) A term of imprisonment; or (2) a sentence authorized by section 18-65a or 18-73; or (3) a fine; or (4) a term of imprisonment and a fine; or (5) a term of imprisonment, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court, and a period of probation or a period of conditional discharge; or (6) a term of imprisonment, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court, and a fine and a period of probation or a period of conditional discharge; or (7) a fine and a sentence authorized by section 18-65a or 18-73; or (8) a sentence of unconditional discharge; or (9) a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole as provided in section 54-125e, except that the court may not impose a period of special parole for convictions of offenses under chapter 420b.

(c) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the court shall inquire on the record whether there are any requests by a victim for restitution, and if (1) a person is convicted of an offense that resulted in injury to another person or damage to or loss of property, (2) the victim requests financial restitution, and (3) the court finds that the victim has suffered injury or damage to or loss of property as a result of such offense, the court shall order the offender to make financial restitution under terms that it determines are appropriate. In determining the appropriate terms of financial restitution, the court shall consider: (A) The financial resources of the offender and the burden restitution will place on other obligations of the offender; (B) the offender's ability to pay based on installments or other conditions; (C) the rehabilitative effect on the offender of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and (D) other circumstances, including the financial burden and impact on the victim, that the court determines make the terms of restitution appropriate. If the court determines that the current financial resources of the offender or the offender's current ability to pay based on installments or other conditions are such that no appropriate terms of restitution can be determined, the court may forego setting such terms. The court shall articulate its findings on the record with respect to each of the factors set forth in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subsection. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for injury or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons and lost wages resulting from injury. Restitution shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental anguish, pain and suffering or other intangible losses, but may include the costs of counseling reasonably related to the offense. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed or directed by a written order of the court on a form prescribed by the Chief Court Administrator containing the amount of damages for injury or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons and lost wages resulting from injury as ascertained by the court. The order of the court shall direct that a certified copy of the completed form containing the written order be delivered by certified mail to each victim and contain an advisement to the victim that the order is enforceable as a judgment in a civil action as provided in section 53a-28a. The court shall retain the original of each form containing a written order of restitution as part of such offender's court record.

(d) A sentence to a period of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with sections 53a-29 to 53a-34, inclusive, shall be deemed a revocable disposition, in that such sentence shall be tentative to the extent that it may be altered or revoked in accordance with said sections but for all other purposes it shall be deemed to be a final judgment of conviction.

(e) When sentencing a person to a period of probation who has been convicted of (1) a misdemeanor that did not involve the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person or (2) a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed, the court shall consider, as a condition of such sentence of probation, ordering the person to perform community service in the community in which the offense or violation occurred. If the court determines that community service is appropriate, such community service may be implemented by a community court established in accordance with section 51-181c if the offense or violation occurred within the jurisdiction of a community court established by said section.

(f) When sentencing a person to a period of probation who is or has been subject to a protective order, the court may issue a protective order that is effective during such period of probation.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 28; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 10; P.A. 73-137, S. 7; 73-639, S. 3; P.A. 75-633, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 11; P.A. 95-175, S. 1; P.A. 97-199, S. 1; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11, S. 62, 65; P.A. 98-234, S. 2; P.A. 00-196, S. 38; P.A. 01-211, S. 13; P.A. 03-19, S. 125; P.A. 10-144, S. 8; P.A. 12-114, S. 20; P.A. 18-63, S. 1; 18-128, S. 1.)

History: 1971 act added exception re Ch. 359 in Subsec. (a) and deleted references to “reformatory” sentences in Subsec. (b)(2) and (7), adding reference to Secs. 18-73 and 18-75 in Subdiv. (7) for conformity; P.A. 73-137 deleted references to Secs. 53a-46 and 53a-93 and added reference to Secs. 53a-46a and 53a-54b in Subsec. (b); P.A. 73-639 added references to Sec. 18-65 in Subsec. (b)(2) and (7); P.A. 75-633 deleted reference to Secs. 18-65 and 18-75 in Subsec. (b)(1), adding reference to Sec. 18-65a and deleted reference to Sec. 18-75 in Subsec. (b)(7); P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference to “chapter 368p” with “section 17a-656 and chapter 420b” and replace “such chapter is” with “the provisions of said section and chapter are” and amended Subsec. (b) to delete from the exclusionary provision references to Secs. 53a-45, 53a-54b and 53a-92, to make a technical change in Subdivs. (2) and (6) and to replace reference to “Sec. 18-65” with “Sec. 18-65a” in Subdiv. (7); P.A. 95-175 inserted new Subsec. (c) re order of financial restitution and considerations required prior to order and relettered former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 97-199 added Subsec. (e) re order of community service in community where offense occurred, implemented by community court; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11 changed effective date of P.A. 97-199 from October 1, 1997, to July 1, 1997, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 98-234 added Subsec. (b)(9) authorizing a sentence of a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole as provided in Sec. 54-125e; P.A. 00-196 amended Subsec. (e) to delete provisions re ordering community service as a condition of accelerated rehabilitation, said provisions being reenacted as part of Sec. 54-56e by same public act, and to make technical changes; P.A. 01-211 amended Subsec. (c) to designate as Subdiv. (1) the condition for ordering restitution that a person is convicted of an offense that resulted in injury to another person or damage to or loss of property, add new Subdiv. (2) re condition that the victim requests financial restitution, add new Subdiv. (3) re condition that the court finds that the victim has suffered injury or damage to or loss of property as a result of such offense, require the court to order the offender to make financial restitution “under terms that it determines are appropriate” rather than “if it determines that financial restitution is appropriate”, replace “In determining whether financial restitution is appropriate” with “In determining the appropriate terms of financial restitution”, redesignate existing Subdivs. (1), (2), (3) and (4) as Subparas. (A), (B), (C) and (D), replace in Subpara. (D) “other circumstances that the court determines makes restitution appropriate or inappropriate” with “other circumstances, including the financial burden and impact on the victim, that the court determines makes the terms of restitution appropriate”, authorize the court to forego setting appropriate terms of restitution if the current financial resources or ability to pay of the offender are such that no appropriate terms can be determined, require the court to articulate its findings on the record re factors in Subparas. (A) to (D), require restitution ordered by the court to be imposed or directed by a written order containing the amount of damages, expenses and lost wages and require a certified copy of the court order to be delivered by certified mail to the victim and to contain an advisement that the order is enforceable as provided in Sec. 53a-28a; P.A. 03-19 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective May 12, 2003; P.A. 10-144 added Subsec. (f) to permit court to issue protective order that is effective during period of probation; P.A. 12-114 amended Subsec. (f) to delete “issued under section 54-1k” re protective order; P.A. 18-63 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re court not to impose period of special parole for conviction of offense under chapter 420b; P.A. 18-128 amended Subsec. (c) to add provision re court to inquire on record whether there are victim requests for restitution, add provision re restitution ordered to be on form prescribed by Chief Court Administrator, add provision re court to retain original of each form containing written order of restitution, and to make technical and conforming changes.

Cited. 172 C. 298. Court does not have sentencing options as provided in this section where Sec. 53a-36 provides for a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment. 180 C. 557. Cited. 197 C. 337; 198 C. 671; 200 C. 268; 207 C. 270; 208 C. 420; 210 C. 519; 225 C. 46.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 32; 30 CA 416; 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345. Monetary obligation re insurance for victim as a special condition of probation speculative. 55 CA 28.

Person convicted under Sec. 19-481(a) required to be sentenced in accord with this chapter where sentence not inconsistent with chapter 359. 31 CS 350. Does not provide for sentence of confinement with condition restricting authority of Commissioner of Correction to award “good time”. 35 CS 545. Section contains no authority for order of restitution unless it is a condition of probation or conditional discharge. Id., 675.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 182 C. 595; 196 C. 655; 206 C. 608; 216 C. 40. Subdiv. (9): Defendant's sentence of 10 years of imprisonment followed by 10 years of special parole violated Sec. 54-128(c) and was an illegal sentence because total length of terms of imprisonment and special parole combined exceeded maximum term of imprisonment authorized for sexual assault in the second degree by Secs. 53a-35a(6) and 53a-71(b). 279 C. 527.

Cited. 8 CA 607. Subdiv. (9): The plain language of public act 18-63 clearly and unambiguously prohibits retroactive application of the amendment to Subdiv., especially when viewed in context of the related savings statutes, Secs. 54-194 and 1-1(t). 209 CA 283.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 34 CA 1. Court did not commit plain error when it did not conduct an analysis pursuant to Subsec. during sentencing because Subsec. does not apply to plea bargains in which defendant and the state have already agreed to restitution amount. 81 CA 310.

Sec. 53a-28a. Enforcement of orders of financial restitution. All financial obligations ordered pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53a-28 or subsection (a) of section 53a-30 may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action by the party or entity to whom the obligation is owed. The party or entity seeking enforcement of the financial obligations as a judgment in a civil action shall file with the Superior Court a copy of the court's order of restitution ordered pursuant to section 53a-28 or 53a-30 together with an affidavit prepared by the agency or entity monitoring payment of the obligations, on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, attesting to the terms of restitution and manner of performance fixed by the court or the Court Support Services Division, identifying the amount of the obligation that has been paid and the amount of the obligation that is owed. Such obligations may be enforced at any time during the twenty-year period following the offender's release from confinement or termination of probation, or not later than twenty years after the entry of the order and sentence, whichever is longer. There shall be no entry fee for filing an enforcement action pursuant to this section. Not later than thirty days after the date of filing of the judgment and the affidavit, the party or entity seeking enforcement of such judgment shall mail notice of filing of the judgment by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the offender at such offender's last-known address. The proceeds of an execution shall not be distributed to the party or entity seeking enforcement of such judgment earlier than thirty days after the date of filing proof of service with the clerk of the court in which enforcement of such judgment is sought. No fee shall be required for the filing of an execution. The payment of marshal's fees for service of an execution shall be collected in accordance with the provisions of section 52-261.

(P.A. 95-175, S. 2; P.A. 17-87, S. 4; 17-99, S. 18.)

History: P.A. 17-87 replaced reference to 10-year period with reference to 20-year period, and made technical changes; P.A. 17-99 added reference to Sec. 53a-30(a), added provisions re party or entity seeking enforcement of financial obligations as judgment in civil action to file copy of court's order of restitution with affidavit, entry fee for filing enforcement action, party or entity seeking enforcement of judgment to mail notice of filing of judgment, distribution of proceeds of execution, fee for filing execution, and collection of payment of marshal's fees for service of execution.

Sec. 53a-29. Probation and conditional discharge: Criteria; periods; continuation or termination. (a) The court may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction of any crime, other than a class A felony, if it is of the opinion that: (1) Present or extended institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public; (2) the defendant is in need of guidance, training or assistance which, in the defendant's case, can be effectively administered through probation supervision; and (3) such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.

(b) The court may impose a sentence of conditional discharge for an offense, other than a class A felony, if it is of the opinion that: (1) Present or extended institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public; and (2) probation supervision is not appropriate.

(c) When the court imposes a sentence of conditional discharge, the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed but shall be subject, during the period of such conditional discharge, to such conditions as the court may determine. The court shall impose the period of conditional discharge authorized by subsection (d) of this section and shall specify, in accordance with section 53a-30, the conditions to be complied with. When a person is sentenced to a period of probation, the court shall impose the period authorized by subsection (d), (e) or (f) of this section and may impose any conditions authorized by section 53a-30. When a person is sentenced to a period of probation, such person shall pay to the court a fee of two hundred dollars and shall be placed under the supervision of the Court Support Services Division, provided, if such person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment the execution of which is not suspended entirely, payment of such fee shall not be required until such person is released from confinement and begins the period of probation supervision.

(d) Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, the period of probation or conditional discharge, unless terminated sooner as provided in section 53a-32 or 53a-33, shall be as follows: (1) For a class B felony, not more than five years; (2) for a class C, D or E felony or an unclassified felony, not more than three years; (3) for a class A misdemeanor, not more than two years; (4) for a class B, C or D misdemeanor, not more than one year; and (5) for an unclassified misdemeanor, not more than one year if the authorized sentence of imprisonment is six months or less, or not more than two years if the authorized sentence of imprisonment is in excess of six months, or where the defendant is charged with failure to provide subsistence for dependents, a determinate or indeterminate period.

(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, the court may, in its discretion, on a case by case basis, sentence a person to a period of probation which period, unless terminated sooner as provided in section 53a-32 or 53a-33, shall be as follows: (1) For a class C, D or E felony or an unclassified felony, not more than five years; (2) for a class A misdemeanor, not more than three years; and (3) for a class B misdemeanor, not more than two years.

(f) The period of probation, unless terminated sooner as provided in section 53a-32, shall be not less than ten years or more than thirty-five years for conviction of a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-90a or subdivision (2), (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-189a, or section 53a-196b, 53a-196c, 53a-196d, 53a-196e or 53a-196f.

(g) Whenever the court sentences a person, on or after October 1, 2008, to a period of probation of more than two years for a class C, D or E felony or an unclassified felony or more than one year for a class A or B misdemeanor, the probation officer supervising such person shall submit a report to the sentencing court, the state's attorney and the attorney of record, if any, for such person, not later than sixty days prior to the date such person completes two years of such person's period of probation for such felony or one year of such person's period of probation for such misdemeanor setting forth such person's progress in addressing such person's assessed needs and complying with the conditions of such person's probation. The probation officer shall recommend, in accordance with guidelines developed by the Judicial Branch, whether such person's sentence of probation should be continued for the duration of the original period of probation or be terminated. If such person is serving a period of probation concurrent with another period of probation, the probation officer shall submit a report only when such person becomes eligible for termination of the period of probation with the latest return date, at which time all of such person's probation cases shall be presented to the court for review. Not later than sixty days after receipt of such report, the sentencing court shall continue the sentence of probation or terminate the sentence of probation. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 53a-32, the parties may agree to waive the requirement of a court hearing. The Court Support Services Division shall establish within its policy and procedures a requirement that any victim be notified whenever a person's sentence of probation may be terminated pursuant to this subsection. The sentencing court shall permit such victim to appear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether such person's sentence of probation should be terminated. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the sentencing court and the sentencing court shall make such statement a part of the record. Prior to ordering that such person's sentence of probation be continued or terminated, the sentencing court shall consider the statement made or submitted by such victim.

(h) For the purposes of this section, a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year may be imposed shall be deemed an unclassified felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 29; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 124, 129; P.A. 79-585, S. 8, 15; P.A. 89-219, S. 6, 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 12; P.A. 93-340, S. 12, 19; P.A. 95-142, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 14, 26; P.A. 02-132, S. 30; P.A. 04-139, S. 8; P.A. 05-288, S. 181; P.A. 08-102, S. 1; P.A. 09-84, S. 1; P.A. 10-43, S. 19; P.A. 12-80, S. 4; 12-133, S. 18; P.A. 13-258, S. 6; P.A. 15-213, S. 2; P.A. 19-189, S. 14.)

History: 1971 act repealed former Subsec. (e) requiring probation officer to make recommendation as to advisability of continuing probation after probationer has been on probation for a year and allowing person on probation to be heard by court with respect to continuance or discontinuance of probation; P.A. 79-585 replaced commission on adult probation with office of adult probation in Subsec. (c); P.A. 89-219 amended Subsec. (c) to require a person sentenced to a period of probation to pay to the court a fee of $200; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes and amended Subsec. (d) to replace “hereinafter provided” with “provided in section 53a-32 or 53a-33” and to replace in Subdiv. (5) “less than three months” with “three months or less”; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (d)(1) to add exception re Subsec. (e) and added Subsec. (e) to authorize a period of probation of not more than 35 years for conviction of a sexual assault under certain circumstances, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (e) to delete reference to an early termination of probation as provided in Sec. 53a-33, establish a minimum period of probation of 10 years, include a violation of Sec. 53-21(2) and delete the provisions that limited the applicability of the Subsec. to where the conviction is of a second or subsequent violation or the defendant was 18 years of age or older and the victim was under 13 years of age; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (e) to replace reference to “subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (c) by replacing “Office of Adult Probation” with “Court Support Services Division” and making a technical change; P.A. 04-139 amended Subsec. (e) to include a violation of Sec. 53a-90a, 53a-196b, 53a-196c, 53a-196d, 53a-196e or 53a-196f; P.A. 05-288 made technical changes in Subsec. (e), effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 08-102 amended Subsec. (c) to replace reference to period of probation authorized by “subsection (d) of this section” with period authorized by “subsection (d), (e) or (f) of this section”, amended Subsec. (d) to add exception re Subsec. (f) and to decrease maximum period of probation for class C or D felony or unclassified felony from 5 years to 3 years, for class A misdemeanor from 3 years to 2 years and for class B misdemeanor from 2 years to 1 year, added new Subsec. (e) re authority of the court to sentence a person to a maximum period of probation of 5 years for class C or D felony or unclassified felony, 3 years for class A misdemeanor and 2 years for class B misdemeanor, redesignated existing Subsec. (e) as Subsec. (f), added Subsec. (g) re procedure for continuation or termination of a person's period of probation after such person completes 2 years of such period if such person was sentenced to a period of probation for more than 2 years for class C or D felony or unclassified felony or after such person completes 1 year of such period if such person was sentenced to a period of probation for more than 1 year for class A or B misdemeanor, and made technical changes; P.A. 09-84 amended Subsec. (c) to make a technical change and add proviso that if a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment the execution of which is not suspended entirely, payment of probation supervision fee is not required until the person is released from confinement and begins period of probation supervision; P.A. 10-43 amended Subsec. (g) to add provision re when probation officer must submit report and present probation cases for review if person is serving concurrent periods of probation; P.A. 12-80 amended Subsec. (d) to include a class D misdemeanor in Subdiv. (4) and increase threshold term of imprisonment from 3 months to 6 months in Subdiv. (5), effective October 1, 2012, and applicable to sentences imposed for crimes committed on or after that date; P.A. 12-133 added Subsec. (h) re motor vehicle violation for which sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year may be imposed to be deemed an unclassified felony; P.A. 13-258 amended Subsecs. (d)(2), (e)(1) and (g) to add references to class E felony; P.A. 15-213 amended Subsec. (f) to add reference to Sec. 53a-189a(a)(2), (3) or (4); P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (f) by replacing “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, and making a technical change”.

Cited. 170 C. 128; 182 C. 595; 197 C. 337; 198 C. 671; 200 C. 268; 204 C. 52; 210 C. 519; 222 C. 299; 225 C. 46; 229 C. 285.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 32; 22 CA 108; 30 CA 416; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1.

Cited. 37 CS 853; 41 CS 229.

Subsec. (d):

Cited. 37 CA 72. Under 2001 revision, defendant's 10-year probationary period on charge of risk of injury to a child in violation of Sec. 53-21(a)(1) violates this section because the maximum length of probation for such violation is 5 years. 119 CA 98.

Subsec. (e):

Sec. 2 of P.A. 95-142, which expanded probation eligibility factors and increased mandatory probation minimum sentence, did not have retroactive effect. 253 C. 392.

Sec. 53a-30. Conditions of probation and conditional discharge. (a) When imposing sentence of probation or conditional discharge, the court may, as a condition of the sentence, order that the defendant: (1) Work faithfully at a suitable employment or faithfully pursue a course of study or of vocational training that will equip the defendant for suitable employment; (2) undergo medical or psychiatric treatment and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose; (3) support the defendant's dependents and meet other family obligations; (4) make restitution of the fruits of the defendant's offense or make restitution, in an amount the defendant can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby. The court or the Court Support Services Division, if authorized by the court, may fix the amount thereof and the manner of performance, and the victim shall be advised by the court or the Court Support Services Division that restitution ordered under this section may be enforced pursuant to section 53a-28a; (5) if a minor, (A) reside with the minor's parents or in a suitable foster home, (B) attend school, and (C) contribute to the minor's own support in any home or foster home; (6) post a bond or other security for the performance of any or all conditions imposed; (7) refrain from violating any criminal law of the United States, this state or any other state; (8) if convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b, 53a-57 or 53a-58 or any offense for which there is a mandatory minimum sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and any sentence of imprisonment is suspended, participate in an alternate incarceration program; (9) reside in a residential community center or halfway house approved by the Commissioner of Correction, and contribute to the cost incident to such residence; (10) participate in a program of community service labor in accordance with section 53a-39c; (11) participate in a program of community service in accordance with section 51-181c; (12) if convicted of a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, undergo specialized sexual offender treatment; (13) if convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor, a nonviolent sexual offense or a sexually violent offense, as defined in section 54-250, or of a felony that the court finds was committed for a sexual purpose, as provided in section 54-254, register such person's identifying factors, as defined in section 54-250, with the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection when required pursuant to section 54-251, 54-252 or 54-253, as the case may be; (14) be subject to electronic monitoring, which may include the use of a global positioning system; (15) if convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l, participate in an anti-bias or diversity awareness program or participate in a program of community service designed to remedy damage caused by the commission of a bias crime or otherwise related to the defendant's violation; (16) if convicted of a violation of section 53-247, undergo psychiatric or psychological counseling or participate in an animal cruelty prevention and education program provided such a program exists and is available to the defendant; or (17) satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation. The court shall cause a copy of any such order to be delivered to the defendant and to the probation officer, if any.

(b) When a defendant has been sentenced to a period of probation, the Court Support Services Division may require that the defendant comply with any or all conditions which the court could have imposed under subsection (a) of this section which are not inconsistent with any condition actually imposed by the court.

(c) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, the court may modify or enlarge the conditions, whether originally imposed by the court under this section or otherwise, and may extend the period, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29. The court shall cause a copy of any such order to be delivered to the defendant and to the probation officer, if any.

(d) The period of participation in an alternate incarceration program, unless terminated sooner, shall not exceed the period of probation authorized by section 53a-29 or two years, whichever is less.

(e) The court may require that the person subject to electronic monitoring pursuant to subsection (a) of this section pay directly to the electronic monitoring service provider a fee for the cost of such electronic monitoring services. If the court finds that the person subject to electronic monitoring is indigent and unable to pay the costs of electronic monitoring services, it shall waive such costs. Any contract entered into by the Judicial Branch and the electronic monitoring service provider shall include a provision stating that the total cost for electronic monitoring services shall not exceed six dollars per day. Such amount shall be indexed annually to reflect the rate of inflation.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 30; 1971, P.A. 781, S. 1; P.A. 73-231; P.A. 78-188, S. 4, 8; P.A. 79-585, S. 9, 15; P.A. 82-298, S. 8; P.A. 86-403, S. 88, 132; P.A. 89-383, S. 4, 16; 89-390, S. 19, 37; P.A. 90-213, S. 4, 56; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 4, 10; P.A. 93-340, S. 13, 19; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 3; P.A. 97-199, S. 3; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11, S. 62, 65; P.A. 99-183, S. 12, 13; P.A. 00-72, S. 5, 12; 00-141, S. 1; P.A. 01-84, S. 15, 26; P.A. 02-132, S. 31; P.A. 03-208, S. 1; P.A. 05-288, S. 182; P.A. 06-187, S. 29; 06-196, S. 292; P.A. 11-51, S. 134; P.A. 12-5, S. 18; P.A. 17-99, S. 19; 17-111, S. 2; P.A. 19-189, S. 15.)

History: 1971 act authorized court to order defendant to reside in residential community center and contribute to costs; P.A. 73-231 authorized court to order that defendant shall reside in a halfway house approved by commissioner of correction; P.A. 78-188 restated Subsec. (a)(4) and required offender to submit to restitution investigation if necessary; P.A. 79-585 replaced commission on adult probation with office of adult probation in Subsec. (b); P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provision re restitution investigation as provided in Sec. 54-110a; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (c), substituting “conditional discharge” for “conditional release”; P.A. 89-383 added new Subsec. (a)(8) authorizing the court to order certain defendants to participate in an alternate incarceration program, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and added Subsec. (d) limiting the period of participation in an alternate incarceration program, effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994; P.A. 89-390 added new Subsec. (a)(9) authorizing the court to order the defendant to participate in a program of special alternative incarceration in accordance with Sec. 53a-39b, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly; P.A. 90-213 added Subsec. (a)(11) authorizing the court to order the defendant to participate in a program of community service labor in accordance with Sec. 53a-39c, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9 deleted former Subsec. (a)(9) authorizing court to order defendant to participate in a program of special alternative incarceration in accordance with Sec. 53a-39b, renumbering remaining Subdivs. accordingly; P.A. 93-340 added new Subsec. (a)(11) authorizing the court to order the defendant to undergo specialized sexual offender treatment when convicted of sexual assault under certain circumstances, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 94-128 negated effect of P.A. 89-383 which had discontinued alternative incarceration program as of July 1, 1994, and reenacted and continued existence of section, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (a)(11) to include a violation of Sec. 53-21(2) and delete provisions that limited the applicability of said Subdiv. to where the conviction is of a second or subsequent violation or the defendant was 18 years of age or older and the victim was under 13 years of age; P.A. 97-199 added new Subsec. (a)(11) re participation in program of community service, renumbering existing Subdivs. (11) and (12) as Subdivs. (12) and (13), respectively; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11 changed effective date of P.A. 97-199 from October 1, 1997, to July 1, 1997, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-183 added new Subsec. (a)(13) re registration of identifying factors with the Commissioner of Public Safety by certain sexual offenders and renumbering existing Subdiv. (13) as Subdiv. (14), effective July 1, 1999; P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) by adding new provision, designated as Subdiv. (15), re participation in an anti-bias crime education program and making technical changes, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 00-141 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes and add Subdiv. (14) re electronic monitoring, and added Subsec. (e) re electronic monitoring services; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a)(12) to replace reference to “subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “Office of Adult Probation” with “Court Support Services Division” and making a technical change; P.A. 03-208 added new Subsec. (a)(16) re counseling or participation in an animal cruelty prevention and education program for defendant convicted of a violation of Sec. 53-247, redesignating existing Subdiv. (16) as Subdiv. (17); P.A. 05-288 made a technical change in Subsec. (e), effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 06-187 amended Subsec. (a)(14) to provide that electronic monitoring may include the use of a global positioning system and amended Subsec. (e) to increase the maximum total daily cost for electronic monitoring services from $5 to $6, effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 06-196 changed effective date of P.A. 06-187, S. 29 from July 1, 2006, to October 1, 2006, effective June 7, 2006; pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Commissioner of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection” in Subsec. (a)(13), effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a)(8) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re conviction of a capital felony, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 17-99 amended Subsec. (a)(4) by adding provisions re Court Support Services Division, if authorized by court, may fix amount and manner of restitution and victim to be advised by court or Court Support Services Division that restitution order may be enforced pursuant to Sec. 53a-28a; P.A. 17-111 amended Subsec. (a)(15) to replace provision re participation in anti-bias crime education program with provision re participation in anti-bias or diversity awareness program or program of community service designed to remedy damage caused by commission of bias crime or otherwise related to defendant's violation; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “53a-70b” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019”, and made technical changes.

Cited. 170 C. 128; 204 C. 52; 207 C. 152; 222 C. 299; 225 C. 46; 240 C. 639. Trial court's imposition of restitution as additional condition of probation was not punitive in nature and therefore did not affect defendant's sentence; section does not deprive trial court of jurisdiction to impose a condition of probation subsequent to initial sentencing and prior to defendant's commencement of probation period. 283 C. 735. Section not applicable to trial court's corrected order of probation because order was a clarification, not a modification, of conditions of probation previously imposed on defendant. 294 C. 516.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 338; 14 CA 272; 19 CA 304; 22 CA 199; Id., 449; 32 CA 1; 33 CA 432; 34 CA 1; 39 CA 722; 45 CA 722. Trial court's modification of defendant's probation to include sex offender evaluation and treatment was proper; Office of Adult Probation had authority under statute to add an additional condition of probation; sexual offender treatment is clearly enumerated in Subsec. (a) and could have been imposed by sentencing court; and at any time during period of probation, after hearing and for good cause shown, court may modify or enlarge conditions of probation pursuant to Subsec. (c). 57 CA 112. Failure to deliver a written copy of conditions of probation did not excuse subsequent probation violation and did not invalidate resulting probation revocation. 58 CA 153. Condition required by Office of Adult Probation was inconsistent with those required by court. 69 CA 421; judgment reversed, see 268 C. 174. Under section, office had authority to include a curfew restriction on defendant at the start of his probationary period without a court hearing and a showing of good cause, and such a condition was not inconsistent with the purposes of probation. 75 CA 643. List set forth in section meant to be illustrative, and not exhaustive. 83 CA 142.

Cited. 35 CS 536. Requiring defendant to sell his gun collection was a condition reasonably related to his rehabilitation. Id., 570. Cited. 41 CS 229; 42 CS 574.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 223; 196 C. 305; 229 C. 285. Where, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleads guilty to sexual assault in fourth degree in violation of Sec. 53a-73a and public indecency in violation of Sec. 53a-186, trial court acted within its discretion in permitting Office of Adult Probation to notify members of defendant's community. 250 C. 280. Subdiv. (4): Since damage to an unoccupied house was the “fruit” of the collective criminal trespass in which the youthful offender had participated and of which he was convicted, the damage had a nexus to the offense and accordingly the order of restitution was reasonably related to the consequence of the youth's criminal trespass and well within the discretion of the trial court even though the youth had not personally profited from the trespass or caused any physical damage to the property. 301 C. 684.

Cited. 3 CA 410; 7 CA 326; 42 CA 460; 45 CA 722. Trial court's order of sexual offender treatment was authorized because section grants the court broad authority to impose any other conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation. 57 CA 743. Court's order that defendant pay veterinary and impoundment bills incurred from defendant's failure to restrain an animal from doing injury to another animal in violation of Sec. 53-247(a) was proper because such bills met statutory requirement of “fruits” for which the court may order restitution and such order did not violate “due process” because court was justified in concluding that defendant had means of earning income during the period set for restitution. 84 CA 542. Trial court's order of specialized sex offender treatment as condition of probation was authorized under Subdiv. (17) re “other conditions reasonably related to” rehabilitation and was not prohibited due to omission from Subdiv. (12) which enumerated certain crimes meriting such treatment. 95 CA 686. Court's termination of defendant's status in accelerated rehabilitation program cannot rest solely on undisposed charge of a crime identical to the underlying charge for which defendant seeks dismissal. 98 CA 111. Subdiv. (17): In order for a condition of probation to be “reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation” pursuant to Subdiv., there must be a nexus between the condition of probation and the charge for which defendant is serving probation. 102 CA 507. Although trial court specifically ordered restitution, it did not find that any damage was caused to the victim by defendant or that defendant profited from the criminal activity, nor was any rehabilitative purpose cited, so there is no basis for the court's order. 118 CA 236; judgment reversed, see 301 C. 684.

Cited. 35 CS 675; 37 CS 853; 39 CS 504. Defendant found to have complied with terms of his accelerated rehabilitation program which required that he refrain from violating any criminal laws of the United States, this state or any other state, notwithstanding fact that defendant pled guilty to criminal charges stemming from separate events that occurred after date that he applied for entry into accelerated rehabilitation but prior to date that he was actually accepted into program. 50 CS 383.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 229 C. 285.

Cited. 3 CA 410; 33 CA 103; 42 CA 768. Office's requirement that, as part of sex offender treatment, defendant refrain from use of alcohol is consistent with terms ordered by the court and therefore properly imposed by office. 60 CA 614. Probation officer could not enter into agreement with defendant that would have been in direct contradiction to a condition of probation imposed by sentencing court. 86 CA 657.

Cited. 37 CS 853.

Subsec. (c):

Special condition on probation administration properly imposed 1 year after sentencing in exercise of court's discretion. 207 C. 152. Once defendant is discharged from probation, the conditions of his probation are no longer subject to modification or enlargement. 287 C. 478.

Cited. 33 CA 103; 37 CA 72; 42 CA 768. Probation officer did not have authority to modify original conditions of probation ordered by sentencing court. 86 CA 657. Statute mandates that a court conduct a hearing related to any decision to modify probation and the hearing must be the forum in which the court explores the issue of whether good cause exists at the time the court is considering modifying the terms of the probation; the court may not modify probation unless there is a showing of good cause. 107 CA 800; judgment reversed, see 294 C. 516. When the state enters into a plea agreement that includes a period of probation, both defendant and the state do so with the understanding that the terms of probation may be modified or enlarged in accordance with law, and that such a modification might include a reduction. 147 CA 465.

Sec. 53a-31. Calculation of periods of probation and conditional discharge. Compliance with conditions during interrupted period. (a) A period of probation or conditional discharge commences on the day it is imposed, unless the defendant is imprisoned, in which case it commences on the day the defendant is released from such imprisonment. Multiple periods, whether imposed at the same or different times, shall run concurrently.

(b) The issuance of a warrant or notice to appear, or an arraignment following an arrest without a warrant, for violation pursuant to section 53a-32 shall interrupt the period of the sentence until a final determination as to the violation has been made by the court. In the absence of a warrant, a notice to appear or an arrest for violation pursuant to section 53a-32, if the defendant has failed to comply with any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, such failure shall not relieve the Court Support Services Division from the responsibility of supervising the defendant.

(c) Notwithstanding the issuance of a warrant or notice to appear or an arrest without a warrant for violation pursuant to section 53a-32, the defendant shall continue to comply with the conditions with which the defendant was previously required to comply pursuant to section 53a-30. The Court Support Services Division shall make reasonable efforts to inform the defendant of the defendant's obligation to continue to comply with such conditions and to provide the defendant with a copy of such conditions.

(d) In any case where a person who is under a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is also under an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, or a sentence authorized under section 18-65a or 18-73, imposed for some other offense by a court of this state, the service of the sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge unless the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is revoked prior to parole or satisfaction of the sentence of imprisonment.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 31; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 11; P.A. 87-282, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 13; P.A. 97-151, S. 1; P.A. 02-132, S. 32; P.A. 03-278, S. 103; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 36; P.A. 08-102, S. 5, 6; P.A. 11-155, S. 1; P.A. 15-211, S. 1.)

History: 1971 act substituted sentences “authorized under section 18-73 or 18-75” for “reformatory” sentences in Subsec. (c); P.A. 87-282 amended Subsec. (c) to delete obsolete reference to repealed Sec. 18-75; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add reference to Sec. 18-65a; P.A. 97-151 amended Subsec. (b) to authorize the court to impose any of the conditions of release set forth in Sec. 54-64a during the interrupted period and provide that, in the absence of a warrant or notice to appear for violation, the failure of the defendant to comply with any conditions of probation or conditional discharge does not relieve the Office of Adult Probation from the responsibility of supervising the defendant; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “Office of Adult Probation” with “Court Support Services Division”; P.A. 03-278 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective July 9, 2003; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that during interrupted period “the court may impose any of the conditions of release set forth in section 54-64a” with provision that during such period “unless otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall comply with any conditions imposed or with any conditions he or she was previously required to comply pursuant to section 53a-30”, effective January 25, 2008; P.A. 08-102 amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that during interrupted period “unless otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall comply with any conditions imposed or with any conditions he or she was previously required to comply pursuant to section 53a-30” with provision that during such period “the court may impose any of the conditions of release set forth in section 54-64a”, thereby reversing the change made by Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, effective May 27, 2008, and further amended Subsec. (b) to delete “During the interrupted period, the court may impose any of the conditions of release set forth in section 54-64a”, added new Subsec. (c) to require defendant to continue to comply with previously imposed conditions notwithstanding issuance of a warrant or notice to appear for a violation and require Court Support Services Division to make reasonable efforts to inform defendant of defendant's obligation to continue to comply with such conditions and provide defendant with copy of such conditions, and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d), effective October 1, 2008; P.A. 11-155 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that “an arraignment following an arrest without a warrant” for violation pursuant to Sec. 53a-32 interrupts period of sentence and make conforming changes and amended Subsec. (c) to add reference to an arrest without a warrant, effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (a) to replace provision re sentence of imprisonment with execution suspended with provision re case in which defendant is imprisoned.

Cited. 170 C. 128; 222 C. 299.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1. Term “release” as used in section includes physical release from custody whether by mistake or not and probation commences by operation of law on date of actual release from imprisonment. 36 CA 440.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 24 CA 575; 39 CA 722. Although probation may continue during a period of incarceration, it does not commence pursuant to section unless defendant is released from imprisonment. 60 CA 515.

Subsec. (b):

Arrest warrant issued “pursuant to section 53a-32” for violation of probation interrupts probation sentence simply by its issuance and exceeding the 120 day limit under Sec. 53a-32(c) for resolution of such violation charge, even without a finding of good cause, does not impact such interruption. 326 C. 731.

Cited. 9 CA 59; 37 CA 72; 39 CA 722. Defendant is not excused from complying with conditions of probation simply because a probation officer informs him that he is in violation of that probation. 75 CA 643. It is the issuance of the warrant that tolls the period of probation and whether the period is tolled is not dependent on the outcome of the violation of probation proceedings. 114 CA 295.

Sec. 53a-32. Violation of probation or conditional discharge. Notice to victim or victim advocate. Arrest. Pretrial release conditions and supervision. Hearing. Disposition. (a) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, or may issue a notice to appear to answer to a charge of such violation, which notice shall be personally served upon the defendant. Any such warrant shall authorize all officers named therein to return the defendant to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. Whenever a probation officer has probable cause to believe that a person has violated a condition of such person's probation, such probation officer may notify any police officer that such person has, in such officer's judgment, violated the conditions of such person's probation and such notice shall be sufficient warrant for the police officer to arrest such person and return such person to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. Whenever a probation officer so notifies a police officer, the probation officer shall notify the victim of the offense for which such person is on probation, and any victim advocate assigned to assist the victim, provided the probation officer has been provided with the name and contact information for such victim or victim advocate. Any probation officer may arrest any defendant on probation without a warrant or may deputize any other officer with power to arrest to do so by giving such other officer a written statement setting forth that the defendant has, in the judgment of the probation officer, violated the conditions of the defendant's probation. Such written statement, delivered with the defendant by the arresting officer to the official in charge of any correctional center or other place of detention, shall be sufficient warrant for the detention of the defendant. After making such an arrest, such probation officer shall present to the detaining authorities a similar statement of the circumstances of violation. Provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to any defendant arrested under the provisions of this section. Upon such arrest and detention, the probation officer shall immediately so notify the court or any judge thereof.

(b) When the defendant is presented for arraignment on the charge of violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, the court shall review any conditions previously imposed on the defendant and may order, as a condition of the pretrial release of the defendant, that the defendant comply with any or all of such conditions in addition to any conditions imposed pursuant to section 54-64a. Unless the court, pursuant to subsection (c) of section 54-64a, orders that the defendant remain under the supervision of a probation officer or other designated person or organization, the defendant shall be supervised by the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch in accordance with subsection (a) of section 54-63b.

(c) Upon notification by the probation officer of the arrest of the defendant or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which such defendant is alleged to have violated the conditions of such defendant's probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that such defendant has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in such defendant's own behalf. Unless good cause is shown, a charge of violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge shall be disposed of or scheduled for a hearing not later than one hundred twenty days after the defendant is arraigned on such charge.

(d) If such violation is established, the court may: (1) Continue the sentence of probation or conditional discharge; (2) modify or enlarge the conditions of probation or conditional discharge; (3) extend the period of probation or conditional discharge, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29; or (4) revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge. If such sentence is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 32; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 12; P.A. 86-403, S. 89, 132; P.A. 95-142, S. 7; P.A. 98-130; P.A. 99-187, S. 4; P.A. 08-102, S. 7; P.A. 10-43, S. 20; P.A. 12-114, S. 14; P.A. 13-214, S. 1.)

History: 1971 act clarified Subsec. (b) to specify that lesser sentence may be imposed when a sentence is revoked; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b), substituting “conditional discharge” for “conditional release”; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re the arrest and return of a sexual offender who has violated the conditions of his probation by failing to notify his probation officer of a change of address and amended Subsec. (b) to rephrase provisions, insert Subdiv. indicators, add Subdiv. (3) authorizing an extension of the period of probation or conditional discharge and prohibit revocation of probation or conditional discharge unless a violation is established “by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence” rather than by “reliable and probative evidence”; P.A. 98-130 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision that any lesser sentence imposed upon revocation may include a term of imprisonment followed by a period of probation; P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision authorizing a probation officer to place a defendant who, in such officer's judgment, has violated the conditions of such defendant's probation in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program in lieu of returning such defendant to court for violation of probation proceedings and to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 08-102 added new Subsec. (b) re court review of previously imposed conditions, court-ordered pretrial release conditions and supervising authority for defendant, designated existing provisions re hearing on violation charges as Subsec. (c) and amended same to make a technical change and add requirement that a charge of violation be disposed of or scheduled for a hearing not later than 120 days after arraignment, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 10-43 amended Subsec. (a) to delete provision authorizing probation officer to place defendant who has violated conditions of probation in zero-tolerance drug supervision program and to authorize probation officer to notify police officer whenever probation officer has probable cause to believe that a person has violated a condition of such person's probation, rather than only when a sexual offender has violated the conditions of such person's probation by failing to notify probation officer of any change of such person's residence address; P.A. 12-114 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re probation officer to notify victim when probation officer notifies a police officer of a probation violation; P.A. 13-214 amended Subsec. (a) to add provisions requiring probation officer to notify victim advocate assigned to assist victim when probation officer notifies a police officer of a probation violation.

See Sec. 54-108c re availability on Internet of information on outstanding arrest warrants for probation violations.

Cited. 165 C. 73. Defendant's right to counsel hereunder is of “constitutional dimension”, and tests of competency are met; order of probation revocation was upheld where defendant moved from receiving state of Maine to Massachusetts without reporting to Connecticut parole authorities and was convicted of possession of drugs in Massachusetts. 167 C. 639. Cited. 169 C. 223; 170 C. 118. In determining issue of “unnecessary delay”, principles applicable to sixth amendment “speedy trial” determinations may be considered. 192 C. 321. Cited. 193 C. 35; 195 C. 461; 204 C. 52; 207 C. 152; Id., 565; 219 C. 629; 222 C. 299; 226 C. 191; 228 C. 487. “Fair preponderance of the evidence” standard for determining whether probation has been violated; judgment of Appellate Court in 29 CA 801, 813 reversed. 229 C. 285. Cited. 235 C. 469; 240 C. 639; 242 C. 648. Willfulness not an element of a probation violation; state need only establish that probationer knew of the condition and engaged in conduct that violated the condition. 256 C. 412. If defendant has been convicted of criminal conduct, following either a guilty plea, Alford plea or jury trial, and defendant has pursued a timely appeal from such conviction and that appeal remains unresolved, a live controversy exists so that an appeal challenging a finding of violation of probation stemming from that conduct is not moot. 286 C. 353. Trial court may not find a violation of probation unless it finds that the predicate facts underlying the violation have been established by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing; the predicate facts proved by the state in this case are insufficient, either individually or in the aggregate, to establish a violation of Sec. 53-21(a)(1), which in this case, served as the foundation for trial court's finding of a violation of probation. 303 C. 18. Re defendant who admitted violating conditions of probation but contested revocation, due process rights were not violated by admission of photographs from social media Internet websites depicting defendant committing acts in violation of terms of probation because state articulated an uncontradicted basis for determining whether each image depicted defendant before or during probation and defendant failed to contest that the photographs depicted her while on probation. Id., 304.

Cited. 3 CA 410; 6 CA 394; 7 CA 131; 9 CA 59; Id., 686; 11 CA 251; 12 CA 679; 13 CA 638; 15 CA 34; 16 CA 264; 18 CA 368; 19 CA 304; 20 CA 572; 22 CA 303; 23 CA 642; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629; 27 CA 225; Id., 780. Standard of proof needed to find a violation of probation discussed. 29 CA 801; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285. Cited. 30 CA 346; 31 CA 278; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 385, see also 37 CA 801; 32 CA 1; 33 CA 162, see also 35 CA 520; 34 CA 1; Id., 46; Id., 537; 35 CA 107. Proper standard of proof in revocation of probation proceeding is that of a fair preponderance of the evidence; previous consideration of case, 33 CA 162, remanded for reconsideration, 229 C. 916; original judgment reversed and case remanded for new probation revocation hearing. Id., 520. Cited. 36 CA 440; 37 CA 72; 38 CA 762; 39 CA 175; Id., 267; Id., 722; 40 CA 395; 42 CA 768; 45 CA 566. Reaffirmed prior holding that proper standard of proof for revocation of probation hearing proceeding is a fair preponderance of evidence and that revocation is on consideration of the whole record. 52 CA 557. A probation revocation hearing has two distinct components. 56 CA 125. In determining whether defendant's probationary status should be revoked court has broad discretion and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of court's ruling. 57 CA 743. State may amend the factual basis for an alleged probation violation prior to a hearing under section. 60 CA 515. If a specific condition of probation does not explicitly proscribe certain noncriminal conduct and cannot be reasonably interpreted to proscribe such conduct, defendant must receive actual notice that continuation of the conduct could result in a charge of violation of a condition of probation. Id., 716. Willfulness is not an element of the offense of violation of probation; court's findings that defendant violated probation were not clearly erroneous. 68 CA 367. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's probation and reinstating prison sentence after defendant's urine tested positive for opiate. Id., 437. Court is vested with broad discretion in determining, on basis of the entire record, whether sentence of probation should continue or be revoked, and court may require defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose a lesser sentence. 81 CA 710. Trial court properly found violations of defendant's probation and did not abuse its discretion in revoking his probation. 102 CA 154. Because defendant accepted a sentence that included probation, modification of terms of probation for violation of Sec. 53-21 to include sexual offender evaluation and treatment did not violate due process as long as modified conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation and public safety. 105 CA 693. In adjudicative phase, court's finding that defendant violated condition of his probation was not clearly erroneous and, in dispositional phase, court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's probation after finding that the rehabilitative purpose of probation could not be fulfilled. 112 CA 40. When, subsequent to a judgment revoking probation, defendant was convicted of crimes for some of the conduct for which his probation was revoked, and Appellate Court had heard his appeal and Supreme Court had denied petition, his appeal re revocation of probation was moot as to those crimes, but was not moot as to conduct that was not at issue at criminal trial. Id., 147. Court's failure to make explicit findings of fact regarding the rationale underlying its decision to revoke probation does not, in and of itself, signify the absence of the dispositional phase. 116 CA 76. A probation revocation hearing does not require all the procedural components associated with an adversarial criminal proceeding; notice to defendant satisfied the mandates of due process. 123 CA 674. If a person is convicted of a crime, he may not claim that in a prior violation of probation hearing regarding the same course of conduct there was insufficient evidence to prove the violation. 130 CA 19.

Cited. 42 CS 574.

Subsec. (a):

A probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding and is not subject to the statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions, and the state may reinstitute a violation of probation charge at any time after dismissal without prejudice by the court provided defendant's period of probation has not expired. 301 C. 630.

Cited. 10 CA 395; 25 CA 421; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 299. Trial court reasonably could have found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated his probation by engaging in breach of the peace and criminal mischief and thus violated criminal laws of the state. 57 CA 64. State satisfied notice requirements when it recited the charges constituting defendant's violation of probation during both defendant's arraignment and probation revocation hearing. 80 CA 75.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 178 C. 145; 225 C. 46. Court's discretion to provide right of allocution to defendant during probation revocation proceeding is identical to discretion provided at time of original sentencing. 243 C. 339. When defendant has raised a claim that trial court abused its discretion in rendering its judgment during dispositional phase, practical relief is available even when there is no live controversy as to whether defendant committed the underlying offense and, therefore, the claim is not moot. 286 C. 367.

Cited. 1 CA 70; 10 CA 395; 31 CA 660. Trial court has broad discretion in continuing or revoking sentence of probation. 50 CA 46. Provides that once a probation violation is established, court may extend period of probation if original period with any extension does not exceed periods authorized by Sec. 53a-29. 72 CA 33. Subsec. requires that violation of probation be “established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence”; this requirement is not satisfied when, as in this case, the substance that defendant possessed was readily available for laboratory analysis to determine whether it in fact contained cocaine, a narcotic, but was never subjected to such testing. 81 CA 409.

Subsec. (c):

120 day limitation establishes a directory rule, rather than a mandatory rule, and such time period is a goal, guideline and advisory. 178 CA 715.

Subsec. (d):

Use of special parole following a finding of a violation of probation is authorized within the “any lesser sentence” language of the Subsec. 192 CA 128; judgment affirmed, see 338 C. 523.

Sec. 53a-32a. Violation of probation by certain sexual offenders. If a defendant who entered a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000, section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, and was ordered to undergo sexual offender treatment as a condition of probation, becomes ineligible for such treatment because of such defendant's refusal to acknowledge that such defendant committed the act or acts charged, such defendant shall be deemed to be in violation of the conditions of such defendant's probation and be returned to court for proceedings in accordance with section 53a-32.

(P.A. 97-151, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 16, 26; P.A. 19-189, S. 16.)

History: P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000,” included a violation of “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21” and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 19-189 replaced “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.

Trial court not required to notify defendant, upon entering guilty plea under Alford doctrine, that failure to acknowledge his guilt could result in violation of condition of his probation requiring sex offender treatment. 268 C. 174. Defendant had been afforded a full hearing on his violation of probation charge as required under Sec. 53a-32(a); even when defendant is acquitted of the underlying crime leading to probation revocation proceeding, probation may still be revoked. 281 C. 548.

Statute can be applied only prospectively; trial court improperly considered defendant's refusal to admit to guilt during sexual offender treatment as a violation of probation. 69 CA 421; judgment reversed, see 268 C. 174. Section does not prevent court from revoking probation for failure to satisfy probation condition of successful completion of sexual offender treatment related to a crime committed under Sec. 53a-21(a)(1) which is not enumerated in section because section's automatic nature does not deprive courts of discretion to revoke probation under other circumstances. 95 CA 686. Simply because automatic revocation proceeding established by section arguably is inapplicable to defendant convicted after trial, it does not follow that such defendant is immune from discretionary revocation sought by defendant's probation officer on the basis of defendant's discharge from sex offender treatment in accordance with the normal procedures set forth in Sec. 53a-32. 98 CA 579. Defendant, who was aware of the terms of his probation when entering his plea, violated his probation when he refused to discuss the details of his underlying offense at counseling. 112 CA 562.

Sec. 53a-33. Termination of probation or conditional discharge. The court or sentencing judge may at any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, terminate a sentence of probation or conditional discharge before the completion thereof, except a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000, section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 33; P.A. 92-260, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 11; P.A. 01-84, S. 17, 26; P.A. 19-189, S. 17.)

History: P.A. 92-260 added “a sentence of”; P.A. 95-142 specified that a sentence of probation or conditional discharge may be terminated “before the completion thereof” and precluded termination of a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of Sec. 53-21(2) or Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000,” and included a violation of “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 19-189 replaced “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.

Cited. 165 C. 73; 170 C. 128; 219 C. 752; 222 C. 299; 225 C. 46.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1; 36 CA 440.

Sec. 53a-34. Unconditional discharge: Criteria; effect. (a) The court may impose a sentence of unconditional discharge in any case where it is authorized to impose a sentence of conditional discharge under section 53a-29, if the court is of the opinion that no proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition upon the defendant's release.

(b) When the court imposes a sentence of unconditional discharge, the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without imprisonment, probation supervision or conditions. A sentence of unconditional discharge is for all purposes a final judgment of conviction.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 34.)

Cited. 170 C. 128; 180 C. 557; 182 C. 595; 188 C. 557; 222 C. 299.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 32; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1; 36 CA 440.

Sec. 53a-35. Imprisonment for any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981: Indeterminate sentences; maximum and minimum terms. (a) For any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be an indeterminate sentence, except as provided in subsection (d). When such a sentence is imposed the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) and the minimum term shall be as provided in subsection (c) or (d).

(b) The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, life imprisonment; (2) for a class B felony, a term not to exceed twenty years; (3) for a class C felony, a term not to exceed ten years; (4) for a class D felony, a term not to exceed five years; (5) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime; and (6) for a capital felony, life imprisonment unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, the minimum term shall not be less than ten nor more than twenty-five years; (2) for a class B, C or D felony the court may fix a minimum term of not less than one year nor more than one-half of the maximum term imposed, except that (A) where the maximum is less than three years the minimum term may be more than one-half the maximum term imposed or (B) when a person is found guilty under section 53a-59(a)(1), section 53a-59a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the minimum term shall be not less than five years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is found guilty under section 53a-60c, the minimum term shall be not less than three years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is found guilty under section 53a-60b, the minimum term shall be not less than two years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced; (3) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c), except as provided in subdivision (2) of said subsection (c), when a person is sentenced for a class C or D felony or for an unclassified felony, the maximum sentence for which does not exceed ten years, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less; except when a person is found guilty under sections 53a-55a, 53a-56a, 53a-60a, 53a-70a, 53a-72b, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a and 53a-103a, the court shall not fix a term of less than one year.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 35; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 13; P.A. 73-137, S. 8; P.A. 74-186, S. 9, 12; P.A. 75-380, S. 14; 75-411, S. 3; P.A. 76-435, S. 2, 82; P.A. 77-422, S. 5; P.A. 80-442, S. 9, 28; P.A. 83-587, S. 76, 96.)

History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to minimum sentence terms in Subsec. (d), required that sentence be specified in the sentence in Subsec. (b), amended Subsec. (c) to add exception re Subsec. (d), to raise minimum term for Class A felony from 1 to 10 years and maximum term from 10 to 25 years, to clarify exception re maximum term of 3 years by specifying minimum terms and to add Subdiv. (3) re unclassified felonies and amended Subsec. (d) to add exception re Subsec. (c)(2) and to include applicability re unclassified felonies; P.A. 73-137 removed reference to death sentence imposed for class A felony in accordance with Sec. 53a-46 in Subsec. (b)(1) and added Subdiv. (6) re capital felonies; P.A. 74-186 removed reference to guilt under Subdivs. (2) or (4) of Sec. 53a-60(a) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 75-380 added exception in Subsec. (d) re required 1-year term; P.A. 75-411 deleted reference to guilt under Sec. 53a-135(a)(2) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 76-435 added exception in Subsec. (d) as amended by P.A. 75-380; P.A. 77-422 expanded exception in Subsec. (c)(2)(B) re required 3-year and 2-year minimum terms and added reference to guilt under Sec. 53-59a; P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (a) to limit applicability to felonies committed prior to July 1, 1981, effective on that date; P.A. 83-587 substituted “53a-59a” for “53-59a” in Subsec. (c).

Cited. 169 C. 263; 171 C. 278; 176 C. 270; 180 C. 557; 182 C. 595; 189 C. 114; 190 C. 327; Id., 639; 193 C. 144; 195 C. 326; 196 C. 655; 199 C. 121; 219 C. 752.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 9 CA 686; 12 CA 403; 19 CA 440; Id., 571; Id., 631; 24 CA 612; 37 CA 228. Section does not apply to crimes committed before October 1, 1971. 133 CA 458.

Courts may impose a definite sentence for a felony of 1 year or less. 31 CS 350. Cited. 33 CS 705.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 231 C. 545. Subdiv. (1): Sec. 53a-35b does not apply to indeterminate life sentences imposed pursuant to Subdiv., regardless of when the sentence was imposed, but applies solely to definite life sentences imposed pursuant to Sec. 53a-35a. 300 C. 649.

Cited. 46 CA 450.

Subsec. (c):

Subdiv. (2)(B): Rational relationship exists between the protection of public health and safety and the imposition of nonsuspendable sentence for violent crime of second degree robbery, an essential element of which is threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 171 C. 677. Cited. 197 C. 413; Id., 485; 202 C. 343; 211 C. 591.

Sec. 53a-35a. Imprisonment for felony committed on or after July 1, 1981. Definite sentence. Authorized term. For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and, unless the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically provides otherwise, the term shall be fixed by the court as follows:

(1) (A) For a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a, or (B) for the class A felony of murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect on or after April 25, 2012, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release;

(2) For the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor more than life;

(3) For the class A felony of aggravated sexual assault of a minor under section 53a-70c, a term not less than twenty-five years or more than fifty years;

(4) For a class A felony other than an offense specified in subdivision (2) or (3) of this section, a term not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years;

(5) For the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than five years nor more than forty years;

(6) For a class B felony other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than one year nor more than twenty years;

(7) For a class C felony, a term not less than one year nor more than ten years;

(8) For a class D felony, a term not more than five years;

(9) For a class E felony, a term not more than three years; and

(10) For an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime.

(P.A. 80-442, S. 10, 28; P.A. 86-220; P.A. 92-260, S. 15; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 2; P.A. 07-143, S. 12; P.A. 10-36, S. 18; P.A. 12-5, S. 2; P.A. 13-258, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 86-220 amended Subdiv. (1) to add “imprisonment without the possibility of release” to reflect revision made by P.A. 85-366; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (6) to add reference to “Sec. 53a-217” and provision that “for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years”, to reflect existing minimum mandatory sentences prescribed in said sections; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 added a new Subdiv. (4) to provide a term of not less than 5 years nor more than 40 years for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under Sec. 53a-55a, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and amended Subdiv. (5) to provide that the specified sentence is for a class B felony “other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a” and delete a reference to Sec. 53a-55a, reflecting the separate sentencing provisions established for Sec. 53a-55a in Subdiv. (4); P.A. 07-143 added new Subdiv. (3) to provide a term of not less than 25 years or more than 50 years for the class A felony of aggravated sexual assault of a minor under Sec. 53a-70c, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and amended renumbered Subdiv. (4) to replace “a class A felony other than murder” with “a class A felony other than an offense specified in subdivision (2) or (3) of this section”, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 10-36 added “unless the section of the general statutes that defines the crime specifically provides otherwise” re specified terms of imprisonment, deleted in Subdiv. (6) “except that for a conviction under section 53a-59(a)(1), 53a-59a, 53a-70a, 53a-94a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the term shall be not less than five years nor more than twenty years”, deleted in Subdiv. (7) “except that for a conviction under section 53a-56a, the term shall be not less than three years nor more than ten years” and deleted in Subdiv. (8) “except that for a conviction under section 53a-60b or 53a-217, the term shall be not less than two years nor more than five years, for a conviction under section 53a-60c, the term shall be not less than three years nor more than five years, and for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years”, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 12-5 amended Subdiv. (1) to add Subpara. (A) designator and provision re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, and add Subpara. (B) re class A felony of murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 13-258 added provision re section of the general statutes that provides the penalty for the crime, amended Subdiv. (8) to delete provision re term not less than 1 year, added new Subdiv. (9) re class E felony, redesignated existing Subdiv. (9) as Subdiv. (10) and amended same to add provision re section of the general statutes that provides the penalty for the crime, and made technical changes.

See Sec. 53a-41 re fines for felonies.

See Sec. 53a-54e re construction of statutes re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012.

Cited. 196 C. 655; 197 C. 337; 198 C. 92; Id., 671; 200 C. 268; Id., 664; 201 C. 598; 202 C. 93; 210 C. 519; 211 C. 258; 212 C. 31. Definite sentencing scheme for any felony under section implicitly repealed indeterminate sentencing aspect of Sec. 21a-278(a). 214 C. 378. Cited. 218 C. 273; 219 C. 752; 220 C. 169; 225 C. 559; 230 C. 109; 234 C. 139; Id., 735; 235 C. 502; Id., 679; 238 C. 389; 240 C. 743. Sec. 53a-35b does not apply to indeterminate life sentences imposed pursuant to Sec. 53a-35(b)(1), regardless of when the sentence was imposed, but applies solely to definite life sentences imposed pursuant to this section. 300 C. 649. Death penalty unconstitutional under Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9 of Connecticut Constitution. 318 C. 1.

Cited. 6 CA 680; 8 CA 177; Id., 491; 9 CA 686; 10 CA 486; Id., 659; 12 CA 403; 15 CA 416; 19 CA 571; 23 CA 201; 32 CA 759; 35 CA 714; 42 CA 348. An offender who has reached the age of 18 is not considered a juvenile for sentencing procedures and eighth amendment protections articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455. 173 CA 559.

Subdiv. (1):

Cited. 207 C. 374; 235 C. 206. The sentencing of an offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of release pursuant to Subdiv. where the offender was under 18 when the crime was committed does not violate constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 289 C. 550.

Subdiv. (2):

Cited. 216 C. 282. Trial court properly determined that imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of not less than 25 years imprisonment did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for a 15-year-old convicted of murder. 290 C. 209. Holding in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review; life sentence for a juvenile includes a sentence of 50 years or more. 317 C. 52.

Cited. 34 CA 58, 93; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537.

Sec. 53a-35b. “Life imprisonment” defined. A sentence of life imprisonment means a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life.

(P.A. 80-442, S. 11, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 3; P.A. 95-19, S. 2; P.A. 12-5, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added provision re life imprisonment without the possibility of release; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change; P.A. 12-5 substituted “life imprisonment means” for “imprisonment for life shall mean” and “subparagraph (A) or (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a” for “subsection (g) of section 53a-46a”, effective April 25, 2012.

See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

Cited. 198 C. 92; 201 C. 276; 207 C. 374; 215 C. 231; 216 C. 282; 219 C. 752; 220 C. 169; 221 C. 430; 234 C. 139. Statutory provision affects substantive rights; in the absence of any clear and unequivocal expression by legislature rebutting presumption of prospective application, statute does not apply retroactively to persons sentenced prior to its enactment. 282 C. 317. Section does not apply to indeterminate life sentences imposed pursuant to Sec. 53a-35(b)(1), regardless of when the sentence was imposed, but applies solely to definite life sentences imposed pursuant to Sec. 53a-35a. 300 C. 649.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 24 CA 612.

Sec. 53a-35c. Availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release shall not be available as a sentence for an offense committed prior to October 1, 1985.

(P.A. 85-366, S. 4.)

Cited. 9 CA 686.

Sec. 53a-36. Imprisonment for misdemeanor. Definite sentence. Authorized term. A sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence and, unless the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically provides otherwise, the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, a term not to exceed one year; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, a term not to exceed six months; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, a term not to exceed three months; (4) for a class D misdemeanor, a term not to exceed thirty days; and (5) for an unclassified misdemeanor, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 36; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 14; P.A. 77-422, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 16; P.A. 10-36, S. 19; P.A. 12-80, S. 2.)

History: 1971 act added exception re guilt under Sec. 53a-61(a)(3) in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-422 expanded exception to include guilt under Sec. 53a-61a; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (1) to consolidate statutory references and delete redundant language; P.A. 10-36 added “unless the section of the general statutes that defines the crime specifically provides otherwise” re specified terms of imprisonment and deleted in Subdiv. (1) “except that when a person is found guilty under section 53a-61(a)(3) or 53a-61a, the term shall be one year and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced”, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 12-80 added provision re section of the general statutes that provides the penalty for the crime, added new Subdiv. (4) re maximum term for class D misdemeanor, redesignated existing Subdiv. (4) as Subdiv. (5) and amended same to add provision re section of the general statutes that provides the penalty for the crime.

See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.

Cited. 169 C. 223; 178 C. 145. Court in sentencing of defendant found guilty under Sec. 53a-61a must impose a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557. Cited. 184 C. 434; 189 C. 114; 194 C. 198; 217 C. 73; 218 C. 273; 223 C. 635.

Cited. 8 CA 607; 9 CA 686; 12 CA 481; 19 CA 631; 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345; 37 CA 228.

Sec. 53a-36a. Imprisonment term for misdemeanor not to exceed three hundred sixty-four days. (a) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, any offense which constitutes a breach of any law of this state for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to but not exceeding one year shall be punishable by imprisonment for a period not to exceed three hundred sixty-four days. A misdemeanor conviction for which a person was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year shall continue to be deemed a misdemeanor conviction after the maximum term of imprisonment is reduced pursuant to this section.

(b) The provisions of this section apply to any term of imprisonment for which a person was sentenced to before, on or after October 1, 2021.

(c) Any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year, prior to October 1, 2021, for any offense previously punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to but not exceeding one year, may apply to the court that entered the judgment of conviction to have the term of sentence modified to the maximum term of imprisonment for a period not to exceed three hundred sixty-four days. Any such application may be filed at any time and the court shall issue such modification regardless of the date of conviction, provided the record of such sentence has not been destroyed.

(P.A. 21-32, S. 35.)

Sec. 53a-37. Multiple sentences: Concurrent or consecutive, minimum term. When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and to the undischarged term or terms in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence. The court shall state whether the respective maxima and minima shall run concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other, and shall state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed. When a person is sentenced for two or more counts each constituting a separate offense, the court may order that the term of imprisonment for the second and subsequent counts be for a fixed number of years each. The court in such cases shall not set any minimum term of imprisonment except under the first count, and the fixed number of years imposed for the second and subsequent counts shall be added to the maximum term imposed by the court on the first count.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 37; P.A. 73-639, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 73-639 added provisions clarifying court's sentencing powers in cases where person is to be sentenced for two or more counts each of which constitutes a separate offense.

Cited. 178 C. 427. Statute provides for three sentencing options where multiple sentences are imposed at same time. Id., 634. Section authorizes multiple sentences with consecutive minimum and maximum terms. 179 C. 381. Cited. 184 C. 366; Id., 434; 185 C. 473; 190 C. 327; 192 C. 471; 197 C. 413; Id., 485; 206 C. 40; Id., 685; 207 C. 270; Id., 276; 208 C. 420; 217 C. 568. Does not impose limits on trial court's common law inherent sentencing power to stay execution of a criminal sentence. 225 C. 46. Cited. 228 C. 384. Court was not prohibited from imposing a term of incarceration consecutive to a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release. 249 C. 645.

Cited. 7 CA 131; Id., 367; 9 CA 365; Id., 686; 17 CA 307; 20 CA 572; 26 CA 10; 34 CA 503. Application of section is limited to “offenses” and since criminal contempt is not a criminal offense, it is not a matter within section's scope; however, legislature did not intend to change existing common law in enacting section and therefore trial court had inherent authority to impose criminal sentence that ran concurrently with previous sentence for criminal contempt. 59 CA 145.

Cited. 30 CS 71; 36 CS 168.

Sec. 53a-38. Calculation of terms of imprisonment. (a) An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody or institution to which he was sentenced.

(b) A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.

(c) When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.

(d) When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes, the escape shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of such person to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 38; P.A. 92-260, S. 17.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).

Calculations of terms of imprisonment discussed. 185 C. 124. Cited. 230 C. 17.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 33 CA 205; 45 CA 566.

Cited. 40 CS 354.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 209 C. 23; 217 C. 568; 228 C. 384. Where habeas corpus petitioner was convicted and sentenced on separate charges in April and September of same year, and the September sentence was to run concurrent to the April sentence, petitioner's September sentence began to run in September, because that is when he was “received in the custody to which he was sentenced”. 274 C. 563.

Cited. 34 CA 503.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 202 C. 343; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 220. Fundamental purpose is to afford inmate credit toward current sentence for time that he was confined as direct result of his initial trial on same charges and therefore petitioner entitled to credit toward his prison sentence for time that he was confined in mental health facility. 258 C. 394.

Cited. 30 CA 190; 39 CA 455. Proper method for calculating terms of imprisonment discussed. 90 CA 460.

Sec. 53a-39. Reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant by sentencing court or judge. Statement by victim. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, at any time during an executed period of incarceration, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.

(b) On and after October 1, 2021, at any time during the period of a sentence in which a defendant has been sentenced prior to, on or after October 1, 2021, to an executed period of incarceration of more than seven years as a result of a plea agreement, including an agreement in which there is an agreed upon range of sentence, upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.

(c) If, after a hearing pursuant to this section, the sentencing court or judge denies a motion to reduce a defendant's sentence or discharge the defendant, the defendant may not file a subsequent motion for relief under this section until five years have elapsed from the date of the most recent decision denying such defendant relief pursuant to this section.

(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(e) At a hearing held by the sentencing court or judge under this section, such court or judge shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the court or judge for the purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence of the defendant should be reduced, the defendant should be discharged or the defendant should be discharged on probation or conditional discharge pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the court or judge and the court or judge shall make such statement a part of the record at the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, “victim” means the victim, the legal representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 39; P.A. 82-428, S. 1, 4; P.A. 84-505, S. 3, 6; P.A. 85-354, S. 1, 3; P.A. 87-538, S. 1, 3, 5; P.A. 90-261, S. 7, 19; P.A. 94-119; P.A. 95-175, S. 3; P.A. 10-36, S. 20; P.A. 21-102, S. 25; P.A. 21-104, S. 63; P.A. 22-36, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 82-428 specified applicability to definite sentences “of three years or less”; P.A. 84-505 authorized the sentencing court or judge to order certain defendants discharged on intensive probation, effective June 13, 1984, to July 1, 1987; P.A. 85-354 added provisions to require applications for the intensive probation program to be referred to the office of adult probation for assessment and recommendations, to specify that the period of intensive probation shall not exceed the unexpired portion of the sentence, to authorize the court or judge to place on regular probation a defendant who successfully completes intensive probation, to specify the period of such regular probation, and to require a defendant discharged on intensive probation to comply with the probation conditions ordered by the court or required by the office of adult probation; P.A. 87-538 prohibited the discharge on intensive probation of a defendant sentenced for a class A felony, authorized the placement in the intensive probation program of a defendant with a definite sentence which includes suspension of incarceration after a period of at least two years but not more than five years, followed by a period of probation, if he has served at least one-half of the unsuspended portion of his sentence prior to release, and reenacted and continued in effect on and after July 1, 1987, the provisions of this section previously effective from June 13, 1984, until July 1, 1987; P.A. 90-261 deleted all provisions re the discharge of a defendant on intensive probation; P.A. 94-119 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added Subsec. (b) authorizing the sentencing court or judge at any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years to reduce the sentence or order the defendant discharged and added Subsec. (c) making the section inapplicable to any sentence imposed for an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence; P.A. 95-175 added Subsec. (d) re statement by victim re reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (d) to make technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 21-102 amended Subsec. (a) by adding an exception as provided in Subsec. (b), replacing “the period of a definite sentence of three years or less” with “an executed period of incarceration”, amended Subsec. (b) by replacing language re a definite sentence of more than 3 years with language re a sentence to an executed period of incarceration of more than 7 years as a result of a plea agreement, added new Subsec. (c) re a denial of a motion to reduce a defendant's sentence and redesignated existing Subsecs. (c) and (d) as Subsecs. (d) and (e), effective June 30, 2021; P.A. 21-104 changed effective date of P.A. 21-102, S. 25, from date of passage to October 1, 2021, effective June 28, 2021; P.A. 22-36 amended Subsec. (b) to add language referencing October 1, 2021, effective May 17, 2022.

See Sec. 51-195 re sentence review by review division.

Cited. 184 C. 366; 187 C. 109; 200 C. 664; 208 C. 420; 210 C. 519; 214 C. 717. Does not confer continuing jurisdiction on trial court to entertain a motion for judgment of acquittal. 230 C. 427. Cited. 240 C. 708.

Cited. 3 CA 497; 9 CA 686; 12 CA 32. Term “sentence” refers to the aggregate or total effective sentence. 19 CA 631. Cited. 20 CA 467; 21 CA 557; 22 CA 601; 23 CA 201. Nothing in section or any other statute confers on trial court jurisdiction to entertain a motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced. 32 CA 1. Section does not violate separation of powers doctrine. 39 CA 632. A definite sentence includes both its executed and suspended portions. 54 CA 387.

When the original sentence was defective, commitment for violation of probation is illegal. 31 CS 350. Cited. 40 CS 238; 41 CS 229.

Subsec. (a):

“Definite sentence” is intended to have same meaning in both this Subsec. and Sec. 54-125e and does not include a period of special parole. 272 C. 72.

Sec. 53a-39a. Alternate incarceration program. (a) In all cases where a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b, 53a-57 or 53a-58 or any other offense for which there is a mandatory minimum sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, after trial or by a plea of guilty without trial, and a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement or the statutory penalty provides for a term of imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion, order an assessment for placement in an alternate incarceration program under contract with the Judicial Department. If the Court Support Services Division recommends placement in an alternate incarceration program, it shall also submit to the court a proposed alternate incarceration plan. Upon completion of the assessment, the court shall determine whether such defendant shall be ordered to participate in such program as an alternative to incarceration. If the court determines that the defendant shall participate in such program, the court shall suspend any sentence of imprisonment and shall make participation in the alternate incarceration program a condition of probation as provided in section 53a-30.

(b) An alternate incarceration program includes, but shall not be limited to, an intensive probation program, any community service program approved by the Chief Court Administrator and any residential or nonresidential program approved by the Chief Court Administrator which provides care, supervision and supportive services such as employment, psychiatric and psychological evaluation and counseling, and drug and alcohol dependency treatment. Any defendant placed in an alternate incarceration program shall comply with any other conditions of probation ordered by the court or required by the Court Support Services Division, as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of section 53a-30.

(P.A. 89-383, S. 3, 16; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3; P.A. 02-132, S. 33; P.A. 12-5, S. 19; P.A. 19-189, S. 18.)

History: P.A. 89-383, S. 3 effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994; P.A. 94-128 negated effect of P.A. 89-383, reenacting and continuing existence of section, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “program to be conducted by the Office of Adult Probation” with “program under contract with the Judicial Department” and replacing “Office of Adult Probation” with “Court Support Services Division” and amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “Office of Adult Probation” with “Court Support Services Division”; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re conviction of a capital felony, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “53a-70b” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019”, and making technical changes.

Sec. 53a-39b. Special alternative incarceration program for young male defendants. Section 53a-39b is repealed, effective October 1, 2003.

(P.A. 89-390, S. 18, 37; P.A. 90-230, S. 75, 101; 90-261, S. 10, 19; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 5, 10; P.A. 03-48, S. 2.)

Sec. 53a-39c. Community service labor program. (a) There is established, within available appropriations, a community service labor program for persons convicted of a first violation of section 21a-267, 21a-279 or 21a-279a, who have not previously been convicted of a violation of section 21a-277 or 21a-278. Upon application by any such person for participation in such program the court may grant such application and, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with section 53a-30. No person may be placed in such program who has previously been placed in such program.

(b) Any person who enters such program shall pay to the court a participation fee of two hundred five dollars, except that no person may be excluded from such program for inability to pay such fee, provided such person: (1) Files with the court an affidavit of indigency or inability to pay, assisted by the Court Support Services Division to the extent requested by such person, and the court enters a finding of inability to pay, or (2) has been determined indigent and eligible for representation by a public defender who has been appointed on behalf of such person pursuant to section 51-296. The court shall not require a person to perform community service in lieu of payment of such fee, if such fee is waived. All program fees collected under this subsection shall be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account.

(P.A. 90-213, S. 3, 56; P.A. 97-248, S. 11, 12; P.A. 99-148, S. 2, 4; P.A. 03-2, S. 50; P.A. 13-159, S. 2; P.A. 21-102, S. 11; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-1, S. 160; P.A. 22-26, S. 26.)

History: P.A. 97-248 amended Subsec. (a) to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously participated in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i, and amended Subsec. (b) to require a pretrial community service labor program established for persons for whom prosecution is suspended to include a drug education component, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-148 amended Subsec. (a) to make eligible for the program persons charged with a violation of Sec. 21a-267, to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously been convicted of a violation of Sec. 21a-267 and to delete the provision that made persons who previously participated in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i ineligible for the program, amended Subsec. (c) to replace provisions that specified differing periods of participation in the program depending upon whether the violation was of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of Sec. 21a-279 with provisions requiring a period of participation consisting of a minimum of 14 days for a first violation and 30 days for a second violation involving a plea of guilty and conviction, and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 1999; P.A. 03-2 added new Subsec. (b) to establish a participation fee of $205, prohibit the exclusion of a person from the program for inability to pay such fee and require that all program fees collected be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account and redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) and (c) as new Subsecs. (c) and (d), respectively, effective February 28, 2003; P.A. 13-159 amended Subsec. (a) to change eligibility for program from persons charged under Sec. 21a-267 or 21a-279 but not previously convicted under Sec. 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-279 to persons convicted of a first violation of Sec. 21a-267 or 21a-279 but not previously convicted under Sec. 21a-277 or 21a-278, delete former Subdiv. (1) re person not previously placed in program, delete former Subdiv. (2) designator and provision re person previously placed in program, and make ineligible for the program any person who has previously been placed in the program, added new Subsec. (c) re period of participation in program to be 30 days, deleted former Subsec. (c) re tolling and dismissal of charges and former Subsec. (d) re period of participation in program for first and second violation, and made technical changes; P.A. 21-102 amended Subsec. (b) by redesignating existing Subdiv. (2) and part of existing Subdiv. (3) re entering of court finding as part of Subdiv. (1) and adding new Subdiv. (2) re finding of indigency based on eligibility for a public defender and prohibition on requiring person to perform community service; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-1 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 21a-279a, effective July 1, 2021; P.A. 22-26 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting reference to “such indigency is confirmed”, adding reference re court finding “of inability to pay”, adding reference re Court Support Services Division assisting person “to the extent requested by such person” and making technical changes, effective July 1, 2022.

Program intended to avoid unnecessary trials and expenditures of resources, so defendant's application for program when trial nearly complete is justification for denying application. 51 CA 126.

Sec. 53a-39d. Pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program. Section 53a-39d is repealed, effective October 1, 2010.

(P.A. 98-145, S. 3, 4; P.A. 99-187, S. 3; P.A. 02-89, S. 83; P.A. 10-43, S. 43.)

Sec. 53a-40. Persistent offenders: Definitions; defense; authorized sentences; procedure. (a) A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who:

(1) (A) Stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree, assault in the first degree, home invasion, burglary in the first degree or burglary in the second degree with a firearm, and (B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) The crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii) murder, sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117, or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive, 53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83, 53-86, 53-238 and 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iv) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph; or

(2) (A) Stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) Murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree, assault in the first degree, home invasion, burglary in the first degree or burglary in the second degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii) prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117, or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive, 53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83 and 53-86 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph.

