The ideal river: How control of nature shaped the international order
By Joanne Yao
()
About this ebook
Environmental politics has traditionally been a peripheral concern for international relations theory, but increasing alarm over global environmental challenges has elevated international society’s relationship with the natural world into the theoretical limelight. IR theory’s engagement with environmental politics, however, has largely focused on interstate cooperation in the late twentieth century, with less attention paid to how the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century quest to tame nature came to shape the modern international order.
The ideal river examines nineteenth-century efforts to establish international commissions on three transboundary rivers – the Rhine, the Danube, and the Congo. It charts how the Enlightenment ambition to tame the natural world, and human nature itself, became an international standard for rational and civilized authority and informed our geographical imagination of the international. This relationship of domination over nature shaped three core IR concepts central to the emergence of early international order: the territorial sovereign state; imperial hierarchies; and international organizations. The book contributes to environmental politics and international relations by highlighting how the relationship between society and nature is not a peripheral concern, but one at the heart of international politics.
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The ideal river - Joanne Yao
The ideal river
ffirs01-fig-5001.jpgThe ideal river
How control of nature shaped the international order
Joanne Yao
Manchester University Press
Copyright © Joanne Yao 2022
The right of Joanne Yao to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Published by Manchester University Press
Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL
www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 1 5261 5438 5 hardback
First published 2022
The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Cover image:
NASA/USGS Landsat 8; Norman Kuring, GSFC
Cover design:
Abbey Akanbi, Manchester University Press
Typeset
by New Best-set Typesetters Ltd
For the Rhine, the Danube, and the Congo Rivers
Contents
List of figures
Preface and acknowledgments
Introduction: The ideal river
1 The taming of nature, legitimate authority, and international order
2 Taming the international highway: constructing the Rhine
3 The 1815 Congress of Vienna and the oldest continuous interstate institution
4 Disciplining the connecting river: constructing the Danube
5 The 1856 Treaty of Paris and the first international organization
6 Civilizing the imperial river: constructing the Congo
7 The 1884–85 Berlin Conference and the international organization that never was
8 History is a river: the taming of nature into the twenty-first century
Conclusion: The strong brown god of the Anthropocene
Bibliography
Index
Figures
2.1 Map of the straightening of the Rhine near Ketsch by Johann Gottfried Tulla, 1833
2.2 Johann Tulla's tombstone in Montmartre cemetery, Paris. Source: Maixentais via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 4.0)
4.1 Trajan's Column: detail of Roman army departing across the Danube. Source: Carole Raddato via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 4.0)
6.1 Map of Africa, 1861
6.2 Sketch of Berlin Conference with map of Africa in the conference hall, 1885
6.3 Congolese village at the Antwerp World's Fair of 1894
Preface and acknowledgments
People who write about rivers often start their narratives by describing a romanticized clarion call from the river that they simply could not ignore – and off they would go to uncover all the lofty secrets of the river from source to mouth. I arrived at my research on rivers in a much more grounded fashion. As I have often told colleagues and complete strangers who quizzically asked me ‘why rivers?’, I started my doctoral studies hoping to research international norms and global oceans. I had just spent three and a half years working in the bureaucratic cage of the US government and wanted an intellectual challenge that captured the expansive scope of the global in all its drama and contradictions. However, when I arrived at the International Relations Department at the London School of Economic and Political Science (LSE), my supervisor looked at my ambitious proposal and questioned the wisdom of a largescale historical project on oceans – ‘how about rivers?’ he asked me.
At first, the move from oceans to rivers seemed like a sensible restraint on the over-eager imagination of a first-year doctoral student. Anchoring my research on the first transboundary river commissions of the nineteenth century whittled down the scope and made the project ‘doable’ (said one senior academic). But I soon realized that rivers were every bit the fertile intellectual and theoretical playground that oceans represented in my original proposals. The metaphorical and metaphysical richness of rivers astonished me. Once I started looking for it, I found that the dream of taming rivers wove through the history of the modern world like a bright thread. It lurks at the heart of modernity – not just in our ironclad faith in unidirectional progress along the river of history, but in modern society's desire for neatness, predictability, finite boundaries, and a straightened sense of political purpose.
