China, the United States, and 21st-Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership

Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein

Introduction: In the Same Boat Together

DURING JUNE 2009, four People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy doctors flew to Tumaco, Colombia, to spend a week aboard the USNS Comfort, where they learned how the U.S. Navy promotes goodwill by delivering high quality and efficient medical care to parts of the world that are in need. No doubt this quite remarkable step in building a U.S.–China maritime partnership was a direct result of the March 2009 visit to Qingdao by chief of naval operations (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughead, in which he participated in the sixtieth anniversary of the PLA Navy and toured its first purpose-built hospital ship, the Type 920 Daishandao/Peace Ark ( , AHH 866). CNO Roughead’s visit, like that of the four PLA Navy doctors to USNS Comfort, suggests a strong commitment on both sides of the Pacific to seizing opportunities to share best practices and develop new areas for cooperation in support of global development and security. As the first of what will reportedly be annual international deployments, Peace Ark is slated to call on ports in the Middle East and Africa in 2010.¹

Nevertheless, CNO Roughead’s attendance at the PLA Navy’s sixtieth anniversary celebrations was very nearly derailed by the "Impeccable incident" of 8 March 2009, in which a group of Chinese enforcement vessels and fishing trawlers harassed the surveillance ship USNS Impeccable then operating some seventy-five miles south of Hainan Island. Many have cited this incident as the most serious crisis in U.S.–China military relations since the EP-3 incident of 1 April 2001. Moreover, tensions have also been building over enhanced Chinese capabilities in a variety of areas, ranging from new submarines to antisatellite weapons to the potential for an antiship ballistic missile. CNO Roughead’s decision to attend the PLA Navy celebration just a month after the Impeccable incident was a definite signal at the most senior U.S. military levels that this most crucial bilateral military relationship would not be permitted to drift in a dangerous direction. Indeed, President Barack Obama had underlined in the immediate aftermath of the Impeccable crisis the importance of raising the level and frequency of the U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue in order to avoid future incidents.² Rather than simple idealism, this approach signaled in fact a new realism: the understanding that global security now depends on a working partnership between the U.S. and Chinese armed forces. While such a partnership could have an impact on various aspects of global security, this partnership is especially crucial in the maritime realm, where both nations share a core interest in protecting the global maritime trading system. This volume is intended to be a guidebook for practitioners—for those charged with the difficult task of building and nurturing the nascent Sino-American maritime partnership, which is beset with challenges, yet holds enormous promise.

This book is the result of the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute’s third annual conference, Defining a Maritime Partnership with China, held in Newport, Rhode Island on 5–6 December 2007. The conference featured seven delegates from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), who represented some of China’s leading universities in the maritime domain. The Chinese delegation included PLA Navy rear admiral Yang Yi, then director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at China’s National Defense University. American participants included representatives from the U.S. Pacific Fleet and other relevant fleet commands as well as the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security.

Despite recent turbulence in U.S.–China military-to-military relations, conference participants reaffirmed that the United States and China have substantial shared interests that could enable extensive bilateral U.S.–China maritime security cooperation. The goal of the conference was to foster dialogue between Chinese and American experts on potential areas of cooperation among our nations’ respective maritime services. Attendees agreed that a strong foundation for maritime partnership exists in the increasingly robust commercial relationship but that the military side of the partnership lags well behind. The conference focused on determining which areas might be fruitful for more extensive U.S.–China maritime cooperation.

Conference Findings

The conference reached six major conclusions:

•Economic cooperation provides a durable foundation for enhanced partnership between the United States and China on the world’s oceans since the health of the global system relies on secure and stable sea-lanes.

•Although barriers still exist that prevent a robust U.S.-Chinese partnership to maintain security at sea, there has been some impressive success in creating new forms of collaboration in search and rescue as well as in fisheries enforcement.

•China’s cautiously positive reaction to the new U.S. Maritime Strategy suggests possibilities for expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, maritime environmental issues, energy security, counterterrorism, and professional military education (PME).³ Further discussions with respect to international legal authorities will be required to find ways to cooperate that take into account each country’s perspective.

•Beijing’s growing capabilities and presence on the seas will make maritime collaboration and crisis management procedures with Washington both more feasible and more essential.

•The sensitive Taiwan issue, differences over definitions and appropriate prioritization of transparency, and a paucity of mutual trust remain fundamental limiting factors for expanded military and maritime cooperation.

•To enhance maritime cooperation, political leaders in Washington and Beijing must create sufficient political and institutional space for maritime and naval professionals to structure cooperation. They must also resist the temptation to use maritime cooperation to score points in the various political controversies that will inevitably affect this complex bilateral relationship. Indeed, repeated suspensions of the bilateral military relationship during 2008–10 have severely hampered the development of long-term cooperative efforts.

The Vibrant Maritime Commercial Partnership

Both the United States and China are vital participants in, and beneficiaries of, the global system, particularly the global economy.⁴ This creates a fundamental imperative for transparent, mutually beneficial cooperation based on equality and reciprocity. Both states are major forces in global international trade, of which 80 percent is seaborne. The United States is China’s most significant export destination. Recent statistics reveal that about 16 million shipping containers enter U.S. ports annually, and Chinese ports handle as much as 40 percent of world container volume. The interconnections between the two economies are vast in scope. As demonstrated clearly by the global financial crisis of 2008–10, a crisis in one economy inevitably has adverse effects on the other. Rear Admiral Yang Yi characterized this close economic relationship as mutually assured dependence.

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) represents a major success in U.S.–China maritime cooperation that has flowed directly from this intensive economic interaction. Beijing has moved rapidly to ensure that its major ports are compliant with new post-9/11 practices for ensuring the security of containerized cargo. As U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner recently noted, Due to the continued support of CSI by [PRC] Minister Mu Xinsheng, U.S. borders are more secure and efficient. Economic partnership between the United States and China is also based on common structural features between the two economies. Both economies are extremely dependent on the reliable and efficient seaborne transport of energy. This shared interest creates a wide range of opportunities for enlarging maritime cooperation. Five of the world’s ten largest ports are in China, and China has the world’s second-largest merchant marine (with many other Chinese-owned vessels sailing under foreign flags). In addition, there is increasing convergence in the two states’ preferences with respect to the balance of port-state rights versus flag-state rights. It is therefore essential that the military and security partnership develop in a manner that complements these larger trends. Indeed, the financial cooperation that has underpinned efforts in Beijing and Washington to limit the global financial crisis and its aftereffects over the course of 2007–10 needs to take into account the close relationship between the global economy and maritime security that protects the world’s trading networks.