(b) A persistent dangerous sexual offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for (A) any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection, or (B) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53-238 or 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, or (C) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection or this subdivision.

(c) A persistent serious felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present felony, convicted of and imprisoned under an imposed term of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for a crime. This subsection shall not apply where the present conviction is for a crime enumerated in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the prior conviction was for a crime other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section.

(d) A persistent serious sexual offender is a person, other than a person who qualifies as a persistent dangerous sexual offender under subsection (b) of this section, who qualifies as a persistent serious felony offender under subsection (c) of this section and the felony of which such person presently stands convicted is a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b and the prior conviction is for a violation of section 53-21 of the general statutes, revised to January 1, 1995, involving sexual contact, committed prior to October 1, 1995, a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000, a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.

(e) A persistent larceny offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of larceny in the third degree in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October 1, 1982, or larceny in the fourth, fifth or sixth degree, and (2) has been, at separate times, twice convicted of the crime of larceny for violations committed during the ten years prior to the commission of the present larceny.

(f) A persistent offender for possession of a controlled substance is a person who (1) stands convicted of possession of a controlled substance in violation of the provisions of section 21a-279, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission of the present possession of a controlled substance, twice convicted of the crime of possession of a controlled substance during the ten years prior to the commission of the present violation of section 21a-279.

(g) A persistent felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony other than a class D or E felony, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission of the present felony, twice convicted of a felony other than a class D or E felony, if such felonies were committed during the ten years prior to the commission of the present felony.

(h) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of being a persistent offender under this section that (1) as to any prior conviction on which the state is relying the defendant was pardoned on the ground of innocence, and (2) without such conviction, the defendant was not two or more times convicted and imprisoned as required by this section.

(i) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by the general statutes for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, shall (1) sentence such person to a term of imprisonment that is not (A) less than twice the minimum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime, or (B) more than twice the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime or forty years, whichever is greater, provided, if a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is authorized for such crime, such sentence shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is twice such authorized mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and (2) if such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, sentence such person to a term of imprisonment that is not less than three times the minimum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime or more than life, provided, if a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is authorized for such crime, such sentence shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is three times such authorized mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.

(j) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous sexual offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of imprisonment for life, as defined in section 53a-35b.

(k) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious felony offender, the court in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.

(l) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious sexual offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose a sentence of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute the maximum sentence specified by section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of felony.

(m) (1) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony authorized by section 53a-35, if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed prior to July 1, 1981, or authorized by section 53a-35a, if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, but prior to October 1, 2019.

(2) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted for a violation committed on or after October 1, 2019, may impose the sentence of (A) imprisonment for a class E felony authorized by section 53a-35a, if such person presently stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-125, or (B) imprisonment authorized by section 53a-36 for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor authorized under section 53a-36 if such person presently stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-125a or 53a-125b.

(n) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender for possession of a controlled substance, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class E felony authorized by section 53a-35a.

(o) When any person has been found to be a persistent felony offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony; provided the sentence imposed may not be less than three years, and provided further three years of the sentence so imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(p) (1) Whenever a person is arrested for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, the prosecuting authority shall investigate and ascertain whether such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in said subsection (a) and would be eligible to be sentenced under subsection (i) of this section if convicted of such crime.

(2) If the prosecuting authority ascertains that such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section and such person has been presented to a geographical area courthouse, the prosecuting authority shall cause such person to be transferred to a judicial district courthouse.

(3) No court shall accept a plea of guilty, not guilty or nolo contendere from a person arrested for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section unless it finds that the prosecuting authority has complied with the requirements of subdivision (1) of this subsection.

(4) If the prosecuting authority ascertains that such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section but decides not to initiate proceedings to seek the sentence enhancement provided by subsection (i) of this section, the prosecuting authority shall state for the record the specific reason or reasons for not initiating such proceedings.

(5) If the prosecuting authority ascertains that such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section and initiates proceedings to seek the sentence enhancement provided by subsection (i) of this section, but subsequently decides to terminate such proceedings, the prosecuting authority shall state for the record the specific reason or reasons for terminating such proceedings.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 40; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 15; P.A. 73-616, S. 40; P.A. 76-336, S. 20; P.A. 80-442, S. 12, 28; P.A. 83-4, S. 1, 2; P.A. 85-603; P.A. 92-260, S. 18; P.A. 94-37, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 48; P.A. 01-84, S. 18, 26; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 6, 7; P.A. 08-51, S. 1, 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-2, S. 19; P.A. 19-151, S. 3; 19-189, S. 19; P.A. 21-102, S. 10.)

History: 1971 act removed requirements that offenders under Subsecs. (a) and (b) have been previously convicted and imprisoned “two or more times” and “at separate times” and redefined persistent larceny offender as one who stands convicted of larceny in “the third or fourth degree” rather than in “the second or a lesser degree” in Subsec. (c); P.A. 73-616 corrected section reference re assault with intent to kill, substituting Sec. 54-117 for Sec. 53-117 in Subsec. (a); P.A. 76-336 substituted sexual assault in first or third degree or sexual assault in first or third degree with a firearm for “rape” in Subsec. (a) and specified applicability of conviction for crimes enumerated in Secs. 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 prior to October 1, 1975; P.A. 80-442 specified applicability of Subsec. (b) to persistent “serious” felony offenders, inserted new Subsec. (d) re persistent felony offenders, relettering as necessary, amended Subsecs. (f) to (h), formerly (e) to (g), re crimes committed on or after July 1, 1981, and added Subsec. (i) re extended incarceration effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-4 amended Subsec. (c) to reflect the establishment of six degrees of larceny pursuant to P.A. 82-271 by including persons convicted of larceny in the third degree “in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October 1, 1982” and larceny in the “fifth or sixth” degree; P.A. 85-603 made a technical change to Subsec. (h) and rewrote some of the language of said Subsec. to reflect said change; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace an obsolete reference to the offense of “sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm” with its revised name of “aggravated sexual assault in the first degree”, and made other minor technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (d); P.A. 94-37 amended Subsec. (f) to revise the penalty for a person found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender by replacing the provision that permitted the court to impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized for a class A felony with the provision requiring the court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than 40 years and by adding the provision requiring the court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life if such person has been twice convicted and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in Subsec. (a)(2); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (a) to delete from category of a persistent dangerous felony offender a person who stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm and has been previously convicted and imprisoned for more than one year for any of said crimes or any predecessor statutes, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, to revise and restructure Subsec. to reflect such deletion and to revise Subdiv. and Subpara. indicators accordingly, added new Subsec. (b) re persistent dangerous sexual offender, new Subsec. (d) re persistent serious sexual offender, new Subsec. (i) re penalty for persistent dangerous sexual offender and new Subsec. (k) re penalty for persistent serious sexual offender, relettering intervening and remaining Subsecs. accordingly, and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (d) to replace in provision re the offense for which the person presently stands convicted the reference to “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, to replace in provision re offenses for which the person was previously convicted the reference to “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000,” and to add reference to a prior conviction for “a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, effective July 1, 2001; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (h) to replace reference to “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section” with “subparagraph (B) of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section”, amended Subsecs. (h) and (i) to delete requirement for imposition of enhanced sentence that “the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest” and amended Subsecs. (j) to (m) to delete requirement for imposition of enhanced sentence that “the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest”, effective January 25, 2008, and amended Subsec. (a) to include the crimes of home invasion, burglary in the first degree and burglary in the second degree with a firearm in Subdivs. (1)(A) and (2)(B)(i), effective March 1, 2008; P.A. 08-51 amended Subsec. (h) to replace “the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981,” with “the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by the general statutes for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted”, insert Subdiv. designators (1) and (2) and in Subdiv. (1) replace a term of imprisonment of “not more than forty years” with a term of imprisonment “that is not (A) less than twice the minimum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime or (B) more than twice the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime or forty years, whichever is greater, provided, if a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is authorized for such crime, such sentence shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is twice such authorized mandatory minimum term of imprisonment”, and in Subdiv. (2) replace reference to “subparagraph (B) of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section” with “subsection (a) of this section” and replace a term of imprisonment “of not more than life” with a term of imprisonment “that is not less than three times the minimum term of imprisonment authorized for such crime or more than life, provided, if a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is authorized for such crime, such sentence shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is three times such authorized mandatory minimum term of imprisonment”, and added Subsec. (n) re obligations of the prosecuting authority and the court whenever a person is arrested for any of the crimes enumerated in Subsec. (a), effective May 8, 2008; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-2 added new Subsecs. (f) and (n) re persistent offender for possession of controlled substance, redesignated existing Subsecs. (f) to (l) as Subsecs. (g) to (m) and existing Subsecs. (m) and (n) as Subsecs. (o) and (p), and made conforming changes; P.A. 19-151 amended Subsec. (e) by deleting “prior to the commission of the present larceny,”, adding provision re violations committed during 10 years prior to commission of present larceny and making a technical change, and amended Subsec. (m) by designating existing provisions re person found to be persistent larceny offender as Subdiv. (1) and amending same by adding “, but prior to October 1, 2019”, and adding Subdiv. (2) re violation committed on or after October 1, 2019; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (d) by replacing “53a-70b” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019”, and making technical changes; P.A. 21-102 amended Subsec. (f)(2) by adding language re the 10 years prior to the commission of present violation and Subsec. (g) by referencing class E felonies and adding language re the 10 years prior to the commission of present felony in Subdiv. (2).

Cited. 176 C. 270; 180 C. 660; 184 C. 215; 188 C. 27; 191 C. 180; 192 C. 471; 194 C. 573; Id., 692; 195 C. 326; 197 C. 280; 198 C. 158; Id., 273; 203 C. 506; 207 C. 619; 218 C. 273; 224 C. 397; 226 C. 601; 227 C. 751; 234 C. 324; 240 C. 317; 242 C. 143. Finding by trial court, rather than jury, that imposing extended incarceration would best serve the public interest clearly violated defendant's constitutional rights under the sixth amendment to U.S. Constitution; section is unconstitutional to the extent it does not provide that defendant is entitled to have jury make a required finding that exposes defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by jury's guilty verdict. 283 C. 748.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 1; 31 CA 140; 36 CA 401; 37 CA 733; 45 CA 369; Id., 390. Admission of certified copy of judgment sufficient to prove persistent dangerous felony offender. 50 CA 521. Section constitutes a sentence enhancement and not an independent criminal offense. 117 CA 486. Rule in 283 C. 748 does not apply retroactively. 130 CA 435. Defendant's status as a persistent felony offender and his resulting sentence enhancements do not run contrary to the plain language of section which permits enhancement of defendant's conviction of robbery in the first degree under Subsec. (a) and of his conviction of attempt to escape from custody under Subsec. (b) and defendant's arguments that his conviction of robbery in the first degree under Subsec. (a) precludes a sentence enhancement under Subsec. (b) and that the legislature did not intend for more than one recidivist enhancement to apply to the conviction of multiple current charges because he was not afforded the opportunity to reform are without merit. 173 CA 119; judgment affirmed in part, see 330 C. 793.

Subsec. (a):

Constitutionality of dangerous felony offender statutes has long been upheld. 173 C. 545. Cited. 193 C. 273. Nothing in statute precludes state from offering probative evidence to clarify an official judgment of conviction in order to prove defendant a second offender. 194 C. 573. No viable basis for challenge to statute on the grounds of vagueness. 195 C. 326. Cited. Id., 475; 200 C. 350; Id., 453; 202 C. 509; 203 C. 81; 206 C. 621; 207 C. 276; 210 C. 573; 213 C. 97; 216 C. 220; 224 C. 445; 232 C. 455.

Cited. 17 CA 490; 19 CA 571; 29 CA 274; 37 CA 672; Id., 733; 39 CA 82; 46 CA 131. Jury improperly found defendant to be a persistent dangerous felony offender because his conviction of attempted assault in the first degree is not one of the qualifying felonies enumerated in Subsec. 51 CA 171.

Cited. 43 CS 77.

Subsec. (b):

Presentence report used to prove that defendant was not persistent felony offender under Subsec. 169 C. 263. Cited. 182 C. 176. Failure to allege imprisonment under provisions of statute not considered reversible error where proof of imprisonment was established during trial and defendant failed to request complete statement of facts. 184 C. 215. Cited. Id., 369; 187 C. 264; 224 C. 397; 227 C. 711; Id., 751; 232 C. 455.

Cited. 9 CA 133; 10 CA 279; 12 CA 375; 13 CA 438; 20 CA 586; 31 CA 178; 34 CA 1; 35 CA 405; 37 CA 733; 39 CA 82; Id., 789; 45 CA 369.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 202 C. 369.

By pleading nolo contendere to charge of being a persistent larceny offender, defendant waived her right to appeal this issue. 4 CA 676. Cited. 14 CA 88; 21 CA 331; 37 CA 228. The word “and” in the exemption contained in subsection is used in a conjunctive manner. 168 CA 37.

Subsec. (d):

Language of section and its legislative purpose require sequence of offense, conviction and punishment for each prior felony before enhanced penalty as a persistent offender attaches. 240 C. 317.

Cited. 41 CA 391.

Subsec. (g) (former Subsec. (f)):

Cited. 169 C. 263; 187 C. 264; 200 C. 453; 207 C. 276. Purpose is to allow sentencing court to impose a more severe sentence than would be allowed for the substantive offense; Subsec. requires sentencing court to consider defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct and whether extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest; there is no requirement that sentences imposed be strictly proportional to the nature of substantive offense or offenses of which defendant was convicted; nature of substantive offense is only one factor to be considered by sentencing court. 254 C. 613.

Cited. 19 CA 571. Under plain and unambiguous language of Subsec., only class D felonies, which carry a lesser maximum punishment than unclassified felonies, are excluded as predicate felonies, the legislature having specifically chosen not to exclude unclassified felonies. 128 CA 765. When defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to a sentence enhancement provision, defendant waives right to jury trial thereon, and no constitutional violation occurs where defendant's increased penalty allegedly results from trial court's, rather than jury's, consideration of factors other than defendant's previous convictions. 141 CA 814.

Subsec. (i) (former Subsec. (h)):

Under 2001 revision, section clearly reflected legislature's negative view of persistent dangerous felony offenders and the degree of punishment it wished to impose on them at the time defendant committed the offenses such that defendant was on fair notice that the substantive provision of section would apply even if certain procedural provisions were later found to be unconstitutional; text and legislative history of section indicate that the term “public interest”, as used in section, does not include the public interest in minimizing costs of incarceration. 303 C. 246.

Cited. 21 CA 331; 37 CA 228. Court followed 283 C. 748 in holding that jury and not the court must make finding of whether defendant's extended incarceration will best serve the public interest. 105 CA 278. Section is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant or on its face. 121 CA 672.

Subsec. (k) (former Subsec. (j)):

Under 2007 revision, and following 283 C. 748, where defendant's guilty plea effectively waived his right to a jury finding that enhancement of his sentence as a persistent serious felony offender was in the public interest, defendant was not presumed to have waived a court finding on the public interest determination and the court was the proper entity to make such public interest determination. 143 CA 76. The applicable law for the purposes of sentencing the defendant was the law in effect at the time that the crimes were committed, which authorized the court to enhance the defendant's sentence under the public interest provision that was eliminated in 2008, since there was no language stating that the legislative amendment applied retroactively. 206 CA 209.

Sec. 53a-40a. Persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000.

(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias, the court shall: (1) In lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a if the crime is a felony, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony, or (2) in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-36 if the crime is a misdemeanor, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony as authorized by section 53a-35a.

(P.A. 90-137, S. 2; P.A. 00-72, S. 10; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 8.)

History: P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference in Subdiv. (1) to “subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a-181b” with reference to Sec. “53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l” and to replace reference in Subdiv. (2) to “subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a-181b” with reference to “section 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000” and amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (b) to delete requirement for imposition of enhanced sentence that “the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest”, effective January 25, 2008.

Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release. A person convicted of an offense committed while released pursuant to sections 54-63a to 54-63g, inclusive, or sections 54-64a to 54-64c, inclusive, other than a violation of section 53a-222 or 53a-222a, may be sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense to (1) a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years if the offense is a felony, or (2) a term of imprisonment of not more than one year if the offense is a misdemeanor.

(P.A. 90-213, S. 54; P.A. 98-90, S. 2; P.A. 10-36, S. 21.)

History: P.A. 98-90 excepted convictions under Sec. 53a-222 from provisions of section; P.A. 10-36 excepted convictions under Sec. 53a-222a from provisions of section, effective July 1, 2010.

Question of whether defendant was on release at time of the offense for which he was convicted and therefore subject to enhanced penalty was not reasonably in dispute, was conceded as fact by defendant, and did not require a jury determination. 280 C. 69. Although the state may not use the erased records to prove the basis for the sentence enhancement, the erasure provisions of Sec. 54-142a do not prohibit the imposition of a sentence enhancement pursuant to this section after the records pertaining to the charges for which defendant was on pretrial release have been erased. 319 C. 494.

Jury hearing not constitutionally required for enhanced sentence based on prior conviction; enhanced penalty provisions do apply to defendant who committed second crime while released on written promise to appear. 62 CA 34. Trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim that sentencing court failed to articulate any reason for enhancing his sentence. 93 CA 61.

Sec. 53a-40c. Psychological counseling required for person convicted of sexual assault of a minor. Any person convicted of a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a where the victim of the sexual assault was a person ten years of age or under shall, in addition to any fine or term of imprisonment imposed, be sentenced to undergo psychological counseling.

(P.A. 93-340, S. 15.)

Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order is a person who (1) stands convicted of assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order under section 53a-223a, criminal violation of a restraining order under section 53a-223b or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108, and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime, (A) been convicted of a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or 53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order under section 53a-223a, criminal violation of a restraining order under section 53a-223b, or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108, or (B) been convicted in any other state of any crime the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision.

(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order, the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a, as applicable, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor or felony, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section 53a-35a.

(P.A. 95-193, S. 2; P.A. 02-127, S. 4; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 9; P.A. 10-144, S. 12; P.A. 12-5, S. 20; P.A. 14-122, S. 58; 14-147, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 02-127 applied the provisions to criminal violation of a restraining order under Sec. 53a-223b and in Subsec. (b) added references to Sec. 53a-35a, specified “felony” in the provision concerning the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment authorized for the next more serious crime and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (b) to delete requirement for imposition of enhanced sentence that “the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest”, effective January 25, 2008; P.A. 10-144 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to delete limitation re 5 years preceding commission of the present crime, designate existing provisions as Subparas. (A) and (C), add Subpara. (B) re conviction in any other state of any crime substantially the same as crimes enumerated in Subpara. (A) and delete “whichever is later” in Subpara. (C); P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a)(2)(A) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re conviction of a capital felony, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 14-122 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 14-147 added references to criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order throughout and amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add “prior to the commission of the present crime,” and delete former Subpara. (C) re release from incarceration with respect to conviction, effective October 1, 2014, and applicable to convictions entered on or after that date.

Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal protective orders. (a) If any person is convicted of (1) a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21, section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70c, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-73a, 53a-181c, 53a-181d, 53a-181e, 53a-182b or 53a-183, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-192a, section 53a-223, 53a-223a or 53a-223b or attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a, or (2) any crime that the court determines constitutes a family violence crime, as defined in section 46b-38a, or attempt or conspiracy to commit any such crime, the court may, in addition to imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a or 53a-36, if the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal protective order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal protective order which shall remain in effect for a duration specified by the court until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown. If any person is convicted of any crime not specified in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection, the court may, for good cause shown, issue a standing criminal protective order pursuant to this subsection.

(b) Such standing criminal protective order may include, but need not be limited to, provisions enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim. If the victim is enrolled in a public or private elementary or secondary school, including a technical high school, or an institution of higher education, as defined in section 10a-55, the clerk of the court shall, upon the request of the victim, send, by facsimile or other means, a copy of such standing criminal protective order, or the information contained in any such order, to such school or institution of higher education, the president of any institution of higher education at which the victim is enrolled and the special police force established pursuant to section 10a-142, if any, at the institution of higher education at which the victim is enrolled, if the victim provides the clerk with the name and address of such school or institution of higher education.

(c) (1) Such standing criminal protective order shall include the following notice: “In accordance with section 53a-223a of the Connecticut general statutes, violation of this order shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.”.

(2) Upon issuance of a standing criminal protective order under subsection (a) of this section, each victim protected by such order shall be given a notice that contains the following language: “If a standing criminal protective order has been issued on your behalf or on behalf of your child, you may elect to give testimony or appear in a family court proceeding remotely, pursuant to section 46b-15c. Please notify the court in writing at least two days in advance of a proceeding if you choose to give testimony or appear remotely, and your physical presence in the courthouse will not be required in order to participate in the court proceeding.”.

(d) For the purposes of this section and any other provision of the general statutes, “standing criminal protective order” means (1) a standing criminal restraining order issued prior to October 1, 2010, or (2) a standing criminal protective order issued on or after October 1, 2010.

(P.A. 96-228, S. 1; P.A. 98-15; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 41, 121; P.A. 99-186, S. 13; P.A. 05-147, S. 2; P.A. 07-123, S. 5; P.A. 10-144, S. 5; P.A. 11-152, S. 5; P.A. 14-147, S. 2; 14-217, S. 128; 14-234, S. 8; P.A. 16-71, S. 14; P.A. 17-163, S. 4; P.A. 19-189, S. 20; P.A. 21-78, S. 7.)

History: (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (c) the reference in public act 96-228 to “section 1 of this act” was deemed by the Revisors to be a reference to section 2 of that act and therefore codified as “section 53a-110c”); P.A. 98-15 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to Secs. 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec.(a) to make provisions applicable to any person convicted “of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a”; P.A. 05-147 amended Subsec. (a) to include a violation of Sec. 53a-223 and make a technical change; P.A. 07-123 amended Subsec. (a) to designate list of qualifying offenses as Subdiv. (1) and amended same by including a violation of Sec. 53a-182b, 53a-183, 53a-223a or 53a-223b and making technical changes, to add Subdiv. (2) re any crime that the court determines constitutes a family violence crime, as defined in Sec. 46b-38a, or attempt or conspiracy to commit any such crime, include sentence authorized under Sec. 53a-36 and to add provision authorizing a court for good cause shown to issue standing criminal restraining order if person is convicted of a crime against a family or household member other than a crime specified in Subdiv. (1) or (2); P.A. 10-144 substituted “standing criminal protective order” for “standing criminal restraining order” in Subsecs. (a) and (b), amended Subsec. (a) to provide that order remain in effect for duration specified by court, made technical changes in Subsec. (b) and replaced former Subsec. (c) re required language with new Subsec. (c) re required notice; P.A. 11-152 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to include a violation of Sec. 53-21(a)(1) or (2), 53a-70c or 53a-73a; P.A. 14-147 added Subsec. (d) defining “standing criminal protective order”; P.A. 14-217 amended Subsec. (c) to replace “five years” and “five thousand dollars” with “ten years” and “ten thousand dollars”, respectively, and make a technical change, effective January 1, 2015; P.A. 14-234 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting references to crime against a family member or household member, as defined in Sec. 46b-38a, and making a conforming change, effective January 1, 2015; P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by adding reference to Sec. 53a-192a(a)(2); P.A. 17-163 added provision re victim enrolled in school or institution of higher education in Subsec. (b), effective January 1, 2018; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”; P.A. 21-78 designated existing provisions of Subsec. (c) as Subdiv. (1) and added Subdiv. (2) re notice to victim protected by order.

See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.

Imposition of a standing criminal restraining order after defendant began serving his sentence did not constitute punishment or affect defendant's sentence and therefore, trial court had jurisdiction to impose it. 269 C. 107.

Order precluding defendant from having contact with his minor children is within scope of statute. 81 CA 84.

Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent operating while under the influence felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime and within the preceding ten years, been convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b, 53a-60d, 14-227a or 14-227m or subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n or been convicted in any other state of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same as section 53a-56b, 53a-60d, 14-227a or 14-227m or subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n.

(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent operating while under the influence felony offender, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.

(P.A. 97-291, S. 1; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 10; P.A. 16-126, S. 30.)

History: Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (b) to delete requirement for imposition of enhanced sentence that “the court is of the opinion that his history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest”, effective January 25, 2008; P.A. 16-126 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing references to Sec. 14-227a(a) with references to Sec. 14-227a and by adding references to Secs. 14-227m and 14-227n(a)(1) and (2).

Sec. 53a-41. Fines for felonies. A fine for the conviction of a felony shall, unless the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically provides otherwise, be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A felony, an amount not to exceed twenty thousand dollars; (2) for a class B felony, an amount not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars; (3) for a class C felony, an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars; (4) for a class D felony, an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars; (5) for a class E felony, an amount not to exceed three thousand five hundred dollars; and (6) for an unclassified felony, an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 41; P.A. 92-256, S. 1; 92-260, S. 19; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70; P.A. 13-258, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A felony from $10,000 to 20,000, for a class B felony from $10,000 to $15,000, and for a class C felony from $5,000 to $10,000; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (3) to replace “law” with “section of the general statutes”; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section; P.A. 13-258 added “unless the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically provides otherwise”, added new Subdiv. (5) re maximum fine for a class E felony, and redesignated existing Subdiv. (5) as Subdiv. (6) and amended same to add provision re section of general statutes that provides the penalty for the crime.

See Sec. 53a-35a re terms of imprisonment for felonies.

See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.

Cited. 231 C. 514.

Cited. 9 CA 686. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of amount of fine not plain error. 65 CA 234.

Sec. 53a-42. Fines for misdemeanors. A fine for the conviction of a misdemeanor shall, unless the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically provides otherwise, be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars; (4) for a class D misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars; and (5) for an unclassified misdemeanor, an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 42; P.A. 92-256, S. 2; 92-260, S. 20; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70; P.A. 12-80, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A misdemeanor from $1,000 to $2,000; P.A. 92-260 replaced “law” with “section of the general statutes”; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section; P.A. 12-80 added “unless the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically provides otherwise”, added new Subdiv. (4) re maximum fine for class D misdemeanor, redesignated existing Subdiv. (4) as Subdiv. (5) and amended same to add provision re section of general statutes that provides the penalty for the crime.

See Sec. 53a-36 re terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors.

See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.

Cited. 178 C. 145; 180 C. 557; 217 C. 73.

Cited. 8 CA 607; 9 CA 686; 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345.

Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations. A fine for a violation shall be fixed by the court in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. In the case of a violation defined in any other section of the general statutes, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified in the section that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance with such section.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 43.)

Cited. 9 CA 686.

Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained money or property through the commission of any felony, misdemeanor or violation, upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense under section 53a-41, 53a-42 or 53a-43, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For purposes of this section, the term “gain” means the amount of money or the value of property derived.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 44; P.A. 92-260, S. 21.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in punctuation.

Cited. 231 C. 514.

Cited. 9 CA 686.

Sec. 53a-44a. Surcharge on fine for criminal trespass or criminal mischief on public land. Whenever any person is convicted of a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-107, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-108, subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of section 53a-109, subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of section 53a-115, subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of section 53a-116, subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-117 or subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-117a, the court, in addition to imposing any fine authorized by section 53a-41 or 53a-42 for such violation, shall impose a surcharge in an amount equal to fifty per cent of such fine. Any such surcharge collected shall be payable to the municipality in which the arrest was made unless the arresting law enforcement authority was a conservation officer, special conservation officer or patrolman appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection under authority of section 26-5, in which case such surcharge shall be payable to the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection.

(P.A. 05-234, S. 9; P.A. 11-80, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 05-234 effective January 1, 2006; pursuant to P.A. 11-80, “Commissioner of Environmental Protection” and “Department of Environmental Protection” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection” and “Department of Energy and Environmental Protection”, respectively, effective July 1, 2011.

Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree. (a) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, punishable in accordance with subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subparagraph (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, or murder under section 53a-54d.

(b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.

(c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 45; P.A. 73-137, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 13, 28; P.A. 82-298, S. 4; P.A. 83-210, S. 2, 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 22; P.A. 12-5, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 73-137 added reference to capital felonies in Subsec. (a) and substituted reference to Sec. 53a-46a for reference to Sec. 53a-46, deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed person indicted for murder to plead guilty with consent of court and state's attorney in which case court would sentence him as for a Class A felony, relettering former Subsecs. (c) and (d) accordingly; P.A. 80-442 specified punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a and deleted reference to death sentenced under Sec. 53a-46a in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that court shall be composed of three judges designated by chief court administrator, who shall also name one such judge to preside, where previously one judge was the judge presiding at the session and the other two were designated by the chief justice of the supreme court; P.A. 83-210 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by inserting “or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a”; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception for “murder under section 53a-54d”, amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that such judges or a majority of them “shall determine the question of guilt or innocence and shall, as provided in said section 53a-46a, render judgment and impose sentence” with “shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly”, and amended Subsec. (c) to replace “him” with “such person”; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference to capital felony with provision re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, punishable under Sec. 53a-35a(1)(A), or murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, punishable as a class A felony under Sec. 53a-35a(1)(B), effective April 25, 2012.

Cited. 187 C. 6; 201 C. 435; 206 C. 346.

Cited. 9 CA 686.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 180 C. 382; 190 C. 639; 198 C. 77; 199 C. 163; 207 C. 374. Defendant's decision to forgo a jury determination in capital felony sentencing proceeding and opt for sentencing by a three-judge panel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent; formulaic canvass of defendant is not required and validity of jury waiver is determined by examination of totality of the circumstances. 303 C. 71.

Subsec. (c):

Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382. Cited. 181 C. 187; Id., 406; 182 C. 66; 188 C. 542; 190 C. 639; 193 C. 695; 195 C. 232. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 201 C. 174; Id., 368; 210 C. 78; 212 C. 593; 214 C. 57; 225 C. 55; 226 C. 237; 231 C. 115; 240 C. 727.

Cited. 7 CA 180; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; 40 CA 151.

Cited. 42 CS 426.

Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal. Section 53a-46 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 46; 1972, P.A. 56, S. 1; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. (a) A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, only if (1) a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section, and (2) such person was eighteen years of age or older at the time the offense was committed.

(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i) of this section. Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or that any factor set forth in subsection (h) of this section exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1) before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection (b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury that determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.

(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material contained in any presentence report that may have been prepared. No presentence information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section shall be on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.

(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.

(e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h) of this section, the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.

(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) of this section exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exist, and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.

(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) of this section exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

(h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e) of this section, that at the time of the offense (1) the defendant was a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, or (2) the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (3) the defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the course of commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.

(i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1) The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a felony and the defendant had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a; or (8) the defendant committed the offense set forth in subdivision (1) of section 53a-54b to avoid arrest for a criminal act or prevent detection of a criminal act or to hamper or prevent the victim from carrying out any act within the scope of the victim's official duties or to retaliate against the victim for the performance of the victim's official duties.

(P.A. 73-137, S. 4; P.A. 80-332, S. 1; 80-442, S. 14, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 1; P.A. 93-306, S. 12; P.A. 95-19, S. 1; P.A. 01-151, S. 1, 2, 5; P.A. 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 12-5, S. 5; P.A. 15-84, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 80-332 restated provisions and referred to mitigating or aggravating factors throughout, replacing references to factors set forth in Subsecs. (f) and (g); P.A. 80-442 referred to imposition of sentence in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1) rather than to sentence for a Class A felony in Subsec. (e), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added a new Subsec. (d) to specify the procedure for the determination by a jury or court of the existence of a mitigating factor and to add a definition of mitigating factors, relettered the remaining Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (f) to replace “a sentence in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1)” with “a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release”; P.A. 93-306 amended Subsec. (h) to add as an aggravating factor that the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon; P.A. 95-19 revised section to permit the jury or court to make findings as to whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors and require the court to sentence the defendant accordingly, while retaining provision that the existence of certain factors concerning the defendant will operate to automatically bar the imposition of the death sentence, and, more specifically, amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the separate hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates “that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists” rather than “that one or more mitigating factors exist” and make technical changes, amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes, amended Subsec. (e) to require the jury or court to return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to “the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d)” rather than “the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor”, amended Subsec. (f) to revise the circumstances that must be found for the court to impose the death sentence by requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death if the jury or court finds “that (1) none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and (3)(A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i)” rather than “that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist and that no mitigating factor exists”, designated provisions of Subsec. (f) re the circumstances that must be found for the court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release as new Subsec. (g) and amended said Subsec. to require the court to impose said sentence if the jury or court finds “that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors” rather than “that none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exists or that one or more mitigating factors exist”, redesignated former Subsec. (g) as new Subsec. (h) and amended said Subsec. to replace the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds that “any mitigating factor exists” and that “the mitigating factors to be considered concerning the defendant shall include, but are not limited to” the five enumerated factors with the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds any of the enumerated factors and deleted former Subdiv. (3) as a factor that would in and of itself bar the imposition of the death sentence the circumstance that at the time of the offense the defendant “was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution”, renumbering Subdivs. (4) and (5) as Subdivs. (3) and (4), respectively, redesignated former Subsec. (h) re aggravating factors as new Subsec. (i) and amended said Subsec. to replace the provision requiring the court to impose the death sentence if no mitigating factor is present and the jury or court finds one of the enumerated factors with “The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following:”; P.A. 01-151 amended Subsec. (h) to add new Subdiv. (2) barring the imposition of the death sentence on a defendant who was a person with mental retardation, as defined in Sec. 1-1g, redesignate existing Subdivs. (2), (3) and (4) as Subdivs. (3), (4) and (5), and make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and amended Subsec. (i) to add Subdiv. (8) establishing as an aggravating factor the commission of the offense set forth in Sec. 53a-54b(1) to avoid arrest for a criminal act, prevent detection of a criminal act, hamper or prevent the victim carrying out the victim's official duties or retaliate against the victim for performance of the victim's official duties and make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; pursuant to P.A. 11-129, “mental retardation” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “intellectual disability” in Subsec. (h)(2); P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference to capital felony with provision re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 15-84 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re hearing as Subdiv. (1) and add Subdiv. (2) re person 18 years of age or older at time of offense, amended Subsec. (h) to delete former Subdiv. (1) re defendant under age 18 and redesignate existing Subdivs. (2) to (5) as Subdivs. (1) to (4), and made technical changes, effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after that date.

See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of “life imprisonment”.

See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.

Cited. 197 C. 436; 207 C. 374; 209 C. 225; 212 C. 258; 221 C. 430; 225 C. 559. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183. Cited. 233 C. 813; 234 C. 735; 235 C. 206; 237 C. 332; 238 C. 389; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 409. Court upheld previous holding that statute does not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular proven factor solely because that factor establishes something good about defendant; instead, statute leaves the decision as to whether a proven factor is mitigating in nature to sentencer's reasoned moral judgment; once sentencer has found an aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no requirement that it go further and make an additional determination that the presence of that factor justifies imposition of the death penalty. 264 C. 1. Statutory scheme does not contemplate right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing; once one or more jurors find that defendant has proven existence of a mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, entire jury, and not just those jurors who have found the existence of that mitigating factor, proceed to the weighing process; nonunanimous decision during penalty phase of a capital trial does not result automatically in sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release; trial court improperly declined to instruct jury that, in order to sentence defendant to death, it must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factor or factors outweigh mitigating factor or factors and that, accordingly, it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment. 272 C. 106. Death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; holdings in 230 C. 183 and 238 C. 389 reaffirmed. 303 C. 71. Death penalty unconstitutional under Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9 of Connecticut Constitution. 318 C. 1.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 32 CA 296; 36 CA 364.

Subsec. (b):

Term “judges” in the first sentence does not entitle defendant who elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing to have all three members of the panel before whom the guilt phase was conducted preside at such hearing. 264 C. 1. Provision does not preclude trial court's declaring a mistrial and impaneling new jury after original jury becomes deadlocked in penalty phase of a capital case. 271 C. 338. Subdiv. (3): Defendant's decision to forgo jury determination in capital felony sentencing proceeding and opt for sentencing by three-judge panel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent; formulaic canvass of defendant is not required and validity of jury waiver is determined by examination of totality of the circumstances. 303 C. 71.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 241 C. 57. The state may present evidence to rebut mitigation at the penalty phase that would not be admissible under normal rules of evidence; under statute, the state like defendant only has to meet the relevancy standard for evidence to be allowed. 251 C. 579. Although defendant may offer any evidence relevant to any mitigating factor, trial court is vested with discretion to exclude irrelevant information. 272 C. 106.

Subsec. (d):

Mercy is a legitimate consideration only insofar as it is related to mitigating evidence; requirement for capital sentencer to consider “all the facts and circumstances of the case” is not unconstitutionally vague. 264 C. 1. Lack of remorse is not listed as a statutory aggravating factor, and so may not be relied upon as an aggravating factor, but because mitigating factors call upon jury to elect whether to exercise mercy, defendant's lack of remorse will be relevant generally to rebut defendant's claimed mitigating factors; jury must make its determination of whether the proposed mitigating evidence is mitigating in nature considering all facts and circumstances of the case, but statute does not require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. 266 C. 171. “Facts and circumstances” language is a constitutionally permissible method of determining how mitigating circumstances are to be established; nowhere does statute require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. 272 C. 106. Requiring fact finder to determine whether a particular mitigating factor established by the evidence is mitigating in nature as a prerequisite to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors does not improperly prevent mitigating evidence offered by defendant from being given full consideration and effect; not improper for three-judge panel to find cumulative factor both factually proven and to be mitigating in nature but not find any of the individual factors to be mitigating in nature although some were factually proven. 303 C. 71. Court's instruction to jury that it was permitted, but not required, to cumulate the evidence to find a mitigating factor complies with previously articulated constitutional standard; instruction describing mitigating evidence as “unique factors concerning the nature of the crime or who the defendant is” did not preclude jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence; “facts and circumstances” language does not unconstitutionally preclude sentencer from considering relevant mitigating evidence and does not unconstitutionally require that mitigating factor have some nexus to the crime; addition of weighing process in 1995 does not alter the constitutionality of allocating to defendant the burden of proving that a factor is mitigating in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Subsec. (e):

Cited. 199 C. 163. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state, and (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 C. 374.

Subsec. (f):

Cited. 199 C. 163; 208 C. 125; 237 C. 694. Statute requires that jury determine that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by any amount or degree; in light of the unique nature of death penalty, of the need for reliability and consistency and the nature of rendering a verdict requiring death penalty, jury must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and therefore it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death sentence should be imposed. 266 C. 171. Three-judge panel could reasonably have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's age, troubled background and other aspects of his person were outweighed, by any amount or degree, by the cruelty, heinousness and depravity of defendant's crime. 303 C. 71.

Subsec. (g):

Cited. 199 C. 163; 235 C. 206; 238 C. 828. Although trial court should generally use language of Subdiv. (2) in instructing jury on the statutory mitigating factor, it is not possible that court's minor misstatement, involving such a tenuous semantic distinction, could have misled jury; general thrust of statute as a whole persuades us that legislature intended to recognize as mitigating, per se, only those factors that tend to reduce defendant's moral culpability for the offense and make it unlikely that threat of execution would serve as effective deterrent; “mental capacity” as used in Subdiv. (2) is not open-ended term referring to any and all types of mental function, but refers specifically to defendant's ability, at time of the offense, to understand the wrongful nature and consequences of his conduct; legislature's intent in enacting Subsec. was to specify factual circumstances under which defendant's moral culpability for committing the offense is reduced; in order to establish either prong of the mitigating factor of Subdiv. (2), defendant must show that his mental impairment had a causal nexus with the offense, thereby reducing his moral culpability. 269 C. 213.

Subsec. (h):

Subdiv. (4): Meaning of “especially cruel” must include intentional infliction of extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 C. 258. “Same felony” means a felony that is the same in all material respects as the felony that is committed in this state during commission of the capital felony; that requirement is fully satisfied only if the two felonies share the same essential elements. 264 C. 1.

Subsec. (i):

To qualify as an aggravating factor that defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, victim must have suffered extreme pain and torture beyond that necessary to cause death. 253 C. 1. Subdiv. (6) does not apply to a capital felony committed during the course of a robbery. 261 C. 111. In order to establish the aggravating factor defined in Subdiv. (4), state must prove that defendant murdered both victims in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. 262 C. 537. Principles of accessorial liability may be used to prove aggravating factors in the penalty phase of a capital case. 271 C. 338. Subdiv. (3): In order to establish this aggravating factor, state must prove that defendant knew that in killing one person, another person would be subject to a very serious risk or danger to his or her life. Id. Subdiv. (4) requires proof that defendant engaged in intentional conduct that inflicted extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture on victim above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing, and that defendant specifically intended to inflict such extreme pain, suffering or torture or was callous or indifferent to the extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture that his intentional conduct in fact inflicted on victim. 272 C. 106. Subdiv. (4): Court's limiting instruction on aggravating factor of committing offense in “an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner” that permits proof by callousness or indifference to the additional pain, suffering or torture that defendant's intentional conduct inflicted on the victim does not render aggravating factor unconstitutionally vague. 303 C. 71. Subdiv. (6): It is not a violation of the state constitution for the sole aggravating factor found by the jury, namely, murder committed for pecuniary gain, to duplicate an element of the underlying crime of capital felony by murder for hire under Sec. 53a-54b(2); statutory language does not impose any additional temporal or premeditation requirements beyond that the expectation of compensation must be created before the murder and exist at the time of the murder. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Subdiv. (1): To ensure that prior felony conviction that is based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is not used as aggravant in a death penalty case, it is in the interests of justice that court hear evidence on whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, and defendant bears burden of establishing the constitutional invalidity of prior plea. 48 CS 279.

Sec. 53a-46b. Review of death sentence. (a) Any sentence of death imposed in accordance with the provisions of section 53a-46a shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rules. In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate said sentence and remand for imposition of a sentence in accordance with subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a.

(b) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that: (1) The sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or (2) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in subsection (i) of section 53a-46a.

(c) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal and, if an appeal is taken, the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall then render its decision on the legal errors claimed and the validity of the sentence.

(P.A. 80-332, S. 2; P.A. 81-472, S. 151, 159; P.A. 85-366, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 23; P.A. 95-16, S. 3, 5; 95-19, S. 3; P.A. 12-5, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 85-366 made a technical change to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-46a by same public act; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 95-16 deleted Subsec. (b)(3) that had required Supreme Court to affirm the death sentence unless it determines the sentence to be excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, effective April 12, 1995; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a) to add “subparagraph (A) of” re reference to Sec. 53a-35a(1), effective April 25, 2012.

Cited. 212 C. 258. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on due process rights. 230 C. 183. Cited. 235 C. 206; 237 C. 332. Death penalty unconstitutional under Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9 of Connecticut Constitution. 318 C. 1.

Cited. 9 CA 686.

Subsec. (b):

Class of similar cases to include all convictions of a capital felony after October 1, 1973, resulting from a trial or from a plea whether or not convictions were followed by imposition of death penalty. 225 C. 559. Prohibition against disproportionality discussed. 234 C. 735. Court concluded that statutory proportionality review scheme is constitutional and that it involves the precedent seeking method of comparative, rather than traditional, proportionality review. 238 C. 389. Court stayed proceedings pending review. 272 C. 674. Subsec. does not create nonwaivable right to mandatory sentence review by Connecticut Supreme Court of any and all claims that death sentence was “the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor”, regardless of the time and manner in which claim was raised; court is not required to impose moratorium on execution of death sentences whenever an unproven claim of systemic arbitrariness in administration of death penalty scheme is raised. Id., 676. Defendant's claim that his death sentence was imposed arbitrarily and capriciously because there are no uniform standards guiding prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty is contradicted by overwhelming authority and is rejected. 303 C. 71. Jury could reasonably have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole aggravating factor outweighed the numerous mitigating factors and therefore the jury's sentencing verdict was not unreasonable and the sentence was not the product of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Sec. 53a-46c. Applicability of death penalty provisions in effect on and after October 1, 1980. The provisions of sections 53a-46a and 53a-46b in effect on and after October 1, 1980, shall be applicable to any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony under subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of section 53a-54b on or after June 13, 1983.

(P.A. 83-327, S. 1, 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 24.)

History: P.A. 92-260 replaced “on October 1, 1980” with “on and after October 1, 1980”.

Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183. Cited. 238 C. 389.

Cited. 9 CA 686.

Sec. 53a-46d. Victim impact statement read in court prior to imposition of sentence for crime punishable by death or life imprisonment without possibility of release. A victim impact statement prepared with the assistance of a victim advocate in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 54-220 may be read in court prior to imposition of sentence upon a defendant found guilty of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

(P.A. 00-200, S. 6; P.A. 03-179, S. 2; 03-278, S. 104; P.A. 12-5, S. 21; P.A. 17-99, S. 40.)

History: P.A. 03-179 replaced “prepared by” with “prepared with the assistance of” and made a technical change; P.A. 03-278 made a technical change, effective July 9, 2003; P.A. 12-5 added provision re crime punishable by life imprisonment without possibility of release, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 17-99 deleted “to be placed in court files”.

Sec. 53a-47. Disposition of person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Confinement and examination. Release. Section 53a-47 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 47; P.A. 75-476, S. 5, 6; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 2, 115, 127; P.A. 81-301, S. 2; P.A. 83-486, S. 2; P.A. 85-506, S. 31, 32.)

PART III

INCHOATE OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-48. Conspiracy. Renunciation. (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.

(b) It shall be a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the actor, after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 48, 49; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 16.)

History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (b) to remove reference to “affirmative” defense.

See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

Cited. 169 C. 377; Id., 517; Id., 642. Generally, may prosecute and sentence defendant for both conspiracy to commit offense and offense itself; Wharton's rule: An agreement by two persons to commit crime which necessarily requires participation of two persons cannot be prosecuted as conspiracy; rule currently valid only as presumption of legislative intent; exception to rule when more persons than required participate; abuse of conspiracy charge to bring in otherwise improper evidence. 171 C. 105. Cited. Id., 524; 172 C. 74; 174 C. 135; Id., 338; Id., 376; 176 C. 131; 177 C. 370; 178 C. 67; Id., 163; Id., 649. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. Id., 704. Cited. 180 C. 481; 182 C. 262; Id., 595; 184 C. 369; 186 C. 426; Id., 648; Id., 696; 187 C. 109; Id., 264; Id., 513; 188 C. 515; Id., 542; Id., 671; 189 C. 201; Id., 337; 190 C. 259; 191 C. 360; 194 C. 18; Id., 361; 195 C. 128; Id., 183; Id., 598; 196 C. 115; Id., 567; 197 C. 201; Id., 326; Id., 413; Id., 644. There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of recklessly or negligently causing a result, therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this statute and Sec. 53a-113 is not crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1. Cited. Id., 14; 200 C. 113; Id., 310; 201 C. 489; 202 C. 520; 204 C. 240; Id., 630; 207 C. 323; 209 C. 1; 210 C. 435; 211 C. 289; 212 C. 195; Id., 387; Id., 593; 213 C. 233. Conspiracy charge against defendant is barred after acquittal of sole alleged coconspirator; conspiracy statute as “bilateral” in nature discussed. Id., 243. Cited. Id., 422; Id., 708; 215 C. 716; Id., 739; 216 C. 801; 218 C. 349; Id., 432; 220 C. 602; Id., 765; 221 C. 447; Id., 595; 223 C. 243; Id., 384; 224 C. 322; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 227 C. 1; Id., 32; Id., 207; 235 C. 397; Id., 679; Id., 748; 236 C. 176; Id., 514; 237 C. 518; 238 C. 380; 239 C. 56; Id., 481; 240 C. 210; Id., 708; 241 C. 322; 242 C. 93. The requisite evidence of an agreement between individuals accused as coconspirators may be provided by a coconspirator's conduct at the scene. 290 C. 816. Conspiracy to commit a reckless act is not a cognizable crime in this state because it is legally impossible to conspire to commit or achieve an unintentional or reckless act. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1. To satisfy specific intent requirements for a conviction of conspiracy to distribute drugs, state must proffer evidence of an agreement to distribute drugs, in addition to mere buyer-seller relationship. 311 C. 1.

Cited. 1 CA 524; 3 CA 503; 5 CA 347; Id., 491; Id., 599; 8 CA 119; Id., 478; Id., 667; 9 CA 548; 10 CA 130; Id., 147; Id., 447; 11 CA 397; Id., 621; 14 CA 205; Id., 445; Id., 605; Id., 807; 15 CA 122; Id., 328; Id., 539; 16 CA 18; Id., 601; 17 CA 247; Id., 648; 19 CA 554; Id., 640; 21 CA 299; Id., 386; Id., 519; 22 CA 449; Id., 567; 23 CA 502; Id., 615; Id., 667; 24 CA 316; Id., 493; 26 CA 94; Id., 667; Id., 779; 27 CA 596; 28 CA 34; Id., 126; Id., 416; 29 CA 359; Id., 843; 30 CA 190; Id., 232; Id., 550; Id., 654; Id., 712; 32 CA 224; 33 CA 253; Id., 409; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 714; Id., 839; 36 CA 59; Id., 190; Id., 454; Id., 556; Id., 631; Id., 672; Id., 753; Id., 774; 37 CA 219; Id., 456; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176; 38 CA 481; Id., 536; Id., 581; Id., 777; Id., 868; 39 CA 224; Id., 333; Id., 526; Id., 550; 40 CA 515; Id., 789; 41 CA 47; Id., 147; Id., 495; 42 CA 472; Id., 500; Id., 555; Id., 687; 43 CA 142; Id., 252; Id., 555; 44 CA 338; 45 CA 110; Id., 282; Id., 455; 46 CA 684; Id., 791. Elements of crime of conspiracy under section discussed. 63 CA 82. Statute is bilateral in nature in that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime. 64 CA 384. Conviction and sentencing for multiple conspiracy offenses based on a single agreement is double jeopardy violation. 65 CA 788. Elements of crime of conspiracy discussed. 70 CA 393. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered into a conspiracy to possess a narcotic substance with intent to sell. 75 CA 223. Jury instructions on conspiracy to commit murder must indicate that state was required to prove intent to agree or conspire to commit murder and intent to cause murder. 92 CA 92. Attempt to commit robbery in first degree in violation of Sec. 53a-49 and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of this section are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 118 CA 35. Defendant's sentences on four separate conspiracy charges arising from two incidents constituted double jeopardy. 124 CA 9. Conviction for two conspiracy charges arising from same agreement constituted double jeopardy. 125 CA 307. Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, with the intent divided into two elements: The intent to agree or conspire, and the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. 126 CA 192. Conviction of conspiracy to possess narcotics under Sec. 21a-279(a) and conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to sell under Sec. 21a-277(a) constitutes double jeopardy. 137 CA 733. Conviction for conspiracy to commit false statement under Sec. 53a-157b and conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence under Sec. 53a-155 pursuant to the same unlawful agreement violates constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 138 CA 420; judgment reversed in part, see 325 C. 399. Multiple sentences for 3 separate conspiracies arising out of a single unlawful agreement violates prohibition against double jeopardy. 144 CA 731; judgment affirmed, see 320 C. 781. Evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant or alleged coconspirator stole headphones, either as a substantive crime or as overt act in furtherance of conspiracy. 164 CA 25.

Cited. 29 CS 344; 30 CS 211. Overt act is essential element of offense and must be alleged in information charging conspiracy. 35 CS 96. Cited. 36 CS 603; 37 CS 527; Id., 853; 38 CS 301; Id., 374; Id., 593.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 243; 189 C. 752; 192 C. 383; 199 C. 389; 200 C. 586; 201 C. 289; 203 C. 420; 207 C. 118; 210 C. 78; Id., 619; 212 C. 50; Id., 485; 213 C. 243; 214 C. 122; Id., 344; 215 C. 570; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 151; 223 C. 635; 227 C. 363; 230 C. 351; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; Id., 537; 235 C. 502; 239 C. 235; Id., 467; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 1; Id., 502; 242 C. 125; Id., 296. Appellate Court in 41 CA 495 reversed trial court's judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence to convict, judgment of Appellate Court reversed. Id., 485. Evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy conviction. 253 C. 354. Where two defendants were tried separately and their respective juries were presented with separate, independent evidence of their agreement to commit the crime in question, acquittal of defendant's coconspirator did not nullify defendant's conviction of the same charge. 257 C. 587. To prove defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of Subsec. and Sec. 53a-135(a)(2), state needs to prove defendant specifically agreed that there would be the display or threatened use of what was represented as a deadly weapon or dangerous object during the robbery or immediate flight therefrom. 315 C. 451.

Cited. 7 CA 701; 9 CA 313; 14 CA 309; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50; Id., 688; 15 CA 416; 16 CA 245; Id., 402; 18 CA 134; 19 CA 179; Id., 195; 20 CA 665; 22 CA 340; 23 CA 602; Id., 746; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595; 25 CA 3; Id., 21; Id., 318; 26 CA 279; 27 CA 558; Id., 161; Id., 306; Id., 474; Id., 645; Id., 721; 29 CA 59; Id., 207; 31 CA 370; 32 CA 842; 33 CA 122; Id., 339; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; Id., 647; 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 96; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 595; 35 CA 740; 36 CA 41; Id., 483; Id., 488; 37 CA 156; Id., 360; Id., 574; 38 CA 434; 39 CA 63; Id., 242; Id., 579; Id., 645; 40 CA 47; Id., 526; 43 CA 488; Id., 830; 44 CA 499; 45 CA 270; 46 CA 640. Conviction for conspiracy to sell a controlled substance within one thousand five hundred feet of a public housing project reversed where trial court instructed that jury must find that conspiracy occurred within one thousand five hundred feet of public housing project; the law is not concerned with where the plan was hatched, but with where conspirators proposed to carry out its unlawful purpose. 73 CA 386. The nexus between defendant's role in the conspiracy and illegal conduct of his coconspirators was not so attenuated or remote that it would be unjust to hold him responsible for the criminal conduct of his coconspirators. 107 CA 413. Nothing in Subsec. requires state to prove future or past criminal acts; federal “buyer-seller exception” not applicable to charge of conspiracy to sell narcotics. 131 CA 433; judgment affirmed, see 311 C. 1. Existence of formal agreement between conspirators need not be proved and may be inferred from proof of the separate acts of the alleged coconspirators and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the acts. 147 CA 53. Defendant's conviction of and sentencing under Subsec. and Secs. 53a-123(a)(3) and 53a-124(a)(2) constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and violate defendant's right against double jeopardy. 176 CA 687.

Cited. 44 CS 490.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 40 CA 526. Breakdown of an agreement does not end a conspiracy or disqualify previous overt acts. 131 CA 433.

Sec. 53a-49. Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense. (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.

(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.

(c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 50; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 17; P.A. 92-260, S. 25.)

History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (c) to remove reference to “affirmative” defense; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.

See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

Cited. 169 C. 377; Id., 581; 173 C. 254; Id., 317; Id., 360; 174 C. 16; Id., 142; 175 C. 398; 179 C. 1; 180 C. 481; 182 C. 207; Id., 430; Id., 595; 183 C. 29; 184 C. 157; 185 C. 163; Id., 199; 186 C. 261; 187 C. 681; 189 C. 383; 193 C. 70; Id., 602; 194 C. 233; Id., 241; Id., 408; 195 C. 611; 196 C. 36; Id., 567; 198 C. 124; 199 C. 14; Id., 155; Id., 591; 200 C. 30; 201 C. 174; Id., 190; Id., 289; Id., 605; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; Id., 520; 203 C. 445; Id., 484; 204 C. 630; 205 C. 61; Id., 616; 206 C. 213; 207 C. 1; 209 C. 34; 210 C. 519; Id., 652; 214 C. 454; 215 C. 695; Id., 716; 216 C. 585; Id., 647; 218 C. 747; 220 C. 384; Id., 765; 221 C. 109; 222 C. 117; Id., 718; 226 C. 497; 227 C. 301; 228 C. 384; Id., 393; 229 C. 125; 231 C. 235; 232 C. 455; 235 C. 397; Id., 40; Id., 469; Id., 502; Id., 748; 236 C. 266; 237 C. 501; Id., 518; Id., 748; 238 C. 389; 241 C. 1; Id., 413; Id., 502; 242 C. 125; Id., 389; Id., 648. In charge of attempt to commit sexual assault, conduct of a suspect who, for the purpose ultimately of having sex with a person whom the suspect believes to be a child, travels to a prearranged place to meet that child, is sufficient to constitute a substantial step in furtherance of the planned crime even if the person to be met is in fact an undercover officer and section is not unconstitutionally vague based on these facts. 277 C. 155. It is possible to commit the crime of home invasion without committing the crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, therefore home invasion in violation of Sec. 53a-100aa(a)(2) and attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of section and Sec. 53a-59(a)(1) are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 343 C. 470.

Cited. 1 CA 344; 2 CA 333; 3 CA 166; 6 CA 24; 7 CA 1; Id., 257; Id., 367; Id., 503; Id., 701; 8 CA 351; Id., 496; Id., 545; Id., 631; 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; Id., 587; 10 CA 130; Id., 503; 12 CA 32; Id., 163; Id., 217; Id., 395; Id., 604; Id., 685; 13 CA 69; 14 CA 526; 15 CA 531; Id., 704; 16 CA 38; Id., 284; 17 CA 359; 19 CA 618; Id., 631; 20 CA 27; 21 CA 326; Id., 386; 22 CA 199; Id., 340; Id., 449; 23 CA 160; Id., 315; 24 CA 13; Id., 624; Id., 697; 25 CA 104; Id., 298; Id., 334; Id., 433; Id., 578; Id., 725; 27 CA 73; Id., 403; Id., 601; 28 CA 34; Id., 64; Id., 469; 30 CA 26; Id., 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; 31 CA 370; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502; 34 CA 103; Id., 223; 35 CA 51; Id., 138; Id., 740; 36 CA 161; Id., 336; Id., 641; Id., 680; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501; Id., 733; 38 CA 777; Id., 581; 39 CA 1; Id., 18; Id., 267; Id., 333; Id., 789; Id., 810; 40 CA 60; Id., 374; Id., 483; 41 CA 515; Id., 751; 42 CA 472; 43 CA 61; Id., 252; Id., 599; 44 CA 6; Id., 70; Id., 231; Id., 476; 45 CA 390; 46 CA 684; Id., 691; Id., 734. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 CA 251. To be guilty of attempt, defendant's conscious objective must be to cause result which would constitute the substantive crime. 107 CA 517. Attempt to commit robbery in first degree in violation of this section and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Sec. 53a-48 are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 118 CA 35. Threats, in connection with holding knife and advancing towards victim, are sufficient evidence for jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of assault in the first degree. 127 CA 1.

Cited. 33 CS 599; 37 CS 755; 38 CS 464; 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 140; 178 C. 689; 182 C. 176; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 188 C. 574; 189 C. 303; 190 C. 822; 194 C. 258; 195 C. 651; 198 C. 53; 199 C. 255; 200 C. 44; Id., 607; 205 C. 528; Id., 673; 207 C. 646; 208 C. 202; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 211 C. 18; Id., 441; Id., 555; 212 C. 31; Id., 50; 216 C. 492; 217 C. 243; 220 C. 408; Id., 652; Id., 928; 221 C. 402; Id., 915; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 524; 227 C. 616; 228 C. 234; 229 C. 60; Id., 839; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 233 C. 502; 238 C. 313; 240 C. 395; 241 C. 322; Id., 802; 242 C. 485. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration, was insufficient to support conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295. An instruction on Subdiv. (1) should be given when evidence indicates that perpetrator failed to accomplish or complete all elements of a particular crime solely because attendant circumstances were not as perpetrator believed them to be, rendering commission of the crime impossible, while an instruction under Subdiv. (2) should be given when perpetrator's conduct falls short of completed offense for reasons other than impossibility; under unique circumstances of case, where information was not specific to which part of attempt statute state was alleging, evidence presented did not clarify this omission, and trial court instructed jury only on Subdiv. (1), there was insufficient evidence to convict. 293 C. 234, but see 317 C. 292. Subdiv. (2): Because there were two separate and distinct transactions, defendant could be convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the first degree without offending the prohibition on double jeopardy. 299 C. 640. Attendant circumstances provision in Subdiv. (1) is not limited to situation where it is impossible for defendant to commit the crime, and applied where defendant admitted to assaulting victim with intent to kill her and believed that he had killed her; substantial step provision in Subdiv. (2) criminalizes certain conduct that would not violate attendant circumstances provision in Subdiv. (1), and both provisions ensure elimination of the impossibility defense. 317 C. 292. Determination of what conduct constitutes a substantial step focuses on what the actor has already done rather than what the actor has left to do to complete the substantive crime. 331 C. 1.

Cited. 5 CA 586; 6 CA 164; Id., 476; 7 CA 149; Id., 257; 10 CA 217; Id., 462; 11 CA 80; 12 CA 221; 13 CA 12; Id., 237; 14 CA 309; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50; 15 CA 222; Id., 416; 23 CA 663; Id., 692; 24 CA 27; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652; Id., 264; 26 CA 52; Id., 65; Id., 114; Id., 242; Id., 367; Id., 433; Id., 779; 28 CA 290; Id., 306; Id., 402; Id., 548; 29 CA 39; Id., 262; 30 CA 9; Id., 68; Id., 470; Id., 606; 31 CA 120; Id., 385; 33 CA 368; Id., 647; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 35 CA 279; Id., 699; 36 CA 41; Id., 718; 38 CA 536; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; 40 CA 387; Id., 624; 41 CA 47; Id., 287; 42 CA 264; 43 CA 488; Id., 578; Id., 619; Id., 680; Id., 785; 44 CA 499; 45 CA 658; Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2): Defendant took substantial step in hiring an agent to commit an arson even though agent was not actually paid; to constitute a substantial step, consummation of the deed is not required. 59 CA 362. Statutory provisions codified common law distinction between the acts of solicitation and attempt and an attempt not a solicitation under Sec. 53a-179a. 65 CA 145. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. To be guilty of crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, defendant must be shown to have had the mental state required to commit assault in the first degree and fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Evidence which established that defendant arranged for sale of heroin to undercover police officer then left his residence and traveled in the direction of designated meeting place for the sale was sufficient to find defendant guilty of attempt to commit a crime, in particular, the sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug dependent in violation of Sec. 21a-278(b). 82 CA 111. Intent required for crime of attempted assault of a peace officer is the intent to prevent the officer from performing duties, regardless of whether injury is intended. 96 CA 634. Subdiv. (2): Conviction as accessory to attempted robbery in the first degree does not require state to demonstrate that accused intended for accomplice to possess a deadly weapon. “Circumstances as he believes them to be” language does not establish additional specific intent element necessitating proof that defendant believed one of his accomplices was armed with deadly weapon during attempted robbery. 184 CA 24. Attempted murder under this section and assault in the first degree under Sec. 53a-59(a) are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 204 CA 207.

Cited. 41 CS 229; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 194 C. 258; 211 C. 555.

Court rejected defendant's argument that “following” must have a predatory thrust and requires proximity in space as well as in time; the jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant followed the intended victim. 105 CA 335.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 221 C. 915.

Cited. 17 CA 128. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.

Sec. 53a-50. Effect of motivation on renunciation. For purposes of this part, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 51.)

Cited. 182 C. 595.

Cited. 17 CA 128; 23 CA 160. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.

Sec. 53a-51. Classification of attempt and conspiracy. Attempt and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted or is an object of the conspiracy, except that an attempt or conspiracy to commit a class A felony is a class B felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 52.)

Cited. 182 C. 595; 184 C. 369; 195 C. 183; 202 C. 520; 204 C. 630; 211 C. 18; 213 C. 708; 235 C. 502. Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree is subject to the minimum nonsuspendable sentence in Sec. 53a-134(b). 264 C. 593.

Cited. 8 CA 545; 10 CA 447; 21 CA 299; 22 CA 567; 29 CA 843; 33 CA 253; 36 CA 190. Legislature clearly intended attempt and conspiracy to commit a class B felony to be punished the same as a class B felony or it would have noted otherwise, as it did with class A felonies. 118 CA 35.

Sec. 53a-52. Conviction; sentencing. Section 53a-52 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 53; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

PART IV*

HOMICIDE

*Unconstitutionally broad discretion. 164 C. 162. Cited. 184 C. 597.

Cited. 45 CA 591.

Cited. 40 CS 498.

Secs. 53a-53 and 53a-54. Homicide defined. Murder defined; affirmative defenses; evidence of mental condition; classification. Sections 53a-53 and 53a-54 are repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 54, 55; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

Sec. 53a-54a. Murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.

(b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death of another person.

(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is (1) a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense, punishable in accordance with subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, (2) murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense, punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subparagraph (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, or (3) murder under section 53a-54d committed by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense.

(P.A. 73-137, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 15, 28; P.A. 83-486, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 26; P.A. 12-5, S. 7; P.A. 15-84, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(2), deleting reference to death penalty imposed as provided by Sec. 53a-46a for capital felony, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-486 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “acted” with “committed the proscribed act or acts”; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add exception for murder under Sec. 53a-54d; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (c) to replace reference to capital felony with provision re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, punishable under Sec. 53a-35a(1)(A), or murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, punishable as a class A felony under Sec. 53a-35a(1)(B), effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 15-84 amended Subsec. (c) to designate existing provision re capital felony as Subdiv. (1), existing provision re murder with special circumstances as Subdiv. (2) and existing provision re murder under Sec. 53a-54d as Subdiv. (3) and add provisions re person 18 years of age or older at time of offense, effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after that date.

See Sec. 53a-54b re murder with special circumstances.

See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.

See Sec. 53a-54e re construction of statutes re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012.

Cited. 171 C. 241; 173 C. 414; 176 C. 508; 177 C. 1; 178 C. 450; Id., 626; 179 C. 1; Id., 431; 180 C. 141. Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. Id., 382. Cited. Id., 589; 181 C. 406; 182 C. 66; Id., 388; Id., 497; Id., 603; 185 C. 163; 186 C. 261; Id., 476; 188 C. 626; 189 C. 303; Id., 346; 190 C. 639; 191 C. 233; Id., 545; 194 C. 408; Id., 416; Id., 483; Id., 530; 195 C. 475; 196 C. 667; 197 C. 60; Id., 180; Id., 337; Id., 436; Id., 507; 198 C. 124; Id., 209; Id., 397; Id., 542; Id., 560; Id., 573; Id., 644; 199 C. 102; Id., 155; Id., 163; Id., 631; Id., 718; 200 C. 553; 201 C. 174; Id., 190; Id., 276; Id., 368; Id., 605; 202 C. 18; Id., 75; Id., 86; Id., 316; 203 C. 212; Id., 641; 204 C. 240; 205 C. 279; Id., 298; Id., 507; Id., 616; 206 C. 182; Id., 213; Id., 323; Id., 346; Id., 512; Id., 678; 207 C. 374; Id., 646; 208 C. 125; 209 C. 225; Id., 290; Id., 622; 210 C. 78; Id., 304; Id., 519; Id., 631; Id., 652; 211 C. 215; Id., 289; Id., 441; 212 C. 325; Id., 387; Id., 612; 213 C. 97; Id., 243; Id., 388; Id., 405; Id., 579; Id., 593; Id., 708; 214 C. 57; Id., 77; Id., 118; Id., 454; Id., 476; Id., 493; Id., 616; 215 C. 231; Id., 277; Id., 570; Id., 646; Id., 695; Id., 739; 216 C. 139; Id., 188; Id., 282; Id., 301; Id., 585; Id., 699; 218 C. 349; Id., 486; Id., 714; 219 C. 16; Id., 596; Id., 721; 220 C. 169; Id., 270; Id., 285; Id., 602; Id., 765; 221 C. 58; Id., 93; Id., 109; 222 C. 506; 223 C. 273; Id., 674; 224 C. 63; Id., 168; Id., 372; 225 C. 55; Id., 114; Id., 524; Id., 609; 226 C. 20; Id., 237; Id., 497; 227 C. 231; Id., 301; Id., 417; Id., 456; Id., 566; 228 C. 62; Id., 118; Id., 281; Id., 412; 229 C. 125; Id., 193; Id., 328; Id., 691; 231 C. 43; Id., 115; Id., 235; 233 C. 44; Id., 215; 234 C. 139; Id., 324; Id., 381; Id., 683; 235 C. 206; Id., 274; Id., 397; Id., 413; Id., 473; 236 C. 189. Affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cited; failure of trial court to instruct jury on extreme emotional disturbance was error; judgment of Appellate Court affirming judgment of trial court in 36 CA 448 reversed, Id., 342. Cited. Id., 514; 237 C. 58; Id., 339; Id., 364; Id., 518; Id., 694. Under appropriate circumstances, defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, the same person; judgment of Appellate Court in 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389; Id., 588; 239 C. 56; Id., 481; 240 C. 210; Id., 727; Id., 743; 241 C. 322; Id., 502; Id., 702; 242 C. 605; Id., 666; 247 C. 318. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration, was insufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295. Death penalty unconstitutional under Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9 of Connecticut Constitution. 318 C. 1. While manslaughter in the first degree under Sec. 53a-55 is a lesser included offense of murder under this section, the states of minds required by the two offenses are mutually exclusive; a jury finding guilty verdicts on both offenses are inconsistent verdicts and both verdicts must be vacated. 325 C. 236.

Cited. 7 CA 180; Id., 223; Id., 470; 10 CA 357; 12 CA 32; Id., 217; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; Id., 602; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; Id., 440; Id., 609; Id., 674; 22 CA 669; 24 CA 115; Id., 244; Id., 692; 25 CA 104; Id., 433; Id., 456; 26 CA 259; 27 CA 1; Id., 520; 28 CA 416; Id., 548; Id., 425; Id., 608; Id., 771; 29 CA 386; Id., 452; Id., 499; 30 CA 677; 32 CA 170; 33 CA 90; Id., 763; 34 CA 103; Id., 317; 35 CA 438; Id., 541; Id., 762; 36 CA 250; Id., 345; Id., 364; Id., 448; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342; Id., 473; Id., 506; Id., 516; Id., 556; 37 CA 749; 38 CA 371; Id., 434; 39 CA 18; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748; Id., 242; Id., 224; Id., 632; 40 CA 151; Id., 318; Id., 387; 41 CA 604; Id., 809; 42 CA 348; Id., 555; 43 CA 61; Id., 549; 44 CA 6; Id., 70; Id., 231; Id., 476; Id., 790; 45 CA 148; Id., 207; Id., 261; Id., 584; 46 CA 216; Id., 285; Id., 578; Id., 640; Id., 684; Id., 734. Evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that defendant intended to cause victim's death. 55 CA 469. It is possible to commit attempted murder without creating risk of any physical injury to another person. 56 CA 592. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of intent requirement under statute not plain error. 65 CA 234. Trial court did not improperly exclude proffered evidence re defendant's claim of intoxication at time of murder. 91 CA 169. To establish crime of murder, state must prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant, with intent to cause death of another, caused the death of such person or a third person; specific intent to kill is an essential element of crime of murder; to act intentionally, defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim. 129 CA 1. Sentences for murder and felony murder were ancillary to capital felony conviction, thus the convictions for murder and felony murder must be vacated. 145 CA 494; judgment affirmed, see 317 C. 741. Conviction of murder under this section and felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c for same offense violated prohibition against double jeopardy. 153 CA 691.

Cited. 40 CS 38; Id., 498; 42 CS 10; Id., 426; 43 CS 367.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 172 C. 65. “Extreme emotional disturbance” guidelines. 177 C. 1. Cited. Id., 487; 180 C. 171; 181 C. 268; Id., 284; 182 C. 142; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 184 C. 121; 186 C. 414; Id., 574; 187 C. 6; 190 C. 219; 191 C. 27; 192 C. 700; 193 C. 474; Id., 646; 194 C. 376; Id., 392; 195 C. 166; Id., 232; Id., 651; 196 C. 557; 197 C. 106; Id., 595; 198 C. 53; Id., 77; 200 C. 224; Id., 607; Id., 642; Id., 743. Charge on this defense was inadequate under the circumstances. 201 C. 174. Cited. Id., 244; Id., 534; 202 C. 259; Id., 429; 204 C. 207; Id., 259; 205 C. 370; Id., 578; Id., 723; 206 C. 229; Id., 300; Id., 391; 208 C. 455; 209 C. 596; 210 C. 481; Id., 619; 212 C. 258; Id., 351; Id., 593; 214 C. 122; Id., 146; Id., 161; Id., 344; Id., 540; 216 C. 492; 217 C. 243. Interpretation of section not to require reasonableness of defendant's extreme emotional disturbance to be determined solely from his subjective viewpoint. Id., 648. Cited. 218 C. 747; Id., 766; 219 C. 234; Id., 295; 220 C. 385; Id., 408; 221 C. 128; Id., 430; 222 C. 1; Id., 718; 223 C. 41; Id., 127; Id., 207; Id., 384; Id., 411; Id., 535; Id., 635; 224 C. 196; Id., 325; 227 C. 389; Id., 448; 228 C. 384; 230 C. 183; 232 C. 537; 233 C. 1; Id., 106; Id., 174; Id., 517; Id., 813; 236 C. 388; 238 C. 253; Id., 313; Id., 395; 241 C. 1; Id., 665; 242 C. 409; Id., 485; 243 C. 205. Term “death” as used in Penal Code includes irreversible cessation of functioning of brain. 244 C. 761. Section incorporates doctrine of transferred intent and holds both a principal and an accomplice liable for death of an unintended victim. 253 C. 354. Re jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, it was proper for trial court to refuse to instruct jury to consider defendant's unique mental and emotional characteristics and impact of those characteristics on defendant since statute incorporates a standard that is objective as to its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 261 C. 336. Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in Sec. 53a-55(a)(1). 262 C. 453. Statute specifically provides for intent to be transferred from the target of defendant's conduct to an unintended victim. 273 C. 393. The “born alive” rule, which prescribes that only one who has been born alive can be the victim of a homicide, was the common law of this state when Penal Code was adopted and has not been abrogated by the legislature, and therefore trial court properly determined that an infant who is born alive and who subsequently dies of injuries sustained in utero is a “person” within meaning of homicide statutes; nothing in section requires a temporal nexus between the victim's status as a person and the conduct that brings about the person's death; transferred intent provisions are equally applicable to a fetus born alive as they are to any other person. 296 C. 622.

Cited. 7 CA 367; Id., 457; 8 CA 496; Id., 147; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278; Id., 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; 10 CA 697; 11 CA 80; Id., 628; 20 CA 27; 21 CA 801; 22 CA 199; Id., 507; Id., 521; 23 CA 692; 24 CA 624; 26 CA 242; 27 CA 73; Id., 403; Id., 643; 28 CA 231; Id., 469; 29 CA 573; 30 CA 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; 31 CA 385; 32 CA 438; Id., 687; Id., 759; 33 CA 122; Id., 782; 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 96; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 368, see also 233 C. 517; 35 CA 138; Id., 374; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413; Id., 541; 36 CA 336; Id., 417; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 252; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388; Id., 404; Id., 574; 40 CA 47; Id., 60; Id., 374; Id., 470; 41 CA 361; Id., 495; Id., 515; 43 CA 252; Id., 830; 44 CA 198; Id., 338; 45 CA 297; 46 CA 600. Statute sets forth a standard that is objective in its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 48 CA 784. Trial court's instruction re extreme emotional disturbance defense was proper. 55 CA 469. Cited. 57 CA 734. Subsec. permits conviction of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under Sec. 53a-55a regardless of extreme emotional disturbance defense. 86 CA 784. One who uses deadly weapon upon a vital part of another will be deemed to have intended the probable result of that act, and from such circumstance a proper inference may be drawn in some cases that there was an intent to kill. 95 CA 263. Murder is a specific intent crime and although court's instruction improperly referred to general intent to engage in proscribed conduct, the erroneous instruction was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt and defendant was not deprived of fair trial because court also properly instructed jury that it had to find defendant intended to cause victim's death. 99 CA 230. A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance is not one which is necessarily committed in hot blood stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused defendant to brood for long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without provocation. 104 CA 780.

Subsec. must be read without the word “affirmative”; the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense charged without imposing any burden on defendant. 33 CS 28. Unborn not included in definition of “person”. 40 CS 498. Cited re ineffective counsel claim. 46 CS 344.

Subsec. (b):

Evidence of mental capacity admissible when defendant is charged with commission of crime under which state must prove defendant acted recklessly. 195 C. 232.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 180 C. 171; 181 C. 151; 193 C. 144; Id., 350; 194 C. 376; Id., 392; 196 C. 655; 200 C. 721; 201 C. 244; Id., 395; 205 C. 638; 214 C. 378.

Cited. 41 CA 530.

Sec. 53a-54b. Murder with special circumstances. A person is guilty of murder with special circumstances who is convicted of any of the following and was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection under the provisions of section 26-5, an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of such employee's or person's employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility, or any firefighter, while such victim was acting within the scope of such victim's duties; (2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit the same for pecuniary gain; (3) murder committed by one who has previously been convicted of intentional murder or of murder committed in the course of commission of a felony; (4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the murder, under sentence of life imprisonment; (5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be returned to safety; (6) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree; (7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction; or (8) murder of a person under sixteen years of age.

