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Abstract: We examine the characteristics and the relative strength of third party sanctions in a series of experiments. We hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose economic payoff is unaffected by the norm violation, may be willing to enforce these norms although the enforcement is costly for them. Almost two-thirds of the third parties indeed punish the violation of the distribution norm and their punishment increases the more the norm is violated. Likewise, up to roughly 60 percent of the third parties punish the violation of the cooperation norm. Thus, our results show that the notion of strong reciprocity also extends to the sanctioning behavior of “unaffected” third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that third party punishment games are powerful tools for studying the characteristics and the content of social norms. Further experiments indicate that second parties, whose economic payoff is reduced by the norm violation, punish the violation much more strongly than do third parties. We also collect questionnaire evidence that is consistent with the view that fairness motives and negative emotions are a determinant of third party sanctions.

Keywords: Social norm, sanction, punishment, strong reciprocity, social preference, third party.

1. Introduction

No human societies exist without social norms, i.e., without normative standards of behavior that are enforced by informal social sanctions. In fact, the ability to develop and enforce social norms is probably one of the distinguishing characteristics of the human species. It is, therefore, not surprising that social scientists, at least those outside of economics, invoke no other concept more frequently than that of “norms” (Sills 1968, 208). For instance, many ethnographic descriptions contain vivid descriptions of powerful social norms, ranging from norms on mating practices and participation in religious activities to food-sharing norms and people’s obligations in cooperative production or defense activities (e.g. Sober & Wilson 1998; Gurven, in press; Fessler 2002a,b). Even in economics, an increasing number of researchers use this concept to explain important phenomena (e.g. Solow, 1990; Kandoori 1992; Nyberg, & Weibull, 1999). Thus, it is impossible to understand human societies without an adequate understanding of social norms. Nevertheless, social norms are still poorly understood. Despite some recent progress (Hechter and Opp 2001), we still know very little about how they are formed, the forces determining their content, how and why they change, their cognitive and emotional underpinnings, how they relate to values, how they shape our perceptions of justice and its violations, and how they are shaped by and shape our neuropsychological architecture. In short, social norms are one of the big unsolved problems in the behavioral sciences.

Social norms are also important for the evolution of human altruism because they have a bearing on the debate between individual and group selection approaches. A key argument against the empirical plausibility of group selection in the evolution of human altruism is that migration between groups removes the differences between groups. If a few selfish individuals join the groups that are predominantly composed of altruistic individuals, the selfish individuals in the group will reproduce at a higher rate, quickly removing the differences in the composition of selfish and altruistic individuals across groups. Thus, group selection cannot become operative. However, the selfish migrants do no longer reproduce at a higher rate in the presence of social norms proscribing individually selfish behavior because they are punished for their violation of the norm. This means that differences in group composition can be maintained, rendering group selection empirically more plausible (Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 2003; Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich & Boyd 2001; Gintis 2001).

In this paper we contribute to the understanding of social norms by studying the underlying enforcement mechanisms. Norms are enforced due to the expectation that

violations of the behavioral standard will be punished. The sanctioning individuals may be “second parties” whose economic payoff is directly affected by the norm violation. For instance one party in an exchange relationship may violate an implicit agreement, hurting the exchange partner. The cheated partner is the “second party” in this case, while an uninvolved outside party who happens to know that cheating occurred is the “third party”. Thus, the norm violation does not directly affect the third party's economic payoff. However, if only second parties imposed sanctions, a very limited number of social norms could be enforced because norm violations often do not directly hurt other people. In the case of voting norms (Knack 1992), for example, nobody is directly hurt if somebody does not vote or votes for the “wrong” party. Likewise, in case of cooperative effort norms, a shirking individual imposes little costs on any particular other individual if work teams are sufficiently large. Thus, third party sanctions greatly enhance the scope for norms for regulating human behavior. In fact, some researchers view the existence of third party sanctions as the essence of social norms because second party punishment strategies are not evolutionarily stable in iterated pair-wise interactions whereas strategies involving third party sanctions are stable (Bendor & Swistak 2001). The problem is, however, that there is still relatively little empirical knowledge about third party sanctions at present. Much of the evidence on third party sanctions comes from ethnographic descriptions of norm enforcement in small-scale societies (see, e.g., Sober and Wilson 1998, Cronk, Chagnon and Irons 2000, Fessler 2002a). Economic historians have also provided accounts of third party punishment (e.g. Greif 1993, 1994).

Although field evidence on the existence and enforcement of social norms is indispensable and, in fact, motivated our study, isolation of the different forces shaping norm enforcement in the field is extremely difficult if not impossible because too many uncontrolled factors simultaneously affect the results. For example, it is generally impossible in the field to distinguish between reputation-driven third party sanctions that are motivated by selfish economic benefits and those driven by altruistic goals. In contrast, in a laboratory experiment it is possible to control for these factors. Therefore, we examine the characteristics and the relative strength of third party sanctions in the context of laboratory experiments in this paper. We introduce, in particular, a third party into the dictator game (DG) and the prisoners' dilemma (PD) game. The third party observes the actions of the players in the DG and the PD and can then punish the other players. Punishment is, however, costly for the third party so that a selfish third party will never punish. This design is motivated by the idea that social norms apply in both games: a norm concerning distributional fairness in the DG and a cooperation norm in the PD. The notion of strong reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter

2002; Gintis et al. 2003, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003) therefore implies that the third parties should be willing to punish the violation of these norms. Thus, if we observe punishment of norm violations, we have evidence that strong reciprocity is also relevant for behavior of third parties.

Apart from providing direct insights into the nature of third party sanctions, our experiments also enable us to evaluate recently developed theories of social preferences (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, in press; Falk & Fischbacher, 1999; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levine, 1998; Rabin, 1993). The different theories assume various non-selfish preferences which have diverse implications for the existence and the pattern of third party sanctions. Finally, one of the most important long term contributions of our paper perhaps consists of the provision of a simple, yet powerful method for studying the characteristics and the content of social norms. Whereas the rewards or sanctions by second parties can often be rationalized, or are at least likely to be colored, by egocentric, “non-normative”, motives, the rewards and sanctions of third parties reveal the truly normative standards of behavior. For instance, norm adherence may trigger feelings of gratitude if second parties benefit from the norm adherence in economic terms and this may, in turn, induce second parties to reward those who obey the norm. In this case, the rewarding by the second party cannot be taken as unambiguous evidence for an appreciated behavioral standard. Likewise, if norm violation directly harms someone, his impulse is to retaliate, but retaliation may have nothing to do with his appreciation of behavioral standards. The study of third party rewards and sanctions can clarify these confounding factors.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we report the results of third party sanction in the context of violations of a distribution norm. In section 3, we deal with the case of cooperation norms, and in sections 4 and 5, we compare the strength and the pattern of second and third party punishment. Section 6 discusses our questionnaire evidence related to negative emotions and fairness judgments and Section 8 concludes the paper.

2. Third party sanctions of violations of a distribution norm

Many experimental economists have studied second party sanctions in the past decade. The most famous example for second party sanctions is probably the ultimatum bargaining game (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982, Camerer 2003). More recently, the study of second party sanctions has been extended to gift exchange games (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997), to public good games (Yamagishi 1986; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992; Fehr and

Gächter 2002), and to taxation games (Bosman and van Winden 2002). There are only a few other papers which report results on third party sanctions (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress and Gee 2002) in the context of violations of fairness norms. However, we know of no paper which examines the relative strengths of second and third party punishment, nor do we know of any work examining the pattern and the strength of third party punishment in PDs. Carpenter and Matthews (2002) study third party sanctions in a public goods context. Since their design allows for reciprocity and strategic interactions among the third parties, they cannot rule out third party punishment for reasons of self-interest. As we will see below, our design completely rules out the possibility of self-interested third party sanctions.

2.1. Methods and experiment design

We studied third party sanctions of violations of a distribution norm by adding a third player with a punishment option to a dictator game (DG) played between player A, the dictator, and player B, the recipient. In the following, we denote this experiment as TP-DG (Third Party Punishment in the Dictator Game). In this treatment, player A has an endowment of 100 points and he can transfer 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 points to player B who has no endowment.¹ The third party, which we denote as player C, is endowed with 50 points. Player C has the option of punishing player A after observing A's transfer to B. Player A's payoff is reduced by 3 points for every punishment point that player C assigns to player A. In principle, player C could assign up to 50 punishment points to A, i.e., C could use his whole endowment for punishing A. At the end of the experiment points were exchanged into real money at an exchange rate of 1 point = CHF 0.3. Player B could not affect the payoff of any other person in the game – he was just the passive recipient of A's transfer. However, while player A was making his decision, player B indicated the amount of punishment he expected player C to impose on A at any feasible transfer level. In addition, B indicated how much he expected player A to transfer to him. B's expectations were recorded by the experimenter but they were never revealed to players A and C.

Certain features were common to all our experiments reported in this paper: first, all subjects were informed about each player's endowment, the exchange rate between Swiss franc and points, and about the extensive form of the game at the beginning of the experiment,

¹ It is well known from many DGs (see e.g. Camerer 2003) that player A almost never gives more than 50 percent of the available money to player B. Therefore, to simplify the game, we did not allow player A to transfer more than 50 points to B. In the experiment reported in Section 4, player A could transfer more than 50 points.

i.e., before they made their decisions or reported their expectations. Thus, player A knew, for example, that C could punish him. Second, subjects received a show-up fee of CHF 10 (\approx US \$ 8) in all experiments. This show-up fee is always included in the following when we report subjects' average earnings. Third, we never used the terms sanctioning or punishment in the experimental instructions. Instead, we instructed the third parties that they have the option of assigning "deduction points" to the other players. The experiment instructions can be found in the appendix of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). Fourth, subjects interacted anonymously with each other and were never informed about the other players' identities. Fifth, the subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. Sixth, each subject participated in only one experiment. Seventh, all experiments were based on the computer software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). Eighth, a player could incur a loss in case of very severe sanctions. It was made clear in the instructions that players had to pay their losses; in fact, however, no losses occurred. Ninth, we implemented the so-called strategy method at the punishment stage. Thus, the third party had to indicate how much he punished the other player(s) for each possible strategy combination of players A and B. In the DG, this meant that player C indicated the number of deduction points for each of player A's possible transfer levels. Of course, C had to make his choices before he knew A's actual transfer.