Significant Search and Rescue Successes

Beijing’s interest in maritime search and rescue has increased substantially in recent years. The tragic loss of 291 Chinese lives when the ferry Dashun caught fire and sank within sight of shore in 1999 served as a stark symbol of China’s deficiencies in this area. Thanks to a major effort in this domain, according to Captain Bernard Moreland, former Coast Guard Liaison Officer Beijing, Less than 10 years after the Dashun tragedy, China has a fully operating professional maritime search and rescue capacity. The China Rescue and Salvage Bureau claims to have saved or assisted 3,849 persons in 2006. Beijing is looking to improve coordination for maritime rescue among the many relevant agencies, including the PLA Navy.

The PLA Navy and the U.S. Navy collaborated in a series of small-scale search-and-rescue exercises during 2006. There has also been robust U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) engagement with Chinese maritime authorities. Visits by USCG cutters have created opportunities for several days of professional exchanges culminating in demonstrations of practice boarding scenarios, Captain Moreland elaborated. Fisheries cooperation has been extensive as well, and there have also been U.S. and Chinese maritime command centers [coordinating] control of ships [and] aircraft . . . in real-time 24 hour operations to save lives. The USCG’s AMVER search-and-rescue system was critical to saving the lives of nineteen sailors of the Unicorn Ace, which sank in the South China Sea in March 2007. In July 2007 thirteen Chinese sailors were rescued from Hai Tong 7, three hundred miles northwest of Guam, with the pivotal involvement of both U.S. Navy and USCG assets. Beijing is eager to expand cooperative initiatives with the USCG.

Prospects for Joint Disaster Relief Operations

Having overcome major reservations, stated Su Hao of China Foreign Affairs University, the Chinese government [now] views [humanitarian operations] as an important part of international security cooperation. The emphasis of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy on disaster relief offers opportunities for the United States and China to cooperate and build mutual trust. As Zhuang Jianzhong of Shanghai Jiao Tong University states, much more can be done to address common challenges and common security threats such as . . . bird flu, climate change and tsunamis. Rear Admiral Yang Yi pointed out that possibilities will materialize as China increases its capabilities in this area, drawing on extensive PLA experience with domestic disaster relief. Indeed, the tragic 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake and 14 April 2010 Yushu earthquake, in addition to other major internal relief operations in China during the last few years, have served to reinvigorate the PLA’s long tradition in this area.

The experiences in the relief efforts following the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami provide another relevant example. Dr. Michael J. Green, Center for Strategic and International Studies, observed that the 2004 tsunami led to unprecedented cooperation among Asia Pacific navies, centered on the U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Regional Core Group—maritime forces that were already accustomed to working together and thus could assemble and interoperate rapidly. This episode made China aware of the limitations of its navy’s capacities to deliver [assistance and aid], compared with the U.S. Navy. Su Hao judged that China’s navy [is] not only facing traditional security threats, it must [now] deal with maritime disasters, humanitarian crises, and other non-traditional security threats. The PLA Navy could gain experience and build confidence in the region by exercising with the U.S. and other navies to be better prepared for operations in response to future humanitarian crises, added Michael J. Green. Peter A. Dutton, Naval War College, maintained that cooperation in humanitarian relief operations seems a very real possibility for the near future, and exercises to practice for instance a medical relief operation could be fruitful and non-threatening. Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, USN (Ret.), judged that China’s new landing platform dock, as well as a new class of hospital ship, suggests that the PLA Navy may now have the requisite capabilities to participate in major maritime international disaster relief operations in the future. In Dr. Su’s evaluation, Humanitarian assistance . . . could create good conditions for Chinese-American maritime cooperation in the long run. Rear Admiral Yang Yi suggested that an exchange of specialists as well as certain war-gaming techniques could be undertaken as first steps in cooperative disaster relief efforts.

Maritime Cooperation in Other Regional Settings

China, with its rapid economic and maritime development, is playing an increasingly significant role in East Asia and beyond. Naval War College president (2004–8) Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN, cited China’s contribution to the Six Party Talks as an example. When considering the tragic 26 March 2010 sinking of Republic of Korea Navy ship Cheonan on the South Korean side of the disputed northern limit line in the Yellow Sea, coordination by the U.S. and Chinese navies to limit regional disputes seems all the more important. But such maritime cooperation need not be limited to East Asia. As Shen Dingli of Fudan University noted, the world is finding China everywhere, and China is finding itself involved everywhere. Rear Admiral Yang Yi stated that China’s interests around the world are continually expanding . . . [and Beijing] should use its own power and provide the world with more ‘public goods.’

In East Asia, however, Michael J. Green maintained, some of China’s maritime neighbors are anxious and so "are engaged in pronounced internal balancing (increasing naval capabilities) in response to China’s growing capabilities, and there is even more widespread evidence of external balancing (alignment) to ensure that a stable equilibrium is maintained. Despite such concerns, all of the maritime powers in Asia seek closer cooperation, confidence-building and mutual transparency with the PLA Navy and all of the powers seek a stable U.S.–China relationship. Moreover, as Dr. Zhu Huayou of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies observed, the United States serves as an important driver for the rapid growth of the ASEAN economy. . . . The ultimate settlement and management of [Southeast Asia regional security] issues cannot be achieved without Sino-U.S. cooperation, especially Sino-U.S. maritime cooperation. Under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization, the United States and China have already undertaken joint research investigating the handling of oil spills as well as the upgrading of navigation aids in the Strait of Malacca. Beijing is also discovering some of the costs of its growing international profile. In Ethiopia, nine Chinese workers were killed when the Ogaden National Liberation Front attacked an oil facility in 2007. Chinese have also been victims of terrorism in Pakistan, such as when a bus of Chinese engineers was recently bombed and three Chinese workers were shot dead in Baluchistan. Cooperation in such regions as South Asia might be bilateral or, more likely, multilateral. In the view of James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Naval War College, conditions are auspicious for shaping a mutually beneficial maritime relationship among India, China, and the United States." Insofar as both Washington and Beijing have common interests in promoting stability and combating these types of terrorist activities, maritime cooperation in a variety of regions may be increasingly feasible.