(P.A. 73-137, S. 3; P.A. 77-604, S. 39, 84; 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-335; P.A. 85-144; P.A. 92-260, S. 27; P.A. 95-16, S. 4; P.A. 98-126, S. 1; P.A. 00-99, S. 120, 154; P.A. 01-84, S. 10, 26; 01-151, S. 3, 5; P.A. 11-51, S. 134; 11-80, S. 1; P.A. 12-5, S. 1; P.A. 15-84, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 77-604 substituted “chief inspector or inspector in the division of criminal justice” for “county detective” in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-335 added Subdivs. (7) and (8) making murder in course of committing sexual assault in first degree and murder of two or more persons at same time a capital felony; P.A. 85-144 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding “economic” and deleting the proviso that the seller was not, at the time of such sale, a drug-dependent person; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subdivs. (1) and (3); P.A. 95-16 added Subdiv. (9) re murder of a person under 16 years of age; P.A. 98-126 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace “an official of the Department of Correction authorized by the Commissioner of Correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility” with “an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of his employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility”; P.A. 00-99 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace reference to sheriff and deputy sheriff with provision re state marshal exercising statutory authority and judicial marshal in performance of duties, effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-84 replaced “fireman” with “firefighter” and made other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 01-151 amended Subdiv. (1) to include the murder of a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Environmental Protection under the provisions of Sec. 26-5, deleted former Subdiv. (6) re the illegal sale, for economic gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to a person who dies as a direct result of the use of such cocaine, heroin or methadone, redesignating existing Subdivs. (7), (8) and (9) as Subdivs. (6), (7) and (8), and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Department of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection”, effective July 1, 2011; pursuant to P.A. 11-80, “Commissioner of Environmental Protection” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection”, effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 12-5 substituted “murder with special circumstances” for “capital felony”, effective April 25, 2012, and applicable to crimes committed on or after that date; P.A. 15-84 added provision re person 18 years of age or older at time of offense, effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after that date.

See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.

See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.

See Sec. 53a-54e re construction of statutes re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012.

Cited. 194 C. 416; 198 C. 92; 199 C. 163; 201 C. 276; 211 C. 289; 215 C. 570; 216 C. 699; 218 C. 486; 230 C. 183; 234 C. 324; Id., 735; 235 C. 206; 237 C. 332; 238 C. 389; Id., 828; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 702; 242 C. 409. Murder in the course of kidnapping does not require ransom; murder in the course of sexual assault includes murder to prevent victim from becoming a witness; denial of a bill of particulars on aggravating factors did not deny fair hearing; meaning of “heinous” and “depraved” discussed; “heinous, cruel or depraved” as a unitary rather than three separate factors discussed; statute complies with the eighth and fourteenth amendments; statutory construction and precedent support conclusion that the burden of persuasion applies to both elements of mitigation; proportionality review still available in this case despite repeal of requirement. 251 C. 285. Trial court properly instructed jury that it could convict defendant of capital felony based upon a theory of conspiratorial liability even though defendant did not pull trigger of gun that killed victims and was not present when the shootings occurred. 271 C. 338.

Cited. 32 CA 38; 36 CA 364; 41 CA 604; 42 CA 348; 43 CA 549; 45 CA 207; Id., 390.

Cited 42 CS 426.

Subdiv. (1):

Conviction for felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c cannot serve as the predicate murder for the crime of capital felony under this section; term “murder” in capital felony statute may be applied only to intentional murder. 241 C. 702. In order to satisfy the element that police officer had been “acting within the scope of his duties”, the state was only required to prove that police officer was acting in the good faith discharge of his official duties when he stopped defendant and attempted to subdue him. 264 C. 1.

Subdiv. (2):

Capital felony murder discussed. 199 C. 163. Cited. 203 C. 420. Evidence that codefendant said “I've got a job for you” and that defendant made preparations for the murder and received a snowmobile after the victim was killed was sufficient to support finding of probable cause that defendant committed murder for pecuniary gain; defendant, having been hired to kill the victim, could be held accessorily liable for capital felony under Subdiv. even if jury found that codefendant, who was not a party to any hiring relationship, was the principal actor who killed the victim; hiring element contemplates a bargained for exchange involving pecuniary gain as consideration for the commission of the murder, and the mere receipt of money or property before or after the murder is not sufficient to hold defendant liable under Subdiv. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Cited. 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538.

Subdiv. (5):

Cited. 197 C. 436; 213 C. 388. Provision does not require that kidnapping be accompanied by a demand for ransom. 249 C. 645. Trial court properly instructed jury that its verdict of guilty on charge of intentional murder would provide the predicate for criminal liability under Subdiv. 263 C. 478.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 233 C. 174. State need only prove that the murder in a kidnap-murder or sexual-assault murder was aggravated in order to establish the aggravating factor. 269 C. 213.

Subdiv. (7):

Cited. 205 C. 298; 237 C. 694. Double jeopardy clause not violated where defendant convicted for two counts of capital felony; evidence indicated that the murders occurred in two sets, at distinctly separate times. 260 C. 339.

Subdiv. (8):

Cited. 206 C. 213; 207 C. 374; 208 C. 125; 209 C. 225; 212 C. 258; 213 C. 708; 218 C. 349; 221 C. 430; 229 C. 125; 233 C. 813. Only an intentional murder can be a predicate murder to capital felony charge under section. 238 C. 828. Cited. 241 C. 322; Id., 702; 242 C. 93. Proper construction to be given to term “in the course of a single transaction” is that there need only be some nexus between murders, that the murders be connected by a common purpose or plan in order to be “in the course of a single transaction”; does not require murders to be at the same time in order to constitute “in the course of a single transaction”; temporal relationship between murders is not an absolute prerequisite to prosecution under Subdiv. 254 C. 578. Read together, Sec. 53a-54(a) and this Subdiv. provide that conviction of intentional murder under doctrine of transferred intent may be the predicate for conviction of capital felony under this Subdiv. when victim is under 16, regardless of defendant's subjective state of mind; knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of Subdiv.; to limit applicability of Subdiv. to cases in which state can prove that defendant knew or reasonably should have known the age of his victim would be both impracticable and inconsistent with the legislative intent. 265 C. 35. Legislature had rational basis for classifying intentional murder of a person under the age of 16 as a capital felony. 272 C. 106.

Cited. 38 CA 581.

Sec. 53a-54c. Felony murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, such person commits or attempts to commit robbery, home invasion, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, such person, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in any prosecution under this section, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (2) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any dangerous instrument; and (3) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon or instrument; and (4) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

(P.A. 74-186, S. 11, 12; P.A. 76-336, S. 21; P.A. 79-570, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 28; P.A. 15-211, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 76-336 replaced rape in first degree, deviate sexual intercourse in first degree and sexual contact in first degree with sexual assault in first degree, sexual assault in first degree with firearm, sexual assault in third degree and sexual assault in third degree with firearm; P.A. 79-570 removed murder resulting from commission of or attempt to commit arson from purview of section; P.A. 92-260 replaced obsolete reference to offense of “sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm” with revised name of “aggravated sexual assault in the first degree”; (Revisor's note: In 1995 the indicators (A), (B), (C) and (D) were changed editorially by the Revisors to (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively for consistency with statutory usage); P.A. 15-211 added “home invasion,” and made technical changes.

See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.

See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.

Cited. 171 C. 683; 176 C. 257; 177 C. 677; 178 C. 116; 179 C. 78. Court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on lesser offenses of first degree burglary and first degree robbery since element of causation, which differentiates felony murder from the lesser offenses, was not sufficiently in dispute. 180 C. 599. Cited. 181 C. 151; Id., 187; 182 C. 419; Id., 580; 183 C. 299; 186 C. 1; 188 C. 542; 189 C. 346; 191 C. 636; Id., 659; 193 C. 70; Id., 144; Id., 350; 194 C. 223; Id., 279; Id., 416; Id., 530; 195 C. 505. Manslaughter is not a lesser included crime otherwise of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 197 C. 396; Id., 436; Id., 588; 198 C. 92; Id., 255; Id., 386; Id., 397; Id., 435; Id., 506; Id., 517; Id., 638; Id., 644; 199 C. 110; 200 C. 323; Id., 721; 201 C. 34; Id., 395; Id., 462; 202 C. 18; Id., 39; 203 C. 4; Id., 212; 204 C. 377; 205 C. 298; Id., 485; Id., 507; Id., 616; Id., 638; 206 C. 157; Id., 657; 207 C. 1; 208 C. 52; 209 C. 34; Id., 75; Id., 290; Id., 564; Id., 636; 210 C. 78; Id., 652; Id., 751; 211 C. 289; 212 C. 387; 213 C. 388; 214 C. 132; Id., 454; Id., 493; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 282; Id., 367; Id., 699; 218 C. 85; Id., 151; Id., 309; Id., 447; Id., 486; 219 C. 743; 220 C. 1; Id., 385; Id., 417; 221 C. 315; Id., 635; Id., 643; Id., 685; 222 C. 117; 223 C. 299; Id., 595; Id., 635; Id., 834; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 227 C. 101; 229 C. 691; 230 C. 88; Id., 183; Id., 351; 233 C. 44; 234 C. 97; 235 C. 595; Id., 748; Id., 802; 237 C. 390; Id., 518; Id., 694; 238 C. 389; Id., 828; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 1; Id., 322. Conviction for felony murder under this section cannot serve as predicate for the crime of capital felony under Sec. 53a-54b(1). Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93; Id., 125; Id., 409; Id., 666; 247 C. 662. It is inconsistent with purpose of statute to allow defendant who causes a death in the course of a felony to claim self-defense because victim attempted to thwart the felony. 254 C. 184. The defense of self-defense does not apply to charge of felony murder as a matter of law. Id., 202. A proper charge on felony murder predicated on an attempt crime should include an instruction on the definition of criminal attempt. 286 C. 707. Conviction of felony murder and robbery in first degree under Sec. 53a-134(a)(1) does not constitute double jeopardy. 302 C. 287. Defendant could be found guilty of felony murder if found guilty of the underlying felony robbery charge regardless of whether defendant was found guilty of the robbery charge as a principal, accessory or on the basis of vicarious liability under the Pinkerton doctrine. 303 C. 378. Felony murder is a class A felony subject to the penalties in Sec. 53a-35a(2). 308 C. 263.

Cited. 11 CA 80; 12 CA 385; 24 CA 723; 27 CA 794; 29 CA 573; Id., 771; 30 CA 381; 31 CA 771; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 88; 32 CA 38; Id., 431; 33 CA 90; 35 CA 762; 36 CA 364; Id., 506; Id., 556; 38 CA 581; 41 CA 515. Self-defense not available as a defense to charge of felony murder. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 472; 43 CA 61; 45 CA 32; Id., 187; Id., 390; Id., 658. Reaffirmed prior holding that self-defense not a valid defense to charge of felony murder. 51 CA 798. Court rejects defendant's argument that killing of victim who resisted a robbery attempt by walking away is not committed “in the course of and in furtherance of” the attempted robbery because the attempted robbery had ceased. 64 CA 596. Felony murder conviction carries mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years imprisonment. 127 CA 718. Homicide and assault were committed “in furtherance of” conspiracy to commit robbery, because it was within defendant's contemplation that one or more of the people she intended to rob at gunpoint would be shot and injured or killed. Id., 819. Conviction of murder under Sec. 53a-54a and felony murder under this section for same offense violated prohibition against double jeopardy. 153 CA 691. Legislature intended multiple punishments for felony murder and the underlying predicate offenses; conviction for kidnapping under Sec. 53a-92(a)(2) and robbery under Sec. 53a-134(a)(1) do not violate double jeopardy even though they are the predicate offenses for felony murder conviction. 180 CA 371; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 338 C. 54.

Cited. 36 CS 141; 41 CS 385; 42 CS 426.

Sec. 53a-54d. Arson murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits arson and, in the course of such arson, causes the death of a person. Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, any person convicted of murder under this section who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall not be eligible for parole.

(P.A. 79-570, S. 1; P.A. 15-84, S. 8.)

History: P.A. 15-84 added provision re person 18 years of age or older at time of offense, effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after that date.

Cited. 191 C. 636. Does not violate defendant's right to due process and equal protection. 196 C. 655. Cited. Id., 667. When two or more persons are the victims of a single episode, there are as many offenses as there are victims. 198 C. 92. Cited. 204 C. 377; 210 C. 22; Id., 519; 211 C. 258; Id., 289; 213 C. 161; 214 C. 378; 216 C. 699; 237 C. 694; 238 C. 828; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 702.

Cited. 41 CA 476.

Cited. 42 CS 426.

Sec. 53a-54e. Construction of statutes re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012. The provisions of subsection (t) of section 1-1 and section 54-194 shall apply and be given full force and effect with respect to a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012.

(P.A. 12-5, S. 38.)

History: P.A. 12-5 effective April 25, 2012.

Sec. 53a-55. Manslaughter in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in subsection (a) of section 53a-54a, except that the fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.

(b) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 56; P.A. 73-137, S. 9; P.A. 83-486, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 73-137 substituted reference to Sec. 53a-54a for reference to Sec. 53a-54 in Subdiv. (2); P.A. 83-486 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by replacing “acts” with “committed the proscribed act or acts”.

Cited. 168 C. 610; 169 C. 309; 170 C. 81; 180 C. 171; 181 C. 406; 182 C. 66; 188 C. 542; 190 C. 639; 192 C. 85; 193 C. 632; Id., 646; Id., 695. Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 200 C. 553; 201 C. 174; 202 C. 429; 210 C. 78; Id., 652; 211 C. 591; 213 C. 38; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 699; 217 C. 498; 223 C. 273; 225 C. 559; 226 C. 237; 233 C. 174; 234 C. 139; 236 C. 342. A conviction of reckless manslaughter pursuant to a robbery conspiracy is permitted under the Pinkerton doctrine because the commission of a reckless crime may be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such conspiracy. 292 C. 296. While manslaughter in the first degree under this section is a lesser included offense of murder under Sec. 53a-54a despite the fact that the elements of manslaughter are not included in the elements of murder, the states of minds required by the two offenses are mutually exclusive; a jury finding guilty verdicts on both offenses are inconsistent verdicts and both verdicts must be vacated. 325 C. 236.

Cited. 7 CA 223; 8 CA 307; 15 CA 74; judgment reversed, see 211 C. 591; 16 CA 223; 24 CA 115; 37 CA 722; 40 CA 189; Id., 374; 41 CA 565; Id., 604; 42 CA 348; 44 CA 62; 46 CA 216.

Cited. 33 CS 28.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (1): It is incumbent upon the state to prove a specific intent to cause serious physical injury as intent to achieve a result is an element of the crime charged. 165 C. 400. Cited. 174 C. 89; 176 C. 107. Subdiv. (3): The conduct proscribed does not require infliction of a physical blow. Id., 227. Cited. 177 C. 538; 179 C. 381. Subdivs. (1) and (3): Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382. Cited. 181 C. 187; 182 C. 403; 183 C. 394; 185 C. 63; 188 C. 237; Id., 653. Subdiv. (1): Attempt to commit is not cognizable. 189 C. 303. Cited. 190 C. 219; Id., 576; 194 C. 119; Id., 279; Id., 376; Id., 408; 196 C. 519; 198 C. 53; Id., 209; Id., 220; Id., 273; Id., 454; 199 C. 155; Id., 383; Id., 417; 200 C. 224; Id., 453; 201 C. 534; Id., 598; 202 C. 520; Id., 520. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629. Cited. 203 C. 466; 204 C. 120; 205 C. 279; 206 C. 278; 207 C. 276; 209 C. 133; 211 C. 441; 212 C. 612; 213 C. 500; Id., 579; 214 C. 57; Id., 77; 216 C. 220; 218 C. 766; 219 C. 16; 220 C. 169; Id., 285; 222 C. 444; 224 C. 546; 225 C. 55; 227 C. 456; Id., 566; Id., 611; 228 C. 118; Id., 147; Id., 281; 229 C. 193; Id., 397; 230 C. 183; 231 C. 115; Id., 484; 233 C. 106; Id., 215; Id., 517; 235 C. 413; Id., 473; Id., 595; 236 C. 189; 238 C. 253; Id., 313; 240 C. 395; Id., 727; Id., 743; Id., 799; 241 C. 502. Motion to dismiss on grounds that Subdiv. (3) is unconstitutionally vague because legislature failed to define phrases “extreme indifference to human life” and “grave risk of death” and defendant was not given “fair warning” and statute is susceptible to “arbitrary enforcement” fails to meet burden of proof because person of ordinary intelligence would have had fair warning that defendant's actions were proscribed and was properly denied by trial court; based on established principles concerning how evidence is construed, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, evidence was sufficient to support trial court's verdict of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. 257 C. 544. Defendant who was convicted of murder pursuant to Sec. 53a-54a(a) was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in Subdiv. (1). 262 C. 453. Subdiv. (1): Crime of intentional manslaughter, unlike reckless manslaughter under Subdiv. (3), or criminally negligent operation, under Sec. 53a-57(a), does not require proof of the defendant's mental state with respect to the risk of death. 342 C. 538.

Subdiv. (3): To be guilty of violating statute, a person must have the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 5 CA 571. Cited. 7 CA 457; Id., 656; 8 CA 273; 9 CA 147; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278; 11 CA 425; Id., 628; 13 CA 175; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; Id., 602; 18 CA 423; 19 CA 576; Id., 609; Id., 674; 20 CA 410; 21 CA 138; 22 CA 265; Id., 321; Id., 340; Id., 507; Id., 521; Id., 669; 23 CA 431; Id., 502; 24 CA 586; Id., 692; 25 CA 456; Id., 734; 26 CA 165; Id., 242; Id., 259; 27 CA 1; Id., 520; Id., 643; 28 CA 34; Id., 81; Id., 231; Id., 771; Id., 825; 29 CA 68; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 566; Id., 162; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 397; Id., 394; Id., 452; Id., 533; Id., 754; Id., 773; 30 CA 26; Id., 232; 31 CA 385; 32 CA 687; Id., 854; 33 CA 116; Id., 782; 34 CA 236; Id., 368, see also 233 C. 517; 35 CA 138; Id., 374; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413; Id., 438; 37 CA 180; Id., 404; Id., 473; 38 CA 801; Id., 815; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; 40 CA 151; 41 CA 831; 42 CA 41; Id., 382; 43 CA 252; Id., 488; 44 CA 790; Id., 731. Evidence presented at trial concerning a healthy 1-year-old left in defendant's care was sufficient to support conviction. 47 CA 188. Subdiv. (1): Criminal liability as an accessory to manslaughter in the first degree has long been recognized under this state's jurisprudence. 49 CA 121. To be guilty under Subsec., it must be established that defendant must have had the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 56 CA 742. Subdiv. (3): Action of defendant in entering house, after car chase, obtaining loaded shotgun, walking 100 feet to edge of driveway and shooting victim showed an extreme indifference to human life. 61 CA 463. Evidence insufficient to find that defendant demonstrated an extreme indifference to human life to support conviction of manslaughter in the first degree when defendant himself ingested fentanyl lollipops, there was no evidence that he or anyone to whom he had given the lollipops had an adverse reaction to them, risks associated with ingestion of methadose and fentanyl not commonly known by laypeople, and defendant immediately called 9-1-1 upon hearing the victim was unresponsive. 106 CA 467. Subdiv. (3): Conviction under Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-59(a)(3) constituted double jeopardy violation because there was no conceivable circumstance in which defendant could have caused victim's death without also having caused victim “serious physical injury” as defined in Sec. 53a-3(4). 187 CA 725. The mens rea elements in the two provisions, namely, the “intent to cause serious physical injury” in Subdiv. (1) and “recklessly engaging in conduct which creates a grave risk of death” in Subdiv. (3), do not relate to the same result; the mental state elements in the two provisions - failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that your manner of operation would cause death under Sec. 53a-57(a) and an intent to cause serious physical injury under Subdiv. (1) - do not relate to the same result; the mental state element under Subdiv. (3) and under Sec. 53a-57(a) is mutually exclusive and relate to the same result, thus guilty verdicts as to the crimes of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation were legally inconsistent. 191 CA 33; judgment reversed in part, see 342 C. 538. Subdiv. (1): As charged, defendant's rights to be free from double jeopardy violated as the offenses of manslaughter in the first degree under Subdiv. and risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21 arose from the same actions and constituted the same offense, and the offense of risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. 197 CA 302; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 425.

Cited. 44 CS 417.

Sec. 53a-55a. Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm when he commits manslaughter in the first degree as provided in section 53a-55, and in the commission of such offense he uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, machine gun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with subdivision (5) of section 53a-35a of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 75-380, S. 3; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 1; P.A. 07-143, S. 13.)

History: July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision that any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(4) and increase the nonsuspendable sentence from one year to five years; P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change, effective July 1, 2007.

Cited. 190 C. 639; 192 C. 85; 193 C. 695; 198 C. 77; Id., 454; 201 C. 174; 206 C. 346; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 699; 225 C. 559. In accordance with 95 CA 362, to establish accessorial liability under Sec. 53a-8 for violation of this section, state must prove that defendant, acting with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, intentionally aided a principal offender in causing the death of such person or of a third person, and that the principal, in committing the act, used, carried or threatened to use a firearm. 300 C. 490.

Cited. 7 CA 223; 10 CA 357; 11 CA 425; 17 CA 97; 21 CA 801; 23 CA 502; 25 CA 734; 26 CA 259; 33 CA 116; 37 CA 722; 39 CA 224; Id., 242. Sec. 53a-54a(a) permits conviction under this section regardless of extreme emotional disturbance defense. 86 CA 784. When defendant is charged with violation of section as an accessory, state must prove that defendant intended to inflict serious physical injury and to aid the principal in doing so, but does not have to also prove that defendant intended the use, carrying or threatened use of the firearm. 95 CA 362.

Subsec. (a):

Court's instructions on intent as element of manslaughter unconstitutional since they could be interpreted as creating a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption. 180 C. 171. Cited. 195 C. 160; 199 C. 383; 203 C. 466; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 27 CA 263.

Sec. 53a-56. Manslaughter in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or (2) he intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide.

(b) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 57.)

Cited. 169 C. 309; 181 C. 406; 188 C. 542; 195 C. 232. Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 199 C. 631; 201 C. 174; 202 C. 629; 210 C. 78; 212 C. 593; 213 C. 579; 216 C. 699; 217 C. 498; 226 C. 237; 227 C. 566; 236 C. 342.

Cited. 7 CA 180; 11 CA 425; 19 CA 674; 21 CA 654; 24 CA 586; 26 CA 448; 32 CA 687; Id., 759; 37 CA 722; 42 CA 348. Cited re evidence sufficient to sustain conviction. 51 CA 814.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 174 C. 89. Subdiv. (1): Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382. Cited. 185 C. 63; 187 C. 6; 193 C. 632; 194 C. 119; 199 C. 155; 206 C. 657; 214 C. 57; 219 C. 16; 222 C. 444; 225 C. 55; 226 C. 20; 228 C. 118; Id., 147; 231 C. 115; 238 C. 253.

Cited. 5 CA 157; Id., 338; 11 CA 628; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; 20 CA 430; 25 CA 456; 28 CA 771; Id., 825; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 32 CA 854; 38 CA 815; 40 CA 47. Conviction for manslaughter under Subdiv. (1) and manslaughter in second degree with a motor vehicle under Sec. 53a-56b(a) for the death of one person does not constitute double jeopardy. 111 CA 466.

Sec. 53a-56a. Manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm when he commits manslaughter in the second degree as provided in section 53a-56, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 75-380, S. 4.)

Cited. 199 C. 631; 201 C. 174; 207 C. 191; Id., 412; 216 C. 282; Id., 699; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281.

Cited. 10 CA 697.

Sec. 53a-56b. Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he causes the death of another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug.

(b) Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class C felony and the court shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty under this section for one year. The court shall also order such person not to operate any motor vehicle that is not equipped with an approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j, for a period of two years after such person's operator's license or nonresident operating privilege is restored by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

(P.A. 82-403, S. 1; P.A. 83-534, S. 8; P.A. 85-147, S. 1; P.A. 08-150, S. 59.)

History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted “while intoxicated” from the title of the offense and a provision that defined “intoxication” to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and replaced elements of offense of “when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes the death of another person” with “when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he causes the death of another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug”; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (b) to require court to order a person found guilty not to operate any motor vehicle that is not equipped with an approved ignition interlock device for a period of two years after restoration of such person's operator's license or nonresident operating privilege.

See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.

See Sec. 14-227o re discount for ignition interlock device services.

Cited. 193 C. 632; 213 C. 74; 216 C. 699; 219 C. 752; 229 C. 228. There is no language in section to indicate expressly that legislature intended that a person convicted of second degree manslaughter with a motor vehicle could not also be convicted of first degree manslaughter. 263 C. 390.

Cited. 5 CA 378; 9 CA 686; 11 CA 122; 12 CA 129; Id., 294; 16 CA 358; 18 CA 223; 21 CA 138; 22 CA 108; 23 CA 215; Id., 720; 29 CA 825; 34 CA 557; Id., 655; 36 CA 710; 40 CA 359.

Subsec. (a):

Sec. 53a-57 not a lesser included offense. 11 CA 473. Cited. 20 CA 495. Conviction under Subsec. and for manslaughter in second degree under Sec. 53a-56(a)(1) for the death of one person does not constitute double jeopardy. 111 CA 466.

Sec. 53a-57. Misconduct with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when, with criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, he causes the death of another person.

(b) Misconduct with a motor vehicle is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 58; P.A. 76-16; P.A. 82-403, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 76-16 defined “intoxication” for purposes of section; P.A. 82-403 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the provision that a person is guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when he causes the death of another person “in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle” and by deleting the definition of “intoxication”.

See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.

Cited. 174 C. 112; Id., 118; 176 C. 445; Id., 451; 188 C. 620; 202 C. 629; 207 C. 336; 216 C. 699; 222 C. 444; 229 C. 228.

Cited. 3 CA 137. Violation of Sec. 14-222a, negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, is a lesser included offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle. 9 CA 686. Not a lesser included offense of Sec. 53a-56b(a). 11 CA 473. Cited. 15 CA 392; 16 CA 497; 21 CA 138; 22 CA 108; 23 CA 720; 28 CA 283; 29 CA 825; 30 CA 428; 34 CA 655. Conviction upheld where defendant became aware that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired, yet continued to operate the motor vehicle. 64 CA 631.

Cited. 35 CS 519; 36 CS 527.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 20 CA 495. This Subsec. and Sec. 14-223(b) contain multiple elements that are dissimilar, and the clear language of the statutes themselves is sufficient for conclusion that they do not impose two punishments for the same act. 84 CA 351. The mental state elements in the two provisions - failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that your manner of operation would cause death under Subsec. and an intent to cause serious physical injury under Sec. 53a-55(a)(1) - do not relate to the same result; the mental state element under Sec. 53a-55(a)(3) and under Subsec. is mutually exclusive and relate to the same result, thus guilty verdicts as to the crimes of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation were legally inconsistent. 191 CA 33; judgment reverse in part, see 342 C. 538.

Sec. 53a-58. Criminally negligent homicide: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person, except where the defendant caused such death by a motor vehicle.

(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 59.)

Cited. 174 C. 89. Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382. Cited. 181 C. 406; 185 C. 63; 187 C. 6; 195 C. 232; 201 C. 174; 202 C. 520; Id., 629; 204 C. 410; Id., 429; 212 C. 593; 213 C. 579; 214 C. 57; 216 C. 699; 223 C. 273; 226 C. 237; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 118, 127. Trial court improperly refused to instruct jury on this lesser included offense; judgment of Appellate Court in 30 CA 95 reversed. Id., 147. Cited. Id., 281; 231 C. 115; 238 C. 253.

Cited. 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; 24 CA 586; 26 CA 448; 28 CA 388; Id., 771; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; Id., 232; 32 CA 687; 34 CA 368, see also 233 C. 517; 35 CA 438. Defendant's diminished mental capacity did not prevent her from forming the mental state associated with criminally negligent homicide since the standard is that of the reasonably prudent person. 131 CA 65; judgment affirmed, see 308 C. 835.

Cited. 40 CS 498.

Sec. 53a-58a. Negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. Section 53a-58a is repealed.

(P.A. 73-639, S. 5; P.A. 81-26, S. 2.)

PART V

ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-59. Assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (2) with intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or (4) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person and while aided by two or more other persons actually present, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.

(b) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony provided (1) any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and (2) any person found guilty under subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim of the offense is a person under ten years of age or if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in section 53a-146, and the actor knew the victim was a witness.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 60; P.A. 80-442, S. 16, 28; P.A. 92-87, S. 1; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 12; P.A. 99-240, S. 13.)

History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) requiring at least 5 years' imprisonment for person found guilty under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-87 added Subsec. (a)(4) re causing serious physical injury to another person while aided by two or more other persons actually present; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 added Subsec. (a)(5) re causing physical injury to another person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm; P.A. 95-142 added Subsec. (b)(2) requiring the defendant to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which 10 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under 10 years of age; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (b)(2) to make the nonsuspendable sentence applicable if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in Sec. 53a-146, and the actor knew the victim was a witness.

Cited. 171 C. 264. Whether physical injury sustained by victim was “serious” was question of fact for the jury. 175 C. 204. Cited. 191 C. 142; 193 C. 333; 196 C. 18; 200 C. 607; 203 C. 484; 207 C. 233; 209 C. 34; 211 C. 441; 215 C. 739; 219 C. 363; 221 C. 402; 227 C. 301; 239 C. 467; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 125; Id., 389.

Cited. 3 CA 607; 5 CA 590; 8 CA 545; 11 CA 621; Id., 699; 13 CA 139; 14 CA 244; Id., 309; 17 CA 200; 19 CA 654; 20 CA 437; Id., 521; 21 CA 557; 25 CA 171; 34 CA 103; 35 CA 107; Id., 609; Id., 762; 36 CA 336; 37 CA 180; 38 CA 20; Id., 777; 39 CA 333; Id., 645; 42 CA 624; 43 CA 549; 44 CA 6; 46 CA 691. Assault statute provides for intent to be transferred and does not require that defendant be aware of the presence of unintended victim. 84 CA 263. In challenge of evidence as being insufficient to prove element that appellant was “aided by two or more other persons actually present”, where appellant and another defendant assaulted the driver of a jeep while a third defendant assaulted the passenger of a jeep and a fourth defendant kept lookout, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the lookout aided in the assault by following the jeep, blocking the jeep from exiting an alleyway and acting as a lookout, and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that appellant and other two defendants had aided each other by attacking from both sides of the jeep so that neither victim could assist the other or run for help. 111 CA 184. Re accessory liability under section, defendant only needs to have the intent to cause serious physical injury, not the intent to do so with a dangerous instrument; jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant intended to aid another to inflict serious physical injury on victim and that principal used a dangerous instrument. 136 CA 568; judgment reversed on eyewitness identification, see 314 C. 131. Convictions for assault in the first degree in violation of this section and risk of injury to a child in violation of Sec. 53-21, revised to 1997, are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 145 CA 374.

Cited. 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 428; 172 C. 94; Id., 275; 173 C. 254. Evidence victim suffered various broken facial bones and spent eleven days in hospital was sufficient to show the “serious physical injury” required for conviction. Id., 389. Cited. 174 C. 16; Id., 604; 176 C. 138; 178 C. 116; Id., 448; 180 C. 481; Id., 557; 182 C. 449; Id., 501; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 183 C. 29; 184 C. 400; 185 C. 63; Id., 372; 186 C. 1; Id., 17; Id., 654; 187 C. 681; 189 C. 61; Id., 303; 190 C. 219; 191 C. 12; 193 C. 48; Id., 474; Id., 632; 194 C. 89; Id., 119; Id., 408; 195 C. 475; Id., 651; 196 C. 395; 197 C. 602; 198 C. 23; 199 C. 155; Id., 322; 200 C. 642; 202 C. 259; Id., 463. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629. Cited. 204 C. 207; Id., 523; 205 C. 370; Id., 673; 208 C. 38; 209 C. 322; 210 C. 619; 211 C. 1; 212 C. 50; 213 C. 97; 214 C. 122; Id., 344; Id., 717; 216 C. 188; Id., 492; Id., 585; Id., 647; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 747; 219 C. 16; Id., 363; 220 C. 385; Id., 408; Id., 915; 222 C. 117; Id., 444; Id., 718; 225 C. 450; Id., 524; 227 C. 301; Id., 518; Id., 711; Id., 751; 228 C. 147; Id., 234; Id., 335; 229 C. 125; Id., 178; 230 C. 608; 231 C. 235; 233 C. 502; 235 C. 473; Id., 746; Id., 748; 237 C. 694. Subdiv. (1): Under appropriate circumstances, defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, same person; judgment of Appellate Court in 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 239 C. 481; 240 C. 395; 241 C. 665; Id., 802; 242 C. 143; Id., 485; Id., 723; Id., 745. Subdiv. (3): Criminal conduct can arise by an omission to act when there is a legal duty to do so and defendant who had established a familial relationship with victim's mother and her children, had assumed responsibility for the welfare of the children and had taken care of the children as though he were their father, had a legal duty to protect victim from abuse and breach of that duty exposed defendant to criminal liability. 245 C. 209. Cited. 247 C. 662. Defendant was not without fair warning and his due process rights were not denied by court's holding construing a common law duty to act under section; evidence that child abuse victim had sustained obvious injuries was sufficient to support defendant's conviction based on his failure to act; re double jeopardy claim, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that his conviction with regard to different injuries arose out of the same act; this section and Sec. 53-21 do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser included offenses and are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. 260 C. 93. Defendant who was not perpetrator of physical assaults on child and who was neither a parent nor a legal guardian could not be criminally liable for assault in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (3); accordingly, defendant's conviction of two counts of that crime were reversed and case remanded for resentencing on remaining charge of risk of injury to a child. 274 C. 727. Sec. 53a-61(a)(2) is lesser included offense of Subdiv. (3), and court's refusal to grant related jury instruction constituted harmful error. 289 C. 742. Subdiv. (1): A fist or other body part is not a dangerous instrument. 307 C. 115. Convictions under Subdivs. (1) and (3) are not legally inconsistent because a person may intend to seriously injure a person within the meaning of Subdiv. (1) while simultaneously recklessly creating a risk of that person's death within the meaning of Subdiv. (3). 316 C. 651. Subsection's use of “serious disfigurement” evidences intent to require consideration of factors such as permanence, location, size, general appearance and visibility to others; serious disfigurement does not have to be permanent or in a location that is visible to others. 332 C. 472. Evidence insufficient to find serious disfigurement where regardless if evaluated at the time of injury or of trial, victim had two lacerations on her forearm caused by a knife that left a permanent scar of one and one-half inches which is unremarkable in appearance and does not substantially detract from her appearance. Id. Where court reversed conviction of assault in the first degree for insufficient evidence, court declined to modify the judgment to reflect the highest lesser included offense that requires only physical injury, assault in the second degree, and remanded case for acquittal and vacating of sentence for said charge. Id. Because Subdiv. (1) does not indicate unit of prosecution intended by legislature, and absent clear legislative intent to impose multiple punishments for violations of same criminal statute arising out of single transaction or occurrence, unit of prosecution must be resolved in favor of rule of lenity to resolve any doubt against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. 336 C. 219. Subdiv. (1): It is possible to commit the crime of home invasion without committing the crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, therefore home invasion in violation of Sec. 53a-100aa(a)(2) and attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-49 are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 343 C. 470.

Cited. 1 CA 609; 3 CA 166; 5 CA 40; 6 CA 124; Id., 469; Id., 476; 7 CA 309; 8 CA 119; Id., 176; 9 CA 79; Id., 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; Id., 330; 10 CA 103; Id., 176; Id., 302; Id., 462; Id., 643; 11 CA 499; 12 CA 217; Id., 655; 13 CA 12; Id., 120; Id., 237; Id., 687; Id., 824; 14 CA 1; Id., 140; Id., 493; Id., 511; 15 CA 34; Id., 416; Id., 531; Id., 704; 16 CA 184; Id., 206; Id., 346; Id., 390; 17 CA 391; 18 CA 477; 19 CA 174; Id., 618; 20 CA 27; 21 CA 688; 22 CA 199; Id., 340; Id., 610; 23 CA 28; Id., 315; Id., 663; Id., 692; 24 CA 152; Id., 264; Id., 316; Id., 556; Id., 563; Id., 624; 25 CA 243; Id., 275; Id., 433; Id., 578; Id., 619; 26 CA 52; Id., 114; Id., 145; Id., 331; Id., 367; Id., 433; Id., 641; 27 CA 73; Id., 322; Id., 654; 28 CA 34; Id., 290; Id., 402; Id., 548; Id., 825; Id., 833; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 518; 29 CA 59; Id., 262; Id., 704; Id., 744; 30 CA 9; Id., 26; Id., 68; Id., 232; Id., 359; Id., 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; Id., 606; 31 CA 58; 32 CA 553; 33 CA 60; Id., 122; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 34 CA 223; Id., 261; Id., 610; Id., 691; Id., 807; 35 CA 51; Id., 138; Id., 279; Id., 699; Id., 740; 36 CA 41; Id., 473; Id., 483; Id., 506; Id., 576; Id., 695; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 21; Id., 464; Id., 749; 39 CA 18; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748; Id., 563; 40 CA 60; Id., 387; Id., 483; Id., 515; Id., 624; 41 CA 515; Id., 565; Id., 831; 42 CA 307; Id., 371; 43 CA 205; Id., 488; Id., 578; 44 CA 26; Id., 231; Id., 476; Id., 499; 45 CA 270; Id., 591; 46 CA 684; Id., 734. Offenses described in Subdivs. (1) and (4) are two separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 53 CA 581. To secure conviction for assault in the first degree under Subdiv. (1), state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, did, in fact, cause serious physical injury to that person and caused that injury by means of a dangerous instrument. 70 CA 232. There was sufficient evidence from which jury reasonably could have found victim had suffered serious and permanent disfigurement and that defendant intended to cause such serious and permanent disfigurement where defendant butted victim's face with his head, bit her face, struck her on the head with a hairdryer, kicked her and attempted to choke her, resulting in scars to victim's face. 74 CA 633. Defendant's actions in shaking infant with such violence as to cause injuries consistent with “shaken baby syndrome” was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe and evinced extreme indifference to human life. Id., 736. Subdiv. (2): Fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Subdiv. (1): Evidence that defendant arrived at crime scene and fired several shots at bedroom where he believed wife was staying was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant committed attempt to commit assault in the first degree which requires proof of intentional conduct constituting a substantial step toward intentionally causing victim serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon. 99 CA 203. Subdiv. (5): Court's instructions to jury improperly included additional element of intent to use firearm but did not prejudice defendant because inclusion of the additional element was to the state's, and not to defendant's, detriment. 107 CA 517. The jury reasonably could have concluded that scars constituted serious physical injury because they negatively affected the appearance of skin on face and abdomen. 118 CA 831. Mandatory nonsuspendable 5 year minimum term of imprisonment for violation of Subdiv. (1) does not violate constitutional due process or equal protection rights. 130 CA 632. Scarring does not have to be on a victim's face, it can be on far less observable parts of the body to support a finding of serious disfigurement; victim suffered serious disfigurement when scar was permanent, easily seen two and one-half years after the injury, and was located on the lower part of arm. 172 CA 668; judgment reversed in part, see 332 C. 472. Subdiv. (3): Conviction under Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-55(a)(3) constituted double jeopardy violation because there was no conceivable circumstance in which defendant could have caused victim's death without also having caused victim “serious physical injury” as defined in Sec. 53a-3(4). 187 CA 725. Attempted murder under Sec. 53a-49(a) and assault in the first degree under this section are not the same offense of for purposes of double jeopardy. 204 CA 207.

Sec. 53a-59a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the first degree: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the first degree, when such person commits assault in the first degree under section 53a-59(a)(2), 53a-59(a)(3) or 53a-59(a)(5) and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with intellectual disability.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the first degree upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with intellectual disability, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person with intellectual disability.

(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the first degree is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 77-422, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 17, 28; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 4; P.A. 99-122, S. 1; 99-186, S. 14; P.A. 11-129, S. 11.)

History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (c) requiring five years' imprisonment for persons found guilty under section provisions, effective July 1, 1981; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 53a-59(a)(5); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the first degree” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the first degree”, where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the first degree” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the first degree” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified new Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186); P.A. 11-129 substituted “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and “person with mental retardation” and made conforming changes.

See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability.

Cited. 180 C. 557; 207 C. 412; 211 C. 1; 216 C. 282; 230 C. 608.

Cited. 5 CA 590; 14 CA 1; 20 CA 467; Id., 521; 35 CA 609.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 235 C. 502.

Cited. 28 CA 402; 40 CA 387. Subdivs. (1) and (5) do not proscribe the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. 98 CA 85.

Sec. 53a-59b. Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree when he is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction or confined in any institution or facility of the Department of Correction and commits assault in the first degree under section 53a-59 and the victim of such assault is an employee of the Department of Correction acting in the performance of his duties.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(c) Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree is a class B felony. If any person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a violation of this section which occurred while such person was confined in an institution or facility of the Department of Correction, such term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.

(P.A. 93-246, S. 2.)

See Sec. 53a-167c re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction, employee or member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles or probation officer.

Sec. 53a-59c. Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy when such person commits assault in the first degree as provided under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-59 and (1) the victim of such assault is pregnant, and (2) such assault results in the termination of pregnancy that does not result in a live birth.

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know that the victim was pregnant.

(P.A. 03-21, S. 1.)

Only logical explanation for legislative decision to limit scope of section to fetuses that are not born alive is that legislature was well aware of the applicability of the born alive rule to infants who suffer injuries in utero but who are born alive and then die from those injuries; enactment of section reflects decision of legislature to reaffirm the applicability of the born alive rule rather than to abrogate it. 296 C. 622.

Sec. 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D or C felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) the actor recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (4) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, the actor intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to such person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or (5) the actor is a parolee from a correctional institution and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, the actor causes physical injury to such employee or member; or (6) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person by rendering such other person unconscious, and without provocation by such other person, the actor causes such injury to such other person by striking such other person on the head; or (7) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person by striking or kicking such person in the head while such person is in a lying position.

(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony or, if the offense resulted in serious physical injury, a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 61; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 18; P.A. 73-639, S. 20; P.A. 84-236, S. 4; P.A. 93-246, S. 3; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 5; P.A. 04-234, S, 2; P.A. 14-220, S. 1; P.A. 15-211, S. 4; P.A. 16-193, S. 28.)

History: 1971 act added Subsec. (a)(6) re physical injury to employee of department of correction or member of parole board; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) re physical injury to peace officer or fireman resulting from intentional attempt to prevent such person from performing his duty, renumbering accordingly; P.A. 84-236 amended Subsec. (a)(5) by changing “committed to” to “in the custody of” and adding phrase “confined in any institution or facility of the department of correction”; P.A. 93-246 amended Subsec. (a)(5) to delete from the scope of the offense a person who is in the custody of the commissioner of correction or confined in any institution or facility of the department of correction and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee of the department of correction causes physical injury to such employee; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add “other than by means of the discharge of a firearm” to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-59 by same public act; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 14-220 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (6) re serious physical injury by rendering person unconscious by striking on the head; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (7) re striking or kicking a person in the head and make technical changes, and amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re offense resulting in serious physical injury is a class C felony; P.A. 16-193 amended Subsec. (a)(5) by making a technical change.

Illegal confinement is no defense to assault on correctional officer. 169 C. 438. Cited. 171 C. 264; 172 C. 275; 173 C. 254; 184 C. 157; Id., 520; 193 C. 144; Id., 232; 197 C. 602; 198 C. 23; 199 C. 146; 216 C. 647; 222 C. 331; 231 C. 545; 237 C. 238.

Cited. 5 CA 590; Id., 612; 7 CA 701; 12 CA 221; Id., 320; Id., 679; 13 CA 667; 17 CA 200; 20 CA 75; 24 CA 13; 32 CA 224; 34 CA 1; 35 CA 138; Id., 431; 36 CA 59; 37 CA 338; 38 CA 598; 46 CA 486; Id., 691; Id., 741.

Cited. 34 CS 531.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 171 C. 395; 175 C. 155; 185 C. 63; 188 C. 574; 190 C. 143; 193 C. 48; 194 C. 119; Id., 408; 195 C. 636; Id., 651; 198 C. 405; Id., 424; 199 C. 322; 201 C. 103; Id., 289; 202 C. 520; 204 C. 207; Id., 714; 209 C. 733; 211 C. 151; 220 C. 385; 221 C. 447; 222 C. 556; 223 C. 243; 226 C. 618; 227 C. 153; Id., 711; Id., 751; 228 C. 147; Id., 910; 230 C. 591; 235 C. 748; 239 C. 481.

Cited. 1 CA 584; 5 CA 40; 6 CA 701; 7 CA 27; Id., 95; Id., 377; 8 CA 35; 9 CA 161; 10 CA 50; Id., 330; Id., 462; 11 CA 665; 13 CA 386; 14 CA 463; Id., 472; Id., 493; Id., 586; 15 CA 586; Id., 704; 17 CA 226; 19 CA 245; Id., 576; Id., 618; 20 CA 27; 22 CA 586; 23 CA 83; Id., 447; Id., 502; Id., 705; 24 CA 264; Id., 563; Id., 624; Id., 685; 25 CA 104; Id., 275; Id., 565; 26 CA 114; Id., 145; Id., 242; 27 CA 73; Id., 322; 28 CA 290; Id., 645; 29 CA 262; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 31 CA 58; Id., 140; Id., 448; 33 CA 647; 34 CA 691; 36 CA 641; Id., 805; 37 CA 437; 38 CA 247; Id., 777; Id., 868; 39 CA 789; 40 CA 757; 41 CA 47; Id., 333; Id., 515; Id., 565; 43 CA 205; Id., 252; 44 CA 125; Id., 307; 45 CA 591; 46 CA 24. Defendant's rights under double jeopardy clause of fifth amendment to U.S. Constitution were violated by his conviction of two counts of assault in the second degree resulting from conduct against one victim that was nonsexual, continuous, uninterrupted and close in time. 92 CA 586. Subdiv. (1): The question of intent is purely a question of fact and intent may be inferred from conduct, and whether such an inference should be drawn is a question for the jury to decide. 118 CA 315.

Cited. 39 CS 494. It is possible to prove assault in the second degree without necessarily proving risk of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the second degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.

Sec. 53a-60a. Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D or C felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a firearm when he commits assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-60, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree and assault in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Assault in the second degree with a firearm is (1) a class D felony, or (2) if the offense resulted in serious physical injury, a class C felony, for which, in either case under subdivision (1) or subdivision (2) of this subsection, one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 75-380, S. 5; P.A. 19-132, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 19-132 amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re class D felony penalty as Subdiv. (1), adding Subdiv. (2) re class C felony penalty, and making a conforming change.

Cited. 198 C. 424; 200 C. 642; 201 C. 368; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 2 CA 617; 5 CA 590; 9 CA 648; 23 CA 502; 45 CA 591.

Sec. 53a-60b. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree: Class D felony: Two years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree when such person commits assault in the second degree under section 53a-60 or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and (1) the victim of such assault or larceny has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault or larceny is a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with intellectual disability.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree upon the same incident of assault or larceny, as the case may be, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all such offenses upon the same information.

(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 77-422, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 18, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 29; P.A. 99-122, S. 2; 99-186, S. 15; P.A. 01-84, S. 6, 26; P.A. 11-129, S. 12.)

History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to require that two years of sentence imposed must be served, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree”, where appearing, added Subsec. (a)(2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add “or larceny”, effective July 1, 2001; (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186); P.A. 11-129 substituted “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and “person with mental retardation” and made conforming changes.

See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability.

Cited. 180 C. 557; 199 C. 146; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282; 223 C. 243; 230 C. 400. Subsec. (a)(1): Subdiv. is unconstitutionally overinclusive because it can be applied to assaults that have no reasonable and substantial relation to the statute's purpose of protecting those who have a diminished capacity to defend themselves or who are particularly vulnerable to injury, but Subdiv. can be constitutionally applied to an assault on a person with a physical disability that (1) diminishes the ability of the person, or a part or organ of the person, to function properly, thereby limiting the person's ability to perform life's activities, and (2) diminishes the person's ability to defend himself from assault or renders him particularly vulnerable to injury. 340 C. 463.

Cited. 5 CA 594; 13 CA 133; Id., 420; 33 CA 616; 44 CA 307.

Sec. 53a-60c. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree with a firearm when such person commits assault in the second degree with a firearm under section 53a-60a and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with intellectual disability.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or assault in the second degree with a firearm and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree with a firearm upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all of such offenses upon the same information.

(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 77-422, S. 3; P.A. 80-442, S. 19, 28; P.A. 99-122, S. 3; 99-186, S. 16; P.A. 11-129, S. 13.)

History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that three years of sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree with a firearm” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm”, where appearing, added Subsec. (a)(2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree with a firearm” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree with a firearm” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186); P.A. 11-129 substituted “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and “person with mental retardation” and made conforming changes.

Cited. 180 C. 557; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 5 CA 590.

Sec. 53a-60d. Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug.

(b) Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class D felony and the court shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty under this section for one year. The court shall also order such person not to operate any motor vehicle that is not equipped with an approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j, for a period of two years after such person's operator's license or nonresident operating privilege is restored by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

(P.A. 82-403, S. 2; P.A. 83-534, S. 9; P.A. 85-147, S. 2; P.A. 08-150, S. 60.)

History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted “while intoxicated” from the title of the offense and a provision that defined “intoxication” to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and replaced elements of offense of “when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes serious physical injury to another person” with “when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug”; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (b) to require court to order a person found guilty not to operate any motor vehicle that is not equipped with an approved ignition interlock device for a period of two years after restoration of such person's operator's license or nonresident operating privilege.

See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.

See Sec. 14-227o re discount for ignition interlock device services.

Cited. 219 C. 752; 222 C. 672; 224 C. 730; 226 C. 191; 230 C. 572. Nothing said in General Assembly proceeding concerning an amendment to section to remedy an unrelated aspect changed the rule of law; judgment of Appellate Court in 33 CA 232 reversed. 232 C. 1.

Cited. 5 CA 590; 9 CA 686; 16 CA 472; 21 CA 138; 22 CA 142; 23 CA 215; Id., 720; 25 CA 282; 26 CA 805; 32 CA 553; 33 CA 232; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1; 34 CA 557; Id., 655; 36 CA 710; 38 CA 282; 40 CA 359. Nothing in Sec. 14-227a prohibits evidence of consciousness of guilt based on defendant's refusal to take a breath test being considered in a prosecution under this section. 63 CA 433.

Sec. 53a-61. Assault in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.

(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which may not be suspended or reduced.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 62; P.A. 86-287, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 30.)

History: P.A. 86-287 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subsec. (a)(3) to reflect preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1).

See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a).

Cited. 170 C. 162; 171 C. 264; 173 C. 254; 184 C. 157; 189 C. 1; 190 C. 428; 194 C. 347; Id., 408; 196 C. 430; 198 C. 190; 200 C. 544; 202 C. 520; Id., 629; 205 C. 352; 209 C. 23; Id., 52; 222 C. 299; Id., 331; 227 C. 677; 228 C. 487; Id., 582; 233 C. 813; 234 C. 78.

Cited. 1 CA 697; 5 CA 590; 6 CA 189; 8 CA 545; 9 CA 59; Id., 631; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352; 11 CA 499; 12 CA 221; Id., 585; 13 CA 708; 14 CA 526; 17 CA 234; 20 CA 6; Id., 75; 21 CA 411; 24 CA 57; Id., 556; 25 CA 421; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 299; Id., 472; 26 CA 157; Id., 439; 27 CA 786; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 29 CA 524; Id., 683; 30 CA 346; 31 CA 497; 35 CA 107; 36 CA 106; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78; 37 CA 338; Id., 733; 39 CA 810; 40 CA 805; 41 CA 47; 42 CA 810; 43 CA 76; 45 CA 282; 46 CA 131.

Cited. 37 CS 664; 39 CS 347; 41 CS 505.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 248; 180 C. 167; Id., 557; 182 C. 353; 184 C. 366; 185 C. 63; 189 C. 114; 193 C. 48; 194 C. 119; 195 C. 232; 197 C. 115; 198 C. 147; 206 C. 40; Id., 657; 210 C. 110; 211 C. 672; 219 C. 160; 220 C. 487; 222 C. 444; 223 C. 41; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 519. Judgment of Appellate Court in 28 CA 581 reversed. 226 C. 601. Cited. 228 C. 610. Subdiv. (2) is lesser included offense of Sec. 53a-59(a)(3), and court's refusal to grant related jury instruction constituted harmful error. 289 C. 742.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 5 CA 40; 6 CA 407; 7 CA 27; Id., 257; 10 CA 330; Id., 709; 11 CA 102; 12 CA 655; 13 CA 386; Id., 667; 19 CA 554; 20 CA 101; 23 CA 663; 24 CA 518; 26 CA 114; Id., 259; Id., 331; 27 CA 322; Id., 322; 29 CA 704; 33 CA 126; 35 CA 51; 38 CA 193; 39 CA 419; Id., 832; 41 CA 565; 42 CA 445; Id., 768; 45 CA 591. This is not a cognizable offense and therefore not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the first degree. 56 CA 592.

Cited. 37 CS 520. Subdiv. (2): Elements of Sec. 53a-64 are so consistent with elements of Subdiv. that the court is precluded by principles of double jeopardy from entering a finding of guilty as to both charges; defendant's recklessly placing his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period of time constituted “serious physical injury”. 46 CS 130. It is possible to prove assault in the third degree without necessarily proving risk of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the third degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.

Sec. 53a-61a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the third degree when such person commits assault in the third degree under section 53a-61 and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with intellectual disability.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the third degree and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the third degree upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which shall not be suspended or reduced.

(P.A. 77-422, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 31; P.A. 99-122, S. 4; 99-186, S. 17; P.A. 11-129, S. 14.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence to reflect preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the third degree” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the third degree”, where appearing, added Subsec. (a)(2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the third degree” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the third degree” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186); P.A. 11-129 substituted “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and “person with mental retardation” and made conforming changes.

See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence.

See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability.

Court, in sentencing defendant convicted under section, must impose a 1-year mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557. Cited. 216 C. 282.

Cited. 5 CA 590; 12 CA 239; 13 CA 420; 16 CA 318; 21 CA 248; 29 CA 524; 31 CA 312; 32 CA 178.

Secs. 53a-61b to 53a-61z. Reserved for future use.

Sec. 53a-61aa. Threatening in the first degree: Class D or class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person (1) (A) threatens to commit any crime involving the use of a hazardous substance with the intent to terrorize another person, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, evacuation or inconvenience; (2) (A) threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience; (3) commits threatening in the second degree as provided in section 53a-62, and in the commission of such offense such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm; or (4) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection with the intent to cause an evacuation of a building or the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section 19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities. No person shall be found guilty of threatening in the first degree under subdivision (3) of this subsection and threatening in the second degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “hazardous substance” means any physical, chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity, concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health and “religiously-affiliated community center” means real property used for the provision of recreational, social or educational services that is owned or leased by a nonprofit organization that holds such property out as being affiliated with an organized religion.

(c) Threatening in the first degree is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section is a class C felony.

(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 7, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 15; P.A. 03-22, S. 1; P.A. 12-114, S. 10; P.A. 16-67, S. 6; P.A. 17-111, S. 3.)

History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to delete in Subdivs. (1) and (2) provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence; P.A. 03-22 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing elements of crime as Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B), respectively, and adding new Subdiv. (2) to restore provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience; P.A. 12-114 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (3) re commission of threatening in the second degree with a firearm and add provisions re charges and prosecution for threatening in the first degree under Subdiv. (3) and threatening in the second degree upon the same information; P.A. 16-67 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re violation with intent to cause evacuation of preschool, school or institution of higher education, amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re class C felony for violation of Subsec. (a)(4) and made technical changes; P.A. 17-111 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to house of religious worship, religiously-affiliated community center and day care center, amended Subsec. (b) to add definition of “religiously-affiliated community center”, and made technical and conforming changes.

See Sec. 52-557t re defense to civil action.

See Sec. 54-130g re pardon.

Subsec. (a)(3): Neither the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution nor the state constitution require that the state prove that defendant had the specific intent to terrorize the target of a threat, only that defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the target of the threat would be terrorized, before defendant can be punished for threatening speech directed at a private individual. 330 C. 149. Subsec. (a)(3): Section is not unconstitutional under the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the state constitution as applied to threatening speech directed at public officials. Id. Subsec. (a)(3): Defendant may be punished for threatening speech directed at a third party if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk both that defendant's speech would be interpreted as a serious threat and that the threat would be communicated to the target of the threat. Id.

Sec. 53a-62. Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2) (A) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (B) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, or (3) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection and the person threatened is in a building or on the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section 19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “religiously-affiliated community center” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-61aa.

(c) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16; P.A. 16-67, S. 7; P.A. 17-111, S. 4.)

History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing “threatening” with “threatening in the second degree” where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, delete Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and delete Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, said provisions being reenacted as part of Sec. 53a-61aa by same act, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re a person, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person and add Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror; P.A. 16-67 amended Subsec. (a) by redesignating existing Subdiv. (2) as Subdiv. (2)(A), redesignating existing Subdiv. (3) as Subdiv. (2)(B) and adding new Subdiv. (3) re person threatened is at a preschool, school or institution of higher education and amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re class D felony for violation of Subsec. (a)(3); P.A. 17-111 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to house of religious worship, religiously-affiliated community center and day care center, added new Subsec. (b) defining “religiously-affiliated community center”, redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), and made technical and conforming changes.

See Sec. 54-130g re pardon.

Cited. 175 C. 204; 182 C. 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 193 C. 602; 195 C. 636; 201 C. 115; 202 C. 343; 205 C. 262; 207 C. 565; 208 C. 689; 209 C. 34; Id., 52; 222 C. 331; 224 C. 494; 227 C. 829; 241 C. 413; 242 C. 648.

Cited. 2 CA 617; 3 CA 289; 8 CA 190; Id., 496; 9 CA 161; 14 CA 6; Id., 526; 25 CA 149; Id., 334; 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; Id., 708; 31 CA 497; 33 CA 103; 40 CA 805; 41 CA 47. Words of defendant's threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of “imminent” serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.

Cited. 37 CS 664; 42 CS 574; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 566; 197 C. 485; 201 C. 462. Judgment of Appellate Court in 28 CA 581 reversed. 226 C. 601. Cited. 227 C. 153; 228 C. 147; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 403. Subdiv. (3): Statements made that “more of what happened to your son is going to happen to you” and “I'm going to be there to watch it happen”, when spoken to one whose son had suffered serious physical injuries, did not constitute a true threat due to subsequent apology and lack of other animosity between the parties; to ensure that only serious expressions of an intention to commit an act of unlawful violence are punished, as the first amendment requires, state must do more than demonstrate that a statement could be interpreted as a threat. 313 C. 434. Imminence is only one factor for a court to consider in determining whether a statement constitutes a true threat under section, and not a requirement. 327 C. 1. Subsec. is divisible, with offenses requiring proof of an intentional mental state under Subdivs. (1) and (2) and recklessness under Subdiv. (3); threatening offense committed with reckless disregard under Subdiv. (3) does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude under Second Circuit case law and for purposes of immigration consequences. 328 C. 198.

Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Cited. 11 CA 80; 13 CA 386; Id., 438; 18 CA 643; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; 35 CA 262; 37 CA 276; Id., 733; 38 CA 306; Id., 777; 39 CA 617; 40 CA 515; 41 CA 584; Id., 701. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally vague on its face; statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case; there is no indication that legislature did not intend to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). 81 CA 248. Convictions for threatening in second degree in violation of Subdivs. (1) and (2) did not violate right against double jeopardy because each conviction arose from a different violation. 154 CA 45. Subdiv. (3): Objective standard for true threats doctrine remains valid and subdivision is constitutionally sound. 185 CA 287; judgment affirmed, see 337 C. 92.

Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person.

(b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 64.)

Cited. 179 C. 617; 194 C. 408; 200 C. 607; 226 C. 497; 233 C. 502; 238 C. 313; 241 C. 413; 242 C. 648.

Cited. 2 CA 617; 3 CA 163; 8 CA 496; Id., 631; 32 CA 84; 33 CA 103; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 41 CA 47; 43 CA 578; 44 CA 6. Under section, jury has to consider objectively the nature and degree of the risk and defendant's subjective awareness of that risk. 75 CA 432.

Cited. 39 CS 347; Id., 359; 42 CS 574.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 227 C. 301; 237 C. 348.

Cited. 3 CA 289; 8 CA 153; 10 CA 659; 18 CA 477; 24 CA 330; 26 CA 145; 40 CA 515; Id., 643; 42 CA 768; 45 CA 369. Defendant's conduct in pointing gun at police officers, even though gun was not racked, and struggling with them in crowded bar was sufficient to constitute reckless endangerment; danger engendered by defendant's conduct arose from distinct potential that others in bar would fire their weapons and result in serious injury to officers or bystanders. 141 CA 377; judgment affirmed, see 317 C. 845.

Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.

(b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 65.)

Cited. 194 C. 408; 223 C. 618.

Cited. 3 CA 166; 8 CA 342; 14 CA 6; Id., 10; Id., 804; 23 CA 123; 24 CA 662; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 618; 31 CA 497.

Cited. 35 CS 570; 37 CS 661; 38 CS 619; 40 CA 643. Defendant's recklessly placing his hands around victim's throat and causing her to lose consciousness for a brief period of time constituted “serious physical injury” in violation of statute. 46 CS 130.

Secs. 53a-64a to 53a-64z. Reserved for future use.

Sec. 53a-64aa. Strangulation or suffocation in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of strangulation or suffocation in the first degree when such person commits strangulation or suffocation in the second degree as provided in section 53a-64bb and (1) in the commission of such offense, such person (A) uses or attempts to use a dangerous instrument, or (B) causes serious physical injury to such other person, or (2) such person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or section 53a-64bb.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of strangulation or suffocation in the first degree and unlawful restraint or assault upon the same incident, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all three offenses upon the same information. For the purposes of this section, “unlawful restraint” means a violation of section 53a-95 or 53a-96, and “assault” means a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-59b, 53a-59c, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-61 or 53a-61a.

(P.A. 07-123, S. 8; P.A. 17-31, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 17-31 added references to suffocation.

Sec. 53a-64bb. Strangulation or suffocation in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of strangulation or suffocation in the second degree when such person restrains another person by the neck or throat or obstructs such other person's nose or mouth with the intent to impede the ability of such other person to breathe or restrict blood circulation of such other person and such person impedes the ability of such other person to breathe or restricts blood circulation of such other person.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of strangulation or suffocation in the second degree and unlawful restraint or assault upon the same incident, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all three offenses upon the same information. For the purposes of this section, “unlawful restraint” means a violation of section 53a-95 or 53a-96, and “assault” means a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-59b, 53a-59c, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-61 or 53a-61a.

(P.A. 07-123, S. 9; P.A. 17-31, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 17-31 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re obstruction of nose or mouth and added reference to suffocation.

The “same incident” prohibition was included by the legislature in Subsec. (b) rather than Subsec. (a) because the provision is not intended to set forth an element of the crime, but, rather, to express legislative intentions relating specifically to double jeopardy. 339 C. 452.

Prohibition on multiple convictions arising out of the same incident in Subsec. (b) does not apply when convictions stem from wholly separate criminal conduct by defendant even if committed against the same victim on the same day. 142 CA 657. Facts presented did not allow for combined convictions of strangulation in the second degree under Subsec. (b), unlawful restraint in the first degree under Sec. 53a-95 and assault in the third degree under Sec. 53a-61(a)(1). 149 CA 334.

Sec. 53a-64cc. Strangulation or suffocation in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of strangulation or suffocation in the third degree when such person recklessly restrains another person by the neck or throat or obstructs such other person's nose or mouth and impedes the ability of such other person to breathe or restricts blood circulation of such other person.

(b) No person shall be found guilty of strangulation or suffocation in the third degree and unlawful restraint or assault upon the same incident, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all three offenses upon the same information. For the purposes of this section, “unlawful restraint” means a violation of section 53a-95 or 53a-96, and “assault” means a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-59b, 53a-59c, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-61 or 53a-61a.

(P.A. 07-123, S. 10; P.A. 17-31, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 17-31 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re obstruction of nose or mouth and added references to suffocation.

PART VI*

SEX OFFENSES

*Cited. 192 C. 154; 202 C. 333; 230 C. 43.

Cited. 35 CA 173.

Sec. 53a-65. Definitions. As used in this part, the following terms have the following meanings:

(1) “Actor” means a person accused of sexual assault.

(2) “Sexual intercourse” means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal opening of the victim's body.

(3) “Sexual contact” means any contact with the intimate parts of a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person.

(4) “Impaired because of mental disability or disease” means that a person suffers from a mental disability or disease which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct.

(5) “Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling such person's conduct owing to the influence of a drug or intoxicating substance administered to such person without such person's consent, or owing to any other act committed upon such person without such person's consent.

(6) “Physically helpless” means that a person is (A) unconscious, or (B) for any other reason, is physically unable to resist an act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact or to communicate unwillingness to an act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact.

(7) “Use of force” means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.

(8) “Intimate parts” means the genital area or any substance emitted therefrom, groin, anus or any substance emitted therefrom, inner thighs, buttocks or breasts.

(9) “Psychotherapist” means a physician, psychologist, nurse, substance abuse counselor, social worker, clergyman, marital and family therapist, mental health service provider, hypnotist or other person, whether or not licensed or certified by the state, who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.

(10) “Psychotherapy” means the professional treatment, assessment or counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition.

(11) “Emotionally dependent” means that the nature of the patient's or former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the patient or former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist.

(12) “Therapeutic deception” means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part of the patient's treatment.

(13) “School employee” means: (A) A teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator, school superintendent, guidance counselor, school counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, school paraprofessional or coach employed by a local or regional board of education or a private elementary, middle or high school or working in a public or private elementary, middle or high school; or (B) any other person who, in the performance of his or her duties, has regular contact with students and who provides services to or on behalf of students enrolled in (i) a public elementary, middle or high school, pursuant to a contract with the local or regional board of education, or (ii) a private elementary, middle or high school, pursuant to a contract with the supervisory agent of such private school.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 66; P.A. 75-619, S. 1; P.A. 81-27, S. 2; P.A. 85-341, S. 1; P.A. 87-259; P.A. 92-260, S. 32; P.A. 93-340, S. 1; P.A. 94-221, S. 17; P.A. 06-11, S. 1; 06-107, S. 1; 06-187, S. 45; P.A. 09-242, S. 1; P.A. 13-47, S. 3; P.A. 18-15, S. 12; P.A. 19-189, S. 21.)

History: P.A. 75-619 deleted definitions of “deviate sexual intercourse”, “female” and “forcible compulsion”, added definitions of “actor”, “use of force” and “intimate parts”, redefined “sexual intercourse” in detail where previously defined as having “its ordinary meaning” and made minor changes in wording of remaining definitions; P.A. 81-27 exempted section 53a-70b from applicability of definitions in this section; P.A. 85-341 amended definition of sexual contact to include “contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor”; P.A. 87-259 amended definition of sexual contact to include contact made for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in the definition of sexual intercourse by repositioning language; P.A. 93-340 added definitions of “psychotherapist”, “psychotherapy”, “emotionally dependent” and “therapeutic deception”; P.A. 94-221 added the definition of “school employee”; P.A. 06-11 redefined “intimate parts” to include any substance emitted from the genital area or anus; P.A. 06-107 and P.A. 06-187 both redefined “psychotherapist” to include a hypnotist; P.A. 09-242 redefined “school employee” in Subdiv. (13) to designate existing provisions as Subpara. (A) and amend same by replacing “elementary or secondary school” with “elementary, middle or high school”, and to add Subpara. (B) re a person who has regular contact with students and provides services to or on behalf of students enrolled in a public or private elementary, middle or high school pursuant to a contract; P.A. 13-47 amended Subdiv. (4) by substituting definition of “impaired because of mental disability or disease” for definition of “mentally defective”, and amended Subdiv. (6) to redefine “physically helpless” by inserting Subpara. (A) and (B) designators and adding provisions re person physically unable to resist an act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact; P.A. 18-15 redefined “school employee” in Subdiv. (13)(A) to include school counselor, effective July 1, 2018; P.A. 19-189 amended introductory language by deleting exception for Sec. 53a-70b, redefined “sexual intercourse” in Subdiv. (2), and redefined “sexual contact” in Subdiv. (3).

Cited. 170 C. 111. Statute includes definition of sexual intercourse and provides that “penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio”; it specifically omits cunnilingus, therefore penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757. Cited. 187 C. 216; 191 C. 453; 192 C. 154; 198 C. 190; 210 C. 110.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 11 CA 102; Id., 316; 33 CA 133; 35 CA 173. Smacking victim's buttocks considered to be sexual contact. 59 CA 538.

Subdiv. (2):

Court properly defined the term “cunnilingus” since statute contained no specific definitions; penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757. Cited. 194 C. 258; 198 C. 285; Id., 617; 201 C. 211; 202 C. 509; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 733; 211 C. 18; 224 C. 397; 226 C. 618. Penetration of the labia majora constitutes vaginal penetration. 252 C. 795. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517. Adequate notice exists that penetration of the vagina includes penetration of the labia majora, and for purposes of the definition of “sexual intercourse”, the two acts are one and the same. 301 C. 122.

Cited. 7 CA 489; Id., 701; 14 CA 451; 23 CA 712; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656. Withdrawal of consent communicated to the other person followed by a compelling use of force to continue sexual intercourse would constitute sexual assault. 35 CA 173. Cited. 38 CA 56; 41 CA 139; Id., 287; 43 CA 785. Applies least penetration doctrine. 50 CA 715.

Subdiv. (3):

Cited. 191 C. 604; 199 C. 121; 205 C. 386; 224 C. 397; Id., 656.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 8 CA 607; 15 CA 251; 20 CA 694; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; 28 CA 402; 30 CA 281; 31 CA 452.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 198 C. 53; 205 C. 386.

Uncontradicted evidence that complainant could communicate using nonverbal methods, including screeching, biting, kicking and scratching, and lack of evidence that complainant was unable to use these forms of communication at time of alleged assault, preclude finding that complainant was “physically helpless” under section. 118 CA 43; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 186. Evidence was sufficient to show victim was “physically helpless”, even though she was able to communicate during earlier stages of assault but could not physically or verbally communicate her lack of consent during later penile-vaginal intercourse. 180 CA 799.

Subdiv. (7):

Cited. 189 C. 611; 202 C. 509; 205 C. 386; 228 C. 552.

Cited. 7 CA 489; 14 CA 40; Id., 451; 16 CA 75; 18 CA 694; 21 CA 411; 30 CA 281.

Subdiv. (8):

Cited. 191 C. 604; 207 C. 456.

Cited. 20 CA 694; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 395; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; 28 CA 402.

Sec. 53a-66. Lack of consent. Section 53a-66 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 67; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)

Sec. 53a-67. Affirmative defenses. (a) In any prosecution for an offense under this part based on the victim's being mentally incapacitated, physically helpless or impaired because of mental disability or disease, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162; P.A. 13-47, S. 4; P.A. 19-189, S. 22.)

History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under 14, relettering Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under Sec. 53a-70b; P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 13-47 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute “impaired because of mental disability or disease” for “mentally defective”; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.

Cited. 192 C. 154; 198 C. 190; 202 C. 86.

Cited. 3 CA 374.

Subsec. (b):

Discussion of “cohabitation” and burden of producing evidence thereof for entitlement to a charge on the affirmative defense under statute. 181 C. 426. Cited. 209 C. 733; 233 C. 813.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 10 CA 709; 11 CA 102; 25 CA 384; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 41 CA 604.

Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint. Sections 53a-68 and 53a-69 are repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 69, 70; P.A. 74-131; P.A. 76-216; P.A. 87-223.)

Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse.

(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the offense is a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age or the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section. Any person found guilty under said subdivision (1) or (2) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age or of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under sixteen years of age.

(3) Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least ten years, a portion of which may be suspended, except as provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, or a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of section 53a-29 and except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a court may suspend a portion of a sentence imposed under this subsection and impose a period of supervised probation pursuant to subsection (f) of section 53a-29.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 71; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 19; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 78; P.A. 75-619, S. 3; P.A. 82-428, S. 2; P.A. 89-359; P.A. 92-87, S. 3; P.A. 93-340, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 13; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 49; P.A. 00-161, S. 1; P.A. 02-138, S. 5; P.A. 15-211, S. 16.)

History: 1971 act replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators in Subsec. (a) with numeric indicators; 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(1) from 21 to 18 reflecting lowered age of majority; P.A. 75-619 reworded section to reflect changes in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, substituted sexual “assault” for sexual “misconduct” and made the offense a Class B rather than Class D felony; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that 1 year of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 89-359 added Subsec. (a)(2) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person under 13 years of age; P.A. 92-87 added Subsec. (a)(3) re committing sexual assault in the second degree while aided by two or more other persons actually present; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to require that the actor be more than 2 years older than the other person; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that 10 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under 10 years of age; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from 1 year to 2 years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence imposed when the victim is other than a victim under 10 years of age and to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of at least 10 years; P.A. 00-161 added Subsec. (a)(4) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was formerly classified as sexual assault in the second degree under Sec. 53a-71(a)(2) but was deleted from said section by same public act; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re classification of offense and length of nonsuspendable sentence as Subdiv. (1) and amending said Subdiv. to add exception re Subdiv. (2), adding new Subdiv. (2) to classify the offense as a class A felony for a violation of Subsec. (a)(1) when the victim is under 16 years of age and for a violation of Subsec. (a)(2) and establish a nonsuspendable sentence for said violations of 10 years if the victim is under 10 years of age and 5 years if the victim is under 16 years of age and designating existing provisions re minimum length of a combined sentence of imprisonment and special parole as Subdiv. (3); P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (b)(3) to add provision re term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, a portion of which may be suspended, and exception and add provision re suspension of sentence and imposition of period of supervised probation.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; Id., 398; 182 C. 412; 184 C. 258; 186 C. 45; Id., 449; Id., 521; 187 C. 216; 190 C. 20; 191 C. 604; 192 C. 154; 194 C. 114; Id., 297; Id., 692; 195 C. 253; 197 C. 280; Id., 298. Does not include sexual intercourse with a victim whom the assailant finds unconscious but does not apply when assailant strangled victim into a state of unconsciousness. 198 C. 53. Cited. Id., 190; 199 C. 121; Id., 193; Id., 281; Id., 481; Id., 693; 201 C. 115; Id., 659; 202 C. 343; Id., 676; 204 C. 98; Id., 441; Id., 571; 205 C. 61; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 733; 210 C. 110. Section not void for vagueness in context of circumstances of case. Id., 132. Cited. 211 C. 672; 212 C. 31; 215 C. 257. Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. Id., 538. Cited. 219 C. 489; 220 C. 112; Id., 345; 222 C. 556; 223 C. 180; Id., 731; 224 C. 397; Id., 656; Id., 663; 226 C. 601; Id., 618; 227 C. 207; Id., 616; Id., 677; 228 C. 456; 230 C. 43; 235 C. 711; 238 C. 389; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 409; Id., 689. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517.

Cited. 1 CA 344; Id., 378; Id., 724; 3 CA 148; Id., 374; Id., 650; 5 CA 424; Id., 556; Id., 586; 7 CA 257; Id., 701; 8 CA 44; Id., 190; Id., 216; Id., 345; Id., 399; Id., 528; Id., 620; 10 CA 457; Id., 520; Id., 709. Court concluded the absence of a marital relationship between defendant and victim is not an essential element. 11 CA 102; Id., 112; Id., 236; Id., 238; Id., 316. Cited. 12 CA 585; 13 CA 413; 14 CA 333; Id., 688; 15 CA 251; 16 CA 75; 17 CA 391; 18 CA 134; 19 CA 111; 20 CA 737; 22 CA 531; Id., 562; 23 CA 1; Id., 221; Id., 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 24 CA 13; Id., 24; Id., 295; 25 CA 334; Id., 503; Id., 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 151; Id., 433; Id., 674; 28 CA 548; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 29 CA 642; 32 CA 773; 34 CA 276; 35 CA 173; Id., 754; 36 CA 177; 38 CA 56; Id., 777; 39 CA 267; 40 CA 553; 41 CA 604; 43 CA 715; 44 CA 548; 46 CA 741. Intent or motive of sexual assault perpetrators discussed. 47 CA 159. Age of victim not an element of crime for which jury makes a factual determination but a sentencing factor determined by the courts. 74 CA 376. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. Because the necessary elements of this section and Sec. 53-21 are distinct, court's respective findings of not guilty and guilty of these distinct crimes was not legally inconsistent. 78 CA 25. Trial court's finding that the state had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had committed sexual assault in the first degree and thereby violated his probation was not clearly erroneous and was supported by the evidence. 108 CA 250. Sexual assault in the fourth degree is not a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the first degree; convictions under this section and Sec. 53a-73a do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because they are separate and distinct crimes and each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not. 171 CA 530.

Cited. 41 CS 229; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 179 C. 328; 180 C. 101; Id., 565; 182 C. 449; 185 C. 163; Id., 402; 186 C. 757; 187 C. 681; 188 C. 372; Id., 565; Id., 574; Id., 697; 189 C. 106; Id., 611; Id., 631; 190 C. 104; Id., 327; Id., 440; Id., 496; 191 C. 604; 192 C. 166; 193 C. 457; 194 C. 258; Id., 594; Id., 692; 197 C. 50; Id., 485; 198 C. 53; Id., 190; Id., 285; Id., 314; Id., 405; Id., 430; Id., 598; Id., 617; 199 C. 62; Id., 399; Id., 481; 201 C. 559; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; 203 C. 385; 204 C. 714; 206 C. 39; Id., 132; Id., 437; Id., 528; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 143; Id., 416; 210 C. 51; Id., 110; Id., 315; Id., 359; 211 C. 18; 212 C. 31; 213 C. 593; 214 C. 38; Id., 717. Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. 215 C. 538. Cited. 216 C. 563; 218 C. 447; 219 C. 269; Id., 283; Id., 489; 220 C. 400; Id., 487; Id., 698; 221 C. 264; 222 C. 87; 223 C. 52; 225 C. 450; Id., 519; 226 C. 601; Id., 618; 227 C. 616; 228 C. 393; Id., 456; Id., 552; Id., 582; Id., 756; 229 C. 529; Id., 557; Id., 580; 230 C. 43; 231 C. 195; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 403; 235 C. 145; Id., 502; Id., 659; 237 C. 284; Id., 576; Id., 694; 241 C. 784; Id., 823; 242 C. 409; Id., 445; Id., 523. Medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1.

