

INSTITUTIONAL VARIANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE, 1816-2002:
ELECTORAL, EXECUTIVE, AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS IN TIME AND SPACE

by

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Dedication

In Memory of
Hayward R. Alker,
1937-2007,

who taught me that stories can be written in many languages,
that realities have many truths,
pointed at issues never raised
and to connections never drawn.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation is about the role of governmental institutions in the making of politics between states. It is an effort to show that the effects of spreading democratic institutions to promote peace are more complex than commonly perceived by politicians and academics today. It is motivated by the hope for a more peaceful world, a peace built on tolerance and the acknowledgement that democratic governance must be vested in local cultures and histories. Democracy and democratization may be many-faceted tools for achieving peace. My aim in this dissertation is to start unwrapping some of these relationships.

The starting point of this dissertation is the Democratic Peace theory, which provides the most referred to and relied upon ideas of the role regimes play for peace. I argue that this status of the Democratic Peace theory is premature. Despite having uncovered an apparent empirical pattern, the research program¹ has by no means provided qualified theoretical explanations. Theory offers clear and comprehensive descriptions of the relations between phenomena. Given the world's complexity, a theory can only explain parts of an observation, leaving other parts out. This dissertation starts from the view that too much has been left out when seeking to explain the absence of conflict between democracies. Consequently, Democratic Peace theory cannot automatically be assumed useful for understanding states' conflict behavior vis-a-vis other states.

This study takes seriously the suggestion that political decision-makers face structural constraints when choosing their actions internationally. Rather than merely assuming that structural constraints shape decision-making, this work points to the political relevance of such a proposition and suggests empirically exploring it by looking at behavioral variation between different types of

¹The term 'research program' refers to a series of theories linked by a set of constitutive and guiding assumptions (Lakatos, 1970). Whereas the Democratic Peace theory refers to the main theoretical argument about how norms and institutions constrain democracies in their behavior internationally, the Democratic Peace as a research program embrace all theorizing and empirical work related to to the main argument.

democracies. Furthermore, this dissertation underscores the importance of understanding the complexities of this variation within regional sub-systems within which democracy and conflict have been subjected to the same historical trajectories. The strong descriptive focus of this work uncovers some of these patterns and raise awareness of generally ignored complexities in the analyses about democracy and peace.

When I first started writing about governmental institutions and conflict more than a decade ago, I largely saw the world through the lenses of positivist research methodologies. My academic upbringing was in the spirit of scientific quantification of the world and the belief that this is the best way to acquire reliable knowledge. Meeting Hayward R. Alker contributed to changing my perspective. There are many ways to describe Alker's contribution to this work, most notably his questioning of categories and assumptions that often remain unchallenged in the academic field of International Relations. Not only did I benefit from his encyclopedic mind, he also introduced me to ideas that he developed as a young scholar at MIT, which unfortunately went largely unheard in the community of international relations scholars. Having evolved scholarly from econometrics at MIT to hermeneutics at USC, Alker understood and respected my epistemological base. Intellectually inspired by Alker's early work on the problems of non-additivity (Alker, 1965, 1968, 1969) combined with his later work on dialectics of world order (Alker, Biersteker, and Inoguchi, 1989:159) and non-linearity (Alker and Christensen, 1972), my work emphasizes the uniqueness and thus non-additive nature of every region as well as the interrelated 'orders' between the regions in the world, the dialectic between democratic institutions, and finally the dynamic of regimes, institutions and interstate conflict over time and within regions.

My quest for understanding the behavioral variation among democracies forced me to search outside the mainstream literature of international relations for answers. This cross-cutting approach enabled me to draw on rich and relevant work from a whole range of disciplines, especially from comparative politics, history, foreign politics and economic theory. My original plan was to look for institutional variation among all states, not only democracies. Through the collection of this information I came to realize that the institutional classifications that I relied on for the coding were largely aspects of democracy and would not capture variation in decision-making constraints among autocratic leaders. I had wanted to detach my analysis from the binary democracy versus autocracy framework in order to avoid relying on assumptions about the value of these regimes. The realization

that my project was already vested in these binary conceptions led me to drop the differentiation of autocracies. The analysis of constrained autocrats would need to be based on differentiation of other structures than those focused on here. As a mentor, Alker was very encouraging of this dialectical process of working in the interface between theory development and data collection. At the same time as respecting the application of sophisticated quantitative techniques, Alker always emphasized the importance of knowing your data. Relying on other people's data, created for different purposes than your own, is sometimes necessary. However, my decision to create a new dataset met his idea of understanding the substance behind numbers. The strong emphasis on descriptive analysis of the data further supported this approach.

Although the extensive duration of this project has been frustrating at times, it did give me time to reflect and internalize ideas that I was exposed to and working with at the University of Southern California (USC). As a result, I have removed myself from a somewhat inhibiting starting point and hopefully become a more informed scholar. I hope that some of this transformation shines through in this work, even though I have chosen to follow an approach which largely conforms to the most recent advances of the quantitative methodologies as defined by scholars studying regimes and conflict. Rather than imply that this is the only way to go about gathering knowledge about governmental institutions and interstate conflict, it signifies an attempt to master one research technique. I believe in the virtue of utilizing and combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Rather than assuming that one is correct and the other is incorrect, I believe they complement each other. Whereas the generalization of quantitative methods can provide useful insight about trends in phenomena across states, regions and over long time spans, they cannot automatically be assumed accurate for individual states and peoples. The conditions affecting whether or not a state will engage in conflict with other states are far more complex and must be contextualized in order to be useful as an instrument for policy-making. The essence of this argument therefore is that generalizations are best suited in the initial stages of studying a phenomenon, but needs to be complemented with disaggregated analyses, based on factors like regions, states, or time periods.

Because of the great challenges I encountered when undertaking this work, such as collecting data on governmental institutions, I opted not to include the type of qualitative analyses that I find crucial to understand relations between governmental institutions and international conflict. The generalizing nature of this work should serve as a starting point for future research in this field

by suggesting the potential importance of governmental institutions when democratizing for peace. Furthermore, this dissertation should serve as a starting point for qualitative analyses of institutions and conflict, such as case studies and comparative case studies, or of systemic analyses. What I do not claim is to have established the final answer to what the association between governmental institutions and conflict is.

My guiding principle in this work has been that of making everything as clear as possible. My goal has been to present thoughts in ways that are clear, logical, easy to follow, and keep the focus on the ideas. Recognizing that the quantitative methodologies in International Relations have become very sophisticated, but for some scholars also complex, difficult, and often expressed in inaccessible terms, I try to present my choices and procedures as explicitly as possible for myself, as well as for the reader and critic.

It is my hope that this work will raise awareness of the policy implications of spreading democracy as a means for achieving and maintaining peace among states. And most of all, I wish that academics and politicians alike will promote democratic institutions with greater understanding of, and respect for, history, culture, and traditions within which these institutions have to work.

I am greatly indebted to those that have supported me and the making of this project throughout the last decade. Among the many contributors, the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, (PRIO) has been my foundation. After funding finalization of my master thesis in 1996, PRIO has repeatedly provided facilities, funds, and a scholarly forum for my dissertation work. In the later years, this invaluable support has been provided by the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) at PRIO. The Research Council of Norway (NRF) was the main source of funds for the dissertation work, which also provided one year paid maternity leave in 2001. While at USC, the School of International Relations and the Center for International Studies have generously funded me through research assistantships, tuition remission, fellowships, and grants. My gratitude also extends to the Fulbright Association and the Norway - America Association, both of which funded my initial year as a doctoral student in the United States. Among the many other organizations or groups supporting my doctoral work are the Swedish Club of Los Angeles and the International Studies Association.

Numerous people have been supportive during the tumultuous road towards this Ph.D. I am grateful to Hayward R. Alker for giving me freedom to mature and define the project on my own terms, and for always making himself available to me. I thank Nils Petter Gleditsch for having faith

in me at the initial stages of the Ph.D., for providing facilities and scholarly support whenever I asked for it, and for always leaving the door open for me at PRIO. I am greatly indebted to Scott Gates for commenting and advising on my early ideas, drafts and methodologies. In his busy schedule as a family member, director for the CSCW, and researcher, he has always been willing to lend support and advice. His generous support has been instrumental to my completion of this work, especially during the final stages. I am thankful to J. Ann Tickner for teaching me to look for perspectives and for being supportive even at times of personal pain and loss. My gratitude extends to Patrick James for taking over the responsibility of chairing my committee upon Alker's passing during the fall 2007. His gentle encouragement and pragmatic approach to this task was very helpful during the final months. I am indebted to Krister Lundell and Lauri Karvonen, and to John Gerring and Strom C. Thacker for generously providing me access to their data on federalism. Yet other people who have supported me in different ways are Linda Cole, Barbara Geddes, Gerald J. Bender, Kristian S. Gleditsch, Håvard Hegre, Cheng Hsiao, Alba Quinones Hesselroth, Odvar Leine, Brandon Prins, Håvard Strand, Barbara Walter, Lars Wilhelmsen and my colleagues and friends at PRIO. I would like to thank my parents for their endless support, patience and understanding throughout these demanding years. Most of all, I admire and thank my husband Bjørn Solberg for hanging on and believing that there is an end to it. Not only has he been a financial provider, editor and proof reader, he has also been my \LaTeX companion and the main engineer behind manipulation of the database. Lastly, my children Magnus and Sunniva Margrethe made sure to fill my free time with love and joy.

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Oslo, Norway

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Table of Contents

Dedication	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Abstract	xvi
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 The Problematic Way to Peace	1
1.1.1 The Underdeveloped Democratic Peace Theory	2
1.1.2 Inferential Fallacies of the Democratic Peace	4
1.1.3 Issues Raised and Questions Asked	6
1.1.4 Conclusion: Towards a Progressive Research Program	11
Chapter 2: The Development of the Democratic Peace Thesis	12
2.1 The Difficult Peace	12
2.2 The Democratic Peace and Its Origin	14
2.3 The First Phase: Domestic Constraints and Peacefulness	15
2.3.1 The Structural/Institutional Explanation	18
2.3.2 The Cultural/Normative Explanation	20
2.3.3 Some Shortcomings of the First Phase	21
2.3.4 Policy Relevance of the Democratic Peace	32
2.3.5 Conclusion: A (Still) Underdeveloped Theory?	33
2.4 The Second Phase: A Generalization of Focus	34
2.4.1 The ‘Third Leg’ Model: Democracy, Trade and Intergovernmental Organiza- tions	34
2.4.2 Moving On From the Current Status of the Democratic Peace	36
2.5 Conclusion	37
Chapter 3: Extending the Democratic Peace	38
3.1 Governmental Institutions in the Status Quo	38
3.2 The First Step Towards an Extended Theory: The Causes of War as the Starting Point	39
3.3 Revisiting the Democratic Peace	43
3.3.1 The Relative Importance of the Democratic Peace in Time and Space	45
3.4 Institutional Refinement of the Democratic Peace Theory	62
3.4.1 The Institutional History of the World	62
3.4.2 Identifying Governmental Institutions	63
3.4.3 The Global Distribution of Institutions	66
3.4.4 The Regional Distribution of Institutions	70
3.4.5 The Distribution of Institutions Across Regions	90

3.5	Lessons From the Institutional History of the World: Regional and Structural Covari- ance	91
Chapter 4:	Democratic Institutions and International Conflict	92
4.1	A Neo-institutional Framework for the Democratic Peace	92
4.2	The Extrinsic Importance of Institutions	94
4.2.1	The Foreign Policy Decision-making Process	96
4.2.2	Mechanisms of Constraint: Representation, Accountability, Responsiveness and Power-sharing	98
4.2.3	Constraints in Democratic Institutions	104
4.2.4	Institutional Interconnectedness	109
4.3	The Intrinsic Importance of Institutions	112
4.3.1	Stability	114
4.4	Conclusion: Assumptions and Hypotheses	117
Chapter 5:	Empirical Analysis	120
5.1	Research Design	120
5.1.1	Introduction: Choosing the Research Design	120
5.1.2	Unit of Analysis	120
5.1.3	Analysis in Time	122
5.1.4	Analysis in Space	122
5.1.5	Methodologies	123
5.1.6	Using Panel Data: Advantages, Problems and Solutions	125
5.1.7	Conclusion: Inference in a Large-N Approach	129
5.2	Data	130
5.2.1	Data Collection and Revision	131
5.2.2	Democracy and Autocracy	133
5.2.3	Measuring Institutions	135
5.2.4	Measuring International Conflict	143
5.2.5	Measuring Control Variables	148
5.2.6	Duration Dependency Correction	153
5.2.7	Conclusion: The Relevance of the Data	154
Chapter 6:	Empirical Results	155
6.1	Introduction	155
6.2	Evaluating the Dominant Theories	155
6.2.1	Examining Major Parameters for Explaining Interstate Conflict	155
6.2.2	Accounting for Temporal Dependence When Explaining Interstate Conflict	161
6.2.3	Spatial Variation in Explanations for Interstate Conflict	169
6.2.4	Some Stylized Facts About Explanations for Interstate Conflict	173
6.2.5	Examining Major Parameters for Explaining Peace	174
6.2.6	Are Democracies More Peaceful?	174
6.2.7	Are Trading and Networking States More Peaceful?	176
6.2.8	Spatial Variation of the Explanations for Peace	183
6.2.9	Some Stylized Facts About the Explanations for Peace	186
6.3	Governmental Institutions as a Refinement of the Democratic Peace	187
6.3.1	Global Variation Between Institutions and International Conflict	188
6.3.2	Spatial Variation Between Institutions and International Conflict	199
6.3.3	Summarizing the Importance of Governmental Institutions to Conflict	223
6.4	Conclusion: Theoretical and Analytical Adjustments	228

Chapter 7: Conclusion: Prospects for Peace by Democratization	230
7.1 Main Arguments and Findings	230
7.2 Policy Relevance and Recommendations	235
7.3 Suggestions for Future Research	237
7.3.1 Theoretical Elaboration	237
7.3.2 Constraints in Autocracies	239
7.3.3 Transition	239
7.3.4 A Call for Attention to Spatial Complexity	240
References	242
Appendix A: List of Variables	278
Appendix B: Timeline	281
Appendix C: Correlation Matrix	282
Appendix D: Codebook	284
D.1 Overview	284
D.1.1 Variable Definitions	285
D.1.2 Cases Included	285
D.1.3 Classification of Electoral Systems	285
D.1.4 Classification of Executive	286
D.1.5 Classification of Federalism	288
D.2 Coding Scheme, Governmental Institutions, 1816-2002	290
D.3 Sources	320

List of Tables

2.1	Auxiliary Observations About the Democratic Peace	17
3.1	Percentages of Democratic Electoral Systems in the World (Country Years, Countries (N))	67
3.2	Percentages of Democratic Executive Systems in the World (Country Years, Countries (N))	68
3.3	Percentages of Democratic Federal Systems in the World (Country Years, Countries (N))	70
3.4	Percentages of Democratic Electoral Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1816-2002(Country Years)	71
3.5	Percentages of Democratic Electoral Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1946-2002 (Country Years)	71
3.6	Percentages of Democratic Executive Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1816-2002 (Country Years)	73
3.7	Percentages of Democratic Executive Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1946-2002 (Country Years)	74
3.8	Percentages of Democratic Federal Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1816-2002 (Country Years)	76
3.9	Percentages of Democratic Federal Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1946-2002 (Country Years)	76
4.1	Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (Pooled)	109
4.2	Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (Latin America)	110
4.3	Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (The West)	110
4.4	Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (Africa)	111

4.5	Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (The Middle East)	111
4.6	Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (Asia)	112
4.7	Pooled and Regional Stability of Democratic Institutions and Autocracy, 1816-2002 (Average Number of Country Years)	116
6.1	Logit Regression of Interstate Conflict Incidence, 1951-1999 (Without Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	157
6.2	Logit Regression of Interstate Conflict Onset, 1951-1999 (Without Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	159
6.3	Regression of Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1951-1999 (Without Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	161
6.4	Logit Regression of Interstate Conflict Incidence, 1951-1999 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	164
6.5	Logit Regression of Interstate Conflict Onset, 1951-1999 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	166
6.6	Regression of Number of Militarized Disputes, 1951-1999 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	168
6.7	Summary of Conflict Observations in Different Regions (Percentages, N)	170
6.8	Summary of Intra-regional Realist Explanations for Interstate Conflict, 1951-1999	171
6.9	Summary of Logistic Regressions of Democracy on Interstate Conflict (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	175
6.10	Pooled Logit Regression of Democracy, Trade, IGOs and Interstate Conflict Incidence, 1951-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	178
6.11	Pooled Logit Regression of Democracy, Trade, IGOs and Interstate Conflict Onset, 1951-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	180
6.12	Pooled Regression of Democracy, Trade, IGOs and Number of Militarized Disputes, 1951-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	182
6.13	Summary of Intra-regional Proponents for Peace, 1951-2001	184
6.14	Pooled Models: Institutions and Conflict in the World (Percentages)	190
6.15	Pooled Logit Regression of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	194
6.15	Pooled Logit Regression of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	195

6.16 Pooled Logit Regression of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Onset (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	195
6.16 Pooled Logit Regression of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Onset (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	196
6.17 Pooled Regression of Democratic Institutions and Number of Militarized Disputes, 1816-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	197
6.17 Pooled Regression of Democratic Institutions and Number of Militarized Disputes, 1816-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	198
6.18 Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in Latin America (Percentages)	201
6.19 Latin America: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Inci- dence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	203
6.20 Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in the West (Percentages)	206
6.21 The West: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	208
6.22 Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in Africa (Percentages)	211
6.23 Africa: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	213
6.24 Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in the Middle East (Percentages)	215
6.25 The Middle East: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict In- cidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	217
6.26 Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in Asia (Percentages)	219
6.27 Asia: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)	221
6.28 Summary of Intra-regional Variation: The Importance of Democratic Institutions to Interstate Conflict Types	227
6.29 Regional Distribution of Missing Observations in the Institutional Variables (Percent- ages, N)	229
C.1 Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables, Pearson's <i>R</i> , 1950-1998	283

List of Figures

1.1	Inferential Fallacies of the Democratic Peace	6
3.1	The World: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002	48
3.2	Latin America: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002	51
3.3	The West: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002	52
3.4	Africa: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002	54
3.5	The Middle East: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002	57
3.6	Asia: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002	59
3.7	The World: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	67
3.8	The World: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	69
3.9	The World: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	72
3.10	Latin America: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	72
3.11	Latin America: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	75
3.12	Latin America: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	77
3.13	The West: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	78
3.14	The West: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	79
3.15	The West: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	80
3.16	Africa: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	82
3.17	Africa: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	83
3.18	Africa: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002	84

3.19	The Middle East: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002	85
3.20	The Middle East: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002	86
3.21	The Middle East: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002	87
3.22	Asia: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002	87
3.23	Asia: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002	88
3.24	Asia: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002	89
6.1	Regional Distribution of Conflict Incidence (Country Years), 1816-2001	224
6.2	Regional Distribution of Conflict Incidence (Country Years), 1946-2002	225

Abstract

Academic scholars and politicians have promoted democracy as a strategy for sustaining peace or preventing conflict. This optimism of ‘democratizing for peace’ is based on the observation that democratic states maintain peace among themselves and the point is reached, beyond which further democratization will produce more peace in the world. This dissertation argues that such optimism is premature as long as the spatial validity of the relationships remains unchecked and the theoretical arguments of the Democratic Peace are underdeveloped. Based on the assumption that domestic politics can constrain foreign policy decision-making, I suggest a theoretical framework that emphasizes the intrinsic and extrinsic role of norms and institutions for decisions about conflict. Choosing to focus on the extrinsic importance of governmental institutions, I argue that constraining mechanisms are represented in institutional sub-systems of democracy: electoral systems, executive systems, and federal systems. Based on my own collection of data on institutional indicators, the empirical analysis suggests that democracies’ institutional setup affects their conflict behavior internationally. Electoral systems have the strongest and most consistent impact on democracies’ conflict behavior. Rejecting disputable assumptions of temporal and spatial universality, this work specifies a new framework for cumulation of knowledge about democracy and interstate conflict. I show that the associations explored are unique in each geographical region. In light of recent trends in the growth of democracy and democratic institutions, I conclude that the prospect for more peace varies greatly between regions. As a consequence, inference about democracy and conflict is non-additive and further research and theorizing is needed to incorporate spatial and temporal conditionalities. If democratizing states adopt the most conflict promoting institutions, ‘zones of conflict’ in regions characterized by a large number of autocratic states may be developing alongside ‘regional zones of peace.’

Chapter 1: Introduction

‘What difference does it make to the dead, the orphans, and the homeless, whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty or democracy?’ (Mahatma Gandhi)²

1.1 The Problematic Way to Peace

This dissertation looks at the institutional variation of states’ international conflict behavior over time and across regions. It is motivated by theoretical shortcomings of the Democratic Peace research program and the policy implications of its implementation.

What role has regime type played for international conflict?³ Academic scholars and politicians have promoted and adapted democracy as a strategy for maintaining peace or preventing conflict. After the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa for example, the ‘Mandela-Mbeki doctrine’ stated that ‘liberal democracy can resolve and avert conflicts and wars, both in Africa and elsewhere’ and attempted to make peace by promoting democratic rule in Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland, Nigeria, Sudan, the Comoros and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) (Landsberg, 2000:109).⁴

²I thank Pinar Tank at PRIO for providing me with this quote.

³The term regime means ‘system of ruling society’ (Keman and Mallouk, 2002:262). Different indicators might be used, but refers to democratic and autocratic forms of government in this work. Democracy is defined as a state scoring 3 or higher on the polity index, whereas autocracy is defined as scoring 2 or lower on the -10 to 10 ranging polity scale (Gleditsch, 2003). This is a relatively liberal definition of democracy as many studies apply the stricter definition of democracy being equal to states scoring 6 or higher on the index.

⁴The ANC-led government in South Africa had to revise this policy after finding it tough to implement and learning that it could undermine its own vital interests (Landsberg, 2000:108).

Spread of democracy was an openly stated goal of the Clinton and the Bush administrations (Bush, 2004; Clinton, 1994) and, more generally, the United States has used force repeatedly as a means in this task (Hermann and Kegley, 1998; Peceny, 1999). For example, the United States took a role in the promotion of democracy in Cambodia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Philippines (Peceny, 1999:555). Most recently through the 2003 invasion, the United States claimed the role as lead designer of an Iraqi democratic political system.

In some cases, the end of a conflict clearly did pave the way for the installment of democratic institutions. For example, the victorious Western Allies imposed democratic institutions in Italy, Japan, South Korea and West Germany at the end of World War II. Furthermore, the Allied success inspired democratization in countries like Greece, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia, (Huntington, 1991:40). More recently, in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war (1988), liberal forces inside Iran worked slowly (although irregularly) towards greater freedom and more liberal rule of law (Rajaei, 1999).⁵

This optimism among policy-makers and academics of spreading democracy as a means for more peace among states is based on the absence of international conflict among democratic countries and the idea that the point is reached, beyond which increasing the number of democratic countries in the world will produce more peace (Cederman and Rao; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre, 1999). Such an optimism is premature as long as the theoretical arguments remain underdeveloped and the regional validity of the patterns has not been analyzed. This dissertation suggests ways to specify and strengthen the theoretical underpinnings of the Democratic Peace theory and redefines the scope of its political relevance. The overarching question that all aspects of this dissertation relate to, therefore, is: *What role do governmental institutions play for democracies' conflict behavior internationally?*

1.1.1 The Underdeveloped Democratic Peace Theory

The importance of questioning the role of governmental institutions to democracies' conflict behavior abroad lies largely within shortcomings of the Democratic Peace research program. The so-called 'democratic peace' refers to the observation that democratic states maintain peace among themselves

⁵This process ended when the new president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power after being elected in 2005.

(Babst, 1964; Doyle, 1983a, 1983b, 1986; Rummel, 1979, 1981; Streit, 1939:132), although they are generally as prone to conflict as autocratic states (Chan, 1984; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1999; Small and Singer, 1976; Weede, 1984).⁶ The dyadic relationship (pacific union among democracies) is usually explained by shared norms and common institutional structures, while lack of a monadic relationship (democracies generally resort to force as much as autocracies) has been linked to the dissimilarity of norms and differing expectations of other regimes' behavior. Based on the ideas put forth by the democratic peace theory, recent surges in the number of democratization efforts has generated hopes for a more peaceful world (Russett, 1993).

Theoretically, the Democratic Peace as a research program suffers from being underdeveloped, whereas much more attention has been put on establishing empirical patterns and further advancing the methodological techniques. As a result, the ideas that norms and institutions constrain political decision-making in democracies have largely been assumed, not empirically tested.

Furthermore, most scholars analyzing the role of democracy for international conflict take dyads, or pairs of states, as their unit of analysis. Such an approach assumes that the effects of norms and institutions are relational. Although relational associations between states are extremely relevant to their conflict behavior, it may not provide the best understanding of the role played by states' domestic properties. From the perspective of the Democratic Peace theory, I suggest that analyzing pairs of states describe the impact of norms more than institutions. Norms are subject to change depending on adversary, whereas a democracy's institutional setup remains the same. Analyzing the impact of institutional constraints on democracies' foreign conflict behavior requires putting the state rather than pairs of states in focus.

