Fixing Russia's Banks: A Proposal for Growth
()
About this ebook
Related to Fixing Russia's Banks
Related ebooks
Out of the Red: Investment and Capitalism in Russia Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Meltdown: Inside the Soviet Economy Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsPutinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Putin's Labor Dilemma: Russian Politics between Stability and Stagnation Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Future of Russia Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsRise and Fall of the Leninist State: A Marxist History of the Soviet Union Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5American Enterprise in Foreign Markets: Studies of Singer and International Harvester in Imperial Russia Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsPioneers for Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization, 1885-1913 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsSuperpower China – Understanding the Chinese world power from Asia: History, Politics, Education, Economy and Military Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Failure of Laissez Faire Capitalism and Economic Dissolution of the West Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Sovereign Wealth Funds: A complete guide to state-owned investment funds Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Road to Global Prosperity Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Incentives and Institutions: The Transition to a Market Economy in Russia Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMarkets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsImperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Bloody Oil Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsTwenty-first-century capital: Critical post-Soviet Marxist reflections Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsFinancial Crisis, Contagion, and Containment: From Asia to Argentina Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Anne Garrels' Putin Country: A Journey into The Real Russia | Summary Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsCapital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsGlobal Fortune: The Stumble and Rise of World Capitalism Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsPost-Imperium: A Eurasian Story Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsOn the Emergence of the New-Imperialist Countries Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsGale Researcher Guide for: Emergence of the BRIC Economies Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Conundrum of Russian Capitalism: The Post-Soviet Economy in the World System Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Uncertain Futures: An Assessment Of The Conditions Of The Present Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsTowards Market Economies: The IMF and the Economic Transition in Russia and Other Former Soviet Countries Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsAlienation and the Soviet Economy: The Collapse of the Socialist Era Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Imperialism and the development myth: How rich countries dominate in the twenty-first century Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5
Banks & Banking For You
A History of Central Banking and the Enslavement of Mankind Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Secrets of the Federal Reserve Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Win In Court Every Time Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Bitcoin Standard: The Decentralized Alternative to Central Banking Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Lords of Easy Money: How the Federal Reserve Broke the American Economy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Billion Dollar Whale: the bestselling investigation into the financial fraud of the century Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Freedom from Tyranny Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/52019 Business Credit with no Personal Guarantee: Get over 200K in Business Credit without using your SSN Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The SBA Loan Book: The Complete Guide to Getting Financial Help Through the Small Business Administration Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Discover The Dark Secrets of Private Banking and Federal Reserve (FED) by Learning The Art of Printing Money Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One: How Corporate Executives and Politicians Looted the S&L Industry Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5God's Bankers: A History of Money and Power at the Vatican Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Mortgages 101: Quick Answers to Over 250 Critical Questions About Your Home Loan Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Delinquent: Inside America's Debt Machine Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsPrinciples of Economics Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMoney Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5How to Open Your Bank Account in the United States: Yes to Entrepreneurs ®, #3 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsBe Your Own Bank: Hidden in Plain Sight Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsInvestment Banking For Dummies Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Anatomy of the Swipe: Making Money Move Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Straight to Hell: True Tales of Deviance, Debauchery, and Billion-Dollar Deals Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Money Hackers: How a Group of Misfits Took on Wall Street and Changed Finance Forever Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5How the Other Half Banks: Exclusion, Exploitation, and the Threat to Democracy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Your Score: An Insider's Secrets to Understanding, Controlling, and Protecting Your Credit Score Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Title is Unimportant Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Silo Effect: The Peril of Expertise and the Promise of Breaking Down Barriers Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5
Reviews for Fixing Russia's Banks
0 ratings0 reviews
Book preview
Fixing Russia's Banks - Michael S. Bernstam
Index
INTRODUCTION
Since the breakup of the Soviet empire in 1991, Russia has attempted but failed to develop a real market economy. The Russian economy has experienced a massive (40 percent) contraction in national income and consumption. Opportunities for sustained growth have been derailed by repeated failures of economic policy. The ostensible major economic reforms that were carried out—privatization, removal of price controls, foreign trade liberalization, reducing inflation—did not generate the widely expected prosperity.¹
The Coming Russian Boom,² the title of a book written in 1996, reflects a widely held view that economic growth in Russia is inevitable. That inevitability is found in the country’s highly educated population, the high savings rate of its people, and, most important, its vast natural resources, especially oil, gas, and strategic metals. In addition, Russia appears to have made perceptible progress in attaining macroeconomic stability by bringing inflation under control.
So why has the boom not yet come? The explanation lies, in large measure, in Russia’s failure to develop a financial system independent of the government, specifically, a real commercial banking system, which is an essential component of a market economy. To redress that problem, we set forth a proposal for reforming Russia’s financial markets that strives to establish a real banking system.
The central theme of this book is simply put. Compared with Western market economies, banks in the Russian Federation (hereafter Russia) do not engage in normal banking practices of accepting deposits and making loans, do not facilitate normal investment, and therefore do not contribute to growth. Russian banks are not really banks at all. They have the look and feel of banks but are better described as nonbank banks or pseudo-banks—we prefer the term ersatz, or inferior imitation, banks. Their owners and managers may use the name banks, but these institutions are not banks. Rather, they have served since 1991 as financial arms of the government and the Central Bank of Russia, distributing and reallocating resources to favored individuals, companies, groups, and industries. They play a role in economic development but one unique to Russia and similar countries, in that the banks themselves are the principal instruments of ownership, management, and subsidies and are the chief beneficiaries of the transition. This strategy has not yet brought visible economic improvement to the rank and file of the Russian people.