Cited. 1 CA 344; Id., 724; 4 CA 514; Id., 672; 7 CA 149; Id., 489; Id., 653; 8 CA 35; Id., 148; Id., 177; Id., 387; Id., 528; Id., 620; 9 CA 208; Id., 340; 10 CA 217; Id., 709; 11 CA 102; Id., 316; Id., 673; 13 CA 60; Id., 67; Id., 76; 14 CA 40; Id., 451; Id., 657; Id., 688; Id., 710; 15 CA 222; 16 CA 75; 17 CA 525; 18 CA 134; Id., 273; Id., 643; Id., 730; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; Id., 618; Id., 631; 20 CA 101; Id., 193; Id., 737; 21 CA 411; Id., 467; 22 CA 329; Id., 477; 23 CA 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 25 CA 243; Id., 384; Id., 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; Id., 725; 26 CA 81; Id., 395; Id., 433; Id., 574; 27 CA 279; Id., 705; 28 CA 91; Id., 195; Id., 360; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 529; Id., 402; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 29 CA 409; Id., 724; 30 CA 56; Id., 281; Id., 523; Id., 915; 32 CA 178; Id., 217; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; Id., 457; 34 CA 276; 35 CA 173; Id., 728; 36 CA 177; Id., 190; Id., 216; Id., 228; Id., 641; Id., 695; 38 CA 56; Id., 100; Id., 125; Id., 231; Id., 531; Id., 777; 39 CA 45; Id., 617; Id., 742; Id., 832; 40 CA 132; Id., 233; Id., 250; 41 CA 139; Id., 204; Id., 255; Id., 287; Id., 317; 42 CA 78; Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823; Id., 445; 43 CA 552; Id., 680; Id., 704; Id., 715; Id., 785; 44 CA 457; Id., 548; 45 CA 66; Id., 116; Id., 289; Id., 756; 46 CA 810. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in commenting on testimony of state's expert witness concerning inconsistencies in results of victim's rape kit tests, that court having also instructed jury to base findings on recollection of all evidence presented; defendant's challenge to other aspects of instructions on scientific evidence were not properly preserved for appellate review; trial court properly admitted victim's written statement to police as constancy of accusation evidence; defendant failed to establish that court abused its discretion or that he was prejudiced by admission of that evidence, and his claim that victim's statement is admissible only if tape recorded was incorrect. 48 CA 135. Subdiv. (1): Trier of fact reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant compelled victim to engage in sexual intercourse by use of force. 52 CA 466. Subdiv. (1): Defendant could not succeed in argument that the evidence did not support a guilty verdict under section; jury could reasonably have concluded that the facts and inferences established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 55 CA 412. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 58 CA 585. Evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201. Subdiv. (1): Sexual assault in the second degree was not a lesser offense included within sexual assault in the first degree because it would be possible to commit the latter offense in the manner described in the information and bill of particulars without committing the former offense. 99 CA 251. Subdiv. (2) and Sec. 53-21(a)(2) are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 118 CA 180. Under Subdiv. (4), state need not show that any specific or identifiable drug or intoxicating substance had been administered to the victim without her consent, only that the victim was under the influence of some drug or intoxicating substance; criminal liability under Subdiv. (4) does not require a showing that the criminal actor administered the drug or intoxicating substance at issue or that the criminal actor knew, or had reason to know, that the victim was mentally incapacitated. 136 CA 731. Subdiv. (2): The age difference of more than 2 years between the complainant and the perpetrator of the sexual assault is an essential element; where the victim of the assault was 12 years old at the time of the assault and the state provided evidence that defendant was married and the father of a 3 year old child at the time and the jury had the opportunity to view defendant, the state presented sufficient evidence of defendant's age. 160 CA 61.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 207 C. 412, 416. Issue of whether victims were less than 10 years of age was a question for jury to decide during guilt phase of trial except in this case, where court decided issue of age in sentencing process, error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 271 C. 499. Under 2001 revision, as amended by P.A. 02-138, S. 5, Subdiv. (3) does not mandate that persons convicted of first degree sexual assault be sentenced to a period of imprisonment and special parole; it provides, rather, that if the court elects to impose such a sentence, the total combined period of imprisonment and special parole must total at least 10 years. 320 C. 239. Under 2005 revision, Subdiv. (3) requires only that any period of special parole that may be imposed shall, along with the accompanying term of imprisonment, constitute a total sentence of not less than 10 years. Id., 259.

Cited. 23 CA 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400.

Sec. 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony. (a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70, and in the commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a deadly weapon, (2) with intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of the victim's body, such person causes such injury to such victim, (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life such person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to the victim, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such victim, or (4) such person is aided by two or more other persons actually present. No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and aggravated sexual assault in the first degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony. Any person found guilty under this section of a class B felony shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least ten years, five years of which may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(2) Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age. Any person found guilty under this section of a class A felony shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, except that, if such person committed sexual assault in the first degree by violating subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-70, and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, twenty years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of section 53a-29 and except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a court may suspend a portion of a sentence imposed under this subdivision and impose a period of probation pursuant to subsection (f) of section 53a-29, or may impose a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28.

(P.A. 75-619, S. 9; P.A. 80-442, S. 20, 28; P.A. 87-246; P.A. 92-87, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 50; P.A. 02-138, S. 6; P.A. 15-211, S. 17.)

History: P.A. 80-442 substituted “deadly weapon” for “firearm” and reference to specific firearms where occurring and increased portion of sentence which may not be suspended or reduced from 1 year to 5 years in Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 87-246 changed the name of the offense from sexual assault in the first degree with a deadly weapon to aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and added Subsec. (a)(2) re disfiguring the victim or destroying, amputating or disabling a member or organ of the victim and (a)(3) re recklessly engaging in conduct creating a risk of death to the victim and thereby causing serious physical injury to the victim; P.A. 92-87 added Subsec. (a)(4) re commission of the offense while aided by two or more other persons actually present; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of 20 years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class A felony if the victim is under 16 years of age, add exception re 20-year nonsuspendable sentence if the violation is of Sec. 53a-70(a)(1) and the victim is under 16 years of age and replace provision that a person found guilty shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole “which together constitute a sentence of twenty years” with provision that a person found guilty shall be sentenced to a period of special parole “of at least five years”; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (b) to designate existing provision re class B felony as Subdiv. (1) and amend same to add reference to Subdiv. (2) and add provision re sentence of at least 10 years imprisonment, 5 years of which may not be suspended or reduced, to designate existing provision re class A felony as Subdiv. (2) and amend same to increase imprisonment from 5 years to 10 years and add provision re suspension of sentence and imposition of period of probation, and to make technical and conforming changes.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; 188 C. 697; 192 C. 154; 204 C. 240; 207 C. 412; 210 C. 110; Id., 315; 211 C. 672. Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. 215 C. 538. Cited. 240 C. 743.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 11 CA 102; 12 CA 179; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; 35 CA 173; 36 CA 805; 43 CA 715.

Cited. 43 CS 211.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 206 C. 40; 216 C. 282; 235 C. 502. 5-week-old fetus constitutes a part of the mother's body and, therefore, is a “member” of her body for purposes of Subdiv. (2). 263 C. 524.

Cited. 25 CA 725. For purposes of the offense described in Subdiv. (4), it is victim's objective and subjective awareness, and not perpetrator's physical proximity, that controls the factual determination as to whether perpetrator is “actually present”. 75 CA 578.

Subsec. (b):

Nothing in June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 suggests that special parole with 20-year maximum sentence provision applied retroactively. 153 CA 639.

Sec. 53a-70b. Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B felony. Section 53a-70b is repealed, effective October 1, 2019.

(P.A. 81-27, S. 1; P.A. 14-234, S. 9; P.A. 19-189, S. 44.)

Sec. 53a-70c. Aggravated sexual assault of a minor: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a minor when such person commits a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-86, 53a-87 or 53a-196a and the victim of such offense is under thirteen years of age, and (1) such person kidnapped or illegally restrained the victim, (2) such person stalked the victim, (3) such person used violence to commit such offense against the victim, (4) such person caused serious physical injury to or disfigurement of the victim, (5) there was more than one victim of such offense under thirteen years of age, (6) such person was not known to the victim, or (7) such person has previously been convicted of a violent sexual assault.

(b) Aggravated sexual assault of a minor is a class A felony and any person found guilty under this section shall, for a first offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, twenty-five years of which may not be suspended or reduced by the court and, for any subsequent offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifty years which may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 07-143, S. 3; P.A. 17-216, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 07-143 effective July 13, 2007; P.A. 17-216 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “imprisonment of twenty-five years which” with “imprisonment, twenty-five years of which”.

For purposes of double jeopardy, Secs. 53-21(a)(2) and 53a-70(a)(2) are essential elements of this section when they are charged as predicate offenses, therefore, the harms targeted by those sections necessarily coexist in every prosecution under this section in which those sections are alleged as predicate offenses; it is not clear from legislative history that legislature intended to specifically authorize cumulative convictions and sentences under this section and Secs. 53-21(a)(2) and 53a-70(a)(2). 170 CA 501.

Subsec. (a):

Subdivs. (1) and (6) constitute separately punishable offenses pursuant to test set forth in 284 U.S. 299; because Subdivs. (1) and (6) each require proof of a fact that the other does not, and because nothing in either the statutory text or legislative history of section reveals a contrary legislative intent, multiple convictions under section for the same transaction do not violate the double jeopardy clause. 319 C. 684.

Sec. 53a-71. Sexual assault in the second degree: Class C or B felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen years of age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more than three years older than such other person; or (2) such other person is impaired because of mental disability or disease to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse; or (3) such other person is physically helpless; or (4) such other person is less than eighteen years old and the actor is such person's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such person's welfare; or (5) such other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (6) the actor is a psychotherapist and such other person is (A) a patient of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs during the psychotherapy session, (B) a patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (7) the actor accomplishes the sexual intercourse by means of false representation that the sexual intercourse is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (8) the actor is a school employee and such other person is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor; or (9) the actor is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction and such other person is a recipient of coaching or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age; or (10) the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor's professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person's participation in a program or activity, and such other person is under eighteen years of age; or (11) such other person is placed or receiving services under the direction of the Commissioner of Developmental Services in any public or private facility or program and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person.

(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which nine months of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 72; P.A. 75-619, S. 4; P.A. 82-428, S. 3; P.A. 83-326, S. 1; P.A. 85-341, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 2; P.A. 94-221, S. 18; P.A. 00-161, S. 2; P.A. 02-106, S. 1; 02-138, S. 7; P.A. 04-130, S. 1; P.A. 07-143, S. 1; P.A. 11-113, S. 1; P.A. 13-47, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 75-619 restated Subsec. (a) to conform with changes made in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, referred to sexual “assault” rather than to sexual “misconduct” and made the offense a Class C felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that nine months of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated “to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse”, redesignated as Subdiv. (3) a victim who is “physically helpless” and renumbered the remaining Subdivs.; P.A. 85-341 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to increase the applicable age from 15 to 16 years; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to specify that the other person be 13 years of age or older and the actor be more than 2 years older than such person, added Subdivs. (6) and (7) re sexual intercourse between a psychotherapist and a patient or former patient and re sexual intercourse accomplished by false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 added Subsec. (a)(8) concerning school employees and students; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by deleting provision re the act of engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was reclassified as sexual assault in the first degree under Sec. 53a-70 by same public act, and by making a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 02-106 added Subsec. (a)(9) re sexual intercourse between a coach or instructor and a person who is a recipient of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting or under 18 years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class B felony if the victim is under 16 years of age; P.A. 04-130 added Subsec. (a)(10) re actor 20 years of age or older who stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under 18 years of age and engages in sexual intercourse with such other person; P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to increase the age differential from 2 to 3 years and make a technical change; P.A. 11-113 added Subsec. (a)(11) re actor who has supervisory or disciplinary authority over person placed or receiving services under direction of Commissioner of Developmental Services in any public or private facility or program and engages in sexual intercourse with such person; P.A. 13-47 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to substitute “impaired because of mental disability or disease” for “mentally defective”.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; 180 C. 54; 185 C. 199; 186 C. 45; 187 C. 73; Id., 348; 189 C. 321; 192 C. 154; 198 C. 53; 199 C. 47; 201 C. 211; 207 C. 374; 209 C. 225; 211 C. 455; 224 C. 1; 228 C. 393; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 409.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 11 CA 102; 13 CA 378; 14 CA 688; 15 CA 251; Id., 289; 25 CA 270; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1; 30 CA 527; 33 CA 133; 35 CA 173; Id., 754; 36 CA 383; 38 CA 56; 43 CA 715; 45 CA 116. Term “years” in Subsec. (a)(1) means periods of 365 or 356 days, not calendar years; Subsec. (a)(1) not void for vagueness as applied to defendant in this case despite lack of judicial gloss on meaning of “years” and does not violate defendant's right to equal protection. 47 CA 68. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Pursuant to Sec. 53-21(2), risk of injury to or impairing the morals of a child involves sexual contact with a child younger than the age of 16 years “in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child”; this section contains no such similar provision; risk of injury to a child, therefore, contains elements lacking in sexual assault in the second degree. 79 CA 591.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 180 C. 167; 181 C. 426; 182 C. 382; 188 C. 565; Id., 644. Subdiv. (3): Terms “responsibility” and “general supervision” discussed. 189 C. 321. Cited. 190 C. 84; 191 C. 453; 197 C. 666; 199 C. 481; 200 C. 440; Id., 734; 204 C. 187; 205 C. 386; Id., 528; 210 C. 51; Id., 244; Id., 359; 211 C. 185; Id., 555; 215 C. 653; 219 C. 283; 220 C. 345; 224 C. 656; 227 C. 207; 228 C. 552; Id., 610; 229 C. 580; Id., 839; 230 C. 43; 237 C. 321; 242 C. 296. Court determined defendant was more than 2 years older than victim by calculating the difference in age based on birthdates rather than calendar years; statute not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate defendant's right to equal protection under the law. 248 C. 543. Statute does not require physical violence as element of the crime. 260 C. 486. Prescribes a general liability crime and defendant cannot prevail on claim that attempt charge under section is invalid based on strict liability of crime; evidence of adult male's electronic mail exchanges with undercover officer posing as 13-year-old girl, defendant's arrival at prearranged meeting place and possession of related pornographic materials was sufficient to prove required intent and knowledge to support conviction under section and section is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness based on these facts. 277 C. 155.

Cited. 7 CA 46; 8 CA 190; Id., 313; 9 CA 426; 10 CA 591; 11 CA 236; 13 CA 493; 14 CA 244; 15 CA 222; 17 CA 174; Id., 186; Id., 447; Id., 525; 18 CA 273; 19 CA 44; Id., 445; Id., 646; 20 CA 40; Id., 115; Id., 193; Id., 263; Id., 288, 289; Id., 530, 532; Id., 737; 23 CA 241; Id., 712; 24 CA 146; 25 CA 235; Id., 243; 26 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; Id., 674; Id., 758; 28 CA 91; 31 CA 120; 32 CA 217; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580; Id., 773; 33 CA 205; 34 CA 46; 37 CA 213; 38 CA 125; Id., 731; 39 CA 742; 40 CA 132; 41 CA 139; 43 CA 142; Id., 619; Id., 667; Id., 785; 45 CA 289; Id., 512. Trial court properly refused to instruct jury as requested by defendant on the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation; no affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation is available under provision of statute prohibiting sexual intercourse between a person who is between the ages of 13 and 15 and a person who is at least 2 years older. 63 CA 536. Subdiv. (1): Sexual assault in the second degree was not a lesser offense included within sexual assault in the first degree because it would be possible to commit the latter offense in the manner described in the information and bill of particulars without committing the former offense. 99 CA 251. Subdiv. (1): Decriminalization of an act under Subdiv. in P.A. 07-143 entitled person with prior conviction for committing such act to erasure and destruction of records under Sec. 54-142d. 142 CA 21. Subdiv. (1): Court could reasonably have found sufficient evidence to satisfy penetration element of sexual assault where both the child and defendant were wearing underwear. 148 CA 378. Subdiv. (1): Conviction under this Subdiv. and Sec. 53-21(a)(2) does not violate defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy because each crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not. 174 CA 172. Subdiv. (3): Evidence sufficient to prove sexual assault in the second degree where victim was able to communicate during earlier stages of assault but could not physically or verbally communicate her lack of consent during later penile-vaginal intercourse. 180 CA 799. Subdiv. (1): The limited exception under Sec. 54-193a for a prosecution of sexual assault in the second degree under this Subdiv. cannot be expanded and applied to a risk of injury charge under Sec. 53-21(a)(2). 213 CA 757.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 207 C. 412. Defendant's sentence of 10 years of imprisonment followed by 10 years of special parole violated Sec. 54-128(c) and was an illegal sentence because total length of terms of imprisonment and special parole combined exceeded maximum term of imprisonment authorized for sexual assault in the second degree by Subsec. and Sec. 53a-35a(6). 279 C. 527.

Sec. 53a-72. Rape in the first degree: Class B felony. Section 53a-72 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 73; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 125; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)

Sec. 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D or C felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) subjects another person to sexual contact and such other person is mentally incapacitated or impaired because of mental disability or disease to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (3) engages in sexual intercourse with another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.

(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class D felony or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class C felony.

(P.A. 75-619, S. 5; P.A. 80-346, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 33; P.A. 02-138, S. 8; P.A. 19-16, S. 15; 19-93, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 80-346 designated previous Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) and added Subdiv. (2) re incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by amending Subsec. (a)(1)(B) to replace “which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person” with “which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical injury to himself or herself” and amending Subsec. (a)(2) to replace “such person” with “the actor” or “him or her” as appropriate; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class C felony if the victim is under 16 years of age; P.A. 19-16 amended Subsec. (a) by adding new Subdiv. (2) re person who is mentally incapacitated and redesignating existing Subdiv. (2) as Subdiv. (3); P.A. 19-93 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by adding “or impaired because of mental disability or disease”.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; 186 C. 45; 187 C. 216; 191 C. 604; 192 C. 154; 194 C. 258; 199 C. 121; 205 C. 352; Id., 386; 207 C. 403; 214 C. 89; 224 C. 656; 240 C. 743. Statute encompasses adopted relatives. 258 C. 779.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 3 CA 374; 6 CA 15; 9 CA 631; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352; Id., 648; 10 CA 591; 11 CA 102; 12 CA 585; 35 CA 173; 43 CA 715; 46 CA 741. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction and court properly instructed jury on element of intent for conviction of sexual assault in the third degree. 81 CA 189.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 198 C. 147; 205 C. 27; 209 C. 416; 210 C. 244; 211 C. 18; 220 C. 400; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 519; 229 C. 580; Id., 557; 233 C. 502; 237 C. 284; Id., 576; Id., 694. Court's failure to define “knowledge” or to explain how it pertains to charge of sexual assault in the third degree did not violate defendant's due process rights where jury instructions, viewed as a whole, adequately informed jury of the elements of the crime. 258 C. 779. Subdiv. (2) does not violate equal protection clause of federal constitution because it applies equally to both opposite sex and same sex intercourse when individuals are related within certain degrees of kindred. 285 C. 528.

Cited. 2 CA 333; 11 CA 236; 12 CA 221; 14 CA 244; 18 CA 273; Id., 694; 20 CA 530; 23 CA 221; Id., 564; judgment reversed in part, see 200 C. 400; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; Id., 725; 26 CA 395; 29 CA 724; 30 CA 281; 32 CA 217; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580; 33 CA 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 36 CA 228; 38 CA 100; Id., 762; 39 CA 657; Id., 742; 41 CA 139; Id., 287; 43 CA 578; 45 CA 756. Subdiv. (2) violates guarantees of equal protection because it proscribes heterosexual, but not homosexual, intercourse between kindred persons, and no rational basis exists for such distinction. 94 CA 667; judgment reversed, see 285 C. 498. Subdiv. (2): Jury instructions were proper as to essential element of sexual assault in the third degree when trial court directed jury to consider admission made by defendant that he was the stepfather of the victim. 110 CA 181. Subdiv. (2): Court could reasonably have found sufficient evidence to satisfy penetration element of sexual assault where both the child and defendant were wearing underwear. 148 CA 378.

Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C or B felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm when such person commits sexual assault in the third degree as provided in section 53a-72a, and in the commission of such offense, such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, rifle, shotgun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm is a class C felony or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of ten years.

(P.A. 75-619, S. 10; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 51; P.A. 02-138, S. 9.)

History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, increase from 1 year to 2 years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence and add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of 10 years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class B felony if the victim is under 16 years of age.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; 192 C. 154; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282; 240 C. 743.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 35 CA 173; 43 CA 715.

Sec. 53a-73. Rape in the second degree: Class C felony. Section 53a-73 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 74; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

Sec. 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1) Such person subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such other person, or (B) thirteen years of age or older but under fifteen years of age and the actor is more than three years older than such other person, or (C) physically helpless, or (D) less than eighteen years old and the actor is such other person's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such other person's welfare, or (E) in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent; or (3) such person engages in sexual contact with an animal or dead body; or (4) such person is a psychotherapist and subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) a patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs during the psychotherapy session, or (B) a patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (5) such person subjects another person to sexual contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by means of false representation that the sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (6) such person is a school employee and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor; or (7) such person is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a recipient of coaching or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age; or (8) such person subjects another person to sexual contact and (A) the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor's professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person's participation in a program or activity, and (B) such other person is under eighteen years of age; or (9) such person subjects another person to sexual contact who is placed or receiving services under the direction of the Commissioner of Developmental Services in any public or private facility or program and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person.

(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class D felony.

(P.A. 75-619, S. 6; P.A. 83-326, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 3; P.A. 94-221, S. 19; P.A. 02-106, S. 2; 02-138, S. 10; P.A. 04-130, S. 2; P.A. 07-143, S. 2; P.A. 11-113, S. 2; P.A. 13-28, S. 1; 13-47, S. 2; P.A. 19-16, S. 16; 19-93, S. 10.)

History: P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated “to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact”, redesignated as Subpara. (C) a victim who is “physically helpless” and relettered the remaining subparagraphs; P.A. 93-340 added Subsec. (a)(4) and (5) re sexual contact by a psychotherapist with a patient or former patient and re sexual contact accomplished by means of false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 added Subsec. (a)(6) re school employees and students; P.A. 02-106 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(1)(B) for purposes of gender neutrality and added Subsec. (a)(7) re a coach or instructor subjecting another person to sexual contact who is a recipient of such coaching or instruction and is a secondary school student receiving such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting or under 18 years of age; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes and amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class D felony if the victim is under 16 years of age; P.A. 04-130 added Subsec. (a)(8) re actor 20 years of age or older who stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over another person under 18 years of age and subjects that other person to sexual contact; P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to revise Subpara. (A) re when victim is under 15 years of age by establishing an age differential between the victim and the actor requiring that for a victim under 13 years of age the actor be more than 2 years older and requiring that for a victim 13 years of age or older but under 15 years of age the actor be more than 3 years older, designating the latter provision as new Subpara. (B) and relettering the remaining Subparas. accordingly; P.A. 11-113 added Subsec. (a)(9) re actor who has supervisory or disciplinary authority over person placed or receiving services under direction of Commissioner of Developmental Services in any public or private facility or program and subjects such person to sexual contact; P.A. 13-28 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to delete “intentionally”; P.A. 13-47 amended Subsec. (a)(1)(C) to substitute “impaired because of mental disability or disease” for “mentally defective”; P.A. 19-16 amended Subsec. (a)(1)(C) by deleting “mentally incapacitated or”; P.A. 19-93 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by deleting former Subpara. (C) re impairment because of mental disability or disease and redesignating existing Subparas. (D) to (F) as Subparas. (C) to (E).

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315. Proof of specific interest required under statute precludes this from being a lesser included offense under Sec. 53-21. 186 C. 45. Cited. 192 C. 154; 204 C. 683; 205 C. 386; 210 C. 396; Id., 582; 211 C. 455; 224 C. 1.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 6 CA 150; 8 CA 607; 11 CA 80; Id., 102; 14 CA 40; 15 CA 251; Id., 289; 18 CA 459; 25 CA 270; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1. Judgment of acquittal in 26 CA 625, 221 C. 917 and 224 C. 656 reversed and case remanded to trial court with direction to render judgment reinstating conviction under section. 31 CA 452. Cited. 34 CA 473; 35 CA 173; 43 CA 458; Id., 715. Reiterated previous holdings touching bare skin not required for sexual contact in the fourth degree. 59 CA 538. Evidence was sufficient to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that defendant touched victim's intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating her, therefore constituting “sexual contact”. 124 CA 261. Sexual assault in the fourth degree is not a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the first degree; convictions under this section and Sec. 53a-70 do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because they are separate and distinct crimes and each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not. 171 CA 530.

It is undisputable that Connecticut recognizes a clear public policy against sexual misconduct and sexual harassment; this public policy is evidenced in state criminal statutes, which provide that “a person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when ... (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent”; thus, arbitration award reinstating police officer who had engaged in sexual misconduct and harassment while on duty clearly violates established public policy and must be vacated. 48 CS 574.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 183 C. 586; 192 C. 37; 200 C. 440; Id., 734; 205 C. 515; 211 C. 555; 215 C. 653. Subdiv. (1)(A): Defendant waived claim that violation of section is not a lesser included offense of violation of Sec. 53a-71(a)(1); judgment of Appellate Court in 26 CA 625 reversed and case remanded for determination of evidence sufficiency. 224 C. 656. Cited. 227 C. 207; 230 C. 43. Subdiv. (1)(A) and Sec. 53-21(a)(2) are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. 291 C. 1. Subdiv. (2): Consistent with other provisions of the Penal Code, sexual assault in the fourth degree is not a strict liability offense with respect to consent element and criminal negligence is the required mens rea for that element. 317 C. 482.

Cited. 12 CA 395; 18 CA 297; Id., 694; 19 CA 44; 20 CA 115; Id., 365; Id., 530; 26 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656; Id., 674; 29 CA 409; 33 CA 205; 34 CA 428; 38 CA 125; 45 CA 116; Id., 289; Id., 512; Id., 613. Subdiv. (1)(A): This offense and the offense of risk of injury to a child are not the same offense for double jeopardy. 49 CA 409. There was sufficient evidence produced at trial to convict defendant of sexual assault in the fourth degree; the state proved defendant was the perpetrator of the assault and victim's testimony, although inconsistent, was credible. 110 CA 97. Subdiv. (1)(A): Under 2005 revision, trial court properly found that minor respondent acted with mental state necessary for commission of sexual assault because court's finding that respondent acted for the purpose of sexual gratification was supported by ample circumstantial evidence, not solely by evidence that respondent had contact with intimate parts of victim. 117 CA 582. 2003 revision of Subdiv. (1)(A) and Sec. 53-21(a)(2) are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 118 CA 589.

Secs. 53a-74 to 53a-81. Rape in the second degree. Deviate sexual intercourse in the first and second degree. Sexual contact in the first, second and third degree. Adultery: Class A misdemeanor. Sections 53a-74 to 53a-81, inclusive, are repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 75–82; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 126–129; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 79, 80; P.A. 75-619, S. 7; P.A. 91-19, S. 2.)

Sec. 53a-82. Prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee.

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor was a victim of conduct by another person that constitutes (1) a violation of section 53a-192a, or (2) a criminal violation of 18 USC Chapter 77, as amended from time to time.

(c) Nothing in this section shall limit a person's right to assert the defense of duress pursuant to section 53a-14 in any prosecution for an offense under this section.

(d) Prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 83; P.A. 06-43, S. 5; P.A. 10-115, S. 1; P.A 13-166, S. 3; P.A. 16-71, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 06-43 added new Subsec. (b) re affirmative defense and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 10-115 amended Subsec. (a) to limit applicability of offense to person 16 years of age or older, added new Subsec. (c) re presumption of coercion of person 16 or 17 years of age and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 13-166 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) to replace provisions re actor being coerced into committing offense with provisions re actor being a victim of conduct by another that constitutes a violation of Sec. 53a-192a, designated as Subdiv. (1), or a victim of a criminal violation of 18 USC Chapter 77, designated as Subdiv. (2), added new Subsec. (d) re right to assert defense of duress pursuant to Sec. 53a-14, and redesignated existing Subsec. (d) as Subsec. (e); P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “sixteen” with “eighteen” re age of person to be guilty of prostitution, deleted former Subsec. (c) re prosecution of person age 16 or 17 and redesignated existing Subsecs. (d) and (e) as Subsecs. (c) and (d).

Meaning of statutory language is clear and is sufficient to warn ordinary person of the prohibited conduct. 37 CS 506. Does not violate right to privacy which has never been extended to encompass prostitutes plying their trade on the street. Id., 515.

Sec. 53a-83. Soliciting sexual acts: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of soliciting sexual acts when: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, such person exchanges anything of value with another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in sexual conduct with such person; (2) such person exchanges or agrees to exchange anything of value with another person pursuant to an understanding that such other person or a third person will engage in sexual conduct with such person; or (3) such person solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual conduct with such person in exchange for anything of value.

(b) Soliciting sexual acts is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty shall be fined two thousand dollars.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 84; P.A. 13-166, S. 4; P.A. 16-71, S. 7; P.A. 17-32, S. 3; P.A. 21-102, S. 2; 21-103, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 13-166 amended Subsec. (b) to provide exception re Subsec. (c) and added Subsec. (c) re class C felony offense if person knew or reasonably should have known the other person had not attained 18 years of age or was a victim of trafficking in persons or a criminal violation of 18 USC Chapter 77; P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re $2,000 fine and amended Subsec. (c) by deleting “such person knew or reasonably should have known at the time of the offense that”; P.A. 17-32 deleted Subsec. (c) re class C felony offense if other person had not attained 18 years of age or was a victim of trafficking in persons or a criminal violation of 18 USC Chapter 77, and made technical and conforming changes; P.A. 21-102 replaced “patronizing a prostitute” with “soliciting sexual acts”; P.A. 21-103 replaced language re payment of a fee with language re exchange for anything of value throughout Subsec. (a).

Section may be harmonized with Sec. 18-100d re determining controlling sentence where prisoner serving concurrent sentences for crimes committed both on or after October 1, 1994, and before October 1, 1994, with good time credit applicable to pre-October 1, 1994, sentence under Sec. 18-7a(c); determination of controlling sentence not a static concept. 261 C. 806.

Cited. 4 CA 520.

Sec. 53a-83a. Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle: Class A misdemeanor. Section 53a-83a is repealed, effective October 1, 2017.

(P.A. 93-265, S. 2; P.A. 97-279, S. 2; P.A. 16-71, S. 8; P.A. 17-32, S. 10.)

Sec. 53a-83b. Commercial sexual abuse of a minor: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of commercial sexual abuse of a minor when: (1) Such person exchanges anything of value with a minor or third person as compensation for a minor having engaged in sexual conduct with such person; (2) such person exchanges or agrees to exchange anything of value with a minor or a third person pursuant to an understanding that in return the minor will engage in sexual conduct with such person; or (3) such person solicits or requests to engage in sexual conduct with a minor, or any other person that such person reasonably believes to be a minor, in return for anything of value.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, commercial sexual abuse of a minor is a class B felony.

(d) For purposes of this section, “minor” means a person who has not attained eighteen years of age.

(P.A. 17-32, S. 4; P.A. 21-103, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 21-103 replaced language re payment of a fee with language re exchange for anything of value throughout Subsec. (a).

Sec. 53a-84. Defenses barred. (a) In any prosecution for prostitution in violation of section 53a-82 or soliciting sexual acts in violation of section 53a-83, the sex of the two parties or prospective parties to the sexual conduct engaged in, contemplated or solicited is immaterial, and it shall be no defense that: (1) Such persons were of the same sex; or (2) the person who received, agreed to receive or solicited a fee was a male and the person who paid or agreed or offered to pay such fee was a female.

(b) In any prosecution for soliciting sexual acts in violation of section 53a-83 promoting prostitution in violation of section 53a-86, 53a-87 or 53a-88 or permitting prostitution in violation of section 53a-89, it shall be no defense that the person engaging or agreeing to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee could not be prosecuted for a violation of section 53a-82 on account of such person's age.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 85; P.A. 10-115, S. 4; P.A. 17-32, S. 8; P.A. 21-102, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 10-115 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and amended same to add “in violation of section 53a-82” re prosecution for prostitution and “in violation of section 53a-83 or 53a-83a” re prosecution for patronizing a prostitute and added Subsec. (b) to provide that it is not a defense to patronizing a prostitute, promoting prostitution or permitting prostitution if the person engaging or offering to engage in sexual conduct for a fee could not be prosecuted under Sec. 53a-82 on account of age; P.A. 17-32 deleted references to Sec. 53a-83a; P.A. 21-102 replaced “patronizing a prostitute” with “soliciting sexual acts”.

Sec. 53a-85. Promoting prostitution: Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to sections 53a-86 to 53a-89, inclusive:

(1) A person “advances prostitution” when, acting other than as a prostitute or as a patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution, procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or premises for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.

(2) A person “profits from prostitution” when acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 86.)

Sec. 53a-86. Promoting prostitution in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree when he knowingly: (1) Advances prostitution by compelling a person by force or intimidation to engage in prostitution, or profits from coercive conduct by another; or (2) advances or profits from prostitution of a person less than eighteen years old.

(b) Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a class B felony. Any person found guilty under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which nine months of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and shall be fined fifteen thousand dollars.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 87; P.A. 10-115, S. 2; P.A. 16-71, S. 16.)

History: P.A. 10-115 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to increase applicable age limit from 16 to 18 and amended Subsec. (b) to add 9-month nonsuspendable sentence for person found guilty under Subsec. (a)(2); P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re $15,000 fine.

Cited. 185 C. 199; 191 C. 453; 199 C. 47.

Sentencing under both risk of injury and promoting prostitution statutes not a double jeopardy violation. 53 CA 627.

Sec. 53a-87. Promoting prostitution in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree when he knowingly advances or profits from prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or owning, either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes.

(b) Promoting prostitution in the second degree is a class C felony and any person found guilty shall be fined ten thousand dollars.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 88; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 81; P.A. 10-115, S. 3; P.A. 16-71, S. 17.)

History: 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(2) from 19 to 18, reflecting change in age of majority; P.A. 10-115 amended Subsec. (a) to delete former Subdiv. (2) re advancing or profiting from prostitution of person less than 18 years old and make a technical change; P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re $10,000 fine.

Cited. 199 C. 47.

Cited. 13 CA 732.

Sec. 53a-88. Promoting prostitution in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the third degree when he knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.

(b) Promoting prostitution in the third degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty shall be fined five thousand dollars.

(1969, P. A. 828, S. 89; P.A. 16-71, S. 18.)

History: P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re $5,000 fine.

Sec. 53a-89. Permitting prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of permitting prostitution when, having possession or control of premises which he knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to halt or abate such use.

(b) Permitting prostitution is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty shall be fined two thousand dollars.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 90; P.A. 16-71, S. 19.)

History: P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re $2,000 fine.

Cited. 185 C. 199.

Sec. 53a-90. Transferred to Chapter 961, Part II, Sec. 54-102a.

Sec. 53a-90a. Enticing a minor. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of enticing a minor when such person uses an interactive computer service to knowingly persuade, induce, entice or coerce any person (1) under eighteen years of age, or (2) who the actor reasonably believes to be under eighteen years of age, to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which the actor may be charged with a criminal offense. For purposes of this section, “interactive computer service” means any information service, system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.

(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, enticing a minor is a class D felony for a first offense, a class C felony for a second offense and a class B felony for any subsequent offense.

(2) Enticing a minor is a class B felony if the victim of the offense is under thirteen years of age and any person found guilty of such class B felony shall, for a first offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and, for any subsequent offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 99-113; P.A. 04-139, S. 1; P.A. 07-143, S. 5; P.A. 16-71, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 04-139 amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty for a first offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony, for a second offense from a class D felony to a class C felony and for any subsequent offense from a class C felony to a class B felony, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (b) to designate existing penalty provision as Subdiv. (1) and amend same to add exception re Subdiv. (2) and to add new Subdiv. (2) classifying offense as a class B felony if the victim is under 13 years of age and specifying a term of imprisonment which may not be suspended or reduced by the court of 5 years for a first offense and 10 years for a subsequent offense, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing provision re age of person as Subdiv. (1) and amending same to replace “sixteen” with “eighteen” and by adding Subdiv. (2) re actor reasonably believes person to be under age 18.

Subsec. (a):

The plain meaning of the word “entice”, as used in Subsec., does not require that an individual actually succeed in convincing a person to act for an enticement to have occurred, and therefore, it is not necessary that defendant actually engage in sexual activity with a minor to be convicted. 127 CA 464.

Sec. 53a-90b. Misrepresentation of age to entice a minor: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of misrepresentation of age to entice a minor when such person, in the course of and in furtherance of the commission of a violation of section 53a-90a, intentionally misrepresents such person's age.

(b) Misrepresentation of age to entice a minor is a class C felony.

(June Sp. Sess. P.A. 07-4, S. 97.)

PART VII*

KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Prosecution where necessary elements of two or more distinct offenses combined in same act; fraudulent restraint in kidnapping, defined; restraint for sexual gratification within purview of kidnapping statute. 164 C. 95. Cited. 166 C. 96; 169 C. 38; 206 C. 40.

Sec. 53a-91. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:

(1) “Restrain” means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As used herein “without consent” means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.

(2) “Abduct” means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (B) using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.

(3) “Relative” means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 92; P.A. 92-260, S. 35.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subdivs. (1) and (2) to replace Subpara. designators “(a)” and “(b)” with “(A)” and “(B)”, respectively.

Language is clear and does not lend itself to any equivocal interpretation. 173 C. 165. Cited. 177 C. 335; 179 C. 328; 188 C. 406; 191 C. 604; 200 C. 586; 209 C. 733; 211 C. 672; 215 C. 716; 216 C. 647; 219 C. 489; 225 C. 347; 226 C. 618. Terms “restrained” and “abducted” interpreted to include frightening victim to remain in bedroom through repeated physical and verbal abuse. 258 C. 510. The point at which an intended interference with liberty under Subdiv. (1) crosses the line to become an intended prevention of liberation under Subdiv. (2) is not entirely clear. 287 C. 509.

Cited. 20 CA 437; 46 CA 486; 55 CA 447.

Subdiv. (1):

Cited. 180 C. 565; 195 C. 253; 198 C. 147; Id., 430; Id., 537; 202 C. 520; 215 C. 173; 237 C. 284.

Cited. 5 CA 586; 13 CA 667; 17 CA 339; 19 CA 396; 30 CA 281; 31 CA 312.

Subdiv. (2):

Cited. 172 C. 22; 177 C. 637; 178 C. 634; 182 C. 449; 199 C. 537.

Cited. 36 CA 190. To prove unlawful restraint, the state had to prove that defendant abducted alleged victim by restraining her with intent to prevent her liberation by using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation. 81 CA 320.

Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B) to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of a government function.

(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)

History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to insert Subpara. indicators and made other technical changes.

Cited. 173 C. 165; 197 C. 436; Id., 588; 198 C. 671; 200 C. 268; 201 C. 276; 211 C. 672; 212 C. 31; 225 C. 347; 227 C. 677; 235 C. 711; 236 C. 112. Court's failure to instruct jury in accordance with 287 C. 509 was harmless because restraint of victim was not incidental to additional offenses. 293 C. 435.

Cited. 8 CA 177; 24 CA 13; 39 CA 632; 46 CA 691; Id., 741.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended. 173 C. 165. Cited. 185 C. 339; 189 C. 346; 194 C. 114; Id., 692; 198 C. 147; Id., 285; Id., 405; 199 C. 399; 200 C. 586; 201 C. 517; Id., 559; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; 203 C. 385; 204 C. 1; Id., 240; Id., 714; 205 C. 132; Id., 673; 206 C. 40; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 210 C. 110; Id., 199; Id., 315; 211 C. 18; 213 C. 388; Id., 422; 214 C. 38; Id., 89; 215 C. 173; Id., 716; 216 C. 647; 217 C. 243; 219 C. 93; Id., 160; Id., 269; Id., 283; Id., 489; 220 C. 270; Id., 345; Id., 487; Id., 698; 221 C. 264; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 450; Id., 519; 226 C. 618; 227 C. 1; Id., 153; 228 C. 582; 229 C. 557; 231 C. 195; 233 C. 403; 235 C. 145. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284. Cited. Id., 694; 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235; 242 C. 445. Where defendant also charged with sexual assault, restriction of movement alone can be basis of kidnapping if defendant, by violent actions, restrained victim with intent to prevent liberation. 262 C. 179; judgment reversed, see 299 C. 740. Legislature intended to exclude from scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 C. 509. Subdiv. (2)(A): Since there was no evidence that defendant restrained victim to any greater degree than that necessary to commit the sexual assault, his conviction of kidnapping in the first degree cannot stand. Id., 608. Holding in 287 C. 509 that to commit a kidnapping, defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime, applies retroactively to petitioner's habeas corpus proceeding in which he challenges his kidnapping conviction. 299 C. 740. Where defendant was also charged with robbery and there was no evidence that victim was bound or moved physically, and victim was restrained for five minutes and released immediately after robbery was complete, the restraint alone cannot support kidnapping charge. 301 C. 77. Subdiv. (2)(A): Subpara. not unconstitutionally vague since defendant had fair warning when he committed sexual assault in 1988 that his movement of victim could support an independent kidnapping conviction. 306 C. 718. Retroactive relief is available, as long as the evidence warrants such relief, for all collateral attacks on judgments rendered final prior to the holding in 287 C. 509, irrespective of whether the kidnapping instruction was challenged in the criminal proceeding, and such challenges are not subject to the procedural default rule; omission of a Salamon instruction not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 321 C. 56. Subdiv. (2)(B): Clarifying “merely incidental to and necessary for” language used in holding in State v. Salamon, 287 C. 509, and cited in Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction, 321 C. 56. 339 C. 1.

Cited. 25 CA 428; 28 CA 195; 33 CA 457; 34 CA 276; 36 CA 190; Id., 216; Id., 641; Id., 718; Id., 774; 37 CA 360; Id., 464; 38 CA 777; 39 CA 579; 41 CA 317; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445; 43 CA 715; 44 CA 307; 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159. Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under section. 55 CA 447. Subdiv. (2): Under kidnapping statute, the state had to prove that defendant had abducted and restrained alleged victim with the intent to inflict physical injury or to sexually attack her. 81 CA 320. Kidnapping in the first degree statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of defendant's case. 91 CA 47. Abduction requirement under kidnapping statute was satisfied by testimony showing that defendant, in an effort to prevent victim from leaving his apartment, took her by the leg and placed his arm around her neck in a headlock and thereby restricted her movement with the intent to prevent her liberation. 96 CA 155. Kidnapping conviction reversed and matter remanded so jury could be instructed re holdings in 287 C. 509 and 288 C. 418 that it could not find defendant guilty of kidnapping unless he intended to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that necessary to commit the underlying crime. 115 CA 166. Subdiv. (2)(A): When assessing whether a kidnapping charge is merely incidental to and necessary for another crime, trial court must make a specific factual finding whether defendant intended to restrain the victim to a greater degree than what was necessary to commit the other crime; where defendant is charged with kidnapping pursuant to Subdiv. (2)(A), and no evidence is presented at trial re defendant's intention to inflict physical injury subsequent to related sexual assault, court's analysis of the kidnapping charge is limited to defendant's conduct up to the completion of the sexual assault. 118 CA 140. Subdiv. (2)(A) is a lesser offense included within the kidnapping charge of Subdiv. (2)(B) and thus conviction of both offenses for the same act constituted double jeopardy. Id., 831. Subdiv. (2): 287 C. 509 does not control burglary and larceny case because restraint of victim was not necessary to accomplish those crimes and restraint occurred after defendant took jewelry. 127 CA 181. Subdivs. (2)(A) and (2)(B) are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 180 CA 371; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 338 C. 54. Subdiv. (2)(B): In order to prevail on habeas claim that the absence of a Salamon instruction did not constitute harmless error, petitioner is not required to establish that there was insufficient evidence to convict him or that a properly instructed jury likely would find him guilty; commissioner bears burden of demonstrating that the omission of a Salamon instruction on incidental restraint did not contribute to the verdict; test to be applied by appellate court is whether there is a reasonable possibility that a properly instructed jury would reach a different result. 184 CA 101; judgment reversed, see 339 C. 1.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Sec. 53a-92a. Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm when such person commits kidnapping in the first degree as provided in section 53a-92, and in the commission of said crime such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm is a class A felony.

(P.A. 75-380, S. 9; P.A. 13-28, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 13-28 made technical changes and amended Subsec. (b) to delete requirement that 1 year of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court

Cited. 198 C. 671. Effect of enactment of statute was to link a more serious crime with a less serious penalty; equal protection rights violated. 200 C. 268. Cited. 204 C. 240; 205 C. 262; Id., 673; 210 C. 110; Id., 315; 211 C. 672; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 40 CA 60.

Subsec. (b):

Statute “has created an irreconcilable conflict in the statutes governing mandatory minimum sentences for kidnapping in the first degree ... until the legislature takes corrective action the sentencing provisions of (statute) govern all prosecutions for kidnapping in the first degree”; statutory construction discussed. 198 C. 671. Equal protection rights discussed. 200 C. 268. Cited. 207 C. 412.

Sec. 53a-93. Proceeding to determine sentence for kidnapping in first degree. Section 53a-93 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 95; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

Sec. 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person.

(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 96; P.A. 93-148, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re three-year nonsuspendable sentence.

Cited. 169 C. 242; 171 C. 47; 172 C. 22; 177 C. 335; Id., 637; 178 C. 549; Id., 634; 185 C. 163; 186 C. 179; 188 C. 406; 190 C. 822; 191 C. 604; 196 C. 430; 198 C. 68; Id., 190; 199 C. 537; 200 C. 586; 202 C. 343; Id., 520; 206 C. 40; Id., 685; 208 C. 365; 211 C. 672; 213 C. 388; 231 C. 195. Omission of Salamon instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 302 C. 236.

Cited. 1 CA 697; 12 CA 268; Id., 613; 20 CA 437; 21 CA 411; 27 CA 786; 35 CA 740; 42 CA 768; 46 CA 486; Id., 691.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 178 C. 600; 179 C. 328; 180 C. 565; 182 C. 449; 187 C. 681; 190 C. 327; 192 C. 166; 197 C. 485; 198 C. 314; 238 C. 784. The legislature intended to exclude from the scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 C. 509. The court's repeated pronouncements that there are no minimum time or distance requirements to establish restraint within the meaning of Subsec., coupled with Subsec.'s prohibition of the act of restraint only when it is accomplished with the specific intent of preventing a victim's liberation, defeats defendant's claim that Subsec. is unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's actions. 294 C. 753. Lack of Salamon instruction was harmless because defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint. 299 C. 447.

There is neither any time requirement for the restraint, nor any distance requirement for the asportation to constitute the crime of kidnapping. 1 CA 697. By its plain terms, Subsec. gives fair warning to the public that if a person abducts another he is guilty of that offense. 83 CA 142. Statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the particular facts in issue because it failed to put defendant on notice that forcibly taking victim's arm but not moving her was a violation. 95 CA 332; judgment reversed, see 294 C. 753. Section not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant whose actions over a 2-hour period included using stun gun and restraints against victim and confining victim in defendant's car and home. 137 CA 29. Defendant possessed specific intent to prevent victim's liberation immediately prior to and during struggle; Subsec. not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant; defendant not subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; cumulative convictions of kidnapping in the second degree and attempted kidnapping in the second degree violate constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 147 CA 598.

Sec. 53a-94a. Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the second degree, as provided in section 53a-94, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or uses or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 75-380, S. 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 37; P.A. 93-148, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one year to three years the length of the nonsuspendable sentence.

Cited. 188 C. 697; 200 C. 523; 201 C. 115; 207 C. 412; 210 C. 110; 211 C. 672; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 9 CA 648; 46 CA 741. Although defendant did not physically restrain victim during her confinement, his threat against victim's life while armed with deadly weapon was evidence from which jury could reasonably infer that defendant possessed specific intent to prevent victim's liberation; defendant could not prevail on argument that section is unconstitutionally vague for failing to provide notice that any restraint of victim, even for a very brief time, could constitute the crime of kidnapping; case is not one of the rare cases where the restraint is so minimal or limited in time as to warrant a finding of unconstitutional vagueness. 133 CA 514.

Sec. 53a-95. Unlawful restraint in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.

(b) Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 97; P.A. 92-260, S. 38.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “the latter” with “such other person”.

Cited. 171 C. 395; 182 C. 353; Id., 366; 187 C. 216; Id., 348; 191 C. 604; 194 C. 297; 195 C. 253; 197 C. 298; Id., 309; 198 C. 430; 199 C. 193; 200 C. 9; 201 C. 659; 202 C. 676; 205 C. 352; 220 C. 112; 222 C. 331; 223 C. 180; 224 C. 397; 226 C. 601; 236 C. 112; 237 C. 284; 242 C. 689. Because an unlawful restraint involves the restriction of another person's movements with the intent to interfere substantially with that person's liberty, the crime of unlawful restraint is a specific intent crime. 287 C. 509.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 5 CA 424; Id., 586; 6 CA 334; 7 CA 701; 8 CA 620; 9 CA 631; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352; 10 CA 217; 13 CA 554; 17 CA 234. Specific intent required. Id, 339. Cited. Id., 391; Id., 490; 22 CA 477; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 31 CA 20; Id., 312; 36 CA 805; 40 CA 553; 41 CA 701; 42 CA 78; Id., 445; 43 CA 715; 46 CA 486. Immediate flight of victim demonstrates absence of restraint by defendant. 140 CA 393.

Cited. 43 CS 211.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 174 C. 500; 176 C. 227; 179 C. 381; 185 C. 211; 186 C. 599; 190 C. 104; 197 C. 50; Id., 602; 198 C. 598; Id., 617; 205 C. 39; Id., 61; Id., 437; Id., 528; 206 C. 40; 209 C. 143; 222 C. 87; 227 C. 32; Id., 153; 241 C. 784; 242 C. 523.

Cited. 6 CA 697; 8 CA 387; Id., 491; Id., 566; 9 CA 79; Id., 208; 13 CA 667; 14 CA 710; 18 CA 134; Id., 730; 19 CA 631; 21 CA 244; Id., 467; 25 CA 725; 26 CA 574; Id., 641; 32 CA 178; 38 CA 531; Id., 777; 39 CA 45; Id., 789; Id., 832; 41 CA 255; Id., 817. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117.

Sec. 53a-96. Unlawful restraint in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the second degree when he restrains another person.

(b) Unlawful restraint in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 98.)

Cited. 178 C. 600; 188 C. 372; 191 C. 604; 197 C. 413; Id., 602; 206 C. 100; 211 C. 672; 224 C. 397; 231 C. 195. Because an unlawful restraint involves the restriction of another person's movements with the intent to interfere substantially with that person's liberty, the crime of unlawful restraint is a specific intent crime. 287 C. 509.

Cited. 9 CA 656; 19 CA 396; 29 CA 524; 30 CA 281; 31 CA 497; 46 CA 486.

Sec. 53a-97. Custodial interference in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree when he commits custodial interference in the second degree as provided in section 53a-98: (1) Under circumstances which expose the child or person taken or enticed from lawful custody or the child held after a request by the lawful custodian for his return to a risk that his safety will be endangered or his health materially impaired; or (2) by taking, enticing or detaining the child or person out of this state.

(b) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 99; P.A. 81-280, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 39; P.A. 95-206, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to include risk to a child held after a request by the lawful custodian for his return; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 95-206 amended Subsec. (a) by classifying the detention of a child or person out of this state as a violation of custodial interference in the first degree.

Cited. 182 C. 353; 226 C. 652. Joint custodian is not inherently immune from criminal prosecution under section solely on basis of his or her status as a joint custodian. 251 C. 656. Language of statute standing alone provided defendant with fair notice of the illegality of his conduct at the time of his actions. 272 C. 762.

Cited. 34 CS 219.

Sec. 53a-98. Custodial interference in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when: (1) Being a relative of a child who is less than sixteen years old and intending to hold such child permanently or for a protracted period and knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; (2) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person or any person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution; or (3) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he holds, keeps or otherwise refuses to return a child who is less than sixteen years old to such child's lawful custodian after a request by such custodian for the return of such child.

(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 100; P.A. 81-280, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 81-280 added Subsec. (a)(3) re failure to return a child to his lawful custodian after a request by the custodian for the child's return.

Cited. 226 C. 652. Language of statute standing alone provided defendant with fair notice of the illegality of his conduct at the time of his actions. 272 C. 762.

Subsec. (a)(3): Legislature intended “refuses to return” to include, at its core, a person who has declined a demand to send back a child to his or her lawful custodian, and this language provides clear notice that it encompasses the behavior of a person who either affirmatively declines to return a child to his or her lawful custodian or declines to take any affirmative steps to return a child to the lawful custodian upon the custodian's request. 197 CA 675.

Sec. 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of substitution of children when, having been temporarily entrusted with a child less than one year old and, intending to deceive a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of such child, he substitutes, produces or returns to such parent, guardian or custodian a child other than the one entrusted.

(b) Substitution of children is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 101.)

PART VIII

BURGLARY, CRIMINAL TRESPASS, ARSON,
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-100. Definitions. (a) The following definitions are applicable to this part: (1) “Building” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, railroad car or other structure or vehicle or any building with a valid certificate of occupancy. Where a building consists of separate units, such as, but not limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building; (2) “dwelling” means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present; (3) “night” means the period between thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise; and (4) “public land” means a state park, state forest or municipal park or any other publicly-owned land that is open to the public for active or passive recreation.

(b) The following definition is applicable to sections 53a-100aa to 53a-106, inclusive: A person “enters or remains unlawfully” in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 102; P.A. 74-186, S. 10, 12; P.A. 79-570, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 40; P.A. 05-234, S. 8; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 74-186 included railroad cars in definition of “building”; P.A. 79-570 included buildings “with a valid certificate of occupancy” in definition of “building”; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in definition of “building”; P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(4) defining “public land”, effective January 1, 2006; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (a) to make definitions applicable to Sec. 53a-100aa, included in existing reference to “this part”, and amended Subsec. (b) to add reference to Sec. 53a-100aa, effective March 1, 2008.

Cited. 191 C. 180; 195 C. 598; Id., 611; 209 C. 322; 210 C. 199; 216 C. 367.

Failure of court to define the phrase “enters unlawfully” misled jury. 6 CA 24. Cited. 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 35 CA 714; 39 CA 1; 44 CA 62.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 188 C. 542, 218 C. 273; 240 C. 708; 242 C. 523.

Cited. 14 CA 119; 22 CA 440; 34 CA 823; 38 CA 231; 43 CA 488. Although it is true that the crime of burglary in the second degree requires the element of a “dwelling” as opposed to “building”, statute defines “dwelling” as a type of building “which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present”; an individual apartment, within an apartment home, while a dwelling, also is a separate building. 76 CA 779. Subdiv. (1): Under the ordinary definition of a “building”, one's home is clearly a building. 78 CA 610. State does not need to furnish valid certificate of occupancy or prove specific ability to occupy if structure in question falls within ordinary meaning of building. 106 CA 295. Subdiv. (2): Evidence was sufficient to find that the breezeway constituted part of the family's “dwelling”. 125 CA 529. Subdiv. (1): Trial court properly determined that shed was a “building” for purposes of section. 151 CA 732. Subdiv. (1): Charges for home invasion, arising under Subsec., and burglary in the first degree, under Sec. 53a-101(a)(3), are susceptible to separation into parts, thus defendant's conviction of both offenses did not violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 187 CA 847.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 8 CA 528; 19 CA 179; 24 CA 563; 42 CA 507. Defendant's presence in an apartment that was not his own, his attempts to evade police and his flight were sufficient evidence from which jury could infer that he had entered apartment unlawfully. 66 CA 357. Restaurant was not open to the public at time defendant entered and management office was a separate area not open to public and defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon premises. 74 CA 607.

Secs. 53a-100a to 53a-100z. Reserved for future use.

Sec. 53a-100aa. Home invasion: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of home invasion when such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein, and, in the course of committing the offense: (1) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, such person or another participant in the crime commits or attempts to commit a felony against the person of another person other than a participant in the crime who is actually present in such dwelling, or (2) such person is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.

(b) An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing” the offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.

(c) Home invasion is a class A felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 1.)

History: Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 effective March 1, 2008.

Subsec. (a)(2): It is possible to commit the crime of home invasion without committing the crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, therefore home invasion in violation of Subdiv. and attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of Secs. 53a-59(a)(1) and 53a-49 are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 343 C. 470.

Subsec. (a)(1): Defendant could not be convicted of attempt to commit home invasion without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that it was specifically defendant who intended to commit a felony in the dwelling. 187 CA 333. Subsec. (a): The express language of Subsec. does not require that defendant enter the dwelling using force or cause any damage upon entering, although evidence of forced entry may be probative of unlawful entry. 192 CA 221.

Sec. 53a-101. Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when (1) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or (2) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and, in the course of committing the offense, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone, or (3) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein.

(b) An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing” the offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.

(c) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 103; P.A. 80-442, S. 21, 28; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 80-442 specified in Subsec. (c) that five years of imposed sentence may not be suspended or reduced when person is guilty under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (a) to restructure provisions, add Subdiv. (3) re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein, which conduct was formerly classified as burglary in the second degree under Sec. 53a-102 but was deleted from said section by same act, and make technical changes, effective March 1, 2008.

Cited. 161 C. 283; 172 C. 74; 174 C. 500; 190 C. 496; 205 C. 456; 207 C. 412; 210 C. 199; 216 C. 563; 220 C. 112; 222 C. 331; 227 C. 32; 229 C. 691.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 6 CA 24; 8 CA 491; 13 CA 133; 19 CA 245; 24 CA 563; 29 CA 704; 30 CA 416; 35 CA 107; Id., 714; 46 CA 118. There was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that defendants took steak knives to arm themselves during the burglary and thus committed burglary in the first degree. 52 CA 149. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 CA 251.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 170 C. 162; 175 C. 398. Subdiv. (1): Presence of a tire iron used to break into an apartment is insufficient by itself to satisfy statutory definition in Sec. 53a-3(7) to support finding of attempted burglary in first degree; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140. Cited. 178 C. 564; 180 C. 481, 482; Id., 557. Subdiv. (2): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599. Cited. 182 C. 366; 185 C. 211; 186 C. 599; 188 C. 372; Id., 574; 189 C. 383; Id., 611; 190 C. 104; 194 C. 241; 196 C. 157; Id., 225; 197 C. 413; 199 C. 62; 200 C. 9; Id., 586; 203 C. 159; 204 C. 714; 205 C. 61; Id., 485; 209 C. 416; 214 C. 132; 216 C. 282; Id., 367; 217 C. 419; 219 C. 269; 221 C. 430; Id., 447; Id., 685; 223 C. 41; Id., 243; Id., 299; 225 C. 524; 227 C. 32, 48; Id., 616, 622; 228 C. 234; 230 C. 351; 232 C. 455; 235 C. 802; 241 C. 702; Id., 784; 242 C. 445; Id., 523. Utility room in rear of gas station convenience store in which defendant sexually assaulted and murdered victim, being a separate room and structurally distinct from the convenience store that could be reached only through gas station's garage bay area and not open to the public, reasonably could have been found to be a separate “building” under statute. 252 C. 274. Trial court correctly permitted jury to consider charge of burglary in the third degree as lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree; state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for burglary in the first degree. 275 C. 192. Subdiv. (2): Conspiracy to commit a reckless act is not a cognizable crime in this state because it is legally impossible to conspire to commit or achieve an unintentional or reckless act. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Cited. 6 CA 667; Id., 697; Id., 701; 8 CA 631; 9 CA 79; Id., 208; 10 CA 176; 12 CA 662; 13 CA 554; 14 CA 67; Id., 657; 15 CA 342; 16 CA 184; Id., 318; Id., 455; 17 CA 391; 19 CA 179; Id., 618; 21 CA 244; 23 CA 692; 24 CA 556; 25 CA 428; Id., 565; 26 CA 641; 27 CA 73; Id., 786; Id., 794; 30 CA 68; 31 CA 312; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 279; 36 CA 774; 38 CA 481; Id., 531; 39 CA 45; 40 CA 60; 41 CA 255; Id., 317; Id., 817; 42 CA 78; 44 CA 307; 45 CA 187; Id., 261. Direct evidence of an entry is not required when evidence is such that the trier of fact reasonably could infer that something defendant did inside the building could not have been done without first entering the building. 78 CA 646. Crimes of burglary in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (1) and burglary in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (2) each contain an element the other does not; to convict defendant under Subdiv. (1), state had to prove that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and that he was armed with a dangerous instrument; to convict defendant under Subdiv. (2), state had to prove that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein and that in the course of committing the crime, he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicted bodily injury on another person; Subsec. does not require state to prove that defendant forcibly entered the building or that defendant was in possession of stolen property. 96 CA 421. Trial court reasonably concluded that defendant injured the victim while in immediate flight from the commission of a burglary even though evidence demonstrated that defendant struck the victim beyond the property line of the residence where the burglary occurred. 132 CA 718. Subdiv. (3): Charges for burglary in the first degree, arising under Subdiv., and home invasion, under Sec. 53a-100aa(a)(1), are susceptible to separation into parts, thus defendant's conviction of both offenses did not violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 187 CA 847.

Sec. 53a-102. Burglary in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein.

(b) Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 104; P.A. 01-83, S. 2; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 01-83 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, designate existing provisions re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein as Subdiv. (1) and add Subdiv. (2) re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (a) to delete former Subdiv. (1) re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein, which conduct was reclassified as burglary in the first degree under Sec. 53a-101 by same act, and make a conforming change, effective March 1, 2008.

Cited. 161 C. 283; 169 C. 263; Id., 556; 175 C. 315; 184 C. 258. Instruction characterizing burglary as a crime against the person likely to involve danger to life was not in error. 188 C. 542. Cited. Id., 715; 190 C. 496; 195 C. 611; 197 C. 574; 198 C. 671; 204 C. 1; 205 C. 456; 215 C. 257; 216 C. 273; 220 C. 417; 229 C. 285; 232 C. 455; 242 C. 523; Id., 689.

Cited. 5 CA 113; 6 CA 24; 9 CA 133; Id., 349; Id., 656; 11 CA 575; 13 CA 413; 14 CA 526; 15 CA 34; 16 CA 333; 19 CA 396; 20 CA 369; Id., 586; 23 CA 201; 29 CA 801; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285; 31 CA 94; Id., 370; 34 CA 599; 35 CA 714; 38 CA 20; Id., 231; Id., 531; 40 CA 553; 41 CA 169; Id., 255. The crime proscribed by section is complete once there has been an unlawful entering or remaining in a dwelling, at night, with intent to commit a crime in that dwelling. 76 CA 779.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 181 C. 172; 182 C. 207; 189 C. 631; 190 C. 440; 199 C. 88; 200 C. 523; 202 C. 676; 204 C. 377; 214 C. 493; 216 C. 699; 220 C. 400; 223 C. 635; 241 C. 784.

Cited. 1 CA 260; 6 CA 697; 14 CA 710; 21 CA 260; 23 CA 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 24 CA 502; 30 CA 606; 35 CA 262; 36 CA 774; 38 CA 643; 42 CA 78. Defendant's right to fair trial and unanimous verdict not violated when court made it clear that the jury had to find each element of crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt and there was ample evidence to support conviction under both alternate theories of liability. 59 CA 305. Jury could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of remaining unlawfully in victim's bedroom because whatever possible license defendant thought he had to enter bedroom, that license was withdrawn when he refused to identify himself, charged at victim, lay on top of her and attempted to kiss and touch her all over her body. 93 CA 205.

Sec. 53a-102a. Burglary in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree with a firearm when he commits burglary in the second degree as provided in section 53a-102, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of burglary in the second degree and burglary in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Burglary in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which one year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 75-380, S. 11; P.A. 76-435, S. 4, 68, 82; P.A. 92-260, S. 41.)

History: P.A. 76-435 made technical corrections, adding simple burglary in the second degree in Subsec. (a) and specifying in Subsec. (b) that burglary in second degree with a firearm is a Class C, rather than Class B, felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).

Cited. 188 C. 697; 190 C. 496; 199 C. 255; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 6 CA 24; 35 CA 714.

Sec. 53a-103. Burglary in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.

(b) Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 105.)

Cited. 161 C. 283; 173 C. 317; 174 C. 253; 176 C. 299; 182 C. 52; Id., 176; Id., 242; 183 C. 225; Id., 444; 184 C. 95; Id., 215; Id., 369; 186 C. 648; 187 C. 6; Id., 292; Id., 444; 189 C. 364; Id., 717; 190 C. 496; 191 C. 146; Id., 180; 193 C. 35; 194 C. 198; Id., 210; Id., 213; Id., 361; Id., 438; Id., 623; 196 C. 185; 197 C. 247; 198 C. 1; 199 C. 30; Id., 308; 202 C. 615; 216 C. 814; 218 C. 273; 219 C. 489; 220 C. 417; 223 C. 731; 232 C. 455; 235 C. 679; 237 C. 390; 239 C. 235; 240 C. 708. Trial court correctly permitted jury to consider charge of burglary in the third degree as lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree; state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for burglary in the first degree. 275 C. 192.

Cited. 2 CA 537; 3 CA 132; Id., 359; Id., 503; 5 CA 599; 6 CA 24; Id., 680; 8 CA 478; 9 CA 141; 10 CA 258; Id., 279; Id., 447; Id., 503; 11 CA 805; 12 CA 1; Id., 196; Id., 375; 13 CA 214; Id., 220; 14 CA 119; Id., 526; 16 CA 184; Id., 601; 18 CA 368; 19 CA 48; 20 CA 205; Id., 721; 22 CA 440; 23 CA 123; Id., 151; Id., 201; 24 CA 295; 25 CA 503; 30 CA 190; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 107; Id., 405; Id., 714; 36 CA 177; Id., 364; 37 CA 40; Id., 228; 38 CA 225; Id., 481; 39 CA 1; Id., 579; 42 CA 507; 44 CA 162; 45 CA 566. Evidence that defendant entered residence and stated he would be able to hit wife before police could arrive was sufficient to establish that at the time he entered dwelling, defendant intended to commit crime of assault. 99 CA 203.

Cited. 33 CS 706; Id., 750; 38 CS 407.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 140; 181 C. 254; 189 C. 461; 194 C. 665; 198 C. 369; 212 C. 50; 218 C. 447.

Cited. 4 CA 514; 7 CA 1; Id., 75; 8 CA 491; Id., 528; 9 CA 121; 13 CA 438; 14 CA 309; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50; 15 CA 531; 17 CA 490; 24 CA 502; 35 CA 699; 44 CA 307.

Sec. 53a-103a. Burglary in the third degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree with a firearm when he commits burglary in the third degree as provided in section 53a-103, and in the commission of such offense, he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of burglary in the third degree and burglary in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Burglary in the third degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 75-380, S. 12.)

Cited. 177 C. 335; Id., 637; 184 C. 215; 190 C. 496; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282; 219 C. 93.

Cited. 6 CA 24; 14 CA 710; 28 CA 369; 35 CA 714.

Sec. 53a-104. Affirmative defense to burglary. It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for burglary that the building was abandoned.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 106.)

Cited. 35 CA 714.

Sec. 53a-105. Conviction for burglary and other offense authorized, when. Section 53a-105 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 107; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

Sec. 53a-106. Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools when he manufactures or has in his possession any tool, instrument or other thing adapted, designed or commonly used for advancing or facilitating offenses involving unlawful entry into premises, or offenses involving forcible breaking of safes or other containers or depositories of property, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the commission of an offense of such character.

(b) Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 108; P.A. 92-260, S. 42.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense.

Cited. 181 C. 172; 182 C. 242; Id., 366.

Cited. 5 CA 599; 6 CA 24; 11 CA 805; 28 CA 369; 35 CA 714; 37 CA 228.

Cited. 33 CS 706.

Sec. 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when: (1) Knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated to such person by the owner of the premises or other authorized person; or (2) such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-16a, 46b-38c, 54-1k or 54-82r by the Superior Court; or (3) such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person; or (4) knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains on public land after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated to such person by an authorized official of the state or a municipality, as the case may be.

(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 109; P.A. 80-58; P.A. 91-381, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 43; P.A. 95-214, S. 4; P.A. 99-240, S. 5; P.A. 03-98, S. 3; P.A. 05-147, S. 3; 05-234, S. 1; P.A. 14-217, S. 188.)

History: P.A. 80-58 added Subsec. (a)(2) specifying that entering or remaining in building or other premises in violation of a restraining order is criminal trespass in the first degree; P.A. 91-381 amended Subsec. (a) by adding “pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c” after “issued”; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by replacing references to “such person” with “he” or “him” as appropriate; P.A. 95-214 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-1k; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-82r and to make provisions gender neutral; P.A. 03-98 added Subsec. (a)(3) re entry or remaining in a building or other premises in violation of a foreign order of protection; P.A. 05-147 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to delete the requirement that the foreign order of protection has been issued “after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person”; P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(4) re entry or remaining on public land, effective January 1, 2006; P.A. 14-217 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add reference to Sec. 46b-16a, effective January 1, 2015.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for trespass on public land.

Cited. 203 C. 466; Id., 624; 204 C. 441.

Cited. 12 CA 172; 18 CA 303; 19 CA 245; 20 CA 599; 24 CA 195; 35 CA 714; 43 CA 1. Conviction reversed; evidence was insufficient to convict defendant under section. 55 CA 475.

Word “owner” must be given broad meaning so statute serves its legislative purpose to protect any possessor of land from unwanted intrusions; proof of title not essential element. 35 CS 555. Cited. 37 CS 853.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 216 C. 647; 236 C. 342. A spouse's right or privilege to enter property is not determined solely by the spouse's ownership interest in the property, or by whether the structure can be characterized as the marital home, but rather by whether the spouse had any possessory or occupancy interest in the premises at the time of entry; In general, when the marital relationship is intact and both spouses have a possessory or occupancy interest in a premises, an isolated request to leave the premises during a heated marital argument will not suffice to revoke one spouse's possessory or occupancy interest in the premises vis-à-vis the other. 334 C. 100.

Cited. 11 CA 24; 12 CA 258; 30 CA 45; 35 CA 262; 36 CA 448; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342. Subdiv. (2): Conviction under this section and Sec. 53a-223(a) did not violate constitutional protection against double jeopardy because legislature intended multiple punishments for offense of trespassing in violation of a protective order. 97 CA 72.

Sec. 53a-108. Criminal trespass in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, (1) such person enters or remains in a building, or (2) such person enters or remains on public land.

(b) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 110; P.A. 05-234, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 05-234 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re entry or remaining in a building as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re entry or remaining on public land and make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective January 1, 2006.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for trespass on public land.

Cited. 203 C. 466; Id., 624; 215 C. 257. Section not applicable based on defendant's knowledge. 245 C. 657.

Cited. 12 CA 375; 19 CA 245; 20 CA 599; Id., 721; 24 CA 489; Id., 541; 31 CA 370; 35 CA 107; Id., 714.

Cited. 35 CS 555; 37 CS 755.

Sec. 53a-109. Criminal trespass in the third degree: Class C or class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so: (1) Such person enters or remains in premises which are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or are fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, or which belong to the state and are appurtenant to any state institution; or (2) such person enters or remains in any premises for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing; or (3) such person enters or remains on public land which is posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.

(b) Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class C misdemeanor, except that any person found guilty under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor and fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 111; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 44; P.A. 05-234, S. 3; P.A. 12-84, S. 1.)

History: 1971 act added Subsec. (a)(2) specifying that person's entering or remaining in premises for purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing although he knows he is not licensed or privileged to do so is criminal trespass in the third degree; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes and deleted redundant language in Subsec. (a); P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(3) re entry or remaining on public land which is posted or is fenced or otherwise enclosed and to make technical changes, effective January 1, 2006; P.A. 12-84 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re any person found guilty under Subsec. (a)(2) shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor and fined not less than $500 or more than $1,000.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for trespass on public land.

Cited. 203 C. 466; Id., 624; 240 C. 708.

Cited. 20 CA 599; 24 CA 195; 35 CA 714.

Cited. 35 CS 555.

Subsec. (a):

Evidence that defendant entered building by not using main entrance but instead forcing open a locked door labeled with a no trespassing sign was sufficient to support conviction under section. 83 CA 377. Statute does not demand that premises be completely enclosed to fall within its purview, but they must be enclosed sufficiently to exclude intruders, namely, those who purposefully enter the property despite having no legitimate reason to do so; where entire property was enclosed by combination of concrete wall and chain link fence, save only for opening in front, which allowed pedestrian traffic to access sidewalk by way of set of steps, property was sufficiently enclosed, even with small gateless entryway, to bring it within the protections of section. 105 CA 179.

Sec. 53a-110. Affirmative defenses to criminal trespass. It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for criminal trespass that: (1) The building involved in the offense was abandoned; or (2) the premises, at the time of the entry or remaining, were open to the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises; or (3) the actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or a person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain, or that he was licensed to do so.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 112.)

Cited. 202 C. 86; 215 C. 82; Id., 257.

Cited. 18 CA 303; 20 CA 599; 35 CA 714.

Cited. 35 CS 555.

Sec. 53a-110a. Simple trespass: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of simple trespass when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains in or on any premises without intent to harm any property.

(b) Simple trespass is an infraction.

(P.A. 83-276, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 45; P.A. 15-211, S. 8.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision re remaining in or on any premises and making technical changes.

Cited. 12 CA 258; 20 CA 599; 24 CA 195; 30 CA 45; 31 CA 370.

Secs. 53a-110b and 53a-110c. Transferred to Part XXI, Secs. 53a-223 and 53a-223a.

Sec. 53a-110d. Simple trespass of railroad property: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of simple trespass of railroad property when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains on railroad property without lawful authority or the consent of the railroad carrier.

(b) Simple trespass of railroad property is an infraction.

(P.A. 00-149, S. 2.)

Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk of bodily injury.

(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229 clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to “building” definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.

Cited. 172 C. 298; 174 C. 135; 178 C. 67; 194 C. 279; 197 C. 158; 198 C. 92; 200 C. 685; 204 C. 4; Id., 769; 210 C. 519; 216 C. 678; 219 C. 605; 220 C. 796; 222 C. 469; 227 C. 829; 235 C. 679; 236 C. 31; 237 C. 694; 238 C. 828.

Cited. 8 CA 581; 12 CA 32; 35 CA 527; Id., 714; 36 CA 454; 40 CA 789; 46 CA 350. Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en route to fire; injuries not required to be substantial or foreseeable. 59 CA 507.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 183 C. 1; 187 C. 109; Id., 513; 191 C. 412; Id., 636; 199 C. 1; 200 C. 30. Trial court's failure to consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for defendant who acted with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268. Cited. 202 C. 93; 204 C. 377; 205 C. 201; 207 C. 118; 213 C. 161; 214 C. 161; Id., 752; 215 C. 1; 216 C. 585; 218 C. 747; 221 C. 713; 227 C. 1; 229 C. 10; 240 C. 708; 241 C. 57. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Subdiv. (4), therefore state is not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Subdiv. (3); evidence supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.

Cited. 10 CA 147; 12 CA 343; 28 CA 9; 30 CA 164; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10; 34 CA 823; 36 CA 753; 37 CA 360; 39 CA 800. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section because evidence was sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent; although prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's closing statements, even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial; jury instructions were proper. 75 CA 163. Definitive expert testimony that a fire was started intentionally is not required for a conviction. 127 CA 560.

Sec. 53a-112. Arson in the second degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, (1) he starts a fire or causes an explosion and (A) such act subjects another person to a substantial risk of bodily injury; or (B) such fire or explosion was intended to conceal some other criminal act; or (C) such fire or explosion was intended to subject another person to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States; or (2) a fire or explosion was caused by an individual hired by such person to start such fire or cause such explosion.

(b) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 114; P.A. 79-570, S. 4; P.A. 80-229, S. 2; P.A. 82-290, S. 2; P.A. 84-4.)

History: P.A. 79-570 made second degree arson a Class B, rather than a Class C felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition of Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting (1) intent to destroy or damage a building of another (2) fires or explosions caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds and (3) subjecting another building to risk of destruction or damage and adding (1) fires or explosions intended to conceal some criminal act and (2) fires or explosions caused by person hired to set fire or cause explosion; P.A. 84-4 added Subsec. (a)(1)(C) re a fire or explosion intended to subject another person to a deprivation of certain rights, privileges or immunities.

Cited. 172 C. 298; 178 C. 67; 189 C. 228; 191 C. 636; 194 C. 617; 195 C. 600. More reasonable to conclude that legislature intended arsonists to be held culpable under statute for creating substantial risk to other buildings, regardless of how close such risks come to being fulfilled. 197 C. 158. Cited. 198 C. 92; 199 C. 389; 204 C. 769; 219 C. 605; 236 C. 375.

Term “another person” includes firefighters. 8 CA 581. Cited. 17 CA 466.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 174 C. 73; 189 C. 201; Id., 752; 195 C. 128; Id., 598; 199 C. 14; 202 C. 93; 215 C. 716.

Cited. 10 CA 422; 28 CA 9. Subdiv. (2): Holding in 99 C. 432, that solicitation of another to set a fire was insufficient to establish the crime of attempt to commit arson, has been legislatively overruled by enactment of P.A. 82-290. 59 CA 362.