There is an inherent lack of logic between the theoretical argument about institutional constraints and the analytical levels of the Democratic Peace. If democracies are constrained by norms and institutions in ways that make them peaceful towards other democracies, why does this peacefulness not extend to their relations with autocracies? The explanation of norms varying, depending on adversary is hardly satisfactory. Democracies exist in many institutional forms that make them democratic in different ways. This dissertation accepts that democracies are as prone to conflict as autocracies on average, but asks whether institutional differences make some democracies act more

⁶Throughout the text, I will refer to the observation that democracies maintain peace among themselves as 'the democratic peace.' Furthermore, I will use 'the Democratic Peace research program,' the abbreviation 'the DP research program,' and 'the DP theory' interchangeably.

aggressively than others in relations to autocratic states? If this logic holds true empirically, then some democracies may be more conflict prone than autocracies.⁷ Spread of these types of democratic institutions may promote more conflict, rather than peace, in the short run, especially if they are surrounded by autocratic neighbors. Consequently, ‘zones of conflict’ may dominate some regions, while ‘zones of peace’ are maintained in others, together creating a global average that promotes an unqualified optimism for peace.

The idea of an institutional theoretical extension enables more direct explorations and analyses of the structural mechanisms taken for granted by the Democratic Peace theory in its present form. I suggest that the constraining effect of institutions on state’s conflict behavior can best be understood by distinguishing between their intrinsic and extrinsic importance, where the former combines norms and institutions in a dialectic and mutually reinforcing association, and the latter is a question of whether institutions have an independent effect on decisions about conflict. Whereas this work acknowledges the intrinsic role of institutions, it focuses on the extrinsic association here. Rather than merely assuming that constraints exist and shape how states act internationally, this work identifies mechanisms that pose these types of constraints in democratic foreign-policy-making: representation, accountability, responsiveness, and power-sharing. These constraining mechanisms are represented in democracies’ institutional setup, most notably determined by states’ electoral, executive, and federal systems. This dissertation explores empirically the interstate conflict behavior of these institutional sub-sets of democracy and contrasts it to the conflict behavior of autocratic states.

1.1.2 Inferential Fallacies of the Democratic Peace

In addition to suggesting theoretical extensions, this work refers to Alker’s (1965:102, 1969) ideas about recurring fallacies in political inference to demonstrate how inferential fallacies pose serious limitations to inference based on Democratic Peace research (see Figure 1.1). Just like the Realist search for the causes of war, the Liberal search for the proponents of peace is based on global generalizations, often perceived as unidirectional and timeless. Although lack of sensitivity to temporal

⁷This work supports the assumption that autocratic leaders, at varying degrees, also face constraints when making decisions about foreign policy. However, it assumes that the specification and nature of constraints in autocracies differ from the ones analyzed here. Decision-making constraints in autocracies needs its own theoretical elaboration and thus, falls outside the scope of this work.

and spatial variation is problematic for both theories, it holds far more serious implications for the Democratic Peace because of its unique, moral commitment to spread democratic governance (individualistic fallacy) (see Duvall and Weldes, 2001:200). The problematic assumption of timelessness implies viewing the association between democratization and growing peace as linear, additive, and irreversible processes. However, the ratio being met at a given point of more democracy being followed by more peace is no guarantee for this trend to continue (cross-sectional fallacy). In other words, inference from longitudinal trends is not automatically relevant to current or future associations (historical fallacy).


Furthermore, the optimism for more peace is based on global analyses about regime types and conflict. Such optimism is premature as long as the spatial variation of democracy and conflict remains unchecked. Although democracies may outnumber autocracies globally, more peace may not follow if the same is not true regionally. Even if this trend is true for one region, it is not automatically the case in another (contextual fallacy).

These inferential fallacies of the Democratic Peace form the basis for the second main goal of this dissertation: to emphasize that a comprehensive understanding of any theory about international relations needs to be situated in the context in which it is expected to be relevant. For theories about democracy and peace, geopolitical regions provide the relevant contexts for shared histories that affect how regimes, as well as governmental institutions and conflict exist and interact. This work suggests that institutions and conflict are linked in inter- and intra regional dynamics, which implies being shaped by systemic patterns on the one hand, and on region specific patterns on the other. This dissertation emphasizes that the prospect for more peace in the world through democratization largely is determined by the prospects for regional peace. In other words, it questions the additivity of Democratic Peace patterns based on the uniqueness of each region (selective fallacy).

Therefore, this dissertation urges caution when deriving policy recommendations about democratizing for peace based on generalizations from global samples (universal fallacy). Alker (1965:102-106, 1969) proposes that only under special circumstances is universal inference from an aggregate sample valid: if there is no structural covariance in and among the sub-covariates. In line with Alker's covariance theorem from his book *Mathematics and Politics* (1965), this dissertation argues that the overall correlation of all states (global variation)⁸ is made up of partial correlations

⁸Generalizations based on the global sample will be described as global, world, or pooled effects throughout the text.

within regions (intra-regional variation) and structural covariance between regions (inter-regional variation). The problem is on the one hand, inferring about the global effects of spreading democracy without investigating that these relationships are the same in the individual regions. On the other hand, most of this optimism is based on inference about pairs of states, which is an inadequate sample for generalizing about all states' behavior (ecological fallacy). These are important inferential misconceptions of the Democratic Peace, which may lead to a problematic faith in democracy's virtues in the quest for peace.



Derived from Hayward R. Alker, Jr., 1965. *Mathematics and Politics*. New York: Macmillan.

Figure 1.1: Inferential Fallacies of the Democratic Peace

1.1.3 Issues Raised and Questions Asked

In response to the theoretical and analytical problems of the Democratic Peace research program this dissertation develops and empirically explores a theory about democratic institutions' role for states conflict behavior abroad. The basis for these tasks is laid out in Chapter 1.1.4, which reiterates the main components of the Democratic Peace theory and discusses important shortcomings of the research program. Two problems underscore the importance of generating new theory: binary

concepts of regime type and conflict promote a far too simplistic understanding of the democracy and conflict association, which is rooted in the problem of the Democratic Peace theory being underdeveloped. Two additional shortcomings support this dissertation's quest for a redefined research design: the inherent lack of logic between the analytical levels of the Democratic Peace combined with the problematic assumptions about timelessness and spatial universality. This section concludes by emphasizing how these shortcomings warrant a theoretical extension of the Democratic Peace. Finally, Chapter 1.1.4 discusses how the original association between regime type and conflict has been incorporated in a more general model for states' conflict behavior abroad; the idea of a 'triangular peace' proposed by Russett and Oneal (2001).

Chapter 2.5 draws on insights from Comparative Politics when suggesting how the Democratic Peace can be extended by focusing on the impact of democratic institutions. It starts out by relating the current status of the DP theory to the other main approach to international relations, Realist theory. This is far from a comprehensive treatment of Realist explanations for international conflict, but is helpful in identifying factors that are commonly referred to as the major explanations for states' action internationally. From a Liberal perspective, democracy can in certain situations intervene in the associations established by realist theories. However, both Realist and Liberal theories about states' behavior vis-a-vis other states are based on global analyses that tend to perceive the phenomena of interest as timeless and universally valid. By revisiting the Democratic Peace, arguments are laid out for why these are problematic assumptions of both theories, but especially debatable given the behavioral commitment to spread democracy. The temporal and spatial relativity of the concepts democracy, autocracy, and conflict are demonstrated in a descriptive analysis that looks at the ebb and flow of these phenomena. This analysis forms the basis for a discussion of the regional and temporal validity of Gleditsch and Hegre's (1997) suggestion that the point is reached after which more democracy is followed by more peace. From this analysis, it becomes clear that the basis for this optimism is flawed and that attention to regional variation is warranted. The other virtue of this chapter is the discussion of democratic waves (Huntington, 1991) which not only demonstrates the non-linearity of the phenomena studied, but also points at their systemic dimensions. This analysis concludes by taking the temporal and spatial conditionality of democracy, autocracy, and conflict as a justification for an institutional refinement of the Democratic Peace theory.

The remaining part of this chapter is devoted to the specification of democratic governmental institutions' role in international conflict, with an extensive part focusing on analyzing the institutional history of the world. Understanding the phenomena behind the numbers is important in quantitative analyses, especially since the present work is the first time in which the data on democratic institutions has been applied. After defining electoral, executive, and federal systems, these are analyzed over time, across and within regions and contrasted to the global patterns. Again, the descriptive analyses demonstrate the temporal and spatial conditionality of the phenomena of interest. This conditionality further underscores the importance that institutional variation of democracy may play for conflict. Having suggested that an institutional refinement may bring about a greater understanding of the complexities in the democracy and peace nexus, the dissertation develops a Neo-institutional framework for the Democratic Peace theory.

This framework suggests that the constraining impact of democratic institutions for foreign policy decision-making is extrinsic or intrinsic. The *extrinsic* impact of institutions is the focus of this dissertation, asking whether governmental institutions have an independent effect on democratic states' conflict behavior abroad? This work assumes that domestic institutions put formal constraints on political decision-making in general, and also that the foreign policy-making process is unique in linking domestic and foreign relations. The theory then specifies four constraining mechanisms as especially crucial to the domestic-international nexus: representation, accountability, responsiveness, and power-sharing. These mechanisms of constraint are unequally represented in different types of democratic institutions: type of electoral system (majority-plurality or proportional), executive system (presidential or parliamentary), and finally in federal systems (unitary or federal). From this follows the main question asked: whether some democracies are more conflict prone than others based on their institutional characteristics?

The *intrinsic* importance of governmental institutions is their association with norms as dialectic and mutually reinforcing. Although not extensively elaborated on, this work suggests that norms and institutions are not mutually exclusive and that governmental institutions incorporate underlying normative understandings that affect foreign policy decision-making. This work suggests that the difference between norms and institutions can be understood as indicators of willingness and opportunity of the use of force in relation to other states. Finally, this work emphasizes that the constraining impact of democratic institutions is affected by the degree to which they are in-

stitutionalized. As an effort to understand this type of conditionality in the data applied here, the stability of the institutional indicators are explored and contrasted between regions.

The theoretical chapter concludes with a brief summary of assumptions and arguments, and the specification of the hypotheses of this dissertation.

The empirical part of the dissertation starts out by closely discussing research design, data and data management in Chapter 4.4. The analysis of regimes and conflict has evolved hand in hand with methodological innovation and Chapter 4.4 shows how this dissertation responds to these developments. Quite some space has been devoted to discussing different ways of handling temporal dependency between observations, which is typical for longitudinal analyses. The chapter concludes by discussing important limitations and benefits of quantitative research.

Chapter 5.2.7 contains descriptions of the data applied. Since a central part of this work involved collecting data on governmental institutions, this chapter includes elaboration of the collection and revision processes. Hopefully, that will encourage evaluation and discussion of the data. The appendix includes the codebook that more extensively describes this dataset.

The empirical results are presented in Chapter 6.4. It starts out by revisiting the basis on which the institutional refinement is intervening, Realist explanations for interstate conflict and the proponents of peace laid out by the ‘triangular peace’ theory. Incorporated in the exploration of these factors is an effort to demonstrate the virtues of incorporating Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s (1998) cubic spline technique to correct for temporal dependency between observations of the conflict variables. The analyses demonstrate that the spatial conditionality problem is present in Realist and Liberal theories, or that these theories’ explanations for conflict and proponents for peace vary depending on region. As a part of establishing the basis on which the extended Democratic Peace builds, the conflict proneness of democracies and autocracies were explored using different operationalizations of international conflict. The results did not support the idea that democracies are more peaceful, suggesting that democracies are more prone to resort to militarized disputes than autocracies, but are less likely to participate at the outset of armed conflicts and full-scale wars globally’

The empirical chapter then moves on to analyze the association between democratic institutions, autocracy, and interstate conflict. Quite a lot of space is devoted to explore the simple bivariate variations in cross-tabulations, before incorporating democratic institutions and autocracy in regression analyses of conflict. With the risk of simplifying the understanding of what makes states engage in aggressive actions vis-a-vis each other, this approach seeks parsimony rather than complexity as a starting point. If associations are ruled out in simple cross-tabulations, then it is unlikely that institutions will have a significant effect in more sophisticated analyses. Since controlling for intervening variables may disguise or alter the effects of institutions (see Ray, 2005), the simple model is the main focus. The associations between democratic institutions, autocracy and conflict are analyzed within each region and the results further support the spatial conditionality of democratizing for peace. This section concludes that democracy and its institutional forms are represented in varying degrees in different regions. The relevance of the statistical associations between institutions and conflict are, therefore, not only a matter of significance and strength of the relationships, but the prospects for more peace through spread of democracy in the future must also be understood in conjunction with the most recent distribution of democratic institutions in different regions. In other words, this work demonstrates that Democratic Peace theory and research must consider temporal and spatial implications of democratizing for peace.

I am hoping that this dissertation contributes to cross-fertilization between the fields of Comparative Politics and International Relations, producing new insights into the link between regime type and conflict. The policy relevance of such a contribution is quite clear: which governmental institutions are best suited to avoid eruption of conflict and to maintain peace between states?

Before moving on, I should make clear what this work is not doing. Most importantly, although recognizing that many aspects of democratization are problematic and warrant attention, I am not attempting to make a moral judgment on these efforts of spreading democratic rule in the world. Rather, I merely make the point that it does not automatically bring about stability and peace. Furthermore, albeit recognizing the relevance of institutions for creating domestic stability and preventing civil war (see for example Reynal-Querol, 2002), the scope of this work is that of conflict between states. Furthermore, the focus on states adopted here should not be confused with denial of the impact non-state actors like the United Nations (see for example Santiso, 2002), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have on the spread of democracy. Most

importantly, I am not attempting to discredit the Democratic Peace research program, but rather suggest ways in which its theoretical basis can be improved, and develop ways for the suggested relationships to be tested.

1.1.4 Conclusion: Towards a Progressive Research Program

This dissertation's quest for improved theoretical and inferential specifications answer Ray's (2005) call for research designs that better understand international relations (Starr, 2005). Building on Alker's (1965, 1968, 1969) ideas of conditional additivity, it suggests elaboration and specification of the Democratic Peace theory in ways that take seriously the political implications of democratizing for peace and the inherent problems of logic between the analytical levels of the research program. Rejecting disputable assumptions of temporal and spatial universality, this work specifies a new framework for cumulation of knowledge about democracy and interstate conflict. It underscores the importance of incorporating temporal dynamism and spatial dialectic in a Lakatosian understanding of the Democratic Peace research program as constantly changing associations between democracy and conflict. Cumulation of theory about democracy and conflict requires theoretical and analytical adjustments without rejecting the core idea of democracies maintaining some level of peacefulness among themselves. This dissertation suggests ways for the Democratic Peace to remain a progressive research program.

Chapter 2: The Development of the Democratic Peace Thesis

2.1 The Difficult Peace

The essence of the democratic peace theory is based on questions about democracy and interstate peace at three analytical levels (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997):

Dyadic Level *Do democracies generally maintain peace among each other?*

State Level *Are democracies generally more peaceful than other states?*

System Level *Is a world with a high proportion of democratic states more peaceful?*

Generally, the scholarly responses to these questions are that democratic states tend to stay at peace with other democracies, but democracies are no less prone to engage in interstate conflict than are other states. Although not heavily researched, the prevailing conclusion about democracy and peace at the system level is that further democratization will be followed by more peace globally.

Both academics and politicians commonly assume that since democratic states tend to stay at peace with each other, spread of democratic governance will lead to a more peaceful world (Bush, 2005; Clinton, 1994; Russett, 1993). Is this necessarily so? After all, democracies are not peaceful - they engage in war as much as autocratic states (Chan, 1984; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1999; Small and Singer, 1976; Weede, 1984).

The marrying of democracy and peace is not as straightforward as it might first appear. First, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace is underdeveloped, and therefore the prevailing

understanding of the dynamic between regime type and peace is limited. Existing theory argues that norms and institutions constrain democratic decision-makers from using force when resolving disputes between each other. The theory does not sufficiently explain why this peace is not effective when dealing with other types of governments or in the relation between autocratic regimes (Chan, 1984:639; Kegley and Hermann, 1995:5; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989:18; Rousseau et al., 1996:521; Small and Singer, 1976:66). If democracies were truly peaceful, wouldn't they stay at peace with all types of states? This seeming inconsistency between the dyadic and the system levels has been explained by norms that vary depending on the opposing state (Dixon, 1994:17; Maoz and Russett, 1993:625; Rousseau et al., 1996:527; Russett, 1993:31-32). This explanation is hardly satisfactory in dealing with the problematic logic behind observations of the Democratic Peace. However, the inductive nature of the research program has prevented the development and testing of a rigorous theoretical foundation.

This lack of logic issue relates to another problem of the democratic peace idea, more specifically to the failure of understanding the constraining mechanisms in a democratic government.⁹ Democracies are unique combinations of democratic institutions, and thus they constrain decision-makers differently. If this holds true, then some types of democracies might be more likely to resort to force than others when encountering autocratic states. The impact of this idea has yet to be investigated because scholars interested in the democratic peace are still occupied with testing the binary regime type perception of democracy versus autocracy. This failure to understand the underlying dynamic of the structural constraints idea in democracies brings me to a third problem with the democratic peace scholarship. Scholars in this field have largely neglected that decision-making constraints exist in autocracies as well, though in different forms.¹⁰ If the propositions hold true, that some democracies are more likely to resort to force than others, as well as some types of autocracies are more likely to use violent means, then it seems relevant to ask whether some types of democracies are more aggressive than some types of autocratic states. Provided that this assumption is correct, then 'democratizing for peace' seems a little more complicated than first assumed. This logic implies that democratization is not automatically followed by a more peaceful world, at least not in the short run. Democracies tend to cluster in so-called 'zones of peace', where the largest

⁹Since norms can change depending on adversary whereas institutions stay the same and are often promoted as a means to peace, I have chosen to put attention to the impact of institutions.

¹⁰Examples of exceptions are Huth and Allee (2002) and Weart (1994, 1998).

zone is the West. Even though peace is largely maintained in such zones, other zones are not so privileged. In the worst case, the further spread of democratic government might lead to more war in regions in which democracies have to interact mostly with autocratic neighbors. Another plausible implication would be the transfer of external conflicts to internal unrest and vice versa. What types of democratic institutions a democratizing country should adopt might therefore prove crucial for the prospects of peace, especially since democratic norms take time to become well established.

The three problems discussed above are rooted in the lack of a coherent and rigorous theoretical foundation for the democratic peace idea. The list of problems is not exhaustive by any means, but I have chosen to focus on institutions since they hold a close connection to real-life politics. More specifically, the promotion of democratic institutions in the name of peace has served to legitimize actions by politicians, NGOs, and business people, not only in promoting democratic rule as a means to peace, but also for strategic and economic gains.

How can the problems of logic, and failure to differentiate between different types of institutional constraints in democracies and autocracies, be approached? I argue here that the first step to understand the underlying dynamic of institutional constraints is to go beyond the prevailing binary regime type approach and try to understand how institutions constrain decision-makers in all types of regimes. Before constructing a new approach, I review the current literature on the democratic peace, with special emphasis on institutional constraints.

2.2 The Democratic Peace and Its Origin

Why do states act violently against other countries? This question has been asked repeatedly and attempted answered by scholars in many different ways. The Democratic Peace research program has been the most influential such effort in the field of International Relations during the past decade. An impressive number of scholars have analyzed numerous aspects of war and peace, motivated by the observation that democracies tend to maintain peace among themselves, but, in general, are as prone to conflict as other states. This observation was reported quite early by Streit (1939:132), whereas the first systematic study of the subject done by Babst (1964) went largely unnoticed. More than 15 years later, Rummel (1979, 1981) called attention to the peace between democracies and even argued that democracies are more peaceful than autocratic states. In a re-examination of Kant, Doyle (1983a, 1983b, 1986) supported the argument that liberal states never fight each other.

These conclusions triggered critical responses from Chan (1984) and Weede (1984), who argued that whether spread of democracy produces more peace in the world is conditional on the type of war and the time period studied.

However, it was not until the Cold War ended that academic and political attention moved from the immediate threat to human existence posed by the prospect of war between major powers to hopes for a more peaceful world. The idea that the spread of democracy could foster peace occurred at a favorable time, especially in countries searching for suitable replacements for communist governments. Academically, the end of the Cold War was the start of an extensive amount of effort to understand the relationship between democracy and war. How far has the democratic peace come in this task? In the following review I address this question by describing the Democratic Peace theory and discussing some strengths and weaknesses of this research program. I conclude that overwhelming attention to empirical patterns and progress in developing suitable methodologies has not been paralleled by an equivalent upgrade and agreement of the theoretical basis for the democratic peace. As a result, failure of understanding the limitations and promises of the observation in focus has led policy recommendations and actual applications to grant too much trust in the idea of ‘democratizing for peace.’ Before assuming that peace is best achieved through democratization, scholars need to better understand the more general relationship between regime types and conflict.

2.3 The First Phase: Domestic Constraints and Peacefulness

At the center of all theorizing and empirical research about the democratic peace is the idea of analytical levels.¹¹ This approach was first adopted by Small and Singer (1976), and developed further by others (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Maoz, 1999). The idea of analytical levels suggests three different questions around which the relationship between democracy and war can be studied: the dyadic level asks whether democracies maintain peace among themselves; the nation or monadic level asks whether democracies more frequently maintain peace in general; and the system level poses the question of whether an international system with a high proportion of democratic states is more peaceful (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre, 1999). The failure of scholars

¹¹Levels as an analytical framework was first developed by Waltz (1959) and suggests that war can be studied at the level of the individual, the nation-state, and the international system (Levy, 2001). In addition to these, Levy (1998) suggests an additional approach to international relations, the organizational level, which refers to explanations of the behavior of organizations.

to be explicit about their usage of the levels framework has at times created confusion about the validity of results between the different levels, and many scholars have perceived the different levels as being independent and mutually exclusive. Typically, democracies were characterized as being more peaceful than other states because they do not fight each other, and the spread of democratic rule was automatically coupled with expectations of a more peaceful world. Issues like these were indicators of an immature research program, which has been replaced by more serious challenges. In this dissertation, the nation-level defines the appropriate empirical focus. Despite focusing on dyads, most theorizing about the democratic peace is in reality at the nation-state level. Thus, arguments about democratic dyads are relevant for my own work insofar as they describe part of states' general behavior. After briefly outlining the democratic peace, I will review the following areas in which this research has been challenged during the past decade: theoretically, conceptually, epistemologically, and methodologically.

What exactly does the democratic peace entail? A consensus among the first studies on the dyadic and nation levels established that although democracies are as warprone as autocracies,¹² they do not fight each other (Bremer, 1992; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Weede, 1992). In contrast, scholars disagree about whether spread of democracy leads to a more peaceful world (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Kelly, Crescenzi and Shannon, 2003; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre, 1999; Snyder, 2000; Ward and Gleditsch, 1998). Researchers have kept investigating these propositions with different understandings of conflict and with increasingly advanced methodologies.¹³ As a result, the idea of democratic peacefulness has been tested not only on large-scale wars with more than 1,000 battle deaths, but on domestic conflict, international wars with few casualties, and on crises and disputes in different forms. Although observations from the testing of such auxiliary propositions do not always concur, taken together, they point at more complex relations between regime type and conflict than what the democratic peace ideas first suggested (see Table 2.1):

¹²Russett and Oneal (2001:36) support the relatively controversial claim that democracies are more peaceful in general than autocratic states.

¹³Some examples of further empirical testing concluding with support to the democratic peace are: Benoit (1996), Cederman and Rao (2001), Owen (1994), Thompson and Tucker (1997). Other scholars have been more skeptical about the phenomenon: Chan (1984), Cohen, (1994), Elman (1997), Enterline (1996), Farber and Gowa (1995), Gowa (1999), Henderson (2002), Kegley and Hermann (1995), Layne (1994), Mansfield and Snyder (1995).

Domestic-level Observations

1. Democracies experience less internal violence (Rummel, 1997).
2. States undergoing transition to democracy are disproportionately prone to international and to domestic war (Enterline, 1996; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Snyder, 2000; Vuckovic, 1999).

Dyadic-level Observations

1. Democratic dyads are more likely to accept third-party conflict management (Dixon, 1993).
2. Democratic dyads are more likely to accept peaceful settlement of disputes (Dixon, 1994; Ray, 1995).
3. Democratic dyads are more likely to compromise on the outcome of dispute settlement (Mousseau, 1998; Raymond, 1994).

Nation-level Observations

1. Democracies are less likely to get involved in war when election time approaches (Gaubatz, 1991).
2. Democracies are more likely to win the wars they fight (Bennett and Stam, 1996; Lake, 1992; Reiter and Stam, 1998, 2002).
3. Wars initiated by democracies tend to be shorter (Bennett and Stam, 1996). Democracies suffer fewer war casualties (Siverson, 1995).
4. Democracies engage in overt military action against each other (Kegley and Hermann, 1995).