The Next Steps in Maritime Educational Cooperation

Understanding the differences and similarities in U.S. and Chinese PME, observed Nan Li, Naval War College, may help to explore the possibilities of future maritime cooperation between the U.S. and China. Yet except for occasional exchanges of short visits to each other’s naval schools by higher-ranking officers, no institutionalized, longer-term exchange programs exist between American and Chinese naval education systems, even though such exchanges are already occurring between Chinese and Japanese maritime services. Although less sensitive cooperation areas, including civilian academic conferences and exchanges, can be augmented immediately, robust ties between relevant PME institutions should build on this foundation, potentially focusing on short courses for students. Rear Admiral Yang Yi emphasized that academic exchanges could additionally facilitate explanation of all aspects of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy to Chinese officials and subject matter experts.

Mutual discussion of nonsensitive linguistic, curricular, and technical elements (e.g., best practices and simulation techniques) could further cooperation possibilities. Despite some key differences in educational methods and organization, Nan Li elaborates, issues such as coastal waters security, maritime search and rescue, countering terrorism and piracy, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation by sea, maritime humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime quarantine of diseases, peacekeeping and international law and the Law of the Sea Convention have become common subjects of study for both American and Chinese naval education. Thus, cooperation on noncompetitive issues may lay the interactive and cognitive basis for further joint efforts to mitigate the consequences of maritime and naval competition. Such institutional relationships among naval research and educational centers will help to build up a group of academic and operational experts (including PME students) who are comfortable with and may advocate forcefully for enhanced U.S.–China maritime partnership in spite of the many challenges that this partnership is bound to confront.

Convergent and Divergent Legal Perspectives

The legal sphere is a major mechanism to strengthen maritime security cooperation between the United States and China. In the opinion of Guifang (Julia) Xue, Ocean University of China, regarding law of the sea issues [and despite its status as a nonsignatory], the United States is . . . full of vigor as a world leader. Now Beijing is endeavoring to be more proactive: [Compared to its previously limited actions,] China now attends more international forums, signs more statements, and conducts more consultations on law of the sea issues with its maritime neighbors. One noteworthy area of U.S.–China cooperation resulting from common legal norms is the series of anti-driftnet fishing enforcement operations that have involved the USCG and the PRC Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) for more than a decade now. FLEC ship riders on USCG cutters, working in tandem FLEC cutters as well as other nations’ assets, have been able to significantly increase enforcement of the UN resolution against driftnet fishing on the high seas. Although the USCG started fisheries cooperation with China in the mid-1990s, including driving cutters around with Chinese agents and sharing fisheries intelligence at conferences, there was an exponential jump in effectiveness recently because the real-time communications channels came into place for effective international operational coordination of cutters, agents, airplanes, and intelligence.⁵ In the experience of Captain Moreland, intelligence and reconnaissance suddenly became actionable; operational resources could be coordinated (e.g., China got cutters under way on short notice to support USCG seizures).

American delegates at the conference emphasized that Chinese participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would be wholly consistent with international legal norms. As Rear Admiral Yang Yi emphasized, this was a point that Chinese presenters were reluctant to embrace, insisting that further UN mandate might be required. However, Shen Dingli did say that he had recommended to the Chinese government that China join PSI. Elaborating further on Beijing’s view of the Law of the Sea, Julia Xue observed that China has not been entirely satisfied with the Law of the Sea Convention. Specifically, she noted that Chinese domestic law does not recognize the right of innocent passage for warships. While acknowledging that the Chinese law on innocent passage does not comply with the text of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), she stated that it is based on long-standing Chinese tradition. Additionally, China found itself disadvantaged in enjoying full entitlement [to its exclusive economic zone] under the Law of the Sea. The March 2009 Impeccable incident brought to light the rather stark differences between Beijing and Washington concerning the issue of permissible military activities in exclusive economic zones. Legal aspects of China’s 2008 counterpiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden are likewise suggestive of differences in perspective.⁶ What can be said definitively at this point is that the law provides a reasonable forum for civilized states to present alternative interpretations. Such disagreements may in fact reflect the strength of institutions to limit conflict by facilitating compromise among the major powers.

New Areas for Cooperation

There is already a strong record of Sino-American cooperation in the domain of search and rescue. Prospects for broader disaster relief cooperation are promising, as are expanded educational initiatives and regional maritime security cooperation. Several other ideas raised by conference participants also deserve limited mention in this summary. Participants agreed, for instance, that maritime energy transport was a strong potential area for cooperation. The two governments have already agreed to coordinate strategic petroleum reserve policies for mutual benefit. Gabriel B. Collins of the Naval War College suggested, There are certainly frictions that will be associated with China’s rise as an energy consumer. . . . Yet now is the time to engage China on the maritime energy security issue in the hope of positively influencing its behavior and policy choices for the benefit of all. Indeed, it is not surprising that nascent maritime cooperation between China and the United States has begun to develop within the Gulf of Aden counterpiracy mission, as noted by CNO Roughead in Qingdao during April 2009. At considerable distance from the sensitive flashpoints of East Asia, the Gulf of Aden may function in the near term as a strategic cooperation zone for the U.S. and Chinese navies. A related fruitful area of cooperation might be studying the maritime implications of ongoing climate change. Polar research is also said to be a promising subject, as demonstrated by USCG Vice Admiral Charles Wurster’s recent visit to the Polar Research Institute of China. With respect to maritime counterterrorism cooperation, Paul J. Smith, Naval War College, added, China . . . is confronting a nascent, yet burgeoning challenge of terrorism and political violence, similar to what has plagued the United States. Beijing and Washington could together form a powerful bulwark against militant extremism and the instability that it promotes. Finally, some participants in the conference called on Beijing and Washington to establish more bilateral and multilateral forums focused on maritime cooperation. For instance, it was suggested that the United States and China already have an important strategic economic dialogue, but they might also form a strategic maritime dialogue or alternatively a northeast Asia maritime security forum.