Sec. 53a-113. Arson in the third degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of arson in the third degree when he recklessly causes destruction or damage to a building, as defined in section 53a-100, of his own or of another by intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion.

(b) Arson in the third degree is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 115; P.A. 73-639, S. 6; P.A. 79-570, S. 5; P.A. 80-229, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 46.)

History: P.A. 73-639 specified applicability to destruction or damage of person's own building in Subsec. (a); P.A. 79-570 made third degree arson a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition in Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).

Cited. 172 C. 298; 177 C. 545; 191 C. 636; 194 C. 210; 197 C. 158; 198 C. 92. There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of recklessly or negligently causing a result; therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this statute and Sec. 53a-48 is not a crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1. Cited. 200 C. 268; 202 C. 520; 235 C. 185; Id., 679.

Cited. 6 CA 680; 10 CA 361; 22 CA 53; 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185; Id., 714.

Cited. 41 CS 525.

Sec. 53a-114. Reckless burning: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of reckless burning when he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's, and thereby recklessly places a building, as defined in section 53a-100, of another in danger of destruction or damage.

(b) Reckless burning is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 116; P.A. 79-570, S. 6; P.A. 80-229, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 47.)

History: P.A. 79-570 made reckless burning a Class D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition in Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).

Cited. 197 C. 158; 200 C. 268.

Cited. 41 CA 701.

Subsec. (a):

The phrase “of another” applies plainly and unambiguously to any proprietary or possessory interest in the endangered building by someone other than the defendant, whether exclusive or nonexclusive. 203 CA 333.

Sec. 53a-115. Criminal mischief in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage to tangible property of another and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages tangible property of another in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars, or (2) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with tangible property of a utility or mode of public transportation, power or communication, and thereby causes an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public, or (3) with intent to cause damage to any electronic monitoring equipment owned or leased by the state or its agent and required as a condition of probation or conditional discharge pursuant to section 53a-30, as a condition of release pursuant to section 54-64a or as a condition of community release pursuant to section 18-100c, and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such electronic monitoring equipment and thereby causes an interruption in its ability to function, or (4) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with (A) any tangible property owned by the state, a municipality or a person for fire alarm or police alarm purposes, (B) any telecommunication system operated by the state police or a municipal police department, (C) any emergency medical or fire service dispatching system, (D) any fire suppression equipment owned by the state, a municipality, a person or a fire district, or (E) any fire hydrant or hydrant system owned by the state or a municipality, a person, a fire district or a private water company, or (5) with intent to cause damage to tangible property owned by the state or a municipality that is located on public land and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such tangible property in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.

(b) Criminal mischief in the first degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 117; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 21; P.A. 83-330, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 48; P.A. 00-141, S. 4; P.A. 01-8; P.A. 05-234, S. 4.)

History: 1971 act added Subsec. (a)(3) re tampering with fire or police alarms; P.A. 83-330 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to designate damaging or tampering with fire or police alarms as Subpara. (A) and to add Subparas. (B) to (E) re damaging or tampering with telecommunication systems, emergency medical or fire service dispatching systems, fire suppression equipment and fire hydrants or hydrant systems; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 00-141 amended Subsec. (a) by making technical changes, adding new Subdiv. (3) re intentional damage to electronic monitoring equipment and redesignating former Subdiv. (3) as Subdiv. (4); P.A. 01-8 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to include damage to electronic monitoring equipment required as a condition of community release pursuant to Sec. 18-100c; P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(5) re damage to tangible property owned by the state or a municipality located on public land in an amount exceeding $1,500, effective January 1, 2006.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for criminal mischief on public land.

Cited. 191 C. 412; 197 C. 326; 240 C. 708.

Cited. 29 CA 59; 46 CA 118.

Cited. 39 CS 400.

Sec. 53a-116. Criminal mischief in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage to tangible property of another and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages tangible property of another in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars; or (2) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with tangible property of a public utility or mode of public transportation, power or communication, and thereby causes a risk of interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public; or (3) with intent to cause damage to tangible property owned by the state or a municipality that is located on public land and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such tangible property in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.

(b) Criminal mischief in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 118; P.A. 05-234, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(3) re damage to tangible property owned by the state or a municipality located on public land in an amount exceeding $250 and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective January 1, 2006.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for criminal mischief on public land.

Cited. 236 C. 266.

Cited. 11 CA 805; 36 CA 680.

Cited. 38 CS 301.

Sec. 53a-117. Criminal mischief in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person: (1) Intentionally or recklessly (A) damages tangible property of another, or (B) tampers with tangible property of another and thereby causes such property to be placed in danger of damage; or (2) damages tangible property of another by negligence involving the use of any potentially harmful or destructive force or substance, including, but not limited to, fire, explosives, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, poison gas or radioactive material; or (3) intentionally or recklessly (A) damages tangible property owned by the state or a municipality that is located on public land, or (B) tampers with tangible property owned by the state or a municipality that is located on public land and thereby causes such property to be placed in danger of damage; or (4) damages tangible property owned by the state or a municipality that is located on public land by negligence involving the use of any potentially harmful or destructive force or substance, including, but not limited to, fire, explosives, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, poison gas or radioactive material.

(b) Criminal mischief in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 119; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 22; P.A. 05-234, S. 6.)

History: 1971 act specified that use of harmful or destructive force or substance is “not limited to” fire, explosives, etc. in Subsec. (a)(2); P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(3) and (4) re intentionally or recklessly damaging or tampering with tangible property owned by the state or a municipality located on public land and re damaging or tampering with tangible property owned by the state or a municipality located on public land by negligence involving the use of any potentially harmful or destructive force or substance and made technical changes, effective January 1, 2006.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for criminal mischief on public land.

Cited. 184 C. 157; 190 C. 428; 194 C. 347; 221 C. 788; 227 C. 153; 229 C. 285; 236 C. 31.

Cited. 1 CA 647; 6 CA 334; 7 CA 75; 9 CA 59; 13 CA 214; 14 CA 526; Id., 804; 17 CA 326; 18 CA 303; 24 CA 473; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788; 29 CA 801; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285; 36 CA 364; 37 CA 733; 38 CA 225.

Cited. 35 CS 587; Id., 675; 36 CS 89; 37 CS 755; 38 CS 665; 39 CS 504.

Sec. 53a-117a. Criminal mischief in the fourth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe such person has a right to do so, such person intentionally or recklessly (1) damages or tampers with any fire hydrant or hydrant system owned by the state or a municipality, fire district or private water company; or (2) damages, tampers with or removes any tangible property owned by the state, a municipality or a person for fire alarm, smoke detection and alarm, fire suppressant or police alarm purposes; or (3) damages or tampers with any fire hydrant or hydrant system owned by the state or a municipality that is located on public land; or (4) damages, tampers with or removes any tangible property owned by the state or a municipality that is located on public land for fire alarm, smoke detection and alarm, fire suppressant or police alarm purposes.

(b) Criminal mischief in the fourth degree is a class C misdemeanor.

(P.A. 83-330, S. 2; P.A. 84-546, S. 125, 173; P.A. 85-132; P.A. 05-234, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 84-546 changed “public alarm purposes” to “police alarm purposes”; P.A. 85-132 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by prohibiting removal of any of the specified property and by including property used for smoke detection and alarm or fire suppressant purposes; P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(3) and (4) re damaging or tampering with any fire hydrant or hydrant system owned by the state or a municipality located on public land and re damaging, tampering with or removing any tangible property owned by the state or a municipality located on public land for fire alarm, smoke detection and alarm, fire suppressant or police alarm purposes and made technical changes, effective January 1, 2006.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for criminal mischief on public land.

Cited. 20 CA 101.

Secs. 53a-117b to 53a-117d. Reserved for future use.

Sec. 53a-117e. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he intentionally damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “tenant”, “landlord” and “premises” have the meanings provided in section 47a-1.

(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 96-74, S. 1; P.A. 98-107, S. 1, 6; P.A. 14-122, S. 189.)

History: P.A. 98-107 rephrased Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 14-122 made technical changes in Subsec. (b).

Sec. 53a-117f. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that a tenant has a right to do so, such tenant (1) intentionally damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or (2) recklessly damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “tenant”, “landlord” and “premises” have the meanings provided in section 47a-1.

(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 96-74, S. 2; P.A. 98-107, S. 2, 6; P.A. 00-196, S. 40; P.A. 14-122, S. 190.)

History: P.A. 98-107 amended Subsec. (a) to rephrase provisions and add provision re reckless damage of the tangible property of the landlord in an amount exceeding $1,500, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 00-196 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 14-122 made technical changes in Subsec. (b).

Sec. 53a-117g. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he recklessly damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “tenant”, “landlord” and “premises” have the meanings provided in section 47a-1.

(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(P.A. 98-107, S. 3, 6; P.A. 14-122, S. 191.)

History: P.A. 98-107 effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 14-122 made technical changes in Subsec. (b).

Secs. 53a-117h to 53a-117j. Reserved for future use.

Sec. 53a-117k. Damage to railroad property in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage to railroad property and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such property in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars, or (2) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with railroad property and thereby causes an interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public.

(b) Damage to railroad property in the first degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 00-149, S. 3.)

Sec. 53a-117l. Damage to railroad property in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage to railroad property and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such property in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or (2) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with railroad property and thereby causes a risk of interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public.

(b) Damage to railroad property in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 00-149, S. 4.)

Sec. 53a-117m. Damage to railroad property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the third degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person: (1) Intentionally or recklessly (A) damages railroad property, or (B) tampers with railroad property and thereby causes such property to be placed in danger of damage, or (2) damages railroad property by negligence involving the use of any potentially harmful or destructive force or substance including, but not limited to, fire, explosives, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, poison gas or radioactive material.

(b) Damage to railroad property in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(P.A. 00-149, S. 5.)

PART IX*

LARCENY, ROBBERY AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Cited. 43 CA 801; 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-118. Definitions generally. (a) The following definitions are applicable to this part: (1) “Property” means any money, personal property, real property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind. Commodities of a public utility nature such as gas, electricity, steam and water constitute property, but the supplying of such a commodity to premises from an outside source by means of wires, pipes, conduits or other equipment shall be deemed a rendition of a service rather than a sale or delivery of property. (2) “Obtain” includes, but is not limited to, the bringing about of a transfer or purported transfer of property or of a legal interest therein, whether to the obtainer or another. (3) To “deprive” another of property means (A) to withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him, or (B) to dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such property. (4) To “appropriate” property of another to oneself or a third person means (A) to exercise control over it, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it, permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value or benefit, or (B) to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or a third person. (5) An “owner” means any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder. (6) To “receive” means to acquire possession, control or title, or to lend on the security of the property. (7) “Service” includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, public utility and transportation service, the supplying of hotel accommodations, restaurant services, entertainment, and the supplying of equipment for use, but does not include school accommodations provided by a school district to (A) a child or an emancipated minor, or (B) a pupil eighteen years of age or older who was a homeless person, as defined in subdivision (3) of section 8-355, at the time of the offense. (8) “Check” means any check, draft or similar sight order for the payment of money which is not postdated with respect to the time of issuance. (9) “Drawer” of a check means a person whose name appears thereon as the primary obligor, whether the actual signature be that of himself or of a person purportedly authorized to draw the check in his behalf. (10) “Representative drawer” means a person who signs a check as drawer in a representative capacity or as agent of the person whose name appears thereon as the principal drawer or obligor. (11) A person “issues” a check when, as a drawer or representative drawer thereof, he delivers it or causes it to be delivered to a person who thereby acquires a right against the drawer with respect to such check. One who draws a check with intent that it be so delivered is deemed to have issued it if the delivery occurs. (12) A person “passes” a check when, being a payee, holder or bearer of a check which previously has been or purports to have been drawn and issued by another, he delivers it, for a purpose other than collection, to a third person who thereby acquires a right with respect thereto. (13) “Funds” means money or credit. (14) A drawer has “insufficient funds” with a drawee to cover a check when he has no funds or account whatever, or funds in an amount less than that of the check; and a check dishonored for “no account” shall also be deemed to have been dishonored for “insufficient funds”. (15) “Credit” means an arrangement or understanding with a bank or depository for the payment of a check, draft or order in full on presentation.

(b) A person who has obtained possession of property by theft or other illegal means shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person who takes, obtains or withholds it from him by larcenous means.

(c) A joint or common owner of property shall not be deemed to have a right of possession thereto superior to that of any other joint or common owner thereof.

(d) In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a person in lawful possession of property shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person having only a security interest therein, even if legal title lies with the holder of the security interest pursuant to a conditional sale contract or other security agreement.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 120; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 23; P.A. 13-211, S. 1.)

History: 1971 act added Subdivs. (6) to (15) in Subsec. (a) defining “receive”, “service”, “check”, “drawer”, “representative drawer”, “issues”, “passes”, “funds”, “insufficient funds” and “credit”; P.A. 13-211 redefined “service” in Subsec. (a)(7) to exclude school accommodations.

Cited. 201 C. 489; 233 C. 552.

Cited. 19 CA 695; 43 CA 801; 45 CA 369; 47 CA 1.

Cited. 32 CS 650.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 186 C. 555; 196 C. 225; 212 C. 31; 223 C. 243; 242 C. 666. Word “appropriate” as defined in Subdiv. (4) is not used in its ordinary sense. 255 C. 746.

Cited. 1 CA 642; 11 CA 684; 14 CA 272; 21 CA 386; 22 CA 449; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 566; 43 CA 801; 45 CA 6; 46 CA 269. Subdiv. (5): In circumstance where owner of motor vehicle took such vehicle from bailee, the bailee had a right of possession superior to that of owner and thus, for purposes of larceny statutes, bailee was the “owner” and owner of motor vehicle was the “taker”. 59 CA 135.

Cited. 35 CS 536. Subdiv. (1): Applicability of a penal code definition to the products liability statute may be inapposite. 40 CS 120.

Sec. 53a-119. Larceny defined. A person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner. Larceny includes, but is not limited to:

(1) Embezzlement. A person commits embezzlement when he wrongfully appropriates to himself or to another property of another in his care or custody.

(2) Obtaining property by false pretenses. A person obtains property by false pretenses when, by any false token, pretense or device, he obtains from another any property, with intent to defraud him or any other person.

(3) Obtaining property by false promise. A person obtains property by false promise when, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by means of a representation, express or implied, that he or a third person will in the future engage in particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or does not believe that the third person intends to engage in such conduct. In any prosecution for larceny based upon a false promise, the defendant's intention or belief that the promise would not be performed may not be established by or inferred from the fact alone that such promise was not performed.

(4) Acquiring property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake. A person who comes into control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the recipient is guilty of larceny if, with purpose to deprive the owner thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to it.

(5) Extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: (A) Cause physical injury to some person in the future; or (B) cause damage to property; or (C) engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or (D) accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or (E) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or (F) cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person's business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed extortion when the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or (G) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or (H) use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or (I) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.

(6) Defrauding of public community. A person is guilty of defrauding a public community who (A) authorizes, certifies, attests or files a claim for benefits or reimbursement from a local, state or federal agency which he knows is false; or (B) knowingly accepts the benefits from a claim he knows is false; or (C) as an officer or agent of any public community, with intent to prejudice it, appropriates its property to the use of any person or draws any order upon its treasury or presents or aids in procuring to be allowed any fraudulent claim against such community. For purposes of this subdivision such order or claim shall be deemed to be property.

(7) Theft of services. A person is guilty of theft of services when: (A) With intent to avoid payment for restaurant services rendered, or for services rendered to him as a transient guest at a hotel, motel, inn, tourist cabin, rooming house or comparable establishment, he avoids such payment by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, by stealth, or by any misrepresentation of fact which he knows to be false; or (B) (i) except as provided in section 13b-38i, with intent to obtain railroad, subway, bus, air, taxi or any other public transportation service without payment of the lawful charge therefor or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such transportation service which has been rendered to him, he obtains such service or avoids payment therefor by force, intimidation, stealth, deception or mechanical tampering, or by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, or (ii) with intent to obtain the use of equipment, including a motor vehicle, without payment of the lawful charge therefor, or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such use which has been permitted him, he obtains such use or avoids such payment therefor by means of any false or fraudulent representation, fraudulent concealment, false pretense or personation, trick, artifice or device, including, but not limited to, a false representation as to his name, residence, employment, or driver's license; or (C) obtaining or having control over labor in the employ of another person, or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another person, knowing that he is not entitled to the use thereof, and with intent to derive a commercial or other substantial benefit for himself or a third person, he uses or diverts to the use of himself or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities.

(8) Receiving stolen property. A person is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen property if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property knowing that it has probably been stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with purpose to restore it to the owner. A person who accepts or receives the use or benefit of a public utility commodity which customarily passes through a meter, knowing such commodity (A) has been diverted therefrom, (B) has not been correctly registered or (C) has not been registered at all by a meter, is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen property.

(9) Shoplifting. A person is guilty of shoplifting who intentionally takes possession of any goods, wares or merchandise offered or exposed for sale by any store or other mercantile establishment with the intention of converting the same to his own use, without paying the purchase price thereof. A person intentionally concealing unpurchased goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store, shall be prima facie presumed to have so concealed such article with the intention of converting the same to his own use without paying the purchase price thereof.

(10) Conversion of a motor vehicle. A person is guilty of conversion of a motor vehicle who, after renting or leasing a motor vehicle under an agreement in writing which provides for the return of such vehicle to a particular place at a particular time, fails to return the vehicle to such place within the time specified, and who thereafter fails to return such vehicle to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand to him for the return of the vehicle by registered mail addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement or, in the absence of such address, to his last-known address as recorded in the records of the motor vehicle department of the state in which he is licensed to operate a motor vehicle. It shall be a complete defense to any civil action arising out of or involving the arrest or detention of any person to whom such demand was sent by registered mail that he failed to return the vehicle to any place of business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the mailing of such demand.

(11) Obtaining property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine. A person obtains property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when such person obtains property by knowingly using in a fraudulent manner an automated teller machine with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person. In any prosecution for larceny based upon fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the machine was located. In any prosecution for larceny based upon more than one instance of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, (A) all such instances in any six-month period may be combined and charged as one offense, with the value of all property obtained thereby being accumulated, and (B) the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in any of the towns in which a machine which was fraudulently used was located. For the purposes of this subsection, “automated teller machine” means an unmanned device at which banking transactions including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers may be conducted, and includes, without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale terminal as defined in section 36a-2.

(12) Library theft. A person is guilty of library theft when (A) he conceals on his person or among his belongings a book or other archival library materials, belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility with the intention of removing the same from the library facility without authority or without authority removes a book or other archival library materials from such library facility or (B) he mutilates a book or other archival library materials belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility, so as to render it unusable or reduce its value. The term “book or other archival library materials” includes any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual material in any format, magnetic or other tape, electronic data-processing record, artifact or other documentary, written or printed material regardless of physical form or characteristics, or any part thereof, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of a library facility. The term “library facility” includes any public library, any library of an educational institution, organization or society, any museum, any repository of public records and any archives.

(13) Conversion of leased property. (A) A person is guilty of conversion of leased personal property who, with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third person, after renting or leasing such property under an agreement in writing which provides for the return of such property to a particular place at a particular time, sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property or any part thereof, and who thereafter fails to return such property to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the lessor within one hundred ninety-two hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand to him for the return of the property by registered or certified mail addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement, unless a more recent address is known to the lessor. Acknowledgment of the receipt of such written demand by the lessee shall not be necessary to establish that one hundred ninety-two hours have passed since such written demand was sent. (B) Any person, being in possession of personal property other than wearing apparel, received upon a written lease, who, with intent to defraud, sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property, or any part thereof, shall be prima facie presumed to have done so with the intention of converting such property to his own use. (C) A person who uses a false or fictitious name or address in obtaining such leased personal property shall be prima facie presumed to have obtained such leased personal property with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third person. (D) “Leased personal property”, as used in this subdivision, means any personal property received pursuant to a written contract, by which one owning such property, the lessor, grants to another, the lessee, the right to possess, use and enjoy such personal property for a specified period of time for a specified sum, but does not include personal property that is rented or leased pursuant to chapter 743i.

(14) Failure to pay prevailing rate of wages. A person is guilty of failing to pay the prevailing rate of wages when he (A) files a certified payroll, in accordance with section 31-53 which he knows is false, in violation of section 53a-157a, and (B) fails to pay to an employee or to an employee welfare fund the amount attested to in the certified payroll with the intent to convert such amount to his own use or to the use of a third party.

(15) Theft of utility service. A person is guilty of theft of utility service when he intentionally obtains electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service that is available only for compensation: (A) By deception or threat or by false token, slug or other means including, but not limited to, electronic or mechanical device or unauthorized use of a confidential identification or authorization code or through fraudulent statements, to avoid payment for the service by himself or another person; or (B) by tampering or making connection with or disconnecting the meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment or by manufacturing, modifying, altering, programming, reprogramming or possessing any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof or by disguising the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by a supplier of electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service, without the consent of such supplier, in order to avoid payment for the service by himself or another person; or (C) with intent to avoid payment by himself or another person for a prospective or already rendered service the charge or compensation for which is measured by a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service, by tampering with such meter or device or by attempting in any manner to prevent such meter or device from performing its measuring function, without the consent of the supplier of the service. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person to whom the service is billed has the intent to obtain the service and to avoid making payment for the service if, without the consent of the supplier of the service: (i) Any meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment has been tampered with or connected or disconnected, (ii) any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof has been modified, altered, programmed, reprogrammed or possessed, (iii) the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by the supplier of the service have been disguised, or (iv) a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service has been tampered with or prevented from performing its measuring function. The presumption does not apply if the person to whose service the condition applies has received such service for less than thirty-one days or until the service supplier has made at least one meter or service reading and provided a billing statement to the person as to whose service the condition applies. The presumption does not apply with respect to wireless radio communications.

(16) Air bag fraud. A person is guilty of air bag fraud when such person, with intent to defraud another person, obtains property from such other person or a third person by knowingly selling, installing or reinstalling any object, including any counterfeit air bag or nonfunctional air bag, as such terms are defined in section 14-106d, in lieu of an air bag that was designed in accordance with federal safety requirements as provided in 49 CFR 571.208, as amended, and which is proper for the make, model and year of the vehicle, as part of the vehicle inflatable restraint system.

(17) Theft of motor fuel. A person is guilty of theft of motor fuel when such person (A) delivers or causes to be delivered motor fuel, as defined in section 14-327a, into the fuel tank of a vehicle or into a portable container, or into both, on the premises of a retail dealer, as defined in section 14-318, and (B) with the intent to appropriate such motor fuel to himself or a third person, leaves such premises without paying the purchase price for such motor fuel.

(18) Failure to repay surplus Citizens' Election Fund grant funds. A person is guilty of failure to repay surplus Citizens' Election Fund grant funds when such person fails to return to the Citizens' Election Fund any surplus funds from a grant made pursuant to sections 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, not later than ninety days after the primary or election for which the grant is made.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 121; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 24; 1972, P.A. 188, S. 1, 2; P.A. 73-639, S. 21; P.A. 75-225; P.A. 76-109; P.A. 79-268; P.A. 81-224; 81-263, S. 1; P.A. 83-417, S. 1; P.A. 84-248, S. 1; 84-301, S. 1; 84-546, S. 161, 173; P.A. 85-339, S. 1; P.A. 91-162, S. 17, 18; P.A. 92-260, S. 49; P.A. 93-392, S. 5; P.A. 95-246, S. 1; P.A. 01-36; P.A. 03-201, S. 1; 03-278, S. 105; Oct. 25 Sp. Sess. P.A. 05-5, S. 50; P.A. 06-118, S. 2; P.A. 13-282, S. 2; P.A. 14-199, S. 4.)

History: 1971 act deleted “Committing the crime of” preceding actual crimes in Subdivs. (6) to (8), specified actions which constitute theft of services or receiving stolen property in Subdivs. (7) and (8), deleting references to those crimes as defined in Secs. 53a-120 and 53a-126 respectively, and added Subdiv. (9) re shoplifting; 1972 act added Subpara. (B) in Subdiv. (7)(2) re fraud in avoiding payment for use of equipment, including motor vehicles and added Subdiv. (10) re conversion of motor vehicle; P.A. 73-639 revised Subdiv. (10) to clarify title of crime where previously crime described was simply referred to as larceny; P.A. 75-225 deleted provision in Subdiv. (3) which required that finding be based on evidence establishing that case facts and circumstances are “wholly consistent with guilty intent or belief and wholly inconsistent with innocent intent or belief”, and that evidence excludes “to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that of the defendant's intention or belief that the promise would not be performed”; P.A. 76-109 applied provisions of Subdiv. (7) to community antenna television service; P.A. 79-268 specified applicability of Subdiv. (7)(3) re “gas, electricity, water and steam service” for consistency with Subdiv. (7)(5); P.A. 81-224 amended Subdiv. (8) to include receiving the use or benefit of public utility services which have been diverted from or incorrectly registered on a meter as larceny by receiving stolen property; P.A. 81-263 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding the provision that a person is guilty of defrauding a public community who authorizes or files a false claim for benefits from a local, state or federal agency or accepts the benefits from a false claim; P.A. 83-417 added Subdiv. (11) re obtaining property through fraudulent use of an automatic teller machine; P.A. 84-248 added Subdiv. (12) defining crime of library theft and the Revisors editorially added a subdivision catchline to conform with previously existing Subdivs.; P.A. 84-301 amended Subdiv. (11) by replacing “automatic” with “automated”, adding provisions re prosecution for larceny based upon more than one instance of fraudulent use, and adding definition of “automated teller machine”; P.A. 84-546 made technical change in Subdiv. (12); P.A. 85-339 added Subdiv. (13) re conversion of leased personal property; P.A. 91-162 amended Subdiv. (13) to delete refusal to return leased personal property or failure to return leased personal property to a certain place within a certain time as elements of the offense of conversion of leased personal property in order to protect consumers leasing personal property under consumer rent-to-own agreements, as defined in Sec. 42-240a, from being charged with the offense of conversion of leased personal property upon their refusal or failure to return such property to the lessor; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subdiv. (6) and made technical changes in Subpara. indicators in Subdivs. (6) to (8), inclusive; P.A. 93-392 added Subdiv. (14) re failure to pay prevailing rate of wages; P.A. 95-246 amended Subdiv. (7) to delete Subpara. (C) re theft of gas, electricity, water, steam, telecommunication or community antenna service, Subpara. (D) re tampering with a meter or measuring device to avoid payment for service the charge or compensation of which is measured by such meter or device and Subpara. (E) re tampering with the equipment of a supplier of gas, electricity, water, steam, telephone or community antenna television service, relettering former Subpara. (F) as Subpara. (C), and added Subdiv. (15) re theft of utility service; (Revisors's note: In 1999 the words in Subdiv. (8)(C) “as not been registered” were replaced editorially by the Revisors with “has not been registered” to correct a clerical error); P.A. 01-36 added Subdiv. (16) re air bag fraud (Revisor's note: In Subdiv. (16), the heading “Air bag fraud.” was added editorially by the Revisors following “(16)” to conform the format of this new subdivision with the format of Subdivs. (1) to (15), inclusive, each of which was enacted with a descriptive heading); P.A. 03-201 added Subdiv. (17) re theft of motor fuel; P.A. 03-278 made technical changes in Subdiv. (11), effective July 9, 2003; Oct. 25 Sp. Sess. P.A. 05-5 added Subdiv. (18) re failure to repay surplus Citizens' Election Fund grant funds, effective December 31, 2006, and applicable to elections held on or after that date; P.A. 06-118 amended Subdiv. (13) to add provision in Subpara. (A) that acknowledgment of receipt of written demand by lessee is not necessary to establish that 192 hours have passed since written demand was sent and to exclude from definition of “leased personal property” in Subpara. (D) personal property that is rented or leased pursuant to chapter 743i; P.A. 13-282 amended Subdiv. (16) by adding references to selling and to counterfeit or nonfunctional air bags; P.A. 14-199 amended Subdiv. (7)(B)(i) to add exception re Sec. 13b-38i.

Cited. 170 C. 463. Inference based on possession of recently stolen property; meaning of “possession”; mere presence of passenger in motor vehicle containing recently stolen goods is insufficient to support conviction. 171 C. 127. Cited. 172 C. 571; 174 C. 338; 176 C. 239; 178 C. 163; Id., 649; Id., 689; 179 C. 576; 180 C. 662; 181 C. 172; Id., 254; Id., 299; Id., 388; 182 C. 449; Id., 476; 183 C. 299; Id., 386; 185 C. 211; 186 C. 1; Id., 426; 188 C. 671; Id., 681; 189 C. 114; Id., 383; 190 C. 104; Id., 541; 194 C. 198; Id., 223; 196 C. 115; Id., 225; Id., 567; 197 C. 17; Id., 201; Id., 247; 198 C. 1; 199 C. 207; 200 C. 310; Id., 586; 201 C. 489; 209 C. 564; 210 C. 652; 211 C. 101; 212 C. 31; 213 C. 422; 214 C. 132; Id., 161; Id., 717; 218 C. 273; 221 C. 685; 223 C. 243; 224 C. 711; 227 C. 611; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; Id., 455; Id., 740; 233 C. 527; Id., 552; 235 C. 502; 241 C. 439; Id., 702; 242 C. 666. Statutory theft under Sec. 52-564 is synonymous with larceny as provided in section; pursuant to section, a person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from the owner. 255 C. 20. Although lack of consent is not specifically enumerated as element of larceny in the first degree, donative victim's inability to consent to a taking is a factor properly considered in the context of traditional understanding of larceny statute. 256 C. 135.

Cited. 1 CA 642; 3 CA 633; 4 CA 544; 5 CA 599; 7 CA 1; Id., 326; Id., 532; 8 CA 125; Id., 491; 9 CA 121; Id., 141; Id., 313; Id., 373; 10 CA 447; 11 CA 102; Id., 161; 12 CA 1; Id., 163; Id., 408; 13 CA 12; Id., 576; Id., 578; Id., 596; 14 CA 88; Id., 472; 15 CA 641; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; Id., 521; Id., 695; 20 CA 513; Id., 665; 21 CA 431; 25 CA 298; Id., 646; 26 CA 52; 28 CA 469; Id., 521; 29 CA 283; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795; 30 CA 190; 31 CA 47; 33 CA 303; Id., 339; Id., 368; Id., 603; 34 CA 250; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; Id., 599; Id., 694; Id., 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 566; 37 CA 482; Id., 589; Id., 619; 38 CA 481; Id., 643; 39 CA 96; Id., 579; 41 CA 584; Id., 695; 42 CA 599; 43 CA 499; Id., 801; 44 CA 294; 45 CA 6; Id., 46; Id., 369; Id., 455; 46 CA 269; Id., 414; Id., 616; Id., 691; Id., 778; 47 CA 1. Section includes “theft of services” as larceny. 66 CA 740. Employers did not commit extortion when they sought restitution of wages from employee who was found guilty of misappropriating the wages. 75 CA 319. The essential elements of larceny are (1) the wrongful taking or carrying away of the personal property of another, (2) the existence of a felonious intent in the taker to deprive the owner of the property permanently, and (3) the lack of consent of the owner; to prove the requisite specific intent, the state must show that defendant acted with the subjective desire or knowledge that his actions constituted stealing. 115 CA 295. Evidence insufficient to establish intent to commit larceny where there was no claim that defendant was not the legal owner of the money taken and evidence was presented that defendant was seeking return of defendant's specific property, albeit by force. 148 CA 684; judgment affirmed, see 317 C. 338.

Cited. 32 CS 650; Id., 653; 34 CS 612; 36 CS 570; 37 CS 678. Statutory definition of larceny does not modify common law rule that proof of the identity of the owner of stolen property is not an element of the crime of larceny. Id., 809. Cited. Id., 853; 38 CS 1; Id., 593; 39 CS 27; Id., 363.

Subdiv. (1):

Cited. 178 C. 480; 199 C. 462; 203 C. 682; 208 C. 420.

Cited. 9 CA 365; 11 CA 684.

Subdiv. (2):

Cited. 169 C. 581; 177 C. 243; 194 C. 96; Id., 233; 195 C. 421; 198 C. 348; 242 C. 345.

Cited. 4 CA 69; 14 CA 88; 28 CA 306.

Subdiv. (5):

Cited. 237 C. 501.

Cited. 7 CA 367; 21 CA 386; 22 CA 449; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501; 40 CA 151. Extortion claim that failed to allege conspirators threatened to bring lawsuit against defendants and to publicize their claims if they were not paid the money demanded held legally insufficient. 62 CA 11.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 14 CA 272; 17 CA 486; 27 CA 635; 44 CA 187.

Subdiv. (7):

Charging in the conjunctive discussed; judgment of Appellate Court in 30 CA 571 reversed. 231 C. 411.

Cited. 10 CA 486; 30 CA 571; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 411; 38 CA 277.

For conviction of offense of theft of services rendered at hotel, motel, inn or comparable establishment, the state must show that accused had been transient guest thereat. 34 CS 603.

Subdiv. (8):

Cited. 178 C. 416. Instruction on intent unnecessary under statute. 181 C. 299. Cited. 188 C. 325. Mens rea and scienter discussed. 192 C. 405. Cited. 195 C. 421; 200 C. 113; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 1 CA 270; 5 CA 129; 8 CA 13; 15 CA 416; 16 CA 402; 25 CA 149; 26 CA 33; 31 CA 614; 37 CA 40; 43 CA 613.

Cited. 31 CS 510. Mental element required is knowledge or belief that the property probably has been stolen; there must be more than mere suspicion or conjecture; use of word “probably” as a specification of degree of certainty clarifies law. 35 CS 531. Cited. 36 CS 603.

Subdiv. (9):

Evidence insufficient to prove that defendant attempted to intentionally deprive store of its property that it exposed for sale within the store. 163 CA 810; judgment reversed in part, see 327 C. 297.

Sec. 53a-119a. Shoplifting and library theft; detention, questioning, presumption of crime. (a) Any owner, authorized agent or authorized employee of a retail mercantile establishment, who observes any person concealing or attempting to conceal goods displayed for sale therein, or the ownership of such goods, or transporting such goods from such premises without payment therefor, may question such person as to his name and address and, if such owner, agent or employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the person so questioned was then attempting to commit or was committing larceny of such goods on the premises of such establishment, may detain such person for a time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises. Any person so questioned by such owner, authorized agent or authorized employee pursuant to the provisions of this section shall promptly identify himself by name and address. No other information shall be required of such person until a police officer has taken him into custody. For the purposes of this subsection, “reasonable grounds” shall include knowledge that a person has concealed unpurchased merchandise of such establishment while on the premises or has altered or removed identifying labels on such merchandise while on the premises or is leaving such premises with such unpurchased or concealed or altered merchandise in his possession.

(b) Whenever an employee or authorized agent of a library facility, as defined in subdivision (12) of section 53a-119, has reasonable grounds to believe that a person (1) is removing or is attempting to remove, without authority, a book or other archival library materials, as defined in said subdivision (12) of section 53a-119, from a library facility or (2) is intentionally mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials, such employee or authorized agent may question such person as to his name and address and may detain such person for a time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises. Any person so questioned by such employee or agent shall promptly identify himself by name and address. For the purposes of this subsection, reasonable grounds shall include knowledge that a person (A) has concealed a book or other archival library materials while on the library facility premises or is removing such book or material from the library facility premises without authority or (B) has mutilated, defaced or destroyed a book or other archival library materials belonging to or deposited in a library facility.

(c) In any civil action by a person detained under the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section against the person so detaining him or the principal or employer of such person arising out of such questioning or detention by any such owner, agent or employee, evidence that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff was, at the time in question, committing or attempting to commit larceny or mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials shall create a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was so committing or attempting to commit larceny or mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials.

(P.A. 73-617, S. 2; P.A. 84-248, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 50.)

History: P.A. 84-248 inserted new Subsec. (b) authorizing employees or authorized agents of library facilities to detain and question any person who, on reasonable grounds, is suspected of attempting to commit library theft, relettering former Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), and adding provision re “mutilating, defacing or destroying library books or archival library materials”; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsecs. (b) and (c).

Transgression of statute results in merchant's inability to assert statutory privilege in a civil proceeding but does not require exclusion of evidence in a related criminal prosecution. 39 CS 392.

Sec. 53a-119b. Using motor vehicle or vessel without owner's permission. Interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle. First offense: Class A misdemeanor. Subsequent offense: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of using a motor vehicle without the owner's permission when: (1) He operates or uses, or causes to be operated or used, any motor vehicle unless he has the consent of the owner; or (2) he obtains the consent of the owner to the use of his motor vehicle by fraud or fraudulent means, statement or representations.

(b) A person is guilty of using a vessel, as defined in section 15-127, without the owner's permission when: (1) He operates or uses, or causes to be operated or used, any vessel unless he has the consent of the owner; or (2) he obtains the consent of the owner to the use of his vessel by fraud or fraudulent means, statement or representations.

(c) A person is guilty of interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle when: (1) He puts into motion the engine of any motor vehicle while it is standing without the permission of the owner except that a property owner or his agent may remove any motor vehicle left without authorization on such owner's property in accordance with section 14-145; or (2) with intent and without right to do so, he damages any motor vehicle or damages or removes any of its parts or components.

(d) Using a motor vehicle or a vessel without the owner's permission or interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle is a class A misdemeanor for a first offense and a class D felony for each subsequent offense.

(P.A. 73-639, S. 18; P.A. 80-292, S. 10; 80-341, S. 3; P.A. 81-351, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 80-292 replaced previous Subsec. (b) provision which made use of motor vehicle without owner's permission a Class B misdemeanor with new provisions specifying first such offense as Class A misdemeanor and subsequent offenses as Class D felonies; P.A. 80-341 inserted new Subsec. (b) re use of vessel without owner's permission, relettering and revising former Subsec. (b) as necessary to reflect its insertion; P.A. 81-351 inserted new Subsec. (c) on interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle, relettering former Subsec. (c) accordingly.

Cited. 195 C. 567; 206 C. 657; 231 C. 195.

Cited. 10 CA 361; 14 CA 119; Id., 169; 21 CA 645; 25 CA 181; 26 CA 165; 27 CA 49; 32 CA 483; 36 CA 364; 37 CA 276; 39 CA 1; 43 CA 613; 45 CA 369.

Cited. 37 CS 901; 43 CS 211.

Sec. 53a-119c. Larceny of a motor vehicle: Class E felony, first offense; class D felony, second offense; class B felony, subsequent offense. (a) A person is guilty of larceny of a motor vehicle when such person commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and the property consists of a motor vehicle.

(b) For purposes of this section, “motor vehicle” means any motor vehicle, construction equipment, agricultural tractor or farm implement or major component part of any of the above. In any prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, evidence of (1) forcible entry, (2) forcible removal of ignition, or (3) alteration, mutilation or removal of a vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence that (A) the person in control or possession of such motor vehicle knows or should have known that such motor vehicle is stolen, and (B) such person possesses such motor vehicle with larcenous intent.

(c) Larceny of a motor vehicle is (1) a class E felony for a first offense, (2) a class D felony for a second offense, and (3) a class B felony for any subsequent offense.

(P.A. 22-115, S. 13.)

Sec. 53a-120. Theft of services; service and credit card defined. Section 53a-120 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 122; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

Sec. 53a-121. Value of property or services. (a) For the purposes of this part, the value of property or services shall be ascertained as follows: (1) Except as otherwise specified in this section, value means the market value of the property or services at the time and place of the crime or, if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property or services within a reasonable time after the crime. (2) Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, written instruments, except those having a readily ascertainable market value such as some public and corporate bonds and securities, shall be evaluated as follows: (A) The value of an instrument constituting evidence of debt, such as a check, draft or promissory note, shall be deemed the amount due or collectible thereon, such figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any portion thereof which has been satisfied; (B) the value of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument. (3) When the value of property or services cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less than fifty dollars.

(b) Amounts included in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 123.)

Cited. 182 C. 52; 191 C. 180; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 7 CA 326; 9 CA 313; 19 CA 521; 25 CA 298; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501. Definition of value is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of case. 111 CA 543.

Evidence of trade-in value insufficient to establish market value or replacement cost for purposes of statute. 35 CS 531.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 176 C. 239; 178 C. 416; 181 C. 172; 190 C. 191; 196 C. 166; Id., 225; Id., 247; Id., 396; 199 C. 308; 200 C. 113.

Cited. 5 CA 129; 12 CA 408; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 269. Subdiv. (1): Market value has been defined as the price that would in all probability result from fair negotiations, where the seller is willing to sell and the buyer desires to buy. 95 CA 248.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 177 C. 243; 178 C. 649; 199 C. 462; 228 C. 926; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 235 C. 502. Thefts are part of “one scheme or course of conduct” if the acts constituting the crime charged are a series of thefts committed in a similar manner and are closely related in time. 305 C. 806.

Cited. 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; 34 CA 250; 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-122. Larceny in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the first degree when such person commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and: (1) The property or service, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion, (2) the value of the property or service exceeds twenty thousand dollars, or (3) the property is obtained by defrauding a public community, and the value of such property exceeds two thousand dollars.

(b) Larceny in the first degree is a class B felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 124; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 25; P.A. 73-639, S. 7; P.A. 81-248, S. 1; 81-351, S. 3; P.A. 82-271, S. 1; P.A. 86-275, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 51; P.A. 00-103, S. 1; P.A. 09-138, S. 1; P.A. 22-115, S. 8.)

History: 1971 act deleted detailed description of extortionist acts in Subsec. (a)(1), i.e. threat of physical injury, damage to property, etc., and made first degree larceny a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 73-639 made first degree larceny a Class B felony; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 81-351 included property consisting of a motor vehicle having a value exceeding $2,000 in the definition of larceny in the first degree inserted new Subsec. (b) enumerating conditions constituting prima facie evidence of a larcenous intent in regard to motor vehicles and relettered former Subsec. (b) accordingly; P.A. 82-271 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by increasing from $2,000 to $10,000 the value of the property or service obtained and added Subsec. (a)(4) concerning defrauding a public community; P.A. 86-275 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to increase the value of a motor vehicle subject to the section from in excess of $2,000 to in excess of $10,000; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(3); P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining “motor vehicle” and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent; P.A. 09-138 amended Subsec. (a) to increase in Subdiv. (2) the value of the property or service obtained from in excess of $10,000 to in excess of $20,000 and increase in Subdiv. (3) the value of a motor vehicle obtained from in excess of $10,000 to in excess of $20,000; P.A. 22-115 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change, delete Subdiv. (3) re property consisting of a motor vehicle and redesignate existing Subdiv. (4) as Subdiv. (3), deleted former Subsec. (b) defining “motor vehicle” and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b).

Inference based on possession of recently stolen property (driver versus passenger of motor van containing stolen property); meaning of “possession”. 171 C. 119. Mere presence of passenger in vehicle containing stolen goods is insufficient to support conviction. Id., 127. Cited. 174 C. 253; Id., 338; 182 C. 52; 183 C. 383; 186 C. 648; 188 C. 715; 189 C. 717; 190 C. 559; 194 C. 361; 196 C. 185; 197 C. 201; Id., 247; 199 C. 30; Id., 207; 202 C. 86; 204 C. 52; 213 C. 233; 224 C. 711; 237 C. 501; 241 C. 413; Id., 439.

Cited. 3 CA 359; 5 CA 113; Id., 347; 6 CA 164; 7 CA 326; Id., 532; 9 CA 349; 12 CA 585; 14 CA 272; 20 CA 810; 21 CA 431; 29 CA 843; 34 CA 599; Id., 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 36 CA 364; 37 CA 40; 45 CA 455.

Cited. 31 CS 501.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 581; 176 C. 239; 177 C. 243; 178 C. 427; Id., 163; Id., 416; Id., 480; Id., 649; 180 C. 182; Id., 662. 181 C. 172; Id., 254, 255; Id., 299; 182 C. 52; 183 C. 225; 185 C. 211; 188 C. 671; Id., 681; 189 C. 114; Id., 201; Id., 337; Id., 383; 190 C. 541; 192 C. 405; 195 C. 421; 196 C. 225; 197 C. 17; Id., 413; Id., 629; 198 C. 348; Id., 369; 199 C. 14; 208 C. 420; 214 C. 132; Id., 717; 218 C. 151; 219 C. 93; 221 C. 685; 227 C. 611; 232 C. 691; 233 C. 527; Id., 552; 235 C. 502; 242 C. 345. Subdiv. (2): Although lack of consent is not specifically enumerated as element of larceny in the first degree, donative victim's inability to consent to a taking is a factor properly considered in the context of a traditional understanding of larceny statute. 256 C. 135.

Cited. 3 CA 633; 4 CA 251; 5 CA 129; 7 CA 292; Id., 445; 8 CA 125; Id., 376; 9 CA 121; Id., 313; Id., 365; 10 CA 447; 11 CA 684; 13 CA 576; 15 CA 416; 16 CA 402; 17 CA 50; Id., 359; Id., 486; 20 CA 354; Id., 665; 21 CA 386; 22 CA 449; 24 CA 502; 25 CA 149; Id., 181; 26 CA 279; 28 CA 306; Id., 521; 29 CA 394; 30 CA 190; 31 CA 614; 33 CA 368; 34 CA 694; 35 CA 566; Id., 740; 36 CA 774; 37 CA 589; Id., 619; 38 CA 481; Id., 643; 39 CA 96; 41 CA 695; 43 CA 499; 44 CA 187; Id., 476; 47 CA 1. Defendant's claim that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of larceny in the first degree was unavailing; the evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to sustaining verdict, was sufficient to support jury's finding that value of victim's car exceeded $10,000, as required by statute, and it was not improper for trial court to permit victim to testify as to his opinion of car's value at time of the crime. 81 CA 377. Subdiv. (3): Vehicle's owner was competent to testify as to the value of his property and that testimony was sufficient to satisfy statutory element that its value exceeded ten thousand dollars. 95 CA 248.

Sec. 53a-123. Larceny in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the second degree when such person commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and: (1) The value of the property or service exceeds ten thousand dollars, (2) the property, regardless of its nature or value, is taken from the person of another, (3) the property is obtained by defrauding a public community, and the value of such property is two thousand dollars or less, (4) the property, regardless of its nature or value, is obtained by embezzlement, false pretenses or false promise and the victim of such larceny is sixty years of age or older, or is a conserved person, as defined in section 45a-644, or is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or (5) the property, regardless of its value, consists of wire, cable or other equipment used in the provision of telecommunications service and the taking of such property causes an interruption in the provision of emergency telecommunications service.

(b) Larceny in the second degree is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 125; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 26; P.A. 73-639, S. 8; P.A. 81-248, S. 2; 81-263, S. 2; 81-351, S. 4; 81-472, S. 152, 159; P.A. 82-271, S. 2; P.A. 86-275, S. 2; P.A. 97-180; P.A. 00-103, S. 2; P.A. 09-138, S. 2; 09-243, S. 1; P.A. 17-87, S. 5; P.A. 22-115, S. 9.)

History: 1971 act applied second degree larceny to cases where property is a motor vehicle and made second degree larceny a Class D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor; P.A. 73-639 specified that taking property, regardless of its nature or value, from another's person is second degree larceny; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 81-263 added Subsec. (a)(4) re property obtained by defrauding a public community where the value of the property is less than $2,000; P.A. 81-351 amended the definition of larceny of a motor vehicle to that with a value of $2,000 or less, inserted new Subsec. (b) enumerating conditions constituting prima facie evidence of a larcenous intent in regard to motor vehicles and relettered former Subsec. (b) accordingly; P.A. 81-472 made technical corrections; P.A. 82-271 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by increasing from $500 to $5,000 the value of the property or service obtained and amended Subsec. (c) by changing the classification from a class D to a class C felony; P.A. 86-275 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to increase the value of a motor vehicle subject to the section from $2,000 or less to a value which exceeds $5,000; P.A. 97-180 added Subsec. (a)(5) re property obtained by embezzlement, false pretenses or false promise from an aged, blind or disabled victim; P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining “motor vehicle” and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent; P.A. 09-138 amended Subsec. (a) to increase in Subdiv. (1) the value of a motor vehicle obtained from in excess of $5,000 to in excess of $10,000 and increase in Subdiv. (2) the value of the property or service obtained from in excess of $5,000 to in excess of $10,000; P.A. 09-243 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (6) re the taking of wire, cable or other equipment that causes interruption in emergency telecommunications service; P.A. 17-87 amended Subsec. (a)(5) by adding provision re conserved person; P.A. 22-115 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change, delete Subdiv. (1) re property consisting of a motor vehicle and redesignate existing Subdivs. (2) to (6) as Subdivs. (1) to (5), deleted former Subsec. (b) defining “motor vehicle” and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b).

Cited. 173 C. 545; 182 C. 176; 183 C. 386; 188 C. 542; 190 C. 559; 194 C. 438; Id., 650; 196 C. 305; Id., 567; 197 C. 166; Id., 201; Id., 247; Id., 309; 198 C. 1; 199 C. 30; Id., 308; Id., 462; 200 C. 113; 202 C. 615; 203 C. 484; 209 C. 23; 213 C. 233; 216 C. 273; 235 C. 679; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 2 CA 537; 5 CA 113; 7 CA 326; 8 CA 125; Id., 478; 9 CA 349; 13 CA 420; Id., 576; Id., 596; 14 CA 272; Id., 472; 16 CA 433; 17 CA 460; 19 CA 495; 20 CA 271; Id., 369; 21 CA 248; 29 CA 843; 35 CA 566; Id., 714; 39 CA 810; 44 CA 187; Id., 294; 46 CA 691. Since statute's language includes both taking of property and subsequent retention of the stolen property, to charge defendant with two counts of larceny is improper; they are not separately punishable and to so charge violates defendant's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 100 CA 565.

Requisites for accepting plea of guilty. 31 CS 501. Cited. 32 CS 650; 35 CS 531; 38 CS 549.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 247; 174 C. 129; Id., 129; 178 C. 427; Id., 689; 181 C. 299; 182 C. 476; 186 C. 426; 187 C. 264; 188 C. 325; Id., 671; 190 C. 191; 191 C. 180; 195 C. 421; 196 C. 36; Id., 115; 198 C. 203; Id., 490; 200 C. 9; 201 C. 462; 206 C. 657; 207 C. 118; 208 C. 365; 210 C. 652; 211 C. 101; 212 C. 223; 213 C. 422; 215 C. 716; 219 C. 160; 220 C. 487; 223 C. 243; 232 C. 455; 233 C. 552; 235 C. 67; 238 C. 784; 239 C. 235; 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (3): Rational basis exists for legislature to classify larceny from the person as a more serious offense than simple robbery and therefore the classification did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. 246 C. 132. For defendant to be found guilty of larceny in the third degree, state must prove that defendant committed larceny by defrauding a public community. 252 C. 229. P.A. 09-138, which increased the minimum value element from $5,000 to $10,000, did not have retroactive effect. 314 C. 529.

Cited. 1 CA 270; Id., 378, 379. Subdiv. (3): Larceny from the person requires an actual trespass to the person of the victim and therefore taking a radio which was in the vicinity of the victim, but not on the victim's person, did not constitute larceny under section. Id., 642. Cited. 3 CA 126; 8 CA 491; 11 CA 102; 12 CA 239; Id., 408; Id., 685; 13 CA 12; Id., 554; 14 CA 169; Id., 493; 20 CA 513; 24 CA 697; 26 CA 52; Id., 114; Id., 279; 28 CA 306; 30 CA 606; 31 CA 47; Id., 94; Id., 312; 32 CA 21; 33 CA 468; 34 CA 250; Id., 610; Id., 699; 35 CA 740; 38 CA 643; 39 CA 579; Id., 840; 40 CA 21; 41 CA 391; Id., 584; Id., 817; 42 CA 810; 46 CA 414; Id., 616. Court found that money was “taken from the person of the victim” in case in which victim was tricked into turning over her money to defendant. 56 CA 428. Subdiv. (3): Wrongfully taking property from the person of another constitutes a trespass of the person, and such a taking from the person constitutes larceny in the second degree. 95 CA 248. Larceny in second degree under section is not ordinarily lesser included offense of robbery for purposes of double jeopardy. 109 CA 74. Subdiv. (5): Section not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and provided sufficient notice that embezzlement from an estate is prohibited even if conduct occurred after separate conservator of estate was appointed. 121 CA 190; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 592. Subsec., as amended by P.A. 09-138 to increase the value of property taken for the commission of larceny in the second degree, does not apply retroactively to defendant's case; legislature stated that the provision was effective October 1, 2009, without any express language referring to retroactivity and the legislative history does not indicate a clear or unequivocal intent for it to apply retroactively. 136 CA 427; judgment affirmed, see 314 C. 570. Subdiv. (3): Defendant's conviction of and sentencing under this Subdiv. and Secs. 53a-48(a) and 53a-124(a)(2) constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and violate defendant's right against double jeopardy. 176 CA 687.

Cited. 36 CS 603; 37 CS 527.

Sec. 53a-124. Larceny in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the third degree when such person commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and: (1) The value of the property or service exceeds two thousand dollars; (2) the property consists of a public record, writing or instrument kept, held or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; or (3) the property consists of a sample, culture, microorganism, specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any other article, material, device or substance which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects or records a secret scientific or technical process, invention or formula or any phase or part thereof. A process, invention or formula is “secret” when it is not, and is not intended to be, available to anyone other than the owner thereof or selected persons having access thereto for limited purposes with his consent, and when it accords or may accord the owner an advantage over competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof.

(b) Larceny in the third degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 126; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 27; P.A. 73-639, S. 9; P.A. 81-248, S. 3; P.A. 82-271, S. 3; P.A. 88-170; P.A. 92-260, S. 52; P.A. 00-103, S. 3; P.A. 09-138, S. 3; P.A. 22-115, S. 10.)

History: 1971 act deleted former Subsec. (a)(5) which classified obtaining property or service, regardless of its nature or value, by extortion as third degree larceny; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subsec. (a)(4) which classified taking property from the person of another, regardless of its nature or value, as third degree larceny; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 82-271 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by increasing from $50 to $1,000 the value of the property or service obtained and amended Subsec. (c) by changing the classification from a class B misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 88-170 amended Subsec. (a) by adding property consisting of a motor vehicle, the value of which is $5,000 or less and inserted new Subsec. (b) stating that in any prosecution under Subsec. (a)(1), evidence of forcible entry, forcible removal of ignition or alternation, mutilation or removal of vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence of larcenous intent, relettering former Subsec. (b) as (c); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining “motor vehicle” and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent; P.A. 09-138 amended Subsec. (a) to increase in Subdiv. (1) the maximum value of a motor vehicle obtained from $5,000 to $10,000 and increase in Subdiv. (2) the value of the property or service obtained from in excess of $1,000 to in excess of $2,000; P.A. 22-115 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change, delete Subdiv. (1) re property consisting of a motor vehicle and redesignate existing Subdivs. (2) and (3) as Subdivs. (1) and (2), deleted former Subsec. (b) defining “motor vehicle” and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b).

See Sec. 53a-212 re stealing a firearm.

Cited. 184 C. 95; Id., 258; Id., 434; 185 C. 260; 187 C. 292; Id., 444; 189 C. 364; 190 C. 715; 191 C. 180; 194 C. 198; Id., 233; Id., 623; 197 C. 247; 200 C. 586; 207 C. 109; 213 C. 233; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 3 CA 503; 7 CA 326; 8 CA 13; Id., 342; Id., 478; Id., 667; 9 CA 141; 10 CA 258; 12 CA 196; 14 CA 159; Id., 272; 18 CA 368; 19 CA 48; 20 CA 810; 23 CA 201; 25 CA 298; 29 CA 843; 32 CA 476; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; Id., 368; 38 CA 643; 41 CA 751; 46 CA 691.

Cited. 36 CS 578; Id., 583; Id., 603; 37 CS 678; Id., 796.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 161; 176 C. 239; 178 C. 287; 179 C. 576; 182 C. 397; 186 C. 222; 189 C. 461; 190 C. 104; 195 C. 567; 199 C. 88; 214 C. 132; 221 C. 685; 230 C. 351; 232 C. 740; 235 C. 502; 239 C. 235; 241 C. 702.

Cited. 6 CA 697; 10 CA 486; 12 CA 1; 14 CA 256; 15 CA 122; 19 CA 521; 21 CA 431; 24 CA 697; 26 CA 279; 28 CA 306; 33 CA 603; 37 CA 219; Id., 482; 39 CA 579; 41 CA 695; 43 CA 613; 46 CA 269. Subdiv. (2): Defendant's conviction of and sentencing under this Subdiv. and Secs. 53a-48(a) and 53a-123(a)(3) constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and violate defendant's right against double jeopardy. 176 CA 687.

Cited. 33 CS 669; Id., 706; 34 CS 603; Id., 656.

Sec. 53a-125. Larceny in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the fourth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service exceeds one thousand dollars.

(b) Larceny in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 127; P.A. 81-248, S. 4; P.A. 82-271, S. 4; P.A. 09-138, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 82-271 amended Subsec. (a) by increasing the value of the property or service obtained from $50 or less to in excess of $500 and amended Subsec. (b) by changing the classification from a class C to a class A misdemeanor; P.A. 09-138 amended Subsec. (a) to increase the value of the property or service obtained from in excess of $500 to in excess of $1,000.

Cited. 172 C. 571; 176 C. 239; 178 C. 416; 179 C. 576; 181 C. 388; 182 C. 242; 194 C. 198; 197 C. 247; Id., 396; 202 C. 443; 209 C. 34; 213 C. 233; 218 C. 273; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 4 CA 514; 5 CA 612; 7 CA 326; 9 CA 133; 12 CA 1; 14 CA 119; Id., 272; Id., 526; 15 CA 641; 20 CA 586; 22 CA 440; 26 CA 33; 29 CA 843; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; 35 CA 405; 38 CA 20. It is possible for defendant to be convicted of larceny for taking property he owns and for depriving bailee of its superior right of possession and the amount of bailee's lien interest in the motor vehicle; but the value of the theft is limited by amount of bailee's lien as secured by the property itself. 59 CA 135.

Cited. 34 CS 612; 35 CS 531; 36 CS 603; 37 CS 755; Id., 853; 38 CS 593; 39 CS 363; Id., 392.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 235 C. 502.

Cited. 3 CA 359; 6 CA 164; 7 CA 1; 11 CA 805; 31 CA 312; 38 CA 643.

Sec. 53a-125a. Larceny in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the fifth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service exceeds five hundred dollars.

(b) Larceny in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(P.A. 82-271, S. 5; P.A. 09-138, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 09-138 amended Subsec. (a) to increase the value of the property or service obtained from in excess of $250 to in excess of $500.

Cited. 201 C. 125; 203 C. 682; 210 C. 435; 213 C. 233; 231 C. 411; 241 C. 439.

Cited. 7 CA 75; 14 CA 205; Id., 272; 15 CA 197; 19 CA 48; 21 CA 331; 24 CA 556; Id., 563; 25 CA 298; 29 CA 843; 30 CA 571; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 411; 37 CA 228; 38 CA 277; 46 CA 118. Defendant may be convicted of larceny in the fifth degree by illegal use of a credit card. 75 CA 756.

Sec. 53a-125b. Larceny in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the sixth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service is five hundred dollars or less.

(b) Larceny in the sixth degree is a class C misdemeanor.

(P.A. 82-271, S. 6; P.A. 09-138, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 09-138 amended Subsec. (a) to increase the maximum value of the property or service obtained from $250 to $500.

Cited. 201 C. 559; 202 C. 369; 203 C. 682; 208 C. 387; 210 C. 435; 212 C. 50; 213 C. 233; 237 C. 613; 241 C. 439. Convictions under this section, Sec. 53a-129d and Sec. 53a-128d(2) do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 326 C. 310. When circumstantial evidence is capable of raising the logical inference of ownership, such evidence is sufficient as a matter of law despite the absence of testimony by the owner identifying the specific property as his own. 327 C. 297.

Cited. 3 CA 132; 4 CA 676; 5 CA 599; 10 CA 130; Id., 503; 13 CA 214; Id., 438; Id., 578; 14 CA 88; Id., 205; Id., 272; Id., 309; 15 CA 197; 17 CA 273; 19 CA 48; 23 CA 123; 28 CA 195; 29 CA 843; 33 CA 432; 37 CA 228; 39 CA 384; 44 CA 125; 46 CA 778. Statutory requirement of “value” set forth in statute is satisfied where witness testified about the usefulness of coats that had been left in her vehicle; it was not necessary to prove coats were spun from silk or fashioned from the finest cloth to satisfy statutory requirement of “value”. 101 CA 144.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 214 C. 161.

Cited. 24 CA 502; 28 CA 469; 37 CA 482; 38 CA 643; 45 CA 6. No double jeopardy where defendant convicted of larceny in the sixth degree and robbery in the third degree. 100 CA 122. Ownership of property by store could not be inferred from evidence offered by state concerning value of such property, and state therefor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of larceny in the sixth degree. 163 CA 810; judgment reversed in part, see 327 C. 297. Evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant or alleged coconspirator stole headphones, either as a substantive crime or as overt act in furtherance of conspiracy to commit larceny under Sec. 53a-48. 164 CA 25.

Sec. 53a-125c. Telephone fraud in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of telephone fraud in the first degree when such person (1) knowingly or intentionally devises or participates in a scheme to defraud another person of money or property, (2) (A) employs false pretenses or false promises, as described in section 53a-119, to obtain such money or property and the amount of such money or the value of such property exceeds twenty thousand dollars, or (B) regardless of its value, obtains such money or property by extortion, and (3) uses a telephonic call, including, but not limited to, a call made by an individual, an automated telephone call and a recorded message, to obtain such money or property from such other person.

(b) Telephone fraud in the first degree is a class B felony.

(P.A. 16-148, S. 2.)

Sec. 53a-125d. Telephone fraud in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of telephone fraud in the second degree when such person (1) knowingly or intentionally devises or participates in a scheme to defraud another person of money or property, (2) employs false pretenses or false promises, as described in section 53a-119, to obtain such money or property and the amount of such money or the value of such property exceeds ten thousand dollars, and (3) uses a telephonic call, including, but not limited to, a call made by an individual, an automated telephone call and a recorded message, to obtain such money or property from such other person.

(b) Telephone fraud in the second degree is a class C felony.

(P.A. 16-148, S. 3.)

Sec. 53a-125e. Telephone fraud in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of telephone fraud in the third degree when such person (1) knowingly or intentionally devises or participates in a scheme to defraud another person of money or property, (2) employs false pretenses or false promises, as described in section 53a-119, to obtain such money or property and the amount of such money or the value of such property exceeds two thousand dollars, and (3) uses a telephonic call, including, but not limited to, a call made by an individual, an automated telephone call and a recorded message, to obtain such money or property from such other person.

(b) Telephone fraud in the third degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 16-148, S. 4.)

Sec. 53a-125f. Telephone fraud in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of telephone fraud in the fourth degree when such person (1) knowingly or intentionally devises or participates in a scheme to defraud another person of money or property, (2) employs false pretenses or false promises, as described in section 53a-119, to obtain such money or property and the amount of such money or the value of such property exceeds one thousand dollars, and (3) uses a telephonic call, including, but not limited to, a call made by an individual, an automated telephone call and a recorded message, to obtain such money or property from such other person.

(b) Telephone fraud in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 16-148, S. 5.)

Sec. 53a-125g. Telephone fraud in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of telephone fraud in the fifth degree when such person (1) knowingly or intentionally devises or participates in a scheme to defraud another person of money or property, (2) employs false pretenses or false promises, as described in section 53a-119, to obtain such money or property and the amount of such money or the value of such property exceeds five hundred dollars, and (3) uses a telephonic call, including, but not limited to, a call made by an individual, an automated telephone call and a recorded message, to obtain such money or property from such other person.

(b) Telephone fraud in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(P.A. 16-148, S. 6.)

Sec. 53a-125h. Telephone fraud in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of telephone fraud in the sixth degree when such person (1) knowingly or intentionally devises or participates in a scheme to defraud another person of money or property, (2) employs false pretenses or false promises, as described in section 53a-119, to obtain such money or property and the amount of such money or the value of such property is five hundred dollars or less, and (3) uses a telephonic call, including, but not limited to, a call made by an individual, an automated telephone call and a recorded message, to obtain such money or property from such other person.

(b) Telephone fraud in the sixth degree is a class C misdemeanor.

(P.A. 16-148, S. 7.)

Sec. 53a-126. Larceny by receiving stolen property. Section 53a-126 is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 128; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

Sec. 53a-126a. Criminal trover in the first degree: Class D felony, first offense; class C felony, subsequent offense. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trover in the first degree when he forcibly enters or forcibly removes the ignition of the motor vehicle of another and uses the motor vehicle without the consent of such owner, and such use results in damage to or diminishes the value of such motor vehicle or subjects such owner to economic loss, fine or other penalty.

(b) Criminal trover in the first degree is a class D felony for a first offense and a class C felony for each subsequent offense.

(P.A. 94-114, S. 1.)

Sec. 53a-126b. Criminal trover in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trover in the second degree when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person uses the personal property of another without the consent of such owner, and such use results in damage to or diminishes the value of such property or subjects such owner to economic loss, fine or other penalty.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “economic loss” includes uncompensated economic loss that exceeds five hundred dollars suffered by an owner of personal property who is engaged in the business of renting or leasing personal property when a person to whom such owner has rented or leased such property pursuant to a written agreement providing for the return of such property at a specified time fails to return such property within one hundred twenty hours after the owner sends a written demand to such person for the return of such property by registered mail addressed to such person at such person's address as shown in the written agreement, unless a more recent address is known to the owner. Acknowledgment of the receipt of such written demand by such person shall not be necessary to establish that one hundred twenty hours have passed since such written demand was sent. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to personal property that is rented or leased (1) for personal, family or household purposes, or (2) pursuant to chapter 743i.

(P.A. 94-114, S. 2; P.A. 06-118, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 06-118 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality, added new Subsec. (b) re failure to return rented or leased personal property and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c).

Sec. 53a-127. Diversion from state of benefit of labor of employees: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of diversion from the state of benefit of labor of employees when he fraudulently procures for himself or another, from any employee of the state or any department thereof, the benefit of any labor which the state or any department thereof is entitled to receive from such employee during his hours of employment or fraudulently aids or assists in procuring or attempting to procure the benefit of any such labor.

(b) Diversion from the state of benefit of labor of employees is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 129; P.A. 92-260, S. 53.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.

Cited. 194 C. 223.

Sec. 53a-127a. Unlawful entry into coin machine; possession of key to enter: Class A misdemeanor. (a) No person shall, with intent to commit larceny: (1) Enter, or force an entrance into, alter or insert any part of an instrument into any coin machine, as defined in section 53a-143; or (2) knowingly possess a key or device, or a drawing, print or mold thereof, adapted and designed to open or break into any such coin machine.

(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(1971, P.A. 753; P.A. 84-546, S. 126, 173; P.A. 92-260, S. 54.)

History: P.A. 84-546 made technical grammar change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).

Sec. 53a-127b. Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or herself or a third person, such person knowingly uses in a fraudulent manner an automated teller machine for the purpose of obtaining property. For the purposes of this section, “automated teller machine” means an unmanned device at which banking transactions including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers may be conducted, and includes, without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale terminal as defined in section 36a-2.

(b) In any prosecution under this section, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the automated teller machine was located.

(P.A. 83-417, S. 2; P.A. 84-301, S. 2; P.A. 03-278, S. 106; P.A. 14-233, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 84-301 replaced “automatic” with “automated” and added definition of “automated teller machine”; P.A. 03-278 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective July 9, 2003; P.A. 14-233 amended Subsec. (c) to replace reference to class C misdemeanor with reference to class A misdemeanor.

See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.

Sec. 53a-127c. Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain when he: (1) Engages in the business for profit or economic gain of tampering or making connection with the equipment of a supplier of an electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service which is not metered or otherwise measured, in whole or in part, without the consent of such supplier, for the purpose of supplying such service on one or more occasions to two or more households, or (2) engages in the business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale to any person other than the supplier of an electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service which is not metered or otherwise measured, in whole or in part, any decoder, descrambler or other device, the principal function of which defeats the electronic signal encryption jamming or individually addressed switching imposed by such supplier for the purpose of restricting the delivery of such service to persons who pay for such service, or (3) without the consent of the supplier of such service and with intent to defraud such supplier, engages in the business for profit or economic gain of connecting or disconnecting the meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments of such supplier or in any other manner tampers or connects with such meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is engaged in the business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device, equipment or component in violation of subdivision (2) of this subsection if such person has five or more decoders, descramblers or other devices in his possession or under his control.

(b) Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain is a class D felony.

(P.A. 84-496; P.A. 89-281, S. 2; P.A. 94-215, S. 1; P.A. 95-246, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 89-281 added theft of cable service and made provisions applicable to one engaging in business for economic gain in Subsecs. (a) and (b); P.A. 94-215 substituted “electric, gas, water, steam” for “utility” where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to add “or other device” in Subdiv. (2), add Subdiv. (3) re connecting, disconnecting or tampering with the meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments of a supplier without the consent of such supplier and with intent to defraud such supplier, and add provision making it a rebuttable presumption that a person is engaged in the business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device if he has five or more decoders, descramblers or other devices in his possession or under his control; P.A. 95-246 included theft of “telecommunications” and “wireless radio communications” service and added “equipment or component” in provision re a rebuttable presumption.

See Sec. 52-570f re civil action and relief authorized for theft of service.

Sec. 53a-127d. Cheating: Class D felony or class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of cheating when, in the course of playing or conducting any lawful gambling game, he: (1) Knowingly uses an altered or counterfeit chip, token, tile, pull tab, wagering slip or check or knowingly marks, loads or tampers with any cards or dice or substitutes for cards or dice provided by the operator of a lawfully operated game of chance any cards or dice that have been marked, loaded or tampered with; or (2) knowingly uses any device, instrument, article or substance with intent to cheat or defraud or to alter or affect the otherwise random results of any lawfully operated game of chance; or (3) intentionally places, increases or attempts to increase a winning wager or decreases or attempts to decrease a losing wager after that period of time during which the rules of a lawfully operated game of chance permit a wager to be placed or after the results of the game in which the wager has been placed become known.

(b) Cheating is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class B misdemeanor.

(P.A. 98-193, S. 1.)

Sec. 53a-127e. Possession of a cheating device: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a cheating device when, while on premises where lawful gambling is to be conducted, such person knowingly possesses or has under such person's control: (1) Any altered or counterfeit chip, token, tile, pull tab, wagering slip or check or any cards or dice that have been marked, loaded or tampered with; or (2) any device, instrument or other thing adapted, designed or commonly used to facilitate the alteration of the normal play or operation of a piece of gaming equipment or to facilitate the unauthorized removal of any money or other contents from any gaming equipment; or (3) any other device, instrument or thing which, under the circumstances in which it is used or possessed, manifests an intent that it be used by the actor or another person to alter the normal play or operation of a lawfully operated game of chance or to commit cheating as provided in section 53a-127d or larceny as provided in section 53a-119.

(b) Possession of a cheating device is a class D felony.

(P.A. 98-193, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 7, 26.)

History: P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and replace in Subdiv. (2) “adopted” with “adapted”, effective July 1, 2001.

Sec. 53a-127f. Possession of a shoplifting device: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a shoplifting device when such person has in such person's possession any device, instrument or other thing specifically designed or adapted to advance or facilitate the offense of larceny by shoplifting, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-119, by defeating any antitheft or inventory control device, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use the same in the commission of larceny by shoplifting.

(b) Possession of a shoplifting device is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 00-9.)

Sec. 53a-127g. Unlawful possession of a personal identifying information access device: Class A misdemeanor. (a) For the purposes of this section, (1) “access device” includes, but is not limited to, any card, plate, code, account number, mobile identification number, personal identification number, telecommunication service access equipment, card-reading device, scanning device, reencoder or other means that could be used to access financial resources or obtain the financial information, personal information or benefits of another person, and (2) “personal identifying information” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-129a.

(b) A person is guilty of unlawful possession of a personal identifying information access device when such person possesses an access device, document-making equipment or authentication implement for the purpose of fraudulently altering, obtaining or using the personal identifying information of another person.

(P.A. 09-239, S. 5.)

Sec. 53a-128. Issuing a bad check. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of issuing a bad check when: (1) As a drawer or representative drawer, he issues a check knowing that he or his principal, as the case may be, does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or believes at the time of issuance that payment will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation; or (2) he passes a check knowing that the drawer thereof does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or believes at the time the check is passed that payment will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation.

(b) For the purposes of this section, an issuer is presumed to know that the check or order, other than a postdated check or order, would not be paid, if: (1) The issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was issued; or (2) payment was refused by the drawee for insufficient funds upon presentation within thirty days after issue and the issuer failed to make good within eight days after receiving notice of such refusal. For the purposes of this subsection, an issuer is presumed to have received notice of such refusal if the drawee or payee provides proof of mailing such notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the issuer at his last-known address.

(c) Issuing a bad check is: (1) A class D felony if the amount of the check was more than two thousand dollars; (2) a class A misdemeanor if the amount of the check was more than one thousand dollars but not more than two thousand dollars; (3) a class B misdemeanor if the amount of the check was more than five hundred dollars but not more than one thousand dollars; or (4) a class C misdemeanor if the amount of the check was five hundred dollars or less.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 130; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 28; P.A. 80-109; P.A. 81-225; P.A. 83-137; P.A. 14-233, S. 6.)

History: 1971 act removed former Subsec. (a) containing applicable definitions; P.A. 80-109 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re presumption that issuer has received notice of drawee's refusal to pay; P.A. 81-225 included proof of mailing by payee as acceptable in presuming that issuer has received notice; P.A. 83-137 amended Subsec. (c) to reclassify the offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony or a class A, B or C misdemeanor depending upon the amount of the check; P.A. 14-233 amended Subsec. (c) to increase check amounts from more than $1,000 to more than $2,000 in Subdiv. (1), from more than $500 but not more than $1,000 to more than $1,000 but not more than $2,000 in Subdiv. (2), from more than $250 but not more than $500 to more than $500 but not more than $1,000 in Subdiv. (3), and from $250 or less to $500 or less in Subdiv. (4).

Cited. 202 C. 443.

Cited. 20 CA 811.

Cited. 34 CS 584. Ability of court to order personal restitution in amount of bad corporate check when there is no finding as to the ability of defendant to pay or as to the extent of his gain; restitution properly ordered against individual defendant issuer of bad corporate check. 35 CS 536.

Sec. 53a-128a. Credit and debit card crimes. Definitions. As used in this section and sections 53a-128b to 53a-128i, inclusive:

(a) “Cardholder” or “holder of a card” means the person named on the face of a payment card to whom or for whose benefit the payment card is issued by an issuer or, in the case of a payment card that does not bear that name of a person on its face, the person who lawfully acquired the payment card;

(b) “Credit card” means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card, as a credit plate, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on credit;

(c) “Debit card” means any card, code, device or other means of access, or any combination thereof, that is issued or authorized for use to debit an asset account held directly or indirectly by a financial institution and that may be used by the cardholder to obtain money, goods, services or anything else of value, regardless of whether the card, code, device or other means of access, or any combination thereof, is known as a debit card. “Debit card” includes, but is not limited to, cards, codes, devices or other means of access or some combination thereof, commonly known as payroll cards and automated teller machine cards. “Debit card” does not include a check, draft or similar paper instrument, or an electronic representation thereof;

(d) “Digital wallet” means a software application that is used on a computer or other device, including, but not limited to, a mobile device, to store digital forms of one or more payment cards that may be used to obtain money, goods, services or anything else of value;

(e) “Expired payment card” means a payment card that is no longer valid because the term shown on it has elapsed;

(f) “Issuer” means the person that issues a payment card, or its agent duly authorized for that purpose;

(g) “Participating party” means any person or any duly authorized agent of such person, that is obligated by contract to acquire from another person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, a sales slip, sales draft or instrument for the payment of money, evidencing a payment card transaction, and from whom, directly or indirectly, the issuer is obligated by contract to acquire such sales slip, sales draft, instrument for the payment of money and the like;

(h) “Payment card” means either a credit card or a debit card;

(i) “Receives” or “receiving” means acquiring possession, custody or control;

(j) “Revoked payment card” means a payment card that is no longer valid because permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 29; P.A. 92-260, S. 55; P.A. 17-26, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change; P.A. 17-26 replaced references to credit card with references to payment card, amended Subsec. (a) by redefining “cardholder” or “holder of card”, added new Subsec. (c) defining “debit card”, added Subsec. (d) defining “digital wallet”, redesignated existing Subsecs. (c) to (e) as Subsecs. (e) to (g), added Subsec. (h) defining “payment card”, redesignated existing Subsecs. (f) and (g) as Subsecs. (i) and (j), and made technical changes.

See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.

A merchant account identification card and a telephone card are within meaning of “credit card”. 246 C. 402.

Sec. 53a-128b. False statement to procure issuance or loading of payment card. Any person who makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement in writing, knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on, respecting such person's identity or the identity of any other person or such person's financial condition or that of any other person, for the purpose of procuring the issuance of a payment card or loading the payment card into a digital wallet, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 30; P.A. 17-26, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 17-26 replaced “credit card” with “payment card”, added provision re loading payment card into digital wallet, and made technical changes.

Sec. 53a-128c. Payment card theft. Illegal transfer. Fraud. Forgery. (a) Any person who takes a payment card from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the consent of the cardholder or of the issuer or who, with knowledge that it has been so taken, receives the payment card with intent to use it or to sell it, or to transfer it to any person other than the issuer or the cardholder is guilty of payment card theft and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i. Taking a payment card without consent includes obtaining it by conduct defined or known as statutory larceny, common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false pretense, false promise or extortion.