System-level Observations

1. Increase in the number of democracies is followed by more conflict in the world, but beyond a threshold of democratization, the number of conflicts decreases (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon, 2003; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre, 1999).

Table 2.1: Auxiliary Observations About the Democratic Peace

How then are these observations explained? Several models have been subject to discussion and testing: the cultural/normative model, the structural/institutional model, and the ‘third leg’ model with focus on economic interdependence/integration. All three theories place attention on domestic factors’ importance for foreign policy decision-making. Recent elaborations of the Democratic Peace theory favor the peace promoting benefits of international law and organizations. All these theoretical explanations claim basis in Kant’s (1784, [1795]) idea of a ‘pacific federation’ or ‘pacific union’ created by liberal republics. More recently, Woodrow Wilson’s 1917 ideas of a peaceful world order marked itself as a strong influence on the democratic peace. Despite substantial theoretical elaboration of the democratic peace recently (Ray, 1998:27), I support the objection that the democratic peace lacks a rigorous theoretical foundation (MacMillan, 2003; Starr, 1996). The democratic peace fails to understand how autocratic states relate to conflict and it does not sufficiently place itself within a wider framework for understanding conflict. I will get back to this criticism after discussing the existing explanations of the democratic peace.

2.3.1 The Structural/Institutional Explanation

Several scholars have discussed segments of the structural/institutional model.¹⁴ In fact, this is the focus of the majority of contributions aiming at explaining the democratic peace. The structural model holds that democratic governmental institutions put constraints on political decision-making in ways that promote peaceful conflict resolution rather than resort to force. The theory is based on the following components:

First, the goal of political leaders is to maximize their likelihood of staying in office. In a democracy, staying in office is largely a function of approval within the existing administration, whereas renewal of tenure is based on popular support. A leader’s chances of maintaining power are affected by a state’s actions abroad as well as domestic policies. Political leaders therefore, must mobilize political support and legitimacy from those groups when dealing with international conflict. In a democracy, very few goals could be presented to justify violent actions against another democracy, and such a mobilization process is difficult and time-consuming.

¹⁴Bueno de Mesquita, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999a, 1999b; Bueno de Mesquita and Ray, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1997a, 1997b; Gartner and Segura, 1998; Gaubatz, 1991; Ireland and Gartner, 2001; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Layne, 1994; Leeds and Davis, 1997, 1999; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Mueller, 1973; Palmer et al., 1999; Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Regens, Gaddie and Lockerbie, 1995; Reiter, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 2002; Rummel, 1979, 1997; Schultz, 1999; Siverson, 1995, 1998.

In contrast, an autocratic government can take on any policy without looking at public opinion or political processes once support from key legitimizing groups is secured. This is the second component of the structural model. The time constraint and complexity of the decision-making process leave time for diplomacy to work and non-violent solutions to a conflict to develop in a dispute between democracies. When two autocratic states engage in conflict, the structural theory predicts a high likelihood that they will resort to violent means, since leaders in both states can make decisions and mobilize resources relatively freely without fear of public or political repercussions.

Finally, conflicts between a democracy and an autocratic state are characterized by the freedom of autocratic leaders to mobilize and act. A democratic state in this emergency situation must find ways to get around the institutional mechanisms that otherwise slow down the decision-making process and the mobilization of forces. This leads to the third component of the structural model, that shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support in democracies can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies.

Empirical testing of the structural model has taken many different shapes, the majority concluding in favor of institutions constraining decision-making about conflict. Scholars have pointed to different results as supporting the peace-promoting effect of institutions. As one of the first to investigate this issue, Morgan and Campbell (1991) concluded that higher levels of decisional constraints lead to lower probability that conflict will escalate to war in major powers. Other research has suggested that democracies tend to participate in shorter wars and they tend to win (Bennett and Stam, 1996; Lake, 1992; Reiter and Stam, 1998, 2002), though the latter argument has been questioned (Stam, 1996). Moreover, democracies are less likely to get involved in wars when approaching an election (Gaubatz, 1991) and they tend to suffer fewer casualties (Reiter and Stam, 1998).

In advancing the structural model, some scholars have compared different types of democracy. Palmer et al. (1999) for example compare differences between parliamentary democracies and conclude that states with low political costs of using force are more likely to get involved in militarized interstate disputes, and once involved, states with high costs are more likely to allow the conflict to escalate. This result suggests a more complex relationship between constraints and conflict behavior, which is in line with arguments made about difference in war-proneness between democracies (Ireland and Gartner, 2001; Prins and Sprecher, 1999).

2.3.2 The Cultural/Normative Explanation

This model was first explicitly formulated and related to the democratic peace research program by Maoz and Russett (1993) and Russett (1993). The normative model holds that democratic norms constrain political decision-making in ways that promote cooperation, negotiation, and peace abroad. The normative explanation by the Democratic Peace theory is best described as based on two components. First, states, to the extent possible, externalize domestic norms which characterize their domestic political process and institutions. This notion suggests that different norms of domestic political conduct are expressed as different patterns of international behavior. These can be democratic norms of compromise, peaceful resolution of disputes, and autocratic norms based on zero-sum calculations and aggressive approaches to conflict.

The second component holds that the anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and autocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former. This suggestion deals with the limits of the ability to apply certain norms given the anarchical international system. For example, when a democracy confronts a autocracy, the former might be forced to adapt the norms of the latter to ensure survival and avoid having to make great concessions over issues at stake. In disputes between democracies on the other hand, both states expect the other to apply democratic norms when interacting.

More recent interpretations of the normative theory have drawn heavily on political psychology. These views hold that democracies discriminate between friends and foes based on psychological factors, seeing other democracies as a part of the 'in-group' whereas autocracies are considered the 'out-group' (Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Weart, 1994). When dealing with an adversary from the in-group, democratic leaders expect negotiation to be successful based on the assumption that the other leaders share their principles and preferences (Weart, 1998:295). In this way, political culture works as a 'signaling device' and source of information between states in conflict.

Empirical testing of these theories has produced somewhat ambiguous results. Scholars concluding with support for norms explaining the democratic peace have typically based their interpretation on democratic dyads being more likely to accept third-party conflict management (Dixon, 1993; Mitchell et al., 1999; Raymond, 1994) and peaceful settlement of disputes (Dixon, 1994; Ray, 1995). Similarly, findings of democratic dyads being more likely to agree to compromise on the outcome of dispute settlement has prompted other scholars to support the normative model (Mousseau,

1998). In yet another interpretation of culture, Henderson (1997, 1998) tested the effect of shared language and ethnicity and concluded that these factors have little impact on reducing the likelihood of war.

2.3.3 Some Shortcomings of the First Phase

The main shortcomings with what I describe as the first phase of democratic peace are a too narrow theoretical focus and a too general empirical approach. By this I refer to four problem areas: first, the concepts democracy and peace give a too limited understanding of how regime type relates to conflict; second, assumptions applied as if they were constant across time and in space; third, the notion of analytical levels is not satisfactory substantiated theoretically; and fourth, the theoretical explanations for the empirical observations are underdeveloped.

2.3.3.1 Problematic Concepts: Regime Type and Conflict

The purpose of concepts is to specify what is being studied and to make limitations of the knowledge based on them explicit. The democratic peace claims to study the relationship between regime type and conflict. How are these concepts defined and how is that problematic?

In the quest for understanding the relationship between regime type and conflict, scholars typically apply a binary definition of regime type: ‘democracy exists where the principal leaders of a political system are selected by competitive elections in which the bulk of the population have the opportunity to participate. Authoritarian systems are autocratic ones’ (Huntington and Moore, 1970:509). I find this definition problematic in two ways: first, regime type can be defined in many different ways and what a researcher chooses depends what he wants to achieve knowledge about. The focus on democracy versus autocracy reflects the interest in democratic governance, and autocracy is merely perceived as its antithesis. This perspective is problematic,¹⁵ but in the context of this dissertation, I would like to show how it leads to an incomplete understanding of the relationship between regime type and conflict. Let me first establish the use of democracy and

¹⁵Some scholars would argue that the democracy versus autocracy dichotomy reflects values in which democracy is perceived as ‘good’ and autocracy equals ‘bad,’ and similarly that these notions reflect the need to identify oneself as the opposite of others, some scholars claim that these categories are wrongly based on the assumption that the state is the important unit of analysis in international affairs, or lastly that understanding and preventing conflict are not best achieved by relying on these regime type categories (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001).

autocracy, rather than democracy and autocracy, in order to be less value laden and to show that the relationship between the two types of governance is not automatically zero-sum.

The motivation behind the democratic peace is to understand how type of political system can help fostering peaceful relations between states. Despite pointing out the need to move beyond the binary conception of regime type as democracies and autocracies, I maintain that the nature of these regimes varies in fundamental ways and consequently, that democratic and autocratic leaders are constrained differently. In broad terms, a democratic leader maintains popular legitimacy and needs to look to the people and the people's representatives for approval of policy choices and actions. Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, largely reach political power through actions that are not based on legitimacy, such as coup d'état or hereditary succession, and are not bound by legal base for exercising authority. In essence, autocratic leaders have a greater capacity of action whereas democratic leaders suffer from inaction (Wintrobe, 2002:13-14). The difference in ability to act relates to democratic leaders being more constrained than autocratic ones when making foreign policy decisions. Recall that peace between democracies is explained by the constraining impact of norms and institutions on decision-making. Because of the fundamentally different basis for decision-making in democratic and autocratic states, I maintain that a binary application of regime type works well to describe the impact of culture and norms on decisions related to conflict.

Conversely, the need to unpack the regime type dichotomy is crucial to understanding the impact of governmental institutions on decisions related to conflict. Scholars tend to define democracy as a fixed combination of institutions and practices. For example, democracy has frequently been identified as a function of elections. Diamond (1996) questioned this minimalist definition and suggested a distinction between 'liberal democracy' and 'electoral democracy.'¹⁶ His main argument is that free, fair, and competitive elections only function in combination with some level of freedom of speech, organization, and press, and legitimization of a political opposition.

In the context of the democratic peace, I would take this argument further and distinguish between important institutions that are instrumental in constraining foreign policy decision-making. Diamond and Plattner (1996) argue that institutions and practices are components that do not

¹⁶Collier and Mahon (1993) suggest a different conceptualization of the democracy and autocracy categories in the comparative literature. They argue in favor of a distinction between primary and secondary categories, where primary refers to an overall category and secondary to the category whose meaning is derived from the primary category (Ibid., 848-849). They identify secondary categories of the primary category democracy as participatory democracy, liberal democracy, and popular democracy. Similarly, populist and bureaucratic authoritarianism are secondary categories of the primary category authoritarianism (Ibid., 850).

define points along a single continuum of improving performance, but rather a matrix of potential combinations that are *differently democratic*. The same argument can be made with respect to autocracies, that they are made up of different institutional arrangements and practices, which in turn make them *differently autocratic*. Depending on the institutional makeup of a government, be it democratic or autocratic, could constrain decision-makers in ways that potentially could affect their likelihood of resorting to force internationally. A handful of suggestions have been made in this direction, though autocratic governance for the most part is left out. Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) distinguish between different levels of constraints on the executive in general, arguing that it affects the opportunity and likelihood of selecting repression or external conflict as a response to challenges domestically. The little work that is done on autocratic regimes and conflict show some evidence for a separate dictatorial peace (Peceny and Beer, 2002), whereas others suggest that autocracies are constrained differently, which in turn affects their likelihood of conflict involvement (Lai and Slater, 2003). With respect to democratic regimes, Prins and Sprecher (1999) argue that different types of democracies, single-party versus coalition and minority governments, matter for the likelihood of interstate dispute escalation. The practical implication of the idea that types of democracies and types of autocracies are constrained differently, is that some types of democratic states might be more likely to resort to force than others, and some types of autocratic states might be more likely to resort to force than others. Consequently, some types of democracy might be more likely to resort to force than some types of autocratic states. In turn, spread of democratic governance is not automatically followed by peace, especially not in states bordered by autocratic neighbors.

The second main concept of the democratic peace is conflict. During early years, scholars based their research on conflict as defined by the Correlates of War project (COW): interstate war according to the COW project refers to sustained combat between the regular military forces of two or more state members of the international system resulting in at least a total of 1,000 battle-related casualties (Small and Singer, 1982). How is reliance on such a definition problematic? It is not the usage of this concept per se that is the problem, but that this type of interstate war reflects only a very limited version of how the use of force has been applied as a political means.¹⁷ More specifically, such a fixed definition of the use of force fails to recognize the historical

¹⁷Barkawi and Laffey (2001) give a comprehensive discussion of how the Democratic Peace theory and analyses rely on a single, static definition of interstate war (Ibid:10) and thus, fail to consider historical transformations of warfare. They argue that these changes in the meaning and usage of military force have implications for the social institution and practices of democracy that extends to the democratic peace (Ibid:12).

transformations in the nature of warfare, which in turn projects very limited understanding of the association between regimes and the use of force. As Barkawi and Laffey (2001:9-10) describe, interstate warfare within the time perspective generally analyzed by Democratic Peace scholars has moved from limited clashes between small military units on the ground during the Napoleonic era to today's deterritorialized cyberwarfare brought about by modern technology and communication. Between these extremes, interstate conflicts have been waged as 'small wars' fought by colonial forces, and as 'total wars' enabled by industrialization and professionalization of warfare. Furthermore, nuclear weapons dramatically changed how conflicts between major powers were fought from direct confrontation to indirectly waged wars fought by proxy states. Obviously, the popular costs of warfare changed throughout these transformations, which is most relevant to democracies in which political leaders must answer to the public.

Although not satisfactorily complying with these historical transformations of warfare scholars studying the Democratic Peace have more recently moved away from the COW-determined conceptualization of war to apply other definitions of conflict. Though still mainly based on a measure of scale, these definitions reduce the required numbers of casualties when identifying relevant uses of force between states. These classifications of interstate conflict include disputes, crises, colonial wars, and civil wars. However, understanding the interplay between different types of conflict and how this relationship is affected by regime type is far from satisfying.

Some research has been done on linkages between types of conflict, mainly focusing on the importance of crises for war. Wright (1964:343) acknowledged that, 'the probability of war between two states during a period of time is a function of the number of crises and the probability of avoiding war in each crisis.' Likewise, Morgan (1994:5) wrote '[b]y discovering the conditions and behavioral dynamics that lead some crises to end in war while others are resolved peacefully, we can have a much better understanding of why wars occur [...].' More recently, Robinson (1996:14) argued that 'scholars studying crisis agree that it constitutes some kind of phase between peace and war. Though crisis is a necessary prelude to war it may culminate in a return to peaceful relations; that is, it is a necessary, not a sufficient condition of mass armed violence.' Other scholars have found support for a link between domestic and international conflicts (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992), where some of these efforts have put attention to ethnicity (Lake and Rothschild, 1998). Yet others have investigated the relationship between international crises and war (Brecher, James and Wilkenfeld,

2000; James, 1988). It is obvious that the analysis of links between different types of conflict is far from exhaustive, a problem made even more evident when looking at the impact of regime type for conflict dynamics.

The practical implication of this criticism is that the democratic peace might exist with regard to some types of conflict and not to others. Some testing of the democratic peace has been done in this respect by testing the existence of a democratic peace on crises (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000), disputes, and civil war (Ellingsen and Schjølset, 2000). However, if regimes are constrained in different ways, as suggested above, then these differences may have varying implications, depending on the type of conflict. This problem area has not been dealt with sufficiently. The degree to which regimes relate to conflict in different ways and the nature of these relationships are crucial in understanding how domestic constraints work to enable and disable the use of force as a means of foreign policy.

Furthermore, the conclusions of the democratic peace are largely based on quantitative testing of the same phenomena in a multiple of different ways. When testing phenomena in the social sciences, researchers rely on operationalizations that are more or less accurate. The results of these tests are potentially largely affected by the inaccuracy or unobserved effects of the parameters measured. Applying different ways of measuring regime type and conflict, with each being as independent as possible from the other, can, therefore, be greatly beneficial for gaining inferential strength. This approach to theory testing is what Campbell (1988) calls ‘multiple operationism.’ Although scholars have individually to some extent tested the democratic peace theory using different operationalizations of conflict, they have each failed to incorporate multiple measurements in the same analysis as a way of enhancing the strength of their results. Similarly, scholars have applied the same operationalizations of regime (democracy and autocracy) when establishing that democracies do not fight each other, with applying different thresholds for democracy as being the only variation of measuring regime.

2.3.3.2 Problematic Assumptions: Time and Space

Regime type and conflict are not only subject to change throughout time, they vary spatially as well. Some critics of the democratic peace have argued that the relationship between democracy and absence of war is limited to certain spatial and temporal domains (e.g. Cohen, 1995; Gowa,

1995). To what extent do temporal and spatial variation of regime type and conflict pose a problem for the democratic peace? What do we gain by acknowledging these shortcomings?

Let me first discuss the problem of temporal generalization. Democratic peace scholars largely base their analyses on the scope of the COW (Singer and Small, 1994) and the Polity (Gurr et al., 1989) datasets, which record data about conflict and regimes from 1816 and 1800 respectively. The criteria for classifying conflict and regime stay the same throughout the entire time period. This is problematic because people's ideas of these concepts have changed, and so has the nature of these phenomena.

The need to incorporate different understandings of conflict and regime type, as argued above, is closely related to the need for incorporating changes in the nature of these phenomena over time. Both conflict and regime type have changed dramatically since the early 1800s, due to and in accordance with global changes. One implication of a fixed notion of conflict is failure to capture historical transformations of conflict and the implications of these transformations (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001:12). Changes in and between industry, technology and bureaucracy have been followed by changes in warfare, which makes warfare during the early 1800 difficult to equate with conflict at the end of the 20th century. Despite acknowledging transformation in warfare, interpretations of these patterns vary (see Maoz and Gat, 2001). Mueller (2003) argued that war has become obsolete because it serves no function any more. Other scholars look at warfare as an institution whose basic principles are constant throughout human history (Cioffi-Revilla, 1996), but change in interplay with social, economic, technological, and political factors (Maoz and Gat, 2001). Yet others argue that these changes do not imply that war will cease to exist, but will change fundamentally with respect to scope, regional distribution, and character (Maoz and Gat, 2001).

Regardless of different interpretations of the nature of conflict, these trends are typically not incorporated into the study of the democratic peace. Some scholars have argued that the empirical absence of war between democracies being based on one, fixed definition of conflict, implies relying on a partial historical context (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001:10). The notion that the democratic peace relies entirely on the COW definition of 'interstate war' is not quite true. Though not reaching scholarly consensus, a democratic peace has been claimed with respect to militarized interstate disputes (Russett and Oneal, 2001) and has shown some relevance to interstate crises (Ben-Yehuda and Marguilis, 2001; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001; Maoz and Russett,

1993). In general though, the democratic peace is based on the absence of one type of conflict between states, namely interstate war as defined by the COW. The nature of warfare is constantly changing, which is reflected by prevalence during some time periods more than others. War during the early 1800s was fought with conventional weapons on the battlefield, World War II ended with the introduction of nuclear warfare and was replaced by proxy battles, invasions and crises during the Cold War, the end of the 20th Century brought a more clinical perception of war fought from the air with the hope of enhanced precision and less civilian involvement, and wars fought between peoples rather than between states. Because the democratic peace bases itself mainly on one of these types of conflict, other important aspects of the links between regime type and conflict are ignored. In other words, the lessons learned may not be applicable for dealing with today's interstate confrontations.

Transformations that produce changes in warfare also affect the nature of regimes. Democratic and autocratic rule emerged at different times and processes throughout the world, which resulted in regimes that were democratic and autocratic in different ways. The comparative politics literature has been especially attentive to different types of democratic systems (Lijphart, 1984, 1992, 1999), but autocratic regimes have also been analyzed by scholars in this field (Huntington and Moore, 1970; Linz, 2000; Linz and Stepan, 1978; O'Donnell, 1973; Perlemutter, 1981). However, these differences in regime type are rarely incorporated or reflected in the study of conflict. In fact, most democratic peace scholars tend to apply the democracy (see Crescenzi and Enterline, 1999; Tarrow, 1996) and autocracy concepts as if they were universally valid.¹⁸ The problem of ignoring changes in the nature of regime type is lack of awareness of how the social and political processes producing these regime types also affect the likelihood of conflict. For example, democratization processes might have been affected by variables that are characteristic of certain time periods, which in turn produced different types of democratic governance. Even Huntington himself (1991, xiv, 30, 38) argued that the democratization of the third wave differs from those of earlier waves, an argument supported by Gasiorowski (1995). Examples of factors that contributed to making some regime types more prevalent during certain time periods are the Cold War, colonialism, and de-colonialization. By applying a historically insensitive perception of regime type, social and political processes producing

¹⁸Recently, critiques of the democratic peace have pointed at the validity problem of applying the concepts of a state transhistorically (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001:5), which is a criticism that extends to the universality of regime type because it assumes the existence of a state system.

the changing institutional nature of regimes are ignored. Since the association between regime type and conflict is affected by these social and political processes, ignoring them means leaving out important elements of the regime type and conflict relationship.

The second problematic assumption of the democratic peace is that of spatial generalization. Most scholars in this field base their analysis on the world or the entire state system. This approach may be related to the nature of statistical techniques applied, which I will discuss more detailed in the methodology chapter. Briefly stated, conflicts are rare events, and, therefore, generalizations based on few observations encounter technical difficulties. In order to analyze conflicts in a way that enables generalizing, researchers find themselves forced to maximize the number of relevant observations.

Generalizing without paying attention to spatial variation of the associations studied are also problematic. The processes underlying emergence of different types of regimes and different types of warfare are often clustered in space, as well as in time. The changes over time in democracy as a form of government form patterns that differ between regions (Huntington, 1991)¹⁹, which is also true for autocracies. In addition to being affected by social and political factors that tend to be similar throughout a region, conflict has spatial dimensions such as often being fought by neighbors (Gleditsch, 1995) and diffused within regions (Starr, 1991; Starr and Most, 1985). By not incorporating spatial differences when studying regime type and conflict, clustering of certain types of governance and the dominance of certain types of warfare get overlooked. Similarly, other factors that could potentially affect the link between regime type and conflict get left out.

Gleditsch and Ward (2000, 2008) recognize spatial and temporal variation of democracy and autocracy as crucial to the democratic peace and to the study of democratization. Building on their logic, I have pointed out the need to extend this idea to incorporate temporal and spatial variation within the regime categories and of conflict as well. Such an approach will break down some important limits to generalizing about the regime type and conflict association.

¹⁹Even the democratization literature frequently fails to recognize the importance of space for democratization processes (see Crescenzi and Enterline, 1999).

2.3.3.3 The Levels Problem

Strictly speaking, the notion of analytical levels strictly refers to the unit analyzed, but it has also been applied as a framework for theoretical generalizing. The democratic peace consists of three levels: the dyadic, monadic and system levels (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997). How well is research at the different analytical levels around which the democratic peace is centered, linked together logically and theoretically?

The *dyadic* level asks whether democracies maintain peace among themselves. The unanimous answer to this question is yes and the well-known explanations hold that norms and institutions work to constrain democratic politicians in confrontations with other democratic leaders. Some scholars have pointed to the discrepancy between the dyadic and the monadic levels. The *monadic* level asks whether democracies are as prone to conflict as autocracies, and even though not agreed upon, most scholars answer yes to this question. It was especially early on that many scholars found the proposed dyadic effect of norms and institutions difficult to reconcile with the monadic conclusion that democracies are as warprone as autocratic states (Small and Singer, 1976; Chan, 1984; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter and Huth, 1996).

I find no logical contradiction between the proposition that democracies do not fight one another and the proposition that democracies fight as frequently as other regime types. The two are fully compatible if democracies wage war more often against authoritarian states than authoritarian states fight each other. However, the continued main focus at the dyadic level sustains the regime type dichotomy, which in turn disables an understanding of conflict with emphasis on other governmental mechanisms. Furthermore, this is not very satisfactory theoretically. If the relations among democracies are regulated by non-violent norms or structural constraints or both (Maoz and Russett, 1993), why should these norms and institutions be completely absent in democracies' relations with autocratic countries? The idea that the war-proneness of democracies is merely a question of self-defense (Rummel, 1983, 1995) is not substantiated in empirical studies (Small and Singer, 1976; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997). The paradox has been explained by democracies being unable to apply peaceful norms in relations with autocratic states because of the risk of being exploited, especially since autocratic states do not have to manage such norms (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Rousseau et al. 1996; Russett, 1993). However, the relative importance of norms and institutions has not been sufficiently tested empirically. In fact, some scholars have pointed to the many peaceful resolutions

between democracies and autocracies, suggesting that autocracies might consider norms of peaceful conflict resolution as well (Dixon, 1994).

Based on such controversy over the theoretical explanations for the dyadic - monadic paradox, I suggest further attention to the interface between institutions and norms. I discuss this issue further in the next chapter, asking whether institutions and norms can be separated.

