Local security governance in Libya

Perceptions of security and protection in a fragmented country

Floor El Kamouni-Janssen
Hamzeh Shadeedi
Nancy Ezzeddine

CRU-Report

Clingendael
Netherlands Institute of International Relations

Local security governance in Libya

Perceptions of security and protection
in a fragmented country

Floor El Kamouni-Janssen
Hamzeh Shadeedi
Nancy Ezzeddine

About the authors

Floor El Kamouni–Janssen is a Research Fellow at the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. Floor's research concentrates on security and stability in the Arab region, and specifically the political economy of Libya. In her work she focuses on the policy implications of regional trends and developments including migration and human smuggling, armed group dynamics, and violent extremism.

Hamzeh Shadeedi is a Research Assistant at the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. In this capacity, he focuses on local governance and security settlements in Libya. He also has an interest in security dynamics, political settlements and culture in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.

Nancy Ezzeddine is a Research Assistant at the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. She primarily contributes to the Levant research programme, seeking to identify the origins and functions of hybrid security arrangements and their influence on state performance and development. Nancy's research is characterized by a mixed-methods approach, involving both qualitative and quantitative analysis.

The Clingendael Institute
P.O. Box 93080
2509 AB The Hague
The Netherlands

Follow us on social media
 @clingendaelorg
 The Clingendael Institute
 The Clingendael Institute

Email: cru@clingendael.org
Website: www.clingendael.org/cru

Contents

Acknowledgement

Executive summary

Libya currently has no central government that is legitimate, effective or both. As a result, alternative informal power settlements have taken shape across the country, and these have begun to provide core government functions. In many areas in Libya, the 'state' is present through its formal institutions, but has to share authority, legitimacy and capacity with informal power brokers such as tribal elders, military councils and militias.

This research presented in this report focuses on local security governance in Libya, which is in the hands of a mix of political, armed and social actors with distinctive roots and interests and with various levels of authority, legitimacy and effectiveness. It specifically looks at how protection and security are organized, and by whom. More than an analysis of local actors and their relationship with the central state, this report offers an exploration of citizens' experiences and perceptions of local security provision. To grasp such perspectives, the report is based on a household survey on safety and security conducted in various municipalities in Libya.

The survey results demonstrate the need to stretch the understanding of how local governance functions beyond formal institutions. A majority of the 144 respondents says that *local* actors provide security in their municipality, not national ones like the governments in Tripoli and Tobruk. Moreover, security is provided by a combination of formal actors, like security directorates, as well as informal ones, like tribes. Many respondents also say that armed groups are most powerful, and sometimes necessary for protection, but that does not earn armed groups much legitimacy. Instead, respondents overwhelmingly say that formal bodies, like the municipal council and security directorates, are considered most legitimate. Tribes are also trusted as a backstop safety net, particularly in municipalities with homogenous power structures.

The report therefore emphasizes that, in order to be effective and conflict-sensitive, any policy and programming in Libya requires up-to-date knowledge of local power arrangements and the political economies in which programmes are implemented. Besides formal bodies, trusted informal security providers should be taken into account as well, particularly when they work with municipal councils. It is advisable that the international community holds on to its commitment to engage with democratically elected civilian bodies and focuses its attention on existing security institutions like the security directorates, not in the least because a majority of Libyans wants that. But at the same time, it can be argued that in practice policy programming requires contact and engagement with the full spectrum of local governance providers, even with informal groups that are unaligned with the internationally backed government and

which may have dubious track records, in order to achieve tangible results. This is not to say that the power of non-state armed groups should be left unaddressed. Because most respondents see informal armed groups (militia) as one of the main problems of Libya, breaking the power of informal armed groups, for example by disconnecting economic opportunity from armed group membership, should be an essential part of policy programming. Finally, this report argues that the international assistance community should tune in to Libyan community organizations from across the country to understand local governance configurations, and to harvest their ideas on legitimate security governance.

Map of Libya

Introduction

This report aims to provide an insight into how the fragmentation of power in post-Qadhafi Libya has shaped different local security governance structures across the country, and how these are perceived and experienced by ordinary Libyans. Security is the most basic service that Libyans require and is seen as a prerequisite for restoring stability and for extending the presence and improving the effectiveness of governance in Libya.[1] But in the absence of a unified and effective central government, alternative informal power settlements have taken shape across the country, and these have begun to provide the core functions that the missing state should assume. Such forms of local governance stem from the fact 'that local communities are not passive in the face of state failure and insecurity, but instead adapt in a variety of ways to minimize risk and increase predictability in dangerous environments'.[2] In many areas of Libya, the 'state' is present through its formal institutions but has to share authority, legitimacy and capacity with informal local powerbrokers such as tribal[3] elders, military councils and militias. Security governance is in the hands of a mix of political, armed and social actors with distinctive local roots and interests and with various levels of authority, legitimacy and effectiveness.

Recent years have seen growing international attention focused on how governance is organised locally in Libya. Decentralisation of government competencies is a logical reaction to the political deadlock at national level.[4] Even though national elections have appeared on the horizon and international diplomatic efforts to unite the warring parties continue,[5] since 2014 when the conflict in Libya escalated, the country has

---

1   Statements at Libya International Peace Forum, Tunis 6-7 September 2017.

2   Ken Menkhaus, 'Government without Governance in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping', *International Security,* Vol. 31, No. 3, 2007, p. 75.

3   It must be pointed out that the term 'tribe' is not uncontested. It lacks consistent meaning and carries different historical and cultural assumptions. Acknowledging potential sensitivities, this report uses 'tribe' because it is most frequently used in the case of Libya – and by Libyans themselves. For further reading see for example: Chris Lowe, *The Trouble With Tribe*, Teaching Tolerance, 2001: https://www.tolerance.org/magazine/spring-2001-the-trouble-with-tribe

4   Tamsin Rutter, 'The EU cities helping Libya's local authorities provide vital public services', *The Guardian* 2017: https://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2017/mar/28/rebuilding-libya-local-councils-eu-cities-public-services

5   At the end of 2015, a roadmap for creating a unified Libyan government, the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) was signed under the auspices of the UN. In March 2016 the Presidency Council (PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA) moved back to the capital, Tripoli, where it has been struggling to assert its authority ever since.

become the arena of two competing 'governments', of which only one receives official international recognition. In 2015, representatives of Libya's rival political factions (i.e. the House of Representatives and the General National Congress) signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) under the auspices of the United Nations, thereby creating the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj. The GNA, which was intended to be a unity government, has been based in Tripoli since March 2016 but is, in effect, overpowered by a military administration, the Interim Government, which is based in the eastern city of Tobruk. The Interim Government is led by Aguila Saleh and the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar. The GNA has also been challenged by a shadow government in Tripoli, the Government of National Salvation (GNS) of Khalifa Ghwell, although this is now virtually defunct. All claim to be the legitimate rulers of Libya and deny each other's legitimacy, making any national political action plan to lead Libya out of the political crisis an ambitious undertaking at the very least.

Establishing a unified central government and pacifying Libya through good governance is further complicated by the fact that locally *de facto* authority is in the hands of a patchwork of armed groups and coalitions,[6] many of which pursue their own local interests. Any national-level political agreement needs to trickle down to largely independent local actors, who are usually armed and whose primary concerns are often unrelated to agreements made by national political and international stakeholders.[7] The power of armed groups is so far reaching that even the GNA's authority in Tripoli rests fully in the hands of several militias who nominally support the GNA but abuse their power over it to influence its decisions, appropriate its resources and appoint their own in its ranks of bureaucrats.[8] When it entered Tripoli in 2016, the GNA could only do so because of the support of local militias with which it had to strike a deal beforehand. However, despite the influence of armed groups within the capital, the government and its armed affiliates are unable to assert their power beyond Tripoli because they would bump into a different set of local (armed) power brokers and their vested local interests. In essence, Libya is a collection of city-states, each with its own internal politics,

---

6   After the revolution, Libya counted 100 to 300 armed groups. By 2014, their number was estimated at 1,600. Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists, 2014, p. 7: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/989511/download

7   Floor El-Kamouni-Janssen and Kars de Bruijne, *Crisis Alert 3 Entering the Lion's Den: Local Militias and Governance in Libya*, Clingendael, 2017, p. 2: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/crisesalert-3-entering-the-lions-den-local-militias-and-governance-in-libya.pdf

8   Wolfram Lacher and Alaa al-Idrissi, Capital of Militias: Tripoli's Armed groups Capture the Libyan State, *Small Arms Survey, 2018*: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-armed-groups.pdf

sovereign areas and 'militaries'. Against this backdrop, it is questionable whether election results and a still-to-be formed national government will ever be accepted by actors on the ground.[9]

For some areas of Libya, the national political crisis resulted in an effective cut-off from state authority and resources, particularly in remote areas far from power centres in the north. Economic stagnation, a crushing liquidity crisis and the division of key state institutions between eastern and western administrations have minimised state budgets and severely limited the ability of the government in Tripoli to pay salaries and provide services. Even now that oil production is almost back to pre-revolution levels, economic waste due to corruption, embezzlement and criminal capture of state resources is rampant, payment of local bureaucrats is absent or below standards, and Libyans' standard of living has remained abject.[10]

The analysis in this report explores how Libya's conflict-ridden transition out of dictatorship, the enduring absence of effective state control, and the localised nature of formal and informal authority structures across the country have shaped security governance at municipal level. It specifically looks at how protection and security are organised and provided, and by whom. However, rather than providing an analysis of local actors, their relationship with the state and an assessment of their ability and willingness to govern, this report instead offers an exploration of citizens' experiences and perceptions of local security, and the extent to which they appreciate, or not, local groups' ability to provide such security. To grasp such grassroots perspectives, this report is based on a household survey of security provision conducted in various municipalities (see box below).

