Zelensky must be given what it takes to defeat Putin on this battlefield, writes LORD DANNATT
Standing on the steps of Blenheim Palace on Thursday, European leaders surrounded Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in an image of steadfast support.
But you could forgive Zelensky for wondering how stalwart those allies really are. Two and half years into Vladimir Putin's bloody war, it must increasingly seem to Zelensky that Nato is offering just enough to keep Ukraine limping on – but not enough to smash Moscow's forces completely.
What else could explain the West's ambiguity over the use of long-range weapons to attack targets in Russia?
On Friday, Sir Keir Starmer rebuffed Zelensky's plea that he ditch the UK's veto on Storm Shadow 'bunker-buster' weapons, which have a range of 186 miles, striking targets inside Russia.
As it stands, the UK and other allies allow Ukraine to fire long-range missiles defensively at targets on Russian soil near the border, but not offensively or deep into Russian territory.
Pictured: Starmer and Zelensky shake hands during a meeting at 10 Downing Street on July 19
Russian President Vladimir Putin holds a meeting via videoconference on July 19
General The Lord Dannatt (pictured) is a former Chief of the General Staff and co-author of Victory to Defeat – The British Army 1918 To 1940. He argues Zelensky must be given what it takes to defeat Putin on this battlefield
This position is, of course, calculated to avoid provoking Putin into wider retaliation. At the heart of that fear is the terrible ultimate prospect that the dictator might reach for the nuclear button, but even less apocalyptic concerns help to dictate policy.
But success in armed conflict can be achieved only if all elements of the battlefield are dominated.
In classic Nato doctrine, this means winning the 'deep, close and rear' battles – that is long-range strikes and raids on infrastructure (deep), front-line combat (close) and the essential support mechanisms such as logistics and headquarters (rear).
Just as Russia is hitting Ukrainian cities, factories and infrastructure, any general knows it is perfectly reasonable for Ukraine to do the same in order to degrade its enemy's military capability.
But thanks to the current restrictions on missile use, Ukraine's armed forces can't execute the 'deep' battle. Zelensky is being forced to fight with one arm tied behind his back.
That's why I believe decision-makers in Washington, London, Berlin and Paris must authorise the use of long-range weapons, such as the Storm Shadow, to strike targets inside Russia.
It would be foolish to discount the possibility of some escalation. But, as in the Cold War, I'm confident this war, at least, won't go nuclear, despite the warnings of those concerned about Britain's deepening involvement in the conflict.
A soldier from the 80th Air assault brigade trains in the direction of Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, on July 20
Zelensky became the first foreign leader to attend a meeting of the British Cabinet in person since 1997 last Friday
For one thing, Russian tactics would likely use a tactical nuclear weapon only to stop an enemy breakthrough in Ukraine. Such a breakthrough could occur only in one of the four eastern provinces that Putin has declared to be forever Russian. Where is the logic in irradiating many square miles of your own soil?
Then there is the relationship between China and Russia to consider. President Xi has so far offered only mild support to Putin and is unquestionably the dominant partner in the relationship. Xi has consistently opposed the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
Of course, escalation could be serious long before it reached nuclear proportions.
A cyber attack on the scale of the outage chaos caused last Friday by CrowdStrike is well within Russia's capability, as is severing underwater communications or energy pipelines in the North Sea.
And if the Houthi rebels in Yemen were capable of striking Tel Aviv, we cannot rule out a long-range conventional missile strike on a target in Western Europe, even potentially here in the UK.
A Ukrainian serviceman of the 24th Mechanized Brigade fires a 155mm M-109 'Paladin' howitzer towards a Russian position on the front line near Chasiv Yar, Donetsk region, on July 20
soldier from the 80th Air assault brigade dismounts from a -80 tank while training in Ukraine
Keir Starmer shakes hands with President Volodymyr Zelensky on the steps of 10 Downing Street on July 19
Nevertheless, military theoreticians often refer to the concept of 'limited war' – that is, restricted in its aims and its geography. The war in Ukraine does indeed have limits, but history has demonstrated that Putin's ambition is not restrained in the same way.
Before Ukraine there was Chechnya and Georgia. Why, after Ukraine, should we not think there might be Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia, or all three – or even Poland?
Anxiety levels are already high in the Baltic States, and one has to wonder why at this moment in their history, both Sweden and Finland recently chose to join Nato.
The fear of Russian expansion is tangible on Russia's borders – no wonder the Poles are spending more than 4 per cent of GDP on defence and building the largest army in Europe.
Any discussion of Ukraine's prospect of achieving military success must also confront the elephant in the room – Donald Trump, who looks likely to win the presidency in November.
He has made the bombastic claim that he could settle the war in a day with one telephone call. If that's the case, Ukraine must be given every chance to achieve a position of advantage on the battlefield before that call is made.
If this war is to have a successfully negotiated end, Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position at the start of any talks.
The reality is that Putin must be stopped, and Ukraine is the place to stop him. The best means of doing so is by giving Kyiv what it needs to finish the job.
The price of stopping Putin now is far better than paying the price of a wider devastating war – as the history of the last century shows.
General The Lord Dannatt is a former Chief of the General Staff and co-author of Victory to Defeat – The British Army 1918 To 1940