Interestingly, institutions stay the same regardless of whether the counterpart is democratic or not (Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Starr, 1992, Weart, 1994). I made the argument earlier that democracies are differently democratic and autocracies are differently autocratic with respect to institutional makeup, and, thus, that decision-makers within these main categories are constrained differently. Thus, the logical extension of this proposition is that some types of democracy might be more prone to conflict than some types of autocracy. The arguments about structural constraints therefore, seem extremely relevant for analyses that focus on the nation level (see for example Siverson, 1995).

If this suggestion hold true, implications follow for the system level as well. The *systemic* level investigates whether spread of democratic governance is followed by a more peaceful world? It is inferred logically from the other two levels; if democracies do not fight each other but are as prone to conflict as autocratic states, then the spread of democracy will bring about a more peaceful world. Rather than investigating whether the system level conclusion is correct, most researchers seem to assume such a relationship. One exception in this regard is Maoz and Abdolali (1989), later followed by a more thorough analysis by Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) who conclude in support of the argument that the spread of democracy has in fact been followed by a lower number of wars fought in the world.

The implications of my monadic level suggestions point to the importance of the monadic level for research and conclusions at the systemic level. Historical development is not continuous, fixed or linear. Rather, changes within and between states can be disrupted, repeated and take the shape of feedback loops. Therefore, the status of a global democratic peace must be continuously reassessed therefore. Even if Gleditsch and Hegre are correct in the assertion that the turning point for an increasingly more peaceful world is passed, no natural or empirical law assures that the relationship between democracy and conflict stays that way.²⁰ If democratic states are constrained

²⁰Russett and Oneal (2001:35) have a similar understanding of regularities as likely, but not law-like internationally.

differently and so are autocratic states, and these differences manifest themselves as important for decision-maker's likelihood to resort to violence, then the spread of democratic type of governance might be relevant for the global prospects for peace.

In addition, the promise democratizing for peace need to be disaggregated from the world to regions. Why is that? Gleditsch and Hegre look at all dyads in the world during the period 1816-1994. They conclude that the relationship between democracy and war takes the shape of an inverted u, where the point where further democratization leads to more conflict is past and followed by a trend of more democracy and less conflict. It is problematic however, that such a systemic approach fails to look at the net effect of democratization at the regional level. The net effect of democratization on conflict can still be negative in some regions even though in the grand total, the spread of democracy is followed by less conflict. For example, democratization in many African countries after the end of colonial rule was more problematic for peace than the overturn of authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s. The degree to which further democratization brings about reasons of worry depends on how long it takes for different regions to pass the point where the net effect of democratization passes the top of the inverted U-shape curve. For Africa, this might never happen.

I argue that the aggregated conclusion from dyad to system has taken place far too quickly and that the monadic level proves more important for world peace than what has been suggested so far. If some democracies are more conflict prone than others, then the spread of such a type of government might lead to more conflict in a region, at least within the near future. As long as large parts of the world fall outside the peaceful zone, it is more important to analyze the promises for peace in different regions before launching optimism for the prospects of world peace.

Would the relationship between regime type and conflict be sufficiently understood with an improved link between the three analytical levels around which the democratic peace is centered? I would like to point to the increased frequency of civil war today. If one perceives of conflict behavior organized according to analytical levels, it is clear that domestic conflicts are completely left out of the present levels' framework. Though not yet recognized by most democratic peace scholars, some scholars have argued in favor of a 'democratic civil peace' (Hegre et al., 2001). The idea of decision-making constraints beyond the binary regime type dichotomy has briefly been applied to

They argue that some evolutionary developments of the international system like the pacifying effect of democracy, interdependence and international organizations are not inevitable, but likely to continue in a stable system.

understanding how democratic leaders deal with civil war (Ellingsen and Schjølset, 2000); Reynal-Querol, 2002), but for the most part civil war has been left out of the democratic peace realm.

2.3.4 Policy Relevance of the Democratic Peace

The policy relevance of the democratic peace is the question of first, how democratic rule is being promoted and second, what are the impacts of democracy and democratization on the prospects for peace and people's well-being around the world? Without trying to moralize about ways to govern, my general view is that democratic rule is preferred to autocratic forms of government due to its merits of providing people with the right to participate in the governing of their lives, its respect for human rights, and, possibly, its ways to prevent conflicts from turning violent. I propose caution in the way democratic rule is promoted however. Democratic rule is being promoted by many different actors, of which the United States is possibly the single most influential. According to Smith (2000), US democracy promotion has been governed by economic interests. The general trend is for decision-makers in well-established democracies to greatly encourage other states to adopt democratic principles. At an extreme, foreign aid to poor countries in the developing world has been conditioned by democratization. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of democratic institutions in each country's context, domestically and regionally. If democracy has a tendency to be married with economic or other interests by its promoters, then the concern about which type is best for the country in which it is to be established takes the back seat. Consequently, there is a risk that a dysfunctional democracy might lead the way to new conflicts.

If the way we promote democracy is related to the lack of attention to which institutions are being installed, then so is the value of democracy. Like Smith (2000), writing about the moral claims of democracy as opposed to other forms of government, I find its virtue to depend on exactly what is meant by the term 'democracy'. In this work I argue that some types of democracy may be more peaceful than others, which directly leads the prospective role of democratic rule as a promoter of peace to what type of democracy is being installed. Furthermore, these respective institutions should consider the context within which they will be functioning. Factors that potentially could affect the success of democratization efforts are; history of democratic experiences, political stability in the respective state and in the region, economic basis, degree of ethnic homogeneity, and number of democratic neighbors.

Is such problematizing of type of democracy irrelevant in light of the argument that the higher the number of democracies in the world, the more peaceful the system? This concern seems especially pertinent since some researchers have found that the spread of democracy has been followed by a declining number of wars in the world, taking the shape of an inverted U-shaped curve (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997). Regardless of the truth about this trend, it is problematic that such a systemic approach fails to look at the regional level. As discussed in the previous section, the net effect of democratization on conflict can still be negative in some regions even though in the grand total, the spread of democracy is followed by less conflict.

Schjølset (1996) concluded that some democracies are more likely to engage in interstate conflict than others. Similarly, Ellingsen and Schjølset (2000) found some democracies to be more likely to experience civil war than others. This relationship indicates that some types of democracy might be more inclined to aggressive behavior than some forms of autocratic governance. Such findings seem to suggest, therefore, that exporting democracy without paying attention to institutional differences would be naïve.

2.3.5 Conclusion: A (Still) Underdeveloped Theory?

How far have we come and where should we go in what I have classified as the first phase of the democratic peace? I have pointed to the need to move beyond the binary regime type dichotomy of the democratic peace in order to better understand the association between regime type and conflict. Democracies and autocracies can take many forms and be differently democratic and differently autocratic with respect to their institutional makeup. In these institutional differences lies potential for constraining decision-makers differently when grappling with the question of use of force. The emergence of types of governance has taken place in different regions at different times, largely as a function of social and political forces. As such, the relevance of certain regime types is bound by temporal and spatial boundaries. These boundaries also apply to the relevance of conflict. Conflict patterns have been produced by social and political factors as well, which has made some types of conflict occur more frequently in certain regions and during some time periods than in others. In other words, the idea of a disaggregated regime typology being superior in achieving knowledge about the regime type and conflict nexus, implies incorporating temporal and spatial concerns. Such a modification of the basis for the democratic peace has implications for the logic between and

interpretation of the analytical levels on which the research program is centered. Most importantly, it emphasizes the importance of the monadic level, especially with respect to recommending applying democracy and democratization as a means for peace. These revisions require empirical reorientation and theoretical elaboration in ways that are virtually absent from the democratic peace debate today. In other words, I am pointing to the need to extend the democratic peace in order to produce fruitful arguments about the relationship between regime type and conflict.

2.4 The Second Phase: A Generalization of Focus

The study of regime type and conflict exists as *one* approach to understanding the causes of conflict. As such, the democratic peace has failed to orient itself within such a framework. In what I call the second phase, some scholars have started this process of defining the role of regime type in a more general approach to the study of conflict.

These very recent effort in getting beyond the democratic peace research programme and integrating it into a more comprehensive understanding of peace and conflict was pioneered by Russett and Oneal (2001). They developed a compelling theory in which they link the pacifying effect of democratic rule with similar, and closely connected, peaceful relations brought about by economic interdependence between states and shared membership in international organizations. The ‘triangular peace’ as perceived by Russett and Oneal rests on three ‘legs,’ democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations, which promote peace independently and through feedback loops. In order to engage in the challenge of generalizing the democratic peace focus, I outline and review the triangular peace thesis here. I will use this as the basis for suggesting a framework based on foreign policy-making in the next chapter.

2.4.1 The ‘Third Leg’ Model: Democracy, Trade and Intergovernmental Organizations

This explanation of peace builds on British liberal ideas of free trade originally proposed by Adam Smith. In a more recent formulation of this relationship, Karl Deutsch depicted economic interdependence as contributing to the creation of a ‘security community’ where shared interests prevent the use of force (Deutsch et al., 1957). Despite being touched upon by Singer and Wallace (1970),

these ideas were not developed further and explicitly put in the context of a democratic peace until the mid-1990s by scholars like John Oneal, Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr (Oneal and Russett, 1997; Russett, Oneal and Davis, 1998; Oneal and Russett, 1999a, 1999b; Starr, 1997). Russett and Oneal (2001:36) maintain, ‘economically important trade and investment limit the likelihood that a state will use force against its commercial partner.’ These processes not only explain integration, but also result in peace among democracies according to Starr (1997).

The ‘third leg’ model refers to the most recent efforts to link the pacifying impact of international organizations to the democratic peace (Oneal and Russett, 1999a; Russett and Oneal, 2001). Oneal and Russett (1999a: 2) claim that the pacific benefits of liberal factors such as membership in international organizations are components of Kant’s image of peace, but have not yet been recognized by the general group of democratic peace scholars. This explanation of peace implies that ‘the more international organizations to which two states belong together, the less likely they will be to fight one another or even to threaten the use of military force’ (Russett and Oneal, 2001:36-37). International organizations ‘directly coerce and restrain those who break the peace, serve as agents of mediation and arbitration, or reduce uncertainty in negotiations by conveying information’ (Russett and Oneal, 2001).

Russett and Oneal (2001) connect the three peace-promoting ‘legs’ through feedback loops or what they call ‘virtuous circles,’ indicating their reciprocal effects. Briefly described, democratic rule, trade and the existence of international organizations are all best sustained in a stable system. The three ‘legs’ can potentially contribute to such stability. ‘Kant argued that three naturally occurring tendencies operate to produce a more peaceful world. Individuals desire to be free and prosperous, so democracy and trade will expand, which leads to the growth of international law and organizations to facilitate these processes’ (Oneal and Russett, 1999a:36). Based on Kant’s ideas, Russett and Oneal draw a triangular image of how democracy, economic interdependence and international organizations encourage peace between states. Democracies tend to trade together, partly because they trust continuous peaceful coexistence. Interdependence may be an external support of pluralism. Democracies tend to engage in the creation and existence of international organizations, which frequently work to sustain democratic governments. Lastly, international organizations are typically created to promote and facilitate trade and interdependent states tend to share membership in international organizations (Oneal and Russett, 1999a:23, fn. 51; Russett and Oneal, 2001). In

short, peace, democracy and trade increase IGO memberships, whereas IGO memberships promote peace, democracy and trade.

Recent research has claimed some limitations to the idea of a ‘virtuous circle,’ however. Boehmer and Nordstrom (2003) for example, argue that Oneal and Russett’s proposition is limited to the most institutionalized IGOs.

2.4.2 Moving On From the Current Status of the Democratic Peace

Most scholars studying the democratic peace include independent variables, controlling for other explanations of conflict. The selection of these factors builds on well-established research on the causes of war. What the application of these controls does not establish however, is an overall theoretical framework for the selection of and importance of these factors. Russett and Oneal’s (2001) idea of a triangular peace however, is a unique contribution in this regard. They argue that their model for explaining peace resting on democracy, interdependence and international organizations, is superior to the democratic peace theory. Inasmuch as I agree that including other variables, one can determine the single effect of regime type, I don’t see how the two approaches of explaining peace or conflict compete. The democratic peace theory does not offer a universal explanation for peace or conflict, but rather explains a small part of the phenomenon - conflict. As such, it exists as a theory within a larger framework and the Russett and Oneal triangulating peace theory is one such construction.

The once very parsimonious democratic peace theory is evolving towards encompassing factors generally believed to affect the causes of war and peace. This, I believe, is a good development. The framework into which the democratic peace is evolving is one that acknowledges the impact of both internal and interstate factors and the different levels for explaining why war occurs in some cases and not in others. Yet, the different aspects, or the four ‘legs’ have not been coordinated. In the next chapter, I try to develop one such model, with emphasis on the impact of institutional constraints. Such a development would be according to how Oneal and Russett (1999a:36) describe the recent developments of the study of democracy and peace; ‘[a]nalytically, we are progressing toward a synthesis of Kantian and realist influences and of dyadic and systemic perspectives.’

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the democratic peace as an approach to understanding the degree to which domestic constraints on decision-makers affect whether states engage in conflict with other countries or not. I have framed the democratic peace as a research program with conceptual limitations and suffering from being theoretically underdeveloped. I have discussed some such conceptual and theoretical problems in order to show how shortcomings of this research program have important policy implications. Moreover, I suggested that integrating the democratic peace into a broader foreign policy framework can improve our understanding of the promises and limitations of governmental institutions as promoters of peace. I will use this discussion as the basis for building such a theory, aiming explicitly at assessing the impact of structural constraints on decision-making across all types of states.

Chapter 3: Extending the Democratic Peace

Goering: ‘Naturally, the common people don’t want war [...] [B]ut after all, it is the *leaders* of the country who determines the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.’

Gilbert: ‘There is one difference [...] In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States, only Congress can declare war.’

Goering: ‘Oh, that is all well and good, but voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.’²¹

3.1 Governmental Institutions in the Status Quo

The overall goal of this dissertation is to establish new insight about the role of governmental institutions with respect to states’ international conflict behavior. More specifically, I ask: given the

²¹Hermann Goering, Hitler’s Reich-Marshal, in a dialogue with G.M. Gilbert, prison psychologist at the Nuremberg trial of the nazi war criminals (Gilbert, 1947:278-279).

disposition of conflict in different states, what is the intervening impact of governmental institutions? As a basis for answering this question, I start out this chapter by revisiting the already established knowledge about international conflict: on one hand are the Neorealist ideas about the causes of war, on the other hand are the Democratic Peace thesis' ideas about proponents of peace, which I discussed in the previous chapter. The important question I ask here is whether institutions can intervene in this already established story about the causes of war and ways of peace? I suggest closer attention to the Democratic Peace theory about regimes, reflecting on the intervening impact of governmental institutions as a refinement of the Democratic Peace.

The first part of this chapter reiterates the conclusions about the causes of war as accepted by Neorealist scholars. These theories emphasize systemic and relational factors associated with conflict. The Democratic Peace ideas evolved in part in opposition to Realist ideas with the original emphasis on domestic factors (structure and culture) and the more recent explicit incorporation of relational dynamics (trade and IGO membership). The second part of this chapter turns to the critique of the Democratic Peace theory provided in the previous chapter and suggests how greater attention to governmental structures is one way to deal with these shortcomings.

3.2 The First Step Towards an Extended Theory: The Causes of War as the Starting Point

Building on the pioneering works of Wright (1964) and Richardson (1960), theorizing and research about the causes of war evolved hand in hand with the establishment of International Relations as a scientific academic field, also referred to as the 'behavioral revolution.' The most dominating of these ideas is known as Realism. Classical Realist theory sees states as the main actors in an anarchical system, in which each state needs to seek power in order to survive, and sees domestic politics as affecting states' behavior internationally (Morgenthau, 1993 [1948]). Neorealist theory places focus on the nature of the international system, rather than on the nature of the individual state and leaders, in explaining states' actions (Waltz, 1979). In the anarchical system of self-help, rivalry between states is likely to culminate in war between them. Since the 1960s, most of the

efforts at explaining war incorporate realist theory in some form (Maoz and Gat, 2001; Vasquez, 1993, 2000).²²

During the early years in the study of the causes of war, the quantification of international relations became the basis on which early theorizing about international war were based, most notably through Singer and Small's (1972) Correlates of War (COW) Project (Vasquez, 1987). Although the Correlates of War Project is still widely applied to study conflict, the project has been both challenged and complimented by more recent data collection efforts. The currently most notable efforts are Gleditsch's (2004) revision and update of the COW data, the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Data (Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996), Brecher and Wilkenfeld's (2000) International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, and the joint effort of mapping armed conflicts by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

This background to the study of war points at the face of the field as it presents itself today: largely quantitatively studied, with attention to factors such as capability, alliance membership, balance of power, and contiguity. These factors' impact on war has generally been studied at the dyadic level of analysis, meaning focus on the relationship between states rather than on the state itself. Early on, the importance of distinguishing between levels of analysis was pointed out by Waltz (1959) and Singer (1961) and is a technique to organize and specify the factors considered relevant to the question of what explains international war, but can also be used to specify the realm of the phenomenon of interest. With respect to Realist ideas, a dyadic approach to examining the causes of war speaks to the Neorealist camp, whereas a monadic or state-level analysis can incorporate the Classical Realist perspective as well as systemic structures. Theoretically, explanations based on dyadic analyses tend to describe states' individual characteristics as well as the nature of the relation between two states. Since the focus of this work is the role of domestic characteristics of states, I proceed by reviewing Realist explanations of war largely as it applies to the state level of analysis.

Realists regard a state's *material capability* as fundamental for its behavior towards other states (Geller, 2000:259). The most commonly applied conceptualization of capability is that of distinguishing between major and minor powers and scholars have argued that the major powers

²²From here on, I do not distinguish between Classical Realism and Neorealism, but treat them as the same theory operating at different levels.

are influential forces in shaping the world (Nijman, 1991; Pastor, 1999). With respect to war, the common conclusion is that major powers are much more likely to participate in war than other states (Bremer, 1992; Small and Singer, 1982). Historically, the system of states has been altered by the impact of wars. Some scholars argue that major powers' aggressive behavior proves their efforts at both enhancing their power and reputation of power by affecting these structural changes (Bremer, 2000). Furthermore, the great capability of major powers enables them to fight long-lasting and costly wars, and enhances their chances of achieving victory.²³ These arguments are complicated by a state's relative change in capability level, however. Decreasing capability in a state might prompt aggressive behavior towards other states as a strategy to divert attention from domestic difficulties, as a means to riches, or as an effort to demonstrate resolve and power.

Alliance formation is another essential vehicle of enhancing capability and power according to realist theory (Walt, 1987). States strive to enhance their security towards other states. If a state's domestic capabilities and the nature of the international state system do not guarantee this goal, then a state pursues power and security by forming alliances. Theoretically, the impact of alliance membership for a country's likelihood of getting involved in conflict with other countries is ambiguous, however. On one hand, alliance membership can deter other states' aggressive behavior and consequently reduce the likelihood of conflict. On the other hand, one state can draw alliance partners into a conflict and indirectly increase the likelihood of conflict between states. There is a similar divergence in the empirical conclusions about the association between alliances and war. Some scholars argue that membership in alliances is associated with a greater likelihood of conflict (Gibler, 2000), whereas others conclude that alliances decrease the likelihood of conflict (Bremer, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1992; Weede, 1983). Although most scholars agree that alliances are associated with war (Maoz, 2000; Vasquez, 1987, 1993), no coherent pattern has yet been revealed.

One of the arguments made about alliances is that they alter the structure of the state system (Vasquez, 1987:123). Specifically, alliances can promote polarization of the system, and consequently, shift the balance of power between states. The *structure of the international system* is another cornerstone in the neo-realist account of war.²⁴ Although realist theory assumes that the

²³The pattern is not the same when conceptualizing capability in terms of wealth, which I will return to when discussing theories aimed at explaining peace.

²⁴Hegemonic theory (expressed by scholars such as Robert Gilpin and Ken Organski) is often seen as alternative to the traditional balance of power theory, because it emphasizes order rather than anarchy in realist theory (Levy, 1998:148).

distribution of power in the system greatly affects states' aggressive behavior internationally, there is little agreement about the nature of this relationship. Levy (1985) for example, argues that a bipolar system is more stable than multipolar systems, but has more frequent wars, although less severe than wars fought during multipolarity. Furthermore, unipolar systems are very unstable and have the most serious and long-lasting wars. Regardless of existing theories predicting its importance, power hierarchies have shown little explanatory power with respect to war (Geller, 2000:275; Sabrosky, 1985), and have been criticized for being overly reliant on the experiences from the Cold War when generalizing.

Another long-standing tradition in explaining war, emphasizes the role of *geography* (Spykman, 1944). In general, interaction between countries is facilitated by contiguity or proximity (Gallup and Sachs, 1999; Furlong and Gleditsch, 2003; Starr and Most, 1976). With respect to how geography facilitates war, one of the most influential theories is Boulding's (1962) idea of loss-of-strength gradient, implying that most states' military capability is limited to carrying out war within limited geographic proximity because of the costs of moving military capability. Critiques have argued that the advancement of military technology has diminished the importance of proximity with respect to warfare. However, the greatest numbers of conflicts take place between poor countries (Hegre, 2000; Hegre et al., 2001) that do not have access to an advanced level of warfare technology, or where such resources are available to only one of the parties. Furthermore, empirical analyses support the importance of geography, concluding that war most frequently occurs between neighbors (Bremer, 1992) and between proximate countries (Gleditsch, 1995), both results pointing to the importance of geography when assessing conflict between states.

With the exception of capability, realist explanations for international war assume that states' aggressive behavior is largely a response to factors outside the realm of the state. The democratic peace theory is largely a response to the realists' failure to recognize the role of domestic factors for war and peace.

Whereas Waltz (2000:13) argued that 'the causes of war lie not simply in states or the state system; they are found in both,' the previous section shows how most realist efforts at explaining states' hostile behavior internationally focus on structural phenomena. In this tradition, the entry of democratic peace theory to the field changed the attention from the causes of war to the conditions for peace. Furthermore, in spite of many scholars putting the two theories up against each other,

claiming them being contradictory, the empirical works undertaken by democratic peace scholars have reintroduced emphasis on the intervening impact of domestic factors on the study of war. This focal switch did not reject the impact of the realist explanations for war, but rather acknowledged and emphasized interaction between the domestic and international political spheres.

As discussed above, the democratic peace theory incorporates this interaction largely by focusing on properties of democratic and autocratic regime types. On the one hand, governmental institutions determine the degree of constraints put on foreign-policy decision-making. On the other hand, the norms associated with regimes determine states' anticipation of adversaries' behavior and in turn, their own actions. In addition, democratic peace scholars combine domestic and international phenomena in their analyses by controlling for realist explanations for war. In other words, given the potential for conflict as defined by realist theory, democratic peace scholars claim that institutions and norms can significantly alter states hostile behavior towards other states. In this respect, the democratic peace presents itself not automatically as a rival to realism, but rather complements realist theory.

3.3 Revisiting the Democratic Peace

One goal of this dissertation is to suggest some ways of extending the democratic peace theory, which takes seriously some of the most fundamental criticisms directed at the research program. Most of this criticism does not reject the idea of some level of peacefulness among democratic states, but rather points at the need to generate new scholarship on the topic. Along this line, the suggestions I make here are intended to promote new scholarship as an extension and refinement rather than a dismissal of the core ideas of the democratic peace.

The list of problems that I deal with here is far from exhausting the criticism directed at the democratic peace. However, they take seriously the policy implication of the research program, the belief that spread of democratic governance is a sufficient means to achieve a more peaceful world. Without rejecting that a world made up of democratic states may be one free of interstate conflict, I suggest that the world and relations between states are more complex than what such logic is able to capture. Joining the concerns expressed by Mansfield and Snyder (1995) that conflict might be a serious side effect of democratization, I argue that failing to incorporate greater complexity when democratizing for peace may lead to the eruption of more conflict in the short run.

Let me briefly repeat some of the main criticisms and hint at my suggestions for how to improve the current perspective by extending and refining it. First, the democratic peace idea holds behavioralist commitments to promote and spread democratic governance (see Duvall and Weldes, 2001:200). There are many problematic aspects about democratizing for peace that I will not be dealing with in this work. However, I urge caution in democratizing for peace, partly based on the idea that some types of democratic institutions may promote more conflict in the short run. Theory suggests that governmental institutions play a role in affecting states' interstate behavior and research has shown that democracies are no less conflict prone than autocracies. Looking at whether the type of institutions a state utilizes matters for its conflict proneness is necessary before making conclusions about the promise of democratic institutions for peace.

This leads me to a related problematic aspect of the democratic peace: the failure to acknowledge that just like democracies, autocratic political leaders are constrained by the institutional framework within which they maneuver when making political decisions. If all states' external conflict proneness varies depending on institutional framework, then one cannot reject the possibility that some democratic states may be more conflict prone than some autocratic states. Consequently, spread of democratic institutions that promote the most aggressive state behavior internationally may lead to more conflict on the short run.