The advantage of the strategy method is that it allows us to examine the subjects' sanctioning behavior in much more (statistical) depth. For instance, the dictators (player A) never or rarely choose certain transfer levels in the DG. Therefore, if C can only respond to A's actual transfer, we might have no or very few responses of the third party to certain transfer levels. A potential disadvantage of the strategy method is that it may underestimate the importance of emotions. Player C may, for example, experience stronger emotions if he actually experiences the violation of a fairness norm than if he just contemplates what he would do in case of a violation of a fairness norm. It is, however, an open question whether the strategy method actually leads to different behaviors compared to methods where the subjects make decisions after they experience their opponents' behaviors.²

66 subjects participated in the TP-DG, and each played the TP-DG only once. The roles of A, B and C were randomly assigned to the subjects at the beginning of the

² It could also be argued that the strategy method dilutes the monetary incentives because subjects make more decisions for the same amount of money. However, a recent meta-study of Camerer and Hogarth (1999) indicates that the modal effect of stake size on mean experimental outcomes is zero (though variance is usually reduced by higher payment). This coincides with the results of a similar study by Smith and Walker (1993). Moreover, Brandts and Charness (2000) as well as Cason and Mui (1998) report evidence indicating that the strategy method does not induce different behaviors.

experiment. The experiment lasted roughly 40 minutes and a subject earned on average CHF 22.20 (\approx US \$ 17).

The purpose of TP-DG was to study whether player C sanctions A for violating a distribution norm. If player C only cares about his own payoff, he will never punish. In addition, if player B believes that C is selfish, B expects no punishment of C regardless of how much A transfers. However, we hypothesized that the salient distribution norm in the DG between A and B is to give 50 points to player B because the subjects played the game anonymously and were never informed about the others' identities. In addition, they were randomly allocated to their roles and, hence, to their endowments. This means that there is no good reason why player A should end up with more money than player B, which renders the equality norm salient. There are now also several theories of social preferences (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher 1999 or Fehr and Schmidt 1999) that are based on the behavioral relevance of equality norms. If the equality norm is indeed behaviorally relevant for player C, one can expect that the punishment C imposes will increase in severity the more the transfer of A falls short of 50. In addition, by asking player B about the punishment he expects C to impose on A we receive information to what extent directly affected parties expect third party norm enforcement, and how accurate their expectations are. This information is important because the impact of social norms on people's behavior increases the more people believe in the presence of third party norm enforcement.

2.2. Results

Recall that the self-interest hypothesis predicts that the third parties only care about their own economic payoff so that they will never punish. This contrasts strongly with the actual behavior of third parties. Figure 1 indicates that the majority of third parties punished the dictators and the vast majority of the recipients expected punishment if the dictators transferred less than the egalitarian level. At each transfer level below 50, roughly 60 percent ($N = 22$) of all players C punish the dictators. The figure also shows that the recipients expected the punishment to exceed that which actually occurred. With the exception of the transfer level of 40, the share of recipients who expect player C to punish is higher than the actual share of punishing players.

Figure 2 indicates that third party punishment and beliefs about third party punishment increase proportionally to the amount by which the dictator's transfer falls short of the egalitarian transfer. The figure shows the deduction points that players C assign on average to the dictator at any feasible transfer level. The average punishment imposed on dictators who

gave nothing is rather high. Player C punished dictators who gave nothing with 14 deduction points, i.e., reducing their income by 42 points. The sanctioning of the dictators monotonically declines and is almost zero if they transfer half of their endowment. A regression analysis also supports this result. If we run an OLS-regression of third party punishment on the variable $(50 - \text{transfer})$ we get a highly significant ($p < .001$) slope coefficient of .28 while the constant is close to zero (-.45) and not significant ($p = .230$).³ This means that no significant punishment occurs for a transfer of 50. Yet, if the dictator reduces the transfer by 10 units, player C assigns on average 2.8 deduction points, thus reducing the dictator's income by 8.4 points. This implies that dictators who give less than 50 gain in economic terms but these gains are quite small.

Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here

Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the recipients' beliefs about punishment are even higher than is the actual punishment. They show that recipients overestimate both the strength and frequency of punishment. If we regress the recipients' beliefs about punishment on $(50 - \text{transfer})$, we get an insignificant constant but a highly significant slope coefficient of .33. Thus, for each reduction of the transfer by 10 units, the recipients expect that the third parties will reduce the dictators' income by 9.9 units. We also conducted Mann Whitney tests to check whether – at any given transfer level below 50 – the beliefs about punishment are significantly different from the actual punishment. The tests indicate, however, that no significant differences exist ($p > .40$ at each transfer level below 50).

Although our primary interest is not focused on the dictators' behavior, a description of the distribution of transfers and the recipients' beliefs about them is worthwhile. The average transfer is 24.5 and the average belief about the transfer is 21.8. A Mann Whitney test ($p = .634$) does not challenge the similarity between actual transfers and recipients' beliefs about them. The actual transfer level is also quite similar to that observed in typical DGs without punishment. According to a meta-analysis conducted in Camerer (2003), the average transfer levels across many different DG studies gravitate around 20 percent of the available pie. Figure 3 also shows that the distribution of actual transfers is relatively similar to the distribution of the recipients' beliefs about the transfers.

Insert Figure 3 about here

³ Our significance tests are based on robust standard errors that take the fact that a given individual's punishment choices are dependent observations while across individuals the punishment choices represent independent observations into account.

2.3. Implications for proximate theories of social preferences

To what extent can recently developed theories of social preferences account for third party punishment in the TP-DG? Theories of social preferences assume that people are not only motivated by their own economic payoff but also care about the payoff of relevant reference agents. Player C, for instance, may also care about the payoff of the dictator or the recipient in the DG. Three types of social preference theories have trouble explaining the existence of non-selfish third party punishment. First, there are theories of altruism (e.g., Andreoni, 1989) which assume that non-selfish players care positively about the economic payoff of relevant reference actors. These theories have the obvious problem that they never predict any punishment. Second, the theory by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and the pure reciprocity approach, as modeled by Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (in press), have problems in explaining the evidence. The approach by Bolton and Ockenfels (BO) assumes that a player is motivated by both his own material payoff *and* his relative share of the total payoff. If the relative share of player i is below or above the fair share defined by $1/n$ (where n is the total number of players), player i experiences a non-pecuniary disutility. Player i is therefore willing to punish in order to move his own share closer to the fair share. In the TP-DG, the third party was endowed with 50 points, the dictator was endowed with 100 points and the recipient had no endowment. Thus, regardless of what the dictator transferred to the recipient, the third party always had a fair share of $1/3$ in this condition. Therefore, BO predict zero punishment by third parties while in fact we observed substantial punishment. One might argue that this is an artifact of the fact that we endowed the third party with a fair share. Yet, the BO approach also has problems if we give the third party an unfair share. Assume, for instance, that we only endow the third party with 30 points so that a player with BO preferences has less (i.e., $30/130$) than the fair share, in which case a BO player also would never punish. By spending a point on punishment he reduces his own payoff by 1 point and the total payoff by 4 points, further *decreasing* his relative share of the total payoff to $29/126$.⁴ Thus, punishing causes an income loss and a non-pecuniary utility loss because the distance between the relative share and the fair share increases. Finally, the BO approach is mute with regard to the punishment target in the TP-DG because – as long as the dictator has transferred some money – the relative share of the third party can be varied regardless of whether the recipient or the dictator is punished. Thus, if we gave C the option to punish A or B, the

⁴ To illustrate this point assume that the endowment of the third party is $x < 33.3$ and punishment is denoted by p . Then the third party's relative share after punishment is $(x - p)/(100 + x - 4p)$. Differentiating this term with respect to p yields $(3x - 100)/(100 + x - 4p)^2$. This derivative is negative for $x < 100/3$ so that punishment decreases the relative share of the third party.

theory predicts that C would be indifferent between punishing A or B. The BO model therefore makes rather absurd and counterfactual predictions for the TP-DG.

The pure reciprocity approach (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger in press) rests on the assumption that unfair behavior of A towards B reveals A's unfair intentions which triggers B's willingness to punish A. However, A never behaved unfairly towards the third party in our TP games. Therefore, the pure reciprocity approach also predicts that third parties will never punish. In contrast, the approaches by Levine (1997), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (1999) are all consistent with the existence of third party punishment. The model by Levine rests on the assumption that there is a willingness to pay to punish individuals with selfish or spiteful preferences. In the TP-DG low transfers reveal that the dictator has such preferences and, therefore, third parties with Levine-type preferences are willing to punish dictators who transfer little.

The models by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (1999) also predict the existence of third party punishment. The FS model is based on the assumption that there are players who are willing to pay in order to reduce the differences between their own payoffs and those of the other players. In the FF model the players are willing to pay because the players view inequalities as unfair. In this model inequality is the trigger of punishment but, in contrast to the FS model, it is not the aim of the players to establish equality through punishment. The material payoff of the third party in the TP-DG is below that of the dictator as long as the latter transfers less than the egalitarian level of 50. Thus, players with FS or FF preferences are willing to punish dictators who transfer less than 50 because this transfer causes a payoff difference between themselves and the dictator. In addition, since sanctioning is costly for the third party, it also reduces the payoff difference between him and the recipient.

3. Third party sanctions of violations of a cooperation norm

3.1. Methods and experiment design

Our next study examines whether subjects are willing to punish deviations from cooperation norms. For this purpose, we introduced the possibility of third party punishment into a prisoners' dilemma (PD) game, hereafter referred to as TP-PD. Like the DG with third party punishment, the PD with third party punishment had two decision stages. In the first stage, only player A and B interacted with each other in a PD. A and B were each endowed with 10 points. At the beginning of stage one, each player could keep these points for himself or

transfer all ten points to the other player, where the experimenter tripled any transferred points. If a player kept the 10 points, he earned 10 points from this decision. If he transferred the 10 points while the other player retained his points, the *other* player earned a total of 40 points from this decision (30 points from the transfer plus his original 10 points) and the first player earned nothing. Thus, irrespective of what the other player did, a player in the first-stage game was always better off if he kept his endowment for himself. Yet, if both players kept their endowment they earned only 10 points each, while if they both transferred their endowment each earned 30 points.

Player C observed A's and B's actions in stage 1, and then had the opportunity to assign deduction points to A and/or B in stage 2. Player C received an endowment of 40 points at the beginning of this stage (after not receiving any endowment in the first stage). He could use his endowment to finance the assignment of deduction points to A and/or B. C could assign up to 20 deduction points to each of the two other players. As in all other experiments, assigning 1 deduction point cost C 1 point and cost the sanctioned player 3 points. To prevent the final payoff to A and B from becoming too unequal from that of C in case both A and B cooperate, we gave players A and B an additional endowment of 15 points each at the beginning of stage 2. The additional endowment for A and B was 15 instead of 10 points because if we had given 10 points all players would have earned 40 points in case A and B cooperate and C does not punish. We thought that this could perhaps create a strong focal point, and to prevent this, we gave A and B slightly more than C in this situation. As always, all players had complete knowledge of the rules of the game. For example, before the start of the game everybody knew every player's endowment, when the endowments were given, and the fact that C could punish them.

72 subjects participated in the TP-PD and 1 experiment point was worth CHF 0.37. Subjects earned on average CHF 23.40 (\approx US \$ 18.7) and the experiment lasted roughly 45 minutes. As in the TP-DG, the third party's decision was elicited with the strategy method. This meant that the third party indicated the number of deduction points for the sanctioned player for each of the four possible action combinations that can occur in the PD: (CC), (CD), (DC), (DD) where C stands for cooperation and D for defection. Technically, we did this in the following way. We presented the third party 4 different computer screens – one for each action combination in the PD. Then the player indicated for each situation how many deduction points, if any, he wanted to assign to A and B.