A turning point came when I started to see how this dream of taming the river hung in the air at formal diplomatic conferences of nineteenth-century Europe and in between the lines of international agreements. It led me to reflect on whether the dry, bureaucratic discussion and decrees of these conferences – and the first ‘technical’ international bodies they created – were actually laden with ideas about how to control not just the political affairs of human society but its relationship with nature. And I grew increasingly disenchanted with accounts of international institutions that seemed divorced from not just a sense of history but a sense of place – as if these diplomatic deliberations and the ‘high politics’ of international relations occurred in a detached vacuum that sealed them off from prevailing intellectual, social, and geographical imaginaries of their times. Perhaps this is why it is so easy to believe that these institutions are not only technocratic and apolitical but also universal and generalizable across time and space.
All this led me to wonder how environmental history might contribute to a historical sociology of the first interstate organizations established to tame international rivers. Can the history of the river be disentangled from the societies that have dreamed along its banks, bathed in its waters, and engineered its shorelines? Can the history of these societies be disentangled from the river that has watered their fields, cleansed their cities, and carried their ideas and institutions to new shores? Ultimately, my aim is not to capture the ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ river (as perhaps those who receive the clarion call might hope to do) but to consider how our entangled human–river histories enabled the political possibilities of modernity. However, studying the co-constitution of human and nonhuman relations as a central theme in the early formation of the current international order also shows us how our modern political order has gone to such lengths to create and reinforce a stark separation between human civilization and nature – an ongoing political effort that informs our troubled relationship with nature in the Anthropocene.
Countless human and nonhuman inspirations have made this book possible. I would like to thank Peter Wilson, George Lawson, Tarak Barkawi, James A. Morrison, and all those at the LSE IR department who saw potential in an unusual graduate project about rivers – in particular, I am very grateful to Peter Wilson for pushing me towards the Danube and George Lawson for his intellectual encouragement, professional support, and no-nonsense advice. Many have, in their own way, inspired me to go on this peculiar intellectual journey including Alexander Wendt, Marco Cesa, Todd Hall, Valerie Morkevicius, Johs Pierce, and my parents Youchun Yao and Qiuping Chen. Many others have contributed to this project by illuminating new avenues and asking provocative questions that have stayed with me – here, I would particularly like to thank Martin Bayly, Klaus Dodds, Andrew Phillips, Tonny Brems Knudsen, Mark Laffey, Meera Sabaratnam, Kim Hutchings, Kiran Phull, and Cameron Harrington.
I would like to thank my friends and colleagues for their untold support in conceiving of, researching, and writing this book – from the LSE gang including Andrew Delatolla, Liane Harnett, Martin Hearson, Heidi NK Wang-Kaeding, Ida Danewid, Bugra Susler (especially for his insights on Turkish views of the Danube), Marian Feist and Daniel Schade (especially for their help with German translations, place names, and cultural insights), Julia Himmrich, Lukas Linsi, Aaron McKeil, and Andreas Nøhr, to my colleagues at Queen Mary who helped with my final framing and whose trailblazing intellectual brilliance has inspired the concluding chapters. I would also like to thank Ben van Zwanenberg for his unwavering support despite the fact that I don't do a ‘real’ science. Finally, as I have suggested in the dedication, I would like to thank the main characters of this book – the Rhine, the Danube, and the Congo rivers – without whom this book could never have been written.
Parts of
Chapter 4 and
5 were first published in ‘Conquest from barbarism
: the Danube Commission, international order and control of nature as a Standard of Civilization’, European Journal of International Relations 25(2): 335–59. I would like to thank SAGE Publishing for permission to reprint this material.
Introduction
The ideal river
Rivers are roads which move, and which carry us whither we desire to go.
Blaise Pascal, Pensées,
1670
Historie without Geographie like a dead carkasse hath neither life nor motion at all.
Peter Heylyn, 1652
In the aftermath of an October storm in 1504, Niccolò Machiavelli appraised the collapsed walls of two ditches outside of Pisa. The ditches were intended to divert the Arno River away from the city-state of Pisa, sever its lines of communications and trade, and force its surrender to Machiavelli's Florence. In addition, the surrounding countryside would benefit from flood control and irrigation. If all went well, cutting wide channels to divert the Arno into the sea would transform Florence into a port city and open it up to the possibility of a maritime empire. The engineering plans had been designed by none other than the great artist and polymath Leonardo Da Vinci who had conducted extensive studies of the Arno and surrounding area. However, to save on cost and manpower, the field engineer responsible for implementing Da Vinci's plans changed the depth of the diversionary channels and doomed the project. From the beginning, Florentine military commanders overseeing the siege of Pisa had been skeptical of this newfangled project to control nature for political purposes. Years after its failure, one commander would write to Machiavelli admonishing him for his hubris in playing God since only a divine force could part the Red Sea or divert the Arno for the benefit of human society (Masters 1999: 21).