Since difference in conflict proneness in this respect applies to relations between democracies and autocracies, the locus within which states exist becomes especially relevant. Most conflicts are fought between proximate states and neighbors. If a democracy is surrounded mainly by other democracies, then it would not matter for their mutual peacefulness which institutions they apply. However, in a context where democracies and autocracies coexist, it may matter a great deal which institutions the states practice. Thus, the importance of space must not be underestimated when analyzing the prospect of peace through democratization.

The importance of space for the democratic peace extends to the problematic assumption that democratization and growing peace are linear, additive, and irreversible processes. This view generates an overly optimistic view of the role of democracy for peace that fails to acknowledge that the trend in the world as a whole may not be reflected in every region. Even though the point may be reached globally in which democracies outnumber autocracies, this may not be followed by more peace if the same is not true for all regions. In other words, global peace may be dependent on

regional peace. Furthermore, there is no timeless association between democracy and peace (Duvall and Weldes, 2001:206; Parry and Moran, 1994). In other words, there is no universal law ruling out the possibility that the democratic expansion may be reversed. Again, the optimism about the role of democracy for peace is assumed, not tested.

The consequence of these shortcomings of the democratic peace research program may be that democratizing for peace generates more conflict rather than more peace. If this is so in the short run or in some regions, then we may never achieve a world of peaceful democracies.

In conclusion therefore, this work's suggestion of extending and refining the democratic peace is based on the fear that oversimplification may justify a spread of democratic governance that contributes to more conflict rather than more peace in the world. As the next chapters will show, I suggest extension and refinement of the democratic peace theory by placing greater emphasis on institutions, time, and space both analytically and substantially. In the next chapter, I show how time and space place limitations on generalizations about states' conflict behavior internationally which proves relevant for incorporating governmental institutions.

3.3.1 The Relative Importance of the Democratic Peace in Time and Space

Scholars have concluded that the growing number of democracies in the world has proven particularly promising for the prospects of peace in the aftermath of what Huntington (1991) identified as the 'third wave' of democratization that started in the mid-1970s. The so-called third wave is part of a process of democratization which has frequently been described as 'a fundamentally irreversible, long-term, global trend' (Huntington, 1991:17, 27; 1984:196; Rustow, 1990:90). The critique that democratizing states are more prone to conflict (Enterline, 1998; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2005) has been rebutted by research concluding that the threshold is already reached beyond which further spread of democratic governance is followed by more conflict globally (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997).²⁵ The latter perspective fails to incorporate spatial variation of democratization. In the following, I attempt to demonstrate that looking at the net ratio of the number of democratic states versus the

²⁵Several scholars seem to accept that an increase in the number of democracies is followed by more conflict in the world, but that beyond a threshold of democratization, the number of conflicts decreases (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon, 2003; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre, 1999). I refer to this threshold throughout the text as the regime type threshold or the regime peace ratio or regime threshold.

number of autocratic states globally is premature when assessing the prospect for a more peaceful world.

Even though the number of democratic societies exceeds that of autocratic ones on a global scale and the number of interstate conflicts may be decreasing, this trend cannot automatically be accepted as uniform and a means to world peace without closer examining the temporal and spatial dimensions of the relevant relationships. Similar to Bremer (2000), I reject the idea that evolution in the global political system follows a linear additive path and rather assume that political processes can be reversed and the impact of present transformations might not be apparent until many years from now. Likewise, the changes in states' political systems taken together might not be reflected in the individual continents. In other words, even though such a regime type ratio exists when looking at the world as a whole, the absence or different shape of such a trend in some regions may portray a less optimistic prospect for peace.

Therefore, drawing conclusions about the importance of the democratic peace theory without considering temporal and spatial variations fails to take seriously policy-implications of democratizing for peace. The nature of regimes and the nature of warfare have changed over time. So has the number of conflicts fought, as well as the number of democratic and autocratic states in the world. In spite of this, only a handful of scholars (Gleditsch and Ward, 1997; Huntington, 1991) have studied democracy and autocracy from a long-term perspective, and little has been done to analyze spatial regularities of peace and conflict (Bremer, 2000).²⁶ Lack of attention to temporal and spatial variations is also typical of analyses of the association between political systems and international conflict. One exception is Gleditsch and Ward's (2000) analysis of the impact of democratization for conflict in time and space. More specifically, each region offering unique prospects for peace points at the importance of incorporating a disaggregated regional examination in an analysis of the democratic peace. Furthermore, the idea that the regime type ratio is crucial to sustaining peace in the future suggests looking at whether and when the regime type ratio is reached in the individual regions. If the number of autocracies exceeds the number of democracies in a region, further democratization might be followed by instability within and between states and result in more conflict rather than peace. This incorporates one of the most serious criticisms directed at the

²⁶Exceptions are Lockhart's (1978) analysis of long-term effects of actions and outcomes of conflicts, Melko's (1992) analysis of long-term factors underlying the zone of peace in the West, and Sarkees, Wayman and Singer's (2003) examination of the temporal distribution of conflict during 1816-1997.

democratic peace theory; Mansfield and Snyder's (1995, 2005) historically grounded warning that democratization may lead to more conflict rather than peace, at least in the short term.

The purpose of this chapter is to show how the variable character of the democratic peace relationship across time and space suggests extending the democratic peace theory systematically to incorporate the roles of governmental institutions. If governmental institutions differ in offering opportunities for, or limiting the use of force towards other states, then, it matters a great deal which types of institutions countries already practice and adopt. In the following, I will establish the temporal and spatial variations of democracy and peace. This will serve as a stepping-stone for introducing the roles of governmental institutions as an extension or refinement of the standard democratic peace theory. Huntington's notion of democratic waves (1991) will aid in predicting the conflict pattern in each region and thus, prospects for achieving a more peaceful world.

Let me back up to the main focus of this chapter and ask: what can be learned by incorporating time and space in the democratic peace? In the following I look at the distribution in the numbers of democratic and autocratic states in the world as a whole and in five regions (Latin America, the West, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia)²⁷ and ask: first, whether an increase in the number of democratic states coincided with a surge in interstate conflict?; second, whether and when the number of democratic states has exceeded that of autocratic states?; and third, whether the time with democracy in majority has been marked by reduction in the number of states involved in violent conflicts with other states?

In answering how democracy and conflict co-evolve globally over time, I need to make a quick side-step to Huntington's notion of democratization. Huntington refers to regime change towards democratic rule in modern times as taking place mainly during three broad time periods or in 'democratic waves:' 1828-1926, 1943-62, and mid 1970s-present (1991, 13-26, 31-46). A wave of democratization is defined as 'a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time' (Ibid., 15). Huntington's wave theory maintains that a reverse trend tends to succeed each democratic wave.

²⁷Latin America includes the Middle and South American countries. The West includes Western and Eastern Europe, the United States, Canada, Israel, Australia and New Zealand. The Middle East excludes Israel and includes Egypt. Asia excludes New Zealand and Australia.




Figure 3.1: The World: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002

How do democracy and conflict vary over the past 200 years? Figure 3.1 shows the annual number of democracy, autocracy and interstate conflict in the *world* during 1816-2002. The increase in the number of democracies globally roughly follows the pattern suggested by Huntington. The number of democracies increased gradually until the mid 1920s, coinciding with a decrease in the number of autocratic states since approximately 1850. In other words, democratization during this time period took place as regime change in already existing countries. Huntington describes this *first* wave as starting with the United States approximately around 1828, and extended mainly to European countries and English colonies, before it ended in 1926. The regime changes were rooted in ideas from the French and American revolutions, but were brought forward by economic and social development. During the reversal trend leading up and into World War II, a process toward autocratic rule unfolded, especially in young democracies.

The *second* wave in the aftermath of the war shows a different pattern however. The increase in number of democracies is paralleled by a relatively steep increase in the number of autocratic states. The democratization efforts during these years came about through the victorious allies from World War II enhancing democratic rule in the defeated camp. Decolonization from Western powers brought about many of the new states and experimentation with democratic institutions during this period. Many of these democracies were short-lived and the second wave lasted only until the mid 1960s. In Figure 3.1, the steep increase in the number of autocracies in the late 1950s starts the second reversal wave, which lasts until the mid 1970s.

The *third* democratic wave starts in the mid-1970s. Huntington describes this movement as global, moving from southern Europe, through Latin America, to Asia, and finally it converted the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. During these years, the trend of an increasing number of autocracies that started in the late 1950s continues until the mid 1980s. From then on, there is a remarkable reduction in the number of autocracies corresponding with a strong increase in democracies. The trend lasts until the turn of the century when, so far, it seems to have stabilized. Similar to democratization during the first wave, the most current regime changes seem to take place within already existing states.

How does conflict between states interact with the democratization story? If Mansfield and Snyder (1995) are correct that democratizing states are more conflict prone, then I should expect an increase in the number of conflicts as the number of democracies go up. During the first wave,

this expectation seems correct until the end of the period (Figure 3.1). After reaching a high during World War I, the number of conflicts starts decreasing at the tail end of the first wave. In fact, conflict is at its lowest as democracy reaches its high at the end of the 1920s. Furthermore, conflict surges while democracy declines until the end of World War II. After the mid 1940s, the rapidly increasing number of democracies goes hand-in-hand with a steady increase in conflict, with the exception of a sharp decline in the number of full-scale wars. Thus, the second wave seems to follow Mansfield and Snyder's prediction of conflict being more prevalent. Likewise, the start of the third democratic wave was accompanied by an increase in conflict. The number of states in conflicts takes a rapid drop during the mid 1980s, which corresponds to a sharp decrease in number of autocracies. This pattern is the opposite of what Mansfield and Snyder's idea would suggest, but only lasts for a brief time period. Democratization and conflict prevalence during the 1990s are increasing, just as expected.

How then is the ratio of democracies versus autocracies in the world? As Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) observed, the number of democracies exceeded that of autocracies in the world in the early-1990s. Since then, the increasing number of democratic states has been paralleled by a decreasing number of autocratic states. Just as Gleditsch and Ward (1997:361) noted, there seems to be an evident shift in the balance between democratic and autocratic states in the world. Figure 3.1 shows the number of states participating in conflict during the same time period. Whether or not there is less conflict in the world after democracies outnumber autocracies may depend on how you define conflict. Even though full-scale war is almost absent, there is a clear increase in the number of conflicts in general after democracy outnumbered autocracy in the early 1990s. Consequently, one should be cautious concluding that further democratization leads to a more peaceful world.²⁸

Many scholars have argued that the advance of democratic societies is not only apparent in the West, but all over the world (Gurr, Jagers and Moore, 1990; Huntington, 1991; Ray, 1995). Whether or not this is the case may affect the grounds for optimism when democratizing for peace.

Latin America Figure 3.2 shows the annual number of democracies and autocracies in *Latin America* during 1816-2002. As will become evident from the figures from the other regions, Latin

²⁸Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon (2003) is one of the few studies that analyses the impact of democratization on the spread of conflict. They conclude that the initial increase of strength in the democratic community increase the level of conflict in the system. However, beyond a certain threshold, conflict reduces as democracy spreads.




Figure 3.2: Latin America: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002

America seems to best reproduce Huntington's democratic waves. Rather, the first wave in Latin America is dominated by a rapid growth in the number of autocratic states during the first half of the 19th century. The period started out with three independent autocracies; Argentina, Haiti, and Paraguay which had grown to eighteen by 1847. Clearly, the decolonization processes in the region fostered autocratic states, rather than democracy. Less than a handful of countries had become democratic by the mid 1920s. This pattern changed during the second wave when the increasing number of democratic states reflected regime transformations toward democracy in the already independent states. The second wave reached a peak during 1967-68 before a decade long reverse wave occurred. With the third wave starting ten years later came a dramatic transformation in the political sphere in Latin America, and democracies have continuously outnumbered autocracies since the early 1980s. The democratization process seems strong and consistent in this region and after 1997, Peru, Cuba and Haiti were the only states regarded as autocratic (receiving a score lower than 3 on the polity index).

With respect to Mansfield and Snyder's suggestion that democratizing states are the most conflict prone, the region should have the greatest number of conflicts coinciding with the second and third wave of democratization. Is this the case? Figure 3.2 shows the number of states taking part in at least one interstate conflict per year. Rather than following the cycle of democratization, conflict occurrence seems to follow the pattern of autocratic states until approximately 1990. In other words,

an increase or decrease in the number of autocratic states is paralleled by an increase or decrease in the frequency of international conflicts. Although some full-scale wars were fought during the 19th century, most of the conflicts fought by Latin American states have been less serious.²⁹ Only for a brief time period, at the outset of the third wave, does democratization take place with an increase in the number of conflicts. In fact, as the the number of democracies exceeds the number of autocratic states in Latin America in the early 1980s, the number of conflicts is clearly decreasing. This trend corresponds to Gleditsch and Hegre’s (1997) prediction of more peace as democratic states gain the majority and begs for optimism for stable peace between states in Latin America.




Figure 3.3: The West: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002

The West Huntington’s description of democratic waves is evident when looking at *the West*. At the start of the time period selected in this work, only the the United States and Switzerland qualified as democratic. However, the first wave swept through Western Europe and, at the turn of the 19th century, democracy gained majority in the region (Figure 3.3). The number of democratic states reached a peak between the two World Wars, followed by a strong reversal leading up to World War II. The second democratizing wave in the West was dominated by the participants in the World War regaining their democratic autonomy and was not followed by a reversal wave. Just as

²⁹It is important to note that some of the complexities in the regime type and conflict nexus in Latin America, as well as in Africa, after World War II are results of the legacy of the Cold War in which both promotion of democracy and states’ conflict involvement were part of the game of rivalry played out by major powers (O’Loughlin et al., 1998).

Huntington (1991) described, the third wave came late to the West and was made up mainly by the disintegration of the Soviet Union around 1990. Autocracy was close to being eradicated in 2002. At the turn of the century, the only states still embracing autocratic governance was Azerbaijan, Belarus and Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Croatia were still transitioning from autocratic rule in 2001, but Croatia had established democracy by 2002.

Does Mansfield and Snyder's prediction of more conflict at times when states democratize hold true in the West? It certainly seems to fit for the democratization processes during the first and third wave as depicted in Figure 3.3. Increased conflict participation coincided with democratization at the end of the first wave, but the number of states in conflict was dramatically reduced after the First World War. After the Second World War, the second democratizing wave concurred with the reduction in the number of states in conflict. Even though the latter pattern diverts from Mansfield and Snyder's expectations, it seems clear that especially the West was affected by occupation and warfare of the latter World War in ways that make it difficult to generalize about democratization and conflict proneness. The third wave however, follows Mansfield and Snyder's prediction. The rapid increase in the number of democracies at the end of the 20th century was accompanied by a dramatic surge in the number of conflicts in the region. Apart from the 1999 war between Yugoslavia and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the surge in number of conflicts did not involve full-scale war.

It seems clear therefore, that the time in which the regime ratio favored democracy right after the turn of the 19th century does not mark a turning point for conflict involvement by states in the West. Gleditch and Hegre's (1997) prediction of more peace after democracies have outnumbered autocratic states in the world does at first seem valid for the West in isolation. After approximately 1980 however, less violent conflicts dominate and there is a reduction of armed conflicts and full-scale wars. Altogether, it supports Mitchell, Gates and Hegre's (1999) conclusion that the pacifying association between democratization and conflict takes time to take effect and that the conflict pattern is changing in the West (Human Security Report, 2005). For example, the 1956 war between Hungary and the former Soviet Union as well as the Gulf War. Although less frequent, full-scale war was not obsolete after the start of the third wave: the war between Cyprus and Turkey in 1974, the Falkland War fought between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982, and the 1990-1991 Gulf War in which Italy, the UK and France participated.

Africa In *Africa*, the trends are quite different than in Latin America and the West. Figure 3.4 shows that spread of democracy in Africa mainly took place in two phases; during the decolonization process from the late 1950s to approximately 1970, and from approximately 1990. In spite of democratization processes in Africa being relative recent phenomena, some African countries have old roots in governing democratically. Liberia was regarded as democratic until the mid-1880s and Ethiopia and the Republic of the Orange Free State (later a province in South Africa) were democratic for the entire second half of the 19th century. Although not being quite as dominating as a wave, the first period of increase in democratic governance roughly followed the pattern of a delayed second wave. What dominates the political arena however, is an extreme rise in the number of authoritarian states, starting around the 1930s. Both the rise of authoritarianism and the increase in democracy during the 1960s were products of the decolonization processes in Africa during which many newly independent countries experimented with democracy. Differently, democratization during the third wave were due to regime transformation rather than state formation. In other words, it seems that the number of independent states have stabilized and that there may be a shift towards more stable adoptions of democratic governance. Some of the most distinct experiments with democratic reforms took place in Malawi, Lesotho, Zambia and Mozambique during 1978-94 (O’Loughlin et al., 1998:564).




Figure 3.4: Africa: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002

Does Mansfield and Snyder's prediction about more conflict erupting as more states are democratizing work in Africa? Since most African states were considered colonies, only a handful of them qualify as independent before World War I. Consequently, there are not many African states classified as participating in interstate conflict during this century. Ironically, this does not automatically imply that Africa experienced a century of peace, but rather that the conflicts fought are not captured by the categories of regime type and conflict as defined here.³⁰ Consequently, I am reluctant to generalize about the relationships between regime types and conflict before 1918 in Africa, but merely note the importance of the unique environment brought about by the colonial legacy. Conflict proneness in Africa seems to follow the wave of autocratization more than the spread of democracy and might point toward the impact of factors such as state consolidation and regime change in general rather than democratization. This does not mean that democratization plays no part, but rather that it doesn't seem to be as strong a force in the political arena as the increase in number of authoritarian states. During the end of the time period investigated, from approximately 1990, regime changes toward democratization coincide with an increase in conflict. The majority of these conflicts are not full-scale wars, which is a trend common for the entire time-period investigated.³¹

How does the ratio between number of democracies and number of autocracies look in Africa? What are the prospects for achieving more peace in the region through further spread of democracy? Common for the entire 200-year period is autocratic states outnumbering democracies (Figure 3.4), which might indicate that conflict is on the rise in Africa. Starting in 1989, Africa becomes more democratic which narrows the gap between autocratic and democratic regimes. The increase of democratic states in Africa coincided with an increase in the number of states involved in international conflict from around 1990. On the one hand, this pattern fits into Mansfield and Snyder's prediction of democratizing states being more conflict prone. On the other hand, the end of the

³⁰Some 19th century interstate wars that are accounted for in the data applied here as opposed to previous versions of the data (Singer and Small, 1972, 1994; Small and Singer, 1982) are the result of Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) revision of the state system definition and Gleditsch's (2004) revised list of wars. As a result, some countries that were previously regarded as colonies and thus did not appear in data sets as participants in conflict were now included. Examples of such interstate conflicts are the Franco-Moroccan war in 1844, the British-Ethiopian war during 1867-68, the Transvaal Revolt during 1880-81 and the Boer war of 1899-1902, the wars between Italy and Ethiopia in 1887 and 1895-96, and that between France and Madagascar in 1894-95.

³¹African full-scale wars, fought during the second half of the 20th century were those between Ethiopia and Somalia during 1977-78, the war between Uganda and Tanzania during 1978-79, and the more recent war between Eritrea and Ethiopia during 1998-2000.

period shows a trend of decreasing number of states in conflict as the gap between democracies and autocracies narrows. Since autocracies still outnumber democracies in Africa and the regime peace ratio has not yet been reached, the positive trend of more peace is not likely to last if Mansfield and Snyder (1995) are right. It is important to keep in mind that Africa is a region ridden with civil wars and consequently, a decrease in the number of states involved in interstate conflicts needs not imply more peace. In fact, the importance of domestic unrest for interstate peace might be very relevant in Africa.

The Middle East Figure 3.5 shows the annual number of democracy, autocracy, and interstate conflict in *the Middle East* during 1816-2002. As in Africa, European colonialism influenced the region until well into the 20th century, which in many states affected their experimentation with democratic rule. Out of 15 Middle Eastern states, approximately half have experimented with democratic governance (Egypt, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey).³² Democracy occurred for the first time in Egypt during the 1920s and at the turn of the 20th century, only two states (Turkey and Iran) were regarded as democratic. Since democratization is rare in the Middle East, it never amounted to a wave. The only long-lasting democratic regimes were those of Turkey and Israel. Consequently, Huntington's democratic wave idea seems unfit for understanding democratic regimes in the Middle East. Similar to Africa however, the increase in the number of autocratic states does take form as a wave.

What happens to states' conflict participation during the wave of autocratization then, rather than evaluating conflict during democratization? Mansfield and Snyder's thesis does not address this issue, and similar to Africa, issues such as decolonization, consolidation and regime change seem pertinent to conflict proneness. The increase in autocratic states, starting after World War I, is comparable to a wave and it does coincide with a strong increase in the number of states involved in conflict starting at the end of the 1930s. The bulk of the interstate conflicts are the Suez Nationalization war in 1956 between Egypt and Israel/UK/France, the Egyptian conflicts with Israel (1967, 1969-70, and 1973), the border conflict between North Yemen and South Yemen in 1972 and 1978-79, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, and the Gulf war in 1990-91. The number of autocracies reached a maximum around 1980 after which it declines. The trend lasts until the end of the time

³²Note that Israel is classified as European and not represented by Figure 3.5




Figure 3.5: The Middle East: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002

period investigated here and does coincide with a reduction in conflict. Right before the turn of the century, this trend of less conflict and fewer autocracies coincide with the rising number of states democratizing. Inasmuch as this pattern rejects the prediction of Mansfield and Snyder that democratization brings about conflict between states, one has to keep in mind the low number of states that are democratizing and the relative short time perspective during which I am observing this trend. In fact, the slight downward trend in the number of democratic states before 1980 was due to Lebanon not qualifying as a democracy after 1975 and the upward trend after 1980 is due to Iran's democratic reforms at the turn of the century. A couple of countries is hardly enough to generate a trend.

Quite clearly, the peace threshold is nowhere in sight for the Middle East. Democratic regimes are scarce in this region and skeptics have voiced disbelief in democracy being the only remedy for the Arab world based on the failures to install democracy previously (Kedourie, 1994). If this is the case, Mansfield and Snyder's gloomy prediction of more conflict may be still waiting for people in the Middle East if more countries start experimenting with democratic forms of governance.

Asia Figure 3.6 shows the annual number of democracy, autocracy, and interstate conflict in *Asia* during 1816-2002.³³ With the exception of Australia and New Zealand, which have been demo-

³³Note that these graphs are run without Australia and New Zealand, which are classified as European here.

cratic since 1901 and 1907 respectively, democracy is a relatively recent phenomenon in Asia. The first experimentation with democratic institutions took place during the decolonization processes in countries like India, Burma, and Sri Lanka after World War II, whereas democracy was instituted in Japan by the victorious states of the war. The next 30 years were marked by short-lived experiments with democratic rule at the same time as most of the newly independent states adopted autocratic ways of governance. Huntington's (1991) description of the third wave seems very fitting for Asia, with the dramatic increase in the number of democratic states starting at the end of the 1980s. These democratization processes lead to democracy taking hold in Asia and took place in countries like South Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. Unlike the experimentation with democratic reforms in Africa and the Middle East, most of the countries undergoing democratization in Asia remained democratic. The last part of this wave of democratization coincided with a decrease in the number of autocratic states, which indicates that the state formation processes that were so prevalent during the second half of the 20th century slowed down. Thus, the increase in the number of democratic states at the end of the third democratic wave in Asia was due to regime transformations from within the state itself rather than being imposed by foreign powers. From around 1990, this trend stagnated and gave way to a slight reversal in the number of democracies and increase in the number of autocracies at the turn of the century. The latter trend was dominated by the independence of the former Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan which all adapted authoritarian governance.

What then does states' conflict participation look like in Asia? Does the wave of democratization coincide with more conflict as Mansfield and Snyder (1995) predict? The answer to the latter question is largely yes, there has been an increase in the number of conflicts between states coinciding with more states becoming democratic. This is true for the first experimentations with democracy during decolonization, but also at the end of the third wave when democratization took place as regime change within already existing states.

