9/11 and Terrorist Travel: A Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
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Reviews for 9/11 and Terrorist Travel
8 ratings11 reviews
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5It's a report, so sometimes the writing gets a bit dry. And, there are many people who feel like this didn't adequately tell all sides of the story. As my friend Steve said, "We should read this book as much for what isn't in there as for what is." I liked reading it, though, for a clear overview of the events of that awful day.
- Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Scary. Infuriating. Hilarious. The 9/11 Report methodically demonstrates that U.S. preparedness was not the fault of any one particular official but the result of institutionalized laxity and bureaucratic cautiousness. The report points out figures that will make your head spin:Even in 2002, the number of U.S. Arabic degrees awarded was six.U.S. air strikes on al Qaeda flew over Pakistan, which had to be informed each time. Pakistan's ISI then warned Bin Laden, who quickly evacuated.Zakariya Essabar's own parents thought he was too religious.The only real security layers between the terrorists and their objectives were visa application forms and airport metal detectors.The FBI, CIA, and NSA were reluctant to share FISA information, underestimating their own legal abilities.Airport security screening, CAPPS, simply required that suspected luggage be held off a plane until the passenger boarded.
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Well presented.
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5It may be unusual that commission reports are readable, but this one is quite well-written and well-structured. I find the last chapters with recommendations for reorganization of the governments security efforts should have been left out and put somewhere else. In the version I have there is annoyingly no index.I find two major omissions: The engineering report on the structural capability of the World Trade Center. As far as I remember this was intentional left out to a separate later report as the enginering modeling took long time. The other omission is the issue with the interrogation of detainees which may have involved torture. The commission report gets away with this issue by writing on page 146: "Our access to them has been limited to the review of intelligence reports based on communications received from the locations where the actual interrogations take place. [...] Nor were we allowed to talk to the interrogators so that we could better judge the credibility of the detainees and clarify ambiguities in the reporting. We were told that our requests might disrupt the sensitive interrogation process". One may wonder what the "sensitive interrogation process" entails...
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Every American should read this report, even considering how boreing and dry government reports of this kind can be. Beware, be informed.
- Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Very good for a discssion of a government report. Now, how do I get my former boss (who looks like Lurch in the Munsters, in case you are curious) at a big agribusiness who is much less curious about the reality of why we went to war than he is about how much butt he needs to kiss/favors he nees to cal in to get his dolt son into a second tier internship to read this? And then absorb it?4 1/2 stars for a book about a government commission; a new standard.
- Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5This is a great book. Yes, it can be dull because it is a commission report but it is so important to each and every American. I don't care what your political beliefs are, what your opinion of 9/11 is, or what you think President Bush did or did not do right, this is a very important book and everyone should read it AND understand it because I can guarentee you this will have and has had huge repercussions on future policies.
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5This is the "official" report of what happend on 9/11. It is a very dry read. The highlight is the narritive about the day. There were a lot of problems with comunication that day but this report does not give concrete ways to prevent this tragedy from happening again.
- Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5September 11, 2011, marks the ten-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. In November 2002, a bipartisan commission was tasked to examine the facts of the attacks. Unlike other government documents that I've read over the years, this book is very readable, although detailed. It includes a timeline of the attacks, biographies of the terrorists, and a brief history of the Middle East.
- Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5I bought this book soon after it came out and I made it my dedicated reading material until I reached the back cover. Why? Because I felt it was important to understand as fully as I could one of the most significant events of my lifetime, hopefully there will not be many more to rival the attacks. That?s a new word in our vocabulary, I noticed in conversations and news reports soon after 9/11 people would sometimes slip up and call it ?the hijacking? or ?the bombing? when it was not really those things. It was just ?the attacks?, there is not a word invented to fully comprehend this horrible event. There are many conspiracy theories around 9/11, I shall not refute them nor will I spend much time creating dragons where there are none. I cannot explain everything about the attacks and neither will this book. This was a complicated event, with many causes, points of failure and its effects shall linger a long, long time.
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5A grab-bag of sorts. Parts of it have almost literary value. Parts trouble me?this was the best they could do? But the sum is certainly the most important Congressional report of the last 20 years. If anything qualifies as a citizen's "must read," this does.