(b) Any person who receives a payment card that such person knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder, and who retains possession, custody or control thereof with intent to use it or to sell it or to transfer it to any person other than the issuer or the cardholder, is guilty of payment card theft and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.

(c) Any person other than the issuer who sells a payment card or any person who buys a payment card from a person other than the issuer violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.

(d) Any person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, obtains control over a payment card as security for debt violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.

(e) Any person, other than the issuer, who, during any twelve-month period, receives payment cards issued in the names of two or more persons which such person has reason to know were taken or retained under circumstances which constitute payment card theft or a violation of section 53a-128b or subsection (c) or (d) of this section violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i.

(f) Any person who, with intent to defraud a purported issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, falsely makes or falsely embosses a purported payment card or falsely loads or causes to be falsely loaded a payment card into a digital wallet or utters such a payment card is guilty of payment card forgery and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i. A person “falsely makes” a payment card when such person makes or draws, in whole or in part, a device or instrument which purports to be the payment card of a named issuer but which is not such a payment card because the issuer did not authorize the making or drawing, or when such person so alters a payment card which was validly issued. A person “falsely embosses” a payment card when, without the authorization of the named issuer, such person completes a payment card by adding any of the matter, other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the payment card before it can be used by a cardholder. A person “falsely loads” or “causes to be falsely loaded” a payment card into a digital wallet when such person stores or causes to be stored on a digital wallet the digital form of (1) a payment card falsely made or falsely embossed by such person, (2) a payment card taken, procured, received or retained by such person under circumstances that constitute a violation of this section or section 53a-128b, or (3) a payment card that such person knows is falsely made, falsely embossed, forged, expired or revoked.

(g) Any person other than the cardholder or any person authorized by the cardholder who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, signs a payment card, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 31; P.A. 17-26, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 17-26 replaced references to credit card with references to payment card, amended Subsec. (f) by adding provision re person who falsely loads or causes to be falsely loaded payment card into digital wallet and adding provision re “falsely loading” and “causes to be falsely loaded”, and made technical changes.

Cited. 37 CS 527.

Sec. 53a-128d. Illegal use of payment card. Presumption of knowledge of revocation. Any person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, (1) uses for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value a payment card obtained or retained in violation of section 53a-128b or a payment card which such person knows is forged, expired or revoked, or (2) obtains money, goods, services or anything else of value by representing without the consent of the cardholder that such person is the holder of a specified card or by representing that such person is the holder of a card and such card has not in fact been issued, or (3) uses a payment card obtained or retained in violation of section 53a-128c or a payment card which such person knows is forged, expired or revoked, as authority or identification to cash or to attempt to cash or otherwise to negotiate or transfer or to attempt to negotiate or transfer any check or other order for the payment of money, whether or not negotiable, if such negotiation or transfer or attempt to negotiate or transfer would constitute a violation of section 53a-128 violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the value of all money, goods, services and other things of value obtained in violation of this subsection does not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i, if such value does exceed five hundred dollars in any such six-month period. Knowledge of revocation shall be presumed to have been received by a cardholder four days after it has been mailed to such cardholder, at the address set forth on the payment card or at such cardholder's last-known address. If the address is located outside the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone or Canada, notice shall be presumed to have been received ten days after mailing by registered or certified mail.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 32; P.A. 17-26, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 17-26 replaced “credit card” with “payment card”, deleted provision re method of mailing, and made technical changes.

Cited. 204 C. 441. Convictions under Subdiv. (2) of this section, Sec. 53a-129d and Sec. 53a-125b do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 326 C. 310.

Review of legislative history of credit card crimes reveals no purpose or intent that enactment of the more specific crime of illegal credit card use precludes state from charging defendant with the more general crime of larceny. 75 CA 756. Conviction under this section and Secs. 53a-129b and 53a-129d for single course of conduct does not constitute double jeopardy. 119 CA 483.

Cited. 37 CS 527.

Sec. 53a-128e. Illegal furnishing of money, goods or services on payment card. (a) Any person who is authorized by an issuer or a participating party to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a payment card by the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer, or participating party, the cardholder, or any other person furnishes money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a payment card obtained or retained in violation of section 53a-128c or a payment card which such person knows is forged, expired or revoked, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the value of all money, goods, services and other things of value furnished in violation of this subsection does not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i if such value does exceed five hundred dollars in any such six-month period.

(b) Any person who is authorized by an issuer or a participating party to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a payment card by the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, the cardholder, or any other person fails to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value which such person represents in writing to the issuer or participating party that such person has furnished violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the difference between the value of all money, goods, services and anything else of value actually furnished and the value represented to the issuer or participating party to have been furnished does not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i if such difference does exceed five hundred dollars in any such six-month period.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 33; P.A. 17-26, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 17-26 replaced “credit card” with “payment card”, and made technical changes.

Sec. 53a-128f. Unlawful completion or reproduction of payment card. Any person, other than the cardholder, having under such person's possession, custody or control two or more incomplete payment cards, or possessing a purported distinctive element of a payment card, with intent to complete such incomplete payment cards or to utilize such purported distinctive element in the production or reproduction of any payment card, without the consent of the issuer, or a person having under such person's possession, custody or control, with knowledge of its character, a distinctive element of any payment card or any machinery, plates or any contrivance designed to produce or reproduce instruments purporting to be the payment cards of an issuer, or of any issuer in a group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element or elements in payment cards issued by all members of such group, who has not consented to the production or reproduction of such cards, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i. A payment card is “incomplete” if part of the matter other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer, or any issuer in a group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element or elements in payments cards issued by all members of such group, requires to appear on the payment card, before it can be used by a cardholder, has not yet been stamped, embossed, imprinted or written on it. A “distinctive element” of a payment card is any material or component used in the fabrication of payment cards, which, by virtue of such element's chemical or physical composition, color or design, is unique to the payment cards issued by a particular issuer or group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element or elements in payment cards issued by all members of such group.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 34; P.A. 92-260, S. 56; P.A. 17-26, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change; P.A. 17-26 replaced references to credit card with references to payment card, and made technical changes.

Sec. 53a-128g. Receipt of money, goods or services obtained by illegal use of credit card. Any person who receives money, goods, services or anything else of value obtained in violation of section 53a-128d, knowing or believing the same to have been so obtained, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i. Any person who obtains at a discount price a ticket issued by an airline, railroad, steamship or other transportation company which was acquired in violation of section 53a-128d without reasonable inquiry to ascertain that the person from whom it was obtained had a legal right to possess it shall be presumed to know that such ticket was acquired under circumstances constituting a violation of said section.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 35.)

Sec. 53a-128h. Certain defenses denied. In any prosecution for violation of sections 53a-128a to 53a-128i, inclusive, the state is not required to establish and it is no defense: (1) That a person other than the defendant who violated said sections has not been convicted, apprehended or identified; or (2) that some of the acts constituting the violation did not occur in this state or were not a violation or elements of a violation where they did occur.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 36.)

Sec. 53a-128i. Penalties for credit card crimes. (a) Any person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(b) Any person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 37.)

Sec. 53a-129. Misapplication of property: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of misapplication of property when, knowingly possessing personal property of another pursuant to an agreement that the same will be returned to the owner at a future time, he loans, leases, pledges, pawns or otherwise encumbers such property without the consent of the owner thereof in such manner as to create a risk that the owner will not be able to recover it or will suffer pecuniary loss.

(b) In any prosecution under this section, it shall be a defense that, at the time the prosecution was commenced, (1) the defendant had recovered possession of the property, unencumbered as a result of the unlawful disposition, and (2) the owner had suffered no material economic loss as a result of the unlawful disposition.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 131.)

Cited. 180 C. 662; 194 C. 223.

Sec. 53a-129a. Identity theft defined. (a) A person commits identity theft when such person knowingly uses personal identifying information of another person to obtain or attempt to obtain money, credit, goods, services, property or medical information without the consent of such other person.

(b) As used in this section, “personal identifying information” means any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual including, but not limited to, such individual's name, date of birth, mother's maiden name, motor vehicle operator's license number, Social Security number, employee identification number, employer or taxpayer identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, health insurance identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation.

(P.A. 99-99; P.A. 03-156, S. 1; P.A. 09-239, S. 1; P.A. 11-165, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 03-156 revised section to replace offense of identity theft with definition of identity theft by amending Subsec. (a) to replace “A person is guilty of identity theft when” with “A person commits identity theft when”, delete requirement that the use of such information be “for any unlawful purpose” and include “money” and “property” among items the person obtains or attempts to obtain, by designating definition of “personal identifying information” as new Subsec. (b) and amending said definition to add provision that such information means “any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual”, include such individual's name, date of birth, employer or taxpayer identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, health insurance identification number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation and replace “demand deposit number” with “demand deposit account number” and by deleting former Subsec. (b) classifying identity theft as a class D felony; P.A. 09-239 amended Subsec. (a) to specify that a person commits identity theft when such person knowingly uses personal identifying information of another person to obtain or attempt to obtain, in the name of such other person, money, credit, goods, services, property or medical information without the consent of such other person; P.A. 11-165 amended Subsec. (a) to delete “in the name of such other person”.

Sec. 53a-129b. Identity theft in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the first degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a, of another person and (1) such other person is under sixty years of age, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds ten thousand dollars, or (2) such other person is sixty years of age or older, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds five thousand dollars.

(b) Identity theft in the first degree is a class B felony.

(P.A. 03-156, S. 2; P.A. 09-239, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 09-239 amended Subsec. (a) by inserting “of another person” re identity theft and providing that other person be under 60 years of age if value of money, credit, goods, services or property exceeds $10,000 or that other person is 60 years of age or older and such value exceeds $5,000.

Conviction under this section and Secs. 53a-128d and 53a-129d for single course of conduct does not constitute double jeopardy. 119 CA 483.

Sec. 53a-129c. Identity theft in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the second degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a, of another person and such other person is under sixty years of age, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds five thousand dollars, or such other person is sixty years of age or older.

(b) Identity theft in the second degree is a class C felony.

(P.A. 03-156, S. 3; P.A. 09-239, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 09-239 amended Subsec. (a) by inserting “of another person” re identity theft and providing that other person is under 60 years of age and value of money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds $5,000 or that other person is 60 years of age or older.

Sec. 53a-129d. Identity theft in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the third degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a.

(b) Identity theft in the third degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 03-156, S. 4.)

Convictions under this section, Sec. 53a-128d(2) and Sec. 53a-125b do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 326 C. 310.

Conviction under this section and Secs. 53a-128d and 53a-129b for single course of conduct does not constitute double jeopardy. 119 CA 483.

Sec. 53a-129e. Trafficking in personal identifying information: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of trafficking in personal identifying information when such person sells, gives or otherwise transfers personal identifying information, as defined in section 53a-129a or 53a-181d, of another person to a third person knowing that such information has been obtained without the authorization of such other person and that such third person intends to use such information for an unlawful purpose, including, but not limited to, a violation of section 53a-181d.

(b) Trafficking in personal identifying information is a class D felony.

(P.A. 03-156, S. 5; P.A. 21-56, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 21-56 added language referencing Sec. 53a-181d in Subsec. (a).

Sec. 53a-130. Criminal impersonation: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when such person: (1) Impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another; or (2) pretends to be a state marshal with intent to obtain a benefit or induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense; or (3) pretends to be a representative of some person or organization and does an act in such pretended capacity with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another; or (4) pretends to be a public servant other than a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or shield by which such public servant is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense; or (5) with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, uses an electronic device to impersonate another and such act results in personal injury or financial loss to another or the initiation of judicial proceedings against another.

(b) The provisions of subdivision (5) of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his or her official duties.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 132; P.A. 97-123, S. 3; P.A. 09-239, S. 4; P.A. 11-51, S. 134; 11-221, S. 1; P.A. 14-86, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 97-123 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to exclude from the offense a person pretending to be “a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety” and include the wearing or display of a “shield”; P.A. 09-239 made a technical change in Subsec. (a) and changed penalty in Subsec. (b) from class B to class A misdemeanor; pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Department of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection” in Subsec. (a)(3), effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 11-221 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re use of electronic device, added new Subsec. (b) re exception for law enforcement officer and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 14-86 amended Subsec. (a) by adding new Subdiv. (2) re pretending to be a state marshal and redesignating existing Subdivs. (2) to (4) as Subdivs. (3) to (5) and amended Subsec. (b) by making a conforming change.

Cited. 194 C. 213; Id., 233; 207 C. 109; 209 C. 23; 225 C. 650.

Held not to be unconstitutionally vague. 2 CA 204. Cited. 18 CA 694; 32 CA 724; 40 CA 643. Does not require use of an official or real badge because statute's goal is to prohibit criminal impersonation with intent of inducing another to submit to authority that he or she does not possess. 66 CA 819.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (1): Statute as written does not prohibit giving a false name. 194 C. 213. Cited. 198 C. 68; 199 C. 146; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 235 C. 502.

Cited. 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; 37 CA 589; 45 CA 303. Statute prohibits impersonating another, not merely giving a false name. 60 CA 534.

Sec. 53a-130a. Impersonation of a police officer: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of impersonation of a police officer when he pretends to be a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or shield by which such police officer is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another person to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense.

(b) Impersonation of a police officer is a class D felony.

(P.A. 97-123, S. 2; P.A. 11-51, S. 134.)

History: Pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Department of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection”, effective July 1, 2011.

Sec. 53a-131. Unlawfully concealing a will: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawfully concealing a will when, with intent to defraud, he conceals, secrets, suppresses, mutilates or destroys a will, codicil or other testamentary instrument.

(b) Unlawfully concealing a will is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 133.)

Sec. 53a-132. False entry by an officer or agent of a public community: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of false entry by an officer or agent of a public community when (1) as an officer or agent of a public community, he makes any intentionally false entry on the books of the public community or (2) he intentionally attests or certifies by placing his signature upon process that he has personally served the same, when he has not done so.

(b) False entry by an officer or agent of a public community is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 134; P.A. 84-108, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 57.)

History: P.A. 84-108 inserted new Subsec. (b) providing that person who intentionally attests or certifies by signature upon process that he has personally served process when he has not done so is guilty of false entry, relettering former Subsec. (b) as (c); P.A. 92-260 combined former Subsecs. (a) and (b) and rephrased language, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b), and amended relettered Subsec. (b) to make technical changes in the name of the offense.

Under former statute, state has been held to be a “public community” and an employee has been held to be an “agent”. 159 C. 544.

Sec. 53a-133. Robbery defined. A person commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for the purpose of: (1) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or (2) compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 135.)

See Sec. 53a-119 for definition of “larceny”.

Defendant's ability to carry out threat of immediate physical force is not essential element of robbery. 175 C. 569. Cited. 176 C. 239; 178 C. 689; 179 C. 576; 180 C. 599; 181 C. 388; 182 C. 430; Id., 449; 183 C. 299; 185 C. 402; 189 C. 114; 190 C. 822; 195 C. 567; 196 C. 122; Id., 395; 199 C. 207; 201 C. 289; Id., 489; 202 C. 349; 206 C. 621; Id., 657; 209 C. 564; 210 C. 652; 211 C. 398; 212 C. 31; 216 C. 367; 219 C. 489; 223 C. 243; Id., 595; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 230 C. 183; 232 C. 455; 233 C. 44; 235 C. 748; 241 C. 322; 242 C. 523; Id., 666. Use of force considered to be in course of robbery or attempted robbery within meaning of statute if it occurs during continuous sequence of events surrounding the taking or attempted taking, even though some time immediately before or after. 248 C. 472. A larceny by false pretenses that precedes the use of force can satisfy the larceny element of robbery under section if the force is used in order to retain the property immediately after the taking. 340 C. 447.

Cited. 1 CA 642; 8 CA 545; Id., 620; 9 CA 373; 10 CA 330; Id., 474; 12 CA 163; 13 CA 420; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; Id., 423; Id., 554; Id., 695; 20 CA 27; Id., 513; 21 CA 299; 24 CA 27; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652; 25 CA 104; Id., 646; 27 CA 601; 28 CA 161; Id., 612; Id., 721; 31 CA 47; 32 CA 193; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; Id., 311; 34 CA 223; 35 CA 699; Id., 839; 36 CA 401; 38 CA 531; Id., 581; 39 CA 63; Id., 478; Id., 579; Id., 617; 41 CA 147; Id., 255; Id., 584; 43 CA 801; 44 CA 307; 45 CA 6; 46 CA 616; Id., 691; Id., 778. Term “purpose” is synonymous with the terms “object” and “intent”; completion of crime not required for conviction under section. 51 CA 541. Knife with a 6-inch blade displayed by defendant during a robbery was capable of causing death or serious physical injury and constituted a “dangerous instrument” and defendant, by his actions, demands for the money and manner of carrying the knife, used or threatened to use it during the robbery. 82 CA 823. Words in common usage can satisfy requirement of threat if jury could reasonably have inferred those words to mean “threat”. 93 CA 257. Defendant's actions in keeping victim's ATM card and the money and ordering victim out of vehicle at gun point were sufficient to constitute the “deliver up” of property within meaning of Subdiv. (2). 102 CA 532.

Cited. 41 CS 525.

Sec. 53a-134. Robbery in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-133 or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (1) Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (2) is armed with a deadly weapon; or (3) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument; or (4) displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm, except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a weapon from which a shot could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime.

(b) Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 136; P.A. 75-411, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 22, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 58.)

History: P.A. 75-411 removed reference to dangerous instruments in Subsec. (a)(2) and added Subdivs. (3) and (4); P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) specifying that five years of sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to specify that “the crime” is “the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-133”.

Cited. 172 C. 74; 175 C. 569; 182 C. 511; Id., 595; 185 C. 473; 186 C. 179; 190 C. 822; 196 C. 305; Id., 309; Id., 430; 199 C. 47; Id., 207; Id., 273; Id., 377; Id., 591; 200 C. 310; Id., 465; 201 C. 34; 202 C. 39; Id., 86; 203 C. 494; 204 C. 52; Id., 240; 207 C. 412; 212 C. 31; 214 C. 454; 218 C. 479; 230 C. 109; 231 C. 43; 236 C. 112; 241 C. 413; 242 C. 125; Id., 648. Defendant cannot be convicted of robbery in the first degree when defendant is the owner of the property that he took from another since the state must prove that defendant committed larceny as an element of the crime, and larceny requires that the property be taken from its owner. 317 C. 338.

Cited. 8 CA 545; 9 CA 373; 10 CA 659; 11 CA 699; Id., 709; 12 CA 268; Id., 655; 13 CA 133; Id., 708; 14 CA 472; 15 CA 34; Id., 197; 19 CA 423; 20 CA 521; 22 CA 216; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 32 CA 38; 35 CA 201; Id., 839; 36 CA 59; Id., 448; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342; 38 CA 20; Id., 581; Id., 868; 39 CA 45; 40 CA 250; 41 CA 147; 43 CA 61; Id., 801; 45 CA 32; 46 CA 684; Id., 691. Court cannot properly instruct jury of elements of section without first instructing jury of elements of Sec. 53a-133; sufficiency of evidence to convict defendant as a principal in robbery. 51 CA 541. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 CA 251.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (2): “Miranda” warning not a ritualistic formula and words which convey its substance are sufficient. 167 C. 309. Cited. 169 C. 242; Id., 683; 170 C. 332. Subdiv. (2): Participation of two persons not necessary, so Wharton's rule is inapplicable. 171 C. 105. Cited. Id., 395; Id., 610; 172 C. 22; Id., 586; 174 C. 16; Id., 129; Id., 142; Id., 452; 175 C. 250. Subdiv. (2): Requirement of weapon's operability is imposed by Sec. 53a-3(6). Id., 569. Subdiv. (4): Essential element of Subsec. is defendant's representation of having a firearm, not the firearm's operability; affirmative defense of inoperability does not violate due process. Id. Cited. 176 C. 239; Id., 367; 177 C. 335; Id., 370; Id., 379; Id., 637; 178 C. 116; Id., 287; Id., 427; Id., 564; Id., 634; Id., 689; 179 C. 46; Id., 576; 180 C. 557. Subdiv. (1): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599. Cited. 181 C. 237; Id., 388; Id., 426; 182 C. 262; Id., 366; Id., 430; Id., 449; Id., 533; Id., 595; 183 C. 280; 185 C. 163; Id., 260; Id., 402; Id., 607; 186 C. 1; Id., 222; Id., 261; Id., 426; 187 C. 681; 188 C. 372; Id., 406; Id., 432; Id., 515; 189 C. 114; Id., 183; Id., 268; Id., 337; Id., 429; 191 C. 564; Id., 670; 192 C. 618; 193 C. 48; Id., 238; Id., 457; Id., 526; Id., 602; 194 C. 89; 195 C. 183; Id., 326; Id., 444; Id., 552; Id., 567; 196 C. 36; Id., 115; Id., 122; Id., 157. Subdiv. (4): Essential element is the representation by defendant that he has a firearm, not the specific identifying characteristic of the weapon alleged in the information. Id., 395. Cited. Id., 567; Id., 685; 197 C. 106; Id., 115; Id., 413; Id., 629; 198 C. 68; Id., 203; Id., 285; Id., 314; Id., 328; Id., 490; Id., 592; Id., 680; 199 C. 5; Id., 62; Id., 146; Id., 255; Id., 473; 200 C. 9; Id., 44; Id., 350; Id., 523; 201 C. 289; Id., 333; 202 C. 1; Id., 259; Id., 349; 203 C. 81; Id., 159; Id., 445; Id., 506; 204 C. 330; Id., 377; 205 C. 673; 206 C. 40; Id., 621; Id., 657; 207 C. 152; Id., 323; Id., 619; 208 C. 38; Id., 202; Id., 365; 209 C. 416; Id., 458; 210 C. 199; 211 C. 18; Id., 398; 212 C. 6; Id., 387; 213 C. 422; 214 C. 38. Subdiv. (4): Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. 215 C. 538. Cited. Id., 695; 216 C. 282; Id., 367; Id., 801; 217 C. 419; 218 C. 85; Id., 151; Id., 432; 219 C. 93; Id., 269; Id., 489; 220 C. 385; Id., 652; 221 C. 447; Id., 643; 222 C. 117; 223 C. 243; Id., 299; Id., 595; Id., 635; 224 C. 711; 225 C. 270; 226 C. 601; 227 C. 363; 228 C. 234; Id., 384; 230 C. 351; Id., 686; 232 C. 455; Id., 691; Id., 707; 233 C. 44; 235 C. 67; Id., 402; Id., 748; Id., 802; 236 C. 342; 238 C. 784; 239 C. 235; 240 C. 317; 241 C. 1; Id., 165; Id., 322; 242 C. 93; Id., 296; 247 C. 662. Subdiv. (4): Because there were two separate and distinct transactions, defendant could be convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the first degree without offending the prohibition on double jeopardy. 299 C. 640. Defendant may properly be convicted of and punished for the crimes of felony murder with the predicate offense of robbery, and the crime of robbery in the first degree under Subdiv. (1) without violating the prohibition against double jeopardy. 302 C. 287.

Cited. 1 CA 584; Id., 642; Id., 697; 2 CA 127; 6 CA 247; Id., 697; 7 CA 1; Id., 27; Id., 95; Id., 149; Id., 217; Id., 445; Id., 503; Id., 528; Id., 715; Id., 726; 8 CA 119; Id., 399; Id., 454; Id., 467; Id., 491; Id., 566; Id., 667; 9 CA 79; Id., 275; Id., 313; Id., 548; Id., 587; Id., 648; 10 CA 50; Id., 103; Id., 330; Id., 404; Id., 474; Id., 624; Id., 643; 11 CA 80; Id., 397; 12 CA 163; Id., 217; Id., 662; 13 CA 76; Id., 554; 14 CA 67; Id., 108; Id., 463; Id., 493; Id., 657; 15 CA 161; Id., 416; Id., 502; Id., 539; Id., 586; 16 CA 38; Id., 206; Id., 284; Id., 390; Id., 402; 17 CA 50; Id., 359; Id., 490; Id., 648; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 53; Id., 179; Id., 554; Id., 695; 20 CA 27; Id., 212; Id., 467; Id., 513; Id., 643; Id., 665; 21 CA 48; Id., 244; Id., 299; 22 CA 98; Id., 329; 24 CA 27; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652; Id., 152; Id., 316; Id., 518; Id., 729; 25 CA 104; Id., 255; Id., 565; Id., 646; 26 CA 114; Id., 242; 27 CA 601; Id., 654; 28 CA 64; Id., 161; Id., 402; Id., 444; Id., 474; Id., 612; Id., 645; Id., 721; 29 CA 207; Id., 274; Id., 421; Id., 679; 30 CA 68; 31 CA 614; Id., 614; Id., 660; 32 CA 21; Id., 193; Id., 476; 33 CA 143; Id., 184; Id., 288; Id., 311; Id., 457; Id., 468; Id., 849; 34 CA 223; Id., 261; Id., 610; 35 CA 279; Id., 699; Id., 740; Id., 781. Subdiv. (3): Robbery in the second degree pursuant to Sec. 53a-135(a)(1) is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to this section. Id., 839. Cited. 36 CA 401; Id., 556; Id., 718; Id., 831; 37 CA 35; Id., 219; Id., 482; Id., 589; Id., 619; Id., 672; Id., 733; 39 CA 63; Id., 82; Id., 384; Id., 478; Id., 502; Id., 579; Id., 617; Id., 840; 40 CA 21; Id., 328; Id., 526; 41 CA 47; Id., 391; Id., 515; Id., 695; 42 CA 472; Id., 669; Id., 810; 43 CA 142; 44 CA 26; Id., 280; Id., 476; Id., 561; 45 CA 6; Id., 270; Id., 390; Id., 658. A showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny; testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (3) requires that evidence show either actual use of a dangerous instrument or its threatened use, demonstrated by either an actual display or words combined with an overt display of the threatened instrument. 71 CA 585. Court's failure to instruct jury on the affirmative defense of inoperability of gun involved in the incident at issue, as provided for in text of statute relative to charge of robbery in the first degree, constituted plain error and violated defendant's constitutional right to fair trial. Id., 865. Subdiv. (3) requires use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument. 81 CA 367. Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under Subdiv. (4). 83 CA 489. Subdiv. (4): There is no statutory monetary value of stolen property included as element of robbery in the first degree. 86 CA 507. Trial court did not err in permitting state to file an amended information charging defendant with robbery in the second degree in violation of Sec. 53a-135(a)(2) after trial had commenced in matter where defendant had originally been charged with robbery in the first degree in violation of Subdivs. (2), (3) and (4); because amended information charged lesser included offenses included within offenses that were charged in the original information, no due process violation arose. 87 CA 750. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt; while every element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying the conclusion need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 93 CA 257. Subdiv. (4): Defendant's statement to victim that she “wouldn't get hurt” if she did what she was told to do, combined with victim's testimony that defendant was holding something under his jacket and pointing it in her direction, provided sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of robbery in the first degree. Id., 650. Subdiv. (4): Defendant need only represent by his words or conduct that he possesses a firearm, and need not actually possess a firearm, to be convicted under Subdiv. 141 CA 814. Subdiv. (1): The act of punching victim in the jaw provided sufficient evidence to satisfy statutory requirement of intent to cause the victim serious injury. 154 CA 271. No constitutional violation against defendant's right not to be placed in double jeopardy exists for convictions under Subdivs. (1) and (3) because a charge under Subdiv. (1) is a separate and distinct offense from a charge under Subdiv. (3). 170 CA 254. Subdiv. (2): Conviction as accessory to attempted robbery in the first degree does not require state to demonstrate that accused intended for an accomplice to possess a deadly weapon. 184 CA 24. Section provides for both principal and accessorial liability, therefore a jury instruction regarding accessory liability with regard to robbery in the first degree is unnecessary. 192 CA 68.

Sec. 53a-135. Robbery in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when such person (1) commits robbery, as defined in section 53a-133, and (A) is aided by another person actually present; or (B) in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, such person or another participant in the crime displays or threatens the use of what such person represents by such person's words or conduct to be a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (2) in the course of committing a larceny while on the premises of a bank, Connecticut credit union or federal credit union, as those terms are defined in section 36a-2, intimidates an employee of the bank, Connecticut credit union or federal credit union by intentionally engaging in conduct that causes another person to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety or the physical safety of another for the purpose of: (A) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking of the property; or (B) compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.

(b) Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 137; P.A. 75-411, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 59; P.A. 12-186, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 75-411 clarified Subsec. (a)(2), including references to display of weapon and to actions in course of commission of crime or in course of immediate flight from commission of crime; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add “as defined in section 53a-133”; P.A. 12-186 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing elements of crime as Subdiv. (1), redesignate existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B), add new Subdiv. (2) re elements of crime in course of committing larceny while on premises of a bank, Connecticut credit union or federal credit union, and make technical changes.

Cited. 171 C. 47; Id., 105; 174 C. 142; 176 C. 270; 178 C. 287; 179 C. 576; 182 C. 207; 183 C. 156; 185 C. 260; 191 C. 506; 197 C. 309; 198 C. 158; 201 C. 125; Id., 489; 202 C. 224; 203 C. 506; 204 C. 630; 210 C. 435; 224 C. 445; 235 C. 469.

Cited. 2 CA 11; 12 CA 375; 13 CA 420; 14 CA 159; Id., 205; 36 CA 401; 37 CA 35; 39 CA 384; 43 CA 801.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 161; 173 C. 545; 176 C. 227; Id., 367; 179 C. 98; Id., 381; 182 C. 476; Id., 533; 184 C. 366; 187 C. 602; 190 C. 327; 194 C. 241; Id., 297; 197 C. 677; 199 C. 557; 200 C. 350; 209 C. 143; 211 C. 1; 229 C. 178; 230 C. 608; Id., 686; 235 C. 67; Id., 145; Id., 502.

Cited. 6 CA 247; 9 CA 656; 10 CA 330; 12 CA 239; 16 CA 264; Id., 455; 17 CA 247; 25 CA 428; 26 CA 779; 31 CA 47; 33 CA 143; Id., 184; Id., 468. Robbery in second degree pursuant to this section is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to Sec. 53a-134(a)(3). 35 CA 839. Cited. 36 CA 774; 41 CA 817. Court's failure to instruct jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree in violation of statute where there was uncontroverted evidence from two state's witnesses that the gun was inoperable constituted plain error and violated defendant's constitutional right to fair trial. 71 CA 865. To prove defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of Subdiv. (2), state needs to prove defendant and co-conspirator specifically had an agreement to display a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument and that defendant had specific intent that such a weapon or instrument would be displayed. 138 CA 228; judgment affirmed, see 315 C. 451. Subsec. contains no language indicating the legislature's intent to bar multiple punishments for the perpetrators of single second degree robberies who, in committing such offenses, violate multiple subdivisions of section. 175 CA 566. Subdiv. (1)(B): A defendant need not have a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, but need only represent by his words or conduct that he is so armed. 203 CA 219.

Sec. 53a-136. Robbery in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of robbery in the third degree when he commits robbery as defined in section 53a-133.

(b) Robbery in the third degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 138; P.A. 92-260, S. 60.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add “as defined in section 53a-133”.

Cited. 169 C. 247; 171 C. 105; 181 C. 388; 185 C. 260; 188 C. 591; 190 C. 428; 192 C. 618; 197 C. 314; 198 C. 285; 199 C. 557; 202 C. 224; 205 C. 61; 209 C. 23; 210 C. 435; 218 C. 432; 219 C. 160; 239 C. 235. Rational basis exists for legislature to classify larceny from the person as a more serious offense than simple robbery and therefore the classification did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. 246 C. 132.

Cited. 5 CA 500; 7 CA 27; 8 CA 454; Id., 620; 13 CA 420; Id., 596; 14 CA 205; 16 CA 318; Id., 433; 17 CA 226; 19 CA 423; 20 CA 513; Id., 643; 21 CA 248; Id., 291; 22 CA 216; 24 CA 316; Id., 518; 26 CA 114; 27 CA 780; 35 CA 839; 39 CA 579; Id., 810; 40 CA 250; 44 CA 307; 46 CA 616; Id., 778.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 185 C. 402; 201 C. 125; Id., 559; 211 C. 101; 220 C. 487; 242 C. 523.

Cited. 8 CA 35; 10 CA 330; 14 CA 493; 35 CA 201; 38 CA 531; 41 CA 255; Id., 584. Jury could reasonably find that defendant's threat was part of the same continuous transaction as the larceny; use or threatened use of a firearm is not an element of the crime. 100 CA 122.

Cited. 33 CS 599; 37 CS 520.

Sec. 53a-136a. Robbery involving occupied motor vehicle. Penalty. Any person who commits robbery by taking a motor vehicle from the person of another knowing that such motor vehicle is occupied by such other person shall be imprisoned for a term of three years which shall not be suspended and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for such offense.

(P.A. 93-204.)

Cited. 46 CA 691. Section is a sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime, notwithstanding the requirement of proof of an additional element to establish a violation of section. 100 CA 565.

PART X*

FORGERY AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Cited. 11 CA 161; 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-137. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:

(1) “Written instrument” means any instrument or article containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.

(2) “Complete written instrument” means a written instrument which purports to be a genuine written instrument fully drawn with respect to every essential feature thereof. An endorsement, attestation, acknowledgment or other similar signature or statement is deemed both a complete written instrument in itself and a part of the main instrument in which it is contained or to which it attaches.

(3) “Incomplete written instrument” means a written instrument which contains some matter by way of content or authentication but which requires additional matter in order to render it a complete written instrument.

(4) A person “falsely makes” a written instrument when (A) such person makes or draws a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an incomplete written instrument, which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or drawer, but which is not such either because the ostensible maker or drawer is fictitious or because, if real, the ostensible maker or drawer did not authorize the making or drawing thereof, or (B) such person signs his or her own name to a written instrument, thereby falsely and fraudulently representing that he or she has authority to sign in such capacity.

(5) A person “falsely completes” a written instrument when (A) such person, by adding, inserting or changing matter, transforms an incomplete written instrument into a complete written instrument, without the authority of any person entitled to grant it, so that such complete written instrument appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer, or (B) such person signs his or her own name to a written instrument, thereby falsely and fraudulently representing that he or she has authority to sign in such capacity.

(6) A person “falsely alters” a written instrument when (A) such person, without the authority of any person entitled to grant it, changes a written instrument, whether it be in complete or incomplete form, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter or transposition of matter or in any other manner, so that such instrument in its thus altered form appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer, or (B) such person signs his or her own name to a written instrument, thereby falsely and fraudulently representing that he or she has authority to sign in such capacity.

(7) “Forged instrument” means a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed or altered.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 139; P.A. 10-180, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 10-180 amended Subdivs. (4), (5) and (6) to add Subpara. (B) including within definition when person signs his or her own name to a written instrument, thereby falsely and fraudulently representing that he or she has authority to sign in such capacity, and made technical changes throughout.

Cited. 207 C. 555; 235 C. 502.

Cited. 11 CA 161; 37 CA 72; 47 CA 1.

Cited. 34 CS 606.

Sec. 53a-138. Forgery in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of forgery in the first degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or represent if completed: (1) Part of an issue of money, stamps, securities or other valuable instruments issued by a government or governmental instrumentality; or (2) part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interests in or claims against a corporate or other organization or its property.

(b) Forgery in the first degree is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 140; P.A. 76-292, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 76-292 made first degree forgery a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony.

Cited. 11 CA 161; 37 CA 72; 47 CA 1.

Cited. 34 CS 606.

Sec. 53a-139. Forgery in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of forgery in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or represent if completed: (1) A deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument or other instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status; or (2) a public record or an instrument filed or required or authorized by law to be filed in or with a public office or public servant; or (3) a written instrument officially issued or created by a public office, public servant or governmental instrumentality; or (4) a prescription of a duly licensed physician or other person authorized to issue the same for any drug or any instrument or device used in the taking or administering of drugs for which a prescription is required by law.

(b) “Drugs” as used in this section includes all drugs except controlled drugs as defined in section 21a-240.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 141; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 38; P.A. 76-292, S. 2.)

History: 1971 act removed exception re narcotic drugs in Subsec. (b); P.A. 76-292 made second degree forgery a Class D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor.

Cited. 201 C. 125; 207 C. 555. Defendant may be found guilty of forgery in the second degree if the state establishes that defendant, with intent to deceive another, falsely made, possessed or altered a written instrument that he or she knew to be forged. 252 C. 229.

Cited. 8 CA 342; 11 CA 161; 28 CA 521; 37 CA 72; 42 CA 790; 47 CA 1. Defendant's true identity is related directly to the crime and therefore defendant must be provided with “Miranda” warnings prior to being asked his or her identity as part of booking process. 103 CA 544. Whether the victim was in fact deceived is not an element of forgery in the second degree, belief of the victim is immaterial. 165 CA 791.

Cited. 34 CS 606.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 169 C. 581; 195 C. 421; 198 C. 68; Id., 158; 199 C. 146; 235 C. 469.

Cited. 5 CA 473; 14 CA 1; 24 CA 493. Altered medical document can reasonably be found to be “other instrument” under Subdiv. (1) as such document may affect a legal right or interest; Subdivs. (1) to (4) are not mutually exclusive. 146 CA 17.

Sec. 53a-140. Forgery in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of forgery in the third degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument, or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged.

(b) Forgery in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 142; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 39.)

History: 1971 act referred to issuance of instrument which person knows to be forged rather than to alteration of such an instrument.

Cited. 194 C. 233; 204 C. 441; 207 C. 109; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 235 C. 469.

Cited. 8 CA 342; 11 CA 161; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502; 37 CA 72; Id., 437; 42 CA 790; 47 CA 1.

Subsec. (a):

The fact that insurer did not rely on the forged document had no bearing on question of whether defendant's conduct was sufficient for a conviction under Subsec. 119 CA 581.

Cited. 34 CS 606; Id., 656.

Sec. 53a-141. Criminal simulation: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal simulation when: (1) With intent to defraud, he makes or alters any object in such manner that it appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which it does not in fact possess; or (2) with knowledge of its true character and with intent to defraud, he issues or possesses an object so simulated.

(b) Criminal simulation is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 143; P.A. 07-206, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 07-206 changed penalty from class A misdemeanor to class D felony.

Cited. 11 CA 161; 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-142. Forgery of symbols: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of forgery of symbols of value when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or represent if completed part of an issue of tokens, public transportation transfers, certificates or other articles manufactured and designed for use as symbols of value usable in place of money for the purchase of property or services.

(b) Forgery of symbols of value is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 144.)

Cited. 11 CA 161; 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-142a. Filing a false record: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of filing a false record against real or personal property when with intent to defraud, deceive, injure or harass another, he or she files, or causes to be filed with a municipality, a record he or she knows, or reasonably should know, is false. As used in this section, “record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form, and includes any record that is recorded in the office of the town clerk.

(b) A person is guilty of filing a false record under sections 42a-9-501 to 42a-9-526, inclusive, when with intent to defraud, deceive, injure or harass another, he or she files, or causes to be filed with the Secretary of the State or a municipality, a record he or she knows, or reasonably should know, is false.

(P.A. 17-99, S. 46.)

History: P.A. 17-99 effective January 1, 2018.

Sec. 53a-143. Unlawfully using slugs: Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to sections 53a-144 and 53a-145:

(1) “Coin machine” means a coin box, turnstile, vending machine or other mechanical or electronic device or receptacle designed (A) to receive a coin or bill or token made for the purpose, and (B) in return for the insertion or deposit thereof, automatically to offer, to provide, to assist in providing or to permit the acquisition of some property or some service.

(2) “Slug” means an object or article which, by virtue of its size, shape or any other quality, is capable of being inserted or deposited in a coin machine as an improper substitute for a genuine coin, bill or token.

(3) “Value” of a slug means the value of the coin, bill or token for which it is capable of being substituted.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 145.)

Cited. 11 CA 161.

Sec. 53a-144. Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the first degree when he makes, possesses or disposes of slugs with intent to enable a person to insert or deposit them in a coin machine, and the value of such slugs exceeds one hundred dollars.

(b) Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 146.)

Cited. 11 CA 161.

Sec. 53a-145. Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the second degree when: (1) With intent to defraud the owner of a coin machine, he inserts or deposits a slug in such machine; or (2) he makes, possesses or disposes of a slug with intent to enable a person to insert or deposit it in a coin machine.

(b) Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 147.)

Cited. 11 CA 161; 12 CA 74.

PART XI*

BRIBERY, OFFENSES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES

*Cited. 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-146. Definitions. For purposes of this part:

(1) An “official proceeding” is any proceeding held or which may be held before any legislative, judicial, administrative or other agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner or notary or other person taking evidence in connection with any proceeding.

(2) “Benefit” means monetary advantage, or anything regarded by the beneficiary as a monetary advantage, including benefit to any person or entity in whose welfare the beneficiary is interested.

(3) “Public servant” is an officer or employee of government or a quasi-public agency, as defined in section 1-120, elected or appointed, and any person participating as advisor, consultant or otherwise, paid or unpaid, in performing a governmental function.

(4) “Government” includes any branch, subdivision or agency of the state or any locality within it.

(5) “Labor official” means any duly appointed or elected representative of a labor organization or any duly appointed or elected trustee or representative of an employee welfare trust fund.

(6) “Witness” is any person summoned, or who may be summoned, to give testimony in an official proceeding.

(7) “Juror” is any person who has been drawn or summoned to serve or act as a juror in any court.

(8) “Physical evidence” means any article, object, document, record or other thing of physical substance which is or is about to be produced or used as evidence in an official proceeding.

(9) “Person selected to be a public servant” means any person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public servant.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 148; P.A. 80-479, S. 1; P.A. 99-240, S. 12; June 11 Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-3, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 80-479 substituted “monetary advantage” for “gain or advantage” in Subdiv. (2), specified “paid or unpaid” advisors or consultants in Subdiv. (3) and added Subdiv. (9) defining “person selected to be a public servant”; P.A. 99-240 made definitions applicable to new Sec. 53a-151a but specific reference not added since said Sec. already included in existing reference to “this part” and made a technical change in Subdiv. (2) for purposes of gender neutrality; June 11 Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-3 redefined “public servant” in Subdiv. (3) to include reference to quasi-public agency.

Cited. 172 C. 458; 200 C. 664; 201 C. 379.

Cited. 2 CA 204; 22 CA 449; 40 CA 643. Section defines official proceeding as broadly covering presently instituted proceedings, as well as future proceedings that “may be held”; definition of witness includes those who have already been summoned to testify, as well as those who may be called to testify in the future. 160 CA 251.

Sec. 53a-147. Bribery: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery if he promises, offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a public servant or a person selected to be a public servant, any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, opinion, recommendation or vote as a public servant or a person selected to be a public servant.

(b) Bribery is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 149; P.A. 80-479, S. 2; P.A. 03-259, S. 46.)

History: P.A. 80-479 included bribery of persons selected to be public servants in provisions and bribery consisting of promises of benefits for recipient's decision, opinion, recommendation of vote, deleting reference to “other exercise of discretion”; P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change bribery from a class D felony to a class C felony.

Offense of offering gratuity requires element of proof, specific intent, which is not needed to prove greater offense of bribery; it is no defense for crime of bribery that police officer had no authority to take action desired by bribe given; covers crime of bribery in broad terms and is not limited to administration of justice and attempts to influence legislation. 172 C. 458. Sec. 29-9 is not lesser included offense to this charge, and acceptance of guilty plea to said section was nullity. Id., 608.

Cited. 1 CA 524; 5 CA 125; 9 CA 15; 14 CA 322; 21 CA 386. The term “offer” is undefined, but section language is similar to federal bribery statute, 18 USC 201(b), and, under federal law, a bribery conviction must be based on more than evidence of mere preparation, but must progress to the point that defendant made an offer that consisted of an expression of a desire and an ability to pay the public official for performing a proscribed act. 156 CA 650.

Sec. 53a-148. Bribe receiving: Class C felony. (a) A public servant or a person selected to be a public servant is guilty of bribe receiving if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another person any benefit for, because of, or as consideration for his decision, opinion, recommendation or vote.

(b) Bribe receiving is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 150; P.A. 80-479, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 61; P.A. 03-259, S. 47.)

History: P.A. 80-479 applied provisions to persons selected to be public servants and reworded Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “another” with “another person”; P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change bribe receiving from a class D felony to a class C felony.

Offense under Sec. 29-9 is not a lesser included offense. 201 C. 379. Cited. 208 C. 411; 214 C. 657; 229 C. 716.

Cited. 5 CA 125; 14 CA 322; 17 CA 486; 20 CA 386; 22 CA 449.

Sec. 53a-148a. Failure to report bribery: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A public servant, as defined in section 53a-146, is guilty of failure to report bribery when the public servant: (1) Knows that (A) another person has attempted to bribe such public servant, as defined in section 53a-147, or (B) such public servant has witnessed either (i) a person attempting to bribe another public servant, as defined in section 53a-147, or (ii) another public servant commit the crime of bribe receiving, as defined in section 53a-148; and (2) does not, as soon as reasonably practicable, report such crime to a law enforcement agency.

(b) Failure to report bribery is a class A misdemeanor.

(June 11 Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-3, S. 6.)

Sec. 53a-149. Bribery of a witness: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery of a witness if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a witness any benefit to influence the testimony or conduct of such witness in, or in relation to, an official proceeding.

(b) Bribery of a witness is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 151; P.A. 03-259, S. 48.)

History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change bribery of a witness from a class D felony to a class C felony.

Cited. 192 C. 98.

Cited. 12 CA 74. State not required to establish existence of official proceeding at time of defendant's offer because definitions in Sec. 53a-146 encompass future proceedings that may be held and witnesses who may be summoned, and because crime of bribery is committed as soon as offer is made and, thus, it is irrelevant whether offer was made before or after institution of official proceeding; section is specific intent crime, requiring that act be made with the intent of influencing testimony or conduct. 160 CA 251. Trial court's interpretation of the term “influence” as meaning to alter comports with the state Supreme Court's construction of the relevant statutory language. 164 CA 459.

Sec. 53a-150. Bribe receiving by a witness: Class C felony. (a) A witness is guilty of bribe receiving by a witness if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his testimony or conduct in, or in relation to, any official proceeding.

(b) Bribe receiving by a witness is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 152; P.A. 03-259, S. 51.)

History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change bribe receiving by a witness from a class D felony to a class C felony.

Sec. 53a-151. Tampering with a witness: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with a witness if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted, he induces or attempts to induce a witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process summoning him to testify or absent himself from any official proceeding.

(b) Tampering with a witness is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 153; P.A. 03-259, S. 52.)

History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change tampering with a witness from a class D felony to a class C felony.

Cited. 193 C. 526; 196 C. 242; 197 C. 369; 200 C. 664; 204 C. 330; 228 C. 147; Id., 918; 230 C. 686; Id., 698.

Cited. 1 CA 647; 12 CA 74; 26 CA 758; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 33 CA 143; 46 CA 741. Defendant's claim that statute is so vague and indefinite that it violates the due process clause of Art. I, Sec. 8 of the state constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution because it did not clearly define his conduct–telephoning victim despite police warnings not to contact her and instructing her to tell police that “nothing ever happened”–is without merit; language of statute plainly warns potential perpetrators that statute applies to any conduct that is intended to prompt witness to testify falsely or to refrain from testifying in an official proceeding that the perpetrator believes to be pending or imminent; legislature's unqualified use of word “induce” clearly informs persons of ordinary intelligence that any conduct, physical or verbal, can potentially give rise to criminal liability. 74 CA 473. Supreme Court made clear that liability under section hinges on mental state of the perpetrator in engaging in the conduct at issue, not on whether he must overcome by coercive means the will of a witness reluctant to do so; as interpreted in our case law, section provides fair warning of the conduct that it prohibits. 83 CA 672. Section can be violated even if witness may be independently willing to provide false testimony; person became a “witness” who may be summoned to testify in an official proceeding once defendant began discussing defendant's case with the person. 138 CA 420. Defendant may not avoid liability by inducing a witness' false testimony through the use of an intermediary instead of communicating directly with the witness. 143 CA 438.

Cited. 39 CS 428; 41 CS 525; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Subsec. applies whenever defendant believes that an official proceeding will probably occur, even if the police are only at the investigation stage and regardless of whether an official proceeding is actually pending or about to be instituted; “about to be instituted” signifies probability rather than temporal proximity; section does not apply when defendant believes that only an investigation, but not an official proceeding, is likely to occur; the jury may consider defendant's attempt to prevent a potential witness from speaking with the police as evidence of his intent to induce the witness to engage in conduct prohibited by section. 312 C. 551.

Cited. 41 CA 584. The “pending or about to be instituted” element may be satisfied when facts support the inference that defendant reasonably could have contemplated that an official proceeding was likely to arise; it is enough under statute to satisfy required belief that an official proceeding is “about to be instituted” and is therefore imminent if defendant, knowing he has been implicated in a crime, threatens a likely witness to that crime to withhold evidence from the police; it is sufficient to qualify as tampering that defendant attempted to discourage the witness from speaking to the police, as opposed to testifying at trial, when there was evidence that defendant believed an official proceeding was imminent. 110 CA 608.

Sec. 53a-151a. Intimidating a witness: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidating a witness when, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted, such person uses, attempts to use or threatens the use of physical force against a witness or another person with intent to (1) influence, delay or prevent the testimony of the witness in the official proceeding, or (2) induce the witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process summoning the witness to testify or absent himself or herself from the official proceeding.

(b) Intimidating a witness is a class B felony.

(P.A. 99-240, S. 1; P.A. 17-24, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 17-24 amended Subsec. (b) to change intimidating a witness from a class C felony to a class B felony.

The phrase “believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted” is satisfied as long as the defendant believes that an official proceeding will probably occur, and it does not matter whether an official proceeding is actually pending or is about to be instituted. 321 C. 729.

Jury reasonably could have concluded that Facebook messages sent to witness by defendant forecasted future physical harm and were sent with the intent to influence, delay or prevent testimony at an official proceeding. 152 CA 590.

Sec. 53a-152. Bribery of a juror: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery of a juror if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a juror any benefit as consideration for the juror's decision or vote.

(b) Bribery of a juror is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 154; P.A. 73-639, S. 10.)

History: P.A. 73-639 made bribery of a juror a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony.

Sec. 53a-153. Bribe receiving by a juror: Class C felony. (a) A juror is guilty of bribe receiving by a juror if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another person any benefit as consideration for his decision or vote.

(b) Bribe receiving by a juror is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 155; P.A. 73-639, S. 11; P.A. 92-260, S. 62.)

History: P.A. 73-639 made bribe receiving by a juror a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “another” with “another person”.

Sec. 53a-154. Tampering with a juror: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if he influences any juror in relation to any official proceeding to or for which such juror has been drawn, summoned or sworn.

(b) Tampering with a juror is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 156.)

Cited. 170 C. 601.

Cited. 38 CS 464.

Sec. 53a-155. Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence if, believing that a criminal investigation conducted by a law enforcement agency or an official proceeding is pending, or about to be instituted, such person: (1) Alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such criminal investigation or official proceeding; or (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public servant who is or may be engaged in such criminal investigation or official proceeding.

(b) Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 157; P.A. 15-211, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision re criminal investigation conducted by law enforcement agency and making technical and conforming changes.

Cited. 214 C. 540; 236 C. 514; 237 C. 339. Section applies, no matter what stage the police have actually reached in their investigation, provided defendant believes it is probable that an official proceeding will arise; omission of the term “investigation” from section excludes situations in which defendant believes only an investigation, but not an official proceeding, is likely to take place. 314 C. 354.

Cited. 1 CA 540; 6 CA 394; 25 CA 624. Section does not require a temporal proximity between the alleged act and the subsequent official proceeding; element re pending or about to be instituted official proceeding was satisfied when defendant reasonably could have contemplated that an official proceeding was likely to arise. 147 CA 53.

Sec. 53a-156. Perjury: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of perjury if, in any official proceeding, such person intentionally, under oath or in an unsworn declaration under sections 1-65aa to 1-65hh, inclusive, makes a false statement, swears, affirms or testifies falsely, to a material statement which such person does not believe to be true.

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor was coerced into committing such offense by another person in violation of section 53a-192.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 158; P.A. 10-33, S. 9; 10-180, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 10-33 added reference to an unsworn declaration under Secs. 1-65aa to 1-65hh; P.A. 10-180 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, added new Subsec. (b) re affirmative defense of coercion and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), effective June 8, 2010.

Cited. 175 C. 279; 189 C. 92; 193 C. 474; 200 C. 243. One-witness-plus-corroboration rule discussed. 204 C. 472.

Cited. 4 CA 359; 5 CA 552; 9 CA 686; 10 CA 605; 17 CA 395.

Sec. 53a-157. Transferred to Sec. 53a-157b.

Sec. 53a-157a. False statement on a certified payroll: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of false statement on a certified payroll when such person intentionally makes a false written statement on a certified payroll submitted pursuant to section 31-53 which such person does not believe to be true and which statement is intended to mislead a contracting authority or the Labor Commissioner in the exercise of his authority or the fulfillment of his duties under chapter 557.

(b) False statement on a certified payroll is a class D felony.

(P.A. 93-392, S. 7; P.A. 13-144, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 13-144 changed “false statement in the first degree” to “false statement on a certified payroll” and made technical changes.

Sec. 53a-157b. (Formerly Sec. 53a-157). False statement: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of false statement when such person (1) intentionally makes a false written statement that such person does not believe to be true with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of such public servant's official function, and (2) makes such statement under oath or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable.

(b) False statement is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 159; P.A. 93-392, S. 6; P.A. 13-144, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 93-392 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to classify the intentional making of a false written statement other than on a certified payroll as false statement “in the second degree”; Sec. 53a-157 transferred to Sec. 53a-157b in 1995; P.A. 13-144 changed “false statement in the second degree” to “false statement” and made technical changes.

Annotations to former section 53a-157:

Cited. 186 C. 265; 200 C. 310; Id., 743; 221 C. 93; 227 C. 1; 238 C. 588.

Cited. 6 CA 143; 9 CA 686; 28 CA 733; 34 CA 694; 35 CA 714; 36 CA 556.

Cited. 38 CS 340; Id., 695; 40 CS 145.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 233 C. 527; 235 C. 679.

Sec. 53a-158. Bribery of a labor official: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery of a labor official if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a labor official any benefit with intent to influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions or duties as such labor official.

(b) Bribery of a labor official is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 160.)

Sec. 53a-159. Bribe receiving by a labor official: Class D felony. (a) A labor official is guilty of bribe receiving by a labor official if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions or duties as such labor official.

(b) Bribe receiving by a labor official is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 161.)

Cited. 229 C. 479.

Sec. 53a-160. Commercial bribery: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of commercial bribery when he confers, or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter's employer or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs.

(b) Commercial bribery is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 162; P.A. 03-259, S. 44.)

History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change commercial bribery from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony.

Cited. 14 CA 236.

Sec. 53a-161. Receiving a commercial bribe: Class D felony. (a) An employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of receiving a commercial bribe when, without consent of his employer or principal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs.

(b) Receiving a commercial bribe is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 163; P.A. 03-259, S. 45.)

History: P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change receiving a commercial bribe from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony.

Cited. 229 C. 479.

Cited. 20 CA 386.

Sec. 53a-161a. Bid rigging: Class D felony. No person, firm, corporation, association or partnership who bids, or intends to bid, for any contract to be awarded by any commission, agency or department of the state or any political subdivision of the state shall induce or attempt to induce any other person, firm, corporation, association or partnership to submit or not to submit a bid or proposal for the purpose of restricting competition. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(P.A. 80-454, S. 1.)

Sec. 53a-161b. Disclosure of bid or proposal: Class A misdemeanor. Unless otherwise required by law, the prices quoted in a bid or proposal for any contract to be awarded by any commission, agency or department of the state or any political subdivision of the state shall not be disclosed by the bidder or offeror prior to the opening, in the case of a bid, or prior to the award, in the case of a proposal, directly or indirectly to any other bidder or offeror or to any competitor. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 80-454, S. 2.)

Cited. 14 CA 322.

Sec. 53a-161c. Receiving kickbacks: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of receiving kickbacks when he: (1) By force, intimidation or threat of procuring dismissal from employment induces any person who is employed in the construction, completion or repair of any public building, public work, or building or work financed in whole or in part by loans or grants from the state, or who has a contract with the state, to give up any part of the compensation to which he is entitled; (2) knowingly solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit, in cash or in kind, from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence such person's conduct in relation to referring an individual or arranging for the referral of an individual for the furnishing of any goods, facilities or services to such other person under contract to provide goods, facilities or services to a local, state or federal agency; or (3) by force, intimidation or threat, such person induces another person who has a contract with the state to give up any part of the compensation to which such other person is entitled. For the purposes of this section and section 53a-161d, “refer” means to send, direct or recommend and “referral” means the act of sending, directing or recommending. For purposes of this subsection, “benefit” shall not include forms of remuneration listed in 42 CFR Section 1001.952.

(b) Receiving kickbacks is a class D felony.

(P.A. 80-290; P.A. 96-169, S. 11.)

History: P.A. 96-169 substituted “when he: (1) By” for “whenever he by”, added Subdivs. (2) and (3) and added definitions of “refer”, “referral” and “benefit”.

Cited. 229 C. 479.

Sec. 53a-161d. Paying a kickback: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of paying a kickback when he knowingly offers or pays any benefit, in cash or kind, to any person with intent to influence such person: (1) To refer an individual, or to arrange for the referral of an individual, for the furnishing of any goods, facilities or services for which a claim for benefits or reimbursement has been filed with a local, state or federal agency; or (2) to purchase, lease, order or arrange for or recommend the purchasing, leasing or ordering of any goods, facilities or services for which a claim of benefits or reimbursement has been filed with a local, state or federal agency.

(b) Paying a kickback is a class D felony.

(P.A. 96-169, S. 12; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 38, 121.)

History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 24, 1998.

Sec. 53a-162. Rigging: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of rigging if, with intent to prevent a publicly exhibited sporting or other contest from being conducted in accordance with the rules and usages purporting to govern it, he: (1) Confers or offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon, or threatens any injury to, a participant, official or other person associated with the contest or exhibition; or (2) tampers with any person, animal or thing.

(b) Rigging is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 164.)

Sec. 53a-163. Soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging if he knowingly solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit the giving of which would be criminal under section 53a-162.

(b) Soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 165.)

Sec. 53a-164. Participation in a rigged contest: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of participation in a rigged contest if he knowingly engages in, sponsors, produces, judges or otherwise participates in a publicly exhibited sporting or other contest knowing that the contest is not being conducted in compliance with the rules and usages purporting to govern it, by reason of conduct which would be criminal under section 53a-162.

(b) Participation in a rigged contest is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 166; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 40.)

History: 1971 act substituted “section 53a-162” for “this section” in Subsec. (a).

Sec. 53a-165. Hindering prosecution defined. As used in sections 53a-165aa, 53a-166 and 53a-167, a person “renders criminal assistance” when, with intent to prevent, hinder or delay the discovery or apprehension of, or the lodging of a criminal charge against, another person whom such person knows or believes has committed a felony or is being sought by law enforcement officials for the commission of a felony, or with intent to assist another person in profiting or benefiting from the commission of a felony, such person: (1) Harbors or conceals such other person; or (2) warns such other person of impending discovery or apprehension; or (3) provides such other person with money, transportation, weapon, disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension; or (4) prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception, any person from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such other person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against such other person; or (5) suppresses, by an act of concealment, alteration or destruction, any physical evidence which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such other person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against such other person; or (6) aids such other person to protect or expeditiously profit from an advantage derived from such crime.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 167; P.A. 02-97, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 02-97 made definition applicable to Sec. 53a-165aa and made technical changes, including changes for purposes of gender neutrality.

Cited. 205 C. 17; 223 C. 595.

Cited. 7 CA 470.

Secs. 53a-165a to 53a-165z. Reserved for future use.

Sec. 53a-165aa. Hindering prosecution in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the first degree when such person renders criminal assistance to another person who has committed a class A or B felony or an unclassified felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for more than ten years and such other person committed such felony with intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or a unit of government.

(b) Hindering prosecution in the first degree is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 02-97, S. 3.)

Sec. 53a-166. Hindering prosecution in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the second degree when such person renders criminal assistance to another person who has committed a class A or class B felony or an unclassified felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for more than ten years.

(b) Hindering prosecution in the second degree is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 168; P.A. 78-37, S. 1; P.A. 02-97, S. 4; P.A. 03-259, S. 49.)

History: P.A. 78-37 classified rendering assistance to person who committed an unclassified offense punishable by maximum imprisonment of more than 10 years as hindering prosecution in the first degree; P.A. 02-97 changed the name of the offense from “hindering prosecution in the first degree” to “hindering prosecution in the second degree” and made technical changes, including a change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change hindering prosecution in the second degree from a class D felony to a class C felony.

Cited. 200 C. 310; 223 C. 595.

Cited. 7 CA 470; 22 CA 601; 28 CA 721.

Cited. 38 CS 521.

Sec. 53a-167. Hindering prosecution in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the third degree when such person renders criminal assistance to another person who has committed a class C, D or E felony or an unclassified felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for ten years or less but more than one year.

(b) Hindering prosecution in the third degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 169; P.A. 78-37, S. 2; P.A. 02-97, S. 5; P.A. 03-259, S. 50; P.A. 13-258, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 78-37 classified assisting person who committed an unclassified offense punishable by maximum imprisonment of 1 to 10 years as hindering prosecution in the second degree; P.A. 02-97 changed the name of the offense from “hindering prosecution in the second degree” to “hindering prosecution in the third degree” and made technical changes, including a change for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 03-259 amended Subsec. (b) to change hindering prosecution in the third degree from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 13-258 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to a class E felony.

Cited. 205 C. 17.

Cited. 1 CA 540; 30 CA 712.

Sec. 53a-167a. Interfering with an officer: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer or firefighter in the performance of such peace officer's or firefighter's duties.

(b) Interfering with an officer is a class A misdemeanor, except that, if such violation causes the death or serious physical injury of another person, such person shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 50; P.A. 76-225; P.A. 01-84, S. 11, 26; P.A. 05-180, S. 4; P.A. 08-150, S. 52; P.A. 10-36, S. 22; 10-110, S. 51; P.A. 13-300, S. 1; P.A. 19-108, S. 6; P.A. 22-117, S. 12.)

History: P.A. 76-225 reworded Subsec. (a) to eliminate redundant reference to interference with peace officer or fireman and made interference with an officer a Class A misdemeanor rather than a Class D felony; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “fireman” with “firefighter” and make other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 05-180 amended Subsec. (a) to include a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within purview of subsection; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (a) to include Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of section; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated”, add “motor vehicle inspector's” re performance of duties and make a technical change, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 10-110 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 13-300 amended Subsec. (b) to establish class D felony penalty if violation causes death or serious physical injury of another; P.A. 19-108 amended Subsec.(a) to delete references to motor vehicle inspector; P.A. 22-117 amended Subsec. (a) to delete references to special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b, effective May 27, 2022.

Cited. 182 C. 242; 189 C. 1; 191 C. 433; 194 C. 347; 195 C. 668; 198 C. 43; 205 C. 456; 211 C. 389; 220 C. 38; 230 C. 400; 234 C. 78; 236 C. 214. Refusal to comply with police command to provide identification following a “Terry” stop may constitute a violation of section even if such refusal is unaccompanied by any physical force or other affirmative act; statute broadly proscribes conduct that hinders, obstructs or impedes a police officer in performance of duties, irrespective of whether offending conduct is active or passive. 280 C. 824. Re 2003 revision, Appellate Court's determination that evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction and that defendant lacked requisite intent was improper in case where defendant, when asked to produce license and registration, swore at officer and left scene, and potential applicability of Sec. 14-217 to present case does not preclude conviction under this section which was drafted expansively to encompass wide range of conduct. 285 C. 447. Evidence was not sufficient to convict defendant under section due to state's failure to pursue a theory of guilt predicated on threatening language and where the trial court did not instruct the jury on the true threat doctrine. 321 C. 729.

Cited. 1 CA 540; Id., 709; 5 CA 616. Statute meets requirement of fair notice to defendant. 6 CA 407. Cited. 7 CA 257; 8 CA 153; 10 CA 486; Id., 532; 12 CA 364; 14 CA 10; 15 CA 58; Id., 161; 18 CA 104; 21 CA 326; 22 CA 10; Id., 683; 23 CA 83; Id., 447; Id., 479; 24 CA 473; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788; Id., 598; 27 CA 49; Id., 103; 28 CA 369; 30 CA 45; 31 CA 178; 36 CA 106; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78; 37 CA 276; 38 CA 56; 40 CA 601; 42 CA 507; 43 CA 76; 45 CA 369; 46 CA 118. Broad intent is to prohibit conduct that hampers activities of police in performance of their duties, including physical resistance as well as defendant's conduct in this case, in which, after officer saw defendant in window and ordered him at gunpoint to get down and show his hands, defendant reentered building and fled through another window. 66 CA 357. Legislature did not intend failure to identify oneself instantly and voicing of declaratory statements, such as “this isn't Russia”, to constitute interference or obstruction under section. 86 CA 363. Interfering with an officer is lesser offense included in greater offense of assault of public safety personnel and thus conviction of both offenses for same act constituted double jeopardy violation. Id., 607. Conviction reversed in case where defendant, when asked to produce license and registration, swore at officer and left scene to bring brother to hospital because section requires physical struggle, attempt to escape or to destroy evidence and there was not sufficient evidence to support conviction under section. 93 CA 349; judgment reversed, see 285 C. 447. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for interfering with an officer. 96 CA 341. Defendant who placed arresting officer in head lock was in violation of section regardless of whether officer had probable cause for making the arrest. 98 CA 350. Under facts presented, conviction of assault of public safety personnel under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(5) and interfering with officer under this section does not violate double jeopardy because each crime required proof of different facts. 124 CA 294. Text message to witness telling him not to write statement to police and to “keep [his] mouth shut” could not be construed to be fighting words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace. 152 CA 590. Conviction of both interfering with a peace officer under this section and assault of public safety personnel under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(1) does not constitute double jeopardy when evidence demonstrates that the two crimes did not stem from the same conduct. 167 CA 281; judgment affirmed, see 328 C. 648.

Cited. 33 CS 4. Construed. Id., 515. Intention to interfere is necessary element of offense; charge to jury also required knowledge of officer's duty; unlawful entry by officer would not be “in the performance of his duties”, so proof of lawfulness is essential element of state's case and Sec. 53a-23 is applicable. 34 CS 531. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. Id., 549. Cited. 36 CS 89; 37 CS 767; 38 CS 364; Id., 400; Id., 665; 39 CS 347; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 221 C. 788. In order to sustain a conviction under statute, there must be a finding that police officers had been acting in the performance of their duties. 261 C. 553.

Defendant acted with the intent to interfere with the performance of the officers' duties; defendant's act does not have to be successful. 1 CA 669. Cited. 5 CA 496; 9 CA 255; 13 CA 667; 17 CA 104; 21 CA 260; 23 CA 123; 24 CA 195; Id., 489; 25 CA 3, 5; 32 CA 224; 33 CA 509; 41 CA 584; 46 CA 791. There was sufficient evidence to support conviction of interfering with an officer where defendant provided police with a false name when asked for his name at crime scene and again while being booked for drug offenses at police headquarters. 110 CA 778. Conviction of both interfering with officer under Subsec. and assault of peace officer under Sec. 53a-167c(a)(1) constitutes double jeopardy. 119 CA 556.

Sec. 53a-167b. Failure to assist peace officer or firefighter: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of failure to assist a peace officer or firefighter when, commanded by a peace officer or firefighter authorized to command assistance, such person refuses to assist such peace officer or firefighter in the execution of such peace officer's or firefighter's duties.

(b) Failure to assist a peace officer or firefighter is a class A misdemeanor.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 51; P.A. 01-84, S. 12, 26; P.A. 05-180, S. 5; P.A. 08-150, S. 53; P.A. 10-36, S. 23; 10-110, S. 52; P.A. 19-108, S. 7; P.A. 22-117, S. 13.)

History: P.A. 01-84 replaced “fireman” with “firefighter” and made other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 05-180 changed the name of the offense from “failure to assist a peace officer or firefighter” to “failure to assist a peace officer, special policeman or firefighter” and included a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within purview of section; P.A. 08-150 included Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of section and changed name of offense from “failure to assist a peace officer, special policeman or firefighter” to “failure to assist a peace officer, special policeman, motor vehicle inspector or firefighter”; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated”, add “motor vehicle inspector's” re execution of duties and make technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 10-110 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 19-108 deleted references to motor vehicle inspector; P.A. 22-117 deleted references to special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b, effective May 27, 2022.

Cited. 216 C. 820. Section not facially unconstitutional under fourth or fourteenth amendments. 217 C. 73. Cited. 218 C. 483.

Cited. 22 CA 683; 31 CA 443.

Sec. 53a-167c. Assault of public safety, emergency medical, public transit or health care personnel: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of public safety, emergency medical, public transit or health care personnel when, with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer, firefighter or employee of an emergency medical service organization, as defined in section 53a-3, emergency room physician or nurse, health care employee as defined in section 19a-490q, employee of the Department of Correction, member or employee of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, probation officer, employee of the Judicial Branch assigned to provide pretrial secure detention and programming services to juveniles accused of the commission of a delinquent act, liquor control agent, state or municipal animal control officer, security officer, employee of the Department of Children and Families assigned to provide direct services to children and youths in the care or custody of the department, employee of a municipal police department assigned to provide security at the police department's lockup and holding facility, active individual member of a volunteer canine search and rescue team, as defined in section 5-249, or public transit employee from performing his or her duties, and while such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, health care employee, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member is acting in the performance of his or her duties, (1) such person causes physical injury to such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member, or (2) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any rock, bottle, can or other article, object or missile of any kind capable of causing physical harm, damage or injury, at such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member, or (3) such person uses or causes to be used any mace, tear gas or any like or similar deleterious agent against such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member, or (4) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any paint, dye or other like or similar staining, discoloring or coloring agent or any type of offensive or noxious liquid, agent or substance at such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member, or (5) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any bodily fluid including, but not limited to, urine, feces, blood or saliva at such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member. For the purposes of this section, “public transit employee” means a person employed by the state, a political subdivision of the state, a transit district formed under chapter 103a or a person with whom the Commissioner of Transportation has contracted in accordance with section 13b-34 to provide transportation services who operates a vehicle or vessel providing public ferry service or fixed route bus service or performs duties directly related to the operation of such vehicle or vessel, or who, as part of the provision of public rail service, is a train operator, conductor, inspector, signal person or station agent and “security officer” has the same meaning as provided in section 29-152u.

(b) Assault of public safety, emergency medical, public transit or health care personnel is a class C felony. If any person who is confined in an institution or facility of the Department of Correction is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for assault of an employee of the Department of Correction under this section, such term shall run consecutively to the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.

(c) In any prosecution under this section involving assault of a health care employee, as defined in section 19a-490q, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant is a person with a disability as described in subdivision (13), (15) or (20) of section 46a-51 and the defendant's conduct was a clear and direct manifestation of the disability, except that for the purposes of this subsection, “mental disability”, as defined in subdivision (20) of section 46a-51, does not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct.

(P.A. 73-639, S. 19; P.A. 90-157, S. 2; 90-250, S. 2; P.A. 93-246, S. 1; P.A. 94-62; P.A. 98-41; P.A. 99-26, S. 28; 99-204; P.A. 01-84, S. 13, 26; P.A. 03-6, S. 1; 03-19, S. 126; P.A. 04-234, S. 2; 04-241, S. 3; 04-257, S. 120; P.A. 05-108, S. 7; 05-180, S. 6; P.A. 06-196, S. 185; P.A. 08-150, S. 54; P.A. 09-191, S. 2; P.A. 10-36, S. 24; P.A. 11-175, S. 4; P.A. 13-111, S. 1; P.A. 15-211, S. 15; P.A. 17-216, S. 3; P.A. 19-108, S. 8; P.A. 22-117, S. 14.)

History: P.A. 90-157 applied provisions to assaults of employees of an emergency medical service organization; P.A. 90-250 applied provisions to employees of the department of correction, specified that assault must occur while peace officer, fireman or correction department employee is acting in performance of his duties and added provision re consecutive sentences for persons sentenced for assault of correction department employees; P.A. 93-246 applied provisions to assault of an employee or member of the board of parole or probation officer; P.A. 94-62 applied the provisions to emergency room physicians and emergency room nurses; P.A. 98-41 applied provisions to an assault of an employee of the Judicial Branch assigned to provide pretrial secure detention and programming services to juveniles accused of the commission of a delinquent act or an assault of an employee of the Department of Children and Families performing duties at Long Lane School; P.A. 99-26 revised the category of employees of the Department of Children and Families to which provisions apply by replacing an employee “performing duties at Long Lane School” with an employee “assigned to provide direct services to children and youth in the care or custody of the department”; P.A. 99-204 added Subsec. (a)(5) re throwing or hurling any bodily fluid at specified personnel and changed the name of the offense to “assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel” where appearing; P.A. 01-84 replaced “fireman” with “firefighter” in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 03-6 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of an employee of a municipal police department assigned to provide security at the police department's lockup and holding facility and make a technical change for the purpose of gender neutrality; P.A. 03-19 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective May 12, 2003; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 04-241 applied provisions to assaults of active individual members of volunteer canine search and rescue teams; P.A. 04-257 amended Subsec. (a) to delete reference to an employee of the Board of Parole, effective June 14, 2004; P.A. 05-108 amended Subsec. (a) to restore reference to an employee of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective June 7, 2005; P.A. 05-180 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b; P.A. 06-196 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 7, 2006; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d; P.A. 09-191 amended Subsec. (a) to define and apply provisions to a “public transit employee”, and changed name of the offense to “assault of public safety, emergency medical or public transit personnel”; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated”, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 11-175 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of a “health care employee as defined in section 19a-490q” and added Subsec. (c) re disability defense for defendant being prosecuted for assault of a health care employee; P.A. 13-111 amended Subsec. (a) by adding references to liquor control agent; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to state or municipal animal control officer and security officer, redefine “public transit employee” by adding provision re public rail service and add definition of “security officer”; P.A. 17-216 amended Subsec. (c) by replacing “a defense” with “an affirmative defense” and defining “mental disability”; P.A. 19-108 amended Subsec. (a) to delete references to motor vehicle inspector; P.A. 22-117 amended Subsec. (a) to delete references to special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b, effective May 27, 2022.

See Sec. 53a-59b re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree.

Cited. 214 C. 195; 231 C. 545; 234 C. 78; 236 C. 31; 237 C. 454; Id., 633.

Cited. 3 CA 353; 10 CA 486; 12 CA 364; 14 CA 10; 27 CA 103; 32 CA 224; 37 CA 338; 40 CA 601; 43 CA 61; Id., 76; 46 CA 118. Under Sec. 53a-23, the illegality of an arrest is not a defense to charges under this section which was intended to require an arrestee to submit to an arrest, even though he believes, and may ultimately establish, that the arrest was without probable cause or was otherwise unlawful; it was not intended to require an arrestee to submit to egregiously unlawful conduct–such as an unprovoked assault–by the police in the course of an arrest, whether the arrest was legal or illegal. 79 CA 667. Interfering with an officer is lesser offense included in greater offense of assault of public safety personnel and thus conviction of both offenses for same act constituted double jeopardy violation. 86 CA 607.

Cited. 33 CS 4; 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 201 C. 605; 205 C. 370; 228 C. 910; 233 C. 502. Judgment of Appellate Court in 37 CA 500 reversed in part to affirm judgment of trial court with respect to charges under section. 237 C. 633. Trial court improperly prevented defendant from offering evidence re first element of the crime, namely, whether the officer was performing his assigned duties when defendant struck him. 255 C. 581. In order to sustain conviction under statute, there must be a finding that police officers had been acting in the performance of their duties. 261 C. 553.

Cited. 1 CA 709; 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; 23 CA 160; Id., 315; Id., 447; Id., 663; 28 CA 469; 30 CA 606; 31 CA 178; 33 CA 509; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 35 CA 431; Id., 699; 37 CA 500; Id., 635; 38 CA 306; 39 CA 333; Id., 657; Id., 789; 43 CA 480; Id., 578; 44 CA 264. In determining whether an assault has been committed, defendant's act does not have to be wholly or partially successful, nor must the act defeat or delay the performance of a duty in which the officer is then engaged, but instead, defendant must only have intended to prevent the officer from performing his or her duties. 112 CA 324. Conviction of both assault of peace officer under Subdiv. (1) and interfering with officer under Sec. 53a-167a(a) constitutes double jeopardy; Subdiv. (1) is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness re defendant's conduct because it provides fair warning that a specific intent to injure officer is not an element of the offense. 119 CA 556. Under facts presented, conviction under Subdiv. (5) and interfering with officer under Sec. 53a-167a does not violate double jeopardy because each crime required proof of different facts. 124 CA 294. Subdiv. (1): Conviction of both interfering with a peace officer under Sec. 53a-167a and assault of public safety personnel under this section does not constitute double jeopardy when evidence demonstrates that the two crimes did not stem from the same conduct. 167 CA 281; judgment affirmed, see 328 C. 648.

Subsec. (b):

Legislature intended to deter all prisoners being held in Connecticut facilities, whether there temporarily or for duration of a sentence, from assaulting employees of those facilities and therefore trial court lacked discretion to impose a sentence concurrent to defendant's federal sentence. 63 CA 386.

Sec. 53a-167d. Assault of a prosecutor: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of a prosecutor when such person, with intent to intimidate or harass, or to retaliate against, another person on account of the performance by such other person of such other person's duties as a prosecutor employed by the Division of Criminal Justice, causes physical injury to such other person.

(b) Assault of a prosecutor is a class C felony.