China’s Rapid Naval Modernization

Conference participants generally agreed that China’s naval modernization was primarily focused on the Taiwan contingency. As Jin Canrong, Renmin University, explained, The Taiwan issue is the dominant factor that drives the modernization of China’s navy. This is the only factor that can lead China into an unlimited arms race. In this regard, Rear Admiral Yang Yi said that the strategic intention of the United States . . . is not transparent in many aspects. Shen Dingli offered: no sovereign government could fail to prepare for the worst-case situation. When all peaceful means have been tried and have failed, China either needs to honor its deterrence or accept a political fiasco. Shortly after the late 2007 conference, however, the election of Ma Ying-jeou as president of Taiwan on 22 March 2008 did pave the way for much enhanced stability in the cross-strait relationship. Although the issue of arms sales from the United States to Taiwan has taken a toll on U.S.–China military relations during 2008–10, it seems that the chances of conflict are much reduced, causing many Chinese and American naval strategists to think anew about other missions and new possibilities for cooperation.

Indeed, conference participants discussed Chinese naval capabilities beyond Taiwan, including sea lines of communication defense and regional security collaboration. The twenty or more roles and capabilities that were discussed suggest a broadening and deepening of China’s maritime strategic missions. The United States and China clearly need to engage in more complete exchanges on these issues, but they may remain constrained by differing definitions of transparency and national security.

One American presenter was strongly critical of Beijing’s blue water naval aspirations, asserting that China’s rapid naval modernization represented folly motivated above all by Chinese nationalism rather than rational national security requirements. Several Chinese presenters said that China would not challenge U.S. naval supremacy. As Jin Canrong explained, China will never compete with the U.S. for naval power leadership. One reason is that China basically is a land power. . . . In modern world history . . . land powers like France, Germany and the Soviet Union . . . all failed when they tried to seek sea power leadership.⁷ Many Chinese presenters registered concerns that recent U.S. deployments in East Asia might be directed against China.

Nevertheless, there was general agreement among both Chinese and American participants that China’s navy would increase its capabilities significantly, and would undertake other missions (aside from preparing for a Taiwan scenario). Shen Dingli observed that new threat perceptions . . . and expanding [requirements] for sea-lane protection, have . . . combined to provide the Chinese Navy with missions commensurate with [its] new power. Jin Canrong stated, Today China’s navy has no blue water reaching capability at all. So, to increase the capability to protect China’s overseas interests is an important part of China’s future national security strategy. A central theme of this conference was the imperative to consider how expanding Chinese maritime capabilities, including naval forces, might support a broader maritime cooperation agenda.

Initial Reactions to America’s New Maritime Strategy

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which was presented by the chief of naval operations and the commandants of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, on 17 October 2007, was warmly endorsed by several Chinese participants. In the assessment of Rear Admiral Shuford, The Chinese were explicit in their recognition that they are ‘stakeholders’ in the system, that they have relied on the U.S. Navy to preserve it, and that they have a responsibility to contribute more. They are very interested in a dialogue with us to better understand key concepts in the new strategy. Zhuang Jianzhong said that he fundamentally agreed with the content of the New Maritime Strategy. Rear Admiral Yang Yi also praised the strategy: The Thousand Ship Navy [concept] serves many . . . Chinese and U.S. interests. It is congruent with China’s goal of pursuing a harmonious world. It may serve as a possible ‘test-bed’ for [bilateral] military cooperation, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Chinese participation, on a case-by-case basis, may hinge on adherence to the following principles, according to Rear Admiral Yang: all activities should be strictly within the framework of U.N. authorization and consistent with international laws; the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries must be respected and the use of force in order to intervene in a country’s internal affairs shall be avoided; the target of activity should be non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, religious extremism and national separatism. Having read the entire Maritime Strategy carefully, and praising most of its content, Rear Admiral Yang Yi raised specific concerns about the section Deter Major Power War, stating that the U.S. approach here could backfire because it would make China feel targeted. To address these and other concerns, Rear Admiral Shuford suggested that workshops be held in which three major subject areas could be addressed: the Maritime Strategy; approaches to identify and overcome internal institutional and cultural barriers (working across governmental agencies) to effectively addressing maritime security missions; and models and lessons learned in working in ad hoc maritime coalitions. The current U.S. Maritime Strategy, emphasizing as it does the maintenance of the global trading system that has benefited no state more than China, certainly lays down a positive framework to undertake enhanced maritime cooperation between Washington and Beijing.

The Imperative for Crisis Management

In the view of many conference participants, military partnership is grossly lagging and creates a serious potential for miscalculation wherein unplanned actions at the tactical level create strategic setbacks for both countries. In a similar vein, Rear Admiral Yang Yi added, contact between the two navies [is increasing]. If the two are in a state of serious mutual distrust, ‘incidents’ will never cease to crop up. There is an increasing possibility of misperceptions (potentially exacerbated by cultural and linguistic differences) transforming tactical incidents into major crises. Unfortunately, in the opinion of Michael J. Green, the U.S. and China are not much better prepared to respond to an incident than in 2001 because the existing 1998 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) merely provides for an annual meeting. The agreement on a hotline may prove easier to implement and test than the MMCA, but it is prone to bureaucratic delay and cannot replace well rehearsed rules-of-the road in theater. Yet, as David N. Griffiths of Dalhousie University emphasizes, China and the United States cannot afford to leave incident management to chance or instinct. The stakes are too high. A single mishandled incident could unintentionally undo years of painstaking progress in building U.S.–China maritime cooperation. Indeed, the Impeccable incident of March 2009 appears to have left many deep scars on the relationship, just as CMSI conference participants had anticipated.

Much discussion at the conference focused on creating significantly more routine exchanges at all levels within the military bureaucracy as one approach to help address this liability. In an era of advanced communications and sensing technology, a robust risk management mechanism that facilitates early, realtime tactical communication between military platforms as well as between operational headquarters would greatly further a larger effort to improve bilateral communications and crisis management. It should be coupled with more frequent meetings (particularly among apolitical military professional operators behind closed doors and among their civilian counterparts) and perhaps some form of after-incident review process and confidence building measures. This would hardly be unprecedented, as there are numerous historical and current models to draw upon.