This report starts with a sketch of the political context of (in)security in Libya after the fall of Qadhafi. Section 2 goes on to discuss the main characteristics of security provision in Libya today. Section 3 presents key insights into local security governance gained from the survey. The report concludes by setting out key principles and suggestions for international providers of assistance in their efforts to address the fragmentation of (in)security in Libya and to provide support for local governance structures in an effective way and for the benefit of the Libyan population.

---

9   Al-Hamzeh al-Shadeedi. *Are the next Libyan elections doomed to fail?*, Clingendael, 2018: https://www.clingendael.org/publication/are-next-libyan-elections-doomed-fail

10   Libya, *World Bank,* 2018: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/209171523638294449/pdf/125257-MEM-April2018-Libya-EN.pdf. In 2017, Libya's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was USD 50.98 billion. By comparison, in 2010 it was at USD 74.77 billion. After four years of negative growth, 2017 saw a GDP expansion of 55%. Libya GDP 1990-2018, *Trading Economics:* https://tradingeconomics.com/libya/gdp.

This report draws from a perceptions survey at household level (stratified convenience sample) conducted in Libyan municipalities in the first half of 2018. Through a combination of open and closed questions, 144 respondents were asked about how safe they feel, what actor(s) provide them with security and protection in their area, and to whom they turn for local security needs. Because of the sensitivity of the questions, respondents participated anonymously. In each municipality, the survey was conducted in a window of two weeks.

For a full description of the methodology, see Annex: Methodology brief.

The survey is ongoing and is intended to feed into municipality-specific and up-to-date information on security governance from a wide range of municipalities across Libya. The survey findings presented in this report come from Tripoli, Zawiya, Ghadames, Ghat, Gharyan, Aziziyah (Warshafana region), Sabratha and Misrata. All data, including incoming data from other municipalities, is published here.

2 The political context of (in)security in Libya

a. The national players

Since the toppling of the Qadhafi regime, and specifically since the escalation in 2014 of violence between the two main warring camps,[11] political authority and territorial control in Libya has been contested and fragmented by a plethora of armed groups. Many armed groups originated in the 2011 revolution, but their number hugely expanded afterwards due to readily available arms and the security vacuum left by regime collapse. The militias that contributed to the fight against Qadhafi were seldom criticised during and in the immediate aftermath of the revolution because of their heroic status as *thuwwar* (revolutionaries). As a reward for their war efforts the newly established administration handed out generous salaries to revolutionary brigades, which were knighted the new 'security bodies'. However, subsequent attempts to gather the multiplying militias under a single authority failed, as the governmental umbrella organisations could not mitigate inter-militia rivalries.

The policy essentially created a hybrid security system in which very weak and nascent formal institutions acted alongside much more powerful informal armed groups that received funding and status from the government. Militias further consolidated their power by seizing control over strategic state institutions and assets, including airports, oil facilities, ports and border control, as well as over competing factions in government. From 2013 onwards, armed groups on the government's payroll began pressing their demands on the government through their hold of strategic assets, for example by blocking oil ports.[12] If a government institution is located in an area under militia control

---

11 In 2014, Khalifa Haftar announced a military campaign – called 'Operation Dignity' – to rid eastern Libya of Islamist militias. Armed conflict erupted in May of that year when, in response, armed groups from Misrata and Islamist factions united in a counteroffensive, Operation Dawn. The escalation in violence split the country politically and geographically. See for example: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, *Dignity and Dawn: Libya's Escalating Civil War*, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 2015: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-Barr-Dignity-and-Dawn-Libyas-Escalating-Civil-War-February2015.pdf

12 Wolfram Lacher, 'Libya's Local Elites and Politics of Alliance Building', *Mediterranean Politics*, 2015, p. 67: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081451

– as is the case for Tripoli – the militia usually issues orders there.[13] Hence the thought that militias would help Libya's new government govern proved deceptive. Instead, the militias overpowered their political counterparts and began manipulating government institutions to their own ends.

At present, both of Libya's 'governments' heavily rely on non-state armed groups to assert their authority and to safeguard their presence. This has led to a situation in which the authority of government does not extend beyond the area controlled by its affiliated armed group(s). In the West, it has become painfully clear that the GNA in Tripoli can only function at the mercy of the capital's main militias (the Special Deterrence Force, the Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion, the Nawasi Battalion, the Halbous Brigade (Infantry 301 Brigade) and the Abu Slim Brigade). The four have stabilised Tripoli in the sense that they jointly prevent the rise of other militias in the capital by swallowing up smaller armed groups and pushing out more powerful ones, like the Misrata militias in 2017. This has enabled them to effectively capture key state functions and resources, posing a clear obstacle to any (future) political settlement[14] but also triggering resentment among armed groups surrounding the capital. At the time of this analysis, South Tripoli is the stage for heavy fighting between local militias – and an unstable coalition of interests between militias in Misrata, Tarhouna and Zintan is taking shape, which challenges Tripoli's militia cartel.[15] It is too early to assess the impact of these clashes but it is clear that major militias in Libya's northwest are seeking to secure their positions and expand their territorial control, which may drastically shake the security *status quo* in and around the capital.

Similarly, there are different armed groups in the east of Libya, although there Khalifa Haftar could consolidate his and the Interim Government's positions thanks to his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA is not a national entity but rather a loose coalition of local armed groups that has a powerful unifying function. Without this military backing, the Tobruk-based government is largely toothless, as it lacks mandate and authority. Of all Libya's 'national' actors, the LNA's area of influence stretches the furthest, covering much of Libya's east as well as swaths of northwest Libya and the Fezzan province in the south. However, local sources explain that despite the image

---

13 Wolfram Lacher and Alaa al-Idrissi, Capital of Militias. Tripoli's Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State, Small Arms Survey – Geneva, 2018: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/?highlight-sana-bp-tripoli

14 Wolfram Lacher, Tripoli's Militia Cartel: How Ill-Conceived Stabilisation Blocks Political Progress, and Risks Renewed War, *SWP Berlin,* 2018, p. 4: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C20_lac.pdf

15 *Ibid.*

of control,[16] there are clear limitations to Haftar's alleged dominance: '[It is said that] Haftar is present in the south, but none of his forces are there. These are mercenaries working for him. The same happens in Warshafana. There is a communal defense dimension: everybody is working on behalf of everybody. Occasionally [local forces] affiliate their manpower to one of the political factions. There is no ideology behind it.'[17] Haftar's power is not uncontested in the territory he claims to control: for example, Haftar was not allowed into Benghazi after the attack on the deputy minister of interior in 2017, because the minister is a member of the powerful Awaqir tribe from Benghazi which opposes the 'Haftar loyalists' who were allegedly behind the attack.[18] Similarly, local forces explained to us that, 'Haftar's days are over if he ever tries to confront the Warfalla tribe.'[19]

Libya's third 'government', the National Salvation Government (NSG) of Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell, challenged the GNA's position in Tripoli. The NSG was in fact a continuation of the original parliament elected in 2012, the General National Congress (GNC). The NSG considers Tripoli to be its base and has fought to re-establish its control there, but it no longer controls any relevant institutions and Khalifa's support base has been waning.[20] Ghwell tried to re-establish local support in 2016 against the GNA – which he sees as a foreign creation – but failed, and in 2017 forces loyal to the NSG (the Steadfastness Front of Salah Badi) were pushed out of Tripoli altogether by GNA-affiliated militias.[21] Even though the NSG's role as a political actor has run out of credibility, its power base is not irrelevant. The NSG found its support in Misrata, Zuwara and a number of other western cities (including from the Amazigh community). There, frustration with the stranglehold of militias over Tripoli is on the rise, and although the NSG is currently no direct competition to the GNA, current events around Tripoli show that renewed conflict over the capital is never far off.