(P.A. 01-25.)

Sec. 53a-167e. Aggravated assault of a public transit employee: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault of a public transit employee when such person (1) commits assault of a person who is a public transit employee, as provided in section 53a-167c, and (2) in the commission of such offense, uses or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct, that such person possesses a knife or box-cutter, or a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm.

(b) Aggravated assault of a public transit employee is a class C felony, except that such person shall be fined not more than twenty thousand dollars.

(P.A. 18-167, S. 11.)

Sec. 53a-167f. Abuse of an oath document: Class D Felony. (a) A person is guilty of abuse of an oath document, executed subsequent to an oath taken by a judicial officer pursuant to section 1-25, when he or she disseminates said oath document to a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written communication, with the intent to defraud, deceive, intimidate, injure or harass a judicial officer.

(b) Abuse of an oath document is a class D felony.

(P.A. 21-104, S. 55.)

PART XII

ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-168. Escape: Definitions. For purposes of sections 53a-169 to 53a-171, inclusive:

(1) “Correctional institution” means the facilities defined in section 1-1 and any other correctional facility established by the Commissioner of Correction.

(2) “Custody” means restraint by a public servant pursuant to an arrest or court order other than a Probate Court order directed against a person who is not in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction when such order is issued.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 170; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 41; P.A. 80-216, S. 1.)

History: 1971 act replaced reference to Sec. 53a-170 with reference to Sec. 53a-171; P.A. 80-216 clarified meaning of custody as it applies to probate court orders.

Cited. 240 C. 97.

Cited. 37 CA 276.

Sec. 53a-169. Escape in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of escape in the first degree (1) if he escapes from a correctional institution or (2) if he escapes from any public or private, nonprofit halfway house, group home or mental health facility or community residence to which he was transferred pursuant to subsection (e) of section 18-100 or section 18-100c and he is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction or is required to be returned to the custody of said commissioner upon his release from such facility or (3) if he escapes from a work detail or school on the premises of the correctional institution or (4) if he fails to return from a furlough authorized under section 18-101a or (5) if he fails to return from work release or education release as authorized under sections 18-90a and 18-100 or (6) if he escapes from a hospital for mental illness in which he has been confined under the provisions of section 17a-582, 17a-584, 17a-593, 17a-594 or 17a-596 or (7) if, while under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, but not confined to a hospital for mental illness, he leaves the state without authorization of the board.

(b) Escape in the first degree is a class C felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 171; P.A. 73-639, S. 12; P.A. 74-338, S. 47, 94; P.A. 78-92, S. 2; P.A. 80-216, S. 2; P.A. 82-12; P.A. 84-236, S. 1; P.A. 85-506, S. 25, 32; P.A. 89-383, S. 2, 16; P.A. 98-39.)

History: P.A. 73-639 replaced offense of escape from a correctional institution with offense of escape in the first degree which includes escapes from correctional institutions and escapes from work details or schools on institution premises; P.A. 74-338 specified failure to return from furlough as first degree escape; P.A 78-92 specified escapes from halfway house, group home or mental health facility and failure to return from work-release or education release as first degree escape; P.A. 80-216 specified escape from halfway house, group home or mental health facility is first degree escape if escapee is in correction commissioner's custody or is to be returned to his custody upon release from the facility; P.A. 82-12 added Subsec. (a)(6) re person who escapes from a state hospital or treatment facility; P.A. 84-236 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include escapes from community residences; P.A. 85-506 amended Subsec. (a)(6) to replace “state hospital or other treatment facility” with “hospital for mental illness” and replace reference to repealed Sec. 53a-47 with “section 17-257c, 17-257e, 17-257n, 17-257o or 17-257q”, and added Subdiv. (7) concerning a person under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board who leaves the state; P.A. 89-383 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include a person who escapes from his abode to which he was released pursuant to Sec. 18-100(f), effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994 (Revisor's note: The amendment to this section contained in P.A. 89-393 was deleted by the Revisors following its expiration on July 1, 1994); P.A. 98-39 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add reference to Sec. 18-100c.

See Sec. 18-101a re consideration of prisoner's failure to return from furlough as crime of escape.

Illegal confinement is no defense to escape from correctional institution. 169 C. 438. Cited. 184 C. 157. Held constitutional as to both due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution. Id., 222. Defendant's acts did not constitute violation of statute as it was amended as of date of acts as he was not then under jurisdiction of Commissioner of Correction. 185 C. 517. Cited. 216 C. 402; 226 C. 497; 234 C. 301.

Cited. 36 CA 440; 39 CA 333; Id., 407; Id., 789.

Cited. 35 CS 544.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 213 C. 38. Subdiv. (2): Proof of single failure to report insufficient to prove guilt of “escape”. 216 C. 402. Subdiv. (2): Decision of Appellate Court in 35 CA 1 overruled to the extent that it permits conviction for escape to rest solely on jury's finding that defendant repeatedly did not report to supervising officer as scheduled. 234 C. 301. Cited. 235 C. 748; 236 C. 209; Id., 266; 241 C. 322.

Cited. 29 CA 817; 35 CA 1; 36 CA 680; Id., 813, 815. Subdiv. (2) simply identifies another environment–a community residence–from which an unauthorized departure, or to which a failure to return, is possible and made culpable; escape is a general intent crime, and all that is necessary to prove the element of intent is that defendant have the general intent to perform the acts that constitute the offense. 121 CA 443.

Subdiv. (3): Equating failure to return from parole with escape held not violative of constitutional right to due process and equal protection. 36 CS 71.

Sec. 53a-170. Escape in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of escape in the second degree if he escapes from any correctional institution while employed at work outside such correctional institution.

(b) Escape in the second degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 173; P.A. 73-639, S. 14; P.A. 92-260, S. 63.)

History: P.A. 73-639 substituted “escape in the second degree” for “escape while at work”; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.

Sec. 53a-171. Escape from custody: Class C felony or class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of escape from custody if such person (1) escapes from custody, or (2) has been adjudicated as delinquent, and escapes from or fails to return from an authorized leave to a state or private facility or institution in which such person has been placed by the court.

(b) If a person has been arrested for, charged with or convicted of a felony, escape from such custody is a class C felony, otherwise, escape from custody is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 172; 1971, P.A. 16; P.A. 00-209, S. 2; P.A. 18-31, S. 42.)

History: 1971 act changed escape from custody after arrest or charge for, or conviction of, a felony from a Class D to a Class C felony; P.A. 00-209 added Subsec. (a)(2) re person who has been convicted as delinquent and fails to return from an authorized leave or escapes from a facility or institution in which such person was assigned or placed and made technical changes; P.A. 18-31 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by replacing “convicted” with “adjudicated”, deleting provision re commitment to Department of Children and Families, deleting Subpara. (A) re failure to return from leave authorized under Sec. 17a-8a, deleting Subpara. (B) designator, adding provision re failure to return from authorized leave and replacing provision re person assigned or placed by Commissioner of Children and Families with provision re person placed by the court, effective July 1, 2018.

Cited. 173 C. 35; 188 C. 406; 196 C. 309; 197 C. 588; 207 C. 270; 211 C. 398; 220 C. 270.

Cited. 3 CA 684; 12 CA 604; 23 CA 160; Id., 615; 24 CA 287; 36 CA 691; 37 CA 276; Id., 733. Knowledge of being charged with a felony, rather than a misdemeanor, is not an essential element. 114 CA 155.

Sec. 53a-171a. Aiding escape from hospital or sanatorium: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of aiding escape from a hospital or sanatorium when he aids the escape from a hospital or sanatorium of any person committed thereto as mentally ill or as drug dependent.

(b) Aiding escape from a hospital or sanatorium is a class A misdemeanor.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 42; P.A. 76-336, S. 11.)

History: P.A. 76-336 reworded Subsec. (a) for clarity and grammatical sense inserting “when he aids the escape from a hospital or sanatorium”.

Sec. 53a-172. Failure to appear in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of failure to appear in the first degree when (1) while charged with the commission of a felony and while out on bail or released under other procedure of law, such person wilfully fails to appear when legally called according to the terms of such person's bail bond or promise to appear, or (2) while on probation for conviction of a felony, such person wilfully fails to appear when legally called for any court hearing relating to a violation of such probation.

(b) Failure to appear in the first degree is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 174; P.A. 92-260, S. 64; P.A. 98-26, S. 1; P.A. 10-180, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language; P.A. 98-26 added Subsec. (a)(2) re failure to appear for a violation of probation hearing; P.A. 10-180 amended Subsec. (a) to replace in Subdiv. (2) “a violation of probation hearing” with “any court hearing relating to a violation of such probation” and make technical changes.

Cited. 176 C. 421; 221 C. 407; 222 C. 556; 223 C. 283; 227 C. 829; 229 C. 285; Id., 529; 236 C. 112; 242 C. 296.

Cited. 4 CA 154; 6 CA 402; 12 CA 621; 13 CA 413; 17 CA 556; 20 CA 205; 24 CA 316; 25 CA 575; 27 CA 279; 29 CA 801; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285; 30 CA 9; Id., 190; 34 CA 191; 36 CA 691; 37 CA 437; 39 CA 816; 41 CA 47; 43 CA 142; Id., 552. In order to prove the wilful element, state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that defendant received and deliberately ignored a notice to appear or that he intentionally embarked on a course of conduct designed to prevent him from receiving such notice. 108 CA 772.

Sec. 53a-173. Failure to appear in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of failure to appear in the second degree when (1) while charged with the commission of a misdemeanor or a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed and while out on bail or released under other procedure of law, such person wilfully fails to appear when legally called according to the terms of such person's bail bond or promise to appear, or (2) while on probation for conviction of a misdemeanor or motor vehicle violation, such person wilfully fails to appear when legally called for any court hearing relating to a violation of such probation.

(b) Failure to appear in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 175; P.A. 87-343, S. 2, 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 65; P.A. 98-26, S. 2; P.A. 10-180, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 87-343 included persons charged with a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language; P.A. 98-26 added Subsec. (a)(2) re failure to appear for a violation of probation hearing; P.A. 10-180 amended Subsec. (a) to replace in Subdiv. (2) “a violation of probation hearing” with “any court hearing relating to a violation of such probation” and make technical changes.

See Sec. 54-2e re issuance of rearrest warrant or capias for failure to appear.

Cited. 227 C. 829; 234 C. 301.

Cited. 6 CA 247; 8 CA 542; 11 CA 644; 13 CA 638; 17 CA 226; 20 CA 811; 38 CA 85; 43 CA 142; 45 CA 722. Pursuant to section, to support a conviction for failure to appear, state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that defendant received and deliberately ignored a notice to appear or that he intentionally embarked on a course of conduct designed to prevent him from receiving such notice. 61 CA 118.

Cited. 35 CS 587.

Sec. 53a-174. Unauthorized conveyance of items into correctional or humane institution or to inmate: Class D felony. Unauthorized conveyance of letter into or from, or use of false name to enter, correctional institution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) Any person not authorized by law who conveys or passes, or causes to be conveyed or passed, into any correctional or humane institution or the grounds or buildings thereof, or to any inmate of such an institution who is outside the premises thereof and known to the person so conveying or passing or causing such conveying or passing to be such an inmate, any controlled drug, as defined in section 21a-240, any intoxicating liquors, any firearm, weapon, dangerous instrument or explosive of any kind, any United States currency, or any rope, ladder or other instrument or device for use in making, attempting or aiding an escape, shall be guilty of a class D felony. The unauthorized conveying, passing or possession of any rope or ladder or other instrument or device, adapted for use in making or aiding an escape, into any such institution or the grounds or buildings thereof, shall be presumptive evidence that it was so conveyed, passed or possessed for such use.

(b) Any person not authorized by law who conveys into any such institution any letter or other missive which is intended for any person confined therein, or who conveys from within the enclosure to the outside of such institution any letter or other missive written or given by any person confined therein, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(c) Any person or visitor who enters or attempts to enter a correctional institution or facility by using a misleading or false name or title shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 176; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 43; 1972, P.A. 12; P.A. 73-639, S. 16.)

History: 1971 act applied provisions to humane institutions and replaced reference to “narcotic or hypnotic” drugs with reference to “controlled” drugs in Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (c) re use of false or misleading name in entrance in or attempt to enter a correctional facility; 1972 act specified conveyance of U.S. currency into correctional or humane institution or to one of its inmates as Class D felony; P.A. 73-639 prohibited conveyance of any “dangerous instrument”.

Cited. 42 CA 264.

Sec. 53a-174a. Possession of weapon or dangerous instrument in correctional institution: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution when, being an inmate of such institution, he knowingly makes, conveys from place to place or has in his possession or under his control any firearm, weapon, dangerous instrument, explosive, or any other substance or thing designed to kill, injure or disable.

(b) Possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution is a class B felony.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 55; P.A. 73-639, S. 17.)

History: P.A. 73-639 applied provisions with respect to possession of dangerous instruments.

Cited. 169 C. 428; 195 C. 1; 227 C. 711; Id., 751; 230 C. 591; 235 C. 748, 749; 240 C. 97.

Cited. 32 CA 448; 36 CA 41; 39 CA 789; 44 CA 499.

Sec. 53a-174b. Conveyance or use of electronic wireless communication device in correctional institution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of conveyance or use of an electronic wireless communication device in a correctional institution when such person, without authorization by the Commissioner of Correction or the commissioner's designee, (1) conveys or possesses with intent to convey an electronic wireless communication device to any inmate of a correctional institution while such inmate is in such institution, or (2) uses an electronic wireless communication device to take a photographic or digital image in a correctional institution.

(b) Conveyance or use of an electronic wireless communication device in a correctional institution is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 05-87, S. 1; P.A. 10-36, S. 25.)

History: P.A. 10-36 restructured provisions by designating existing provisions re elements of offense as Subsec. (a) and penalty for offense as Subsec. (b), naming offense “conveyance or use of an electronic wireless communication device in a correctional institution” in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and making conforming changes, effective July 1, 2010.

PART XIII

RIOT AND RELATED OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-175. Riot in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of riot in the first degree when simultaneously with six or more other persons he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm, and in the course of and as a result of such conduct, a person other than one of the participants suffers physical injury or substantial property damage occurs.

(b) Riot in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 177.)

Cited. 32 CA 224.

Sec. 53a-176. Riot in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of riot in the second degree when, simultaneously with two or more other persons, he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.

(b) Riot in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 178.)

Cited. 32 CA 224.

Sec. 53a-177. Unlawful assembly: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawful assembly when he assembles with two or more other persons for the purpose of engaging in conduct constituting the crime of riot, or when, being present at an assembly which either has or develops such a purpose, he remains there with intent to advance that purpose.

(b) Unlawful assembly is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 179.)

Cited. 32 CA 224.

Sec. 53a-178. Inciting to riot: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of inciting to riot when he advocates, urges or organizes six or more persons to engage in tumultuous and violent conduct of a kind likely to cause public alarm.

(b) Inciting to riot is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 180; P.A. 92-260, S. 66.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “create” with “cause”.

Sec. 53a-179. Criminal advocacy: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal advocacy when (1) he advocates the overthrow of the existing form of government of this state or any subdivision thereof by imminent dangerous action, or (2) with knowledge of its contents, he publishes, sells or distributes any document which advocates such imminent dangerous action.

(b) Criminal advocacy is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 181.)

Cited. 197 C. 436.

Sec. 53a-179a. Inciting injury to persons or property: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of inciting injury to persons or property when, in public or private, orally, in writing, in printing or in any other manner, he advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits the unlawful burning, injury to or destruction of any public or private property or advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits any assault upon any organization of the armed forces of the United States, as defined in section 27-103, or of this state, as defined in section 27-2, or the police force of this or any other state or upon any officer or member thereof or the organized police or fire departments of any municipality or any officer or member thereof, or the killing or injuring of any class or body of persons, or of any individual.

(b) Inciting injury to persons or property is a class C felony.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 52; P.A. 18-72, S. 15.)

History: P.A. 18-72 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).

Cited. 234 C. 78.

Cited. 36 CA 821. Section not void for vagueness and overbreadth. 48 CA 148. Provisions codified common law distinction between solicitation an attempt and solicitation not an attempt under Sec. 53a-49(a)(1). 65 CA 145.

Subsec. (a):

Statute not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth; requirement of intent that must be read into statute preserves it from constitutional demise under first amendment. 41 CS 525. Cited. 43 CS 46.

Sec. 53a-179b. Rioting at correctional institution: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of rioting at a correctional institution when he incites, instigates, organizes, connives at, causes, aids, abets, assists or takes part in any disorder, disturbance, strike, riot or other organized disobedience to the rules and regulations of such institution.

(b) Rioting at a correctional institution is a class B felony.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 53.)

Cited. 190 C. 143; 227 C. 711; Id., 751; 237 C. 454; 240 C. 97.

Statute not constitutionally vague or overbroad. 30 CA 224. Cited. 32 CA 224; 39 CA 333; 44 CA 264.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Sec. 53a-179c. Inciting to riot at correctional institution: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of inciting to riot at a correctional institution when he incites, instigates, organizes, connives at, causes, aids, abets or takes part in any meeting of inmates of a correctional institution, the purpose of which is to foment unrest, disorder, disturbance, strike, riot or other organized disobedience to the rules and regulations of the institution.

(b) Inciting to riot at a correctional institution is a class C felony.

(1971, P.A. 871, S. 54.)

Cited. 32 CA 224.

Sec. 53a-180. Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree: Class D or C felony. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the first degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, such person: (1) Initiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion, catastrophe or emergency under circumstances in which it is likely that public alarm or inconvenience will result; (2) reports, by word or action, to any official or quasi-official agency or organization having the function of dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property, an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion or other catastrophe or emergency which did not in fact occur or does not in fact exist; (3) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection with intent to cause a large scale emergency response; or (4) violates subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection with specific intent to falsely report another person or group of persons because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person or group of persons. For purposes of this section, “large scale emergency response” means an on-site response to any such reported incident by five or more first responders, and “first responder” means any peace officer or firefighter or any ambulance driver, emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician or paramedic, as those terms are defined in section 19a-175.

(b) Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree is a (1) class D felony for a violation of subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of this section, or (2) class C felony for a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section.

(c) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, if (1) a person is convicted of an offense in violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section that resulted in a large scale emergency response, (2) any agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state requests financial restitution for costs associated with such emergency response, and (3) the court finds that the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state incurred costs associated with such emergency response as a result of such offense, the court shall order the offender to make financial restitution under terms that the court determines are appropriate. In determining the appropriate terms of financial restitution, the court shall consider: (A) The financial resources of the offender and the burden restitution will place on other obligations of the offender; (B) the offender's ability to pay based on installments or other conditions; (C) the rehabilitative effect on the offender of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and (D) other circumstances, including the financial burden and impact on the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state, that the court determines make the terms of restitution appropriate. If the court determines that the current financial resources of the offender or the offender's current ability to pay based on installments or other conditions are such that no appropriate terms of restitution can be determined, the court may forego setting such terms. The court shall articulate its findings on the record with respect to each of the factors set forth in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subsection. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for actual expenses associated with such emergency response. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed or directed by a written order of the court containing the amount of actual expenses associated with such emergency response, as ascertained by the court. The order of the court shall direct that a certified copy of the order be delivered by certified mail to the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state. Such order is enforceable in the same manner as an order pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53a-28.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 182; P.A. 81-353, S. 1; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 1, 9; P.A. 17-72, S. 1; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1, S. 24.)

History: P.A. 81-353 increased the penalty from a class B to a class A misdemeanor; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing “falsely reporting an incident” with “falsely reporting an incident in the first degree” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, delete in Subdiv. (1) a false report or warning re a “crime” and delete former Subdiv. (3) re a gratuitous report to a law enforcement officer or agency re an offense or incident, said provision being reenacted as Sec. 53a-180c by same act, and amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 17-72 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re large scale emergency response and added Subsec. (c) re financial restitution in case of a violation of Subsec. (a)(3); July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re a violation of Subdiv. (1), (2) or (3) and amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing penalty as Subdiv. (1) for a violation of Subsec. (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) and adding Subdiv. (2) re class C felony.

Cited. 186 C. 265; 188 C. 161; 200 C. 743; 216 C. 301; 219 C. 529; Id., 557; 221 C. 93; 223 C. 635; 224 C. 627; 227 C. 1; 238 C. 588.

Cited. 14 CA 548; 19 CA 396; 29 CA 843; 36 CA 556. Evidence was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict under section. 55 CA 475.

Cited. 34 CS 666.

Sec. 53a-180a. Falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death: Class C or B felony. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death when such person commits the crime of (1) falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as provided in subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of section 53a-180, (2) falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of section 53a-180c, or (3) falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as provided in subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-180 or falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-180c, and such false report described in subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection results in the serious physical injury or death of another person.

(b) Falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death is a (1) class C felony for a violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section, or (2) class B felony for a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section.

(P.A. 81-353, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 67; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 3, 9; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1, S. 25.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes in the name of the offense; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, replace reference to the crime of “falsely reporting an incident as provided in section 53a-180” with “falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as provided in section 53a-180” and add reference to the crime of “falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in section 53a-180c” and amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, effective January 1, 2002; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing provision re falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as Subdiv. (1) and adding reference to Subsec. (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) of Sec. 53a-180, designating existing provision re falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as Subdiv. (2) and adding references to Subsec. (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) of Sec. 53a-180c, adding Subdiv. (3) re falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as provided in Sec. 53a-180(a)(4) or in the second degree as provided in Sec. 53a-180c(a)(4) and adding reference to Subdiv. (1), (2) or (3) and amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re class C felony as Subdiv. (1), adding reference to violation of Subsec. (a)(1) or (a)(2) and adding Subdiv. (2) re class B felony for violation of Subsec. (a)(3).

Sec. 53a-180b. Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death: Class D or C felony. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death when such person commits the crime of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in (1) subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of section 53a-180c, or (2) subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-180c, and such false report described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection is of the alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of the serious physical injury or death of another person.

(b) Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death is a (1) class D felony for a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, or (2) class C felony for a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section.

(P.A. 97-147, S. 2; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 4, 9; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1, S. 26.)

History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “the crime of falsely reporting an incident as provided in section 53a-180” with “the crime of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in section 53a-180c” and make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, effective January 1, 2002; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing provision re falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as Subdiv. (1), adding reference to Subsec. (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) of Sec. 53a-180c, adding Subdiv. (2) re violation of Sec. 53a-180c(a)(4) and making a conforming change and amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re class D felony as Subdiv. (1), adding reference to violation of Subsec. (a)(1) and adding Subdiv. (2) re class C felony for violation of Subsec. (a)(2).

Sec. 53a-180c. Falsely reporting an incident in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor or Class E felony. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, such person gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency (1) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur, (2) an allegedly impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur, (3) false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein, or (4) violates subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection with specific intent to falsely report another person or group of persons because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person or group of persons.

(b) Falsely reporting an incident in the second degree is a (1) class A misdemeanor for a violation of subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of this section, or (2) class E felony for a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section.

(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 2, 9; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1, S. 27.)

History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re a violation of Subdiv. (1), (2) or (3) and amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re class A misdemeanor as Subdiv. (1), adding reference to violation of Subsec. (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) and adding Subdiv. (2) re class E felony for violation of Subsec. (a)(4).

Sec. 53a-180d. Misuse of the emergency 9-1-1 system: Class B or A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of misuse of the emergency 9-1-1 system when such person (1) dials or otherwise causes E 9-1-1 to be called for the purpose of making a false alarm or complaint, (2) purposely reports false information which could result in the dispatch of emergency services, or (3) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection with specific intent to make a false alarm or complaint or report false information about another person or group of persons because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person or group of persons.

(b) Misuse of the emergency 9-1-1 system is a (1) class B misdemeanor for a violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section, or (2) class A misdemeanor for a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section.

(P.A. 07-106, S. 6; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1, S. 28.)

History: July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re violation of Subdiv. (1) or (2) and amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re class B misdemeanor as Subdiv. (1), adding reference to violation of Subsec. (a)(1) or (a)(2) and adding Subdiv. (2) re class A misdemeanor for violation of Subsec. (a)(3).

Secs. 53a-180e to 53a-180z. Reserved for future use.

PART XIV

BREACH OF THE PEACE, HARASSMENT
AND RELATED OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-180aa. Breach of the peace in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of breach of the peace in the first degree when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person places a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive or incendiary device or an imitation of a hazardous substance in a public place or in a place or manner likely to be discovered by another person.

(b) For the purposes of this section: (1) “Hazardous substance” means any physical, chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity, concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health, and (2) “public place” means any area that is used or held out for use by the public whether owned or operated by public or private interests.

(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 5, 9.)

History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002.

Sec. 53a-181. Breach of the peace in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public place; or (2) assaults or strikes another; or (3) threatens to commit any crime against another person or such other person's property; or (4) publicly exhibits, distributes, posts up or advertises any offensive, indecent or abusive matter concerning any person; or (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene gesture; or (6) creates a public and hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which such person is not licensed or privileged to do. For purposes of this section, “public place” means any area that is used or held out for use by the public whether owned or operated by public or private interests.

(b) Breach of the peace in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 183; P.A. 92-260, S. 68; P.A. 98-55; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 6, 9.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a)(6) to replace “public, hazardous or physically offensive condition” with “public and hazardous or physically offensive condition” and amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense; P.A. 98-55 added Subsec. (a)(7) re placing a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive or incendiary device in a public place and defined “public place”, and amended Subsec. (b) to add exception making a violation of Subdiv. (7) a class A misdemeanor; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing “breach of the peace” with “breach of the peace in the second degree” where appearing, deleted Subsec. (a)(7) re placing of a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive or incendiary device in a public place, said provision being reenacted as part of Sec. 53a-180aa by same act, and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, and amended Subsec. (b) to delete exception that made a violation of Subsec. (a)(7) a class A misdemeanor, effective January 1, 2002.

Cited. 190 C. 371; 191 C. 433; 194 C. 347; 195 C. 668; 205 C. 456; 217 C. 73; 237 C. 613; Id., 633; 243 C. 115.

Cited. 3 CA 410; 6 CA 334; Id., 407; 9 CA 255; 10 CA 499; 12 CA 74; Id., 306; Id., 481; 13 CA 139; 14 CA 6; Id., 10; Id., 548; 15 CA 641; 17 CA 234; Id., 339; 26 CA 157; 28 CA 344; 29 CA 683; 36 CA 135. Statute found not to be unconstitutionally vague on its face and not to be overbroad. 56 CA 264.

Cited. 33 CS 93; 34 CS 548. Obscene gesture must be erotic in a significant way and must appeal to prurient interest in sex or portray sex in patently offensive way. Id., 575. Not unconstitutionally vague or overly broad. 35 CS 587. Cited. 36 CS 89; Id., 609. Whether defendant's vituperations addressed to the police officer constituted breach of the peace under statute discussed. 38 CS 349. Cited. 39 CS 359; 43 CS 46.

Notice of conduct to be precise; history prior to penal code. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 667. Cited. Id., 751, 752.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 198 C. 43; 214 C. 378; 227 C. 153; 233 C. 903. Subdiv. (1): Does not require proof of actual physical contact on part of defendant with a victim; when applied to speech, parameters of the violent, threatening or tumultuous behavior prohibited by section are consistent with “fighting words”; judgment of Appellate Court in 36 CA 625 reversed. 237 C. 613. Subdiv. (3): To avoid invalidation on grounds of overbreadth, judicial gloss adopted that when a police officer is the only person upon whose sensibilities the inflammatory language could have played, a conviction can be supported only for extremely offensive behavior supporting an inference that the actor wished to provoke the policeman to violence. 265 C. 145. Subdiv. (3): Statements made that “more of what happened to your son is going to happen to you” and “I'm going to be there to watch it happen”, when spoken to one whose son had suffered serious physical injuries, did not constitute a true threat due to subsequent apology and lack of other animosity between the parties; to ensure that only serious expressions of an intention to commit an act of unlawful violence are punished, as the first amendment requires, state must do more than demonstrate that a statement could be interpreted as a threat. 313 C. 434. Evidence sufficient to support finding that defendant intended to “inconvenience, [annoy] or alarm” victim by posting victim's diary entries on Facebook even though victim was not invited by defendant to view the posts. 321 C. 688.

Subdiv. (5): This part of statute is confined to language which constitutes “fighting” words and defendant's repeated vile, racist and threatening epithets were of such a nature. 1 CA 669. Cited. Id., 709. Statute meets requirements of fair notice to defendant. 6 CA 407. Cited. 14 CA 440; 27 CA 103; 36 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613; 37 CA 500; judgment reversed in part, see 237 C. 633; 38 CA 306; 41 CA 847. The distinction that may be drawn between the “fighting words” as contemplated under Subdiv. (1) and those under Subdiv. (5) can be found under the totality of the circumstances which gives rise to the words; Subdiv. (1) proscribes fighting words uttered in a violent, tumultuous or threatening manner, whereas Subdiv. (5) proscribes fighting words that tend to induce immediate violence by the person or persons to whom the words are uttered because of their raw effect; the core meaning of Subdiv. (5) remains intact–fighting words may arise in different contexts not confined to abusive or obscene language–and is not unconstitutionally vague. 78 CA 98. There is no indication that legislature did not intend to create separate crimes prohibited by this section and Sec. 53a-62(a)(2). 81 CA 248. Subdiv. (1): Defendant engaged in fighting or violent or tumultuous behavior with intent to cause annoyance, alarm and inconvenience by spitting on victim's face because spitting is an unsanitary act, likely to spread potentially deadly disease and is almost universally regarded as contemptuous, is calculated to incite others to act in retaliation and actual physical contact of defendant with victim is not required. 102 CA 551. Defendant's statement that “you better watch yourself” to staff after exiting day-care center did not meet “fighting words” or “true threat” exceptions to first amendment speech protections justifying revocation of probation for committing breach of the peace under section. 183 CA 354; judgment reversed, see 183 C. 354. Subdiv. 1: Does not cover commercial settings that are not open to the public. 200 CA 401.

Cited. 38 CS 581; 39 CS 504.

Sec. 53a-181a. Creating a public disturbance: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of creating a public disturbance when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he (1) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) annoys or interferes with another person by offensive conduct; or (3) makes unreasonable noise.

(b) Creating a public disturbance is an infraction.

(P.A. 83-276, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 69.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change.

Cited. 228 C. 795; 243 C. 115.

No right to jury trial. 9 CA 255. Cited. 12 CA 258; 24 CA 195; Id., 541; 28 CA 344; 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345. Classification by legislature of infractions as noncriminal acts payable by fine operates as a presumption that infractions do not constitute criminal offenses for purposes of double jeopardy analysis, albeit one that is rebuttable by clear proof to the contrary; protections afforded by federal double jeopardy clause were not implicated by trial court's erroneous sua sponte dismissal of charge against defendant when trial court plainly did not evaluate the state's evidence and failed to make a determination that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. 134 CA 346.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 237 C. 613.

“Offensive conduct” defined; legislative intent to proscribe conduct which actually involves physical violence or portends imminent physical violence. 12 CA 481. Cited. 36 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613. Language in Subdivs. (1) and (2) is similar to that of disorderly conduct statute in Sec. 53a-182, and therefore, based on prior court interpretations of Sec. 53a-182, is not facially vague. 134 CA 175.

Sec. 53a-181b. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias: Class D felony. Section 53a-181b is repealed, effective October 1, 2000.

(P.A. 90-137, S. 1, 3; P.A. 00-72, S. 11.)

Sec. 53a-181c. Stalking in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when such person commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section 53a-181d, and (1) such person has previously been convicted of a violation of section 53a-181d, (2) such conduct violates a court order in effect at the time of the offense, (3) such person is twenty-two years of age or older and the other person is under sixteen years of age, or (4) such person intentionally directs such conduct at the other person, in whole or in part, because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person.

(b) Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 92-237, S. 1; P.A. 12-114, S. 11; P.A. 21-56, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 12-114 amended Subsec. (a) to delete “this section or” re previous conviction in Subdiv. (1) and make technical changes; P.A. 21-56 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, add language re person 22 years of age or older in Subdiv. (3) and add Subdiv. (4) re conduct due to perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person; P.A. 21-56 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, add language re person 22 years of age or older in Subdiv. (3) and add Subdiv. (4) re conduct due to perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.

Cited. 46 CA 661.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Sec. 53a-181d. Stalking in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Course of conduct” means two or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which a person directly, indirectly or through a third party, by any action, method, device or means, including, but not limited to, electronic or social media, (A) follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates about or with or sends unwanted gifts to, a person, or (B) interferes with a person's property;

(2) “Emotional distress” means significant mental or psychological suffering or distress that may or may not require medical or other professional treatment or counseling; and

(3) “Personally identifying information” means:

(A) Any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, prior legal name, alias, mother's maiden name, Social Security number, date or place of birth, address, telephone number or biometric data;

(B) Any information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, financial, education, consumer or employment information, data or records; or

(C) Any other sensitive private information that is linked or linkable to a specific identifiable individual, such as gender identity, sexual orientation or any sexually intimate visual depiction.

(b) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when:

(1) Such person knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to (A) fear for such specific person's physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; (B) suffer emotional distress; or (C) fear injury to or the death of an animal owned by or in possession and control of such specific person;

(2) Such person with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear that such person's employment, business or career is threatened, where (A) such conduct consists of the actor telephoning to, appearing at or initiating communication or contact to such other person's place of employment or business, including electronically, through video-teleconferencing or by digital media, provided the actor was previously and clearly informed to cease such conduct, and (B) such conduct does not consist of constitutionally protected activity; or

(3) Such person, for no legitimate purpose and with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm, by means of electronic communication, including, but not limited to, electronic or social media, discloses a specific person's personally identifiable information without consent of the person, knowing, that under the circumstances, such disclosure would cause a reasonable person to:

(A) Fear for such person's physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; or

(B) Suffer emotional distress.

(c) For the purposes of this section, a violation may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication originated or at the place where it was received.

(d) Stalking in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 92-237, S. 2; P.A. 12-114, S. 12; P.A. 17-31, S. 1; P.A. 21-56, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 12-114 added new Subsec. (a) defining “course of conduct”, redesignated existing Subsecs. (a) and (b) as Subsecs. (b) and (c), and amended redesignated Subsec. (b) to replace former elements of crime with Subdiv. (1) re course of conduct that would cause reasonable person to fear for safety and Subdiv. (2) re course of conduct that would cause reasonable person to fear that person's employment, business or career is threatened; P.A. 17-31 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine “course of conduct” and to define “emotional distress”, and amended Subsec. (b)(1) to designate existing provision re fear for physical safety as Subpara. (A) and to add Subpara. (B) re emotional distress; P.A. 21-56 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing definition of “course of conduct” as Subdiv. (1) and making technical changes and redsignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in same, designating existing definition of “emotional distress” as Subdiv. (2) and adding Subdiv. (3) defining “personally identifying information”, amended Subsec. (b) by adding “or concerning”, adding “specific” in Subpara. (A) and adding Subpara. (C) re fear injury to or death of an animal in Subdiv. (1), by replacing “intentionally” with “with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm”, adding “or concerning”, making a technical change and adding “including electronically, through video-teleconferencing or by digital media” in Subdiv. (2) and by adding Subdiv. (3) re use of electronic or social media to disclose personally identifiable information, added new Subsec. (c) re place where violation is committed and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d).

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.

Cited. 44 CA 84. Held to be not unconstitutionally vague. 46 CA 661. Proof of verbal threats or harassing gestures not essential to prove violation of section; section can be violated without defendant's uttering a syllable, writing a word or making a gesture. 121 CA 520. Section requires that any “following” be “wilful” and “repeated”, and the following must have a predatory thrust to it; section does not encompass following that is aimless, unintentional, accidental or undertaken for a lawful purpose. 139 CA 553. Defendant not guilty under section because there was no evidence of a second act directed specifically against plaintiff to satisfy the “course of conduct” element. 166 CA 844.

Constitutionality of statute under attack for vagueness or overbreadth discussed. 43 CS 46.

Sec. 53a-181e. Stalking in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of stalking in the third degree when such person recklessly causes another person to reasonably (1) fear for his or her physical safety, or (2) suffer emotional distress, as defined in section 53a-181d, by wilfully and repeatedly following or lying in wait for such other person.

(b) Stalking in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(P.A. 95-214, S. 1; P.A. 17-31, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 17-31 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing provision re fear for physical safety as Subdiv. (1), adding Subdiv. (2) re emotional distress and making technical changes.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.

Sec. 53a-181f. Electronic stalking: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of electronic stalking when such person, with the intent to kill, injure, harass or intimidate, uses any interactive computer service or electronic communication service, electronic communication system or electronic monitoring system to place another person under surveillance or otherwise to engage in a course of conduct that: (1) Places such other person in reasonable fear of the death of or serious bodily injury to (A) such person, (B) an immediate family member of such person, or (C) an intimate partner of such person; or (2) causes, attempts to cause or would be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress to a person described in subparagraph (A), (B) or (C) of subdivision (1) of this subsection.

(b) For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, (1) “immediate family member” means (A) a spouse, parent, brother or sister or a child of the person or person to whom the person stands in loco parentis, or (B) any person living in the household and related to the person by blood or marriage, and (2) “intimate partner” means a (A) former spouse, (B) person who has a child in common with the person regardless of whether they are or have been married or are living or have lived together at any time, or (C) person in, or who has recently been in, a dating relationship with the person.

(P.A. 15-175, S. 1; P.A. 21-102, S. 8.)

History: P.A. 21-102 substantially modified Subsec. (a) by changing elements of offense and replacing “recklessly” with “with the intent” as the mens rea for the offense, added new Subsec. (b) re definitions and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) re penalty as Subsec. (c) and increased penalty in same from a class B misdemeanor to a class D felony.

Secs. 53a-181g and 53a-181h. Reserved for future use.

Sec. 53a-181i. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias: Definitions. For the purposes of sections 53a-181j to 53a-181l, inclusive:

(1) “Disability” means physical disability, mental disability or intellectual disability;

(2) “Gender identity or expression” means a person's gender-related identity, appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance or behavior is different from that traditionally associated with the person's assigned sex at birth;

(3) “Mental disability” means one or more mental disorders, as defined in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”;

(4) “Intellectual disability” has the same meaning as provided in section 1-1g; and

(5) “Physical disability” means any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, blindness, epilepsy, deafness or being hard of hearing or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device.

(P.A. 04-135, S. 1; P.A. 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 17-202, S. 101.)

History: Pursuant to P.A. 11-129, “mental retardation” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “intellectual disability”; P.A. 17-202 amended Subdiv. (5) by replacing “hearing impairment” with “being hard of hearing” in definition of “physical disability”.

Sec. 53a-181j. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree when such person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person motivated in whole or in substantial part by the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person, causes physical injury to such other person or to a third person.

(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree is a class C felony, for which three thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

(P.A. 00-72, S. 1; P.A. 04-135, S. 2; P.A. 17-111, S. 5; P.A. 21-78, S. 17.)

History: P.A. 04-135 amended Subsec. (a) to add “disability” and “gender identity or expression” as bases; P.A. 17-111 amended Subsec. (a) to add “sex” and to replace “serious physical injury” with “physical injury” and amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re minimum fine and remitting or reducing fine; P.A. 21-78 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “because of” with “motivated in whole or in substantial part by”.

See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.

Sec. 53a-181k. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree when such person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person or group of persons motivated in whole or in substantial part by the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person or group of persons, does any of the following: (1) Causes physical contact with such other person or group of persons, (2) damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of such other person or group of persons, or (3) threatens, by word or act, to do an act described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection, if there is reasonable cause to believe that an act described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection will occur.

(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree is a class D felony, for which one thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

(P.A. 00-72, S. 2; P.A. 04-135, S. 3; P.A. 17-111, S. 6; P.A. 21-78, S. 18.)

History: P.A. 04-135 amended Subsec. (a) to add “disability” and “gender identity or expression” as bases; P.A. 17-111 amended Subsec. (a) to add “sex”, and add references to group of persons, and amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re minimum fine and remitting or reducing fine; P.A. 21-78 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “because of” with “motivated in whole or in substantial part by”.

See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (3) not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 265 C. 145.

Subdiv. (3) is not unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibits only true threats, not all threats, and is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness in context of defendant's actions and words. 104 CA 46. Evidence was sufficient for jury to reasonably determine that defendant had requisite specific intent to intimidate or harass victim on basis of victim's actual or perceived sexual orientation, which evidence included statement to police replete with disparaging remarks against homosexuals and defendant's statement prior to incident that victim was homosexual. 118 CA 711.

Sec. 53a-181l. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree: Class E felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree when such person, with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person or group of persons motivated in whole or in substantial part by the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person or persons: (1) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property, or (2) threatens, by word or act, to do an act described in subdivision (1) of this subsection or advocates or urges another person to do an act described in subdivision (1) of this subsection, if there is reasonable cause to believe that an act described in said subdivision will occur.

(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree is a class E felony, for which one thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

(P.A. 00-72, S. 3; P.A. 04-135, S. 4; P.A. 17-111, S. 7; P.A. 21-78, S. 19.)

History: P.A. 04-135 amended Subsec. (a) to add “disability” and “gender identity or expression” as bases; P.A. 17-111 amended Subsec. (a) to add “sex”, and amended Subsec. (b) to change offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class E felony and to add provision re minimum fine and remitting or reducing such fine; P.A. 21-78 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “because of” with “motivated in whole or in substantial part by”.

See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.

Sec. 53a-182. Disorderly conduct: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) by offensive or disorderly conduct, annoys or interferes with another person; or (3) makes unreasonable noise; or (4) without lawful authority, disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons; or (5) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or (6) congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a reasonable official request or order to disperse; or (7) commits simple trespass, as provided in section 53a-110a, and observes, in other than a casual or cursory manner, another person (A) without the knowledge or consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is inside a dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, and not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

(b) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 184; P.A. 01-83, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 01-83 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality and add Subdiv. (7) re a person who commits simple trespass and observes another person inside a dwelling under certain circumstances.

Cited. 188 C. 557; 194 C. 347; 224 C. 914; 228 C. 795; 234 C. 78; 237 C. 613; Id., 633.

Cited. 5 CA 616; 9 CA 15; Id., 255; 11 CA 24; 12 CA 258; Id., 306; Id., 364; Id., 481; 17 CA 156; Id., 234; Id., 339; 22 CA 303; 26 CA 157; 28 CA 344; 29 CA 283; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795; 36 CA 106; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78. Evidence sufficient to support conviction for disorderly conduct. 96 CA 341.

Cited. 34 CS 612; 36 CS 129; 37 CS 767; 38 CS 472; Id., 665.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 179 C. 328. Subdiv. (3): Under statute, disorderly conduct may occur in a place that is not public. 194 C. 347. Cited. 221 C. 788. Subdiv. (2): Plain language of section unconstitutionally vague, court construed it to provide it with constitutional content for the future; judgment of Appellate Court in 29 CA 283 reversed. 228 C. 795. Cited. 230 C. 183; 237 C. 619.

Cited. 8 CA 153; Id., 517; 36 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613; 40 CA 643. Subdiv. (2): Held unconstitutional on its face where conduct occurred prior to judicial gloss placed on statute. 46 CA 661. Subdiv. (2) should be read and applied as follows: A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with the predominant intent previously defined or with reckless disregard for the risks of his or her conduct, the person, by conduct that is grossly offensive under contemporary community standards to a person who actually overhears it or sees it, disturbs or impedes the lawful activity of another person. 83 CA 724. There was sufficient evidence presented by the state and the court reasonably could have inferred on the basis of the size of defendants' belongings and their position on the sidewalk that defendants intended to cause inconvenience, annoyance and alarm and did obstruct sidewalk. 108 CA 146.

Expression of political views found not to constitute disorderly conduct. 33 CS 93. Subdiv. (2): Failure of charge to limit application of section to “fighting words” deprived defendant of freedom of speech constitutional guarantee. 34 CS 689.

Sec. 53a-182a. Obstructing free passage: Class C misdemeanor. (a) Unless a person is engaging in any activity which is expressive of rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this state, a person is guilty of obstructing free passage when, after being warned by a law enforcement officer not to do so, he (1) stands, sits or lies in or upon any public street, curb, crosswalk, walkway area, mall or the portion of private property utilized for public use, so as to obstruct unreasonably the free passage of pedestrians thereon, or (2) obstructs unreasonably or prevents free access to the entrance to any building open to the public.

(b) Obstructing free passage is a class C misdemeanor.

(P.A. 83-221; P.A. 92-260, S. 70.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes.

Cited. 28 CA 344.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Sec. 53a-182b. Harassment in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of harassment in the first degree when, with the intent to harass, annoy, alarm or terrorize another person, he threatens to kill or physically injure that person or any other person, and communicates such threat by telephone, or by telegraph, mail, computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm and has been convicted of a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or 53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216. For the purposes of this section, “convicted” means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) For the purposes of this section, such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication originated or at the place where it was received.

(d) Harassment in the first degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 90-282, S. 1; P.A. 95-143, S. 1; P.A. 12-5, S. 22; P.A. 14-233, S. 4; 14-234, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 95-143 amended Subsec. (a) to include communication of the threat by computer network; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re conviction of a capital felony, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 14-233 amended Subsec. (b) to replace “telephone call was made or” with “communication originated or at the place” and make a technical change; P.A. 14-234 made identical changes as P.A. 14-233.

Cited. 45 CA 408.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Sec. 53a-183. Harassment in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm another person, and for no legitimate purpose, such person: (1) Communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, electronic mail or text message or any other electronically sent message, whether by digital media account, messaging program or application, or otherwise by computer, computer service or computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or any other form of communication, in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation or alarm; (2) makes a telephone call or engages in any other form of communication, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation or alarm; or (3) communicates or shares a photograph, video or words or engages in any other form of communication to a digital, electronic, online or other meeting space, in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation or alarm.

(b) For the purposes of this section, such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication originated or at the place where it was received.

(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 185; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 44; P.A. 89-103, S. 2; P.A. 90-282, S. 2; P.A. 95-143, S. 2; P.A. 12-114, S. 13; P.A. 21-56, S. 5.)

History: 1971 act substituted “telegraph” for “telephone” in Subsec. (a)(2); P.A. 89-103 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include communicating by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network; P.A. 90-282 changed name of offense to harassment in the second degree; P.A. 95-143 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include communication by computer network; P.A. 12-114 amended Subsec. (b) to substitute “where the communication originated” for “where the telephone call was made” and make technical changes; P.A. 21-56 amended Subsec. (a) by substantially revising existing elements of offense and adding Subdiv. (3) re communicating or sharing a photograph, video or words to a digital, electronic, online or other meeting space.

Cited. 204 C. 4; 209 C. 52.

Cited. 4 CA 520; 5 CA 79; 8 CA 598; 43 CA 527; 44 CA 84. Section applies to communications made by means of a cellular telephone. 117 CA 493.

Cited. 39 CS 428; 43 CS 46. Internet service provider has federal immunity from tort liability for damages related to e-mail sent via provider's service. 46 CS 406.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 223 C. 731. Contrary to prior interpretations, Subsec. prohibits not only harassing or alarming conduct, but offending speech as well, that is not protected by first amendment including, in particular, true threats; defendant did not have fair warning that she could be prosecuted under Subsec. solely on basis of content of her speech, therefore conviction reversed. 310 C. 337.

Subdiv. (3): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Cited. 25 CA 503. Subdiv. (2): Section does not require state to prove defendant engaged in a direct communication with the person whom he intended to harass. 40 CA 544. Cited. 41 CA 847; 43 CA 527. Subdiv. (3): Is not unconstitutionally vague either on its face or as applied to defendant's conduct. 46 CA 661. Subdiv. (2): Not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. 49 CA 617. Subdiv. (3): Statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; statute prohibits purposeful telephone harassment and does not involve first amendment concerns since it proscribes conduct and not the content of calls; section is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct. 55 CA 475, but see 310 C. 337. Criminal violation of a protective order pursuant to Sec. 53a-110b and harassment in the second degree pursuant to Subdiv. (3) constitute separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 61 CA 118. Defendant who made 5 phone calls to victim was not placed in double jeopardy for multiple convictions of harassment under section because fact that victim listened to the messages consecutively did not transform defendant's separate offenses into one act or one offense and the phrase “a telephone call” coupled with the phrase “likely to cause annoyance” shows legislative intent to punish each call made with the requisite intent. 93 CA 582. A person's speech during a telephone call may be evidence of the person's intent in physically making the telephone call, but cannot be basis for conviction under section without implicating the person's freedom of speech rights; it is the physical act of placing the call and causing a ring at the receiving end that constitutes the actus reus under Subdiv. (3). 120 CA 330, but see 310 C. 337. Subdiv. (3): Legislature intended the standard of conduct for provision re “annoyance or alarm” to be that perceived as such by a reasonable person operating under contemporary community standards; section unconstitutionally applied to defendant's speech in violation of first amendment re defendant's telephone call to the office of his ex-wife's attorney because the evidence of the harassing manner of defendant's telephone call rested entirely on the content of the speech he conveyed. 128 CA 546. Subdiv. (2): Subdiv. does not unconstitutionally prohibit certain forms of speech protected by first amendment to U.S. Constitution. 155 CA 560. Subdiv. (2): Unconstitutional as applied because conviction was dependent upon content of e-mail, rather than the manner in which it was communicated, therefore violating defendant's right to free speech. Id., 758.

Subdiv. (3): Freedom of speech subject to reasonable regulation of place and manner of exercise; not necessary to limit application of statute to “fighting words”; the prohibition is against purposeful harassment by means of device readily susceptible of abuse; trespasser upon our privacy. 34 CS 689.

Sec. 53a-183a. Obstructing or interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife: Class C misdemeanor. (a) No person shall obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person at the location where the activity is taking place with intent to prevent such taking.

(b) A person violates this section when he intentionally or knowingly: (1) Drives or disturbs wildlife for the purpose of disrupting the lawful taking of wildlife where another person is engaged in the process of lawfully taking wildlife; (2) blocks, impedes or otherwise harasses another person who is engaged in the process of lawfully taking wildlife; (3) uses natural or artificial visual, aural, olfactory or physical stimuli to affect wildlife behavior in order to hinder or prevent the lawful taking of wildlife; (4) erects barriers with the intent to deny ingress or egress to areas where the lawful taking of wildlife may occur; (5) interjects himself into the line of fire; (6) affects the condition or placement of personal or public property intended for use in the lawful taking of wildlife in order to impair its usefulness or prevent its use; or (7) enters or remains upon private lands without the permission of the owner or his agent, with intent to violate this section.

(d) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor.

(P.A. 85-351; P.A. 90-322.)

History: P.A. 90-322 amended Subsec. (a) to revise the elements of the offense by replacing “harass” with “obstruct”, adding provision that the obstruction or interference occur “at the location where the activity is taking place” and deleting as an element interference or harassment of another person engaged in “acts in preparation” for the lawful taking of wildlife, inserted new Subsec. (b) to enumerate specific intentional or knowing acts that constitute a violation, and Subsec. (c) to define “taking” and “wildlife” and relettered former Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (d).

Cited. 226 C. 265. Section does not violate first amendment to U.S. Constitution; it is narrowly drawn to serve significant state interests in public safety, raising revenue, wildlife management and protection of citizens' rights to hunt, and leaves open ample alternative means of communication. 260 C. 275.

Cited. 43 CS 46.

Sec. 53a-183b. Interfering with an emergency call: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of interfering with an emergency call when such person, with the intent of preventing another person from making or completing a 9-1-1 telephone call or a telephone call or radio communication to any law enforcement agency to request police protection or report the commission of a crime, physically or verbally prevents or hinders such other person from making or completing such telephone call or radio communication.

(b) Interfering with an emergency call is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 03-43, S. 1.)

See Sec. 53-210 re refusal to relinquish party line when needed for emergency call.

Sec. 53a-183c. Disruption of a funeral: Class A misdemeanor. (a) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Funeral” means any ceremony or memorial service held in connection with the burial or cremation of an individual; and

(2) “Boundary of the location”, with respect to a funeral, means (A) in the case of a funeral that is held at a cemetery, the property line of the cemetery; (B) in the case of a funeral that is held at a mortuary, the property line of the mortuary; (C) in the case of a funeral that is held at a house of worship, the property line of the house of worship; and (D) in the case of a funeral that is held at any other type of location, the reasonable property line of that location.

(b) With respect to any funeral, no individual may engage in an activity during the period beginning sixty minutes before and ending sixty minutes after such funeral, any part of which activity:

(1) (A) Takes place within the boundaries of the location of such funeral or takes place within one hundred fifty feet of the point of the intersection between (i) the boundary of the location of such funeral; and (ii) a road, pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress from the location of such funeral; and (B) includes the individual wilfully making or assisting in the making of any noise or diversion that is not part of such funeral and that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such funeral with the intent of disturbing the peace or good order of that funeral; or

(2) (A) Is within three hundred feet of the boundary of the location of such funeral; and (B) includes the individual wilfully and without proper authorization impeding the ingress to or egress from such location with the intent to impede the ingress to or egress from such location.

(P.A. 07-98, S. 1; 07-187, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 07-187 changed effective date of P.A. 07-98, S. 1 from October 1, 2007, to June 6, 2007, effective June 6, 2007.

PART XV

INTOXICATION

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 186; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 45; P.A. 74-280, S. 22, 25; P.A. 75-479, S. 11, 12, 25; P.A. 76-300, S. 2, 3, 4; P.A. 86-371, S. 34, 45; P.A. 89-390, S. 36, 37.)

PART XVI

LOITERING IN OR ABOUT SCHOOL GROUNDS.
PUBLIC INDECENCY

Sec. 53a-185. Loitering on school grounds: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of loitering on school grounds when he loiters or remains in or about a school building or grounds, not having any reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a pupil or any other license or privilege to be there.

(b) Loitering on school grounds is a class C misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 187; P.A. 92-260, S. 71.)

History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense.

Sec. 53a-186. Public indecency: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of public indecency when he performs any of the following acts in a public place: (1) An act of sexual intercourse as defined in subdivision (2) of section 53a-65; or (2) a lewd exposure of the body with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desire of the person; or (3) a lewd fondling or caress of the body of another person. For the purposes of this section, “public place” means any place where the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others.

(b) Public indecency is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 188; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 46; P.A. 76-336, S. 22; P.A. 92-260, S. 72.)

History: 1971 act substituted “A person” for “Any person” for consistency with other statutes; P.A. 76-336 specified sexual intercourse as defined in Sec. 53a-65 and deleted reference to acts of deviate sexual conduct in Subsec. (a) for conformity with changes enacted re sex offenses; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.

Cited. 18 CA 482; 29 CA 591; 37 CA 534.

Cited. 38 CS 313; Id., 661.

PART XVII*

TAMPERING WITH PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS,
EAVESDROPPING, VOYEURISM AND UNLAWFUL
DISSEMINATION OF INTIMATE IMAGES

*See chapter 959a re wiretapping and electronic surveillance.

Secs. 53a-187 to 53a-189 cited. 238 C. 692.

Sec. 53a-187. Definitions. Applicability. (a) The following definitions are applicable to sections 53a-188 and 53a-189: (1) “Wiretapping” means the intentional overhearing or recording of a telephonic or telegraphic communication or a communication made by cellular radio telephone by a person other than a sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of either the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device or equipment. The normal operation of a telephone or telegraph corporation and the normal use of the services and facilities furnished by such corporation pursuant to its tariffs shall not be deemed “wiretapping”. (2) “Mechanical overhearing of a conversation” means the intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or discussion, without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment. (3) “Unlawfully” means not specifically authorized by law. For purposes of this section, “cellular radio telephone” means a wireless telephone authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to operate in the frequency bandwidth reserved for cellular radio telephones.

(b) This section and sections 53a-188 and 53a-189 shall not apply to wiretapping by criminal law enforcement officials in the lawful performance of their duties and do not affect the admissibility of evidence in any proceedings other than a prosecution for eavesdropping or tampering with private communications.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 189; P.A. 86-403, S. 90, 132; P.A. 89-103, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 89-103 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to communications made by cellular radio telephone in the definition of wiretapping and to define “cellular radio telephone”.

Cited. 171 C. 524; 212 C. 195; 224 C. 593; 238 C. 692.

Cited. 15 CA 529.

Cordless telephone conversations are protected telephonic communications. 45 CS 497.

Sec. 53a-188. Tampering with private communications: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with private communications when: (1) Knowing that he does not have the consent of the sender or receiver, he obtains from an employee, officer or representative of a telephone or telegraph corporation, by connivance, deception, intimidation or in any other manner, information with respect to the contents or nature of a telephonic or telegraphic communication; or (2) knowing that he does not have the consent of the sender or receiver, and being an employee, officer or representative of a telephone or telegraph corporation, he knowingly divulges to another person the contents or nature of a telephonic or telegraphic communication.

(b) Tampering with private communications is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 190.)

Cited. 171 C. 524; 212 C. 195; 238 C. 692.

Sec. 53a-189. Eavesdropping: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in wiretapping or mechanical overhearing of a conversation.

(b) Eavesdropping is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 191.)

See Sec. 52-570d re prohibition on recording private telephonic communications and civil remedies for violation thereof.

Cited. 171 C. 524; 197 C. 326; 212 C. 195; 216 C. 541; 224 C. 593; 238 C. 692.

Cited. 8 CA 673; 15 CA 529.

Cordless telephone conversations are protected telephonic communications. 45 CS 497.

Sec. 53a-189a. Voyeurism: Class D or C felony. (a) A person is guilty of voyeurism when, (1) with malice, such person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise records the image of another person (A) without the knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, (2) with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person or any other person, such person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise records the image of another person (A) without the knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, (3) with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person, commits simple trespass, as provided in section 53a-110a, and observes, in other than a casual or cursory manner, another person (A) without the knowledge or consent of such other person, (B) while such other person is inside a dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, and not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, or (4) with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person or any other person, such person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise records the genitals, pubic area or buttocks of another person or the undergarments or stockings that clothe the genitals, pubic area or buttocks of another person (A) without the knowledge and consent of such other person, (B) while such genitals, pubic area, buttocks, undergarments or stockings are not in plain view, and (C) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether such other person is or is not in a public place.

(b) For purposes of this section, “in plain view” does not include any view that is achieved by photographing, filming, videotaping or otherwise recording under or around a person's clothing, and “public place” means public place, as defined in section 53a-186.

(c) Voyeurism is (1) a class D felony for a first offense, except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, (2) a class C felony for any subsequent offense, and (3) a class C felony for a first offense when (A) such person has been previously convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (f) of section 53a-29, or (B) the intended subject of the offense is a person under sixteen years of age.

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 54-193, no person may be prosecuted for an offense under subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section except within five years from the date of the offense, or within five years from the date the subject of the offense discovers the existence of the photograph, film, videotape or other recording that constitutes a violation of subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section, whichever is later.

(P.A. 99-143, S. 1; P.A. 03-114, S. 1; P.A. 06-187, S. 42; 06-196, S. 292; P.A. 15-213, S. 1; P.A. 19-14, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 03-114 increased the penalty from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 06-187 amended Subsec. (a) to designate elements of the offense committed with the mens rea of malice as new Subdiv. (1), redesignate existing Subdivs. (1), (2) and (3) as Subparas. (A), (B) and (C) of new Subdiv. (1) and reenact elements of the offense committed with the mens rea of “intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person or any other person” as new Subdiv. (2), effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 06-196 changed effective date of P.A. 06-187, S. 42 from July 1, 2006, to October 1, 2006, effective June 7, 2006; P.A. 15-213 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (3) re with intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desire a person commits simple trespass and add Subdiv. (4) re with intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desire a person photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise records genitals, pubic area or buttocks, undergarments or stockings of another person, amended Subsec. (b) to designate existing provision re class D felony as Subdiv. (1) and add Subdivs. (2) and (3) re class C felonies, and added Subsec. (c) re time for prosecuting offense; P.A. 19-14 added Subsec. (a)(4)(C) re reasonable expectation of privacy, added new Subsec. (b) to define “in plain view”, redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) and (c) as Subsecs. (c) and (d), and made a technical change.

The “not in plain view” element of section refers to the plain view of the public generally, meaning that a person must not be in a position where any member of the public, lawfully situated, could plainly view the person being recorded. 328 C. 219.

The perspective from which the “not in plain view” element of voyeurism must be evaluated is that of the defendant, not that of the general public. 166 CA 613; judgment reversed, see 328 C. 219.

Sec. 53a-189b. Disseminating voyeuristic material: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of disseminating voyeuristic material when such person disseminates a photograph, film, videotape or other recorded image of another person without the consent of such other person and knowing that such photograph, film, videotape or image was taken, made or recorded in violation of section 53a-189a.

(b) Disseminating voyeuristic material is a class D felony.

(P.A. 99-143, S. 2.)

Sec. 53a-189c. Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of unlawful dissemination of an intimate image when (1) such person intentionally disseminates by electronic or other means a photograph, film, videotape or other recorded image of (A) the genitals, pubic area or buttocks of another person with less than a fully opaque covering of such body part, or the breast of such other person who is female with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion of such breast below the top of the nipple, or (B) another person engaged in sexual intercourse, as defined in section 53a-193, (2) such person disseminates such image without the consent of such other person, knowing that such other person understood that the image would not be so disseminated, and (3) such other person suffers harm as a result of such dissemination. For purposes of this subsection, “disseminate” means to sell, give, provide, lend, trade, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate, present, exhibit, advertise or otherwise offer, and “harm” includes, but is not limited to, subjecting such other person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, physical injury, financial injury, psychological harm or serious emotional distress.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this subsection shall not apply to:

(1) Any image described in subsection (a) of this section of such other person if such image resulted from voluntary exposure or engagement in sexual intercourse by such other person, in a public place, as defined in section 53a-181, or in a commercial setting;

(2) Any image described in subsection (a) of this section of such other person, if such other person is not clearly identifiable, unless other personally identifying information is associated with or accompanies the image; or

(3) Any image described in subsection (a) of this section of such other person, if the dissemination of such image serves the public interest.

(c) Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image to (1) a person by any means is a class A misdemeanor, and (2) more than one person by means of an interactive computer service, as defined in 47 USC 230, an information service, as defined in 47 USC 153, or a telecommunications service, as defined in section 16-247a, is a class D felony.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability on the provider of an interactive computer service, as defined in 47 USC 230, an information service, as defined in 47 USC 153, or a telecommunications service, as defined in section 16-247a, for content provided by another person.

(P.A. 15-213, S. 8; P.A. 21-102, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 21-102 amended Subsec. (a) by defining “harm”, Subsec. (b)(2) by adding language re other personally identifying information associated with or accompanying image, and Subsec. (c) by designating existing penalty as Subdiv. (1) and adding Subdiv. (2) re a class D felony.

PART XVIII

BIGAMY AND INCEST

Sec. 53a-190. Bigamy: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of bigamy when he marries or purports to marry another person in this state if either is lawfully married; or so marries or purports to marry another person in any other state or country in violation of the laws thereof, and knowingly cohabits and lives with such other person in this state as husband and wife.

(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of bigamy that at the time of the subsequent marriage or purported marriage: (1) The actor reasonably believed, based on persuasive and reliable information, that the prior spouse was dead; or (2) a court had entered a judgment purporting to terminate or annul any prior disqualifying marriage and the actor did not know that such judgment was invalid; or (3) the single person did not know that the other person was legally married.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 192; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 47; P.A. 92-260, S. 73.)

History: 1971 act substituted “A person” for “Any person” for conformity with other statutes; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.

Sec. 53a-191. Incest: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of incest when he marries a person whom he knows to be related to him within any of the degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.

(b) Incest is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 193; P.A. 80-346, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 74.)

History: P.A. 80-346 substituted “such person” for “he” or “him”, eliminating unnecessary distinctions based on sex and removed reference to engaging in sexual intercourse with relative as incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by replacing “such person” with “he” or “him” as appropriate.

Cited. 189 C. 321; 210 C. 244. Relationship as half-uncle and half-niece is void. 213 C. 637.

PART XIX

COERCION

Sec. 53a-192. Coercion: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of coercion when he compels or induces another person to engage in conduct which such other person has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which such other person has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in such other person a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will: (1) Commit any criminal offense; or (2) accuse any person of a criminal offense; or (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair any person's credit or business repute; or (4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.

(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution based on subdivision (2), (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section that the actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other person to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting from further misbehavior or making good a wrong done.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 194; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 48; P.A. 92-260, S. 75.)

History: 1971 act referred simply to coercion rather than to “criminal” coercion in Subsec. (c); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.

Cited. 240 C. 766.

Cited. 8 CA 351; 18 CA 694; 40 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-192a. Trafficking in persons: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of trafficking in persons when such person (1) knowingly compels or induces another person to engage in conduct involving sexual contact with one or more third persons, or provide labor or services that such person has a legal right to refrain from providing, by means of (A) the use of force against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or a third person, (B) fraud, or (C) coercion, as provided in section 53a-192, (2) (A) knowingly compels or induces another person to engage in conduct involving sexual contact with one or more third persons that constitutes sexual contact for which such third person may be charged with a criminal offense, and (B) such person who is compelled or induced to engage in such conduct is under eighteen years of age, or (3) otherwise knowingly commits an act that constitutes sex trafficking. For the purposes of this subsection, “sexual contact” means any contact with the intimate parts of another person, and “sex trafficking” means the recruitment, harboring, transportation or provision of a person for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with another person in exchange for anything of value.

(b) It shall be an affirmative defense in any prosecution or delinquency proceeding under this section that the defendant was under eighteen years of age and his or her participation in the offense was a result of having been a victim of conduct of another person that constitutes trafficking in persons in violation of subsection (a) of this section.

(P.A. 06-43, S. 1; P.A. 10-36, S. 26; P.A. 13-166, S. 2; P.A. 15-195, S. 4; P.A. 16-71, S. 12; P.A. 17-32, S. 2; P.A. 21-103, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 06-43 effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to replace “work” with “provide labor or services”, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 13-166 amended Subsec. (a) to substantially revise elements of offense and add definition of “sexual contact”; P.A. 15-195 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing provision re person compelling or inducing another person to engage in conduct involving more than one occurrence of sexual contact with one or more third persons as new Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) to (3) as Subparas. (A) to (C) and adding new Subdiv. (2) re compelling or inducing another person who is under 18 to engage in conduct involving more than one occurrence of sexual contact with one or more third persons; P.A. 16-71 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting “more than one occurrence of” re trafficking that involves sexual contact with one or more third persons, by deleting former Subdiv. (2)(A) re prostitution and by deleting Subpara. (B) designator in Subdiv. (2); P.A. 17-32 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re act that constitutes sex trafficking and defining “sex trafficking”, and amended Subsec. (b) by changing trafficking in persons from a class B felony to a class A felony; P.A. 21-103 amended Subsec. (a) by adding “knowingly” in Subdivs. (1), (2)(A) and (3), designating existing Subdiv. (2) as (2)(A) and eliminating age threshold in same, adding Subdiv. (2)(B) re a person under 18 years of age, and redefining “sex trafficking” to replace actions undertaken for a fee to those undertaken in exchange for anything of value, added new Subsec. (b) re an affirmative defense and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c).

See Sec. 52-571i re action for damages for violation of this section.

PART XX

OBSCENITY AND RELATED OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-193. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this section and sections 53a-194 to 53a-210, inclusive:

(1) Any material or performance is “obscene” if, (A) taken as a whole, it predominantly appeals to the prurient interest, (B) it depicts or describes in a patently offensive way a prohibited sexual act, and (C) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value. Predominant appeal shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or performance or the circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for some other specially susceptible audience. Whether a material or performance is obscene shall be judged by ordinary adults applying contemporary community standards. In applying contemporary community standards, the state of Connecticut is deemed to be the community.

(2) Material or a performance is “obscene as to minors” if it depicts a prohibited sexual act and, taken as a whole, it is harmful to minors. For purposes of this subdivision: (A) “Minor” means any person less than seventeen years old as used in section 53a-196 and less than sixteen years old as used in sections 53a-196a and 53a-196b, and (B) “harmful to minors” means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of a prohibited sexual act, when (i) it predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, (ii) it is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value for minors.

(3) “Prohibited sexual act” means erotic fondling, nude performance, sexual excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, masturbation or sexual intercourse.

(4) “Nude performance” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state in any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.

(5) “Erotic fondling” means touching a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or if such person is a female, breast.

(6) “Sexual excitement” means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.

(7) “Sado-masochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.

(8) “Masturbation” means the real or simulated touching, rubbing or otherwise stimulating a person's own clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the person is female, breast, either by manual manipulation or with an artificial instrument.

(9) “Sexual intercourse” means intercourse, real or simulated, whether genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex or between a human and an animal, or with an artificial genital.

(10) “Material” means anything tangible which is capable of being used or adapted to arouse prurient, shameful or morbid interest, whether through the medium of reading, observation, sound or in any other manner. Undeveloped photographs, molds, printing plates, and the like, may be deemed obscene notwithstanding that processing or other acts may be required to make the obscenity patent or to disseminate it.

(11) “Performance” means any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.

(12) “Promote” means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise, produce, direct or participate in.

(13) “Child pornography” means any visual depiction including any photograph, film, videotape, picture or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, digital, mechanical or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a person under sixteen years of age engaging in sexually explicit conduct, provided whether the subject of a visual depiction was a person under sixteen years of age at the time the visual depiction was created is a question to be decided by the trier of fact.

(14) “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated (A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal physical contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or with an artificial genital, (B) bestiality, (C) masturbation, (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse, or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.

(15) “Visual depiction” includes undeveloped film and videotape and data, as defined in subdivision (8) of section 53a-250, that is capable of conversion into a visual image and includes encrypted data.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 195; P.A. 74-124; P.A. 78-331, S. 21, 58; 78-345, S. 1, 4; P.A. 83-507; P.A. 85-496, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 76; P.A. 04-139, S. 2; P.A. 14-192, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 74-124 added provision re application of contemporary community standards in judgments concerning obscenity; P.A. 78-331 extended applicability of definitions to encompass Sec. 53a-196a; P.A. 78-345 amended Subsec. (b) to replace “nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse” with reference to prohibited sexual acts, to redefine “minor” re 16-year-olds, to replace definition of “nudity” with definition of “nude performance”, to delete definition of “sexual conduct”, to define “prohibited sexual act”, “erotic fondling”, “masturbation”, and “sexual intercourse” and to redefine “harmful to minors” as description or representation which lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value for minors rather than as something “utterly without redeeming social importance for minors” and redefined “material” in Subsec. (c) to specify something used or adapted to arouse “prurient, shameful or morbid” interest; P.A. 83-507 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine “obscene” by replacing (1) “its predominant appeal is to prurient, shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, excretion, sadism or masochism” with “it predominantly appeals to the prurient interest”, (2) “it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters” with “it depicts or describes in a patently offensive way a prohibited sexual act” and (3) “it is utterly without redeeming social value” with “taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value”, and reordered and redesignated the other definitions; P.A. 85-496 included reference to section 53a-196c and added definition of “child pornography”; P.A. 92-260 made definitions applicable to “this section and sections 53a-194 to 53a-210, inclusive” rather than to “sections 53a-193 to 53a-196a, inclusive and section 53a-196c”, replaced alphabetic Subsec. indicators with numeric indicators, amended Subsec. (1) to replace numeric Subdiv. indicators with alphabetic indicators and add “or performance” in provisions re judging predominant appeal and applying community standards, and amended Subsec. (2) to replace numeric Subdiv. indicators with alphabetic indicators and alphabetic Subpara. indicators with numeric indicators; P.A. 04-139 applied definitions to Secs. 53a-196e to 53a-196g, inclusive, amended Subdiv. (2) to make a technical change and to delete in Subpara. (A) applicability to Sec. 53a-196c of definition of a minor as a person less than 16 years old, redefined “child pornography” in Subdiv. (13) and added definitions of “sexually explicit conduct” and “visual depiction” as Subdivs. (14) and (15), respectively; P.A. 14-192 amended Subdiv. (13) to redefine “child pornography” by adding “digital”.

Cited. 193 C. 612. Defendant's challenge denied re prior interpretation of “live performance” and “before an audience” in Subdivs. (11) and (13), revision of 1999. 277 C. 155.

Cited. 3 CA 80; 28 CA 91; 29 CA 591.

Definition of obscenity is sufficiently explicit to inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what material would be in violation of the law; definition of “obscene” contained in section is presently immune from attack upon the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth at the federal level. 32 CS 639. Cited. 38 CS 570, 574.

Subdiv. (11):

Requirement in Sec. 53a-196d, through its incorporation of Sec. 53a-193(11) and (13), that the live performance depicted in the materials be “performed before an audience” means that there must be some recording or viewing of, or listening to, a live performance, or a reproduction of a live performance, by a person or persons other than the person or persons simultaneously engaged in the performance; the number of such persons recording, viewing or listening to the performance and whether they actually are present at the live performance or depicted in reproductions of it are irrelevant for purposes of determining whether an audience exists. 252 C. 579.

Subdiv. (14):

Subpara. (E): Although they should not be rigidly or mechanically applied, the factors set forth in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, factors are helpful in cases in which probable cause depends in part on whether the description in a search warrant affidavit of possibly lascivious images supports, as part of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable inference that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. 335 C. 29.

Sec. 53a-194. Obscenity: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of obscenity when, knowing its content and character, he promotes, or possesses with intent to promote, any obscene material or performance.

(b) Obscenity is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 196.)

State has burden of presenting evidence of contemporary community standards in prosecution for obscenity, except where performance is so offensive that no conceivable community standard would permit it. 174 C. 46. Cited. 193 C. 612.

Cited. 28 CA 91.

Obscenity statute is not so vague or overly broad as to violate federal standards; section is presently immune from attack upon the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth at the federal level. 32 CS 639. Cited. 33 CS 681; 38 CS 570.

Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 656.

Sec. 53a-195. Defense. In any prosecution for obscenity it is a defense that the persons to whom allegedly obscene material was disseminated, or the audience to an allegedly obscene performance, consisted of persons or institutions having scientific, educational or governmental justification for possessing or viewing the same.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 197; P.A. 92-260, S. 77.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.

Cited. 200 C. 664.

Sec. 53a-196. Obscenity as to minors: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of obscenity as to minors when he knowingly promotes to a minor, for monetary consideration, any material or performance which is obscene as to minors.

(b) For purposes of this section, “knowingly” means having general knowledge of or reason to know or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry as to (1) the character and content of any material or performance which is reasonably susceptible of examination by such person and (2) the age of the minor.

(c) In any prosecution for obscenity as to minors, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant made (1) a reasonable mistake as to age, and (2) a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor, by examining a draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document, exhibited by such minor, purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years of age or older.

(d) Obscenity as to minors is a class D felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 198; P.A. 85-496, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 78.)

History: P.A. 85-496 increased penalty from class A misdemeanor to class D felony; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).

Under revision of 1999, provision that proscribes “importation of two or more copies” was not limited to copies of the same image, but also included reproductions of two or more different images; section not limited to commercial importation of child pornography but also includes transmittal of images by personal computer; expert evidence is not necessary to establish that child depicted is real and not electronically generated; evidence that defendant sent images via electronic mail service routed through Virginia was sufficient to establish the proscribed activity of “importing” images. 277 C. 155.

Cited. 36 CS 352.

Sec. 53a-196a. Employing a minor in an obscene performance: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of employing a minor in an obscene performance when such person (1) employs any minor, whether or not such minor receives any consideration, for the purpose of promoting any material or performance which is obscene as to minors, notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult audience, or (2) permits any such minor to be employed, whether or not such minor receives any consideration, in the promotion of any material or performance which is obscene as to minors, notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult audience, and such person is the parent or guardian of such minor or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such minor's welfare.

(b) Employing a minor in an obscene performance is a class A felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 77-577, S. 2; P.A. 78-345, S. 2, 4; P.A. 85-496, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 79; P.A. 07-143, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 78-345 restated provisions for conformity with Sec. 53a-193 as amended; P.A. 85-496 increased penalty from class B felony to class A felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes and amended Subsec. (b) to require any person found guilty to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which 10 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, effective July 1, 2007.

See Sec. 17a-47 re legal division within Department of Children and Families.

Cited. 227 C. 207.

“Audience”, in Subsec. (a)(1), may consist of a single photographer of a live performance or a single person viewing photographs of the performance, whether or not any spectator was present at performance or depicted in photographs; Subsec. (a)(1) advances legislative purpose of prohibiting the exhibition and viewing of children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of the number of spectators. 135 CA 215.

Sec. 53a-196b. Promoting a minor in an obscene performance: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of promoting a minor in an obscene performance when he knowingly promotes any material or performance in which a minor is employed, whether or not such minor receives any consideration, and such material or performance is obscene as to minors notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult audience.

(P.A. 78-345, S. 3, 4; P.A. 85-496, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 80.)

History: P.A. 85-496 increased penalty from class C felony to class B felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).

Evidence, which included videos that did not depict a prohibited sexual act as defined in Sec. 53a-193(3) but served as corroboration of activities described in victim's testimony, was sufficient to sustain conviction of promoting a minor in an obscene performance. 308 C. 274.

Cited. 28 CA 91.

Sec. 53a-196c. Importing child pornography: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of importing child pornography when, with intent to promote child pornography, such person knowingly imports or causes to be imported into the state three or more visual depictions of child pornography of known content and character.

(b) Importing child pornography is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 85-496, S. 5; P.A. 04-139, S. 3; P.A. 07-143, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 04-139 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “any child pornography” with “three or more visual depictions of child pornography” and make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, deleted former Subsec. (b) providing that importation of two or more copies of any publication containing child pornography shall be prima facie evidence that such publications were imported with intent to promote child pornography, redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as new Subsec. (b) and amended said Subsec. to increase penalty from a class C felony to a class B felony; P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (b) to require any person found guilty to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which 5 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, effective July 1, 2007.