Impediments to Enhanced U.S.–China Maritime Cooperation

There remain significant political, cultural, and practical obstacles to enhanced Sino-American maritime cooperation. Chinese participants concurred that Washington’s continuing support for Taipei (e.g., arms sales) remains the most significant barrier to enhanced bilateral cooperation. Rear Admiral Yang Yi explained, Needless to say, the Chinese and American armies are both making military preparation for worst-case scenarios in the Taiwan Strait. So, at present, it is unrealistic for the PLA and the U.S. military to engage in substantial military cooperation. And there are political reservations on the U.S. side as well. As Michael J. Green observed, While there is renewed momentum in U.S.–China maritime cooperation, reciprocity is falling short of expectations.

A significant cultural divide between the United States and China is a reflection of the states’ very different modern histories. The United States has been a major world maritime power for more than a century. By contrast, China is a new maritime power that has suffered major predations by hostile foreign powers originating from its maritime flank. This may explain, in the view of Peter A. Dutton, Beijing’s very slow transition away from a coastal state mentality to a maritime power mentality. As David N. Griffiths pointed out at the conference, even language can have a complicated impact on discussions of future cooperation, since in Chinese the word for security ( ) is also the same word for safety, and so may have a rather different connotation in the Chinese context.

There is also a variety of impediments to enhanced maritime cooperation. There are major resource limitations on both sides. For example, the USCG apparently must turn down many engagement opportunities with China because it does not have adequate resources to respond to all Chinese requests for cooperative activities. Likewise, China seems for now to still lack some critical assets (e.g., large helicopters) for major offshore disaster relief operations. There are organizational problems as well—for example, the bewildering number of Chinese organizations involved in search-and-rescue operations. Finally, there are also some major differences in the organization of maritime and naval education systems in each country; these might pose further challenges to building cooperative relationships.

Despite these major impediments, however, it is certainly worth considering how the improved cross-strait situation since 2008, coupled with new cooperation-oriented platforms such as hospital ships as well as new outward initiatives such as the Gulf of Aden counterpiracy mission may, taken in the aggregate, have opened a significant window of opportunity for enhanced U.S.–China maritime cooperation.

Organization of This Book

The first section of this volume surveys the stakes that the United States and China share in the global maritime commons. In his opening chapter on China’s maritime development, Zhuang Jianzhong emphasizes that Beijing intends to pursue both a full range of development and security interests at sea and cooperation with other stakeholders such as the United States. Zhuang is heartened at the truly unprecedented cooperative language of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy and is waiting to see how it will be implemented in practice. Gabriel B. Collins then deploys detailed figures and statistics to demonstrate the critical importance of the global maritime commons to China’s economic development, as exemplified by the PLA Navy’s counterpiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden. Collins suggests a variety of specific ways in which the United States can help to further integrate China into the international maritime system and ensure that its core interests are recognized there. David N. Griffiths concludes the section with a thought-provoking primer on military-to-military relationships, their challenges, and their important contributions to peace and stability. Griffiths suggests that a professional gathering of sailors and other maritime specialists can often find agreement and rules of the road where their political counterparts cannot.

The second section considers the understudied subject of maritime domain awareness, or how the oceans can best be monitored and managed in support of a robust U.S.–China maritime partnership. Andrew S. Erickson, Naval War College, examines the CSI, its genesis, and its practice and value in the United States and China. Erickson concludes that CSI has succeeded by linking robust economic and security interests, introducing new technologies and commercial opportunities, facilitating access to the U.S. market, and allowing for true reciprocity. Paul J. Smith then explores how China’s vulnerability to terrorism has increased with its international profile and human footprint. He shows that the United States and China have substantial shared interests in this area, and that their collaboration has deepened, particularly since 11 September 2001. In subsequent chapters, Lyle J. Goldstein, Naval War College, and Captain Bernard Moreland discuss a wide spectrum of cooperative opportunities in the civil maritime governance domain. Goldstein offers a detailed analysis of the five major Chinese organizations responsible for maritime enforcement, their respective roles, and their prospects for eventual consolidation. He finds that in addition to strengthening China’s maritime claims and furthering China’s growing soft power, China’s civil maritime organizations, like the USCG, can serve as a kind of buffer between states in crisis, circumventing the intensification of crises that may result from rapid naval deployments. Drawing largely on his personal experience as Coast Guard liaison officer at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, Moreland details the rationale for, and accomplishments of, bilateral civil maritime cooperation. He demonstrates that, thanks to the relatively less sensitive nature of maritime law enforcement, the United States and China have achieved far more in this area than they have thus far in the naval dimension.

The third section covers both maritime legal issues and humanitarian operations. The first two contributors offer Chinese and U.S. viewpoints on important aspects of the Law of the Sea. Julia Xue details the differing legal perspectives that China and the United States have concerning the Law of the Sea and observes the divergent strategic interests and national histories from which these perspectives emerge. Nonetheless, Xue is optimistic that China and the United States will find ways to overcome these differences because the nations share too many common concerns to allow obstacles to stand in the way of cooperation. Indeed, Xue notes, as major powers China and the United States have a common responsibility to cooperate to achieve peace and development. Peter A. Dutton assesses Chinese decisions to either participate in or opt out of four major maritime security initiatives—PSI, CSI, Combined Task Force 150, and counterpiracy operations—in light of normative international law interpretations and unique Chinese legal perspectives. His chapter concludes that U.S.–China cooperation must respect both nations’ sovereign interests and legal perspectives, but that cooperation can be achieved based on independent, coordinated action that allows each participant the freedom to define the scope of authorities it views as legitimate to employ. Su Hao then turns to humanitarian assistance and search and rescue, which are assuming increasing importance in China as new missions for the PLA Navy. Su believes that this could be a good area for collaborative efforts with the United States in the future. Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, USN (Ret.), offers a historically informed tour d’horizon of U.S.–China cooperation concerning humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. He addresses obstacles to maritime security cooperation, including the Impeccable incident, but is optimistic that cooperative efforts can facilitate broader strategic understanding on the high seas. Lyle J. Goldstein and William S. Murray then introduce an understudied and thought-provoking topic: international efforts to rescue submarines in distress. They acknowledge that there are security concerns on all sides but argue forcefully that increased Chinese participation under the aegis of the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office would be a valuable confidence-building measure whose advantages would outweigh any costs. Andrew S. Erickson concludes the section with another somewhat unorthodox topic: the prospects for joint U.S.–China naval efforts to combat avian influenza. Noting the clear existence of a common enemy and robust medical infrastructure in both militaries, Erickson contends that such cooperation is an idea whose time has come.