Why do we attach such importance to banks? Apart from their normal role of allocating resources by accepting deposits from the public and making loans to enterprises, banks also establish clear boundaries between the public
and the private.
A defining characteristic of socialism is the unity, commonality, or indivisibility of the public and private. Under socialism, all resources were owned or controlled by the state and all production was financed by the state. A starting point of transition economies is to create private ownership and separate the financing of production from the government. The establishment of real commercial banks, independent of the government, becomes the vehicle to break up the financial chain of socialism. Banks create the sovereignty of private individuals in the economy by lifting households to the role of reigning lenders, thereby replacing the government, which is relegated to a more limited role of issuing money and performing other legitimate public endeavors.
The book has four chapters. Chapter 1 provides some background material on Russian economic conditions. Chapter 2 covers 1991–1995, what we term the era of nonmonetary and ersatz banking systems. Chapter 3 encompasses 1996–1997, which saw the slow emergence of a monetary regime but during which real commercial banks failed to develop. Chapter 4 looks at 1998 and beyond, offers some ideas about how to convert Russia’s ersatz banks into true banks, and assesses the prospects for Russia’s financial system if the current system remains in place.
1. The authors would like to thank Thomas E. MaCurdy of the Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University, for his valuable insights that we incorporated throughout this volume. Yakir Plessner, professor of economics at Hebrew University (Rehovot), and Andrew I. Sitnikov, of the Institute of Systems Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences, provided seminal ideas, institutional knowledge, and useful comments on various segments of this book. Those scholars do not necessarily agree with all of our analyses and conclusions. We alone are responsible for the content of the volume.
2. Richard Layard and John Parker, The Coming Russian Boom (New York: Free Press, 1996).
CHAPTER ONE
Russian Economic Conditions
RUSSIAN PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL
Since its establishment as a separate state in 1991, Russia’s economic performance has been vastly below its productive potential. Per capita income stands at about $4,200 in world market prices, which is lower than the world average of $5,200 and less than one-sixth that of the United States.¹ Per capita income in Russia falls beneath that in Tunisia, Algeria, Botswana, Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama, Brazil, Mexico, and other economies, all of which, at least in the popular image, are relatively poor countries. In Russia, which is the landlord of a space station for American astronauts, something is amiss.
What separates Russia from these other third world countries is its enormous, immediate, current growth potential. Russian income is three, perhaps as much as four, times lower than it could and should be.
First, Russia has the productive capacity in place to double its output of goods and services (its gross domestic product, or GDP). Indeed, just nine years ago, Russian GDP was nearly double current levels. By official and international counts, the economy contracted by 43 percent during 1990–1997 (see figure 1). This accounting may exaggerate the decline in output, as many firms underreported production to reduce their tax liabilities. Offsetting this potential undercounting, however, is the gain that accrued, equivalent to 15 percent of Russian GDP during 1992–1997, when Russia terminated $58 billion in annual energy subsidies to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.²
Figure 1. Economic Contraction in Russia, 1990–1997
Source: Russian State Committee on Statistics, regular releases
Second, even before the great contraction of the 1990s, Russian industrial investment allowed for a much higher level of output than that produced under the country’s faulty, inefficient, socialist economic arrangements. Western estimates show that the Russian level of capital stock per worker should have produced some 44–52 percent more goods and services than it did.³
Third, Russia has a highly educated workforce. Western estimates imply that countries with the same number of years of education per employee as Russia enjoyed in the late 1980s had about 35 percent higher income per capita.⁴
Fourth, and perhaps most important, Russian industry produced, and continues to produce, a large amount of negative value added as a result of the application of arbitrary, artificial, distorted, subsidized, and cross-subsidized prices that determine the real cost of production inputs. In other words, a dollar’s worth of raw ingredients emerges from the production process as finished merchandise worth less than a dollar. In 1994, the middle year of Russian reforms, Russian industry subtracted 34 percent from the global market value of natural resources alone, without accounting for subtracting the additional value from the intermediate goods used in their production.⁵ The mere introduction of true market prices, coupled with the elimination of subsidies, cross-subsidies, cross-debts, and other distortions, would eliminate negative value added in production. The whole country would be better off if the workers in these value-subtracting enterprises were paid full wages to stay at home until sufficient reforms were put in place to add value to production. By itself, the cessation of value-subtracting economic activities would substantially increase GDP, without any additional investment or other effort.
Taking all four factors together, a three- to fourfold increase is a ballpark estimate of Russia’s real productive potential under true private markets in the near term. To this can be added the potential gains from the application of recent Western technological advances to the exploitation of Russia’s vast untapped natural resources, assuming that Russian politics can tolerate a much larger role for foreign enterprises.
THE INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES OF SOCIALISM
A key factor in Russia’s failure to develop real banks has been the institutional legacies of socialism. Long decades of socialist rule resulted in deep and pervasive state penetration of the economy and society. Under central planning, the Russian economy was highly centralized, monopolistic, protected from foreign competition and exposure; it was also structurally anomalous. It lacked most of the social, legal, and institutional infrastructure taken for granted even in underdeveloped market economies.
The old Soviet banking system was a monobank system, centered on the state bank, Gosbank, which covered the entire Soviet Union through its many branches and collection systems. All monetary transactions went through