There is now considerable evidence on conditionally cooperative behaviors in prisoners' dilemmas or public good games (Dawes 1980, Messick and Brewer 1983, Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001). Subjects are willing to cooperate if the probability that others also cooperate is sufficiently large. This observation led us to believe that defection constitutes a much more severe norm violation if the partner in the PD cooperates than if he defects. Therefore, we predicted that a norm of conditional cooperation shapes the pattern of third party punishment in the PD.

3.2. Results

In fact, a large fraction of third parties punished the defector if the other player cooperated in the PD. A sizeable fraction of third parties punished if both players defected, although the punishment was much lower compared to the situation where there was only one defector in the group. The evidence for this claim comes from Table 1, which shows the third party's average expenditure for punishment in all four situations that can emerge in a PD. In addition, the table indicates the fraction of punishing C players in each situation. The outstanding feature of Table 1 is that if one player in the PD defects while the other cooperates, then 45.8% of third parties punish and the average punishment (averaged over *all* C players) is 3.35 deduction points.⁵ In other words, third party punishment reduces the defector's income in the group on average by $3.35 \times 3 = 10.05$ points. If, in contrast, the other player in the PD group also defects, the percentage of punishers is 20.8% and each defector receives on average only .583 deduction points, i.e., the income of the punished player is only reduced by $.583 \times 3 = 1.75$ points. A Wilcoxon signed rank test for matched pairs shows that this difference is significant ($p = .008$), indicating that third parties perceive the same action – in our case defection – very differently, depending on what the other player in the group does. This punishment pattern suggests that defection constitutes a less severe norm violation if the other player is also a defector.

⁵ 11 of the 24 subjects in the role of player C punish in the PD. Therefore, the average expenditure, if we average over all *punishing* C-players, is 7.31 deduction points.

Table 1: Third party punishment in the prisoners' dilemma (average expenditure)

Punished player is a	Other player in the PD-group is a defector	Other player in the PD-group is a cooperator
defector	.583 (20.8%)	3.354 (45.8%)
cooperator	.063 (8.3%)	.083 (4.2%)

Note: The first number in each cell denotes the average punishment of player C. The number in parentheses denotes the percentage of C's who punish. N = 24.

Several features of the punishment pattern in Table 1 support the view that a considerable percentage of the players subscribe to a cooperation norm. This is indicated by the fact that mutual cooperation is almost never punished while mutual defection is punished in 20.8 percent of the cases. Moreover, if the other player in the PD group is a cooperator and the punished player switches from cooperation to defection, the percentage of punishing players increases from 4.2% to 45.8%. Notice also that even if the other player in the PD group is a defector, a switch of the punished player from cooperation to defection causes a sizeable increase in the percentage of punishers – from 8.3% to 20.8%. In order to test whether punishment is insignificant in case of mutual cooperation, we regressed the amount of punishment on a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the *punished* player is a defector, another dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the *other* player in the PD group is a defector, an interaction between the two dummies, and a constant. The results of this regression are shown in Table 2.

The constant in Table 2 measures the amount of punishment if both dummies are zero, i.e., if both players cooperate. As we can see, the constant is insignificant, indicating negligible sanctions in this case. The dummy for “punished player is a defector” is, however, 3.27 and highly significant. In contrast, the dummy for “other player in the PD group is a defector” is close to zero and insignificant, indicating that punishment of cooperators remains insignificant if the other player in the group changes from cooperation to defection. In other words, the punishment of a cooperator is negligible, irrespective of whether the other player in the group cooperates or defects. This contrasts sharply with the punishment pattern for defectors. The sanctioning of a defector becomes much more severe if the other player in the

PD group changes from defection to cooperation. Finally, the negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between the dummies shows that, if the punished player switches from cooperation to defection, the increase in punishment that occurs is significantly smaller if the other player in the group is a defector compared to when the other player is a cooperator.

Table 2: Third party punishment in the prisoners' dilemma (regression results)

	Coefficient	Robust standard error	p-value
Punished individual is a defector (Pun-def)	3.271	1.102	.007
Other player in the PD group is a defector (other-def)	-.021	.098	.834
(Pun-def)×(other-def)	-2.75	1.058	.016
constant	.083	.084	.331

Note: Dependent variable is the expenditure for sanctions by the third parties. OLS regression with clustering on individuals ($N = 192$, $\text{Prob} > F = .022$, adjusted $R^2 = .195$). We show robust standard errors that take into account that the sanctioning choices of a given individual in the different situations may be dependent while the sanctioning choices of different individuals are independent.

The results in the TP-PD have also implications for theories of social preferences. The existence of third party punishment challenges the pure reciprocity approaches by Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (in press) because these approaches predict no punishment in the TP-PD. The reason is again that defection in the PD implies no hostility towards player C. Likewise, the model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) predicts no punishment. This can be illustrated for the case where player A cooperates and B defects. Then the payoffs for A, B, and C before C's decision to punish are given by (15, 55, 40). If C assigns one deduction point to B, C's payoff share *increases* from $40/110 = 0.364$ to $39/106 = 0.368$. Thus, if the third party punishes, her share moves further away from the fair share of $1/3$. Therefore, a third party with preferences according to the Bolton and Ockenfels model will not punish. This contrasts with the models by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (1999) because the payoff differences between the third party and the other players matter in these models. Thus, the third party may well punish the defector because the

defector earns more than the third party. However, both models have difficulties in explaining the fact that mutual defection is also punished, because the payoff vector in this case is (25, 25, 40) before the punishment decision of C. Since player C is better off than both A and B, player C will never punish in this situation. In fact, however, 20.8% of the third parties punished, albeit at a rather low level. The model by Levine (1998) is again consistent with the existence of third party punishment of defectors because defection may be taken as a signal that the defector is a greedy subject.

4. Second versus third party punishment in the context of a distribution norm

4.1. Methods and experiment design.

In the DG, second party punishment means that the recipient, player B, has the option of punishing the dictator. We developed the following design to compare the relative strength of second and third party punishment. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned either the role of the dictator (player A) or that of the recipient (player B). Then we formed groups of two players with each group comprising one player A and one player B. The players in these groups then participated in a second party punishment (SP) condition and in a third party punishment (TP) condition according to the design described below. The sequence of the two conditions was balanced to control for order effects.

As in TP-DG, player A was endowed with 100 points and B had no endowment in the first stage. However, player B received an endowment of 50 points at the beginning of stage 2 in both the SP and TP condition. To keep the payoff differences generated by A's transfer constant, we also gave A an endowment of 50 points at stage 2. With the help of the endowment, B could finance his sanctions even if A transferred nothing to him. In stage 2, player B had the option of punishing a dictator specific to the condition he is playing after observing player A's transfer. However, while player B could punish his dictator (player A) in the SP condition, player B could only punish the dictator of a different group (player A') in the TP condition (see Figure 4). By comparing B's sanctioning of the own dictator (player A) in the SP-condition to the sanctioning of the out-group dictator in the TP-condition (player A'), we can examine the relative strength of third party punishment. Since A' is in a different group, A' could not affect player B's economic payoff. This means that with respect to the group comprising players A' and B', player B was an unaffected third party. A further important feature of this treatment is that we ruled out reciprocity between the punishers, i.e., if player B could punish A' then player B' (who was in the group with A') could never punish

player A (who was in the group with B). Instead, player B' could only punish a dictator from a third group, say A'. This feature rules out behavior that follows the principle "I punish your dictator and you punish mine". We deliberately designed the experiment in this way to ensure that the punishing players are not engaged in a strategic interaction with other punishers.

Insert Figure 4 about here

In the SP condition, the punishing player is the recipient of his dictator's transfer and can punish him accordingly. Thus, the second party punisher experiences what it means to be the recipient of a dictator's transfer. This raises the design question whether the punishing player in the TP condition should also be the recipient of a dictator's transfer – as is the case in our TP condition. Note that being the recipient of *another* dictator's transfer does not change the punishing player's position as a third party vis à vis the punished dictator. The punishing player's payoff is still completely unaffected by the actions of the dictator he can punish. The choice of whether the punishing third party is placed in the role of transfer recipient depends on the question being examined. If the experience of being a transfer recipient remains constant across conditions, we can focus exclusively on the fact that the punisher is directly affected by the action of the dictator who can be punished in the second party condition, whereas the punisher is not affected by the action of the dictator whom he can punish in the third party condition. Since we wanted to focus on this effect, we also put the third party punisher in the position of a transfer recipient.

When the subjects played the first condition (either SP or TP), they did not know that a second condition would follow; we first told the subjects at the end of the first condition that a second experiment would follow, and that this experiment would then be the final one. In this way, we eliminated any effect from the second condition on the first. We implemented this feature because we thought that there might be important behavioral spillovers between the first and the second conditions. In this case, by comparing the SP condition, when played first, with the TP condition, when played first, we can compare the two conditions without any confound.

In the TP condition, the third party (player B) was informed how much his own dictator (player A) had transferred to him when B was deciding about the punishment of the outgroup dictator A'. The punishment decision was again elicited by the strategy method, i.e., B indicated how much he punished A' for every possible transfer of A' to B'. Likewise, in the SP condition B indicated how much he would punish A for every possible transfer of A to B. There is thus a difference between the SP and the TP condition because the punishing player

in the TP condition knew how much he had received from his own dictator before he made the punishment decision. We deliberately introduced this feature because if we did not tell the third parties in the TP condition how much they had received, they still would have had beliefs about this transfer. Thus, there were only two possibilities available: controlling the beliefs of the third parties by telling them how much they had received or accepting an uncontrolled belief. We decided that it would be better to know the third parties' beliefs and to use this information as a control variable in our statistical analysis (see below).

92 subjects participated in both the SP and the TP condition. The exchange rate between points and CHF was 1 point = 0.13 CHF. Subjects earned on average CHF 30 (\approx US \$ 24) in this experiment which lasted roughly 75 minutes.

4.2. Results

A main result of this experiment is that the dictators face severe sanctions in the second and third party condition. However, second party sanctions for transfers below the egalitarian level are considerably stronger than those of the third party, implying that low transfers are profitable for the dictators in the TP condition but not in the SP condition. Figure 5 provides the evidence for this claim. It shows the punishment pattern across the SP and the TP condition. The figure illustrates that second parties punish more than third parties for any transfer level below 50, while punishment is generally very low and similar across conditions for transfer levels above 50. These qualitative differences between second and third party punishment are the same regardless of whether the SP-condition or the TP-condition is conducted first.