Sec. 53a-196d. Possessing child pornography in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of possessing child pornography in the first degree when such person knowingly possesses (1) fifty or more visual depictions of child pornography, or (2) one or more visual depictions of child pornography that depict the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury, or (3) (A) a series of images in electronic, digital or other format, which is intended to be displayed continuously, consisting of two or more frames, or a film or videotape, consisting of two or more frames, that depicts (i) more than one child engaging in sexually explicit conduct, or (ii) more than one act of sexually explicit conduct by one or more children, or (B) any combination of a (i) series of images in electronic, digital or other format, which is intended to be displayed continuously, (ii) film, or (iii) videotape, which series, film or videotape each consists of two or more frames and depicts a single act of sexually explicit conduct by one child.

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the acts of the defendant, if proven, would constitute a violation of section 53a-196h.

(c) Possessing child pornography in the first degree is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 95-143, S. 3; P.A. 04-139, S. 4; P.A. 07-143, S. 8; P.A. 10-112, S. 3; 10-191, S. 2; P.A. 14-192, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 04-139 renamed offense by replacing “possessing child pornography” with “possessing child pornography in the first degree” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to replace provision that offense occurs when a person “knowingly possesses child pornography, as defined in subdivision (13) of section 53a-193” with “knowingly possesses fifty or more visual depictions of child pornography” and delete provision that possession of a photographic or other visual reproduction of a nude minor for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental or judicial purpose is not a violation of subsection, and amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty from a class D felony to a class B felony; P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (b) to require any person found guilty to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which 5 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 10-112 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re 50 or more visual depictions as Subdiv. (1) and add Subdiv. (2) re visual depictions of child pornography that depict infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury; P.A. 10-191 added new Subsec. (b) re affirmative defense and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 14-192 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (3) re possession of series of images in electronic, digital or other format intended to be displayed continuously, or a film or videotape.

Trial court properly rejected defendant's claim that statute is unconstitutionally vague; there is no first amendment right to possess materials otherwise covered by definition of child pornography specified in Sec. 53a-193(13) when the person depicted is younger than 18, statute is not unconstitutional on its face and defendant having conceded that statute clearly gives fair notice that pornographic materials depicting children under 16 are prohibited and having admitted that he possessed materials depicting children under 16, statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant; “minor”, for purposes of statute, means a person under 16 years of age. 252 C. 579.

Sec. 53a-196e. Possessing child pornography in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of possessing child pornography in the second degree when such person knowingly possesses (1) twenty or more but fewer than fifty visual depictions of child pornography, or (2) a series of images in electronic, digital or other format, which is intended to be displayed continuously, consisting of twenty or more frames, or a film or videotape, consisting of twenty or more frames, that depicts a single act of sexually explicit conduct by one child.

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the acts of the defendant, if proven, would constitute a violation of section 53a-196h.

(c) Possessing child pornography in the second degree is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 04-139, S. 5; P.A. 07-143, S. 9; P.A. 10-191, S. 3; P.A. 14-192, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (b) to require any person found guilty to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which 2 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 10-191 added new Subsec. (b) re affirmative defense and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 14-192 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re possession of 20 or more but fewer than 50 visual depictions as Subdiv. (1) and add Subdiv. (2) re possession of series of images in electronic, digital or other format, intended to be displayed continuously, or a film or videotape.

Sec. 53a-196f. Possessing child pornography in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possessing child pornography in the third degree when such person knowingly possesses (1) fewer than twenty visual depictions of child pornography, or (2) a series of images in electronic, digital or other format, which is intended to be displayed continuously, consisting of fewer than twenty frames, or a film or videotape, consisting of fewer than twenty frames, that depicts a single act of sexually explicit conduct by one child.

(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the acts of the defendant, if proven, would constitute a violation of section 53a-196h.

(c) Possessing child pornography in the third degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 04-139, S. 6; P.A. 07-143, S. 10; P.A. 10-191, S. 4; P.A. 14-192, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (b) to require any person found guilty to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which 1 year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 10-191 added new Subsec. (b) re affirmative defense and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 14-192 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re possession of fewer than 20 visual depictions as Subdiv. (1) and add Subdiv. (2) re possession of series of images in electronic, digital or other format, intended to be displayed continuously, or a film or videotape.

Sec. 53a-196g. Possessing child pornography: Affirmative defenses. In any prosecution for a violation of section 53a-196d, 53a-196e, 53a-196f or 53a-196h it shall be an affirmative defense that (1) the defendant (A) possessed fewer than three visual depictions, other than a series of images in electronic, digital or other format, which is intended to be displayed continuously, or a film or videotape, of child pornography, (B) did not knowingly purchase, procure, solicit or request such visual depictions or knowingly take any other action to cause such visual depictions to come into the defendant's possession, and (C) promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any visual depiction or copy thereof, took reasonable steps to destroy each such visual depiction or reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access to each such visual depiction, or (2) the defendant possessed a visual depiction of a nude person under sixteen years of age for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental or judicial purpose.

(P.A. 04-139, S. 7; P.A. 10-191, S. 5; P.A. 14-192, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 10-191 made provisions applicable in prosecution for violation of Sec. 53a-196h; P.A. 14-192 amended Subdiv. (1)(A) to add provision re possession of series of images in electronic, digital or other format intended to be displayed continuously, or a film or videotape.

Sec. 53a-196h. Possessing or transmitting child pornography by minor: Class A misdemeanor. (a)(1) No person who is under eighteen years of age may knowingly possess any visual depiction of child pornography that the subject of such visual depiction knowingly and voluntarily transmitted by means of an electronic communication device to such person and in which the subject of such visual depiction is a person under sixteen years of age.

(2) No person who is under sixteen years of age may knowingly and voluntarily transmit by means of an electronic communication device a visual depiction of child pornography in which such person is the subject of such visual depiction to another person who is under eighteen years of age.

(b) As used in this section, “child pornography” and “visual depiction” have the same meanings as provided in section 53a-193, and “electronic communication device” means any electronic device that is capable of transmitting a visual depiction, including a computer, computer network and computer system, as those terms are defined in section 53a-250, and a cellular or wireless telephone.

(P.A. 10-191, S. 1; P.A. 17-25, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 17-25 amended Subsec. (a) to delete “thirteen years of age or older but”.

Sec. 53a-196i. Commercial sexual exploitation of a minor: Class C felony. (a) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Advertisement for a commercial sex act” or “advertisement” means any advertisement or offer in electronic or print media which includes an explicit or implicit offer for a commercial sex act to occur in this state;

(2) “Commercial sex act” means any act of sexual contact, as defined in section 53a-65, or sexual intercourse, as defined in section 53a-65, for which something of value is given to or received by any person;

(3) “Depiction” means any photograph, film, videotape, visual material or printed material; and

(4) “Person” has the meaning provided in section 53a-3, but does not include a government or a governmental instrumentality.

(b) A person is guilty of commercial sexual exploitation of a minor when such person knowingly purchases advertising space for an advertisement for a commercial sex act that includes a depiction of a minor.

(c) (1) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall not be a defense that the defendant (A) did not know the age of the person depicted in the advertisement, (B) relied on an oral or written representation of the age of the person depicted in the advertisement, or (C) relied on the apparent age of the person depicted in the advertisement.

(2) In any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, prior to purchasing advertising space for the advertisement, made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the person depicted in the advertisement by requiring the person depicted in the advertisement to produce a driver's license, marriage license, birth certificate or other government-issued or school-issued identity card that identifies the age of the person, provided the defendant retains and produces a copy or other record of the license, certificate or identity card used to ascertain the age of the person depicted in the advertisement.

(d) Commercial sexual exploitation of a minor is a class C felony.

(P.A. 12-141, S. 1.)

Secs. 53a-197 and 53a-198. Disseminating indecent comic books: Class A misdemeanor. Failing to identify a comic book publication: Violation. Sections 53a-197 and 53a-198 are repealed, effective October 1, 2004.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 199, 200; P.A. 92-260, S. 81; P.A. 04-139, S. 14.)

Sec. 53a-199. Injunction against promoting any obscene material or performance. An injunction may be granted against the promoting of any material or performance that is obscene or obscene as to minors or the possessing with intent to promote any such material.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 201.)

Sec. 53a-200. Institution of action for adjudication of obscenity. Whenever any state's attorney or assistant state's attorney has reasonable cause to believe that any person is knowingly promoting any material or performance that is obscene or obscene as to minors, he shall institute an action for an adjudication of the obscenity of such material or performance. Such action shall commence with the filing of an application for an injunction with a judge of the superior court for the judicial district wherein is located such material or performance. The complaint shall: (1) Be directed against the promoting of the material or performance; (2) designate as defendants and list the names and addresses, if known, of its promoters, or any person possessing it with intent to promote it; (3) allege its obscene nature; (4) seek an adjudication that it is obscene or obscene as to minors and an injunction against any promoting or possessing with intent to promote; (5) seek its surrender, seizure, destruction or termination.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 202; P.A. 74-183, S. 124, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 514, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 92-260, S. 82.)

History: P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas and “circuit” with “county or judicial district”, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas in reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced prosecuting attorneys with state's attorneys and assistant state's attorneys and court of common pleas with superior court, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing alphabetic with numeric Subdiv. indicators.

Sec. 53a-201. Presentation of material or evidence depicting performance. Probable cause determination. Time for trial and decision. The prosecuting attorney, at the time of presenting the complaint and application to the court, shall also present the material or a witness or other evidence describing or depicting the performance. If, after examination, the court finds no probable cause to believe such material or performance obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall dismiss the action. If, after examination, the court finds probable cause to believe such material or performance obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall then proceed as in other applications for an injunction. The person sought to be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues, commencing within one day after the close of all pleadings, and any decision by the court shall be rendered within two days of the conclusion of the trial.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 203; P.A. 92-260, S. 83.)

History: P.A. 92-260 added provisions requiring that the court “dismiss the action” if it fails to find probable cause and that the court proceed as in other applications for an injunction “if, after examination, the court finds probable cause to believe such material or performance obscene or obscene as to minors”, provisions which were contained in former Sec. 53-244d which was repealed by 1969 P.A. 828, S. 214, the same act which enacted the penal code.

Sec. 53a-202. Third party may be made a party. On or before the date set for trial, any person who promotes, or who possesses with intent to promote, the material or performance complained of in the application for an injunction may file an appearance and be made a party to the proceedings.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 204.)

Sec. 53a-203. Jury trial. Every person appearing shall be entitled, upon request, to a trial by jury and the court may order a trial of any issue to the jury.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 205; P.A. 92-260, S. 84.)

History: P.A. 92-260 deleted an obsolete reference to “the criminal sessions of such court”.

Cited. 17 CA 326; 40 CA 515.

Sec. 53a-204. Evidence. At the trial, all parties shall be permitted to submit evidence, including the testimony of experts, pertaining but not limited to the following: (1) The elements or standards specified in the definitions of obscene and obscene as to minors; (2) the artistic, literary, scientific, educational or governmental merits of the material or performance; (3) the intent and knowledge of any defendant.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 206; P.A. 92-260, S. 85.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing alphabetic with numeric Subdiv. indicators.

Sec. 53a-205. Judgment. If the court or jury, as the case may be, finds the material or performance not to be obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall enter judgment accordingly. If the court or jury, as the case may be, finds the material or performance to be obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall enter judgment to such effect and may, in such judgment or in subsequent orders of enforcement thereof: (1) Enter an injunction against any defendant prohibiting him from promoting or possessing such material or performance, under such conditions and within such time as the court may order; (2) direct any resident defendant to dispose of all such material in his possession or under his control under such conditions and within such time as the court may order; or (3) if any defendant fails fully to comply with the judgment or order of the court, direct the state police or any organized local police department to seize and destroy all such material in the possession or under the control of such defendant wherever the same may be found within their jurisdiction.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 207; P.A. 77-614, S. 486, 587, 610; P.A. 78-303, S. 85, 136.)

History: P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979, but under authority of P.A. 78-303 existing reference to state police was retained.

Sec. 53a-206. Injunction and restraining order. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance and shall describe in reasonable detail the obscene material or performance and the promoting or possessing sought to be restrained, and is binding only upon the defendants to the action and their officers, agents, servants and employees and upon those persons in active concert or participating by contract or arrangement with them, who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 208; P.A. 92-260, S. 86.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.

Cited. 16 CA 601.

Sec. 53a-207. Service of process on nonresidents. Every nonresident person, whether acting personally or by an agent, salesman, employee, officer or another, who promotes any material or performance that is obscene or obscene as to minors in this state shall be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of the State as his attorney and to have agreed that any process in any action arising under sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive, brought against or naming such nonresident as a defendant, may be served upon said secretary and shall have the same validity as if served upon such nonresident personally. Such process shall be served by the officer to whom the same is directed upon said secretary by leaving with or at the office of said secretary a true and attested copy thereof and by sending to the defendant, by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, a like true and attested copy with an endorsement thereon of the service upon said secretary addressed to such defendant at his last-known address. The Secretary of the State shall keep a record of each such process and the day and hour of service.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 209; P.A. 92-260, S. 87.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.

Sec. 53a-208. Extradition. In all cases in which a court has entered its judgment pursuant to section 53a-205 that the material or performance in question is obscene or obscene as to minors, and a charge of a violation of the injunction or restraining order is thereafter brought against a person who, being a defendant to such judgment, cannot be found in this state, the Governor, or anyone performing the functions of Governor by authority of a law of this state, shall, unless such person has appealed from such judgment and such appeal is not finally determined, demand his extradition from the executive authority of the state in which such person may be found, pursuant to the laws of this state.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 210; P.A. 92-260, S. 88.)

History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to “sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive,” with “section 53a-205”.

Sec. 53a-209. Penalties. Any defendant, or any officer, agent, servant or employee of such defendant, or any person in active concert or participation by contract or arrangement with such defendant, who receives actual notice, by personal service or otherwise, of any injunction or restraining order entered pursuant to section 53a-205 and who disobeys any of the provisions thereof shall be fined not more than three thousand five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 211; P.A. 92-260, S. 89; P.A. 13-258, S. 20.)

History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to “sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive,” with “section 53a-205”; P.A. 13-258 changed fine from $1,000 to $3,500 and made a technical change.

Sec. 53a-210. Levy of fine against property. Any fine against any person under section 53a-209 may be levied against any of his real property, personal property, tangible or intangible, choses in action or property of any kind or nature, including debts owing to him, which may be situated or found in this state.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 212; P.A. 92-260, S. 90.)

History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to “any of sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive,” with “section 53a-209”.

PART XXI

MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-211. Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or silencer: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a sawed-off shotgun or a silencer when he owns, controls or possesses any sawed-off shotgun that has a barrel of less than eighteen inches or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches or when he owns, controls or possesses any silencer designed to muffle the noise of a firearm during discharge.

(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to persons, firms, corporations or museums licensed or otherwise permitted by federal or state law to possess, control or own sawed-off shotguns or silencers.

(P.A. 76-45; P.A. 80-244.)

History: P.A. 80-244 deleted phrase “of any caliber” following reference to sawed-off shotguns in Subsec. (a).

See Secs. 29-35 to 29-38a, inclusive, and 53-202 to 53-206d, inclusive, re regulation of firearms and penalties imposed for firearms violations.

Cited. 190 C. 715; 198 C. 68; 201 C. 505; 207 C. 323; 224 C. 163; 233 C. 215.

Cited. 1 CA 697; 7 CA 550; 11 CA 397; 13 CA 76; 14 CA 67; 15 CA 539; 17 CA 490; 26 CA 698; 28 CA 474; 30 CA 9. Fact that the weapon in evidence had a pistol grip was of no consequence because the barrel had been sawed off and therefore weapon was a sawed-off shotgun. 99 CA 183. Defendant was not entitled to jury instruction that “mere presence in the vicinity of the firearm, however, is not enough to establish possession”. 113 CA 651.

Sec. 53a-212. Stealing a firearm: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of stealing a firearm when, with intent to deprive another person of such other person's firearm or to appropriate the firearm to such person or a third party, such person wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds a firearm, as defined in subdivision (19) of section 53a-3.

(b) Stealing a firearm is a class C felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

(P.A. 77-217; P.A. 13-3, S. 43.)

History: P.A. 13-3 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) and amended Subsec. (b) to change penalty from a class D felony to a class C felony and provide that 2 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and $5,000 of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced unless the court states its reasons for remitting or reducing the fine.

Cited. 189 C. 461; 190 C. 715; 196 C. 157; 197 C. 201; 198 C. 405; 199 C. 591; 241 C. 702.

Cited. 7 CA 367; 8 CA 631; Id., 667; 9 CA 349; 19 CA 48; 20 CA 521; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 740; 38 CA 481; Id., 643; Id., 750. Fact that the weapon in evidence had a pistol grip and could not be fired from the shoulder was of no consequence because it was a weapon capable of discharging a gunshot and therefore satisfied statutory definition of firearm. 99 CA 183.

Sec. 53a-213. Drinking while operating a motor vehicle: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of drinking while operating a motor vehicle when such person drinks any alcoholic liquor while operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state or upon any road of any specially chartered municipal association or of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or in any parking area for ten cars or more, or upon any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of section 14-218a or 14-307a or upon any school property. As used in this section, “alcoholic liquor” has the same meaning as provided in section 30-1.

(b) Drinking while operating a motor vehicle is a class C misdemeanor.

(P.A. 79-368; P.A. 14-122, S. 192; P.A. 21-28, S. 12.)

History: P.A. 14-122 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 21-28 amended Subsec. (a) by adding reference to Sec. 14-307a and making a technical change.

Sec. 53a-213a. Smoking, otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis while operating a motor vehicle: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of smoking, otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis, as defined in section 21a-420, while operating a motor vehicle when he or she smokes, otherwise inhales or ingests cannabis, as defined in section 21a-420, while operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state or upon any road of any specially chartered municipal association or of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or in any parking area for ten cars or more, or upon any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of section 14-218a or upon any school property. No person shall be convicted of smoking or otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis while operating a motor vehicle and possessing or having under such person's control a controlled substance upon the same transaction. A person may be charged and prosecuted for either or each such offense, a violation of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of any drug and any other applicable offense upon the same information.

(b) Smoking, otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis while operating a motor vehicle is a class C misdemeanor.

(c) No peace officer shall stop a motor vehicle for a violation of this section if such violation is the sole reason for such stop.

(June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-1, S. 112.)

History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-1 effective July 1, 2021.

Sec. 53a-213b. Smoking, otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis as a passenger in a motor vehicle: Class D misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of smoking or otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis, as defined in section 21a-420, in a motor vehicle when he or she smokes or otherwise inhales or ingests cannabis in a motor vehicle that is being operated by another person upon a public highway of this state or upon any road of any specially chartered municipal association or of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or in any parking area for ten cars or more, or upon any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of section 14-218a or upon any school property. No person shall be convicted of smoking or otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis as a passenger in a motor vehicle and possessing or having under such person's control a controlled substance upon the same transaction, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both offenses upon the same information.

(b) Smoking or otherwise inhaling or ingesting cannabis in a motor vehicle is a class D misdemeanor.

(c) No peace officer shall stop a motor vehicle for a violation of this section if such violation is the sole reason for such stop.

(June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-1, S. 113.)

History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-1 effective July 1, 2021.

Sec. 53a-214. Criminal lockout: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A landlord or lessor of a residential or nonresidential unit subject to the provisions of chapter 830 or 832, or an owner of such a unit, or the agent of such landlord, lessor or owner is guilty of criminal lockout when, without benefit of a court order, he or she deprives a tenant, as defined in subsection (l) of section 47a-1, or a lessee of a nonresidential unit, of access to his or her residential or nonresidential unit or his or her possessions.

(b) Criminal lockout is a class C misdemeanor.

(P.A. 81-24; P.A. 19-132, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 19-132 amended Subsec. (a) by adding references to lessor and lessee, replacing “dwelling unit” with “residential or nonresidential unit”, replacing “his personal possessions” with “his or her possessions”, adding reference to Ch. 832, and making technical and conforming changes.

Sec. 53a-215. Insurance fraud: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of insurance fraud when the person, with the intent to injure, defraud or deceive any insurance company: (1) Presents or causes to be presented to any insurance company, any written or oral statement including computer-generated documents as part of, or in support of, any application for any policy of insurance or a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to such policy of insurance, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such application or claim; or (2) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to prepare or make any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurance company in connection with, or in support of, any application for any policy of insurance or any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to such policy of insurance, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such application or claim for the purposes of defrauding such insurance company.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “statement” includes, but is not limited to, any notice, statement, invoice, account, estimate of property damages, bill for services, test result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense.

(d) Insurance fraud is a class D felony.

(P.A. 81-113; P.A. 00-211, S. 6; P.A. 17-15, S. 96.)

History: P.A. 00-211 amended Subsec. (a) to delete “providing coverage for loss or damage to real or personal property caused by fire” re insurance policies and to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality and amended Subsec. (c) to redefine “insurance company”; P.A. 17-15 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).

See Secs. 53-440 to 53-443, inclusive, re health insurance fraud and abuse.

Cited. 227 C. 1.

Cited. 28 CA 9; 44 CA 294. Subsec. (a)(2): In order to establish guilt under the Subsec., the state must present evidence that defendant engaged in conduct related to the making or preparing of the insurance claim, and evidence that defendant intended to defraud the insurance company when she started a fire does not reasonably support the inference that she engaged in the making or preparation of any statement provided to the insurance company. 184 CA 595.

Sec. 53a-216. Criminal use of firearm or electronic defense weapon: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon when he commits any class A, B or C or unclassified felony as defined in section 53a-25 and in the commission of such felony he uses or threatens the use of a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm or electronic defense weapon. No person shall be convicted of criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon and the underlying felony upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon is a class D felony for which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 81-342, S. 1; P.A. 86-287, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 86-287 added reference to electronic defense weapons.

Cited. 195 C. 651; 226 C. 497; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 143.

Cited. 24 CA 330. Judgment reversed where defendant convicted of violation of statute and Sec. 53a-134(a)(2). 85 CA 708.

Sec. 53a-217. Criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon when such person possesses a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon and (1) has been convicted of (A) a felony committed prior to, on or after October 1, 2013, (B) a misdemeanor violation of section 21a-279 on or after October 1, 2015, or (C) a misdemeanor violation of section 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d committed on or after October 1, 2013, and during the preceding twenty years, (2) has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120, (3) has been discharged from custody within the preceding twenty years after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, (4) knows that such person is subject to (A) a restraining or protective order of a court of this state that has been issued against such person, after notice has been provided to such person, in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, or (B) a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, (5) (A) has been confined on or after October 1, 2013, in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding sixty months by order of a probate court, or with respect to any person who holds a valid permit or certificate that was issued or renewed under the provisions of section 29-28 or 29-36f in effect prior to October 1, 2013, such person has been confined in such hospital within the preceding twelve months, or (B) has been voluntarily admitted on or after October 1, 2013, to a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding six months for care and treatment of a psychiatric disability, unless the person (i) was voluntarily admitted solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person as those terms are defined in section 17a-680, or (ii) is a police officer who was voluntarily admitted and had his or her firearm, ammunition or electronic defense weapon used in the performance of the police officer's official duties returned in accordance with section 7-291d, (6) knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued prior to June 1, 2022, pursuant to section 29-38c after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, or a risk protection order or risk protection investigation order issued on or after June 1, 2022, pursuant to section 29-38c, or (7) is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing or receiving a firearm pursuant to 18 USC 922(g)(4). For the purposes of this section, “convicted” means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, “ammunition” means a loaded cartridge, consisting of a primed case, propellant or projectile, designed for use in any firearm, and a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year may be imposed shall be deemed an unclassified felony.

(b) Criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon is a class C felony, for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

(P.A. 82-464, S. 1; P.A. 86-287, S. 5; P.A. 91-212; P.A. 98-129, S. 12; P.A. 99-212, S. 1; P.A. 01-130, S. 15; P.A. 03-98, S. 4; P.A. 05-147, S. 4; 05-283, S. 2; P.A. 12-133, S. 19; P.A. 13-3, S. 44; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-2, S. 6; P.A. 16-34, S. 15; P.A. 19-17, S. 5; P.A. 21-67, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 86-287 added reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 91-212 replaced “pistol, revolver” with “firearm” and made technical changes; P.A. 98-129 added Subsec. (a)(2) prohibiting possession by a person who has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense; P.A. 99-212 made provisions applicable to a person convicted of any felony rather than only of a capital felony and specified class A, B, C and D felonies; P.A. 01-130 added Subsecs. (a)(3) and (4) re possession by a person who knows he or she is subject to a restraining or protective order issued after notice and an opportunity to be heard in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person and re possession by a person who knows he or she is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to Sec. 29-38c after notice and an opportunity to be heard; P.A. 03-98 amended Subsec. (a)(3) by replacing “protective order issued by a court” with “protective order of a court of this state” and adding provisions re foreign order of protection and re order that has been issued against such person; P.A. 05-147 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to designate existing provisions re a restraining or protective order as Subpara. (A), designate existing provisions re a foreign order of protection as Subpara. (B) and amend said Subpara. (B) to delete the requirement that the foreign order of protection has been issued “after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person”; P.A. 05-283 added Subsec. (a)(5) re possession by a person who is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing or receiving a firearm pursuant to 18 USC 922(g)(4); P.A. 12-133 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision re motor vehicle violation for which sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year may be imposed to be deemed an unclassified felony; P.A. 13-3 changed “criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon” to “criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon”, amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re violation of Sec. 21a-279(c), 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d committed on or after October 1, 2013, in Subdiv. (1), add new Subdiv. (3) re person discharged within preceding 20 years after being found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, redesignate existing Subdiv. (3) as Subdiv. (4), add new Subdiv. (5) re person confined on or after October 1, 2013, in hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities within preceding 60 months by probate court order, or such confinement within preceding 12 months for person who held valid permit or certificate in effect prior to October 1, 2013, and re person voluntarily admitted within preceding 6 months on or after October 1, 2013, redesignate existing Subdivs. (4) and (5) as Subdivs. (6) and (7), and define “ammunition”, and amended Subsec. (b) to change penalty from class D felony to class C felony and provide that $5,000 of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced unless the court states its reasons for remitting or reducing the fine; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-2 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to replace reference to Sec. 21a-279(c) with reference to Sec. 21a-279; P.A. 16-34 amended Subsec. (a)(4)(A) by deleting “and an opportunity to be heard”; P.A. 19-17 amended Subsec. (a)(5)(B) by replacing “treatment of a psychiatric disability and not solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person” with “treatment of a psychiatric disability, unless the person (i) was voluntarily admitted solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person”, and adding clause (ii) re police officer who was voluntarily admitted; P.A. 21-67 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by designating existing language re felony as Subpara. (A), replacing “or of a violation of section 21a-279,” with “(B) a misdemeanor violation of section 21a-279 committed on or after October 1, 2015, or (C) a misdemeanor violation of section” and adding “during the preceding twenty years” at the end of newly designated Subpara. (C) and amended Subsec. (a)(6) by adding reference to June 1, 2022, and language re a risk protection order or investigation and making a technical change, effective June 1, 2022.

Cited. 200 C. 453; 221 C. 915; 227 C. 363; 229 C. 164; Id., 385; 231 C. 235; 234 C. 324; Id., 455; 235 C. 274; Id., 402; 238 C. 389; 242 C. 143; Id., 648; 247 C. 318. Subsec. (a)(3)(A) and Sec. 53a-223(a) are not the same offense, and conviction under both sections for the same transaction does not violate constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 307 C. 1.

Cited. 6 CA 189; 11 CA 11; 15 CA 161; Id., 342; 19 CA 48; 26 CA 367; 29 CA 207; 30 CA 249; Id., 340; 33 CA 521; 34 CA 236; 35 CA 781; 36 CA 805; 37 CA 276; 39 CA 82; 40 CA 151; 45 CA 584. Weapons possessed by convicted murderer are contraband and cannot be given away by the convicted murderer. 65 CA 360. Defendant was not entitled to jury instruction that “mere presence in the vicinity of the firearm, however, is not enough to establish possession”. 113 CA 651.

Replica antique pistol, which fired a .44 caliber ball propelled by a black powder charge, instead of a bullet from a fixed cartridge, constituted a weapon under section; defendant's claim of implicit “antique gun exception” to prohibitions of section rejected. 49 CS 248.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 228 C. 384; 241 C. 413.

Cited. 15 CA 330; Id., 749; 19 CA 576; 20 CA 137; 24 CA 685; 30 CA 26; 42 CA 768; 45 CA 390. Court upheld prior rulings that convictions under both Sec. 29-35(a) and Subdiv. (1) do not constitute double jeopardy. 83 CA 377. Fact that the weapon in evidence had a pistol grip and could not be fired from the shoulder was of no consequence because it was a weapon capable of discharging a gunshot and therefore satisfied statutory definition of firearm. 99 CA 183. Conviction under this section and Sec. 53a-223(a) did not violate constitutional protection against double jeopardy because legislature intended multiple punishments for possessing a firearm in violation of a protective order. 122 CA 399; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 1. An arraignment satisfies section's requirement for notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuance of a protective order and legislature did not intend to impose a specific requirement for an evidentiary hearing prior to such issuance. 180 CA 527. Plain and unambiguous use of the language “a firearm”, in the singular, establishes that each possession of a firearm by a convicted felon constitutes a separate, punishable violation. 197 CA 161.

Sec. 53a-217a. Criminally negligent storage of a firearm: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminally negligent storage of a firearm when such person violates the provisions of section 29-37i and a minor or, a resident of the premises who is ineligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law or who poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals, obtains the firearm and causes the injury or death of such minor, resident or any other person. For the purposes of this section, “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.

(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply if the minor obtains the firearm as a result of an unlawful entry to any premises by any person.

(P.A. 90-144, S. 2; P.A. 13-3, S. 56; P.A. 19-5, S. 3.)

History: (Revisor's note: In codifying public act 90-144 the internal reference in Subsec. (a) to “section 29-37c” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “section 29-37i” for accuracy); P.A. 13-3 amended Subsec. (a) to add provisions re injury or death caused by resident of premises who obtains firearm while ineligible to possess firearm or while posing a risk of imminent personal injury to self or others and make technical changes; P.A. 19-5 redefined “minor” in Subsec. (a).

Section not vague as applied to defendant's conduct; he cannot mount a facial challenge to the statute. 242 C. 211.

Sec. 53a-217b. Possession of a weapon on school grounds: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a weapon on school grounds when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person possesses a firearm or deadly weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, (1) in or on the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school, or (2) at a school-sponsored activity as defined in subsection (h) of section 10-233a.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the otherwise lawful possession of a firearm (1) by a person for use in a program approved by school officials in or on such school property or at such school-sponsored activity, (2) by a person in accordance with an agreement entered into between school officials and such person or such person's employer, (3) by a peace officer, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-3, while engaged in the performance of such peace officer's official duties, or (4) by a person while traversing such school property for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting or for other lawful purposes, provided such firearm is not loaded and the entry on such school property is permitted by the local or regional board of education.

(June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-1, S. 1; P.A. 93-416, S. 7; P.A. 94-221, S. 1; P.A. 98-129, S. 15; P.A. 01-84, S. 8, 26; P.A. 16-55, S. 10; P.A. 19-108, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 93-416 amended Subsecs. (a) and (c) to replace reference to offense of “possession of a firearm on school grounds” with revised name of “possession of a weapon on school grounds” due to inclusion of deadly weapon in offense in Subsec. (a); P.A. 94-221 added Subsec. (a)(2) re school-sponsored activities and amended Subsec. (b)(5) to substitute “permitted by” the board of education for “not prohibited by school officials” and, notwithstanding the provisions of Subsec. (b), provided for the prohibition by boards of education of the possession of firearms by students in or on school property or at a school-sponsored activity; P.A. 98-129 amended Subsec. (a) to add element that the person know that he is not licensed or privileged to possess a weapon on school grounds and deleted former Subsec. (b)(1) that had made provisions of Subsec. (a) inapplicable to the lawful possession of a firearm by a person holding a valid state or local permit to carry such firearm, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and deleted provision that had authorized boards of education and supervisory agents of private schools to prohibit the possession of firearms by students in or on school property or at a school-sponsored activity; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (b)(1) to exempt possession of a firearm for use in an approved program “at such school-sponsored activity” and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality in Subsecs. (a) and (b), effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 16-55 amended Subsec. (b) by adding Subdiv. (5) re motor vehicle inspector; P.A. 19-108 amended Subsec. (b) to delete reference to motor vehicle inspector, and make a technical change.

Sec. 53a-217c. Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver when such person possesses a pistol or revolver, as defined in section 29-27, and (1) has been convicted of (A) a felony committed prior to, on or after October 1, 2013, (B) a misdemeanor violation of section 21a-279 committed on or after October 1, 2015, or (C) a misdemeanor violation of section 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d committed during the preceding twenty years, (2) has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120, (3) has been discharged from custody within the preceding twenty years after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, (4) (A) has been confined prior to October 1, 2013, in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding twelve months by order of a probate court, or has been confined on or after October 1, 2013, in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding sixty months by order of a probate court, or, with respect to any person who holds a valid permit or certificate that was issued or renewed under the provisions of section 29-28 or 29-36f, in effect prior to October 1, 2013, such person has been confined in such hospital within the preceding twelve months, or (B) has been voluntarily admitted on or after October 1, 2013, to a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding six months for care and treatment of a psychiatric disability, unless the person (i) was voluntarily admitted solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person as those terms are defined in section 17a-680, or (ii) is a police officer who was voluntarily admitted and had his or her firearm, ammunition or electronic defense weapon used in the performance of the police officer's official duties returned in accordance with section 7-291d, (5) knows that such person is subject to (A) a restraining or protective order of a court of this state that has been issued against such person, after notice has been provided to such person, in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, or (B) a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, (6) knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued prior to June 1, 2022, pursuant to section 29-38c after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, or a risk protection order or risk protection investigation order issued on or after June 1, 2022, pursuant to section 29-38c, (7) is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing or receiving a firearm pursuant to 18 USC 922(g)(4), or (8) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States. For the purposes of this section, “convicted” means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver is a class C felony, for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.

(July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1, S. 3; P.A. 98-129, S. 13; P.A. 99-212, S. 21; P.A. 03-98, S. 5; P.A. 05-147, S. 5; 05-283, S. 3; P.A. 13-3, S. 45; 13-220, S. 16; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-2, S. 7; P.A. 16-34, S. 16; P.A. 19-17, S. 6; P.A. 21-67, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 98-129 added Subsec. (a)(2) prohibiting the possession of a pistol or revolver by a person who has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and replaced in Subdiv. (4) “hospital for mental illness” with “hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities”; P.A. 99-212 added Subsec. (a)(6) prohibiting the possession of a pistol or revolver by a person who knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to Sec. 29-38c(d) after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly, and made provisions gender neutral; P.A. 03-98 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(1) and replaced “protective order issued by a court” with “protective order of a court of this state”, and added provisions re foreign order of protection and re order that has been issued against such person in Subsec. (a)(5); P.A. 05-147 amended Subsec. (a)(5) to designate existing provisions re a restraining or protective order as Subpara. (A), designate existing provisions re a foreign order of protection as Subpara. (B) and amend said Subpara. (B) to delete the requirement that the foreign order of protection has been issued “after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person”; P.A. 05-283 added Subsec. (a)(7) prohibiting the possession of a pistol or revolver by a person who is prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing or receiving a firearm pursuant to 18 USC 922 (g)(4) and redesignated existing Subdiv. (7) as Subdiv. (8); P.A. 13-3 amended Subsec. (a)(4) by inserting Subpara. (A) designator, adding “prior to October 1, 2013,” re person confined in hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities within preceding 12 months by probate court order, adding provision re such confinement on or after October 1, 2013, within preceding 60 months or within preceding 12 months for person who held valid permit or certificate in effect prior to October 1, 2013, and adding Subpara. (B) re person voluntarily admitted within preceding 6 months on or after October 1, 2013, and amended Subsec. (b) to change penalty from class D felony to class C felony for which 2 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and $5,000 of the fine may not be remitted or reduced unless the court states its reasons for remitting or reducing the fine; P.A. 13-220 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to add “committed prior to, on or after October 1, 2013,” re felony and add “committed on or after October 1, 1994,” re violation of Sec. 21a-279(c), 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-2 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to replace reference to Sec. 21a-279(c) with reference to Sec. 21a-279; P.A. 16-34 amended Subsec. (a)(5)(A) by deleting “and an opportunity to be heard”; P.A. 19-17 amended Subsec. (a)(4)(B) by replacing “treatment of a psychiatric disability and not solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person” with “treatment of a psychiatric disability, unless the person (i) was voluntarily admitted solely for being an alcohol-dependent person or a drug-dependent person” and adding clause (ii) re police officer who was voluntarily admitted and had firearm, ammunition or electronic defense weapon used in performance of duties returned; P.A. 21-67 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by designating existing language re felony as Subpara. (A) and replacing “or of a violation of section 21a-279,” with “(B) a misdemeanor violation of section 21a-279 committed on or after October 1, 2015, or (C) a misdemeanor violation of section” and replacing “on or after October 1, 1994” with “during the preceding twenty years” at the end of newly designated Subpara. (C) and amended Subsec. (a)(6) by adding reference to June 1, 2022, and language re a risk protection order or investigation and making a technical change, effective June 1, 2022.

Operability of the pistol or revolver is not essential element of the offense. 59 CA 112. Where prior felony conviction formed basis of a charge under section, violation of section could not be established without presenting proof of such conviction. 64 CA 384.

Sec. 53a-217d. Criminal possession of body armor: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of body armor when he possesses body armor and has been (1) convicted of a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony, except a conviction under section 53a-196a, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86, 53a-122 or 53a-196b, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153 or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, or (2) convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “body armor” means any material designed to be worn on the body and to provide bullet penetration resistance and “convicted” means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(P.A. 98-127, S. 1; P.A. 12-5, S. 23.)

History: P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re conviction of a capital felony, effective April 25, 2012.

See Sec. 53-341b re restriction on sale or delivery of body armor.

Sec. 53a-217e. Negligent hunting. Penalties. Fines deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund. Suspension of hunting license. Forfeiture of hunting weapon. Prima facie evidence of hunting. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Criminal negligence” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-3;

(2) “Hunting” has the same meaning as provided in section 26-1;

(3) “Loaded hunting implement” means (A) a rifle or shotgun with a live round in the chamber or in a magazine which is attached to such rifle or shotgun, a muzzle-loaded firearm with the percussion cap in place, or a flintlock firearm with powder in the pan, (B) a bow and arrow with an arrow notched on the bow, (C) a drawn crossbow with a bolt in place, or (D) a high velocity air gun that is charged with a projectile in the chamber or in a magazine that is attached to such air gun; and

(4) “Serious physical injury” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-3.

(b) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the first degree when, with criminal negligence while hunting, such person discharges a loaded hunting implement and thereby causes the death of another person.

(2) Negligent hunting in the first degree is a class D felony.

(c) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the second degree when, with criminal negligence while hunting, such person violates any provision of section 26-85 or discharges a loaded hunting implement and thereby causes the serious physical injury of another person.

(2) Negligent hunting in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be fined not less than four hundred dollars.

(d) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the third degree when such person, while hunting, (A) discharges a firearm at a time of day when hunting is not permitted, (B) discharges a firearm from a vehicle, (C) hunts while the person's license to hunt is suspended, (D) hunts out of season or on a Sunday, or (E) discharges a firearm so as to cause the projectile to strike or enter into any building occupied by people or domestic animals or used for storage of flammable or combustible materials.

(2) Negligent hunting in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars.

(e) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the fourth degree when such person, while hunting, (A) hunts without purchasing a license, permit or stamp or other permission required by law, (B) is in possession of a loaded hunting implement at a time of day when hunting is not allowed, (C) hunts with or discharges a firearm less than two hundred fifty feet from any building occupied by people or domestic animals or used for storage of flammable or combustible materials, or less than one hundred twenty-five feet from any such building while hunting in tidal water areas, unless written permission of the owner of such building has been obtained, or (D) hunts from or discharges a hunting implement from or across a public highway.

(2) Negligent hunting in the fourth degree is a class C misdemeanor.

(f) Any person who is convicted of a violation of any provision of subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d within five years of a previous conviction for violation of this section shall be considered a persistent negligent hunter. Upon such second conviction within five years, a persistent negligent hunter shall be fined an amount that is not less than twice the minimum fine provided for the second violation and shall be subject to penalties provided for the next more serious degree of negligent hunting under subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d.

(g) Any fine imposed for a conviction under subsection (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d shall be deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established pursuant to section 54-215.

(h) (1) The Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection may suspend the hunting license of any person convicted under subsection (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d for: (A) Indefinitely upon conviction of negligent hunting in the first degree or upon conviction of any violation of subsection (b) of section 53-206d; (B) up to ten years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the second degree; (C) up to five years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the third degree; and (D) up to three years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the fourth degree.

(2) Any person arrested for a violation of subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d, except as provided in section 26-85 shall surrender any firearm, bow, crossbow, bolt or high velocity air gun in the person's possession while hunting at the time of the alleged violation. Such property shall be confiscated at the time of arrest by a police officer or conservation officer. Upon nolle or dismissal of charges or acquittal of such person of such violation, such property shall be returned to the person within five business days and in the same condition as when the firearm, bow, crossbow or high velocity air gun was surrendered. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 54-33g and 54-36a, the property shall be turned over to the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection upon conviction of such person for such violation. Said commissioner shall (A) retain the property for use by personnel of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, (B) convey the property to the Commissioner of Administrative Services for sale at public auction, the proceeds of which shall be credited to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established pursuant to section 54-215, or (C) destroy the property.

(i) Possession by any person of a loaded hunting implement while at or entering or leaving an area where a reasonable person would believe the objective was to take wildlife shall be prima facie evidence of hunting, except that a person may, one hour before sunrise during the regulated deer and turkey firearms hunting seasons, be in possession of a loaded rifle or shotgun, as defined in subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section, provided a live round is not in the chamber of the rifle or shotgun.

(P.A. 00-142, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-3, S. 472; P.A. 11-80, S. 1; P.A. 14-122, S. 193, 194.)

History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-3 amended Subsec. (g) by deleting provision requiring certain fines to be deposited in Conservation Fund and by making conforming changes; pursuant to P.A. 11-80, “Commissioner of Environmental Protection” and “Department of Environmental Protection” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection” and “Department of Energy and Environmental Protection”, respectively, in Subsec. (h), effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 14-122 made technical changes in Subsec. (a)(1), (2) and (4).

Sec. 53a-218. Interference with a cemetery or burial ground: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of interference with a cemetery or burial ground when such person: (1) Intentionally destroys, mutilates, defaces, injures or removes any tomb, monument, gravestone or other structure placed or designed for a memorial of the dead, or any portion or fragment of such tomb, monument, gravestone or other structure, or any fence, railing, curb or other enclosure for the burial of the dead, in or from any cemetery or burial ground that is (A) an abandoned cemetery, as defined in section 19a-308a, or (B) a cemetery or burial ground other than an abandoned cemetery and such person takes any such action without authorization of the owner of the burial lot, or a lineal descendant of the deceased, or of the municipality, cemetery association or person or authority responsible for the control or management of the cemetery or burial ground; or (2) wantonly or maliciously disturbs the contents of any tomb or grave in any cemetery or burial ground that is (A) an abandoned cemetery, as defined in section 19a-308a, or (B) a cemetery or burial ground other than an abandoned cemetery and such person takes any such action without authorization of the owner of the burial lot, or a lineal descendant of the deceased, or of the municipality, cemetery association or person or authority responsible for the control or management of the cemetery or burial ground.

(b) Interference with a cemetery or burial ground is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars.

(P.A. 84-280, S. 4; P.A. 89-109; P.A. 96-209, S. 2; P.A. 17-49, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 89-109 established a minimum fine of $500; P.A. 96-209 amended Subsec. (b) by changing penalty from class D to class C felony; P.A. 17-49 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subpara. (A) re abandoned cemeteries and designating existing provision re action without authorization of owner or lineal descendant applicable to cemeteries and burial grounds other than an abandoned cemetery as Subpara. (B), and making technical and conforming changes.

Sec. 53a-219. Unlawful possession or sale of gravestones: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of the unlawful possession or sale of gravestones when he possesses or sells, offers for sale or attempts to sell or transfers or disposes of any monument, gravestone or other structure placed or designed for a memorial of the dead, or any portion or fragment thereof, knowing that it has been unlawfully removed from a cemetery or burial ground.

(b) Unlawful possession or sale of gravestones is a class D felony.

(P.A. 84-280, S. 5.)

Sec. 53a-220. Interference with a memorial plaque: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of interference with a memorial plaque when he, without authorization of the governmental body responsible for the placement, control or maintenance of a memorial plaque, intentionally defaces, mutilates or destroys a plaque commemorating a person or an event, or removes such a plaque from its official location.

(b) Interference with a memorial plaque is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 91-173, S. 1.)

Sec. 53a-221. Unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a memorial plaque: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of the unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a memorial plaque when he possesses or purchases or attempts to purchase or sells, offers for sale or attempts to sell or transfers or disposes of a plaque commemorating a person or an event knowing that it has been unlawfully removed from its official location.

(b) Unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a memorial plaque is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 91-173, S. 2.)

Sec. 53a-221a. Interference with a war or veterans' memorial or monument: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of interference with a war or veterans' memorial or monument when such person, without authorization of the government body or veterans' organization responsible for the placement, control or maintenance of a war or veterans' memorial or monument, intentionally defaces, mutilates or destroys such memorial or monument, or removes such memorial or monument, or any part thereof, from its official location.

(b) Interference with a war or veterans' memorial or monument is a class D felony and any person found guilty under subsection (a) of this section shall be fined five thousand dollars.

(P.A. 12-38, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 12-38 effective May 14, 2012.

Sec. 53a-221b. Unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a war or veterans' memorial or monument: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of the unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a war or veterans' memorial or monument when such person possesses or purchases or attempts to purchase or sells, offers for sale or attempts to sell, or transfers or disposes of a war or veterans' memorial or monument, or any part thereof, knowing that it has been unlawfully removed from its official location.

(b) Unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a war or veterans' memorial or monument is a class D felony and any person found guilty under subsection (a) of this section shall be fined five thousand dollars.

(P.A. 12-38, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 12-38 effective May 14, 2012.

Sec. 53a-222. Violation of conditions of release in the first degree: Class D or Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of violation of conditions of release in the first degree when, while charged with the commission of a felony, such person is released pursuant to subsection (b) of section 54-63c, subsection (c) of section 54-63d or subsection (c) of section 54-64a, and intentionally violates one or more of the imposed conditions of release.

(b) Violation of conditions of release in the first degree is a class D felony, except that any violation of conditions of release that involve (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of a person in violation of the conditions of release, or (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking a person in violation of the conditions of release is a class C felony.

(P.A. 98-90, S. 1; P.A. 99-186, S. 10; P.A. 07-123, S. 3; P.A. 17-31, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec. (a) to revise a statutory reference and make provisions gender neutral; P.A. 07-123 renamed offense by replacing “violation of conditions of release” with “violation of conditions of release in the first degree”, amended Subsec. (a) to delete provision making offense applicable to a person charged with a “misdemeanor or motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed”, include a person released pursuant to Sec. 54-63c(b), delete provision that person be released “on the condition that such person (1) avoid all contact with the alleged victim or (2) not use or possess a dangerous weapon” and require that person intentionally violate “one or more of the imposed conditions of release”, rather than “that condition”, and amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 17-31 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re class C felony when violation of conditions of release involve imposing restraint upon person or liberty of person, or threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking person.

Sec. 53a-222a. Violation of conditions of release in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor or Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of violation of conditions of release in the second degree when, while charged with the commission of a misdemeanor or motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed, such person is released pursuant to subsection (b) of section 54-63c, subsection (c) of section 54-63d or subsection (c) of section 54-64a and intentionally violates one or more of the imposed conditions of release.

(b) Violation of conditions of release in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, except that any violation of conditions of release that involve (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of a person in violation of the conditions of release, or (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking a person in violation of the conditions of release is a class D felony.

(P.A. 07-123, S. 4; P.A. 17-31, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 17-31 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re class D felony when violation of conditions of release involve imposing restraint upon person or liberty of person, or threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking person.

Sec. 53a-223. (Formerly Sec. 53a-110b). Criminal violation of a protective order: Class D or class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal violation of a protective order when an order issued pursuant to subsection (e) of section 46b-38c, subsection (f) of section 53a-28, or section 54-1k or 54-82r has been issued against such person, and such person violates such order.

(b) No person who is listed as a protected person in such protective order may be criminally liable for (1) soliciting, requesting, commanding, importuning or intentionally aiding in the violation of the protective order pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-8, or (2) conspiracy to violate such protective order pursuant to section 53a-48.

(c) Criminal violation of a protective order is a class D felony, except that any violation of a protective order that involves (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of a person in violation of the protective order, or (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking a person in violation of the protective order is a class C felony.

(P.A. 91-381, S. 1; P.A. 95-214, S. 5; P.A. 99-240, S. 4; P.A. 02-127, S. 3; P.A. 11-152, S. 11; P.A. 14-173, S. 5; 14-217, S. 122.)

History: P.A. 95-214 amended Subsec. (a) to include a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-1k; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (a) to include a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-82r; Sec. 53a-110b transferred to Sec. 53a-223 in 2001; P.A. 02-127 amended Subsec. (b) to change the classification of the offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 11-152 added new Subsec. (b) to provide that no protected person may be criminally liable for specified offenses and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 14-173 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 53a-28(f); P.A. 14-217 amended Subsec. (c) to add provision re class C felony when violation involves imposing restraint upon the person or liberty of a person, or threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking a person in violation of protective order, effective January 1, 2015.

Annotations to former section 53a-110b:

Section, as amended by P.A. 99-240, does not provide that validity of underlying protective order is a necessary element of offense. 273 C. 418.

Cited. 46 CA 661. Criminal violation of a protective order pursuant to section and harassment in the second degree pursuant to Sec. 53a-183(a)(3) constitute separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 61 CA 118.

Annotations to present section:

Crime requires only a showing of general intent and jury could reasonably infer from circumstantial evidence that defendant had intent to violate protective order and direct evidence of intent was not required. 280 C. 69.

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had actual notice of the protective order where defendant had admitted he knew he was not supposed to be near complainant and there was testimony re standard courtroom procedure of explaining the terms of the order and giving a copy to defendant; court did not need to decide whether actual notice is an implicit element of section. 159 CA 598.

Subsec. (a):

Subsec. and Sec. 53a-217(a)(3)(A) are not the same offense, and conviction under both sections for the same transaction does not violate constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 307 C. 1.

Conviction under this section and Sec. 53a-107(a)(2) did not violate constitutional protection against double jeopardy because legislature intended multiple punishments for offense of trespassing in violation of a protective order. 97 CA 72. Conviction under this Subsec. and Sec. 53a-217(a)(3)(A) did not violate constitutional protection against double jeopardy because legislature intended multiple punishments for possessing a firearm in violation of a protective order. 122 CA 399; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 1.

Sec. 53a-223a. (Formerly Sec. 53a-110c). Criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order: Class D or class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order when an order issued pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-40e has been issued against such person, and such person violates such order.

(b) No person who is listed as a protected person in such standing criminal protective order may be criminally liable for (1) soliciting, requesting, commanding, importuning or intentionally aiding in the violation of the standing criminal protective order pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-8, or (2) conspiracy to violate such standing criminal protective order pursuant to section 53a-48.

(c) Criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order is a class D felony, except that any violation that involves (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of a person in violation of the standing criminal protective order, or (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking a person in violation of the standing criminal protective order is a class C felony.

(P.A. 96-228, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 37, 121; P.A. 10-144, S. 6; P.A. 11-152, S. 12; P.A. 14-217, S. 123.)

History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 24, 1998; Sec. 53a-110c transferred to Sec. 53a-223a in 2001; P.A. 10-144 substituted “standing criminal protective order” for “standing criminal restraining order”; P.A. 11-152 added new Subsec. (b) to provide that no protected person may be criminally liable for specified offenses and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 14-217 amended Subsec. (c) to add provision re class C felony when violation involves imposing restraint upon the person or liberty of a person, or threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking a person in violation of standing criminal protective order, effective January 1, 2015.

Use of the word “involves” in Subsec. (c) indicates that unit of prosecution is on a transactional basis and section permits criminal liability for each discrete act in violation of a restraining order. 337 C. 92.

Sec. 53a-223b. Criminal violation of a restraining order: Class D or class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal violation of a restraining order when (1) (A) a restraining order has been issued against such person pursuant to section 46b-15, or (B) a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another, and (2) such person, having knowledge of the terms of the order, (A) does not stay away from a person or place in violation of the order, (B) contacts a person in violation of the order, (C) imposes any restraint upon the person or liberty of a person in violation of the order, or (D) threatens, harasses, assaults, molests, sexually assaults or attacks a person in violation of the order.

(b) No person who is listed as a protected person in such restraining order or foreign order of protection may be criminally liable for (1) soliciting, requesting, commanding, importuning or intentionally aiding in the violation of the restraining order or foreign order of protection pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-8, or (2) conspiracy to violate such restraining order or foreign order of protection pursuant to section 53a-48.

(c) No person who is listed as a respondent in a restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or a foreign order of protection issued pursuant to section 46b-15a and against whom there is an order of no contact with the protected party or parties may be criminally liable for a violation of such order if such person causes a document filed in a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1, to be served on the protected party or parties in accordance with the law by mail or through a third party who is authorized by statute to serve process.

(d) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, criminal violation of a restraining order is a class D felony.

(2) Criminal violation of a restraining order is a class C felony if the offense is a violation of subparagraph (C) or (D) of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section.

(P.A. 02-127, S. 1; P.A. 03-98, S. 6; P.A. 05-147, S. 6; P.A. 11-152, S. 13; P.A. 14-217, S. 124; P.A. 15-85, S. 17.)

History: P.A. 03-98 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provisions re foreign order of protection issued after notice and opportunity to be heard in a case involving use of physical force and making technical changes; P.A. 05-147 amended Subsec. (a)(1)(B) to delete the requirement that the foreign order of protection has been issued “after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person” and amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 11-152 added new Subsec. (b) to provide that no protected person may be criminally liable for specified offenses and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 14-217 amended Subsec. (c) to designate existing provision re class D felony as Subdiv. (1) and amend same to add “Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection,” add Subdiv. (2) re when criminal violation of a restraining order is class C felony, and make a technical change, effective January 1, 2015; P.A. 15-85 added new Subsec. (c) re restraining order respondent not criminally liable for violation of order if respondent causes document filed in family relations matter to be served on protected party in accordance with law and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d).

Not unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would have ample warning that terms “stay away from” and “contacts” prohibit distinct conduct; violation of either Subdiv. (1) or (2) of Subsec. (a) requires proof of an element that the other does not and therefore violation is two separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 97 CA 332. Section is not a specific intent crime, and all that is necessary is a general intent that defendant intended to perform the activities that constituted the violation. 151 CA 527.

Sec. 53a-223c. Criminal violation of a civil protection order: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal violation of a civil protection order when (1) a civil protection order has been issued against such person pursuant to section 46b-16a, and (2) such person, having knowledge of the terms of the order, violates such order.

(b) No person who is listed as a respondent in a civil protection order issued pursuant to section 46b-16a may be criminally liable for a violation of such order if such person causes a legal document to be served on the protected person by mail or through a third party in accordance with the law. For purposes of this subsection, “legal document” includes, but is not limited to, a notice of appearance or any other application, petition, or motion filed in good faith by such person in connection with any pending court matter, or in any court matter that may be brought subsequently.

(P.A. 14-217, S. 187; P.A. 15-85, S. 18.)

History: P.A. 14-217 effective January 1, 2015; P.A. 15-85 added new Subsec. (b) re civil protection order respondent not criminally liable for violation of order if respondent causes legal document to be served on protected party in accordance with law, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c).

Sec. 53a-224. Recruiting a member of a criminal gang: Class A misdemeanor. (a) For the purposes of this section: (1) “Criminal gang” means a formal or informal organization, association or group of three or more persons that has: (A) As one of its primary activities the commission of one or more criminal acts; (B) members who individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in one or more criminal acts; and (C) an identifying name, sign or symbol, or an identifiable leadership or hierarchy; and (2) “criminal act” means conduct constituting a felony, as defined in section 53a-25, or a misdemeanor, as defined in section 53a-26, other than a violation of this section.

(b) A person is guilty of recruiting a member of a criminal gang when, with knowledge that membership or continued membership in such criminal gang is conditioned upon the commission of a criminal act, or with intent to facilitate the criminal acts of such criminal gang, such person knowingly causes, encourages, solicits, recruits, intimidates or coerces a person under eighteen years of age to join, participate in or remain a member of such criminal gang.

(P.A. 13-302, S. 1.)

Sec. 53a-225. Enticing a juvenile to commit a criminal act: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony. (a) For purposes of this section, “criminal act” means criminal act, as defined in section 53a-224.

(b) A person is guilty of enticing a juvenile to commit a criminal act if such person is twenty-three years of age or older and knowingly causes, encourages, solicits, recruits, intimidates or coerces a person under eighteen years of age to commit or participate in the commission of a criminal act.

(c) Enticing a juvenile to commit a criminal act is a (1) class A misdemeanor for first offense, and (2) class D felony for any subsequent offense.

(P.A. 21-33, S. 12.)

Secs. 53a-226 to 53a-249. Reserved for future use.

PART XXII*

COMPUTER-RELATED OFFENSES

*See Sec. 53-451 et seq. re computer crimes.

Sec. 53a-250. Definitions. For the purposes of this part and section 52-570b:

(1) “Access” means to instruct, communicate with, store data in or retrieve data from a computer, computer system or computer network.

(2) “Computer” means a programmable, electronic device capable of accepting and processing data.

(3) “Computer network” means (A) a set of related devices connected to a computer by communications facilities, or (B) a complex of two or more computers, including related devices, connected by communications facilities.

(4) “Computer program” means a set of instructions, statements or related data that, in actual or modified form, is capable of causing a computer or computer system to perform specified functions.

(5) “Computer services” includes, but is not limited to, computer access, data processing and data storage.

(6) “Computer software” means one or more computer programs, existing in any form, or any associated operational procedures, manuals or other documentation.

(7) “Computer system” means a computer, its software, related equipment, communications facilities, if any, and includes computer networks.

(8) “Data” means information of any kind in any form, including computer software.

(9) “Person” means a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association and any other legal or governmental entity, including any state or municipal entity or public official.

(10) “Private personal data” means data concerning a natural person which a reasonable person would want to keep private and which is protectable under law.

(11) “Property” means anything of value, including data.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 1; P.A. 95-79, S. 183, 189.)

History: P.A. 95-79 redefined “person” to include a limited liability company, effective May 31, 1995.

See Sec. 53-451 re computer crimes.

Sec. 53a-251. Computer crime. (a) Defined. A person commits computer crime when he violates any of the provisions of this section.

(b) Unauthorized access to a computer system. (1) A person is guilty of the computer crime of unauthorized access to a computer system when, knowing that he is not authorized to do so, he accesses or causes to be accessed any computer system without authorization.

(2) It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution for unauthorized access to a computer system that: (A) The person reasonably believed that the owner of the computer system, or a person empowered to license access thereto, had authorized him to access; (B) the person reasonably believed that the owner of the computer system, or a person empowered to license access thereto, would have authorized him to access without payment of any consideration; or (C) the person reasonably could not have known that his access was unauthorized.

(c) Theft of computer services. A person is guilty of the computer crime of theft of computer services when he accesses or causes to be accessed or otherwise uses or causes to be used a computer system with the intent to obtain unauthorized computer services.

(d) Interruption of computer services. A person is guilty of the computer crime of interruption of computer services when he, without authorization, intentionally or recklessly disrupts or degrades or causes the disruption or degradation of computer services or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user of a computer system.

(e) Misuse of computer system information. A person is guilty of the computer crime of misuse of computer system information when: (1) As a result of his accessing or causing to be accessed a computer system, he intentionally makes or causes to be made an unauthorized display, use, disclosure or copy, in any form, of data residing in, communicated by or produced by a computer system; or (2) he intentionally or recklessly and without authorization (A) alters, deletes, tampers with, damages, destroys or takes data intended for use by a computer system, whether residing within or external to a computer system, or (B) intercepts or adds data to data residing within a computer system; or (3) he knowingly receives or retains data obtained in violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection; or (4) he uses or discloses any data he knows or believes was obtained in violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection.

(f) Destruction of computer equipment. A person is guilty of the computer crime of destruction of computer equipment when he, without authorization, intentionally or recklessly tampers with, takes, transfers, conceals, alters, damages or destroys any equipment used in a computer system or intentionally or recklessly causes any of the foregoing to occur.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 2.)

See Sec. 53-451 re computer crimes.

See Sec. 53a-301 re computer crime in furtherance of terrorist purposes.

Cited. 49 CA 582.

Sec. 53a-252. Computer crime in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the first degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and the damage to or the value of the property or computer services exceeds ten thousand dollars.

(b) Computer crime in the first degree is a class B felony.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 3.)

Sec. 53a-253. Computer crime in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the second degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and the damage to or the value of the property or computer services exceeds five thousand dollars.

(b) Computer crime in the second degree is a class C felony.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 4.)

Sec. 53a-254. Computer crime in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the third degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and (1) the damage to or the value of the property or computer services exceeds one thousand dollars or (2) he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person.

(b) Computer crime in the third degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 5.)

Sec. 53a-255. Computer crime in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the fourth degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and the damage to or the value of the property or computer services exceeds five hundred dollars.

(b) Computer crime in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 6.)

Sec. 53a-256. Computer crime in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the fifth degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and the damage to or the value of the property or computer services, if any, is five hundred dollars or less.

(b) Computer crime in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 7.)

Sec. 53a-257. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained money, property or services or other consideration through the commission of any offense under section 53a-251, upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing a fine, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of such offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For the purpose of this section, “gain” means the amount of money or the value of property or computer services or other consideration derived.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 8.)

Sec. 53a-258. Determination of degree of crime. Amounts included in violations of section 53a-251 committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the degree of the crime.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 9.)

Sec. 53a-259. Value of property or computer services. (a) For the purposes of this part and section 52-570b, the value of property or computer services shall be: (1) The market value of the property or computer services at the time of the violation; or (2) if the property or computer services are unrecoverable, damaged or destroyed as a result of a violation of section 53a-251, the cost of reproducing or replacing the property or computer services at the time of the violation.

(b) When the value of the property or computer services or damage thereto cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the value shall be deemed to be two hundred fifty dollars.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the value of private personal data shall be deemed to be one thousand five hundred dollars.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 10.)

Sec. 53a-260. Location of offense. (a) In any prosecution for a violation of section 53a-251, the offense shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the act occurred or in which the computer system or part thereof involved in the violation was located.

(b) In any prosecution for a violation of section 53a-251 based upon more than one act in violation thereof, the offense shall be deemed to have been committed in any of the towns in which any of the acts occurred or in which a computer system or part thereof involved in a violation was located.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 11.)

Sec. 53a-261. Jurisdiction. If any act performed in furtherance of the offenses set out in section 53a-251 occurs in this state or if any computer system or part thereof accessed in violation of section 53a-251 is located in this state, the offense shall be deemed to have occurred in this state.

(P.A. 84-206, S. 12.)

Sec. 53a-262. Computer extortion by use of ransomware: Class E felony. (a) A person is guilty of computer extortion by use of ransomware, when such person (1) introduces ransomware into any computer, computer system or computer network, and (2) demands payment of money or other consideration to remove the ransomware, restore access to the computer, computer system, computer network or data contained on such computer, computer system or computer network, or otherwise remediate the impact of the ransomware.

(b) Computer extortion by use of ransomware is a class E felony.

(c) For purposes of this section, “ransomware” means any computer contaminant or lock placed or introduced without authorization into a computer, computer system or computer network that restricts access by an authorized person to the computer, computer system, computer network, or any data held by the computer, computer system or computer network, but does not include authentication required to upgrade or access purchased content or the blocking of access to subscription content in the case of nonpayment for such access, and “computer contaminant” means any set of computer instructions that are designed to modify, damage, destroy, record or transmit data held by a computer, computer system or computer network without the intent or permission of the owner of the data.

(P.A. 17-223, S. 1.)

Secs. 53a-263 to 53a-274. Reserved for future use.

PART XXIII

MONEY LAUNDERING

Sec. 53a-275. Money laundering. Definitions. For the purposes of this section and sections 53a-276 to 53a-282, inclusive:

(1) “Monetary instrument” means coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, negotiable investment securities or negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.

(2) “Equivalent property” means property that may be readily converted into, or exchanged for, United States or foreign currency or coin, including gold, silver or platinum bullion or coins, diamonds, emeralds, rubies, sapphires or other precious stones, stamps or airline tickets, or any other property that is intended to be so converted or exchanged.

(3) “Felony” means a felony under the laws of this state or a criminal offense committed in another jurisdiction punishable under the laws of that jurisdiction by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

(4) “Exchange”, in addition to its ordinary meaning, means purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, deposit, withdrawal or extension of credit.

(P.A. 87-373, S. 5.)

Sec. 53a-276. Money laundering in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of money laundering in the first degree when he exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments derived from criminal conduct constituting a felony and of a total value exceeding ten thousand dollars, for one or more other monetary instruments or equivalent property, with the intent to conceal that the exchanged monetary instrument or instruments or equivalent property is derived in whole or in part from the criminal sale of a controlled substance or with the intent that the exchange aid a person in the criminal sale of a controlled substance or to profit or benefit from the criminal sale of a controlled substance.

(b) Money laundering in the first degree is a class B felony.

(P.A. 87-373, S. 6.)

Sec. 53a-277. Money laundering in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of money laundering in the second degree when he exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments derived from criminal conduct constituting a felony and of a total value exceeding ten thousand dollars, for one or more other monetary instruments or equivalent property, with intent to conceal that the exchanged monetary instrument or instruments or equivalent property is derived from any criminal activity or with intent that the exchange aid a person to commit criminal conduct or to profit or benefit from the commission of a crime.

(b) Money laundering in the second degree is a class C felony.

(P.A. 87-373, S. 7.)

Sec. 53a-278. Money laundering in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of money laundering in the third degree when he exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments derived from criminal conduct constituting a felony and of a total value exceeding ten thousand dollars, for one or more other monetary instruments or equivalent property, with knowledge that the exchange will conceal that the exchanged monetary instrument or instruments or equivalent property is derived from any criminal activity, or with knowledge that the exchange will aid a person to engage in or to profit or benefit from any criminal activity.

(b) Money laundering in the third degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 87-373, S. 8.)

Sec. 53a-279. Money laundering in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of money laundering in the fourth degree when he exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments derived from criminal conduct constituting a felony for one or more other monetary instruments or equivalent property, with knowledge that the exchange will conceal that the exchanged monetary instrument or instruments or equivalent property is derived from any criminal activity, or with knowledge that the exchange will aid a person to engage in or to profit or benefit from criminal activity.

(b) Money laundering in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 87-373, S. 9.)

Sec. 53a-280. Money laundering. Alternative fine. In lieu of the fine authorized under section 53a-41 or 53a-42, and in addition to any fine authorized by section 53a-44, any person who violates section 53a-276, 53a-277 or 53a-278 shall be fined, for a first offense, not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, or twice the value of the criminally derived monetary instrument or instruments, whichever is greater, and for a second or subsequent offense, not more than five hundred thousand dollars or five times the value of the criminally derived monetary instruments, whichever is greater.

(P.A. 87-373, S. 10.)

Sec. 53a-281. Money laundering. Corporate fines. Any corporation which violates section 53a-276, 53a-277 or 53a-278 shall be fined, for a first offense, not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars or twice the value of the criminally derived monetary instrument or instruments, whichever is greater, and for a second or subsequent offense, not more than five hundred thousand dollars or five times the value of the criminally derived monetary instruments, whichever is greater.

(P.A. 87-373, S. 11.)

Sec. 53a-282. Money laundering. Presumptions. (a) A person who pays or receives substantially less than face value for one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity is presumed to know that the monetary instrument or instruments are derived from criminal activity.

(b) A person who engages in a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, knowing or believing that such instrument or instruments, or the instrument or instruments or equivalent property exchanged for such criminally derived instruments, bear fictitious names, is presumed to know that the monetary instrument or instruments derived from criminal activity are in fact so derived.

(c) A person who fails to record or report a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, in circumstances under which such recording or reporting is either required by law or is in the ordinary course of business, is presumed to know that the monetary instrument or instruments are derived from criminal activity.

(d) A person who engages in a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, knowing that the physical condition or form of the monetary instrument or instruments makes it apparent that they are not the product of bona fide business or financial transactions, is presumed to know that they are derived from criminal activity.

(P.A. 87-373, S. 12.)

Secs. 53a-283 to 53a-289. Reserved for future use.

PART XXIV

VENDOR FRAUD

Sec. 53a-290. “Vendor fraud” defined. A person commits vendor fraud when, with intent to defraud and acting on such person's own behalf or on behalf of an entity, such person provides goods or services to a beneficiary under sections 17b-22, 17b-75 to 17b-77, inclusive, 17b-79 to 17b-103, inclusive, 17b-180a, 17b-183, 17b-260 to 17b-262, inclusive, 17b-264 to 17b-285, inclusive, 17b-357 to 17b-361, inclusive, 17b-600 to 17b-604, inclusive, 17b-749, 17b-807 and 17b-808 or provides services to a recipient under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as amended, and, (1) presents for payment any false claim for goods or services performed; (2) accepts payment for goods or services performed, which exceeds either the amounts due for goods or services performed, or the amounts authorized by law for the cost of such goods or services; (3) solicits to perform services for or sell goods to any such beneficiary, knowing that such beneficiary is not in need of such goods or services; (4) sells goods to or performs services for any such beneficiary without prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, when prior authorization is required by said department for the buying of such goods or the performance of any service; (5) accepts from any person or source other than the state an additional compensation in excess of the amount authorized by law; or (6) having knowledge of the occurrence of any event affecting (A) his or her initial or continued right to any such benefit or payment, or (B) the initial or continued right to any such benefit or payment of any other individual in whose behalf he or she has applied for or is receiving such benefit or payment, conceals or fails to disclose such event with an intent to fraudulently secure such benefit or payment either in a greater amount or quantity than is due or when no such benefit or payment is authorized.

(P.A. 96-169, S. 3; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 00-2, S. 25, 53; P.A. 05-280, S. 27; P.A. 21-102, S. 7.)

History: (Revisor's note: In 1997, the phrase “17b-180 to 17b-183, inclusive,” was replaced editorially by the Revisors with “17b-180a, 17b-183,” to reflect the repeal of Secs. 17b-180, 17b-181 and 17b-182); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 00-2 deleted reference to Sec. 17b-114, added reference to Sec. 17b-749 and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2000; P.A. 05-280 substituted “17b-361” for “17b-362” as Sec. 17b-362 was repealed by the same act, effective July 1, 2005; P.A. 21-102 added Subdiv. (6) re knowledge of event affecting initial or continued right to benefit or payment.

Sec. 53a-291. Vendor fraud in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the first degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of ten thousand dollars.

(b) Vendor fraud in the first degree is a class B felony.

(P.A. 96-169, S. 4.)

Sec. 53a-292. Vendor fraud in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the second degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of five thousand dollars.

(b) Vendor fraud in the second degree is a class C felony.

(P.A. 96-169, S. 5.)

Sec. 53a-293. Vendor fraud in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the third degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of one thousand dollars.

(b) Vendor fraud in the third degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 96-169, S. 6.)

Sec. 53a-294. Vendor fraud in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the fourth degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of five hundred dollars.

(b) Vendor fraud in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 96-169, S. 7.)

Sec. 53a-295. Vendor fraud in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the fifth degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of two hundred fifty dollars.

(b) Vendor fraud in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.

(P.A. 96-169, S. 8.)

Sec. 53a-296. Vendor fraud in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the sixth degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in an amount of two hundred fifty dollars or less.

(b) Vendor fraud in the sixth degree is a class C misdemeanor.

(P.A. 96-169, S. 9.)

Secs. 53a-297 to 53a-299. Reserved for future use.

PART XXV

TERRORISM

Sec. 53a-300. Act of terrorism. Enhanced sentence. (a) A person is guilty of an act of terrorism when such person, with intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or a unit of government, commits a felony involving the unlawful use or threatened use of physical force or violence.

(b) When any person has been found guilty of an act of terrorism, the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.

(P.A. 02-97, S. 1; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 11.)

History: Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (b) to delete requirement for imposition of enhanced sentence that “the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest”, effective January 25, 2008.

Sec. 53a-301. Computer crime in furtherance of terrorist purposes: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in furtherance of terrorist purposes when such person, with intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or a unit of government, commits computer crime, as defined in section 53a-251, or commits a violation of any provision of section 53-451.

(b) Computer crime in furtherance of terrorist purposes is a class B felony and, if such offense is directed against any public agency, as defined in section 1-200, that is charged with the protection of public safety, five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 02-97, S. 9.)

Sec. 53a-302. Criminal misrepresentation: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal misrepresentation when such person, with intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or a unit of government and with respect to any criminal matter under investigation by an agency or official of the state or any political subdivision of the state, knowingly and wilfully (1) falsifies, conceals or covers up a material fact by any trick, scheme or device, (2) makes any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation, or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, and such act materially impairs such investigation.

(b) Criminal misrepresentation is a class C felony.

(P.A. 02-97, S. 10.)

See Sec. 53a-165aa re hindering prosecution in the first degree.

Sec. 53a-303. Contaminating a public water supply or food supply for terrorist purposes: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of contaminating a public water supply or food supply for terrorist purposes when such person, with intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or a unit of government, introduces a hazardous substance into (1) any storage reservoir or distribution reservoir, as those terms are defined in section 25-43, or any lake or pond, or any stream tributary thereto, that is used for supplying the inhabitants of a town, city or borough with water, or (2) any source or supply of food, as defined in section 21a-92, that is intended for human consumption.

(c) Contaminating a public water supply or food supply for terrorist purposes is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 02-97, S. 8.)

Sec. 53a-304. Damage to public transportation property for terrorist purposes: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of damage to public transportation property for terrorist purposes when such person, with intent to cause damage to bus, railroad or other public transportation property or to cause an interruption or impairment of transportation service rendered to the public, and with intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or a unit of government, damages such property or tampers with such property and thereby causes such property to be placed in danger of damage.

(b) Damage to public transportation property for terrorist purposes is a class C felony.

(P.A. 02-97, S. 7.)

Secs. 53a-305 to 53a-319. Reserved for future use.

PART XXVI

ABUSE OF ELDERLY, BLIND OR DISABLED PERSONS OR PERSONS
WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

Sec. 53a-320. Definitions. For the purposes of sections 53a-320 to 53a-323, inclusive:

(1) “Person” means any natural person, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, unincorporated business or other business entity;

(2) “Elderly person” means any person who is sixty years of age or older;

(3) “Blind person” means any person who is blind, as defined in section 1-1f;

(4) “Disabled person” means any person who is physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f;

(5) “Person with intellectual disability” means any person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g;

(6) “Abuse” means any repeated act or omission that causes physical injury or serious physical injury to an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability, except when (A) the act or omission is a part of the treatment and care, and in furtherance of the health and safety, of the elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability, or (B) the act or omission is based upon the instructions, wishes, consent, refusal to consent or revocation of consent of an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability, or the legal representative of an incapable elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability. For purposes of this subdivision, “repeated” means an act or omission that occurs on two or more occasions;

(7) “Intentionally” means “intentionally” as defined in subdivision (11) of section 53a-3;

(8) “Knowingly” means “knowingly” as defined in subdivision (12) of section 53a-3;

(9) “Recklessly” means “recklessly” as defined in subdivision (13) of section 53a-3;

(10) “Physical injury” means “physical injury” as defined in subdivision (3) of section 53a-3; and

(11) “Serious physical injury” means “serious physical injury” as defined in subdivision (4) of section 53a-3.

(P.A. 03-267, S. 6; P.A. 04-257, S. 111; P.A. 11-129, S. 15.)

History: P.A. 04-257 made a technical change, effective June 14, 2004; P.A. 11-129 amended Subdivs. (5) and (6) to substitute “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and “person with mental retardation” and make conforming changes.

Sec. 53a-321. Abuse in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of abuse in the first degree when such person intentionally commits abuse of an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability and causes serious physical injury to such elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability.

(b) Abuse in the first degree is a class C felony.

(P.A. 03-267, S. 7; P.A. 04-257, S. 89; P.A. 11-129, S. 16.)

History: P.A. 04-257 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 14, 2004; P.A. 11-129 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and make conforming changes.

Sec. 53a-322. Abuse in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of abuse in the second degree when such person: (1) Intentionally commits abuse of an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability and causes physical injury to such elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability, or (2) knowingly commits abuse of an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability and causes serious physical injury to such elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability.

(b) Abuse in the second degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 03-267, S. 8; P.A. 11-129, S. 17.)

History: P.A. 11-129 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and make conforming changes.

Sec. 53a-323. Abuse in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of abuse in the third degree when such person (1) knowingly commits abuse of an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability and causes physical injury to such elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability, or (2) recklessly commits abuse of an elderly, blind or disabled person or a person with intellectual disability and causes physical injury to such elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability.

(b) Abuse in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 03-267, S. 9; P.A. 11-129, S. 18.)

History: P.A. 11-129 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and make conforming changes.