---

16   Recently, Haftar himself stated that his forces control more than 80% of Libya. حفتر يعلن قرب السيطرة
      على ليبيا بالكامل، الميادين, 2017: http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/830352/%D8%AD%D9%81%
      [D8%AA%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A](http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/830352/)
      [7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8](http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/830352/)
      [9-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%](http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/830352/)
      [85%D9%84](http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/830352/)

17   Statement by Tuareg power broker, interview in July 2018, location withheld.

18   'War in Benghazi: Deputy Interior Minister of Libya GNA vows to take on eastern strongman Haftar', *Libyan Express,* 2017: https://www.libyanexpress.com/war-in-benghazi-deputy-interior-minister-of-libya-gna-vows-to-take-on-eastern-strongman-haftar/

19   Statement by Tuareg power broker, interview in July 2018, location withheld.

20   Mattia Toaldo et al., *'A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players', European Council on Foreign Relations:* https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict

21   Abdulkader Assad, 'Fierce clashes between anti-GNA and pro-GNA forces break out in east Tripoli', *The Libya Observer,* 2017: https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/fierce-clashes-between-anti-gna-and-pro-gna-forces-break-out-east-tripoli

b. Local security provision

Domestic conflict between 'national' actors and their internal divisions has significantly reduced the ability of government authorities to provide basic services for its citizens. As a result, space has opened up for alternative structures of authority and coercion to establish themselves.[22] Across Libya, a plethora of locally based groups has taken over responsibility for providing resources, services and security from the state in areas under their control. This not only expands and consolidates their territorial control, but also contributes to their political recognition by, and in some instances legitimacy from, communities and groups within them. The willingness, and in many cases ability, to govern distinguishes such state-like (armed) groups from bandits or extractive groups.[23] In Libya, the fragmentation of local power and the authority of local non-state (armed) groups has therefore resulted in a situation in which the state and its formal institutions (whether subordinate to Tripoli or to Tobruk) have become only one centre of power among many, and not necessary the most powerful – even though the GNA represents the country at international level and receives international support.[24]

In a militarised context like Libya where armed actors hold local sway, groups that play a role in local governance and security provision can be placed along a continuum ranging from positive affiliation with the state to competition with the state. As well as actors with a clear government affiliation, such as the Presidential Guards in Tripoli, many groups are somewhere in the middle of the continuum: they are not set on directly undermining the state, but have a more ambiguous or less positive attitude vis-à-vis government. This category includes armed groups that display significant power, such as the Misrata Military Council and the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigades. Such groups have profited from the weakness of formal institutions: it has enabled them to carve out a role for themselves in the local power equilibrium and legitimise their existence domestically and vis-à-vis external actors.[25] At first glance, non-state groups in this grey area between positive and negative attitudes towards the state seem best able to 'assist' the government in restoring law and order: that is, they can step in where formal security actors like the police and the regular army are absent or unable to function. However,

---

22 See for example Erwin van Veen, 2018, 'Hybrid security organizations in the Levant. The politics and force of competition and cooperation', forthcoming, p. 7, on how hybrid governance can develop in contexts where the state is failing or absent.

23 Stathis Kalyvas, the Logic of Violence in Civil war, 2006.

24 Erwin van Veen, *ibid.*, 2018, p. 7

25 Salient examples in this category that caught international attention are the militias that became active in guarding formal detention centres: although they act in compliance with the central government's (and international) interest in controlling prisons, they operate outside the state's realm and their actions largely go unchecked.

their level of autonomy and lack of accountability negatively affects the state's ability to fulfil its obligations, including the protection of communities.

The survey findings confirm this. They show that Libyans do not feel safe and that their perception of security has deteriorated since the fall of Qadhafi (see figure 1). A minority of respondents (23%) say they feel completely safe today, compared to 20% a year ago, and only 28% expect their security situation to improve over the course of the coming year. By contrast, an overwhelming 78% of respondents say they felt safe before the revolution, under the Qadhafi regime. Figure 2 shows that people's perception that under Qadhafi life was more safe (or less unsafe) is felt in all types of municipalities (see box below), regardless of the level of fragmentation of security provision in the municipality.

Figure 1   How safe do you feel?

Dominance of security providers

Security polity across Libya is not fragmented to the same degree: some municipalities witnessed intense armed struggles in recent years which divided their territory between local (armed) groups, whereas other cities stayed relatively calm and uncontested because they remained under the control of a single security actor. To do justice to this local variation, we categorised the municipalities included in the survey by dominance of local security providers and have broken down the survey data accordingly. In this understanding, 'homogenous' refers to municipalities with one dominant security provider and 'fragmented' refers to municipalities where there are several security actors.

Ghat, Ghadames, Gharyan and Misrata are municipalities that are currently relatively homogenous (i.e. there is one dominant security provider). Aziziyah has no security provider at all, according to respondents. Tripoli, Zawiya and Sabratha have several security actors and are therefore categorised as 'fragmented'.

Figure 2   How safe do you feel? Per type of municipality.

The survey also explored *where* respondents feel most safe, and to what extent the number of security providers present in the municipality influences such perceptions of safety. Figure 3 shows that respondents feel the least at risk in their own homes

(64%) and their own neighbourhoods (41%). One of the respondents from Gharyan tellingly stated: 'I am a housewife. I decided to spend most of my time at home so that I am not exposed to threats.' Survey data show that feelings of insecurity are significantly greater in public places and towards the outskirts of towns. In figure 4 we see that respondents from homogenous municipalities feel more safe to move around in their direct surroundings and public places in their municipality than respondents from fragmented municipalities, where only 13% of respondents says they feel safe in their neighbourhood. One of the survey enumerators stated: 'There is no real need to differentiate between safe and unsafe neighbourhoods in my town. If I am not careful, they [armed men] will shoot me anywhere.'[26]

Figure 3   Where do you feel safe?

26   Statement by enumerator (anonymous), February 2018, Tunis.

Figure 4 Where do you feel safe? Per type of municipality.

3 Characteristics of security provision in Libya

The significant difference in feelings of safety before and after the revolution begs the question of how the security vacuum was filled when the former regime collapsed, and by whom. Analysis of the evolution of local security governance since the revolution and the survey data show three interlinked characteristics that define security provision in Libya today: it is largely in the hands of *local* (and non-state) actors; it follows several *patterns* or modalities across the country; and it displays a significant measure of *plurality*. This section explores each of the three characteristics.

Local
During the revolution against Qadhafi, local councils arose in the 'liberated' areas and took care of city affairs. Libyans welcomed the change, because for the first time they could handle basic bureaucratic services in their own city or district – services that has been centralised in Tripoli under the Qadhafi regime.[27] In 2012 Libya's interim government (the National Transitional Council, NTC) passed law 59 on public administration in response to popular demand for further decentralisation and better provision of public services. Approximately 100 municipal councils were elected to serve their communities.

However, in the following years, a combination of the further breakdown of security, political contestation, and woeful underfunding left municipal councils struggling to fulfil their obligations and to maintain their political legitimacy.[28] At the same time, Libyans placed high expectations on their municipality to provide services and economic opportunities. As a rentier state, Libya relies almost entirely on revenues from oil, and in turn local councils depend fully on central government to cover their expenses (instead of, for example, on tax collection). Such dependency quickly drained the state budget, which was largely used to pay salaries instead of improving public services and funding municipalities.[29] At present, municipal councils lack the mandate and resources to (fully)

---

27   Mahmoud Bader, 'Is Local Government in Libya the Solution?', *Atlantic Council,* 2014: http://www. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/is-local-government-in-libya-the-solution
28   Mohamed Elmagbri and Josiah Cohen, 'Op-Ed: An uncertain future for Libyan local governance', *Libya Herald,* 2017: https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/09/01/op-ed-an-uncertain-future-for-libyan-local-governance/
29   Mahmoud Bader. 'Is Local Government in Libya the Solution?', *Atlantic Council,* 2014: http://www. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/is-local-government-in-libya-the-solution

govern territories formally under their control. Many councils have little to no budget available, and often no jurisdiction to handle governance affairs even though they are often expected to do so by local residents. A respondent from Sabratha answered in the survey: 'I trust the municipal council [to provide for the local population] because it is an elected body, but it is weak.'[30]

Attempts to improve local governance and the jurisdiction of municipal councils were also undermined by the burgeoning number of militias following the 2011 revolution and the government's failed attempts to integrate them into a collapsed security sector. The fateful decision by Libya's new leaders to place militiamen on the government payroll as interim security providers and use them to guard key infrastructure[31] not only depleted the state budget (recruitment into armed groups skyrocketed due to government payrolling), it also further nested armed groups in local political economies and increased armed groups' relevance in the daily management of the municipality. Moreover, militias that were not able to legitimise themselves through central government turned to their municipalities for money – for example, by demanding payment for local protection services.

Survey findings demonstrate the sheer variety of local governance providers as well as the often restricted role of municipal councils compared to other local actors. When asked who is the main governance provider in the municipality, the majority of respondents say that local forces (38%) control the municipality, directly followed by the security directorate (31%, see figure 5). Clearly, national actors (GNA and LNA) have little control locally compared to local power brokers. As figure 6 shows, respondents say that the protection of assets, infrastructure and individuals is in the hands of a mix of stakeholders and they see the municipal council as only one among many. When broken down per municipality, we note that the survey findings support the notion that the GNA is a dominant security provider only in Tripoli (see figure 7) but that governance in other municipalities is far more diverse.