Figure 5 also indicates that the dictators are strongly sanctioned in both conditions. In fact, the punishment for transfers below 50 in the second party condition is so high that the dictators always earn less money if they give less than 50. To show this, we computed the dictators' expected payoff for every feasible transfer level (see Figure 6). The dictators' average earnings minus the average punishment costs imposed on them yields the expected payoff. Figure 6 shows that the egalitarian transfer maximizes the dictators' payoff in the SP condition. This means that second party punishment is so strong at all transfer levels below 50 that the dictators' gain from a lower transfer is overcompensated by the losses caused by punishment. In the TP condition, the situation is different because transfers of 0 and 10 are more profitable than the other transfer levels.⁶

⁶ Some dictators seem to have anticipated this difference in punishment across treatments. While the modal transfer level is zero in the TP condition, the modal transfer level is 50 in the SP condition. A Wilcoxon signed

Insert Figure 5 and 6 about here

To test whether the differences between second and third party punishment are significant, we ran OLS-regressions with robust standard errors (see Table 3). As in our previous regression-based tests, these standard errors take into account that only the observations across individuals are independent while no independence is assumed for different choices of given individuals. In the regressions, we only used the data from those second and third party conditions that were conducted as first conditions in a session because we detected spillover effects across SP and TP conditions. The punishment level was significantly higher (3.5 deduction points) when the TP condition was conducted as the first condition compared to when it was conducted after the SP condition. This indicates that there was a spillover effect from the SP to the TP condition. To keep this spillover from contaminating our statistical results, the regressions in Table 3 are only based on data from the first condition in a session. Since third party punishment is higher when the TP condition is conducted first, relying on this data makes it more difficult to detect differences between the SP and TP conditions.

The regression in the first column of Table 3 is based on data from the SP condition only. The punishment of the second parties is regressed on the variable D_{neg} which is defined as the maximum of the two numbers (0, 50 – transfer), and on the variable D_{pos} which is defined as the maximum of the two numbers (0, transfer – 50). D_{neg} measures the negative deviation from the egalitarian transfer, i.e., by how much a given transfer is below 50. D_{pos} measures the positive deviation of a given transfer from the egalitarian level. Notice that if D_{neg} is positive D_{pos} must be zero and vice versa. This specification is suggested by Figure 6, which clearly shows that punishment responds differently to transfer levels below or above 50, respectively. A further advantage of this regression is that the constant measures the amount of punishment that exists at the egalitarian transfer level.

The regression for the SP condition in Table 3 shows that both the constant and D_{pos} are insignificant, indicating that punishment is negligible at the egalitarian transfer level and remains so for transfers above 50. However, an increase in D_{neg} by 10 units increases the punishment by 4.54 deductions points for transfers at or below 50, reducing the dictator's income by 13.62 points. This confirms that deviations from the egalitarian transfer were not profitable for the dictator in the SP condition. In the second column of Table 3, we show the regression for the TP condition. We use again D_{neg} and D_{pos} as regressors but we also add the

rank test for matched pairs shows however that – despite the shift in the modal offer – the average offer is not different across conditions. This suggests that, to have an impact on the dictators' behavior, dictators have to experience that low transfers do not pay in the SP condition.

transfer that the third parties received from their own dictator as an explanatory variable. However, the coefficient on “transfer to third parties” is low and insignificant. Likewise, the constant is insignificant in the TP regression. For transfer levels at or below 50, however, an increase in D_{neg} significantly increased the punishment by third parties.

Table 3: Relative strength of third party punishment in the Dictator Game

	Second Party Punishment	Third Party Punishment	Second and Third Party Punishment
Constant	1.676 (.999)	2.076 (2.241)	1.676 (.999)
D_{neg}	.454*** (.087)	.207*** (.061)	.454*** (.087)
D_{pos}	-.025 (.026)	-.070*** (.024)	-.025 (.026)
Transfer to third party		.106 (.085)	
TP-dummy			2.624 (1.667)
$D_{neg} \times$ TP-dummy			-.247** (.105)
$D_{pos} \times$ TP-dummy			-.046 (.035)
No. of observations	264	242	506
Prob > F	.0001	.016	.0000
Adjusted R^2	.373	.211	.309

Note: OLS regressions with clustering on individuals. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.

A comparison of the coefficient for D_{neg} in the SP and the TP condition shows that D_{neg} has a stronger impact in the SP condition. To examine whether this difference is significant, we ran a regression with the data from both conditions (see column three in Table 3). We add a

dummy for the TP condition in this regression. We also interacted the TP dummy with D_{neg} and D_{pos} . The regression shows that the TP dummy is insignificant, suggesting that the punishment level is not significantly different across conditions at the egalitarian transfer. The coefficient for the interaction term $D_{neg} \times TP$ -dummy is significantly negative, however, indicating that punishment is less severe in the TP condition for transfer levels below 50. The small and insignificant coefficient for the interaction between the TP dummy and D_{pos} confirms that punishment remains negligible and does not differ across conditions for transfers above 50.

Up until now, we have examined the aggregate pattern of punishment in both conditions. The aggregate pattern hides some important individual differences, however. When we examine the individual sanctioning patterns, it turns out that there are 4 clusters of people. There are those subjects who never punish. Then there are those who only punish for transfer levels below 50 and never punish for transfer levels above 50. The sanctioning pattern for subjects in this latter category generally increases monotonically in D_{neg} . Thirdly, there are subjects whose sanctions also increase monotonically with D_{neg} but who also sanction dictators who transfer more than 50. In general, their sanctions for transfers above 50 are low but positive. They tend not to sanction all transfer levels above 50 but only some. Finally, there is a small number of remaining subjects who are characterized by rather peculiar sanctioning patterns that do not fall into one of the first three categories. Two subjects, for example, imposed one deduction point on the dictator at all feasible transfer levels. Three other subjects punished those who give little and those who give (close to) everything but not the intermediate transfers.

Table 4 shows the percentage of subjects that belong to the different categories across conditions. In the second party condition, 26% never punished and 39% only punished transfers below 50. It is reversed in the third party condition, indicating that the lower average sanctions for transfers below 50, relative to the SP condition, are also the result of a smaller number of punishers. The fraction of monotone punishers who also punish some transfers levels above 50 is 20% and 26%, respectively.

Table 4: Classification of subjects according to their sanctioning pattern

Type of subject	Second party punishment (N = 46)	Third party punishment (N = 46)
Never punish	26%	39%
Punish only transfers below 50	39%	26%
Monotone punishers who punish also some transfers at or above 50	20%	26%
Others	15%	9%

The comparison between the SP and the TP condition has also implications for the different social preference theories. Since we know already that the model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and the pure reciprocity models fail to capture third party punishment, we concentrate on the other models. The model by Levine predicts that there is no difference between second and third party punishment. The reason is that a given low transfer to the recipient reveals the dictator's selfish or spiteful preferences regardless of whether the recipient (i.e., the second party) or the third party can punish. Therefore Levine's model cannot explain the treatment differences. This contrasts with the Fehr-Schmidt and Falk-Fischbacher model. They predict that third parties punish less than second parties. The payoff difference between the dictator and the potential punisher increases by 2 units under the SP condition for any additional unit kept by the dictator; in the TP condition the payoff difference increases by only 1 unit. This follows simply from the fact that the potential punisher in the SP condition is also the recipient in a DG. Therefore, any additional unit the dictator keeps below the egalitarian transfer level induces more punishment in the SP condition than in the TP condition. The intuition behind this prediction is simply that the non-pecuniary harm for the potential punisher created by greedy transfers is higher in the SP condition than in the TP condition.

This prediction coincides with the predictions of a more psychological approach that stipulates that the anger experienced due to a certain action is given by the level of arousal times the salience of the cue. In our case, the transfer level by the dictator measures the salience of the cue whereas the level of arousal (for a given salience of the cue) is determined

by how much it hurts psychologically to receive a low transfer. Since a low transfer is more harmful in the SP condition it seems reasonable to assume that the level of arousal is also larger. Thus, according to this view, subjects will experience more anger in the SP condition which induces them to punish more severely than in the TP condition.

There is one aspect in the data which neither the Fehr-Schmidt nor the Falk-Fischbacher models predicts satisfactorily. Recall that the punishment by third parties is not significantly affected by the transfer they received from their own dictator (see regression 2 in Table 3). This contradicts both models because the higher the transfer the third party receives from his own dictator, the less reason there is for punishing the dictator in the other group. This is so because the income difference between the third party and the dictator in the other group becomes smaller if the own dictator transfers more to the third party. Note that the insignificant impact of the own dictator's transfer on third party punishment is consistent with Levine's model because the behavior of the own dictator does not affect the inferences about the dictator's preferences in the other group.

5. Second versus third party punishment in the context of cooperation norms

5.1. Methods and experiment design

In order to compare second and third party punishment in the PD, we used a similar design to that in the previous section (see Figure 7). Subjects were randomly assigned to two player groups who played a PD at the first decision stage. This PD was identical to the one in TP-PD. At the beginning of the second decision stage, each player received an additional endowment of 20 points. Then players A and B could sanction each other in the SP condition, while player B could only sanction a player A' from another group and player A could only sanction a player B'' from a third group in the TP condition. Again, we implemented the strategy method in the punishment stage and ruled out reciprocity between the punishers in the TP condition. Note that in order to compare, *ceteris paribus*, second party punishment with third party punishment, it is inevitable that the punishing player can only sanction *one* of the other players – the other player in his own group in the SP condition or one member of another group in the TP condition. This differs from TP-PD, because player C could punish both PD-players in this experiment. As in all previous experiments the subjects were fully informed about the rules of the game.

Insert Figure 7 here

94 subjects participated in this experiment. Each subject participated in both a TP and an SP condition and, to control for spillovers, we reversed the sequence of conditions for half of the subjects. The exchange rate between points and CHF was given by 1 point = CHF 0.3.

Subjects average earnings were CHF 33.40 (\approx US \$ 26.7) and the experiment lasted roughly 75 minutes.

5.2. Results

The main results of the comparison between second and third party punishment in the PD can be summarized as follows: both second and third parties strongly punish the defectors while the punishment of cooperators is negligent. However, second party punishment is much stronger than third party punishment, implying that defection is profitable in the TP but not SP condition. Tables 5 and 6 provide the support for this claim. These tables and all the other statistical analyses in this section are based on the data from the first condition in each experiment. This restriction is imposed because, as in the case of the DG, there are strong spillovers from the first to the second condition. Table 5 indicates the average expenditures of the sanctioning subjects for punishing defectors or cooperators, respectively. The table shows that the average expenditure for sanctioning a defector in the SP condition is 8.40. Thus, the punished subject loses $3 \times 8.4 = 25.2$ points. In contrast, the average expenditure for punishing a cooperator is only 0.67 in the SP condition. There is also a large difference in the punishment of defectors and cooperators in the TP condition. The punishment of cooperators is generally very small while that of defectors is sizeable. These differences are highly significant. Regardless of the treatment condition and regardless of whether the PD partner of the punished subject defected or cooperated in the TP condition, defectors are always punished significantly more than cooperators (Wilcoxon signed rank test, $p < 0.0001$ in all cases). Table 6 further supports this conclusion by showing that the percentage of subjects who punish a defector varies – depending on the condition – between 32.6% and 66.7%, while the percentage of subjects who punishes a cooperator varies between 8.3 and 15.2 percent.