Although the number of states in conflict increases as more states are democratizing, there is more to the story of conflict in Asia. In general, there are three peaks in the number of states involved in international conflicts (see Figure 3.6): around 1960, the early 1980s, and the end of the 1990s. These peaks were not dominated by full-scale wars, which in isolation have their own time periods during which they are frequent: around 1950 and around 1970. The first very violent period




Figure 3.6: Asia: Democracy, Autocracy, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-2002

around the 1950s was marked by serious conflicts, such as the war between the two Koreas during 1950-53, and the conflict between China and Taiwan that reoccurred repeatedly during the 1950s. When the number of states in full-scale war rose again in the late 1960s, it was due to wars such as that between South Vietnam and North Vietnam during 1965-75 and China's conflicts with several neighbors during that time. For example, China repeatedly clashed with India over the Himalayan border (1962, 1967) and China was involved in minor conflicts with both Burma (1969) and the former Soviet Union (1969) during this time period. The last small surge in the number of Asian states in full-scale conflict took place at the end of the 1980s and was marked by conflicts such as the decade-long war between Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union (1979-88) and repeated border conflicts between China and Vietnam during 1978-88. The periods between these peaks are marked by clear rises in the number of international conflicts in general, which during these times are confrontations short of war. This is not surprising, as many conflicts in Asia are characterized by a long-term adversarial relationship with varying intensity. The most prominent example is probably the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

It is too early to predict whether further democratization will endure in Asia, and it is unclear still whether more peace is to be expected. However, if more states adopt democracy, the region may well be at a turning point in the relation between regime types and conflict. In fact, if Australia and New Zealand were classified as Asian, then the number of democracies have already caught up

to the number of autocracies. Thus, the crucial point after which further democratization will breed more peace (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997) was achieved during the second half of the 1990s, and even though it was followed by a slight decrease in the number of democratic states at the turn of the century, the trend might suggest that a more peaceful Asia is within reach provided that the newly established democracies remain stable.

Which conclusions can be drawn then about the relative importance of time and space for the idea that further democratizing will be followed by a more peaceful world? The starting point of this chapter was the optimism voiced among democratic peace scholars that the point has been passed upon which further democratization is followed by more peace in the world. The trends apparent in the data applied here seem to suggest caution vis-a-vis the idea of democratizing for peace. Yes, Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) are correct when declaring that democracies already outnumber autocracies in the world. However, I do not find that more peace follows automatically. Moreover, Latin America seems to be the only region in which passing the crucial regime type ratio has been followed by a stagnation or reduction in the number of states in conflict. Even in the West, where democracies outnumbered autocracies approximately 100 years ago, state participation in full-scale wars and serious international conflicts have periodically risen and fallen.

Asia might be in the process of reaching a democratic majority, whereas the point of democratic dominance in Africa and the Middle East seems far from within reach. The impact of this for peace has not been treated as important in the democratic peace theory and research, however. Therefore, I emphasize here that democracy is not the dominant form of governance everywhere and that the point at which further democratization brings about more peace has not yet been reached in all regions. Furthermore, focus on regions puts attention on some of the complexities that democratizing for peace may hold. Specifically, disaggregating the focus means acknowledging that each region is characterized by a context that is unique in facilitating or inhibiting further diffusion of democracy.³⁴

Part of what this chapter demonstrates may be common knowledge among scholars studying democratization; that democratization processes are at different stages in different regions. What is new in this chapter, is the demonstration that each region is unique when it comes to predicting the

³⁴This focus on regions in addition to the world as a whole should not diminish the relevance of factors outside the regional context have played in aiding the promotion of autocratic as well as democratic regimes. Some examples are colonialism, imperialism, conditioning of aid, and promotion of ideology.

prospects for more peace through democratization. In fact, hardly any region seems to achieve peace through democratization, not even after having passed the threshold of democracies outnumbering autocracies.

Furthermore, this chapter suggests that there are quite different things going on in each region, some in which there are poor prospects for democratizing for peace. Common to the latter is uncoordinated strivings for democratization as opposed to the entire region going through processes that promote democratization. As long as there are only scattered democratization efforts within a region, these democracies have to survive and coexist with many autocratic neighbors which, for many reasons, seems futile. It is in these regions that the type of institutions might be the most crucial to the survival of democracy and peace, not the least because of the frequent domestic conflicts and the domestic-international connection.

Since the time period during which democracy has been in majority is relatively short and because the definition of conflict affects the conclusion, I dare not reject Gleditsch and Hegre's optimism for peace. What I do claim however, is that the trends in the world as a whole are products of the trends in each region as well as of the systemic interconnectedness between regions. In Alker's words (1965: 102), the overall correlation of all states is made up of partial correlations within the regions and a structural covariance between the regions.' In each region, Mansfield and Snyder's (1995) argument that democratization goes hand in hand with more conflict seems substantiated. If democratization is accompanied by more conflict, it becomes relevant to ask whether type of democracy makes a difference for states' conflict proneness? If so, the spread of democratic societies based on the most conflict prone governmental principles may lead to more conflict in the short run.

I do not accept Huntington (1991) and Starr's (1991) assumption that democratization is a regular, predictable and unstoppable trend. Just as O'Loughlin et al. (1998:568) cautioned against assuming that the spread of democratic societies is caused by 'universal laws,' the desired point upon which further democratization brings more peace regionally cannot be reached without paying attention to aspects of the democratization process which can affect a country's conflict involvement. One such factor is the role governmental institutions play in already established, as well as in newly independent states.

3.4 Institutional Refinement of the Democratic Peace Theory

The idea that democratizing for peace is not linear nor universal, suggests closer attention to the role regimes can play in preventing or promoting conflict between states. Although the democratic peace theory suggests that both norms and institutions determine states' conflict proneness, it is establishing and shaping governmental institutions that have been the practical tools politicians apply during the democratization process. Furthermore, institutions largely define the formal process through which political decisions are being made. It is crucial therefore, to better understand how governmental institutions affect states' participation in conflict in established democracies as well as in new ones.³⁵

The following chapters start out with a description of the institutional history of the world before turning to a discussion of the intervening role of governmental institutions in a theory about an institutional refinement of the democratic peace theory.

3.4.1 The Institutional History of the World

Along with democracy and democratization comes the focus on governmental institutions. Governmental institutions are formal procedures that define how political decision-making takes place, with the state as its most important context. Democratic political systems exist as many institutional combinations, where each institution has a specific function. Taken together, the unique combination of institutions make democracies differently democratic. The type of institutions a democracy is made up of, therefore, affects its political performance, even when the political process is affected by non-institutional factors. However, some institutions have a stronger impact than others in determining the shape and functioning of a democratic state. Three structural dimensions are generally important when identifying democratic states: first, the electoral system; second, the executive system; and third, the centralization of political authority.

³⁵Whether or not a state is democratic can sometimes be difficult to determine, especially if states do not fit one of the extreme democratic or autocratic categories. Countries in which the type of governance places itself towards the middle of the Polity democracy-autocracy index might have related characteristics that complicate the governance-conflict nexus: for example the country's age and the degree to which governmental institutions are consolidated. For the purpose of mapping the institutional history of the world, I disregard these factors.

Huntington's work on democratic waves shows that countries often share democratic history with other states within the same region. Moreover, countries within a region often share context and experiences with social and political forces that may have affected the shape and functioning of regimes. The adaptations of democratic institutions that produce a 'democratic wave' tend to be prompted by similar factors, which in turn affect the institutional makeup and political performance of democracies within the region. In addition to this type of regional covariance, structural covariance between the regions suggests that systemic factors such as World War II or the Cold War rivalry has affected democratization and potentially the spread of democratic institutions.

Assuming that type of governmental institutions can affect democracies' conflict behavior, exploring the institutional history of democracy seems imminent. Awareness of spatial and temporal clustering of democratic institutions, as well as their distribution vis-a-vis each other will serve as a foundation and reality check for the quantitative examination that follows later. This task is structured in three steps: first, identifying and defining the most relevant governmental institutions; second, analyzing electoral, executive and federal institutions in the world as a whole; third, analyzing electoral, executive and federal institutions in each region (Latin America, the West, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia); and fourth, comparing trends between regions.

3.4.2 Identifying Governmental Institutions

Electoral systems are methods by which citizens identify their representatives (Lijphart, 1995a). When an assembly is elected, the electoral system translates popular votes into seats. Certain features of the electoral system are especially important in shaping the outcome of elections. Whereas the electoral formula generally is the most decisive, its impact can be modified or strengthened by factors like district magnitude, electoral threshold, and size of the assembly (Ibid.).

The most important electoral formulas can be grouped together in three categories: first, majority-plurality; second, semi-proportional representation (semi-PR); and third, proportional representation (PR) (Goodwin-Gill, 1994; International IDEA, 1997; Lijphart, 1994b, 1995). Common for *majority-plurality* electoral systems is the use of single-member districts and the favoring of allocating many seats to few parties or candidates. These systems favor stability over accuracy in representation. Plurality systems for example, are often referred to as 'first past the post,' which means that the winning party or candidate is the one receiving the most votes. In plurality systems

such as in the United Kingdom, it is possible to win the election without winning the majority of votes. Majority systems, such as in Australia, tend to favor two parties and try to ensure that the winner receives an absolute majority (more than 50 percent).

Often seen as the opposite of majority-plurality principles, systems with *proportional representation* share the distinctive idea of distributing seats proportionally to the votes received. There are different degrees of proportionality between the different forms of PR systems, however. The d'Hondt method is used in for example Belgium and Colombia and is one of the least proportional and slightly favors large parties, whereas the pure Sainte-Laguë formula applied in states like Norway approximates proportionality more closely (Lijphart, 1994b:23).

Semi-proportional electoral systems combine features of PR and majority-plurality systems. Typically, these types of elections do not fit neatly into the two main categories, but translate votes into seats in ways that fall in-between. The semi-PR category is made up of countries that are less homogenous than the other two groups. In Japan for example, voters cast their votes for individual candidates and the candidates with the most votes win as in plurality systems. However, the voters have less votes than the number of seats and the electoral formula is called 'limited vote' (Lijphart, 1994b:40). Unlike majority-plurality systems, many of the semi-pr systems offer opportunities for minority representation (Ibid.).

Executive systems define formal political authority between the head of state, the cabinet, and the legislative. The two main forms of executive systems are presidentialism and parliamentarism. In a *presidential* democracy, the executive branch of the government is headed by a popularly elected president, the president and the legislature each have autonomy and are not subject to mutual confidence. Finally, the president appoints and directs the cabinet and has some constitutionally granted law-making authority (Lane and Ersson, 2002:264; Keman and Mallouk, 2006:348-349). Presidential democracy is exemplified by the United States.

Shugart (2006:348) describes a 'pure' *parliamentary* democracy as having two essential characteristics: first, the executive authority consists of a prime minister and cabinet, arising from the legislative assembly. The executive is constantly subject to potential dismissal via a vote of 'no confidence' by a majority of the legislative assembly. Great Britain falls into this category.

Semi-presidential democracies are hybrid types of governments that combine features of presidential and parliamentary democracy. There are many different forms, but typically the executive

is headed by a popularly elected president whose power is more symbolic than actual. In addition, semi-democratic democracies are governed by a prime ministerial executive and a cabinet that closely resembles that of a parliamentary democracy (Shugart, 2006:349-350). The Finnish democracy is structured this way.

In most democratic states, the constitution determines the territorial distribution of powers (Hague and Harrop, 1987:163), or in other words, the national and the sub-national concentration of political authority. The two main forms are unitary states, in which sovereignty is placed in the central government, and federal states where there is a formal distribution of power between the central and sub-national government.

The common principle among *unitary* states is concentration of political power in the central government. Although the status given to local government varies a great deal among the unitary states (Drewry, 1995:1302), the general idea is for regional governments to make policy and administer within the mandate given by the central government (Hague and Harrop, 1987:176). The actual balance of political power between the center and the regional governments tend to vary from democracy to democracy, most notably determined by the issues at hand. For example, regional governments are generally in charge of providing welfare services as agents of the central government, adhering to design and financial limitations given by the latter. Some examples of unitary states are the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries.

Federalism is a system in which functions are legally shared between central and regional governments, combining elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule (Watts, 1999:7). This formal division of functions is what Riker (1975:100) described as 'the essence of federalism.' In a federal state, both governments have 'constitutional authority to make some decisions independently of the other, even though in practice there is now very marked interdependence between [them]. Citizens of a federal state remain subject to the authority of both the central and the provincial governments, each of which acts directly on the citizen'(Hague and Harrop, 1987: 169-170). The numbers of federal democracies is relatively small, although they are widespread geographically. The United States is the federal archetype, but federalism is also applied in countries like India, Malaysia, Australia, Argentina and Switzerland.

Semi-federal democracies combine federal and unitary elements and fall in-between the two main categories. Distinct for these states are elective legislatures functioning at the regional level,

whereas constitutional sovereignty is reserved for the national government (Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, 2005). Many semi-federal arrangements have been products of federalism of power in federal states. For example, Brazil can be regarded as a semi-federal state after Getulio Vargas came to power in the mid-1930s and initiated a decade of federalism of power at the expense of state and local government (Elazar, 1994:43). For other states, semi-federal arrangements have been the stepping stone between unitarism and federalism, such as in Belgium in the 1970s and 1980s (Elazar, 1994:31-32).

3.4.3 The Global Distribution of Institutions

The first institutional distinction of interest is that of democratic electoral systems (Table 3.1). During the entire 1816-2002 period, there were approximately as many years of majority-plurality systems in the world (14 percent) as PR systems (14 percent). There was a low percentage of semi-PR system years and they were distributed among a relatively high number of states. In other words, the global experience with semi-PR elections was made up of few countries with relatively short experiences with the system by 2002. This trend remains the same when looking at the shorter 1946-2002 time period, which is hardly surprising given the fact that only three states had experimented with semi-PR electoral systems by the end of World War II; Guatemala (1944-), the United Kingdom (1867-83), and Iceland (1944-58). Most of the adaptation of semi-PR systems took place at the end of the 20th Century. During the 1946-2002 time period, PR system years outnumbered the majority-plurality ones with percentages of 22 and 16 respectively. The proportional representation electoral system is largely a 20th century phenomenon, only applied by a handful of countries such as Peru (1828-34), Belgium (1899-), and Switzerland (1816-) before 1900.

Figure 3.7 shows that the PR systems have gained numbers relatively steadily since their introduction in Belgium in 1899.³⁶ However, most democratizing states applied majority-plurality elections until the end of World War I, after which the PR democracies outnumbered the majority-plurality ones and remained in the majority during the rest of the period studied. The numbers of majority-plurality systems increased steadily in the post-World War II time period. The trends change toward the end of the century, however. Whereas the number of democracies with PR systems

³⁶Although proportional electoral systems became more common at the turn of the 19th century, it is important to note that Peru applied this principle during the 1828-34 time period.

	1816-2002	1946-2002
Majority-Plurality Democracy	14 (2071, 65)	16 (1180,55)
Semi-PR Democracy	3 (420, 29)	5 (346, 28)
PR Democracy	14 (2018, 65)	22 (1621, 63)
Autocracy	67 (9784, 165)	57 (4114, 129)
Total	100 (14574)	100 (7270)

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (605, 286).
Missing: 281, 9.

Table 3.1: Percentages of Democratic Electoral Systems in the World (Country Years, Countries (N))

continues to grow, there is a sudden and distinct rise in the number of hybrid electoral systems and a decline in the number of democracies with majority-plurality elections.




Figure 3.7: The World: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

Executive system is the second dimension focused on when analyzing the institutional history of the world. Table 3.2 shows the percentages of democratic executive systems in the world during 1816-2002 and 1946-2002. The distribution of country years between presidential and parliamentary democracy is relatively even for both time periods. This is confirmed in Figure 3.8 that shows the annual number of executive systems globally. In addition, the figure unveils a strong increase in the

	1816-2002	1946-2002
Presidential Democracy	12 (1691, 74)	16 (1172,72)
Hybrid Democracy	8 (1175, 39)	12 (898, 37)
Parliamentary Democracy	12 (1785, 39)	15 (1075, 36)
Autocracy	67 (9784, 165)	57 (4114, 129)
Total	100 (14574)	100 (7270)

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (605, 286).
Missing: 137, 9.

Table 3.2: Percentages of Democratic Executive Systems in the World (Country Years, Countries (N))

number of presidential democracies starting at the end of the 1970s, with presidential systems outnumbering the parliamentary ones in 1987. In 2002, there were more than twice as many presidential democracies as parliamentary ones. Hybrid democracies made up eight percent of all country years during 1816-2002, which increased to 12 percent when looking at the shorter time period. By looking at how many countries make up the total number of country years within the 1946-2002 time period, it becomes clear that both the hybrid and parliamentary democracies have longer experiences with their respective institutions than presidential systems (the average number of years with the same institution is smaller for presidential democracies than for hybrid and parliamentary ones).

The third institutional dimension of interest here is that of federalism. Table 3.3 shows the global percentages of democratic federal systems during 1816-2002 and 1946-2002. The trends are the same regardless of time period. The number of unitary country years is more than three times the number of federal years and there is a very small percentage of states applying a hybrid system. During 1946-2002, 31 percent of the country years were unitary, 9 percent were federal and only 3 percent of the democratic country years applied a hybrid system. During the entire 200-year period, the average number of federal years per state was 40 whereas the same average for the unitary democracies was 33. This suggests more stability among the federal regimes than the unitary ones.

Figure 3.9 shows how the democratic federal systems are distributed over time and it is pretty evident that the unitary systems are far more dominant than the federal and the hybrid systems and that states democratizing at the end of the 20th century were adopting unitary political structures.




Figure 3.8: The World: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

Switzerland is maybe the most obvious example of a long-lasting federal democracy, but other states, such as India, have proven stable during the 1946-2002 time period. Many other experiments with federal institutions were brief or interrupted, such as in Indonesia (1949-50), Nigeria (1960-83) and Myanmar (Burma, 1948-61). Especially notable is the increase and decline of unitary democracies between the World Wars and the dramatic rise in the number of new democracies starting in the 1990s, unanimously adapting unitary systems. During the period between the World Wars, the rise and fall in the number of unitary states took place as a few new states, such as Ireland (1921-), adopted unitary democratic institutions. However, this 'wave' was mostly made up of older states such as Portugal, Greece, Ethiopia and Egypt experiencing political instability and thus, interruptions in their unitary and democratic political systems.

In sum, a couple of main trends are evident when looking at the institutional history of the world as a whole. The distribution of majority-plurality electoral systems and PR systems is relatively equal, until the growth in the number of states with proportional systems makes these dominant during the last 30 years of the time period analyzed. Similarly, the number of presidential and parliamentary regimes goes hand-in-hand until presidentialism gains popularity in the 1980s and outnumbers parliamentary democracy. As opposed to the other institutional dimensions, hybrid institutional arrangements are relatively frequent when looking at the executive system. The clearest

	1816-2002	1946-2002
Unitary Democracy	24 (3457, 105)	31 (2287,101)
Hybrid Democracy	2 (283, 13)	3 (240, 12)
Federal Democracy	7 (1030, 26)	9 (621, 25)
Autocracy	67 (9784, 165)	57 (4114, 129)
Total	100 (14574)	100 (7270)

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (605, 286).
Missing: 18, 6.

Table 3.3: Percentages of Democratic Federal Systems in the World (Country Years, Countries (N))

tendency however, is the dominance of unitary country years and continued increase in the number of unitary democracies.

3.4.4 The Regional Distribution of Institutions

Are these global trends mirrored at the regional level? Not always. The frequencies of democratic institutions in the regions often vary from the aggregated global frequencies, especially when looking at electoral and executive democratic institutions. Examining the regions one by one will reveal the extent of these variations.

Latin America In Latin America, 14 percent of the country years are PR systems, as opposed to 9 percent being majority-plurality observations during 1816-2002 (Table 3.4). Whereas this trend remains, it is quite a bit stronger for the shorter 1946-2002 time period (Table 3.5). Out of all states, 31 percent are PR country years and 15 percent have majority-plurality elections.

Figure 3.10 shows how electoral institutions are distributed over time in *Latin America* with PR democracies clearly dominating the entire 200 year time span. A reverse trend in the otherwise growing number of PR democracies took place in the 1960s and 1970s, which paralleled a growth in the number of majority-plurality democracies. A closer look at the states shows that the decline in the number of states with PR systems is due to regime transitions or change to autocratic systems (for example, Brazil, Chile, Argentina or Uruguay). The rise in number of majority-plurality systems from the early 1960s included countries such as the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and

Row Pct Column Pct (N)	Latin America	The West	Africa	The Middle East	Asia	Total (Row)
Maj-Plur Democracy	15 9 (311)	53 21 (1103)	15 12 (309)	1 1 (11)	16 15 (337)	100 (2071)
Semi-PR Democracy	35 4 (146)	36 3 (153)	5 1 (21)	0 0 (0)	24 5 (100)	100 (420)
PR Democracy	24 14 (476)	68 27 (1382)	4 3 (78)	3 4 (51)	2 1 (31)	100 (2018)
Autocracy	25 71 (2460)	26 49 (2548)	20 77 (1936)	11 94 (1088)	18 79 (1752)	100 (9784)
Total (Column)	100 (3462)	100 (5214)	100 (2513)	100 (1163)	100 (2222)	14574

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (605).
Missing: 281.

Table 3.4: Percentages of Democratic Electoral Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1816-2002(Country Years)

Row Pct Column Pct (N)	Latin America	The West	Africa	The Middle East	Asia	Total (Row)
Maj-Plur Democracy	18 16 (214)	29 17 (345)	23 14 (273)	1 2 (11)	29 25 (337)	100 (1180)
Semi-PR Democracy	26 7 (91)	39 7 (134)	6 1 (21)	0 0 (0)	29 8 (100)	100 (346)
PR Democracy	26 31 (415)	65 52 (1046)	5 4 (78)	3 7 (51)	2 2 (31)	100 (1621)
Autocracy	15 46 (614)	12 24 (487)	37 80 (1535)	15 90 (620)	21 65 (858)	100 (4114)
Total (Column)	100 (1334)	100 (2012)	100 (1907)	100 (689)	100 (1328)	7270

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (286).
Missing: 9.

Table 3.5: Percentages of Democratic Electoral Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1946-2002 (Country Years)




Figure 3.9: The World: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

Barbados. At the turn of the 20th century, there were approximately as many states with semi-PR electoral systems as majority-plurality, but twice as many democracies had PR electoral institutions. Guatemala and Honduras have both oscillated between semi-PR democratic electoral systems and autocracy. Ecuador, Mexico and Honduras are other countries in Latin America that have brief or recent experiences with semi-PR electoral systems.




Figure 3.10: Latin America: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

Row Pct Column Pct (N)	Latin America	The West	Africa	The Middle East	Asia	Total (Row)
Presidential Democracy	49 24 (821)	22 7 (369)	20 14 (342)	2 3 (32)	8 6 (127)	100 (1691)
Semi-pres Democracy	3 1 (32)	82 18 (960)	4 2 (52)	3 3 (37)	8 4 (94)	100 (1175)
Parliamentary Democracy	8 4 (144)	72 25 (1290)	6 4 (107)	0 0 (0)	14 11 (244)	100 (1785)
Autocracy	25 71 (2469)	26 49 (2548)	20 77 (1936)	11 94 (1088)	18 79 (1752)	100 (9784)
Total (Column)	100 (3462)	100 (5214)	100 (2513)	100 (1163)	100 (2222)	14574

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (605).
Missing: 137.

Table 3.6: Percentages of Democratic Executive Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1816-2002 (Country Years)

In Latin America, a clear trend diverts from the global trend when looking at the executive system. Whereas the frequencies of presidential and parliamentary democracies were approximately equal in the world as a whole, presidentialism is by far the most common executive arrangement in Latin America, regardless of time period (Table 3.6 and Table 3.7). The pattern is notably strong during 1946-2002 with 40 percent of the country years being presidential democracy as opposed to 11 percent being parliamentary democracy.

By looking at the annual distribution of executive systems in Figure 3.11, it becomes obvious that parliamentarism is a rare phenomenon, only found in the post-World War II time period in Latin America, and that semi-presidential systems are as good as non-existent. Similar to the decline in the number of states with PR electoral systems during the 1960s and 1970s, the number of presidential democracies was reduced as many of these countries turned autocratic. During the dramatic rise in democratization processes at the last quarter of the 20th century, states were unanimously adopting presidential systems.

The enormous popularity of presidentialism is somewhat puzzling given the dominance of PR electoral systems. A closer look at the numbers reveals that 43 percent of all democratic country

Row Pct Column Pct (N)	Latin America	The West	Africa	The Middle East	Asia	Total (Row)
Presidential Democracy	46 40 (539)	19 11 (226)	21 13 (248)	3 5 (32)	11 10 (127)	100 (1172)
Semi-pres Democracy	4 2 (32)	76 34 (683)	6 3 (52)	4 5 (37)	10 7 (94)	100 (898)
Parliamentary Democracy	13 11 (144)	57 31 (616)	7 4 (71)	0 0 (0)	23 18 (244)	100 (1075)
Autocracy	15 46 (614)	12 24 (487)	37 80 (1535)	15 90 (620)	21 65 (858)	100 (4114)
Total (Column)	100 (1334)	100 (2012)	100 (1907)	100 (689)	100 (1328)	7270

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (286).
Missing: 9.