---

30   Statement from survey respondent from Sabratha. In addition, in some areas the municipal council is also bypassed because the central level is involved. For example, local labour offices are subordinate to the Ministry of Labour and report back to that ministry instead of to the municipal council. This connection with central institutions further challenges the ability of municipal councils to govern.

31   David McDonough, 'Reforming Libya's Post-Revolution Security Sector: The Militia Problem', *Centre for Security Governance,* 2014: http://secgovcentre.org/2014/05/reforming-libyas-post-revolution-security-sector-the-militia-problem/

Figure 5   Who controls your municipality?

- Armed groups
- GNA
- LNA
- Local forces
- Security directorate
- Smuggling groups

Figure 6   Who controls main infrastructure points and the rule of law in your municipality?

- GNA
- LNA
- Municipal council
- Security directorate
- Local forces [including tribal forces]
- Armed groups
- Smuggling groups
- Other

Figure 7   Who controls the main infrastructure points and the rule of law in your municipality? Per individual municipality.

Gharyan

Ghat

Sabratha

Zawiyah

Tripoli

Misrata

Patterns

Because the local power dynamics that affect the way in which governance is organised are different in every locality, security provision in Libya is patterned: however, several 'modalities' in security provision co-exist and intertwine. Across the country we find a mix of militia rule, tribal authority and military governance. These are not mutually exclusive or, in the case of militia and tribes, confined to specific regions, but are key to understanding the complex, layered and network-based reality of security provision in Libya.

After the revolution, the fragmentation of territory and power was most intense in Libya's northwest, in the large urban areas of Tripoli and Misrata, and in the surrounding Warshafana and Nafusa Mountains regions. There, deepening rifts between local armed elites, tribes, clans and families have fragmented territory and consolidated the hold of these groups over their area through the barrel of the gun and forced displacements. It is in this (most densely populated) part of Libya where *militia rule* created a patchwork of 'city-states' like Misrata, Tripoli, Gharyan, Zintan and Zawiya where (coalitions of) local armed actors and militias – some with a tribal character – hold sway in a hard-fought power equilibrium. As a respondent from Misrata pointed out: 'In my area, money and arms create the most powerful actors.'

Libya's militia 'culture' is entangled with *tribalism*: a historical social phenomenon and age-old way of structuring society.[32] Libya has around 140 clans and families that extend beyond geographical borders, and around 30 influential tribes.[33] At the top are the Warfalla, Tarhouna, Qadhadfa and Magarha tribes. A number of tribes that were less relevant under the previous regime, like the Tebu and Zintan tribes, have acquired and displayed particular power in post-revolution Libya. In much of Libya's modern history, political power ascribed to tribes has been restricted by subsequent leaderships. Qadhafi was clever in undoing the power of notable tribal leaders and exploiting tribal differences as a means to keep tribes in control, but he also mixed the importance of tribal identity with nationalist discourse in favour of his own regime.

Tribalism is present across the entire country, but the extent to which tribal identity retains the ability to mobilise groups socially and politically in Libya today is debatable and connected to local power dynamics. Some observers point to the re-emergence of tribal leaders in the public sphere since the revolution, particularly in the field of

32   Alaa al-Ameri, 'The Myth of Tribal Libya', *The Guardian,* 2011: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/30/libya-tribal-myth-national-dignity

33   Abdulsattar Hatitah, *Libyan Tribal Map: Network of Loyalties That Will Determine Gaddafi's Fate*, Asharq al-Awsat, 2011: https://www.cetri.be/Libyan-Tribal-Map-Network-of?lang=fr

conflict resolution,[34] whereas others argue against overstating the influence of tribalism in present-day Libya due to counterforces such as urbanisation, population growth, globalisation, and regional and religious movements.[35] Nonetheless, tribal actors were among those who filled the governance and security vacuum that followed the Qadhafi era, and asserted themselves within the fragmented security and justice space. Many Libyans appreciate tribes for their peace-making efforts and for restoring local relations. At the same time, however, in post-revolution power struggles, almost all Libyan families armed themselves and tribes became militarised. With the collapse of central state security and political polarisation after 2014, the armed capacities of tribes became even more pronounced and tribes inserted themselves into local power disputes and armed conflict. [36]

Tribalism is also a strong characteristic of east Libya (Cyrenaica province), but there the influence of tribes and militias is overlaid with *military government*. In August 2016 the Libyan National Army's Chief of Staff Abdelraziq al-Nazouri (working under the direct command of Khalifa Haftar) started a process of replacing democratically elected mayors with military commanders in several towns and cities in east Libya. The replacement of elected councillors with appointed military governors raised much concern about a permanent military takeover. Both in Libya and by the international community, the replacements were widely understood as regression on the path of democratisation and a step away from achieving a unified civilian government.

Although internationally criticised for creating a military junta, many citizens in the east seemingly welcomed the LNA's move, as the elected municipal councils had failed to deliver basic services, including the provision of security. Under de facto military rule, citizens expected a more secure and responsive system of local governance.[37] Indeed, for example in Benghazi, the elected governor established effective cooperation with LNA security forces. Haftar also carefully and effectively crafted a web of tribal alliances because he realised he could only advance with the weight of tribal notables behind the LNA. In Tobruk and elsewhere, this had the effect of tribal elders themselves asking the LNA for a military commander – although they had appreciated the work of the municipal council, they argued that the situation in the city called for a military leader to restore safety.[38]

---

34 'Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts', *International Crisis Group,* 2012: https://www.crisisgroup. org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/divided-we-stand-libya-s-enduring-conflicts

35 Peter Cole and Fiona Mangan, *Tribe, Security, Justice, and Peace in Libya Today*, United State Institute of Peace, 2016: https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/09/tribe-security-justice-and-peace-libya-today

36 *Ibid.*

37 Mohamed Elmagbri and Josiah Cohen, 'Op-Ed: An uncertain future for Libyan local governance', *Libya Herald,* 2017: https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/09/01/op-ed-an-uncertain-future-for-libyan-local-governance/

38 *Ibid.*

Yet Haftar and Al-Nazouri's efforts to bring east Libya under military rule are more complex than they appear. First, because the LNA itself suffers from tribal and political divisions, Haftar's move to concentrate power in the hands of a loyal few caused resentment with other groups who had participated in his military campaign. Haftar crafted a web of tribal alliances to expand his control in the east, but tribal leaders allegedly are increasingly questioning Haftar's tribal legitimacy, as he is a member of the western Farjani tribe. The Awaqir tribe from Benghazi, for example, exercises significant power in the city and has overruled Haftar before. For instance, when former GNA Deputy Minister Faraj Qaim from the Awaqire tribe was arrested by the LNA, brewing tensions between the LNA and the Awaqir over his arrest, including a bloody attack on the LNA's Benghazi base on 23 January, led to his release. Similarly, Madkhali Salafi groups contributed to Haftar's military campaign but have now started to claim a Salafi footprint in the public domain in return – which fuels tensions with other factions within the LNA who thought they had ousted, not unleashed, Islamists from the east.[39] In any case, as local sources also suggest, armed groups that operate on the LNA's side are not necessarily tied to Haftar's cause for ideological reasons, but rather out of pragmatism or convenience.

Second, the overnight appointment of military governors at municipal level did not suddenly change local power dynamics. Local armed groups, including jihadists and tribal militias, would not give up their territory, interests and constituencies to a uniformed LNA commander. Testimony to this was the battle for Benghazi, which Haftar claimed would only last 'weeks', but which became a three-year campaign because an array of local armed groups fiercely fought Haftar's forces. The majority of those were local militias who still retain power in the city despite efforts to disband them.[40] It is probably due to the LNA's internal strife and its inability to put more remote areas under its control through local forces that Haftar enlisted Chadian and Darfuri militias as mercenaries.[41] As a local source suggests: 'South Libya is a recruitment base for all of the armed groups. Everybody who has seed funding – even if it is just one vehicle – tries to consolidate its power by enlisting southern mercenaries.'[42]

---

39   Ahmed Salah Ali, *Haftar and Salafism: A Dangerous Game*, Atlantic Council, 2017: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/haftar-and-salafism-a-dangerous-game

40   Ayman al-Warfalli, 'Libya's eastern commander declares victory in battle for Benghazi', *Reuter,* 2017: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-benghazi/libyas-eastern-commander-declares-victory-in-battle-for-benghazi-idUSKBN19Q2SK and Frederic Wehrey, 'Whoever Controls Benghazi Controls Libya', *The Atlantic,* 2017: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/benghazi-libya/532056/

41   Thomas Howes-Ward, 'Libya's Foreign Militias', *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs,* 2018: https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/libyas-foreign-militias/

42   Tuareg power broker, interview, 13 July 2018, location withheld.

Plurality

In recent years, debates on how to engage in fragile and conflict-affected states have challenged a conventional, state-centric take on security provision. Many conflict-ridden contexts display modes of security provision that took shape because the state was absent, failing or harmful to its citizens. Instead, in fragile and conflict-affected settings, security providers directly authorised by the state (such as the police and the regular army) tend to co-exist with a multitude of other coercive actors. This is the case in Libya as well, which – due to the state's inability to fully meet citizens' needs for security and that alternative actors have stepped in to fulfil that need – is best understood as a context dominated by plural security actors – 'actors characterised by the ability and willingness to deploy coercive force, lack of integration into formal state institutions, and an organisational structure that persists over time, that seek to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, and punishment'.