Table 5 and Table 6 also show that punishment is much stronger in the SP condition relative to the TP-condition. Whereas the average expenditure in the SP condition is 8.40, it is 3.09 in the TP condition if the punished defector's PD partner cooperated, and 1.43 if the punished defector's PD partner also defected. Mann Whitney tests indicate that these differences across SP and TP conditions are significant ($p < 0.01$ in all cases). Likewise, the

percentage of subjects who punish defectors is larger in the SP than in the TP condition (see Table 6).

**Table 5: Relative strength of third party punishment in the prisoners' dilemma
(average expenditure of third and second parties for punishment)**

Punished person is a	Second party punishment	Third party punishment if the punished person's PD partner cooperates	Third party punishment if the punished person's PD partner defects
Defector	8.40	3.09	1.43
Cooperator	0.67	0.59	0.69

Table 6: Relative frequency of punishing individuals in the prisoners' dilemma

Punished person is a	Second party punishment	Third party punishment if the punished person's PD partner cooperates	Third party punishment if the punished person's PD partner defects
Defector	66.7% (32 out of 48)	58.7% (27 out of 46)	32.6% (15 out of 46)
Cooperator	8.3% (4 out of 48)	15.2% (7 out of 46)	15.2% (7 out of 46)

The numbers in Tables 5 and 6 imply that defection was not profitable for the defector in the SP condition. The defector's income was on average reduced by $3 \times 8.4 = 25.2$ points while the gain from a defection was only 10 points, generating an overall income reduction of 15.2 points. Therefore, cooperation was the better choice than defection from a purely monetary viewpoint because the small residual punishment imposed on a cooperator in the SP condition caused an income reduction of only $3 \times 0.67 = 2.01$ points. The situation was different for a defector in the TP condition. If the defector's PD partner cooperated, the defector incurred a cost of $3 \times 3.09 = 9.27$. Consequently, defection led to an overall income of $30 + 10 - 9.27 = 30.73$ if the PD-partner cooperated. A cooperative choice, in contrast, led to a small residual

punishment cost of $3 \times 0.59 = 1.77$ so that the overall income from cooperation was $30 - 1.77 = 28.33$. Qualitatively, the same argument holds for the case where a defector's PD partner also defected because third party sanctions were even weaker in this case. Thus, given the punishment pattern, defection in the TP condition was profitable regardless of the PD partner's actions.

Our previous emphasis has been on how much potential punishers are willing to pay to punish defectors relative to cooperators. Another question is whether the willingness to incur costs for punishing defectors depends significantly on whether the punisher himself cooperated or defected. This question is particularly interesting in the TP condition because a cooperator has no direct reason to feel exploited by the defection of an *outside* group member in this condition. However, those subjects who cooperate themselves are perhaps better able to empathize with cooperators in other groups who had to face the defection of their PD partner.

Tables 7 and 8 indicate that both subjects who themselves defect and subjects who themselves cooperate in the PD impose considerable sanctions on the defectors. However, regardless of whether the sanctioning subject is a second or a third party, cooperators punish more frequently than do defectors and impose much stronger sanctions on the defectors. Table 7 splits up the first row of Table 5, and Table 8 splits up the first row of Table 6, according to whether the punisher was a cooperator or a defector. Table 7 shows that cooperators punish defectors considerably more than defectors punish other defectors, regardless of the condition. Yet, defectors also impose considerable punishment on other defectors in some conditions.⁷ For instance, cooperators spend 9.21 points on sanctioning in the SP condition whereas defectors spend “only” 2.67 points. These results are also supported by Table 8, indicating that the percentage of punishing cooperators is considerably higher than the percentage of punishing defectors; among the defectors, however, 27% to 50% also punish other defectors. The differing willingness of cooperators and defectors to punish is significant at the $p = .068$ level in the SP condition (Mann Whitney test). The difference is also significant at the 10 percent level in the TP condition ($p = .081$, Mann Whitney test) if the punished defector's PD

⁷ Intuitively, the presence of punishing defectors may be surprising but there are several plausible reasons why defectors may punish other defectors or even cooperators. Spiteful or competitive individuals (“inequity lovers”) who aim at maximizing the difference between their own payoff and that of the other players punish regardless of whether the other person cooperated or defected. Self-serving biases may also be a reason. Assume, for instance, that a third party defects in her own group because he is a conditional cooperator who only cooperates if he believes that the PD partner will do so. Yet, he has pessimistic beliefs about the PD partner and, therefore, he defects. This third party might nevertheless punish a defector in another group if the defector's PD partner cooperated because he overlooks (or discounts the possibility) that the defector in the other group also might have been a conditional cooperator with pessimistic beliefs.

partner cooperated. The difference is insignificant, however, if the punished defector's PD-partner also defected ($p = .430$, Mann Whitney test). Thus, except for the last case, cooperators punish significantly more but the significance level is only 10 percent. The reason for this is that the number of defectors is generally relatively small, rendering it difficult to reach high significance levels.

Table 7: Who sanctions defectors (average expenditure)

Punisher is a	Punished person is a	Second party punishment	Third party punishment if the punished person's PD partner cooperates	Third party punishment if the punished person's PD partner defects
Cooperator	Defector	9.21	3.65	1.71
Defector	Defector	2.67	1.93	0.87

Table 8: Who sanctions defectors (relative frequency)

Punisher is a	Punished person is a	Second party punishment	Third party punishment if the punished person's PD partner cooperates	Third party punishment if the punished person's PD partner defects
Cooperator	Defector	69% (29 out of 42)	67.7% (21 out of 31)	35.5% (11 out of 31)
Defector	Defector	50% (3 out of 6)	40% (6 out of 15)	26.7% (4 out of 15)

Table 7 enables us to illustrate a potential objection to our comparison of second party and third party sanctions. When we performed this comparison in Table 5 and 6, we did not hold the action of the potential punisher in his own PD group constant across conditions. This follows necessarily from the fact that we did not specify the actions of the punishers in their own PD group in Table 5. Thus we did not test whether a potential punisher *who cooperated in his own PD group* punishes a defector in the SP condition more than one in the TP condition. Yet, it becomes clear that this is indeed the case upon examination of Table 7. A cooperator in the SP condition spends 9.21 points for punishing a defector whereas a cooperator in the TP condition spends “only” 3.65 points for the punishment of a defector

who faces a cooperating PD partner. This difference is significant at all conventional levels ($p = .007$, Mann Whitney test) and contrasts with the case of punishing defectors. Subjects who defect in their own group spend 2.67 points on the punishment of a defector in the SP condition and 1.93 points in the TP condition (in case the PD partner cooperated). This difference is not significant ($p > 0.3$, Mann Whitney test). Thus, cooperators punish defectors much more in the SP condition than in the TP condition whereas defectors punish defectors roughly the same way across conditions.

6. Negative emotions and fairness judgments

Influential social scientists (Hirshleifer 1987, Frank 1988, Elster 1989) have argued that the sanctions which enforce social norms are based on strong emotions. They hypothesized that emotions are the drivers of norm enforcement decisions. Moreover, Elster argued that being the object of negative emotions such as anger causes a large disutility on its own, independent of any material losses. Therefore, the fact whether cooperating or defecting subjects anticipate the emotions triggered by their behavior is of interest. All subjects who participated in the TP condition of the prisoners' dilemma game filled out a questionnaire after the experiment designed to elicit third parties' positive and negative emotions in different hypothetical scenarios. We are aware of the fact that self-reported or predicted emotions need to be treated with caution. It is entirely possible that self reported emotions deviate systematically from the emotions that subjects actually would experience if they were in a particular scenario. However, despite these caveats we believe that subjects' answers to our questions are informative. Even if subjects construe their answers according to prevailing social norms such that they (unconsciously) tell us the emotions they believe they should have in a given situation rather than the emotions they would have, we receive additional information about the social norms that apply in the situation. We believe, therefore, that the results below suggest at least interesting hypotheses regarding the role of emotions in norm enforcement.

We were interested in the perceived positive and negative emotions of third parties towards cooperators and defectors and whether they anticipate other people's emotions if they themselves cooperate and defect. In addition, we also elicited subjects' fairness judgments and their anticipation of others' fairness judgments. Subjects faced different scenarios before answering our questions. A typical scenario designed to elicit their own predicted emotions and fairness judgments was, for instance, the following:

Imagine that the first member of group B transfers 10 points to the second and the second transfers nothing. You now accidentally meet the second member. How do you feel towards this person or his/her decision, respectively?

After reading this scenario, the subjects could indicate their feelings of anger or satisfaction, respectively, on a seven point scale. The scale ranged from “The second member's decision makes me very angry” to “I am very pleased with the second member’s decision” with 5 additional intermediate steps. The scale ranged from ‘very angry’, ‘angry’, ‘somewhat angry’, ‘neither angry nor pleased’ to ‘somewhat ‘pleased’, ‘pleased’, ‘very pleased’. In addition, they could judge the fairness or unfairness of the action of the second member on a seven points scale by selecting one of the following statements: “I think that the decision of the second member is ‘very unfair’, ‘unfair’, ‘somewhat unfair’, ‘neither fair nor unfair’, somewhat fair’, ‘fair’, ‘very fair’.” After the subjects had indicated their answers to these two (sets of) statements, they were confronted with the next scenario. The subjects were given a total of four different scenarios. In scenario 1, they indicated their feelings (judgment) towards a defector who faces a defecting PD partner. In scenario 2, they indicated their feelings (judgment) towards a defector who faced a cooperating PD partner. In scenarios 3 and 4 they indicated their feelings (judgment) towards cooperators who faced defecting (scenario 3) or cooperating (scenario 4) PD-partners.

Another set of questions elicited subjects’ *anticipation* of third parties’ emotions and judgments in the cases where they cooperated and defected. Different scenarios again preceded each pair of questions. As in the previous set of questions, the scenarios outlined the four possible outcomes in a PD. They were phrased as follows:

Imagine that the other member of your group transfers 10 points to you. You transfer nothing to the other member of your group. You now accidentally meet a member of another group who is informed about the transfers in your group. What do you believe this person's feelings are towards you?

After subjects had read this scenario, they indicated the strengths of anger or satisfaction that they anticipated from the third party. The feasible answers ranged from “This person is very angry about my action” to “This person is very pleased about my action. The other feasible categories were "angry", "somewhat angry", "neither angry nor pleased", "somewhat pleased", "pleased". In addition, they also indicated whether the third party judged their behavior as fair or unfair. The feasible categories for the judgment of (un)fairness were the same as those in the previous set of fairness questions.