However, if rivers are meandering roads with surprising destinations, then Da Vinci and Machiavelli's effort to tame the river and bend nature to the will of human society did not end outside of Pisa on that October day. Instead, their experiment represented the beginning of an underlying shift in Western international society's relationship with nature that would not be limited to their ambitions for the Arno and Florence. Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the notion that government authorities rather than divine intervention were responsible for taming nature and safeguarding its bounty for society would become a key component of European modernity – and society's faith that scientific advancements could conquer nature took on not only political but moral importance. Likely with the failed diversion of the Arno in mind, in The Prince Machiavelli likens fortune to a violent river that rains destruction on an unprepared society. Hence, he advises the wise ruler to build dikes and dams when times are quiet so that when the waters rise, ‘either they go by a canal or their impetus is neither so wanton nor so damaging’ (1998 [1532]: 98). In this passage, taming the river not only benefits society economically and politically, but it is also a demonstration of moral virtue and prudent governance.
Furthermore, Da Vinci and Machiavelli's project to tame the Arno ultimately looked westward toward the Americas. Since Christopher Columbus's first voyage, Florentine merchants had been interested in the commercial opportunities that America represented, and one of its native sons, Amerigo Vespucci, led the first Europeans to the shores of what is today Brazil. As Florentines celebrated Vespucci's discoveries with fireworks and fanfare, they also wondered how much wealth and power they might gain by becoming a maritime power themselves with access to the world's oceans (Masters 1999: 104–5). Diversion channels on the Arno promised to make Florence a navigable port on the Ligurian Sea. Even more than creating a physical link to the sea, the diversion of the Arno represented the global ambitions of the modern European geographical imagination. Taming and controlling this local river was just the first step to taming and controlling the world.
This book charts how society's quest to tame nature, dismissed by Florentine military commanders as mere hubris in the early sixteenth century, came to shape the modern international order. While Da Vinci and Machiavelli's project ended without success, their overall political project to control the river for the benefit of society would inspire others. By the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Enlightenment confidence in civilized society's ability to tame nature would become a central tenet of legitimate state authority. In addition, like Florentine leaders whose geographical imagination looked to the Americas, the taming of nature as a standard of legitimate rule also spurred colonialism and informed the development of imperial hierarchies. Hence, this book details how the taming of nature shaped not just the modern territorial state and relations between states, but also helped to constitute global hierarchies that continue to underpin modern international politics. Throughout, I use the term ‘taming’ to capture the multifaceted motivations behind projects to control the river, and in particular, to underscore the moral logics of battling the dark forces of chaos through the use of modern science.
To investigate how the taming of nature shaped the modern international order, I focus on Europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the political moment in which a particular European modernity became the driver of global transformations that reordered international politics and gave rise to early global governance. During this transformation, taming the river was enfolded into a broader liberal economic project that foregrounded the control of nature as a global standard of economic and political legitimacy. This standard became as applicable to the floodplains of the Arno as to the wetlands of the Danube delta and the megadams of the Indian subcontinent and the American West. Here the ideal river is as conceptualized by Blaise Pascal when he noted that ‘rivers are roads which move, and which carry us whither we desire to go’ (1670: 5). The ideal river is a rational and reliable highway for the seamless movement of goods, people, and ideas, and hence it enriches the state, enlightens the populace, and brings liberal progress along the metaphorical river of history. This book is about the construction of that ideal river in the European geographical imagination and the ensuing political projects to actualize that vision through the creation of the first international organizations (IOs).
Conceptualizing the river: between matter and ideas
Many characters weave through the story of the establishment of the first IOs – some are scientists and engineers who prepared plans to deepen and straighten unruly rivers; some are explorers and artists whose written and pictorial accounts depicted the wonders and dangers of the river to a mesmerized European public; some are bureaucrats, lawyers, and diplomats at foreign offices and conferences who translated the mission to tame rivers into official agreements and international law. But perhaps the most important and understudied characters in these stories are the rivers themselves.
Traditionally, environmental politics has not been a central concern for IR theorizing, with works on environmental policy as either an extension of international regimes scholarship (Young
1994; 2016; Haas
2015) or international political economy (Clapp and Dauvergne 2016; Falkner 2017). This orientation largely treats the environment as a collective action problem for international society to solve, reinforcing an assumed duality between an external nature in trouble and an international human society that must marshal the political will and technological ingenuity to save it. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the increasing salience of global environmental challenges has elevated consideration of society's relationship with nature into the theoretical limelight (Eckersley 2004; Nixon 2011; O’Neill 2017; Forrester and Smith 2018) – particularly critical reflections that emphasize the interconnectedness and interdependence between human and nonhuman worlds.