The fourth section provides a regional context for U.S.–China efforts. Here Michael J. Green draws on his considerable policy experience to assess the responses of China’s neighbors to its naval development and cooperation with the United States. He emphasizes that the two nations need to work harder to insulate maritime cooperation from capricious political retaliation, to test and strengthen agreements like the MMCA, and to increase reciprocity. Dr. Wu Shicun, National Institute for South China Sea Studies, offers a broad overview of China’s interests and maritime claims in the South China Sea region. While discussing candidly strategic differences, he sees substantial room for cooperation between China, the United States, and other nations in the region against such nontraditional security threats as terrorism, piracy, and transnational crime. Zhu Huayou then discusses in detail the cooperation in the South China Sea to date and outlines potential areas for future initiatives, including efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental pollution, and challenges to sea-lane security. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara conclude the section with an analysis of the prospects for cooperation among the United States, China, and India in the Indian Ocean. This strategic triangle of great power relations, they argue, has the potential either to further regional security or to destabilize the region, depending on how it is handled by the parties involved.

The fifth section concludes the volume by assessing the prospects for maritime security cooperation between the two nations in the future. Nan Li initiates this discussion by comparing U.S. and Chinese naval education systems. He finds that the Chinese Navy has defined nontraditional security-related nonwar naval operations as a major driver of China’s naval modernization, which addresses major concerns shared by the U.S. Navy. Growing similarity, familiarity, and shared concerns may open windows of opportunity for U.S.–China naval education cooperation; this in turn may help to enhance confidence building and improve crisis management. Andrew S. Erickson then examines Chinese assessments of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy. He finds that the strategy’s emphasis on conflict prevention echoes many elements of Chinese strategic culture and doctrine; the avowed objective of securing the global maritime commons is highly compatible with China’s strategic interests; and the new emphasis on humanitarian operations, especially, offers opportunities for bilateral cooperation to build mutual trust. Chinese analysts are heartened by the strategy’s new rhetoric, and encouraging progress has been made in bilateral maritime cooperation already. But at the higher levels of China’s military and civilian government, officials believe that the ball is in Washington’s court, and they are waiting for concrete actions on the part of the United States. Yu Wanli, Peking University, reviews China’s maritime development, which he believes to be moderate and constrained, and its influence by the United States. He concludes optimistically that China’s national strategy . . . and the stakeholder relations between China and the U.S. call for the two navies to strengthen bilateral exchanges and joint actions in areas such as sea rescue and anti-piracy operations. Rear Admiral Yang Yi concludes the volume by offering a Chinese naval perspective on maritime security cooperation between China and the United States. He points out that without increased efforts at communication and joint exercises between the two militaries, growing U.S. focus on East Asia and China’s naval development will lead to increased incidents that are in neither side’s interest. He therefore advocates for gradual trust-building [to] reduce suspicions and misjudgment. It means an exploration in selective and incremental engagement. China will thus decide whether to participate in global maritime partnership activities on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own principles and national interests. This candid and realistic assessment offers reason for cautious optimism, and Rear Admiral Yang’s participation in the conference and this volume is itself a very positive and encouraging step in the building of more robust maritime relations between the United States and China.

This book contains chapters that were not presented at the conference but were deemed to be of sufficient importance to demand inclusion. It must be emphasized that the views expressed in the introduction and these chapters are those of the authors alone and in no way represent the official policies or estimates of any organization of the governments of the United States or the People’s Republic of China. This volume has been compiled on the principle of academic freedom; no one associated with it, including the editors and contributors, should be construed in any way to endorse any ideas other than his or her own.

The Larger Perspective

The Wenchuan earthquake of 12 May 2008, which killed more than sixty-nine thousand Chinese citizens and devastated communities across Sichuan province, reminds us that some of the greatest threats to human security do not stem from international relations but can be addressed by them. In this light, it was heartening to see both China’s own robust efforts, many involving the PLA, and offers of assistance from governments around the world, including that of the United States. In response to Chinese requests, for instance, U.S. military aircraft delivered supplies from Hawaii to Chengdu. The members of U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] offer our sincere condolences to the citizens of the People’s Republic of China who have been affected by this recent earthquake, stated Admiral Timothy Keating, commander, U.S. Pacific Command. We will continue to provide any assistance we can to minimize their suffering and loss of life.⁸ This tragedy only reinforces our determination to work with Chinese scholars and maritime policymakers to help mitigate the effects of natural and other disasters everywhere around the world in the future.

An encouraging step toward this larger goal is currently being taken in the Gulf of Aden, where, as this volume went to press, PLA Navy ships were escorting merchant vessels from China and other countries as part of a UN-sanctioned counterpiracy effort. Since 26 December 2008 China’s navy has dispatched twelve ships in five task forces to the pirate-infested waters near Somalia. As of 20 March 2010 PLA Navy forces have escorted 1,768 ships in 179 convoys. Sixteen PLA Navy operations have rescued 10 Chinese and 13 foreign-flagged vessels from pursuit by pirates.⁹ As of 25 December 2009, 3,300 PLA Navy personnel had participated, and 405 foreign vessels had been escorted.¹⁰