The results of the questionnaire are presented in Table 9. We have scaled the self reported emotions and judgments from -3 to $+3$ including 0 . The number 0 indicates a neutral statement like “neither fair nor unfair” or “neither angry nor pleased” while negative (positive) numbers indicate negative (positive) emotions or negative (positive) fairness judgments. The main results presented in Table 9 can be summarized as follows. *First*, third parties predict that they will have negative emotions towards defectors and judge the defectors’ action as unfair whereas they predict that they will have positive emotions towards cooperators and they judge their action as fair. This is simply inferred from the fact that defectors are on average assigned negative numbers on our scale whereas cooperators are assigned positive numbers. These results also hold at the individual level. The actions of the defectors virtually never elicit positive predicted emotions while the actions of the cooperators rarely are predicted to elicit negative ones. *Second*, subjects predict that they will have much stronger negative emotions towards defectors whose PD partner cooperates than towards defectors whose PD partner defects. For example, the anger score of defectors who face a cooperator is -1.13 whereas the anger score of defectors who face defectors is “only” $-.52$. Likewise, the unfairness score of defectors whose PD partner cooperates is -1.05 while the score of defectors whose PD-partner defects is only $-.22$. These differences are significant at all conventional levels ($p < .001$, Wilcoxon signed rank test).

Third, the action of the PD partner generally does not affect the predicted emotions triggered by the cooperators and the judgments about them. Regardless of what the PD partner does, the cooperators’ satisfaction and fairness scores are above one and do not vary much with the PD partner’s action. *Finally*, the subjects anticipate the three regularities described above as indicated by the last two rows in Table 9. Defectors predict that third parties have negative emotions towards them and that their actions will be judged as unfair. For instance, defectors predict that third parties have an anger score of -1.32 . Likewise, cooperators anticipate that third parties have positive emotions towards them and that their actions will be judged as fair. Defectors also predict that third parties’ negative emotions are much stronger if the PD partner cooperated than if he defected. These differences in the predicted emotions and judgments of others who are in the third party position are also significant at all conventional levels ($p < .001$, Wilcoxon signed rank test).

Table 9: Fairness judgments and negative emotions in third party punishment

		Towards defectors		Towards cooperators	
		If the defector's PD partner cooperates	If the defector's PD partner defects	If the cooperator's PD partner cooperates	If the cooperator's PD partner defects
Own judgment & predicted own emotions if in the 3 rd party position	Anger versus satisfaction	-1.13	-.52	1.23	1.03
	Fair versus unfair	-1.05	-.22	1.55	1.54
Predicted judgment & emotions of others who are in 3 rd party position	Anger versus satisfaction	-1.32	-.56	1.44	1.06
	Fair versus unfair	-1.46	-.54	1.57	1.47

Note: Judgments and self reported (predicted) emotions are scaled from -3 to +3 including 0, which indicated a neutral judgment or emotion.

The results of our questionnaire are consistent with the view that emotions cause the sanctioning decisions that enforce social norms because the pattern of third party punishment and the emotional pattern fit together nicely. Recall that third parties primarily punish defectors while cooperators are skipped over. If negative emotions induce third parties to punish, then they should report negative emotions when facing a defector and positive emotions when they meet a cooperator. This is exactly what we observe in Table 9. Moreover, third parties punished defectors whose PD partner cooperated much more than those whose PD partner defected. Therefore, if emotions cause sanctions, third parties should report that defectors with a cooperative PD partner trigger stronger negative emotions than do those with a defecting PD partner. Table 9 shows that this is indeed the case. Finally, if subjects are themselves the potential target of a third party punisher, they predict this pattern of negative emotions. This is consistent with the view that subjects are well aware that third parties dislike defection and might well punish them if the subject defects. In this context it is also interesting that the predicted negative emotions and unfairness judgments of others who are in

the third party position are generally stronger than the *own* predicted negative emotions and unfairness judgments (compare the first two rows with the second two rows in Table 9). While these differences are not significant it nevertheless shows how strongly subjects assume that defection triggers anger and is viewed as unfair.

7. Concluding remarks

In this paper, we studied the enforcement mechanisms behind social norms. Our results indicate that a large percentage of subjects is willing to enforce distribution and cooperation norms even though they incur costs and reap no economic benefit from their sanctions. Subjects do this even though they have not been directly harmed by the norm violation. Thus, third party sanctions provide a further important example for the notion of strong reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter 2002; Gintis et al. 2003, Fehr & Fischbacher 2003). Our questionnaire results are consistent with the view that third party sanctions are driven by negative emotions and negative fairness judgments towards norm violators. Moreover, subjects also predict that the third parties will exhibit negative emotions and that they will judge norm violations as unfair. We also show that sanctions by second parties directly harmed are much stronger than are third party sanctions. The observed second party sanctions are strong enough to render norm violations unprofitable. In contrast, the sanctions of a single third party do not suffice to render norm violations unprofitable. Thus, in the context of our experiment, more than one third party is needed to enforce the norm. However, this condition is probably met frequently in real life. Therefore, taken together our results suggest that altruistic third party sanctions are likely to be a powerful enforcement mechanism for social norms.

We also believe that our experiments can be a useful tool for the study of the content and the strength of distribution and cooperation norms across different societies and cultures. It is, for instance, well known that many small-scale societies are characterized by food-sharing norms (Gurven, in press). Our third party punishment experiments may be a useful instrument for examining the forces behind food-sharing and other cooperative activities. Finally, we believe that the experiments can form the basis for the construction of convincing proximate and ultimate models of human altruism. Such theories should be able to explain the prevailing patterns of third party punishment and the punishment patterns associated with the evolution of social norms. Proximate models of pure reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, in press) as well as the inequity aversion model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are clearly unable to account for our data. In contrast, the models by Levine (1998), Fehr and

Schmidt (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (1999) predict most, but not all, aspects of our data quite well.

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General Instructions for Participants A

Welcome to this scientific experiment in economics.

By carefully reading the following instructions, you can – depending on the decisions you and the other participants make – earn money in addition to the 10 francs start-up capital you receive as a fee for your participation. It is, therefore, of importance that you accurately pay attention to the instructions given below. Please direct any questions to us.

Communication with other participants is absolutely prohibited during the experiment. The violation of this rule automatically leads to the exclusion from both the experiment itself and all ensuing payments.

We do not deal with francs, but with points during this experiment. The total amount of points earned during the experiment will, on completion of the experiment, be converted (and paid out) into francs at the rate of

1 point equals 30 centimes.

This experiment involves 3 different types of participants: participants A, participants B, and participants C. **You are a participant A.** You will be dealing with a participant B and with a participant C in the course of the experiment. You will never be aware of the identities of participant B nor C during or after the experiment; similarly, participants B and C will never learn with whom they interacted, ensuring the total anonymity of the decision makers. Likewise, all earnings will be paid out anonymously on completion of the experiment, i.e. no participant learns how much you earned in the experiment.

Specific Instructions for the Experiment Procedure

The following describes the experiment's two stages.

Stage one

In this stage, participants A are the sole decision-makers. As a participant A, you get an endowment of 100 points at the beginning stage one. Participant C gets 50 points, and participant B gets no endowment.

You must decide how many of the 100 points you wish to assign to participant B. You can give participant B a number of points between 0 and 50 in a multiple of tens, i.e. 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 points.

If, for example, you grant participant B 40 points, your income at the end of stage one will amount to 60 points, and participant B's income will amount to 40 points. If you accord him 10 points, your income will be 90 points, and the income of participant B will be 10 points at the end of stage one. If you grant B 0 points, your income at the end of stage one will amount to 100 points while participant B's equals 0 points.

Stage two

In stage two, only the participants C are the decision-makers. As soon as you have made your decision, participant C is informed of how many points you assigned to participant B. Now, participant C can transfer deduction points to you. Each deduction point charged to you as participant A diminishes your income by 3 points, and participant C's income is reduced by 1 point. Participant C can transfer a number of deduction points between 0 and 50.

Suppose participant C charges 2 deduction points: your income will be reduced by 6 points while participant C's income will be reduced by 2 points. If participant C transfers 19 deduction points to you, your income diminishes by 57 points and participant C's income is reduced by 19 points.

This is how we calculate participants A's, B's, and C's respective incomes:

Participant A's income amounts to

- + 100 points (participant A's endowment)
- number of points assigned to participant B by participant A
- 3 times the number of deduction points transferred to participant A by participant C

Participant B's income amounts to

- + number of points you assign to participant B

Participant C's income amounts to

- + 50 (participant C's endowment)
- number of deduction points participant C charges you

Please note that your earnings may be negative, in which case the points will be deducted from your start-up capital.

Procedure on the Computer

In stage one, you have to decide how many points you want to assign to participant B. The following screen will be displayed:

You are participant A

You may transfer 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 points to participant B

How many points to you want to transfer? |....

OK

In stage 2, participant C is informed of the number of points you transferred to B and decides how many – if any – deduction points he wants to charge you.

As soon as participant C has made his choice, the experiment is completed.

You, then, will be shown the following screen:

You are participant A		
Your endowment	100	
Number of points you assigned participant B	
Number of deduction points transferred to you by participant C	
Your income in points		
	
continue		

Before the experiment can begin, you must complete the control questionnaire located on the next page. Upon completion, notify the tester by raising your hand. The experiment will begin as soon as every participant has successfully answered all control questions.

Control Questions

1. Participant A assigns 0 points to participant B.
 - a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
 - b) Participant C charges participant A with 30 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
2. Participant A assigns 40 points to participant B.
 - a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
 - b) Participant C charges participant A with 15 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?

Are there any questions?

General Instructions for Participants B

Welcome to this scientific experiment in economics.

Depending on the decisions of the other participants, you can earn money in addition to the 10 francs start-up capital you receive as a fee for your participation. Please direct any questions to us.

Communication with other participants is absolutely prohibited during the experiment. The violation of this rule automatically leads to the exclusion from both the experiment itself and all ensuing payments.

We do not deal with francs, but with points during this experiment. The total amount of points earned during the experiment will, on completion of the experiment, be converted (and paid out) into francs at the rate of

1 point equals 30 centimes.

This experiment comprises 3 different types of participants: participants A, participants B, and participants C. **You are a participant B.** In the course of the experiment you will be dealing with a participant A and with a participant C. You will never be aware of the identities of participant A nor C during or after the experiment; similarly, participants A and C will never learn with whom they interacted, ensuring the total anonymity of the decision makers. Likewise, all earnings will be paid out anonymously on completion of the experiment, i.e. no participant learns how much you earned in the experiment.

Specific Instructions for the Experiment Procedure

The following describes the experiment's two stages.

Stage one

In this stage, participants A are the sole decision-makers. At the beginning of stage one, participants A get 100 points each as an endowment. Participants C get 50 points as an endowment, whereas you as a participant B get no endowment.

Participant A must decide how many of his 100 points he wishes to assign to you. He can transfer to you a number of points between 0 and 50 in a multiple of tens, i.e. 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 points.

If, for example, participant A grants you 40 points, his income at the end of stage one will amount to 60 points, and your income will amount to 40 points. If he accords you 10 points, his income will be 90 points, and your own income will be 10 points. If he grants you 0 points, his income, at the end of stage one will result in 100 points, and your own income will result in 0 points.