To understand the river's role in the creation of the first IOs, it is important not only to examine rivers as material objects that enable or obstruct human endeavors, but as characters with identities taken on through centuries of interaction with human culture and politics. The Rhine flows 1,250 kilometers from streams that empty into Lake Constance (also known as the Bodensee) to the North Sea port of Rotterdam, and cuts across the bloody history of Franco-German contestation over territory, power, and European supremacy. The second longest river in Europe, the Danube flows 2,860 kilometers from Germany's Black Forest region to the Black Sea through ten current European countries and all of European history since Marcus Aurelius stood on its banks and looked dimly across at the barbarian Germanic tribes. The second longest river in Africa and the deepest in the world, the Congo flows in a semi-circle 4,700 kilometers from the highlands of East Africa into the Atlantic Ocean – in fact, the Congo enters the Atlantic with such force that its dark yellow footprint can be seen many kilometers from shore. Despite all its hydrological marvels, however, thanks to Joseph Conrad's chilling prose, the Congo is suspended forever in the Western imagination as the heart of darkness.
Conceptualizing the river in this way draws on a broadly constructivist meta-theoretical framework. I build on Emmanuel Adler's understanding of constructivists as mediativists where ‘social reality emerges from the attachment of meaning and functions to physical objects; collective understandings, such as norms, endow physical objects with purpose and therefore help constitute reality’ (1997: 324). The reality of the river is constituted by the social meanings we attach to it. However, while Adler framed mediativists as a ‘middle ground’ between positivists and post-positivists, I understand this as a different way of analyzing social reality that rejects both the positivist insistence on an objective and pre-social material reality, as well as the post-positivist reluctance to theorize the impact of material forces on social discourses and constructions. Instead, social structures emerge from our entanglement with material forces as much as material forces are constituted and reconstituted by social ones. While the material and social might be analytically distinguishable – the river that flows from source to ocean versus our ideas about what the river should do and therefore what the river means – the political significance of neither can be fully understood without the other.
To put it differently, to understand the rivers’ role in the story of the first IOs is also to put the human characters in the context of not only their historical epochs, but also their sense of geographical place. If the river's characteristics are entwined in human culture and politics, then human society has also been intimately shaped by the river. Nineteenth-century Romantics floating down the Rhine might gaze up at the imposing cliffs and wax poetic about the river's ‘natural’ beauty, but local communities along the river have actively engineered its bends and flows since Neolithic times. And the social fabrics of these local communities have always been shaped by the evolving materiality of the river and the political, economic, and spiritual meanings attached to the vivacity of its flow, its violence during storms, and its placidity during moments of quiet contemplation.
Indeed, the physical attributes of rivers – as a life-giving force, as a boundary that separates spaces, and a conduit that connects them – are rooted deep in human cultures and frame international society's longstanding narratives of water wars and water peace. Water holds a central place in all world religions – the term for Islamic law, shari’a, originates from a term that means ‘the path that leads to water’, while in Daoism, to resemble water is the highest virtue. Talmudic, Christian, and Islamic traditions all recognize the ‘right to thirst’, chafa, as a thirsty person's right to drink water no matter who owns the well or water source. At the same time, the term ‘rivals’ comes from the Latin rivalis or ‘one who uses the same stream’ and reflects a sense of Malthusian competition. The iconic Persian garden, reproduced in universally familiar carpet designs, has four channels symbolizing the four rivers of paradise dividing the quadrants of the earth and all meeting in a central fountain (Thacker 1979: 28–9). Flowing water not only denoted boundaries between earthly kingdoms – the River Styx famously separated the land of the living from that of the dead, and Julius Caesar's Rubicon separated the past to which we cannot return from a future of our own making. The river's ability to divide, connect, and transform make it more than simply a passive backdrop to human politics.
Environmental historians, perhaps because of their unique analytical focus, have long contemplated this co-constitution of social and natural worlds – indeed, environmental history is the record of that co-constitution. As David Blackbourn eloquently wrote, ‘what we call landscapes are neither natural nor innocent; they are human constructs. How and why they are constructed (many would say imagined
, even invented
) belongs to the stuff of history’ (2006: 15). In telling this entangled story of human society and the river, Blackbourn and other environmental historians not only wear away at the stark divide between human civilization and nature, but build the case against the purity of either. They do so by articulating the ways in which both nature and society ‘are at once material and discursive’ (Pritchard 2011: 17).