Non-state security providers may acquire legitimacy by proving to be more effective and efficient, proximate and relevant to local populations. However, plural security actors are frequently associated with human rights violations, perverse interface with the state, difficulty in providing security equitably in diverse contexts, and an almost ineluctable tendency towards net production of insecurity over time.[43] 'The panorama of plural security providers can include militias, warlords, customary authorities, political authorities, organized criminal groups, neighborhood gangs, improvised community watch patrols, etc.'[44]

In Libya, such an array of actors such as militias and tribal armed factions also operates simultaneously and with varying relationships with the state and with each other. As discussed in more detail below, the security realm is controlled by multiple (categories of) armed actors, of which only few are affiliated with the government in Tripoli and the administration in Tobruk. Unable to call upon the state as the sole guarantor of their security, Libyans say they have to 'hustle for protection'[45] from local state and non-state groups, tapping into their own networks and connecting to the armed groups that control their area. The situation of plural security is typical in Libya today, but as we have seen above it does not contribute to perceptions of safety. Survey findings show that respondents generally do not feel safe (see figure 2) but that in municipalities with the least plural security context (such as those with only one security provider) respondents feel safer (see figure 4).

---

43   Megan Price, 'Setting the Aperture Wider: A synthesis of research and policy advice on security pluralism in Tunis, Nairobi and Beirut', *Plural Security Insights*. 2016, p. 8: https://www.kpsrl.org/publication/setting-the-aperture-wider-a-synthesis-of-research-and-policy-advice-on-security-pluralism-in-tunis-nairobi-and-beirut

44   Megan Price et al., 'Plural security providers in Beirut', *Knowledge Platform Security and Role of Law,* 2015: https://www.kpsrl.org/publication/plural-security-provision-in-beirut

45   Megan Price et al*.,* 'Hustling for Security: Managing plural security in Nairobi's poor urban settlements', *Plural Security Insights,* 2016: http://pluralsecurityinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/160707_PSI_Policy-brief_Nairobi.pdf

4   Key survey insights

Insights from the survey demonstrate that municipal councils are only part of the full picture of local governance provision in Libya. Formal governance actors are one among many that have a role in the provision of services, and the boundaries between the various actors are not always clear cut. In practice, solutions in service provision are usually pragmatic, based on personal networks and often bypassing formal governance structures.[46] The situation is compounded further because of municipal councils' lack of budget, and sometimes jurisdiction, to handle governance affairs in their area.[47] Hence, any attempts to improve local (security) governance 'top down', or via formal governance structures, need to grapple with the reality that municipal councils vary in terms of capacity, resources and effectiveness and they usually need to share their authority with other local actors.

Stretching the understanding of how governance is organised locally beyond the municipal councils, however, requires a more bottom-up and in-depth understanding of local governance configurations and the power arrangements that underpin them. It can be argued that each locality deserves a separate political economy analysis of security governance because the organisation of security is directly affected by the networks of actors operating in these areas, their relationships and local interests, and the competing claims to power that co-exist and intertwine. However, despite local variety and complexity, the survey shows agreement among respondents about which actors are considered most legitimate. Respondents overwhelmingly put their trust in formal bodies – the security directorate (87%) and the municipal council (80%) (see figure 8) and say they turn to these bodies for protection. At the same time, respondents describe the formal structures as weak, underdeveloped and ineffective, and some noted that in any case they ultimately need to turn to informal actors to have their needs met.

---

46   As a source explains about local modes of operandi in Libya: 'A counselor may be the cousin of the hospital director, who has a contact at the Ministry of Health and together they contemplate a way to finance an ambulance together with a militia or a local businessman. The problem is solved but the formal authorities are irrelevant.' From: meeting with author, July 2018.

47   As a source explains: 'An example is the local labour offices who are subordinate to the Ministry of Labour and therefore answer to the ministry, not to the municipal councils.' From: meeting with author, June 2018.

Figure 8   Which actors do you trust and seek security support from?

The survey emphasises that Libyans widely consider armed groups to be the main obstacle on the road to a unified and civilian-led state.[48] Respondents say that armed groups are not only jeopardising Libya's state-building aspirations, they are also a real security threat at municipal level because of their military strength, involvement in local conflict, and connections to those in power. More than a third of respondents (36%) named armed groups as the biggest security threat in their municipality, directly followed by smuggling groups (32%, see figure 9).[49] As a consequence, armed groups' local power does not earn them much legitimacy. As figure 8 shows, few respondents (15%) trust armed groups and figure 10 shows that more respondents perceive armed groups as perpetrators of threat (25%) than as protection providers (7%). The survey findings are full of quotes by respondents stating how 'men with guns' are an everyday threat. For example: 'I am a merchant. Robbery by armed groups is the biggest everyday threat to my safety'; 'At my school [where I am director] the students who are armed are the biggest threat.'[50]

---

48   Views shared in workshop with coalition of Libyan civil society organisation representatives, August 2017, Tunis.

49   Statements at Libya International Peace Forum, 6-7 September 2017, Tunis.

50   Statements from survey respondents in Gharyan.

Figure 9   Which actor is the biggest threat to your municipality?

- Armed groups
- GNA
- Local forces
- Smuggling groups
- Security directorate

Figure 10   Which actors do you perceive as either perpetrators of threat or as protection providers in your municipality?

Perpetrator
Protection Provider

However, as is noticeable from the mix of formal and informal actors involved in security provision, the threat from armed groups is not convincingly countered by one alternative security provider (see figure 11). Only in Tripoli is there a dominant security provider, the GNA, but that prevalence is not reflected in other municipalities.

Figure 11   What actors are perpetrators of threat and protectors from threat in your municipality?

What stands out from the survey is that, by comparison, most respondents (31%) say it is local actors – formal ones such as the security directorate as well as informal ones such as tribes – that provide security, not 'national' actors (GNA, LNA). The findings clearly show that the internationally supported government in Tripoli is perceived as the dominant security provider only in the capital itself, even though current clashes in Tripoli once again prove that it cannot effectively control its affiliated militias. The situation elsewhere (even in municipalities close to Tripoli) is far more mixed. Interestingly, the LNA scores higher than the GNA when it comes to security support: with 75%, the LNA is named as one of the most trusted security providers (see figure 8).

As we have seen, in most municipalities local forces (which include tribal forces) are the main security providers and armed groups are the main causes of insecurity. The survey supports earlier reporting on how, in post-Qadhafi Libya, tribes emerged as

a protection insurance policy and mediation service in extreme circumstances.[51] It is important, however, to contextualise the role of tribes in each municipality. In Bani Walid for example, where the only tribe is the Warfalla, the Warfalla Social Council (comprised of tribal notables) coordinates all local affairs. It accepts no orders from central or municipal government and leaves the local security directorate largely powerless. However, Sebha, the 'capital' of the Fezzan, has a much more heterogeneous tribal composition and a history of intertribal conflict. There, tribal policing has fuelled local conflict, putting civilians in harm's way.[52]

Survey findings underscore the influence of tribes at municipal level, particularly in the realm of security, justice and conflict mediation. Tribes can function as a backstop safety net, but the extent to which they can effectively provide protection depends on the homogeneity of their area and as such, the inclusiveness of their support. In places with relatively stable and homogeneous tribal structures, like Ghat and Ghadames, tribes seem to have the ability and local power base to engage in security provision. Respondents from Ghat, which is dominated by the Tuareg, say that '[they] trust the tribe because they attempt to fill the vacuum left by the state by providing services and making efforts at conflict resolution and community reconciliation'. In the city of Gharyan, which historically also has a strong tribal character, a respondent identifies the 'Council of Elders and tribal sheikhs as the most influential actors'. Similarly, a respondent from Ghadames, the oasis town on the border with Tunisia and Algeria, noted that 'strength and weakness depend on your tribal affiliation'.

The last quote implies that the 'tribalisation' of governance and security can also negatively impact local security and social cohesion if access to services (protection) is restricted to those from certain families, clans and tribes. A respondent from Gharyan points out, 'I work as a nurse in a health clinic. The family members of patients [from local tribes] are a big threat for the clinic and for us. They may threaten us when we stop treatment of a patient who can no longer be saved.'[53] Particularly in fragmented municipalities with a tribal character, such as Gharyan, tribal affiliations provide protection but it is potentially a non-inclusive form of service delivery at the same time.