Book preview
9/11 and Terrorist Travel - National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
A Note to the Reader:
This volume represents the complete work of the 9/11 Commission staff report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,
as published on the 9/11 Commission Web site on August 22, 2004. In an effort to assure the greatest possible accuracy and completeness of this published book, Commission staff reviewed the text prior to publication after consulting Commission management. Small edits were then made where necessary in formatting, grammar, and in a handful of instances, facts. In each case, the factual changes pertained to correcting a wrong number or date, such as one overstayed
to two overstayed,
or in one case, September 8, 2001
changed to July 2001.
These changes were necessary to clarify or correct the text. In no case was actual substance altered.
All rights reserved. Written permission must be secured from the publisher to use or reproduce any part of this book, except for brief quotations in critical reviews or articles.
Printed in the United States of America
08 07 06 05 04 1 2 3 4 5
9781618588586
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
NOTE FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
PREFACE
1 - INTRODUCTION: A FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 BORDER STORY
2 - THE SEPTEMBER 11 TRAVEL OPERATION: A CHRONOLOGY
3 - TERRORIST ENTRY AND EMBEDDING TACTICS: 1993 TO 2001
4 - IMMIGRATION AND BORDER SECURITY EVOLVE: 1993 TO 2001
5 - PLANNING AND EXECUTING ENTRY FOR THE 9/11 PLOT
6 - CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESPONSE: POST-SEPTEMBER 11
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: - TRAVEL AND IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS DIGITAL IMAGES
APPENDIX B: - THE SAUDI FLIGHTS
APPENDIX C: - IMMIGRATION HISTORIES OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WITH TERRORIST CONNECTIONS
NOTES
NOTE FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
THE COMMISSION STAFF ORGANIZED its work around specialized studies, or monographs, prepared by each of the teams. We used some of the evolving draft material for these studies in preparing the seventeen staff statements delivered in conjunction with the Commission’s 2004 public hearings. We used more of this material in preparing draft sections of the Commission’s final report. Some of the specialized staff work, while not appropriate for inclusion in the report, nonetheless offered substantial information or analysis that was not well represented in the Commission’s report. In a few cases this supplemental work could be prepared to a publishable standard, either in an unclassified or classified form, before the Commission expired.
This study is on immigration, border security and terrorist travel issues. It was prepared principally by Thomas Eldridge, Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel II, Janice Kephart, and Kelly Moore, with assistance from Joanne Accolla, and editing assistance from Alice Falk. As in all staff studies, they often relied on work done by their colleagues.
This is a study by Commission staff. While the Commissioners have been briefed on the work and have had the opportunity to review earlier drafts of some of this work, they have not approved this text and it does not necessarily reflect their views.
Philip Zelikow
PREFACE
IT IS PERHAPS OBVIOUS TO STATE THAT TERRORISTS cannot plan and carry out attacks in the United States if they are unable to enter the country.Yet prior to September 11, while there were efforts to enhance border security, no agency of the U.S. government thought of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. Indeed, even after 19 hijackers demonstrated the relative ease of obtaining a U.S. visa and gaining admission into the United States, border security still is not considered a cornerstone of national security policy. We believe, for reasons we discuss in the following pages, that it must be made one.
Congress gave the Commission the mandate to study, evaluate, and report on immigration, nonimmigrant visas and border security
as these areas relate to the events of 9/11. This staff report represents 14 months of such research. It is based on thousands of pages of documents we reviewed from the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, approximately 25 briefings on various border security topics, and more than 200 interviews.We are grateful to all who assisted and supported us along the way.
The story begins with A Factual Overview of the September 11 Border Story.
This introduction summarizes many of the key facts of the hijackers’ entry into the United States. In it, we endeavor to dispel the myth that their entry into the United States was clean and legal.
It was not. Three hijackers carried passports with indicators of Islamic extremism linked to al Qaeda; two others carried passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner. It is likely that several more hijackers carried passports with similar fraudulent manipulation. Two hijackers lied on their visa applications. Once in the United States, two hijackers violated the terms of their visas. Two overstayed their permitted length of stay. And all but one obtained some form of state identification. We know that six of the hijackers used these state issued identifications to check in for their flights on September 11. Three of them were fraudulently obtained.
The chronology that follows in chapter 2, The September 11 Travel Operation,
is a detailed account of how each hijacker acquired a visa and entered the United States. In all, they had 25 contacts with consular officers and 43 contacts with immigration and customs authorities. They began acquiring their visas in April 1999 and began entering the country in December 2000.They successfully entered the United States 33 times over 21 months, through nine airports of entry, most of which were on the East Coast. Neither the consular officers who adjudicated their visas nor the immigration inspectors who admitted them into the country had any knowledge of fraudulent al Qaeda documents.