They remind us, as Count George Buffon did in the eighteenth century, that an untouched nature is a human fantasy: ‘the state in which we see nature today is as much our work as it is hers. We have learned to temper her, to modify her, to fit her to our needs and desires’ (quoted in Ferkiss 1993: 56). Equally, human civilization has always been actively shaped by nature. Peter Coates's environmental history of six rivers begins with the provocation that he intends to write not only about what societies do to the river, but also what rivers do to society. A nod to new materialist thinking, Coates's rivers are not merely objects in a human story but subjects and agents that act upon societies (2013: 26–7). For much of human history, the movement of people and ideas has depended on the directionality of rivers. Kinshasa emerged as a prosperous trading post long before Europeans arrived in central Africa due to its position at the head of a series of cataracts that made this inland city, rather than a coastal city, the center of Congo River trade. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Danube delta was thrown into the geopolitical limelight due to a hydrological quirk – rather than flowing with force into the Black Sea, the Danube turns and slows down, losing its way in wetlands and causing silt to obstruct international shipping. Lauren Benton shows how waterways acted as conduits for European power projection and colonial control, creating an uneven texture in their overseas empires – ‘a fabric that was full of holes’ – based on spatial distance from these arteries of imperial control (2010: 39).
While human society and nature are entwined, it is important to emphasize that they are also not reducible to one another. Environmental historians write against a natural world that is entirely collapsible into human constructs as they write against a human world determined purely by material – and some would say biological – forces. Environmental historians challenge a Galtonian biological determinism and Karl Wittfogel's environmental determinism (
1956)
¹ as much they contest a river that came into being purely from the human imagination. To view the world from either extreme would be to do violence to both nature and society. Indeed, one of this book's main themes is to examine how the materiality of the river reinforces, pushes back against, and reconstitutes the ideal river to create international politics.
Navigating the binary: liberalism, imperialism, and progress
Focusing on human society and the river as entangled, embedded, and inseparable allows me to make two overall interventions into the study of international politics. First, it foregrounds the problematic binary between civilization and nature and an implicit assumption behind ideologies of progress that the advancement of human civilization depends on the subjugation of nature. Here, my reflections revolve around Scottish philosopher James Dunbar's invocation: ‘let us wage war with the elements, not with our own kind’ (1780: 338). This quote suggests an opposition between a conflictual international society that engages in internal fratricidal violence and an idealized and progressive international society with a united purpose in the struggle against nature. In this way, the creation of the first organizations along transboundary rivers reflects Dunbar's call to forge international cooperation through the common aim of taming nature – a solidarity developed in the conviction that scientific and technical expertise will benefit humankind by rendering the nonhuman world less threatening, more predictable, and more profitable. Indeed, the liberal mantra that cooperation produces a ‘win-win’ scenario depends precisely on this wager that working together will allow us to extract more utility from our environment. Therefore, international institutions help us redirect our efforts from fighting our own kind to a common struggle against the elements.
Framing the relationship between civilization and nature as one of binary opposition and inevitable conquest by the former over the latter is also problematic in that the line between what is considered ‘civilization’ and ‘nature’ is not fixed. Once civilization's dominance over nature is established, moving the boundaries between the two can be an incredibly effective tool for social exclusion and political subjugation. Dunbar's call above was made in the context of praising colonialism in the Americas as essential to improving the climate: ‘by opening the soil, by clearing the forests, by cutting out passages for the stagnant waters, the new hemisphere becomes auspicious, like the old’ (1780: 338). Here, Dunbar elevates the control of nature based on European models as not only key to making the land more economically valuable, but also to recovering ‘our patrimony from Chaos’ (1780: 338). This moral framing also implies that indigenous populations’ inability or unwillingness to ‘improve’ the land placed them firmly on the side of Chaos – a framing that continues to hamstring indigenous peoples as they confront capitalist forces and the state over rights to land into the twenty-first century.