When looking at types of insecurity experienced, the survey shows that respondents from more homogenous and tribal municipalities experienced less intrusive types of insecurity: for instance, no experiences of murder and punishment of opponents were reported in Ghat and Ghadames. A respondent from Gharyan stated in the survey:

---

51   *Ibid.*

52   'Libya. Protection – Situation Overview, January-Feburary 2018', UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Protection Cluster, 2018: https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-protection-situation-overview-january-february-2018

53   Statement from survey respondent Gharyan.

'Mixed neighbourhoods are particularly unsafe, but neighbourhoods dominated by one tribal actor are relatively safe.'

Figure 12   What types of insecurity do you see/experience in your municipality?

Compared to findings from municipalities that are homogenous in terms of security provision, figure 12 shows that in municipalities where the security realm is fragmented (e.g. Tripoli, Zawiyah and Sabratha) more intrusive types of violence are experienced. This is likely to be the case because in areas of fragmented security provision, citizens have been confronted with open and fierce competition between armed groups.

However, the survey shows that respondents living in municipalities where security provision is fragmented do not necessarily feel less safe than those in areas where the security polity is homogenous (see figure 2). On the contrary: survey data support the idea that in Libya there are municipalities where a fragmented security landscape produced a sense of order and stability: survey findings show that 62% of respondents in fragmented (militia-held) municipalities feel safe compared to 40% in areas controlled by tribal actors (see figure 13). This may be explained by the fact that tribalism and militia culture are intertwined and that recent waves of heavy fighting involved tribal

actors (notably around the southern city of Sebha, for example). But more than anything, it underscores the need to contextualise data. The survey includes a sample from Tripoli (from January-February 2018) which has a very particular security landscape. Before the current round of fighting, militias in Tripoli stabilised the immediate security situation for local residents, even though the same militias are widely seen as a security problem (see box 'Tripoli: organised fragmentation').

Figure 13   How safe do you feel? Per governance modality militia/tribal.

Tripoli: organised fragmentation

Tripoli was included in the survey sample and counts as a fragmented security polity. A number of militias dominate the city's territory (and increasingly state institutions and the bureaucracy) leaving the government powerless. However, at the time of the survey (early 2018), Tripoli was no unstable patchwork of armed groups constantly fighting each other. Since 2016, the city has been carved up into marked areas where particular armed groups have exclusive control (see map below). The boundaries of areas of control are clear for all and violent clashes have mostly occurred at the fringes of the city or when an armed group oversteps the boundaries that are in place. For citizens, this situation of *organised fragmentation* has significantly improved everyday security. This clearly shines through in the survey findings. However, current fighting in and around the city makes clear how delicate this status quo really is and that fighting by the same militia may lower residents' feelings of relative security.

Legend:
Pink – Special Deterrence Forces
Blue – Al Nawasi Battalion
Green – Abu Saleem Brigade
Purple – Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade
Orange – Mobile National Forces
Grey – Disputed
Yellow – Al Baqara and Al-Kani Battalion (Tajoura)

Source: Al-Marssad

Survey findings demonstrate that Libyans experience different interrelated and mutually reinforcing threats that cut across different aspects of their lives, highlighting the interface between security and development. Even though the survey used for this study focused on security threats, other forms of threat commonly cited by survey respondents included economic insecurity, limited access to basic services, and health insecurity. Or, as a respondent from Ghadames put it: 'I need protection from all types of threats and violence.'[54]

---

54   Statement from survey sample from Ghadames.

Recognising the full spectrum of types of insecurities and the security challenges faced by Libyans today, a gap opens up between perceptions of insecurity and the incident-based reality of security in Libya. Most respondents say they are exposed to severe safety threats in their direct environment, even though Libya ranks as a low-intensity conflict country. Indeed, analysis of conflict events shows that violent incidents and fatalities in Libya steadily decreased between 2011 and 2017 (although the decrease was slowed down by the escalation of violence in 2014, see figure 14). Yet 79% of respondents have experienced or seen destruction and loss of property and 59% identified murder as a direct threat to their security (see figure 15). Or, as a respondent from Zawiyah put it: 'There is no safe place in our municipality since the city is controlled by armed groups. A simple tension may result in gunfire.'[55] Such findings demonstrate the volatility of the situation in many areas and the consequent need to contextualise survey data. Above all perhaps, it underlines the impact that conflict and the actions of armed groups can have on communities and the importance of factoring in local perceptions in all attempts to improve local security.

Figure 14   Violent incidents and fatalities in Libya between 2011 and 2017, by type of incident. ACLED, 2018

---

55   Statement from survey sample from Zawiyah.

Figure 15   What types of insecurity do you experience in your municipality?

5 Suggestions for policy

As this report has shown, local security governance in Libya varies greatly in how it is organised and its extent and effectiveness. There is no single actor involved, and the provision of local governance is influenced by changes in local power dynamics and episodes of local conflict. Security is provided in particular local contexts that are constantly in flux and, in certain areas, very difficult to understand. The question remains what a deep understanding of local governance and security provision in Libya means for international policies aiming to enhance good governance (e.g. those of the EU, which re-committed to its support for Libyan municipalities and local governance earlier this year), as well as to policies that aim to improve living conditions and basic services for Libyans and migrants in Libya.[56]

The findings presented in this report emphasise that, in order to be effective and conflict-sensitive, any policy and programming in Libya requires up-to-date knowledge of local power arrangements and the political economies in which programmes are implemented. Despite an advanced understanding within the international assistance community that what you do in Libya, and with whom, needs to be carefully considered, the risks and dilemmas attached to supporting local governance in Libya through international assistance projects remain. For example, selecting local partners is risky because others may feel excluded; interactions with local armed groups and non-democratic bodies may be required; and working without reference to national institutions is problematic.

A near-obvious principle therefore is that all support for local governance needs to be based on in-depth knowledge of variations between municipalities and regions and between the complexities of local governance structures and the actors and interests involved. This study only scratches the surface of that, and needs to be followed up by up-to-date analysis and ideally more in-depth studies of each locality. Understanding Libya as a collection of local political economies is key: an approach to local governance that works well in a particular town may play out very differently elsewhere. In the fragmented polity of Libya, support easily legitimises and cements the power of certain actors over others. We have seen, for example in Sabratha,[57] how quickly such a

---

56   'Libya', EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya_en

57   In 2017, an Italian effort to stem migration from Western Libya backfired. Financial support for a local armed group, the Anti-IS Operation Room, to address human smuggling in the area unleashed heavy fighting with rivalling militia involved in the smuggling business.

disruption of the local power balance can turn violent, adding another layer of conflict to an already fragile status quo.

Building on the findings of the survey used for our analysis, which intended to present a 'bottom-up' perspective on security provision, the following principles stand out as needing to be taken into account by every initiative that aims to address the fragmentation of security and improve local stability.

- First, although municipal councils need to be supported to exercise their lawful powers, the influence and role of other actors at municipal level should not be overlooked. In the realm of security provision, we have seen that security directorates and informal actors, in many cases tribes, are involved and enjoy considerable legitimacy from the local population. Therefore, it is advisable to **stretch the understanding of local governance stakeholders beyond the municipal council** to other local security providers that are trusted because they have a role in the protection of citizens. In particular, the areas where informal local actors work with municipal councils deserve our attention and additional research because it is in these areas where the legitimacy of formal structures and the efficiency and local connections of informal structures come together. Existing policy programming to support positive examples of local governance through capacity building may be extended to the realm of security provision as well.
  All initiatives to enhance positive examples of cooperation between formal and informal actors in security governance, however, need to include efforts to build a better notion of the public good in society. This is an essential step in moving away from network-based and personal affiliation-driven security provision. As is more often the case in contexts of plural security, formal and informal security providers may put their group interests over that of the public, limiting the inclusiveness of their governance activities. Even when a group is perceived as legitimate, such as tribal actors or security directorates, international assistance should channel efforts at broadening the 'client base' of such government providers as much as possible, so that benefits are not seen only by certain sections of the population. This is not only an assignment for security providers but for the wider populace as well, which should be encouraged to enhance social cohesion within communities and build on shared notions of legitimacy in governance.

- Second, precisely because supporting local actors can be a risky business if it does not happen in a context- and conflict-sensitive way, **international assistance must carefully weigh the practicality argument** regarding engagement with non-state armed groups and military governors. It can be argued that in practice, policy programming requires contact and engagement with informal groups that are unaligned with the internationally backed government and which may have dubious track records, in order to achieve tangible results. However, it is advisable that the international community holds on to its commitment to engage with democratically

elected civilian bodies and focus its attention on existing security institutions like the security directorates, not in the least because Libyans also want that. The survey for this study shows that a large majority of Libyans puts their trust in these institutions. At the same time, there are areas in Libya where the presence and activities of informal armed groups have improved everyday safety. Similarly, the imposition of military governance in LNA territory is heavily scrutinised but to a certain extent also welcomed by Libyans for its stabilising effect. The survey findings show that the LNA is respected for its role as security provider, not only in the east, and that it in any case ranks higher as a guarantor of protection than the GNA – which still receives the support of the international community. Placing informal (armed) groups on a continuum from positive affiliation with the state to competition with the state is a start; realising that their positions on the spectrum are not fixed is essential. Policy and programming should be focused on incentivising informal security providers to move to more collaborative relationships with formal security providers – preferably placing them under the command chain of formal bodies – and to support formal security structures to perform their function as legitimate arms of the state.