The next chapter, Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics, 1993 to 2001,
explores the topic of fraudulent documents, which terrorists have long used to support their international travel. Indeed, the CIA studied these documents and published their commonalities as far back as the 1980s.They even made a training video for border inspectors to help them detect such fraud. This effort was abandoned in the early 1990s, just as the United States experienced the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.We reviewed information available on terrorist travel practices in the 1990s and identified numerous entry and embedding tactics, unknown at the time of these earlier attacks in the United States owing to the lack of analysis. No government agency systematically would analyze terrorists’ travel patterns until after 9/11, thus missing critical opportunities to disrupt their plans.
Chapter 4, Immigration and Border Security Evolve, 1993 to 2001,
provides an overview of counterterrorism activities as they relate to border security in the Intelligence Community, the State Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Here we explore the evolution of the terrorist watchlist and explain the process of applying for a visa and for gaining entry into the United States.The reader is introduced to the Bureau of Consular Affairs in the State Department and visa policy in general. The various INS units working on counterterrorism are discussed, along with enforcement of immigration law and the immigration benefits system.
Chapter 5, Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot,
discusses visa issuance and admission into the United States as it specifically applied to the hijackers. Thus, visa policy in Berlin, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, where the hijackers received their visas, is explored in depth. Similarly, we review aspects of the admission of the hijackers in detail, noting the immigration violations they committed. On both topics, visas and entry, we include excerpts of interviews with consular, immigration, and customs officials involved in the admission of the hijackers. We conclude with an assessment of how well the State Department and the INS performed in the period prior to 9/11.
Crisis Management and Response Post–September 11,
chapter 6, reports on actions taken by the intelligence community, the departments of State and Justice, and the INS following the attacks, up to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. Particular attention is paid to programs implemented by the Justice Department, in some cases as part of the interagency process, including the Interview Project,Visa Condor, the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, and NSEERS, the National Security Exit and Entry Registration System.
Appendix A contains graphics relevant to the 9/11 plot. In Appendix B, The Saudi Flights,
we examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the departure of Saudi nationals from the United States in the days after the 9/11 attack. The procedure followed for each flight, including the inspection of passengers and their belongings, is covered in detail. Finally, in Appendix C, we describe the immigration histories of certain terrorists.
1
INTRODUCTION: A FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 BORDER STORY
TERRORISTS TRAVEL FOR MANY REASONS, including to train, communicate with other terrorists, collect funds, escape capture and interrogation, engage in surveillance of potential targets, and commit terrorist attacks.¹
To avoid detection of their activities and objectives while engaging in travel that necessitates using a passport, terrorists devote extensive resources to acquiring and manipulating passports, entry and exit stamps, and visas. The al Qaeda terrorist organization was no exception. High-level members of al Qaeda were expert document forgers who taught other terrorists, including Mohamed Atta, the 9/11 ringleader, their tradecraft.²
The entry of the hijackers into the United States therefore represented the culmination of years of practice and experience in penetrating international borders. We introduce our monograph with a retelling of the September 11 events from the perspective of border security as we understand it today.
The conspirators
Twenty-six al Qaeda terrorist conspirators—eighteen Saudis, two Emiratis, one Egyptian, one Lebanese, one Moroccan, one Pakistani, and two Yemenis—sought to enter the United States and carry out a suicide mission.³ The first of them began to acquire the means to enter two years and five months before the 9/11 attack.
Intelligence about terrorist travel
Three hijackers were known or knowable by intelligence authorities as al Qaeda terrorists in early 2000, but their biographical information was not fully developed and communicated to border authorities for watchlisting at U.S. consulates abroad (by the State Department) and at the border (by immigration and customs border inspectors). The travel plans of all three also were known or knowable in 2000, in part because of cooperation from Arab and Asian country intelligence services and border authorities.
The 19 hijackers used 364 aliases, including different spellings of their names and noms de guerre.⁴ As they passed through various countries, their names were recorded by governments and their intelligence and border authorities.