Table 3.7: Percentages of Democratic Executive Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1946-2002 (Country Years)

years were states that held proportional elections at the same time as practicing presidentialism during 1816-2002. During 1946-2002 this number rose to 57 percent combining PR systems and presidential democracy. The paradox in this institutional combination lies in their competing underlying principles: the former sharing power between many, whereas the latter seeks to put political authority in the hands of few. Why this institutional combination? States adopting presidentialism is not surprising given the strong open and covert presence of the United States in domestic affairs in Latin America during the Cold War. Furthermore, a democratic presidency seems to facilitate regime change from the already established authority structures often based on close ties between an autocratic strongman and the military. It seems likely that political actors choose democratic institutions which maintain their position of authority. The popularity of proportional elections during most of the 1946-2002 time period might be explained by the pressure to democratize from Europe as a part of the Cold War rivalry with the United States, but is also likely to be remnants of the colonial experience in Latin America. Despite the recentness of these patterns, the overwhelming strength of democracy at the end of the 20th century might suggest this institutional combination being a successful one, likely facilitating both stable and representative democratic governments.




Figure 3.11: Latin America: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

The distribution of federal institutions is similar to that of executive systems in Latin America. Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 show a clear dominance of unitary institutional structures regardless of time period. During 1946-2002, 42 percent of the observations were unitary country years and only 8 and 4 percent were federal and semi-federal respectively.

Figure 3.12 confirms that unitary democracies have dominated in Latin America throughout the 200 year time period of interest. However, the many autocratization processes during the 1970s and 1980s took place in unitary democracies as well as those with PR electoral systems and presidentialism, before the third wave made the democratic unitary systems even more dominant than before.

In sum, Latin American democratic institutional history shows clear dominance of PR elections, presidentialism and unitary arrangements, regardless of time and place. With the exception of the federal institutions, Latin American institutional history differs from that of the world as a whole.

The West What does the institutional history of the *West* look like? Similar to Latin America, PR electoral systems dominate in the West (Table 3.4 and Table 3.7). Again, the trend is consistent regardless of time period, but stronger when looking at the post-World War II years. During 1946-2002, as many as 52 percent of all observations were coded as PR electoral systems, 17 percent had

Row Pct Column Pct (N)	Latin America	The West	Africa	The Middle East	Asia	Total (Row)
Unitary Democracy	23 23 (800)	52 35 (1804)	15 20 (511)	2 6 (75)	8 12 (267)	100 (3457)
Semi-federal Democracy	23 2 (64)	54 3 (154)	7 1 (21)	0 0 (0)	16 2 (44)	100 (283)
Federal Democracy	13 4 (138)	68 14 (696)	4 2 (40)	0 0 (0)	15 7 (156)	100 (1030)
Autocracy	25 71 (2469)	26 49 (2548)	20 77 (1936)	11 94 (1088)	18 79 (1752)	100 (9784)
Total (Column)	100 (3462)	100 (5214)	100 (2513)	100 (1163)	100 (2222)	14574

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (605).
Missing: 18.

Table 3.8: Percentages of Democratic Federal Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1816-2002 (Country Years)

Row Pct Column Pct (N)	Latin America	The West	Africa	The Middle East	Asia	Total (Row)
Unitary Democracy	24 42 (559)	47 54 (1086)	13 16 (306)	3 10 (69)	12 20 (267)	100 (2287)
Semi-federal Democracy	20 4 (48)	53 6 (127)	9 1 (21)	0 0 (0)	18 3 (44)	100 (240)
Federal Democracy	18 8 (113)	50 16 (312)	6 2 (40)	0 0 (0)	25 12 (156)	100 (621)
Autocracy	15 46 (614)	12 24 (487)	37 80 (1535)	15 90 (620)	21 65 (858)	100 (4114)
Total (Column)	100 (1334)	100 (2012)	100 (1907)	100 (689)	100 (1328)	7270

Note: Regime years in transition are excluded (286).
Missing: 6.

Table 3.9: Percentages of Democratic Federal Institutions, Within and Across Regions, 1946-2002 (Country Years)




Figure 3.12: Latin America: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

majority-plurality elections and only 7 percent had semi-PR arrangements. When looking at the frequencies over time (Figure 3.13) it becomes clear that PR elections are phenomena of the 20th century. Belgium was the first country in the West to establish a proportional electoral system in 1899, followed by Switzerland and others at the end of World War I. This increasing number of states establishing PR systems took place as institutional re-arrangements within democracies, as part of the state formation that took place at the end of World War I, but also as a part of the declining number of autocracies that lasted until the mid-1920s. Norway switched from majority-plurality to a PR-system in 1920 and new states like Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland established PR electoral systems. Yet others transitioned from being autocratic to adapting democratic PR systems, such as the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, Poland and Sweden.

The peculiar decline in the number of PR systems between the World Wars was part of the rise of autocracy leading up to the Second World War. After World War II, the number of majority-plurality systems has been fairly consistent while the number of states with PR systems seems to be conversely related to the number of autocratic states. This suggests that democratizing states largely adapted PR systems during 1946-2002. Democratization processes in former republics of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, however, brought semi-PR electoral arrangements into the Western arena. At the turn of the century, these hybrid systems were clearly outnumbering states with majority-plurality elections.




Figure 3.13: The West: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

The distribution of executive systems in the West is also quite different from the global pattern. Whereas the frequency of presidential and parliamentary country years were close to equal in the world as a whole, there is an overweight of parliamentary observations in the West during 1816-2002 (Table 3.5). Furthermore, there is a large percentage of states with hybrid institutional arrangements throughout the entire 200 year time period. When looking at the 1946-2002 time period in isolation, the percentage of hybrid democratic observations is larger than that of presidential and parliamentary ones (Table 3.8). This pattern stands in stark contrast to the small percentage of hybrid country years globally. Have these trends persisted over time? No, they have not. Figure 3.14 shows that parliamentary democracies were in the majority until the 1980s. With the communist bloc breaking up in the East, regime transitions and state formations prompted dramatic rises in the number of hybrid executive systems. Furthermore, the number of presidential democracies rose to match that of parliamentary ones by the turn of the 20th century. In Poland for example, the end of the authoritarian regime gave power to a presidential executive system, which was modified to further diminish the power of the presidency in the 1997 constitution. From then on, Poland can be considered a semi-presidential system. Many states transitioned from autocracy to presidential democracy during the last decade of the 20th century, such as Croatia and Romania, but also Bulgaria had a presidential executive system until it got modified and regarded as semi-presidential after the 1991 constitution. The state formation processes during this decade produced semi-presidential

systems in states like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whereas others like Macedonia and Moldova established presidential democratic systems.




Figure 3.14: The West: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

How then are federal institutions distributed in the West? Table 3.6 and Table 3.9 show trends that mirror that of the world as a whole during both the 1816-2002 and 1946-2002 time periods. The percentage of unitary democracies is much larger than that of federal ones and the divide becomes stronger when looking at only the post World War II time period. Here, more than half of all country years in the region are unitary. Figure 3.15 shows that the number of federal states has largely remained stable throughout the entire 200 years, meaning that nearly all changes in the community of democratic and autocratic states involve unitary democratic arrangements. Just like elsewhere, many of the federal arrangements in the West were modeled on the United States or were established in former British colonies as a means to sustain colonial ties (Riker, 1975). Democracies with long-lasting federal systems in the West are countries like the United States, Canada, Switzerland, the German Federal Republic and Australia, whereas more brief experiences with democratic federal arrangements have taken place in states like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia (Serbia), Cyprus and Russia. The handful of democratic states that have applied a semi-federal system are Belgium, Spain, Germany (Prussia), the stable and long-lasting system in Austria, and the more recent experiences of Ukraine and Georgia.




Figure 3.15: The West: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

In sum, proportional electoral systems are dominant in the West and parliamentarism has a long and stable tradition. Important for the stronghold of proportional electoral systems in the West was the growth of mass society. From the 19th century's demands for mass participation grew multi-party traditions, which were likely better maintained by electoral systems proposing power-sharing as opposed to concentrating power. Similarly, regional demands for national autonomy might have lain the ground for adaptations of proportional electoral systems. The long traditions of parliamentarism relates to the impact of the United Kingdom in the region. The growth of hybrid executive systems in the disintegrated Communist bloc at the end of the 20th century suggests that the building of new democratic institutions took place as a compromise between old and new authority structures, reducing the power of self-proclaimed leadership. The federal institutional history of the West follows an identical pattern to the federal history of the world as a whole for the entire 200 year time period. There is an overwhelming majority of unitary institutional arrangements, which seems to co-evolve with regime changes between democracy and autocracy, and state formation processes. Very few states seem to fluctuate between federal and unitary institutional setups.

Africa What does the institutional history look like in *Africa*? Before turning to the institutions themselves, it is important to point to a trend unique to Africa: the percentage of autocratic country years increases when looking at the 1946-2002 time period as opposed to the larger 200 years' sample (Table 3.4). This pattern might point to the unique impact of colonialism on state formation and regime consolidation in Africa, suggesting that the democratization processes are at quite a different stage in this region than others. Putting it bluntly, democracy is still scarce and scattered in Africa. Out of the democratic institutional experiences, what do the electoral systems look like in the region? The pattern is strongly diverging from the global one with majority-plurality electoral systems dominating greatly over PR and semi-PR electoral systems. This trend and its strength is consistent during both time periods analyzed (Table 3.4 and Table 3.5). This peculiar lack of variation in strength between the two time periods is unusual and raises the suspicion that the colonial legacy affects the patterns even more strongly. Figure 3.16 shows that institutional variation in Africa is a 20th century phenomenon. Furthermore, the low number of states qualifying for system membership before World War II, coupled with the colonial rivalry taking place in the region in the 1800s, suggest that definitions of state and system on which this dissertation is built make it impossible to catch variation in governance structures of African states before World War II.

More clearly, the institutional patterns of the 1816-2002 and the 1946-2002 time periods are identical because there is no variation before World War II.




Figure 3.16: Africa: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

Figure 3.16 reveals that the most interesting time period in Africa has just begun, with the increase in the number of PR democratic electoral systems starting around 1990. This trend coincides with a sharp decrease in the number of autocratic states. Although counting just a little more than a handful of states each, the number of PR democracies had caught up to that of majority-plurality systems at the start of the 21st century. In 2000, African states with PR electoral systems were Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Mozambique, South-Africa, Namibia and Madagascar. In 2000, states with majority-plurality systems were Mali, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Malawi, Botswana and Mauritius. The tradition of majority-plurality electoral systems might stem from copying institutions from previous colonial powers (Great Britain and France). The more recent growing number of states adopting proportional electoral institutions could be part of the growth of mass society during modernization processes at the end of the 20th century, resulted in a growing number of groups demanding political representation. Furthermore, it seems likely that the choice of proportional systems might have been prompted as a response to the increase in domestic unrest taking place in many African countries.

Common to executive and federal institutional arrangements in Africa is the lack of variation. Table 3.5 and Table 3.8 show that most democratic states in Africa are presidential and unitary and

Figures 3.17 and 3.18 describe this pattern as consistent over time. Other than in South-Africa and Mauritius, most African experiences with parliamentarism have been brief. Examples of democratic states with short parliamentary periods are Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, the Comoros and Sudan. Similarly, the handful of democracies having practiced federalism are Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Uganda, Somalia, and the Comoros. The scarcity of parliamentarism in Africa seems somewhat surprising given the colonial legacy of Great Britain. On the other hand, presidentialism might be the most natural choice for African states building on experiences with political structures favoring clientelism and military rule. After all, political leaders of a transitioning polity seem inclined to favor political institutions that maintain their position in power. Once established and favoring a strong political elite, change might not be imminent. Bratton and van de Walle (1997:43-44) suggest that traditions with neopatrimonialism is so strong in Africa that in some cases, these power structures dominate over the formal institutions in political decision-making. If the formal institutions are not the forum through which real political decision-making happens, then it seems likely that demands for change will be futile and not take place.




Figure 3.17: Africa: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

The Middle East The history of democratic institutions is difficult in the *Middle East*, because there is so little experience with democracy and hardly any institutional variation between the few existing observations. Figure 3.5 showed that democracy in the Middle East is absent before




Figure 3.18: Africa: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1816-2002

World War II, with the exception of Egypt scoring 4 on the Polity index during 1922-27. During the 1946-2002 time period, only 7 percent of the Middle Eastern country years had PR electoral systems, 2 percent had majority-plurality elections, and no democratic state performed semi-PR elections (Table 3.7). Figure 3.19 displays the annual distribution of democratic electoral systems during 1946-2002. The pattern shows a stable frequency of states with PR elections and two brief occurrences of majority-plurality systems. A closer look at the data shows that the frequency of PR systems is made up by Turkey being regarded as a PR democracy for most of the post-World War II time period. Turkey's democratic system was interrupted by autocratic time periods and transition in 1960, 1971-72 and 1980-82. The only two states being classified as democratic majority-plurality systems are Iran during 1997-02 and Lebanon during 1970-74.

The distribution of executive systems in the Middle East shows an equal percentage between presidential and hybrid democratic systems during 1946-2002 (Table 3.8). No democracy was regarded as having parliamentarism in the Middle East and the democratic presidential experiences are shared between Iran, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon. The Second Turkish Republic modified the power of the president and is regarded as a hybrid executive system from 1961 onwards. Figure 3.20 confirms the relatively stable pattern among a handful of democratic states in the Middle East.

Table 3.9 and Figure 3.21 shows that there is no variation in the percentages of federal institutions in the Middle East during 1946-2002. All democratic states were regarded as unitary.




Figure 3.19: The Middle East: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002

Taken together, the results for the Middle East suggest that not much can be learned from a quantitative analysis of democratic institutions in the Middle East because of the scarcity of observations and lack of variation in democratic institutions. Furthermore, the absence of democracy and democratic institutions in the region make global generalizations irrelevant for the Middle East and the region itself a doubtful basis for drawing global generalizations. Early on, Issawi (1956:28) noted that the economic and social basis required to build democracy is nonexistent in the Middle East. Judging from the continued absence of democratic polities throughout the entire time period analyzed here, one might suggest that Issawi's remark still holds true. Using Binder's (1988) words, this peculiar lack of democracy in an entire region might be referred to as a 'cluster of absences': the missing concept of liberalism, lack of autonomous corporate institutions, the absence of a middle class etc. (quoted in Krämer, 1993:2). Explaining the relatively stable institutional adaptation by the democratic states that do exist in the Middle East is difficult. However, there might be answers in arguments that emphasize the role of institutions and government as merely an organizing force or instrument for maintenance and enforcing of Islamic law (Krämer, 1993:5). As long as the existing democratic structures do not compromise on this purpose, there might be no incentive to change them. Furthermore, the role of governmental institutions in general might be compromised by long traditions of strong loyalty to small groups such as the tribe, clan, religious sect, or the family (Issawi, 1956:28). If political decision-making bypasses governmental institutions by taking place




Figure 3.20: The Middle East: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002

in non-constitutional arenas, the role of institutions is modified and does not change and evolve in tune with other political changes.

Asia Democratization in *Asia* is unique in the sense that it has not taken place suddenly, but rather the number of states turning democratic has increased gradually throughout most of the period after World War II, at least until the surge in the number of democracies at the end of the 20th century (Figure 3.6) (Sørensen, 1993:37-40). Whether or not this is meaningful for understanding which type of democratic institutions states adapt is unclear, but many scholars have emphasized the great differences between countries in Asia (Lee, 2002; Sørensen, 1993).

Similar to the Middle East, the history of democratic institutions in Asia is a history of the post-World War II time period (Figure 3.6), starting with Indian independence in 1947. The dominance of PR electoral systems globally during 1946-2002 (Table 3.1) is not mirrored in Asia. Rather, 25 percent of all Asian country years were majority-plurality electoral systems, 8 percent were semi-PR systems, whereas PR elections were virtually absent (Table 3.4). Figure 3.22 shows that this trend is consistent over time, but that the years after 1980 is marked by a decline in the number of majority-plurality systems and a growing number of semi-PR electoral systems. The observations of PR elections are shared between Sri Lanka, Indonesia and East Timor, with Sri Lanka being the only democracy with a relatively stable PR system. Semi-PR electoral systems are




Figure 3.21: The Middle East: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002

found in Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Thailand and the Philippines, where the latter two democracies endured recent changes from majority-plurality systems to semi-PR elections.




Figure 3.22: Asia: Democratic Electoral Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002

When looking at the percentages of executive systems in Asia (Table 8), the frequency of parliamentary observations is almost double that of presidential ones with 18 versus 10 percent. This pattern differs from the more equal distribution of parliamentarism and presidentialism among democracies globally. The dominance of democracies with parliamentarism is evident throughout

the entire 1946-2002 time period, as Figure 3.23 shows. However, there was a slight increase in the number of democracies with presidential or hybrid executive systems around 1990 and by the turn of the century, there was an approximately even distribution of democracies with presidentialism, parliamentarism or semi-presidential systems in Asia. In 2002, presidential systems were Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Indonesia. At the same time, hybrid executive systems were Mongolia, India, Bangladesh, East Timor and Fiji, whereas parliamentarian systems were practiced in Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea.




Figure 3.23: Asia: Democratic Executive Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002

Table 3.9 shows that the distribution of federal institutions in Asia during 1946-2002 is similar to the global pattern. There is a clear overweight of unitary observations, with 20 percent versus the 12 percent federal country years, and the small 3 percent hybrid observations. This pattern has not been consistent throughout time. Figure 3.24 shows that although the unitary democracies have been outnumbering states with other institutions for most of the post-World War II time period, unitary democracies doubled in the 1990s. The frequency of autocratic states and other federal institutions were relatively stable during this decade, which suggests that it was newly established states that adapted unitarism during these years. A closer look at the observations show that the recent increase in unitary democracies involves countries like Nepal, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Taiwan and Mongolia. Examples of hybrid federal democracies are the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, whereas Malaysia, the Solomon Islands, Pakistan and India have experiences with federalism.




Figure 3.24: Asia: Democratic Federal Systems and Autocracy, 1946-2002

Taken together, the results for Asia show that only the federal institutional distinction follows the global pattern with unitary systems being dominant. The dominance of parliamentarism and majority-plurality elections in Asia clearly differs from the distribution of institutions in the world as a whole. What explains these institutional choices in Asia? The victorious Allies installing and promoting democracy in Asia after World War II must have shaped the institutional setup of states like Japan. The main legacy of colonialism on democratic institution building seems to be a predisposition towards the adaptation of certain governmental institutions over others. On the one hand, this predisposition can build on historical experience, but on the other, it may be a result of pressure from the colonial power-holder. Just as in other regions, the British played a strong part in democratization processes in former colonies such as Sri Lanka and India. A derivative legacy of colonialism might be institutional discontinuity. The brief experimentation with political institutions, seen in many new states after decolonizing, might be a reaction against the projecting of institutional frameworks built by the previous colonial leaders. A further impact on institutional choice might be the political pressure to democratize as a means of containment of communism and the United States serving as a model for economic and political institution building. Lastly, many scholars have pointed to the large differences between countries in Asia, which suggests a greater complexity in the way democracies take shape institutionally as well.

The conclusion from this analysis of the institutional history of regions shows unique regional patterns for electoral and executive systems, whereas the regional distribution of federal systems mirrors the global pattern. Not only does this suggest that one should be cautious when generalizing from an aggregated sample of electoral and executive systems, but it also points to the importance of more locally based and systemic influences on democracy and democratization. Clearly, the institutional history of the West is largely affected by the two World Wars more than in any other region. In addition, the West is largely affected by the two World Wars and of the breakup and disintegration of the communist bloc at the end of the 20th century. Africa must be analyzed from a different understanding of system and system membership before World War II. There is hardly any variation in terms of executive or federal systems in Africa; most democratic states have presidential and unitary institutions. This does not mean that other institutional arrangements are unimportant, but merely that these institutions' prospect for peace has to be assumed based on non-African experiences. Yet again, the institutional history of Latin America and Asia differs from that of the world when looking at elections or executive systems. Only federalism seems to follow the same patterns regionally as globally. Common for all regions however, is the many changes in the distribution of democratic institutions during the recent 'third wave' of democratization.

3.4.5 The Distribution of Institutions Across Regions

It is time to make a quick comparison of the distribution of governmental institutions across regions. Are there regional clustering or are the institutions distributed more or less evenly around the world? When looking at electoral systems for the entire 200-year time period, there is a clear dominance of majority-plurality elections in the West (Tables 3.4 and 3.7). This trend changes when looking at the 1946-2002 time period, during which the majority-plurality systems are relatively evenly spread out, with the exception of the Middle East where any electoral experience is virtually absent. There is a greater degree of clustering of PR elections, with 90 percent of the country years being shared between Latin America and the West regardless of time period. Together with Asia, these two regions are also arenas for a large amount of the semi-PR electoral experiences.

Democratic executive institutions are also clustered, although in different patterns than in the electoral systems. Table 3.5 and Table 3.8 show that almost half of the years with presidential systems are located in Latin America, but both the West and Africa host approximately 20 percent

of the presidential country years. Furthermore, semi-presidential institutional setups seem to be a phenomenon of the West. These trends are consistent regardless of the time perspective. As much as 72 percent of the parliamentary country years are located in the West when looking at the 1816-2002 time period, but this share is reduced during 1946-2002 with Latin America and Asia hosting a larger number of parliamentary observations.

Similarly, Table 3.6 and Table 3.9 show the regional clustering of federal institutions. Unitary and federal democratic institutions obviously cluster in regions in which democracy is most frequent, regardless of type. The uneven distribution of institutional experiences is mostly evident in the scarce presence of democracy in the Middle East. In addition, unitary democratic systems cluster in Latin America and the West, whereas both the semi-federal and the federal systems are shared between Latin America, the West and Asia. The most interesting patterns take place during the third wave of democratization. The trends tend to be consistent between both time periods, but much stronger during 1946-2002.

3.5 Lessons From the Institutional History of the World: Regional and Structural Covariance

The two most important lessons drawn from looking at the distribution of democratic institutions within and across regions over time is: first, that institutions tend to cluster in time and across space; and secondly, that regional clustering often differs from the global pattern. Consequently, global generalizations cannot be assumed valid for regions without careful consideration.

The obvious conclusion from this analysis of the democracy and peace perspective is caution about predicting more peace based on democracies outnumbering autocracies in the world. Rather, closer attention needs to be given to the regional relationships between regimes and international conflict and the context in which they exist. For the work undertaken here, it justifies closer attention to the role governmental institutions play in the regime and conflict nexus. The next chapters will explore this corollary.

Chapter 4: Democratic Institutions and International Conflict

4.1 A Neo-institutional Framework for the Democratic Peace

The focus of this dissertation is the Democratic Peace theory, and the core of the Democratic Peace focuses on how normative and institutional constraints on political decision-makers make some states more peaceful or conflict prone than others. The theory in the field is largely underdeveloped, especially at the state level. The overwhelming attention to empirical patterns and methodological progress has not been mirrored in theoretical development. Most scholars are still occupied with testing which of the normative and structural theories best explain states peaceful or aggressive behavior internationally. Furthermore, these tests largely refer to the literature as it emerged at the end of the Cold War, as the search for understanding empirical regularities between democracy and war became widespread. Despite a few efforts, not much has changed with respect to theory development of the Democratic Peace since Bueno de Mesquita et al (1999) and others (MacMillan, 2003) pointed out that the Democratic Peace lacks a rigorous theoretical foundation.

The work undertaken here specifically addresses this absence of theoretical elaboration of the democratic peace idea, suggesting one venue along which theorizing can be pursued by combining comparative politics and neo-institutionalism with international relations. The relevant overarching question addressed therefore is *whether institutions are important for states' aggressive behavior vis-a-vis other states?* A starting point is the view that governmental institutions frame the process of political decision-making as well as shape limitations for action and performance (Keman, 2002). Democratic governments are made up of combinations of institutions that make them dif-

ferently democratic. As proposed earlier, the most important institutional structures are electoral systems, executive systems and federalism of political authority. With respect to the different types of institutions in the context of international conflict, one might ask *whether a democracy made up of a specific, or certain combinations of institutions, shows a different performance profile from a democracy made up of other institutions, with respect to conflict involvement?* In line with works by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and others (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003; Keman, 2002; Rousseau, 2005; Siverson, 1998), institutional arrangements are regarded as influential in the shaping of political decision-makers behavior in the sense that the institutional makeup of a democracy facilitates and constrains foreign policy decision-making. Consequently, governmental institutions can work as escalators or modifiers of a state's conflict potential. Examining these mechanisms might be crucial for understanding the prospects for peace through democratization.

If the above proposition is true, that some types of democracies are more conflict prone than others, then the next question becomes *whether democracies with certain institutional characteristics are even more conflict prone than autocracies?* The answer to this question is potentially crucial in understanding the prospect for peace through democratization. Since many democratic or democratizing states coexist with autocratic neighbors, then theoretically, the spread of the most conflict prone democracies can lead to more conflict in the short run.

Pursuing theory-building of the democratic peace idea along these lines rejects the common approach of regarding normative and structural theories as rivals or mutually exclusive. Rather, this work sees norms and institutions as interconnected parts of a constraining framework for foreign policy decision-making. Borrowing perspectives from neo-institutionalism (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003; Keman, 2002; Lane and Ersson, 2002; March and Olsen, 2006; Olsen, 2008), the constraining effects of institutions are regarded as *intrinsic* or *extrinsic*, where the former combines norms and institutions in a dialectic and mutually reinforcing relationship, and the latter is a question of whether institutions have an independent effect on decisions vis-a-vis participation in international war.