- The above relates to a third principle, namely that Libya's militia culture could only have come into being because of the economic advantages connected to it. We have seen how the post-revolution administration gave armed groups official status and salaries, and how militias have been able to secure major assets for themselves ever since. Therefore, **joining militia must be disconnected from economic opportunity**. Creating viable alternatives to being part of an armed groups as a form of livelihood provision is important. It not only diminishes the incentive to join, it also alleviates feelings of economic insecurity. Hence, this approach can learn from and be linked to anti-smuggling policies that try to achieve the same effect: providing licit economic opportunity so that criminal activity is less attractive.[58] At the same time, however, attempts to cut the ties between militias and the economy by providing alternatives to armed group membership risks creating new incentives for capturing economic sectors and patronage dynamics. A long-term and comprehensive approach to economic reform is therefore required, as is increased awareness of how the benefits of formal economic opportunities could be appropriated by informal armed groups.

- A final principle pertains to local perceptions and process. The research for this report has shown that no one is better informed on local contexts and local perceptions and attitudes than Libyans themselves. The survey is an instrument to capture experiences with security provision that would otherwise remain hidden. As researchers, we had the pleasure of tapping into a few of Libya's many

---

58 Fransje Molenaar, *Why The EU Should Help Former Smugglers Get A Job*, Clingendael, 2018: https://www.clingendael.org/publication/why-eu-should-help-former-smugglers-get-job

community-based organisations that have the ability to align an understanding of the international community on (in)security in Libya with the perceptions and experiences of ordinary Libyans. **It is important that the international assistance community tunes in to Libyan community organisations from across the country to harvest their ideas on legitimate security governance.** At the same time, it must be aware of the risks attached to following local preferences and a biased approach. In supporting security governance in Libya there should not be an over-focus on specific parts of the country, and there must be a long-term commitment to local partnerships.

Needless to say, even with these principles in mind, there are no easy answers or quick solutions to improving the fragmented security landscape or the effectiveness and legitimacy of security provision in Libya, particularly because each locality would require a different set of policy interventions that are aligned with the local context. Building on the analysis developed in this report and the perceptions on security shared with us by Libyan citizens through the survey, the matrix below is an attempt to capture some practical ideas – including their potential risks – for policy programming at municipal level, contextualised by the level of fragmentation of security in the municipality and the type of security actors involved.

	Tripoli	Misrata	Ghat	Gharyan
Type of governance	Militia	Militia	Tribal (Tuareg Tribe)	Tribal (Arabized and Amazigh Tribes)
Heterogeneity of governance	Fragmented	Homogenous	Homogenous	Fragmented
Context	The GNA's authority in Tripoli hinges on its affiliated militias and does not extend beyond its area of control.	Officially affiliated with the GNA, Misratan militias exercise heavy leverage over the municipality and the government in Tripoli.	Ghat is a relatively stable Tuareg border town, but the tribe is, to a large extent, cut off from state support and economic opportunity.	Gharyan is in the GNA's zone of influence but its authority is contested by local tribal (armed) forces. The military council (consisting of several local brigades) effectively controls the municipality.
Security concerns	Militia capture of territory and public institutions and state assets poses an obstacle to sustainable political agreement and legitimate governance. Lack of civilian oversight and formal command structure over armed groups increases the potential for inter-militia conflict and violence. Surrounding groups and interests unaligned with Tripoli's main militia, threaten status quo and further limit GNA's authority.	Local armed groups effectively control the municipalities' territory and local service provision, possibly limiting the inclusiveness of governance and sidelining the elected municipal council. Efforts to extend the GNA's authority to Misrata are interpreted as an attempt to take away the autonomy of militias. Local forces are involved in armed confrontations outside the municipality.	The tribe enjoys local legitimacy due to its ability to keep the municipality relatively safe, yet it is involved in violent confrontations in other parts of south Libya. Economic opportunity is limited and central government support is negligible. The local economy rides on profits from the smuggling of goods, and affiliation with the GNA is nominal.	Local forces (brigades) united in the military council only recently, and claim to work in tandem but not subordinate to formal security actors (security directorate). Security provision is in the hands of the military council, possibly limiting its inclusiveness to particular groups and networks and bypassing the security directorate. The municipality relies on the GNA for resources and services but local support for the LNA exists as well.
Policy approach	State- and institution building, integration of government-aligned militia in formal structures and under civilian oversight	State- and institution building, supporting local security cooperation and accountability mechanisms, integration of armed groups in formal security structures	Formalising informal authority, capacity building and economic support	Local dialogue, institution- and capacity building, integration of informal armed groups in formal structures

	Tripoli	Misrata	Ghat	Gharyan
Suggestions for pro-gramming	Continue capacity building of central and municipal government to guarantee stronger institutional presence, by putting in place more advanced reporting procedures and support lines between central government and municipal council in Tripoli and throughout the country. Start security sector reform process (under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya) with the ultimate aim of bringing militias under civilian government oversight, but starting with de-ployment of local forces (including existing militia) in key locations and positions to stabilise the immediate security situation and pilot their alignment with GNA.	Support reconciliation within the municipality between the military council and municipal council, learning from other locally driven reconciliation initiatives (e.g. between Mis-rata and Zintan). Help build capacities of formal security bodies that are seen as legitimate (i.e. the secu-rity directorate) and support integration of armed group members into its ranks. Improve accountability mecha-nisms for local security and service provision between mili-tia, the municipal council, and their constituents, building on shared notions of legitimacy among population.	Capitalise on the positive role of the tribe by formalising its authority and improving its cooperation with the municipal council. Provide actors involved in local governance with capacity training, particularly on inclusive and accountable governance. Help improve support lines be-tween the central state and the municipality, in order to improve the quality of service provision and to overcome post-revoluti-on marginalisation.	Help improve the relationship between the military council and the security directorate, in order to bring together the first's influen-ce and the latter's legitimacy. Coordinate efforts in local security provision, working towards an eventual integration of non-state armed groups into a formal security struc-ture. Promote a local dialogue process between tribal elders, convened by the municipal council, to find common ground on quality and provision of governance and on recon-ciliation within the municipality. Support the municipal council to exercise its lawful powers, putting in place clearer lines of support and communication between the central government and the municipal council.
Potential risks	The state and militia are not mutually exclusive; enhanced state capacities and strengthened institutions will not automatically reduce the power of militia because of their intertwinement through personal networks and economic dependencies. The adverse may happen: a stronger state could further legitimise and strengthen tensions between state-affiliated and non-state armed groups. Its affiliated armed groups, and fuel tensions between state-affiliated and non-state armed groups.	Integration of armed groups into formal structures may negatively affect the legitimacy of the latter in the eyes of the local population. Reconciliation efforts may spark renewed conflict over control of the municipality and increase insecurity for local residents.	Cooperation between tribe and state institutions may be perceived as taking away tribal autonomy and as contrary to local political views (nostalgia for previous regime). Central government may not gain legitimacy as long as eco-nomic opportunities in the area are lacking.	Integration of tribal brigades into the formal security body (security directorate) may result in a 'take-over' of the latter by the members and interests of local brigades, negatively affecting the legitimacy of formal structures in consequence.

Annex
Methodology brief

The survey designed for this study aimed to deliver against two objectives to complement the qualitative analysis in this report:

1) To understand citizens' perception of security and protection providers in their direct surroundings and at municipal level
2) To conduct a comparative analysis of local security governance across different municipalities in Libya.

Municipality selection was done on the basis of:

1) Geography (the survey was designed to target municipalities in the east, west and south of the country)
2) Different governance modalities (tribal, military and militia)
3) Availability and interest of local partners (i.e. accessibility and security situation).

Operationalisation of security concepts was put into place via sets of questions and indicators used to assess citizens' perceptions of security.

Table 1   List of survey questions

Security concept	List of questions
General security situation in municipality	1. Available services and facilities 2. Types of safety threats 3. Feelings of safety at different times and locations
Violence and protection dynamics	1. Main victims of violence 2. Main perpetrators of violence 3. Main protection providers 4. Main groups receiving protection
Security actors in the municipality	1. Actors in control of the municipality 2. Actors in control of infrastructure 3. Actors in control of law and order 4. Trust towards different actors 5. Protection sought from different actors
Security competitiveness between actors in the municipality	1. Degree of competition/cooperation between different actors 2. Frequency of confrontations between different actors

The survey questions were customised to reflect the local security constellation of each municipality. The lists of actors included were based on the security constellation of the municipality when the survey was conducted (mid-2017). To customise the survey for each municipality, we used a combination of literature review and desk research, and consultation with local partners from the municipality. The survey is yet to be carried out in the east of the country due to inaccessibility.