Three were carrying Saudi passports containing a possible extremist indicator present in the passports of many al Qaeda and other terrorists entering the United States as early as the first World Trade Center attack in 1993.This indicator had not been analyzed by the CIA, FBI, or our border authorities for its significance. Indeed, passports seized by the FBI in terrorist investigations were not routinely made available to the CIA for analysis.
Two hijackers were carrying passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent manner.They contained fraudulent entry-exit stamps (or cachets) probably inserted by al Qaeda travel document forgers to hide travel to Afghanistan for terrorist training. Our analysis of their travel patterns suggests that several more hijackers whose passports did not survive the attacks were likely to have had similar false stamps in their passports. The existence and significance of these stamps was not known to border authorities.
Two Saudis were carrying passports that might have been provided to them by a family member working in the Saudi passport ministry.The Saudi passport authority was rife with patronage and security weaknesses known by then to the State Department and CIA, but they were not the subject of intelligence analysis, diplomatic or security policy, or countermeasures.
Visas
The 19 hijackers applied for 23 visas and obtained 22. Five other conspirators were denied U.S. visas. Two more obtained visas but did not participate in the attack for various reasons.
They began attempting to acquire U.S. visas in April 1999, two years and five months before the attack. Consular officers were unaware of the potential significance of an indicator of potential extremism present in some al Qaeda passports, had no information about fraudulent travel stamps that are associated with al Qaeda, and were not trained in terrorist travel tactics generally.
Two Yemenis were denied visas in Yemen for reasons of U.S. immigration law unrelated to terrorism. At the same time, two Saudi hijackers obtained visas in Saudi Arabia. When these two Saudis later showed up in Afghanistan, they were selected for the mission in part because they already had U.S. visas. Later, most of the operatives selected were Saudis, who had little difficulty obtaining visas.
In early 2000, four conspirators sought U.S. visas to learn how to become pilots in the plot. An Egyptian and a Lebanese obtained visas easily in Berlin, because they had established ties to Germany and so did not look like intending immigrants. Both presented new passports. A Yemeni who wanted to be a pilot was repeatedly turned down for a visa because he did not have strong ties to Germany, failed to complete the necessary paperwork, and looked like an intending immigrant.
Thirteen of the hijackers presented passports less than three weeks old when they applied for their visas, but the new passports caused no heightened scrutiny of their visa applications.
Two hijackers lied on their visa applications in detectable ways, but were not further questioned about those lies.
Two hijackers were interviewed for reasons unrelated to terrorism. Most simply had their applications approved and their passports stamped with a U.S. visa. Consular officers were not trained to detect terrorists in a visa interview. Terrorism concerns were handled through the watchlist, and all the conspirators’ names were checked against the terrorist watchlist without producing a match.
One Saudi, one Moroccan, and one Pakistani were each denied visas for reasons unrelated to terrorism.The last conspirator, the Pakistani, was denied on August 27, 2001, in the United Arab Emirates.
The mastermind of the operation, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, used a travel facilitator to acquire a visa on July 23, 2001, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, using an alias.
Ports of entry
Once the operation was under way, the conspirators attempted to enter the United States 34 times over 21 months, through nine airports. They succeeded all but once. Border inspectors at U.S. airports were unaware of the potential significance of indicators of possible terrorist affiliation in conspirators’ passports and had no information about fraudulent travel stamps possibly associated with al Qaeda. No inspectors or agents were trained in terrorist travel intelligence and document practices. The culture at the airports was one of travel facilitation and lax enforcement, with the exception of programs to interdict drug couriers and known criminals.
When they began to arrive at the U.S. airports in January 2000, the pilots traveled alone. With the exception of two of the hijackers, the muscle
operatives arrived between late April and late June 2001.They came in groups of two or three, and in four cases were screened by the same inspector.
All but one of the hijackers presented visitor visas that immigration inspectors used to decide whether to admit them as tourists or on business. All but two of the nonpilots were admitted as tourists and were granted automatic six-month stays.This allowed them to maintain a legal immigration status through the end of the operation. One of the two nonpilots admitted on business was granted a one-month stay; he, along with another of the nonpilot operatives, was in violation of immigration law for months before the attack.
The one pilot who came in on a student visa never showed up for school, thereby violating the terms of his U.S. visa. Another of the pilots came in on a tourist visa yet began flight school immediately, also violating the terms of his U.S. visa. This pilot came in a total of seven times on a tourist visa while in school. In both cases, the pilots violated the law after their entry into the United States.