Hence, casting a group as ‘closer to nature’ and therefore ‘barbaric’ and ‘uncivilized’ legitimates, first, treating that group as inferior and less worthy of normative consideration, and second, engaging in projects to tame and civilize that group in order to control and perhaps breed out those ‘natural’ impulses. In other words, the project to tame nature has not been confined to rivers and forests but also extends to ‘untamed’ elements in human society – indeed, to civilize the savage beyond the pale has long been a central aim of and justification for colonial and imperial practices. The political story this book tells shows how the ambition to tame the river seamlessly dovetails into the mission to master the ‘darker’ side of human nature and subdue the unruly elements of society. By draining the Prussian swamps in the eighteenth century, Frederick the Great not only made useless land useful, but also hunted down army deserters hiding there. In the twentieth century, Saddam Hussain's project to drain the Mesopotamian swamps between the Tigris and Euphrates echoed Frederick's efforts by taming the rivers at the same time as hunting down rebels who sheltered in the reeds. By emphasizing how attempts to reorder nature also imply the reordering of society, I contend that liberal accounts of economic and moral progress likewise involve projects to rationalize ‘untamed’ peoples and places.
Second, and relatedly, the entangled human–river history in this book also cautions us against drawing simplistic lessons on institutional success and failure. It is all too easy to tell a narrative of institutional success in which the first fledging interstate body established along the Rhine developed into an effective international institution and inspired a cooperative model replicated first along the Danube and then across the globe in contexts as diverse as the Nile and Mekong rivers. Perhaps we can even draw a progressive line from the 1815 Rhine Commission to the League of Nations, the United Nations, and all subsequent global governance institutions. Equally, it is just as tempting to tell a narrative of institutional failure in which the first interstate commission along the Rhine was stymied by political conflict between riparian states, the second along the Danube only achieved temporary and limited success because of British hegemony, and the complete failure to establish a third commission along the Congo resulted in one of the worst tragedies of the colonial era. The first narrative reinforces the triumph of international society over untamed nature while the second reverses the story as one of human hubris. But both narratives envision nature and civilization as opposites engaged in conflict and miss a more complex story that resists the alluring simplicity of this duality.
While it is tempting to want the story of the first IOs to be either a liberal tale of progressive triumph or a realist tragedy, the historical wrinkles behind the story of each river commission thwart such a telling. To borrow from Blackbourn, framing history this way would be to ‘tell a one-eyed tale’, but ‘even in our age of sound-bites and simple story lines, with its inbuilt biases against complexity, it is surely still possible to hold two contradictory ideas in our heads’ (2006: 11). Here, I suggest it is not only possible but useful to steer between the ideological banks and acknowledge that whether an international organization or an international order is considered a success or failure largely depends on where in history we stand. At the turn of the twentieth century, as a seat of the Danube Commission, the small Danube delta town of Sulina bustled with cosmopolitan life as visitors marveled at the success of the commission in bringing nations together. Half a century later, the Iron Curtain bisected the river and the commission as a beacon of liberal progress seemed all but extinguished. Surely being able to see both stories enhances our understanding of the current international order and the complex dynamics behind envisioning and building that order. But perhaps more fundamentally, being able to hold both stories in our heads dispels the myth that either story is natural or inevitable. One of the goals of this account, then, is to resist and denature simplistic narratives about the inevitable success or preordained failure of international institutions and the global governance projects they represent.
Historicizing the first international organizations
IR scholarship has long debated the role of IOs in facilitating cooperation and advancing international peace and security. The proliferation of IOs since the late nineteenth century seems to fly in the face of realist skepticism toward their efficacy as independent actors in international politics. As of the early twenty-first century, there are an estimated 330 IOs and 37,500 international nongovernment organizations (INGOs) (Rittberger et al. 2019: 1).² IR often captures the growth in IOs and INGOs under the designation of global governance, a term used to describe the increasing networks of actors and processes that produce international order in the absence of a central world government. In other words, global governance is about enabling global problem-solving without a powerful central authority to coordinate and enforce collective action.
However, given all the intellectual effort IR scholars have put into theorizing international cooperation and critically assessing the formal institutional structures designed to achieve that cooperation, there is curiously little analytical attention paid to the establishment of the first IOs. Created in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the 1815 Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine is often catalogued as the first intergovernmental organization (Reinalda 2009). This first commission was followed by the first ‘international’ organization:³ the 1856 European Commission of the Danube, established in the aftermath of the Crimean War. As the nineteenth century progressed, such organizations multiplied and became an accepted way of deliberating issues of transnational concern and formulating collective policy (Murphy 1994; Murphy and Yates 2019). International bodies sprang up to address issues as diverse as coordinating postal services and telecommunications and collaboration between secret police. While some early twentieth-century thinkers such as Leonard Woolf were interested in the 1856 European Commission of the Danube as a prototype for a world government based on functionalism (Woolf 1916; Wilson 2003), these early organizations have largely been passed over in