Stage two

In stage two, only participant C is the decision-makers. As soon as A has made his decision, participant C is informed of how many points participant A assigned to you. Now, participant C can transfer deduction points to participant A. Each deduction point participant C transfers to participant A diminishes participant C's income by 1 point and participant A's income by 3 points. Participant C can transfer a number of deduction points between 0 and 50.

Suppose participant C transfers 2 deduction points to participant A; participant C's income will be reduced by 2 points, and participant A's income will be reduced by 6 points. If participant C assigns 19 deduction points to participant A, participant C's income is diminished by 19 points and participant A's income is reduced by 57 points.

This is how we calculate participants A's, B's, and C's respective incomes:

Participant A's income amounts to

- + 100 points (participant A's endowment)
- number of points assigned to participant B by participant A
- 3 times the number of deduction points transferred to participant A by participant C

Participant B's income amounts to

- + number of points assigned to participant B by participant A

Participant C's income amounts to

- + 50 (participant C's endowment)
- number of deduction points charged participant A by participant C

Procedure on the Computer

In stage one, participant A has to decide on how many points to grant participant B. In stage two, participants C decide on the deduction points to be transferred to participants A. You, as a participant B, have no decision to make. But you must indicate what you believe that participants A and C will decide, i.e. you must estimate the number of points participant A will grant you, and you must estimate how many deduction points participant C will transfer to participant A. This estimate is to be made for every possible decision A can make. You must enter your estimates on the screen below. In the box to the right of the number 0, you enter the number of deduction points you believe participant C transfers to participant A in the event that participant A grants you 0 points. In the box beside the number 10 you enter the number of deduction points you believe participant C transfers to participant A in the event that participant A grants you 10 points. In the last box you enter the number of deduction points you think participant C charges participant A in the event that participant A grants you 50 points.

You are participant B

What do you believe is participant A deciding?
 How many points is he granting you?

How do you believe is participant C going to decide?

Number of points participant A grants you	Number of deduction points participant C transfers to participant A
0	
10	
20	
30	
40	
50	

OK

As soon as you have made your decision, the following screen informs you of the results of the experiment:

You are participant B
Number of points granted you by participant A
Number of points transferred to participant A by participant C
Your income in points
	continue

Before the experiment can begin, you must complete the control questionnaire located on the next page. Upon completion, notify the tester by raising your hand. The experiment will begin as soon as every participant has successfully answered all control questions.

Control Questions

1. Participant A assigns 0 points to participant B.
 - a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
 - b) Participant C charges participant A with 30 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
2. Participant A assigns 40 points to participant B.
 - a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
 - b) Participant C charges participant A with 15 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?

Are there any questions?

General Instructions for Participants C

Welcome to this scientific experiment in economics.

By carefully reading the following instructions, you can – depending on the decisions you and the other participants make – earn money in addition to the 10 francs start-up capital you receive as a fee for your participation. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that you accurately pay attention to the instructions given below. Please direct any questions to us.

Communication with other participants is absolutely prohibited during the experiment. The violation of this rule automatically leads to the exclusion from both the experiment itself and all ensuing payments.

We do not deal with francs, but with points during this experiment. The total amount of points earned during the experiment will, on completion of the experiment, be converted (and paid out) into francs at the rate of

1 point equals 30 centimes.

This experiment involves 3 different types of participants: participants A, participants B, and participants C. **You are a participant C.** In the course of the experiment you will be dealing with a participant A and with a participant B. You will never be aware of the identities of participant A nor B during or after the experiment; similarly, participants A and B will never learn with whom they interacted, ensuring the total anonymity of the decision makers. Likewise, all earnings will be paid out anonymously on completion of the experiment, i.e. no participant learns how much you earned in the experiment.

Specific Instructions for the Experiment Procedure

The following describes the experiment's two stages.

Stage one

In this stage participants A are the sole decision-makers. At the beginning of the stage, participant A gets 100 points as an endowment. You as a participant C get 50 points as an endowment. Participant B gets no endowment.

Participant A must decide how many of his 100 points he wishes to assign to participant B. He can transfer to participant B a number of points between 0 and 50 in a multiple of tens, i.e. 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 points.

If, for example, participant A grants participant B 40 points, his income at the end of stage one will amount to 60 points, and participant B's income will amount to 40 points. If he grants participant B 10 points, his income will be 90 points, and participant B's income will be 10 points at the end of stage one. If he grants participant B 0 points, his income, at the end of stage one, will result in 100 points, and participant B's own income will result in 0 points.

Stage two

In stage two, you, as participant C, are the only one to make a decision. As soon as A has made his decision, you are informed of how many points participant A assigned to participant B. Now, you can transfer deduction points to participant A. Each deduction point you transfer to participant A diminishes your income by 1 point and participant A's income by 3 point. You can assign a number of deduction points between 0 and 50.

Suppose you transfer 2 deduction points to participant A, your income will be reduced by 2 points, and participant A's income will be reduced by 6 points. If you assign 19 deduction points to participant A, your income is diminished by 19 points and participant A's income is reduced by 57 points.

This is how we calculate participants A's, B's, and C's respective incomes:

Participant A's income amounts to

- + 100 points (participant A's endowment)
- number of points assigned to participant B by participant A
- 3 times the number of deduction points you transfer to participant A

Participant B's income amounts to

- + number of points participant A assigns to participant B

Participant C's income amounts to

- + 50 (participant C's endowment)
- number of deduction points you charge participant A

Procedure on the Computer

In stage one, participant A has to decide on how many points to grant participant B. In stage two, you have to decide how many deduction points you wish to transfer to participant A. You must decide on the amount of deduction points to be transferred before you know participant A's decision. This means that you must indicate if and how many deduction points you want to transfer to participant A for all of his possible decisions. You must determine if and how many deduction points you plan to transfer to A in the event that A grants 0 or 10 or 20 points, etc. to participant B. You enter your decision on the screen below: In the first box you enter the number of deduction points you transfer to participant A in the event that A grants participant B 0 points. In the second box you enter the number of points you transfer to participant A in the event that A grants participant B 10 points. In the bottom box you enter the number of deduction points you transfer to participant A in the event that A grants participant B 50 points.

You are participant C

Please determine the number of deduction points, if any, you transfer to participant A.

Number of points participant A grants participant B	Number of deduction points you transfer to participant A
0	
10	
20	
30	
40	
50	

OK

As you do not know how many points participant A transferred to participant B, any of the six possibilities may occur, and you have to make a decision for each. Which of your decisions ultimately applies depends on the actual amount of points participant A grants. If, for example, A grants B 30 points, both your and A's incomes are determined by the decision you make for this eventuality.

As soon as you have made your decision, the following screen informs you about the results of the experiment:

You are participant C		
Your endowment		50
Number of points granted participant B by participant A	
Number of deduction points charged participant A by you	
Your income of points	
continue		

Before the experiment can begin, you must complete the control questionnaire located on the next page. Upon completion, notify the tester by raising your hand. The experiment will begin as soon as every participant has successfully answered all control questions.

Control Questions

1. Participant A assigns 0 points to participant B.
 - a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
 - b) Participant C charges participant A with 30 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
2. Participant A assigns 40 points to participant B.
 - a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?
 - b) Participant C charges participant A with 15 deduction points.
 - What is participant A's income?
 - What is participant B's income?
 - What is participant C's income?

Are there any questions?

General Instructions for Participants A

Welcome to this scientific experiment in economics.

By carefully reading the following instructions you can – depending on the decisions you and the other participants will make – earn money in addition to the 10 francs start-up capital you receive as a fee for your participation. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that you accurately pay attention to the instructions given below. Please direct any questions to us.

Communication with other participants is absolutely prohibited during the experiment. The violation of this rule automatically leads to the exclusion from both the experiment itself and all ensuing payments.

We do not deal with francs, but with points during this experiment. Thus, each income will, be temporarily calculated in points. The total amount of the points earned during the experiment will, on completion of the experiment, be converted into francs at the rate of

1 point equals 37 centimes.

At the end of the experiment you will receive the equivalent of the points earned during the process plus the 10 francs in **cash** for participating in this experiment.

This experiment involves 3 different types of participants: participants A, participants B, and participants C. **You are a participant A.** At the beginning of the experiment groups of two – consisting of one participant A and one participant B each – are formed. You thus form a group with a participant B. The experiment consists of two stages. In stage one, both you, as participant A, and your associated participant B must decide **if you want to transfer points to the other group member or if you want to keep the points for yourselves.**

Your group of two, consisting of you and a participant B, is linked with a participant C. Participant C is in a position to observe which decision you and participant B make. In stage two, participant C will be able to transfer **deduction points** both to you and participant B. In the event of participant C transferring deduction points, the income of the person being the recipient of deduction points will be reduced. After stage two the experiment is completed.

None of the participants will ever be aware of the identities of the other participants, either during or after the experiments, ensuring total anonymity of all persons involved.

Below you find specific instructions for the experiments procedure.

Stage one of the Experiment

You are linked in a group of two with another member – participant B. At the beginning of stage one, you and participant B each receive an endowment of **10 points**, which can either be withheld or transferred to the other group member. If you keep 10 points to yourself, you will earn exactly 10 points. If you transfer the 10 points, we will triple this amount, i.e. participant B gets 30 points. It works in exactly the same way the other way around: if participant B transfers 10 points to you, we will triple them, and you get 30 points.

As soon as you and participant B have made your choices, the respective incomes from stage one are determined. There are four possibilities:

	Your income from stage 1	Participant B's income from stage 1
1) Both you and participant B withhold the 10 points	10 points	10 points
2) Both you and participant B transfer the 10 points	30 points	30 points
3) You transfer the 10 points, participant B withholds the 10 points	0 points	40 points
4) You withhold the 10 points, participant B transfers the 10 points	40 points	0 points

During stage 1, you enter your decision on a screen (see next page). There are two boxes marked “0 points” and “10 points” in the middle of the screen. Choose one of them with a mouse click. Activate the OK button when you are done. As long as the OK button is not activated, you can revise your decision.

Stage 1 of the experiment

You are participant A

How many points do you want to transfer to the other member of your group?

0 points
 10 points

OK

As soon as all group members have made their decision, we move on to stage 2.

Stage two of the Experiment

At the beginning of stage 2 all participants receive an additional endowment. This endowment amounts to 15 points each for participant A and participant B, and to 40 points for participant C. Thus, you are endowed with an extra capital of 15 points. In stage two, participant C can reduce both participant A's and participant B's income by **transferring deduction points**. However, participant C can leave A's and B's income **unchanged** by transferring no deduction points. And finally, participant C can transfer deduction points individually to participant A or B alone. Let us describe the consequences in incomes resulting from the transfer of deduction points:

How to calculate incomes at stage two of the experiment

If participant C transfers deduction points to participant A or participant B, he does so at an expense equaling the points transferred. In addition, the incomes of participants A and B are reduced by three times the amount of the points transferred. If, for example, participant C transfers 2 deduction points to A and 5 deduction points to B, it costs C $2 + 5 = 7$ points, while A's income is reduced by $2*3 = 6$ points, and B's income is reduced by $5*3 = 15$ points. If participant C transfers 2 deduction points to A, but no deduction points to B, it costs participant C 2 points, while only participant A's income is reduced by $2*3 = 6$ points. In the event that participant C transfers no deduction points at all, he suffers no cost, and neither A's nor B's income is reduced. Participant C can transfer up to 20 deduction points to participant A and up to 20 deduction points to participant B.