Five hijackers attempting entry were referred by primary inspectors for a more intensive review by secondary inspectors. One pilot was referred at two entries, in one case by a customs inspector trained to look for drug couriers, and in the other by an immigration inspector thinking the pilot might be an intending immigrant. One pilot was referred for having the wrong visa and one nonpilot hijacker for failing to have a visa. Two others were referred for failing to complete their arrival and customs forms and for being unable to communicate with the inspectors. No lookouts or visa revocations were posted alerting border authorities to the terrorist association of two of the hijackers until after each has entered the United States for the last time.
Four hijackers were admitted after the secondary inspectors who interviewed them were unable to, or did not, verify information supplied by the operative, misunderstood the law, or failed to follow procedures. One was interviewed at length by a border inspector. The inspector concluded, on the basis of his hostile and arrogant behavior and contradictory statements, that he was unlikely to comply with U.S. immigration law and posed a risk. He was denied entry. The inspector was backed up by his superior, but acted in the face of a general expectation of leniency toward Saudi citizens at that airport.
These entries occurred during a period when approximately 20 million people applied for visas, and more than 10 million people came into the United States through 220 airports of entry.
In the United States
Three hijackers filed applications for change of status to extend their stays in the United States and stayed in compliance with U.S. immigration laws through September 2001. These were among nearly 600,000 new applications received in September 2000 and were added to a backlog of 3 million others.Two pilots attached the same supporting financial documents to their immigration benefit applications and were adjudicated by the same official in the summer of 2001.
The pending but unadjudicated benefits applications assisted two hijackers in persuading border inspectors to admit them during secondary inspections when they tried to reenter the United States. The adjudications were premised on the validity of their attendance at flight school, but in fact this school should not have been certified to accept foreign nationals. Another hijacker’s application allowed him to stay in the United States legally for an extra six months.
While the applications were pending, one hijacker appeared at an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office in Florida and requested a longer length of stay for a companion—possibly another hijacker—that would have enabled the other man to remain through September, when his own visa expired.The inspector refused that request, and realizing that the length of stay granted this hijacker during his secondary inspection was too long, rolled it back to midsummer 2001. The hijacker departed the United States in July and returned again ten days later, thereby acquiring a new length of stay that extended beyond September 11, 2001.
On August 23, 2001, the CIA provided biographical identification information about two of the hijackers to border and law enforcement authorities. The CIA and FBI considered the case important, but there was no way of knowing whether either hijacker was still in the country, because a border exit system Congress authorized in 1996 was never implemented.
One of the two overstayed his visa by less than six months. Without an exit system in place at the border tied to law enforcement databases, there was no way to establish with certainty that he remained in the United States. Thus, there was no risk that his immigration law violations would be visible to law enforcement, and there was no risk of immigration enforcement action of any kind.
Immediate response to the attacks
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, immigration and customs leadership jointly put in place their agencies’ most stringent security precautions, in the process nearly shutting down our borders; the backed-up traffic at the land borders caused a commercial crisis. Because resources were already strained, thousands of other enforcement officials in the National Guard, Border Patrol, and state and local police were needed to help border authorities reduce wait times for those seeking U.S. entry for tourism or business.
Under Justice Department direction, the FBI and the INS initiated a series of counterterrorism-related security programs using immigration law violations as a predicate to interview, detain, and in many cases deport aliens from countries with possible ties to al Qaeda. Also at the urging of the Justice Department, the State Department, together with the FBI, initiated a series of programs to heighten scrutiny of visa applicants from countries with an al Qaeda presence.
In the weeks after September 11, after the national airspace reopened, at least ten flights of Saudi nationals departed the United States. One flight sponsored by the Saudi government carried relatives of Saudi fugitive Usama Bin Ladin. Passengers on the flights were screened by the FBI prior to their departure, but allegations of high-level government involvement spurred theories that passengers received special treatment.
The 9/11 HIJACKERS AND CONSPIRATORS
American Airlines Flight 11—
North Tower of the World Trade Center
American Airlines Flight 77—Pentagon
United Airlines Flight 93—Pennsylvania
United Airlines Flight 175—South Tower of the World Trade Center
Other Conspirators Involved with the Visa Process
Other Conspirator Involved with the Visa and Port of Entry Process
2
THE SEPTEMBER 11 TRAVEL OPERATION: A CHRONOLOGY
THE SUCCESS OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 PLOT depended on the ability of the hijackers to obtain visas and pass an immigration and customs inspection in order to enter the United States. It also depended on their ability to remain here undetected while they worked out the operational details of the attack. If they had failed on either count—entering and becoming embedded—the plot could not have been executed.