This is part of a growing pattern of contributions to international security in which, in fulfillment of President Hu Jintao’s fourth new mission for the PLA—namely, to play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development¹¹—China has dispatched UN peacekeepers at levels that periodically lead the permanent members of the Security Council (and now total more than fifteen thousand on eighteen UN missions).¹² The United States, in accordance with its new Maritime Strategy, has welcomed China’s efforts in the waters off Somalia as an example of cooperation that furthers collective security. On 18 December 2008 at the Foreign Press Center in Washington, Admiral Keating vowed to work closely with the Chinese flotilla and to use the event as a potential springboard for the resumption of dialog between People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces and the U.S. Pacific Command forces. This augurs well for increased cooperation and collaboration between the Chinese military forces and U.S. . . . forces, he stated.¹³ On 1 November 2009, Rear Admiral Scott Sanders, commander, Combined Task Force-151, visited his counterpart, Rear Admiral Wang Zhiguo, aboard the PLA Navy frigate Zhoushan (hull 529). As a partner in maritime security, we have worked with China on a tactical level in order to prevent piracy . . . off the coast of Somalia, Sanders stated. Having the opportunity to sit down and share views with Adm. Wang was an invaluable experience. The cooperation between our nations continues to pay big dividends.¹⁴ In January 2010 Chinese media confirmed that China may assume the rotating chairmanship of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, a multinational effort to coordinate counterpiracy efforts among organizations operationally, and on the water tactically.¹⁵ Captain Chris Chambers, director of Combined Maritime Forces operations, described this as a very positive development. He added, There has been major progress in communication and co-operation with navies that once didn’t really speak to each other. . . . It will open the door for other independent nations to come in.¹⁶

We hope that this volume will help policymakers on both sides of the Pacific to chart a course for enhanced U.S.–China maritime cooperation sufficiently compelling to weather occasional storms of bilateral discord. In the words of Sun Zi, the United States and China are crossing the river in the same boat, and should help each other along the way ( ). Global security for the twenty-first century and beyond can, and indeed perhaps must, be built upon such a solid and significant foundation.

Notes

1.Senior Captain Duan Zhaoxian, Assistant Chief of Staff, PLA Navy, presentation in Session 5: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Maritime Security Challenges Conference 2010, Maritime Forces Pacific, Canadian Navy, Victoria, British Columbia, 29 April 2010.

2.The President Meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, The White House Blog, 12 March 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/03/12/president-meets-with-chinese-foreign-minister-yang-jiechi.

3.For further analysis of PLA Navy counterpiracy deployments, see A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandants of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, 17 October 2007), http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf.

4.The following sections address major themes of the 2007 conference and draw on direct statements of the delegates as much as possible. The conference proceedings are cited as Defining a Maritime Security Partnership with China, Third annual conference, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 5–6 December 2007.

5.Captain Moreland adds, U.S., Japan, Russia, and Canada have been flying maritime surveillance flights for years, and sharing the sighting reports weeks or months afterwards through conferences and diplomatic channels.

6.For further details, see Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Sea Power in Action: The Counter-Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond, in Roy Kamphausen and David Lai, eds., The PLA at Home and Abroad—Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010).

7.For further analysis of this timely subject, see Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds., China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009).

8.Jim Garamone, U.S. Sends Relief Supplies to China, American Forces Press Service, 18 May 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49920.

9.Sailing into the Storm: International Praise for Chinese Escort Fleets Protecting Merchant Ships against Somali Pirates, Beijing Review, 19 April 2010, http://bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2010-04/19/content_264275.htm.

10.Li Xiaokun and Peng Kuang, Anti-Piracy Special: Calming Troubled Waters, China Daily, 29 December 2009.

11.Introduced by Hu at an expanded Central Military Commission conference on 24 December 2004, the first three missions are to serve as an important source of strength for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to consolidate its ruling position; to provide a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development; and to provide a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests. Earnestly Step up Ability Building within CPC Organizations of Armed Forces, [Liberation Army Daily], 13 December 2004, available at www.chinamil.com.cn.

12.Lü Desheng, PLA Contributes a Lot to UN Peacekeeping Operations, Liberation Army Daily, 26 April 2010, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2010-04/26/content_4194204.htm.

13.Donna Miles, U.S. Welcomes Chinese Plans to Fight Piracy, Admiral Says, American Forces Press, 18 December 2008, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52386.

14.CTF-151 Commander Visits Chinese Counter-Piracy Flagship, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, 2 November 2009, http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/ctf-151-commander-visits-chinese-counter-piracy-flagship.html.

15.Principled Consensus on Escort Missions Reached between China, EU, NATO, CMF, Xinhua, 30 January 2010, http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-01/30/content_1523729.htm; and Chinese Fleet Protects Merchant Ships, Ministry of the National Defense People’s Republic of China, 25 January 2010, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Video/2010-01/25/content_4120288.htm.

16.Greg Torode, China to Lead Anti-Piracy Patrols: PLA Navy Officials Agree to Expanded Role Coordinating International Efforts off Somalia, South China Morning Post, 28 January 2010.

Zhuang Jianzhong

China’s Maritime Development and U.S.–China Cooperation

How Do Maritime Issues Fit into China’s Overall Development Strategy?

As China’s president, Hu Jintao, explained in his report at the recent 17th Party Congress, The strategic development goal of China right now is to build a moderately prosperous society in all aspects.¹ To achieve this goal, by 2020 China will increase its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to four times that of the year 2000.² China’s long-term goal, to be achieved by 2050, is to transform China into a mid-level developed country. President Hu stated, We have made progress toward the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects set at the 16th Congress, and we will continue to work hard to ensure its attainment by 2020.³

In terms of national defense, President Hu emphasized that to strengthen national defense and the armed forces occupies an important place in the overall arrangements for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Bearing in mind the overall strategic interests of national security and development, we must take both economic and national defense development into consideration and make our country prosperous and our armed forces powerful while building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects.⁴ He added, We must implement the military strategy for the new period, accelerate the revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics, ensure military preparedness, and enhance the military’s capacity to respond to various security threats and accomplish diverse military tasks. We are determined to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and help maintain world peace.⁵

With regard to naval development, according to China’s defense white paper of 2006, the navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with nuclear and conventional means of operations. Moreover, the navy is endeavoring to build mobile marine troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of information, and strengthen its overall capacity of operation in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support.⁶

President Hu Jintao remarked in 2007 that to develop maritime issues is one of strategic tasks to boost our national economic development, and he stressed on many occasions the importance of developing China’s ocean economy.⁷ The oceans are of extreme importance to China’s peaceful development in a multitude of areas. It is not enough to rely on land for the supply of food; China must also obtain food from the sea. The oceans are also an important source of energy. China imports half of its oil from abroad, and the proportion of imported oil will only increase in the future. In addition, more than 60 percent of the oil China imports comes via sea-lanes. China is facing environmental challenges and resource shortages. The oceans are a critical medium for communications; telephone and Internet cables run along the seabed. As a major country, China also explores the two polar regions and outer space. China even has rich culture buried in the seabed in the form of archaeological heritage. These are just a few examples of how essential the maritime dimension is to Chinese civilization and national development.