These are the resulting incomes on conclusion of the experiment:

Total income of participant A:	
Income from stage 1	
+ endowment of 15 points	
– 3 times the deduction points transferred by C	
Total income of participant B:	
Income from stage 1	
+ endowment of 15 points	
– 3 times the deduction points transferred by C	
Total income of participant C:	
Endowment of 40 points	
– deduction points transferred to A	
– deduction points transferred to B	

After participant C has determined the deduction points he wants to transfer in stage two of the experiment, a screen (see below) will inform you of the transfers of points you and participant B decided upon at stage one, as well as of the amount of deduction points participant C transferred to you. Moreover, you will be told your income from this experiment.

Your transfer of points in stage 1
Transfer of points by the other member of your group in stage 1
Your income from stage 1
Endowment in stage two of the experiment	15
Reduction of income due to the deduction points transferred to you
Your total income
	continue

Control Questions

***You must answer every question. Please write down the entire calculation.
Direct any questions to the experimenters!***

1. In stage one of the experiment, A and B each transfer 0 points. Participant C, at stage two, charges no deduction points. What is the income of the following at the conclusion of the experiment?

Participant A
Participant B
Participant C

2. In stage one of the experiment, A and B each transfer 10 points. Participant C charges no deduction points in stage two,. What is the income of the following at the conclusion of the experiment?

Participant A
Participant B
Participant C

3. In stage one of the experiment, A transfers 0 points and B transfers 10 points. Participant C transfers 4 deduction points to A and 12 deduction points to B in stage two. What is the income of the following at the conclusion of the experiment?

Participant A
Participant B
Participant C

4. In stage one of the experiment, A transfers 10 points and B transfers 10 points. Participant C transfers 6 deduction points to A and 0 deduction points to B in stage two. What is the income of the following at the conclusion of the experiment?

Participant A
Participant B
Participant C

General Instructions for Participants C

Welcome to this scientific experiment in economics.

By carefully reading the following instructions you can – depending on the decisions you and the other participants will make – earn money in addition to the 10 francs start-up capital you receive as a fee for your participation. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that you accurately pay attention to the instructions given below. Please direct any questions to us.

Communication with other participants is absolutely prohibited during the experiment. The violation of this rule automatically leads to the exclusion from both the experiment itself and all ensuing payments.

We do not deal with francs, but with points during this experiment. Thus, each income will, be temporarily calculated in points. The total amount of the points earned during the experiment will, on completion of the experiment, be converted into francs at the rate of

1 point equals 37 centimes.

At the end of the experiment you will receive the equivalent of the points earned during the process plus the 10 francs in **cash** for participating in this experiment.

This experiment involves 3 different types of participants: participants A, participants B, and participants C. **You are a participant C.** At the beginning of the experiment groups of two - consisting each of one participant A and one participant B – are formed. **You are not a member of such a group.** However, you will be informed of the decisions which participants A and B of a specific group make. The experiment consists two stages. In stage one, both participants A and B grouped with you must decide **if they want to transfer points to the respective other participant of their group or if they want to keep the points for themselves.**

You, as a participant C, are linked to a group of two and you are informed of the decisions participants A and B make. At stage two, you will be able to transfer **deduction points** to both participants A and B. In the event that you charge deduction points, the income of the recipient of such deduction points will be reduced. The experiment is completed after stage two.

None of the participants will ever be aware of the identities of the other participants, either during or after the experiments, ensuring total anonymity of all persons involved.

Below you find specific instructions for the experiments procedure.

Stage one of the Experiment

Participant A and participant B are joined in a group of two. At the beginning of stage one, both participants A and B get an endowment of **10 points**, which they can either withhold or transfer to the other member of the group. If a participant keeps the 10 points to himself, he earns exactly these 10 points. If he transfers the 10 points to the other participant, we will triple the amount, i.e. this other participant gets 30 points.

As soon as participants A and B have made their choices, the respective incomes resulting from stage one are determined. There are four possibilities:

	A's income from stage 1	B's income from stage 1
1) Both A and B withhold the 10 points	10 points	10 points
2) Both A and B transfer the 10 points	30 points	30 points
3) A transfers and B withholds the 10 points	0 points	40 points
4) A withholds and B transfers the 10 points	40 points	0 points

As soon as A and B have made their decision, we go on to stage 2.

Stage two of the Experiment

At the beginning of stage two all participants receive an additional endowment. This endowment amounts to 15 points each for participant A and participant B, and to 40 points for participant C. Thus, you are endowed with a capital of 40 points. At stage two, you, as participant C, can reduce both participant A's and participant B's income by **transferring deduction points**. However, you also can leave A's and B's income **unchanged** by transferring no deduction points. And finally, you can transfer deduction points individually to participant A or B alone.

The exact procedure is described below. Let us, for the moment, describe the consequences for the incomes resulting from the transfer of deduction points:

How to calculate incomes at stage two of the experiment

If you, as participant C, transfer deduction points to participant A or participant B, you do so at an expense equaling the points transferred. In addition, the incomes of participants A or B are reduced by three times the amount of the points transferred. If, for example, you transfer 2 deduction points to A and 5 deduction points to B, it costs you $2 + 5 = 7$ points, while A's income is reduced by $2 \cdot 3 = 6$ points, and B's income is reduced by $5 \cdot 3 = 15$ points. If you transfer 2 deduction points to A, but no deduction points to B, it costs you 2 points, while only participant A's income is reduced by $2 \cdot 3 = 6$ points. In the event that you transfer no deduction points at all, you suffer no cost, and neither A's nor B's income is reduced. You can transfer up to 20 deduction points to participant A and up to 20 deduction points to participant B.

These are the resulting incomes on conclusion of the experiment:

Total income of participant A:

Income from stage 1
+ endowment of 15 points
– 3 times the deduction points transferred by C

Total income of participant B:

Income from stage 1
+ endowment of 15 points
– 3 times the deduction points transferred by C

Total income of participant C:

Endowment of 40 points
– deduction points transferred to A
– deduction points transferred to B

How to make your input at stage two

In stage one, both participants A and B decide whether or not they want to transfer their 10 points. You, as participant C, must decide on how many, if any, deduction points you want to charge each particular participant **before** you know their, A's and B's, decision made in stage one.

This means that you will have to indicate if you want to charge deduction points to the two members of the group for each possible case. There are four possibilities:

- Case 1:** Participant A and participant B transferred 0 points to each other
- Case 2:** Participant A transferred 0 points and participant B transferred 10 points
- Case 3:** Participant A transferred 10 points and participant B transferred 0 points
- Case 4:** Participant A and participant B transferred 10 points to each other

You must decide if and how many, deduction points to transfer to the two members of the group for **all** of the four possibilities. To do this, you will be **shown 4** screens corresponding exactly to the four possibilities described above. As an example, we demonstrate screen 2 (see below) corresponding to case 2, in which participant A transferred 0 points to B and participant B transferred 10 points to A. Enter the deduction points, if any, you want to charge participant A and participant B. The screen is arranged as follows:

Stage two of the Experiment	Case 2 of 4 possible cases	
Please decide for this case whether or not you want to transfer deduction points to the two members of the group, if any		
	Participant A	Participant B
Transfer of points	0	10
Incomes resulting from stage 1 for group B	40	0
How many deduction points to you transfer to the two members of the group?
		OK

- In the **first row** (“Transfer of points”) you see the points which participant A and participant B transferred to each other.
- The **second row** (“Incomes resulting from stage 1”) shows the incomes of the two group members resulting from their decisions made at stage one. Below the title “Participant A” you see participant A’s income, in the next column you see participant B’s income.
- You enter your own decision (“How many deduction points to you transfer”) in the **third row**. You must make an entry into both columns: type any number between 0 and 20 in the respective boxes. In the event that you, for instance, do not wish to change A’s income, enter 0; if you wish to transfer 11 deduction points to participant B, enter “11” into the box, etc.

First, you decide for case 1. As soon as you are done, the second screen (case 2) appears, then the third (case 3), and finally the fourth (case 4). Altogether, you will make four decisions on the transfer of deduction points on four 4 different screens.

Participants A and B, of course, actually only chose **one** combination of transfers, meaning that only one of the four possible cases will apply. The choices which participants A and B actually make determine the costs which you incur from the transfer of deduction points.

Suppose case 1 occurred (both members transferred 0 points): screen 1 is relevant for your entry of deduction points, meaning that the number of deduction points you choose in case 1 will determine the earnings to be paid out to you and participants A and B. In the occurrence of case 3, your decision made on screen 3 will be relevant to the respective payments, etc.

After stage two of the experiment, you will be shown a screen (see below) indicating the number of points transferred by participant A and participant B, as well as the number of deduction points you actually transferred to A and B. In addition, you will be informed of your income attained in both stages.

Number of points transferred by A
Number of points transferred by B
Endowment
Deduction points transferred to A
Deduction points transferred to B
Your total income
	continue

The experiment is concluded after the display of this screen.
Are there any questions?

Control Questions

*You must answer every question. Please write down the entire calculation.
Direct any questions to the testers!*

- In stage one of the experiment, A and B each transfer 0 points. Participant C, at stage two, charges no deduction points. What is the income of the following at the conclusion of the experiment?

Participant A
 Participant B
 Participant C
- In stage one of the experiment, A and B each transfer 10 points. Participant C charges no deduction points in stage two. What is the income of the following at the conclusion of the experiment?

Participant A
 Participant B
 Participant C
- In stage one of the experiment, A transfers 0 points and B transfers 10 points. Participant C transfers 4 deduction points to A and 12 deduction points to B in stage two. What is the income of the following at the conclusion of the experiment?

Participant A
 Participant B
 Participant C
- In stage one of the experiment, A transfers 10 points and B transfers 10 points. Participant C transfers 6 deduction points to A and 0 deduction points to B in stage two. What is the income of the following at the conclusion of the experiment?

Participant A
 Participant B
 Participant C

Figure 1: Percentage of third parties who punish in the dictator game




Figure 2: Pattern of third party punishment in the dictator game




Figure 3: Distribution of actual and expected transfers in the dictator game





Figure 4: The comparison of second and third party punishment in the dictator game.

Second Party Punishment



Third Party Punishment





Figure 5: Comparison of second and third party punishment




Figure 6: Expected payoffs of dictators under second and third party punishment







Figure 7: The comparison of second and third party punishment in the prisoners' dilemma.

Second Party Punishment



Third Party Punishment



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