Instructions on the survey were shared with our local partners in a meeting in August 2017 in Tunis organised by Clingendael staff. The instruction workshop was followed up with a written manual and instruction videos for easy reference. Interim survey findings and experiences with the survey approach were shared and discussed in a workshop with Libyan partners in Tunis in February 2018.

The survey was conducted at household level through face-to-face interviews with a stratified convenience sample of respondents with the safety for both enumerator and respondent taken into consideration. To ensure a minimal degree of representativeness, the survey enumerators were asked to conduct surveys in four different neighbourhoods in their municipality: two neighbourhoods that were generally regarded as secure and two neighbourhoods generally regarded as insecure. In addition, enumerators were asked to select different types of respondents in each neighbourhood: at least one man and one woman, at least one young person and one elderly person, and members of all relevant ethnic groups.

All respondents were kept anonymous. Enumerators could submit the surveys through an online survey tool, audio recording or hard copy.

Table 2   Survey sample*

Municipality	Local partner	Number of respondents	Date of completion
Zawiyah	Women are Coming – Libya	19	7/4/2018
Tripoli	Al Rahma	24	5/2/2018
Sabratha	Brothers without Borders for Humanitarian Work	6	9/3/2018
Misrata	Human Rights Organization for the Consolidation of Constitutional Justice	28	20/4/2018
Ghat	Individual contractor	12	15/5/2018
Gharyan	Individual contractor	11	7/2/2018
Ghadames	Ghadames Youth – Ghadames Eyes Organization	20	25/4/2018
Aziziyah	Individual contractor	24	18/5/2018

*   Changes in the local security situation and the (in)activity of local partners account for the differences in number of respondents between municipalities. The survey process is ongoing. Partners can continue submitting survey data, which will be uploaded to the Clingendael website.

Legends

Table 3   Categories of armed groups

Name	Description
GNA	Armed forces strongly affiliated with the Government of National Accord. They include, among others, the Presidential Guards, *Saiqa* Forces and the Special Deterrence Forces.
LNA	The Libyan National Army is a loose coalition of armed forces that vary in size and resources under the leadership of Major-General Khalifa Haftar. The LNA is a self-styled military force and not the nation's regular army.
Security directorate	Security directorates (*mudiriyat al-aman*) were established under the previous regime. They can be understood as the state's police force. Although they are relatively weak, security directorates enjoy local legitimacy.
Local forces	Forces comprised of volunteers who provide security for their own community. This category includes tribal forces and local neighbourhood watch groups.
Armed groups	Armed groups (including militias) that are relatively powerful. Depending on the local context, they provide security and/or are perceived as a threat. Examples include the Zintan Military Council, Tebu Armed Groups and Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, among many others.
Smuggling groups	Armed groups whose primary activity is the smuggling of people and goods. This category includes, for example, Al-Dabashi, Al-Zawaiy and Al-Hanish groups.

Table 4   Categories of insecurity

Theft	Crime of stealing material belongings
Destruction, loss	Damaging material belongings beyond repair (including bombing)
Murder	Unlawful premediated killing of human being(s)
Punishment of opponents	The punishment of individuals or groups who oppose the authority of main power holder in the municipality
Violence against civilians	Violence by armed actors against (a group of) unarmed civilians
Physical violence	Physical injuries to the individual following situational threats
External threats	Threat by armed external actors (i.e. not from the municipality)
Sexual abuse	Unwanted sexual contact

Bibliography

Al-Ameri, A., 2011. 'The Myth of Tribal Libya', *The Guardian,* https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/30/libya-tribal-myth-national-dignity

Ali, S., A. *Haftar and Salafism: A Dangerous Game,* Atlantic Council, Washington, D. C., 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/haftar-and-salafism-a-dangerous-game

Al-Shadeedi, A. H., *Are the next Libyan elections doomed to fail?* The Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 2018, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/are-next-libyan-elections-doomed-fail

Al-Warfalli, A. 2017. 'Libya's eastern commander declares victory in battle of Benghazi', *Reuters,* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-benghazi/libyas-eastern-commander-declares-victory-in-battle-for-benghazi-idUSKBN19Q2SKAssad, A. K., 2017. 'Fierce clashes between anti-GNA and pro-GNA forces break out in east Tripoli', *Libya Observes*, https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/fierce-clashes-between-anti-gna-and-pro-gna-forces-break-out-east-tripoli

Bader, M. *Is Local Governance in Libya the Solution?* Atlantic Council, Washington, D. C., 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/is-local-government-in-libya-the-solution

Cole P, and Mangan F., *Tribe, Security, Justice, and Peace in Libya Today,* United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D. C., 2016, https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/09/tribe-security-justice-and-peace-libya-today

Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts, Crisis Group, Brussels, 2012, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/divided-we-stand-libya-s-enduring-conflicts

El-Kamouni-Janssen F., and de Bruijne K. *Crisis Alert 3 Entering the Lion's Den: Local Militias and Governance in Libya,* the Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 2013, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/crisesalert-3-entering-the-lions-den-local-militias-and-governance-in-libya.pdf

Elmagrbi M, and Cohen J., 2017. 'Op-Ed: An uncertain future for Libyan local governance', *Libya Herald*, https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/09/01/op-ed-an-uncertain-future-for-libyan-local-governance/EU Emergence Trust Fund for Africa. (n.d.). Libya. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya_en

Gartenstein- Ross, D. *Dignity and Dawn: Libya's Escalating Civil War,* The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, The Hague, 2015, https://icct.nl/publication/dignity-and-dawn-libyas-escalating-civil-war/

'Haftar announces a close full-control of all Libya', 2017, Al-Mayadeen, http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/830352/حفتر-يعلن-قرب-السيطرة-على-ليبيا-بالكامل

Hatitah, A. S. 2011. 'Libyan Tribal Map: Network of Loyalties That Will Determine Gaddafi's Fate', *Asharq al-Awsat,* https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/theaawsat/features/libyan-tribal-map-network-of-loyalties-that-will-determine-gaddafis-fateKalyvas, Stathis. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lacher, W. 2016. 'Libya's Local Elites and the Politics of Alliance Building', *Mediterranean Politics,* 21(1).

Lacher W., Al-Idrissi, A. *Capital of Militias: Tripoli's Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State,* Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2018, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-armed-groups.pdfLacher, W. *'Tripoli's Militia Cartel: How Ill-Conceived Stabilisation Blocks Political Progress, and Risks Renewed War,* German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/libya-tripolis-militia-cartel/

Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 2014, https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2014/12/20/libya-militias-tribes-and-islamists

McDonough, D. *Reforming Libya's Post-Revolution Security Sector: The Militias Problem*, Center for Security Governance, Ontario, 2014, http://secgovcentre.org/2014/05/reforming-libyas-post-revolution-security-sector-the-militia-problem/

Menkhaus, K. 2007. 'Government without Governance in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping', *International Security,* 31(3).

Molenaar, F. *Why the EU Should Help Former Smugglers Get a Job,* the Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 2018, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/why-eu-should-help-former-smugglers-get-job

Personal interview, Tuareg power broker, 2018. Location Withheld, 13 July.

Price, M., et al. *Hustling for Security: Managing plural security in Nairobi's poor urban settlements*, Plural Security Insights, 2016, http://pluralsecurityinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/160707_PSI_Policy-brief_Nairobi.pdf

Price, M., et al. *Plural Security Providers in Beirut,* Knowledge Platform Security and the Role of Law, The Hague, 2015, https://www.kpsrl.org/publication/plural-security-provision-in-beirut

Price, M. *Setting the Aperture Wider: A Synthesis of Research and Policy Advice on Security Pluralism in Tunis, Nairobi, and Beirut*, Plural Security Insights, 2016, https://www.kpsrl.org/publication/setting-the-aperture-wider-a-synthesis-of-research-and-policy-advice-on-security-pluralism-in-tunis-nairobi-and-beirut

Rutter, T. 2017. 'The EU cities helping Libya's local authorities provide vital public services', *The Guardian,* https://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2017/mar/28/rebuilding-libya-local-councils-eu-cities-public-services

Statement at Libya International Peace Forum, 2017, Tunis, September.

Toaldo, M., et al. *A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players,* European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict

Trading Economics. (n.d.). Libya GDP 1990-2018. Retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.com/libya/gdp

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Protection Cluster. Jan-Feb 2018. Libya. Protection – Situation Overview. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-protection-situation-overview-january-february-2018Van Veen, E., 2018. 'Hybrid Security organizations in the Levant', unpublished manuscript.

'War in Benghazi: Deputy Interior Minister of Libya GNA vows to take on eastern strongman Haftar', *Libyan Express,* 2017 https://www.libyanexpress.com/war-in-benghazi-deputy-interior-minister-of-libya-gna-vows-to-take-on-eastern-strongman-haftar/

Wehrey, F. *Whoever Controls Benghazi Controls Libya*, Carnegie Endowments for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/76034?lang=en

World Bank. (n.d.). Libya. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/209171523638294449/pdf/125257-MEM-April2018-Libya-EN.pdf