Most importantly, the reunification and the integrity of our territory remain unfulfilled, and most of the key areas are situated in the East China Sea, South Sea, and Taiwan Strait. Also, as we assume increasing international responsibilities, we need more sea-projection capability to send the rescue and humanitarian forces and forces on antiterrorism and antipiracy missions. China’s recent deployment of its naval ships against pirates in Gulf of Aden is an example of these missions. It is thus abundantly clear that ocean strategy is an indispensible part of China’s overall national development strategy.

Still, it must be emphasized that China is pursuing a peaceful policy; we are going along a peaceful development road, and we are promoting the development of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. Our maritime strategy must be subordinate to our overall national strategy. We can only build a relatively moderate People’s Liberation Army Navy to defend our coast areas, not a blue water navy or a strong sea power to control the sea as the United States does. Regarding maritime issues, we should uphold a concept of peaceful use of ocean resources and harmonious joint use of these resources. We should oppose sea hegemony and promote common development. These new concepts of maritime strategy should be in line with our overall peaceful development strategy, and not the reverse. We should build harmonious oceans and a harmonious world.

What Are the Main Factors Driving China’s Maritime Development?

The first driving factor in China’s maritime development is the new realization of the importance of oceans. It is now common consensus worldwide that the twenty-first century is a maritime century. Under the driving forces of economic globalization and integration, everything in today’s world has something to do with the oceans. International politics, international economics, military activities, and scientific research are all closely related to the oceans. There are three phases in mankind’s ocean views: the first phase is in the earlier stage of capitalism, when the ocean became the main venue of the capitalist expansion to find colonies and accumulate capital. The ocean played a major role in accelerating industrial civilization. In the later part of the twentieth century came another leap in mankind’s ocean views. With the development of ocean technology and exploration, the oceans themselves have changed from being merely the venues and passages to the outside world to being new rich resources for development as well. With the signing of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, almost all countries link their economic development with coastal areas and use the maritime economy to support their economic development. The so-called Blue Demarcation Movement (a widespread effort by coastal states to demarcate maritime claims) is a prime example. Now in this new age of transforming from industrial civilization to information civilization, the oceans have become a new area and new space of mankind’s existence and sustained development as well as the new area and new height for seizing strategic advantage. China too has recognized this transformation and has raised maritime consciousness greatly.

The second force promoting awareness of the oceans’ new role and significance is the new maritime development strategy of many developed countries. Many Western countries have established new maritime development strategies in rapid succession, thus entering a new stage of development. For instance, the United States emphasizes sustainable maritime development, enhances administration of ocean resources, develops further the maritime technology industry and ocean thermal energy, and explores seabed minerals. Russia is also establishing a new maritime strategy of strengthening its navy, commercial relations, and scientific research ships in order to improve its comprehensive maritime strength. The other maritime countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and India are likewise in the process of establishing their respective new maritime development strategies with the goal of rapidly becoming sea powers. These developments represent another driving force for China to have its own strategy.

The third driving factor in maritime development is China’s own requirements. China is a maritime country with a long coastline of about eight thousand miles. China has the largest population in the world but has limited land resources. The ocean is definitely the choice for sustained development. Building a strong maritime country is an objective need for both our economic construction and our national security. Becoming a sea power generally means having a comprehensive capacity to explore and develop one’s ocean economy, to find and utilize maritime resources and have a sea-controlling capacity, and it means being able to take the best advantage of one’s power to safeguard national interests and security. Strictly speaking, China is a land country, not a sea power, and we are far behind the Western sea powers. We are not even among the big five: the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. So being a sea power is not compatible with our country’s position in the world. For instance, the value our total maritime economy production in 1978 was 6 billion RMB; in 2005 it was 1,700 billion RMB. It only accounts for 2.6 percent of total GDP; by comparison, South Korea’s maritime economy occupies 7.8 percent of GDP.

As we all know, a complete maritime strategy covers many fields, including maritime resources, maritime engineering, maritime industry, maritime environment, maritime security, maintenance of maritime rights, maritime transportation, maritime law enforcement, and international maritime cooperation. In all these aspects, China is only at the beginning. We must raise our maritime consciousness, accelerate our maritime development, establish a new strategy, and aim at becoming a maritime country at the earliest opportunity.

What Is the Role of Maritime Policy in China’s New Global Diplomacy?

In his report at the 17th Party Congress, President Hu Jintao stated that the world today is undergoing tremendous changes and adjustments. Peace and Development remain the main themes of the present era, and pursuit of peace, development and cooperation has become an irresistible trend of the times. He added, We maintain that the people of all countries should join hands and strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.⁸ Personally, I think that this is the key to our new global diplomacy.

To build a harmonious world, we also need a harmonious ocean, which is one component of a harmonious world. The oceans became an arena for nations to interact with each other when the human society entered a certain stage. If we look back at the five thousand years history of ocean development and usage, and the five hundred years of cooperation and competition, we can see that oceans in peace or in turbulence have been a barometer indicating the state of major power relations. The history of ocean development could be considered, in a certain sense, one of great power competition. Those countries that are stronger will control the oceans. Portugal became a sea power at the time of the sixteenth century, and then the sixteenth century witnessed Portuguese hegemony. The seventeenth century was dominated by Dutch sea power. The eighteenth century saw French sea power politics. The nineteenth century saw the never-fallen flags of the British on the oceans, and U.S. aircraft carriers cruised the high seas in the twentieth century. History tells us that the international community needs stable, harmonious great-power relations. So whether the sea is tranquil or stormy is really an important indicator of great power relations.

China’s maritime policy is dedicated to building a harmonious ocean and peaceful seas, which includes several aspects. We will carry out policies of peaceful use of ocean space and proper development of ocean resources, work hard to protect the ocean environment, and