Here we present the facts and circumstances of the hijackers’ travel operation, including their 25 contacts with consular officers and their 43 contacts with immigration and customs authorities. We also discuss the 12 contacts with border authorities by other September 11 conspirators who applied for a visa. The narrative is chronological, retracing the hijackers’ steps from their initial applications for U.S. visas, through their entry into the United States, to their applications for immigration benefits, and up through their acquisition of state identifications that helped them board the planes. Along the way, we note relevant actions by U.S. government authorities to combat terrorism. There were a few lucky breaks for U.S. border authorities in this story. Mostly, though, it is a story of how 19 hijackers easily penetrated U.S. border security.
Overview of the hijacker’s visas
The 9/11 hijackers submitted 23 visa applications during the course of the plot, and 22 of these applications were approved. The hijackers applied for visas at five U.S. consulates or embassies overseas; two of them were interviewed. One consular officer issued visas to 11 of the 19 hijackers. Of the eight other conspirators in the plot who sought visas, three succeeded, but only one of the three later sought to use the visa to enter the United States.
Hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar were the first to submit visa applications because they were originally slated to be pilots.The four hijackers who did become pilots applied for visas in 2000. The remaining muscle
hijackers applied in the fall of 2000 through the spring and summer of 2001, three applying twice.
Most of the hijackers applied with new passports, possibly to hide travel to Afghanistan recorded in their old ones. It is likely that many of the hijackers’ passports contained indicators of extremism or showed ties to al Qaeda. However, this intelligence was not developed prior to 9/11, and thus State Department personnel reviewing visa applications were not trained to spot these indicators of a terrorist connection. Visa decisions for the hijackers and conspirators were consistent with a system that focused on excluding intending immigrants and depended on checking a database of names to search for criminals and terrorists.
Overview of the hijackers’ entries
The hijackers successfully entered the United States 33 of 34 times, with the first arriving on January 15, 2000, at Los Angeles International Airport. All others entered through airports on the East Coast, including 11 entries through New York area airports and 12 through Florida airports.
The four pilots passed through immigration and customs inspections a total of 17 times from May 29, 2000, to August 5, 2001. Ziad Jarrah was the most frequent border crosser, entering the United States seven times. Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi came in three times each, entering for the last time on May 2 and July 19, 2001, respectively. Hani Hanjour was the only hijacker to enter on an academic visa, arriving on December 8, 2000. He had already attended both English and flight training schools in the United States during three stays in the 1990s. Hanjour was also the only pilot who already had a commercial pilot’s license prior to entry, having acquired it in 1999 in Arizona.¹
Though Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi came to the United States as early as January 2000, the remaining muscle entered between April 23, 2001, and June 29, 2001. They arrived in six pairs and one trio. Four pairs were processed by the same immigration inspector. Only three of the muscle were referred to a secondary inspection for further scrutiny. Of these, only one, Mohamed al Kahtani, was refused entry to the United States.
Entering the United States as tourists was important to the hijackers, since immigration regulations automatically guaranteed tourists six months of stay. Thus the 14 muscle hijackers who entered the United States in the spring and early summer of 2001 were able to remain in the country legally through September 11. The six-month tourist stays also assured the hijackers of sufficient time to make such preparations for their operation as obtaining the identifications some of them used to board the planes on September 11. Fourteen of 15 operatives and all of the pilots acquired one or multiple forms of U.S. state-issued identification. Only Satam al Suqami did not, possibly because he was the only hijacker who knew he was out of immigration status: his length of stay end date of May 20, 2000, was clearly inserted in his passport.
Note: Per an agreement with the Department of State, we have protected the identities of individual consular officers involved with the adjudication of visas to the hijackers. Throughout the chronology, each is referred to as he,
regardless of the person’s actual gender. For similar reasons, we have chosen not to include the names of border inspectors in this report.
The Entry of the Hijackers: Acquiring Visas
November 1998
Upon the indictment of Usama Bin Ladin on November 4, a threat advisory was immediately sent by the headquarters of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to all immigration inspectors at ports of entry. Warning of possible infiltration into the United States by radical Islamic fundamentalists sympathetic to UBL, the advisory called for hard
inspections of certain visitors from Middle Eastern countries, but only if they were referred to a secondary immigration inspection. This instruction applied to the countries of origin of all of the hijackers.²
April 1999
April 3—Nawaf al Hazmi applied for a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, submitting a written visa application, his passport, and a photograph. Hazmi was a Saudi citizen born August 9, 1976.³ Hazmi’s passport was new—issued on March 21, 1999, and it contained an indicator of extremism that has been associated with al Qaeda.⁴
Also on April 3, 1999, the same day that Nawaf al Hazmi was applying for his visa in Jeddah, another of the 9/11 conspirators, Khallad, attempted to get a visa in Sanaa,Yemen, using the alias Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf. He submitted a written application, a photograph, and a Yemeni passport, issued March 18, 1999, shortly before he applied for this visa. On his application, he listed his date of birth as January 1, 1974, and his nationality as Yemeni.
⁵
Khallad listed his address in the United States as Bothell W.A.,
and gave Medical Treatment
as the purpose of his visit. Injured while fighting in Afghanistan, he had an artificial right leg. He indicated that he intended to arrive in the United States in April 1999 and stay for a period of "aprox [sic] two months."⁶
Khallad was interviewed, apparently by a consular officer, who took notes of their conversation on the visa application. As best as we can tell from the copy we have obtained, the officer wrote Family in Shobanah and Br (unintelligible) —1 kid—has shops w/family—artificial leg—needs all med info.
He denied the application under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 221 (g), the provision used to cover denials for incomplete applications or other unspecified reasons, seemingly out of concern that Khallad needed to present more information about his medical condition before he could secure a visa. In general,Yemenis had greater difficulty than wealthier Saudis convincing consular officers they were not intending immigrants.⁷
This is the only visa application we have located for Khallad, though he claims to have applied for one previously.⁸
April 7—Khalid al Mihdhar applied for a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, submitting a written application, his new passport, and a photograph. Mihdhar was a Saudi citizen born May 16, 1975.⁹ Mihdhar’s passport was issued on April 6, 1999.¹⁰ Mihdhar’s passport contained the same indicator of extremism as Nawaf al Hazmi’s. But because this indicator of extremism was unknown at the time to U.S. intelligence officials, the consular officer adjudicating their visas had not been warned to watch for it.
Both Hazmi and Mihdhar’s visa applications were destroyed before September 11, according to routine State Department document destruction practices in place in Jeddah, so we could not review them. The electronic records of their applications, their photographs, and information about the visas issued to them still exist, however, and are maintained in the State Department’s Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), and we have reviewed this material.
It is not possible to state with certainty whether either Hazmi or Mihdhar were interviewed by a consular officer in connection with their visa applications.¹¹ The consular officer who approved Hazmi’s visa stated, I do not remember these specific applications.
¹² State Department computer records did not provide any help in this regard, because they do not indicate whether the applicant has been interviewed.¹³
If either of these two were interviewed, they must have convinced the officer they had good reasons to be going to the United States: both were issued visas after CLASS record checks showed no derogatory information about them. Hazmi’s visa was issued on April 3, 1999. Mihdhar’s visa was issued on April 7, 1999. Both were one-year, multiple-entry visas.
January 2000
January 15—Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar arrived together at Los Angeles International Airport from Bangkok, Thailand. The two Saudis were admitted as tourists for six-month stays by the same primary immigration inspector, who was unaware of the indicators of extremism likely present in their passports.¹⁴
Neither Hazmi nor Mihdhar was on the watchlists available to border inspectors. However, Mihdhar was a known al Qaeda operative at the time, and a copy of his passport was available to the intelligence community.¹⁵
January 18—Marwan al Shehhi, an Emirati, was issued a ten-year B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.¹⁶ Shehhi submitted a new passport with his visa application. Although his application was destroyed prior to September 11, 2001, pursuant to routine document handling policies, an electronic record was maintained by State.¹⁷ The consular officer who issued the visa said Shehhi probably was not interviewed, explaining that UAE nationals were not interviewed in connection with their visa applications unless—as did not happen in this case—there was a watchlist hit.
¹⁸ UAE nationals were considered good visa risks both on economic and on security grounds.¹⁹
April 2000
April 2—Nawaf al Hazmi’s visa expired,²⁰ but that expiration had no