The intrinsic importance of governmental institutions is determined by the nexus between norms and institutions in the foreign policy setting. If institutions are regarded as the formalization of societal norms, then institutions are intrinsically important insofar as they comply with norms. Compliance between norms and institutions is crucial for institutions to be regarded as legitimate

(Tsebelis, 2002). If political institutions or political actions shaped within the institutional framework deviate substantially from the commonly held norms, then the existing institutional framework is in jeopardy. In democracies that are going through dramatic political or societal changes, such as processes of democratization or autocratization, the intrinsic importance of institutions would be at stake and lack of legitimacy likely result. Conversely, waning institutional legitimacy can possibly alter its normative basis. In other words, norms and institutions exist in a mutually reinforcing or dialectic relationship.

One essential revival of governmental institutions in the comparative politics literature is taking place by the neo-institutional search for their importance beyond mere compliance with norms. This is the perspective pursued in this work: the search for the extrinsic importance of governmental institutions or the consequences for decision-making of how institutions work. Lijphart (1999) identifies this as the interactive sphere between governmental institutions and political decision-makers. Such a strong emphasis on domestic explanations for states' actions vis-a-vis other states does not disregard the importance of international factors. Rather, the domestic and the international arenas are both essential in understanding why states engage in aggressive actions towards each other.

Such an approach to governmental institutions bases itself on assumptions about how institutions work: first, institutions promote order and predictability, second, they enable and constrain political decision-makers, and third, institutions translate structures into political action and action into continuity and change (see March and Olsen, 2006:4-5). These characteristics of governmental institutions are assumed to make decision-makers behave differently vis-a-vis decisions about conflict involvement. Once a decision about conflict involvement is made, these structures put limitations on subsequent decision-making regarding this conflict. Upon involvement, however, each conflict is largely shaped by its own dynamic.

4.2 The Extrinsic Importance of Institutions

Similar to the institutional approach of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Lane and Ersson (2002), the work undertaken here rests on the assumption that institutions are important for foreign policy decision-making insofar as they constrain or provide opportunities for individual or collective action. In order to create testable models of the institutions' constraining impact, they are discussed with respect to four dynamics of the institutions-decision-makers nexus: representation, accountability,

responsiveness, and power-sharing. Along these dimensions lie important extrinsic limitations that politicians face when making decisions about foreign policy, but also when dealing with policy outputs in general. Similar to Morgan and Campbell (1991), this work assumes that war is a result of decisions made by governmental leaders in an environment where some degree of disagreement exists between two states. Given the variation in the decisions made with respect to conflict involvement, the relevant question to be elaborated on and tested is whether governmental institutions make a difference?

The mechanisms identified as essential in evaluating the interactive sphere between institutions and foreign policy decision-making are relevant for the very nature of democracy as opposed to autocracy in their extreme forms. The term ‘democracy’ stems from the Greek word *demokratia*; *demos*, people, and *krateein*, rule, means ‘rule by the people’ (Webster’s Dictionary, 1990). As a political system, democracy is based on two essential characteristics, namely the right to participate and the right to oppose and vote out the highest officials in the government (Dahl, 1989:220). These characteristics can be assembled within a distinctive set of political institutions and practices. The presence or absence of these institutional arrangements forms a framework that poses different degrees of representation, accountability, responsiveness and power-sharing on the decision-makers, which constrain their policy-making in different ways.

There are two ways in which the interactive sphere between governmental institutions and foreign policy decision-making can be analyzed: the micro level focuses on the impact of one institution at a time, whereas the macro approach looks at combinations of institutions. The point of departure here is a micro approach in which each institutional dimension is discussed with respect to its constraining capacity. The important next step is to look at the constraining impact of institutional combinations. The scope of this dissertation only allows for the latter to be discussed from a more general approach. Before discussing the constraining impact of institutions in the foreign policy context, it is important to identify the political sphere at stake. This is addressed by asking what makes the foreign policy decision-making process distinct from domestic policy-making and how are decisions about aggressive actions abroad unique in the foreign policy setting?

4.2.1 The Foreign Policy Decision-making Process

Structural constraints in the form of governmental institutions constitute the formal framework for policy-making in a state. Decision-makers are not free to make any decision they prefer, a fact true for both democratic and autocratic states. What type of decision politicians make may partly depend on the combination of governmental institutions that constitutes the basis for the decision-making process. Bringing attention to domestic institutions when looking to understand states' action internationally departs from neo-realist and neo-liberal understandings of international relations. The approach undertaken here maintains states as central, but seeks to understand state action internationally as a process taking place in the interactive sphere between the national and the international. Political decision-makers are instrumental in linking domestic and international affairs. Specifically, domestic support for military expenditures and actions is necessary. According to Vasquez (1987:135), decision-makers need to prove the presence of a concrete threat and actions by an opposing state in order to secure domestic support. In this respect, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) are correct in emphasizing that it is politicians, not states, that make decisions. However, political decision-making manifests itself in state action. Thus, analyzing state action is one approach to understanding foreign policy decision-making. Although decision-making is an important component of the association between domestic governmental institutions and states' actions internationally, the work undertaken here takes state action as a manifestation of the institutions-politicians interaction.

In general, '[d]ecision-making in democracies [can be defined as] a process of reaching agreement in group situations through voting, unanimity, or interpretation' (Steiner, 1995:337). This process is driven by politicians whose thinking and acting have much in common. Some general assumptions about political leaders concern their motivation for decision-making. There is an ongoing and still unresolved debate over whether politicians are motivated by mere self interest or if they have some degree of selflessness, irrespective of dealing with domestic or international affairs. Philosophically, these two positions reflect ideas from Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau respectively. Most analyses of political leaders take on a rational choice perspective with the Hobbesian assumption of the power-driven politician (Bueno de Mesquita and Root, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Downs, 1957a, 1957b). Others however, assume that democratic leaders are motivated by what they believe is the best interest of the people (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999). Although a solely altruistic motivation seems farfetched, judging

the degree to which the rather selfish political driving force is correct seems difficult. The work undertaken here rejects the extreme position taken by many scholars (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Ray, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) that politicians will make choices that promote their personal interest rather than what is best for the country they are governing. This might be true for some extremely autocratic leaders, but is assumed to be prevented by rules and expectations in democratic states. However, one strong motivation of political decision-makers is to maximize their chances of winning power and keeping it.

In combination with the idea of the power-seeking decision-maker is the assumption that incumbent leaders fear being removed from office and desire to remain in power. This motivation of maintaining their political position will influence leaders when making foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, this work assumes that each decision-maker works as a member of a group of people who co-operate with the common goal 'to enjoy the income, prestige, and power that go with running the governing apparatus' (Downs, 1957b:137).

Although decisions about a states' action internationally take place in the same institutional framework as decisions about domestic affairs, many aspects of foreign policy-making make this process different. Rather than interacting with political opponents whose influence is granted by the same democratic processes as the one providing power to the sitting leaders, foreign policy is made dealing with opponents whose basis for power might be entirely different. Anticipating responses from these types of actors involves a greater degree of insecurity, especially when dealing with autocratic states. With respect to conflict involvement, initiating or responding to aggressive behavior when dealing with such a high degree of uncertainty involves a much larger risk of potentially damaging consequences for both the democratic leaders and the population granting their power. This has led some researchers to conclude that democracies are less likely to initiate new interstate conflicts, but once involved they tend to come out winning (Lake, 1992; Russett and Oneal, 2001:66-68).

Another factor that makes foreign policy-making a special case is that some typical features of democracy shape the decision-making process to a lesser degree than for domestic politics.³⁷

³⁷The argument that democracy is associated with the degree to which decision-makers are constrained does not exclude the possibility that autocratic leaders might be constrained as well. Farrell (1966:184-185) maintains that foreign policies are often designed for domestic ends in both 'open' (high access, accountable) and 'closed' (low access, unaccountable) societies (Gellner, 1983). However, the nature and scope of constraints are fundamentally different between democratic rule and autocratic forms of governments. For example, democratic political leaders must maintain a winning coalition domestically to remain in power, whereas autocratic leaders reach out to a smaller group (Olson, 1993). Democratic decision-makers are accountable to the population, whereas autocratic leaders stay in power even when the population suffers, as long as they pay their small group of supporters and the armed forces.

In both the domestic and foreign decision-making process, politicians base choices of action on a small fraction of available information that members of the bureaucracy have pre-selected (Russett, 1990:9). In addition, the process during which decisions are made is more covert when handling foreign policy matters, especially when involving the potential use of force. Thus, the lack of transparency of the decision-making process limits public access to information on foreign affairs and military concerns and strategies.

Finally, the time frame available for making decisions about foreign affairs is less predictable and most likely shorter than in the case of domestic politics. This might be especially important when deciding on a response to other states' initiative or actions. In some situations where decisions require a high degree of secrecy and quick resolutions, the formal decision-making process might be bypassed.

This discussion suggests that, whereas democratic political leaders share the same motivation and face constraints when making foreign policy decisions, the mechanisms of constraint generally put on politicians do not automatically apply when dealing with foreign policy and conflict issues. The remaining question then is what role do governmental institutions play in constraining political leaders facing a threat to national security initiated by another state?

4.2.2 Mechanisms of Constraint: Representation, Accountability, Responsiveness and Power-sharing

The Democratic Peace theory maintains that structural constraints work to limit the use of force as an option, but only in relations between democracies. Decisions about the use of force must normally go through the formal decision-making process, which can be cut short in the case of an emergency. When democracies oppose each other, time-consuming and complex processes of gaining public and political support for war mobilization take place in both states. This leaves time for diplomacy to work and non-violent conflict solutions to develop. When two autocratic states engage in conflict, the structural theory predicts a high likelihood of resort to violent means since leaders in both states can make decisions and mobilize resources relatively freely, without the fear of public or political repercussions. Finally, conflicts between a democracy and an autocratic state are characterized by the freedom of autocratic leaders to mobilize and act. According to the structural constraints

theory, a democratic state in this emergency situation will find ways to get around the institutional mechanisms that otherwise slow down the decision-making process and the mobilization of forces.

This situation-specific view of the impact that institutional constraints have on foreign policy decision-making is assumed without much theoretical elaboration and empirical testing. If governmental institutions shape the making of politics in general, it seems questionable to assume that they have no influence on decisions about foreign policy when it involves dealing with autocratic states, even if the impact is weaker. However, the largely immature nature of the structural constraints theory as it exists today does not allow for empirical testing of the impact of institutions. In its present form, theories about institutional constraints are merely superficial ideas about the observed variation in conflict participation among regimes.

In order to understand the role structural constraints can play for states' aggressive behavior towards other states, empirical tests that target variation in conflict involvement need to be based on specific measurements of governmental institutions. I suggest looking to the field of Comparative Politics and differentiating between electoral systems, executive systems, and federal systems. Furthermore, theoretical elaboration of how constraints influence political leaders in these specified institutions is needed to explain a possible institutional variation. The work undertaken here initiates such an effort by suggesting four mechanisms that constrain decision-makers in governmental institutions: representation, accountability, responsiveness and power-sharing. These different constraining dimensions are assumed to exercise varying capacities in different governmental institutions, each having an independent impact on foreign policy decision-making. In addition, they coexist in a mutually reinforcing system, which will be discussed as institutional interconnectedness. What do these mechanisms of constraint entail and how are they represented in different institutions? The mechanisms are described below with a general discussion of their constraining capacities. This discussion forms the basis for the proceeding discussion of the constraining impact of institutional archetypes.³⁸

Representation refers to the role of politicians in an elective democracy, to make political decisions that represent the people in that state (Birch, 1993:29). In other words, representation is 'the mechanism by which the people participate indirectly in government through representatives'

³⁸Tsebelis (2002) would argue that such an approach to understanding governmental institutions is immature and that the impact of institutions can be studied beyond classifications of categories like presidential and parliamentary democracies. Even if this were true, the debate about the role of governmental institutions for states' use of force internationally is underdeveloped to the extent that starting from the most widely used framework seems justified.

(Scigliano, 1995:1054-1058). The representatives are either popularly elected or appointed by those who are elected. How can this role of representatives constrain politicians when making decisions about conflict involvement towards other states? The authority granted to representatives refers to the acceptance within a society of the right of people or institutions to make decisions that are binding for others and to issue sanctions against those who ignore them (Birch, 1993:29). The role of representing is not always straightforward, however. Politicians' interests, opinions and goals are not identical to those of the public. Therefore, the public cannot be fully represented by one decision, but rather by multiple views that are sometimes in flux and incompatible. This means that decision-makers must define which views they are representing, before deciding whether to pursue coinciding policies. The harder it is for decision-makers to define public expectations, the less likely they are to represent public opinion. Consequently, decision-makers are more likely to suffer sanctions imposed by a dissatisfied electorate or institutions. In order to maintain office, politicians are likely to feel pressure towards making political choices that satisfy public opinion. Thus, policy-making is a function of the decision-makers' expectations of voters' preferences. In a Downsian fashion (Downs, 1957a, 1957b), politicians are expected to formulate policy and pursue political decisions that appeal to the mainstream population in order to maximize their chances of staying in office.

Decisions about foreign aggression are often profiled by a single politician, such as a president or a foreign minister; this might put greater public demands for representation on the relevant individual. When a political decision is closely associated with one politician in this way, the demand of being represented will be directed toward the relevant person, and the consequences of an unpopular decision might be greater for that individual than for the entire body of elected politicians. Thus, politicians being concerned with maintaining their position in power are likely to choose the use of force as a political means as long as they do not feel vulnerable towards sanctions of unpopular decisions. Choosing conflict involvement as a political means can turn the opinion sour if the conflict becomes long lasting, demands a large number of casualties or becomes costly financially. In situations in which public opinion strongly disagrees with the policy pursued, it is not only each decision-maker that is subject to individual sanctions, but the entire population of representatives can be removed by a vote of no confidence. In this way, representation constrains politicians' willingness to resort to aggression as a political tool vis-a-vis other states.

Representation is closely connected to the principle of *accountability*. According to Parry and Moran (1994:5, 266), the principle of accountability is more fundamental to democratic rule than ‘representation.’ The practical functioning of a democracy based on elections is a ‘division of labor’ between the elected and the electorate and requires a great deal of transparency in the political decision-making process. Accountability is the obligation of elected political leaders to answer for their political decisions when asked by voters or constituent bodies (Diamond and Morlino, 2004:25).

The two forms of accountability generally referred to are *vertical* and *horizontal accountability*. Vertical accountability refers to relations between the electorate and the political leaders, characterized by: information, justification, and punishment (or compensation) (suggestion by Schedler, quoted in Diamond and Morlino, 2004:25). According to Schmitter (2004:48-49), political accountability must be institutionalized, or embedded in a mutually understood and pre-established set of rules, to function effectively. Political decision-makers are constrained by the accountability process through fear of not being re-elected or removed from office. Since holding politicians accountable is a process based on applying information to justify political actions, the constraining effect of vertical accountability can be modified by making information available that supports the given choice of action. When dealing with questions about international conflict involvement, the covert and often rapid nature of decision-making allows politicians to make public arguments and reports that support the chosen course of action. This is at least true for the short term perspective, which is crucial to the willingness of getting involved in a conflict. However, the large availability and exchange of information, typical of any democratic country, is likely to make such efforts of shaping public opinion as a means to avoid sanctions less successful in the long run. In other words, vertical accountability constrains decision-makers from a long-term perspective, but might not hamper willingness to get involved in conflict with other states initially.

Worth noting however, is Schmitter’s (2004:49) point that the judging of which politicians are the most accountable may not be based on electoral turnover, loss of confidence vote in parliament, presidential impeachment, or premial resignation. Rather, Schmitter notes that the most accountable decision-makers may be those who never face such threats. Leaders acting with a high degree of accountability are likely to be regarded as more legitimate and may therefore have greater leverage when making decisions that go against commonly held opinions.

Horizontal accountability describes relations between governmental institutions, meaning that politicians must not only answer to the public, but also to other officials and institutions (Diamond and Morlino, 2004:25). This form of horizontal accountability is generally described as ‘checks and balances.’ Selected distribution of information as a way to shape opinion and justify the use of force seems less an option for avoiding sanctions between governmental institutions. Other politicians have a better understanding of how politics is made and greater access to the information on which political decisions are based. Different from vertical accountability between public and politicians which is largely sanctioned through the re-election process, governmental institutions with ‘checks and balances’ relations can carry out sanctions at any time if needed. This means that the greater the horizontal accountability, the more constrained are the politicians.

Responsiveness in a democracy means that ‘the government adopts policies that follows the [preferences] of public opinion’ (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999:12; Powell, 2004). According to Powell (2004), democratic responsiveness is based on several steps: first, on the translation of public preferences into coherent national policy choices offered by competing political parties. Furthermore, the public’s electoral preferences must be aggregated into a government of policy-makers, and finally the elected officials must translate political preferences and commitments into policies.

The principle of responsiveness shares with representation the close link to the public. However, responsiveness differs from representation in that it does not imply the duty to follow every public fancy, but rather the authority to exercise the policy that the politicians themselves assume is best for society. Underlying the principle of responsiveness is the idea that the individual citizen may be less able to consider the larger societal or global implications of decisions and thus, that policy-making is best performed by responsive representatives.

The degree to which a democratic system is responsive can be difficult to assess. Responsiveness might be hampered by incoherent expressions of public preferences, but also if short-term interests are in conflict with long-term political goals (Diamond and Morlino, 2004:28). Other factors facilitate responsiveness, such as a strong civil society and a well-established and functioning party system. These are factors that favor vertical accountability as well (Ibid).

Responsiveness seems at first glance to be less constraining than the related principle of representation, as it supports greater decision-making freedom justified by the argument that politicians are better informed. However, identifying where the role of representing stops and the authority

provided by being responsive starts seems a difficult task for both the public and the decision-makers. Furthermore, the sanctions against politicians making unpopular decisions are the same - the failure to get re-elected or being removed from office by a vote of no confidence. In this way, the final political authority is given to the public in the re-election process. At least, re-election can be regarded as an indicator of how satisfied the public is with the political performance of the existing decision-makers. To some degree therefore, it seems that the principles of representation and responsiveness work in similar ways. One difference is crucial, however: responsiveness does grant decision-making freedom for politicians insofar as they can convince the public of the legitimacy of the politics pursued.

In foreign policy-making, questions about the use of force against another state involves issues that can sometimes be difficult to convey to the public as legitimate. Most importantly, aggressive actions against another state contradicts the internationally accepted principle of state autonomy, it generally involves casualties and is costly financially. In addition, the nature of the issues at stake may be such that complete information cannot be made available to the public. Crossing these types of boundaries may promote negative responses from the domestic public, but also create pressure from actors internationally. Potentially, aggressive behavior between states is likely to be met by ethical rejections both domestically and internationally, from people not willing to carry the human and financial costs of violent actions. When expecting these types of responses, politicians need to provide information that justifies choices of action.³⁹ The degree to which decision-makers follow public expectations or whether they make decisions relatively independently and seek to convince the public of the legitimacy of their choice is unclear, but policy-making does probably involve both. In practice, responsiveness can be compromised (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). For example, leaders may try to manipulate public opinion and maximize their autonomy, budget limitations always force politicians to put priority on some issues over others, and decision-makers may be constrained by non-state actors whose preferences are not always converging with those of public opinion.

The principle of *power-sharing* is fundamental to the practical functioning of democratic governance and is closely intertwined with the above mentioned mechanisms that constrain political decision-making in democracies. Rather than the autocratic concentration of power in the hands of the few, democracies distribute power in different ways, such as between the elected and the

³⁹This work does not take a stand on the question of whether there is difference in aggressiveness between the public and the political leaders.

electorate, between political groupings within the same institution, and between different institutions. The principles of representation, accountability and responsiveness are all based on the idea of sharing power. Even though decision-makers theoretically have to consider preferences of the public or other politicians, it is ultimately the actual decision-making authority that matters for political actions. The more individuals needed to be consulted and the more groups that need to reach an agreement before a decision is made, the more constrained is a leader. Also, the greater the balance between decision-making institutions, and the greater the dependency on support from these institutions, the more constrained the decision-maker. Accordingly, politicians in a government based on power-sharing are more constrained than leaders who make decisions in a system where power is concentrated.

4.2.3 Constraints in Democratic Institutions

How are the above mentioned mechanisms of constraint represented in democratic institutional structures? Governmental institutions provide formal rules and procedures for how decisions are made (see definitions in Subsection 3.4.1). The three structural dimensions generally applied when comparing democratic sub-systems are electoral systems, executive systems, and federal systems. Since the intermediate categories are less clear-cut and involve combinations of institutions that vary more than the main categories, the following discussion about constraints in democratic institutions focuses on the main types. This work assumes that these intermediate democracies fall in-between the main institutional categories in terms of placing constraints on decision-making. Further exploration and theorizing may be useful, but falls outside the scope of this dissertation.

One of the most essential features of democracy is political leaders representing the population (Birch, 1993). *Generally, the greater the representation, the greater the constraints put on political decision-making.* The logic behind this reasoning is that more groups represented means more opinions to consider. Consequently, agreeing on a political action takes longer and allows for diplomacy to function and misinterpretations to be clarified. Democratic institutions represent and constrain decision-making differently. The nature of the electoral system determines who the representatives are, and thus, who they represent and who is excluded from representation. As de-

defined earlier, majority-plurality electoral systems typically use single-member districts⁴⁰ and allocate many seats to few parties or candidates. Differently, systems based on proportional representation largely distribute seats according to the votes received in multi-member districts. The nature of the districts affects the number of groups represented, the nature of groups represented, and the behavior of the groups once elected (Adams, 1996).

Majority-plurality systems favor representation of fewer groups, generally brought about in a two-party system.⁴¹ Consequently, some groups might get systematically underrepresented, typically along politicized fault lines like gender, race, ethnicity, or geography. The degree to which this is problematic depends on the degree to which a country's population is defined along these lines. If a country's demography is such that majority-plurality elections fail to represent these types of groups, then the principle of representation is at stake. Furthermore, decision-makers are likely to meet public objections and feel constrained insofar as the decisions made split the population along these fault lines. With respect to decisions about foreign aggression however, there is little reason to believe that the pursuit of force is determined by gender, race, ethnicity, or geography. Rather, some scholars claim that aggression abroad works to unite the population domestically, at least if the use of force is short-term and not costly (see James and Oneal, 1991; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Meernik and Waterman, 1996).

Majority-plurality systems represent large groups, which in turn promote a greater degree of homogeneity. Proportional systems represent many smaller groups which form coalitions characterized by multiple views. Consequently, majority-plurality systems provide decision-makers with more freedom and ability to make political decisions, whereas proportional electoral systems represent many groups and a greater degree of constraints. However, the constraining impact of representation is conditioned, not only by the type of electoral system representing public opinion, but also by the number of groups needed to be represented. Representation is installed by constitution in federal systems, guaranteeing the inclusion of regional and minority interests. Representation is less explicit in unitary governments and may be much more shaped by electoral or executive system. In general, I argue that politicians are the least constrained by the representation mechanism in

⁴⁰In single-member districts, only one member is elected to the parliament, whereas more than one member is elected when multi-member districts are used.

⁴¹The statement that majority elections favor two-party systems are generally referred to as Duverger's Law (Riker, 1982).

majority-plurality systems, presidential and unitary states. Proportional systems, parliamentary or federal systems represent more groups and therefore pose the greatest degree of constraints on political leaders.

Accountability is another mechanism that constrains democratic leaders. It implies that politicians must answer for their political decisions if asked by voters (vertical accountability) or constituent bodies (horizontal accountability) (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). *Generally, the more accountable, the more constrained are the leaders.* This constraining mechanism is explained by political leaders' fear of being removed from office. With respect to electoral systems, majority-plurality elections promote decision-making freedom from horizontal accountability, but constrain politicians to a greater extent vertically. The representation of few groups reduce the number of opinions to consider and the number of views to disagree with, which means greater decision-making freedom. This is especially true if the two dominating parties gravitate towards each other politically (Downs, 1957a,1957b), which tends to be the outcome of majority-plurality elections. Proportional systems are constrained by both vertical and horizontal accountability. In addition to seeking agreement among different opinions in a coalition that reflects many public views, the coalition has to answer to a parliamentary body which also represents multiple views. As suggested previously, sanctions by the public take place by the failure to be re-elected, whereas accountability between politicians themselves or between governmental institutions can be carried out at any time of the electoral cycle and poses a greater degree of constraint.

Whereas a president answers to the public and faces the threat of being held accountable through impeachment, this rarely happens. In reality, a president is held accountable by the failure to get re-elected or by being denied the funds required to carry out a political decision, such as getting involved in war. The constraining impact of being held accountable may be diminished depending on the electoral cycle. If a president is already in his or her last term, the threat of not being re-elected has no impact on the president's political choices. A prime minister in a parliamentary democracy, on the other hand, needs to make political choices that are approved by the parliament.

The constitutional guarantee of representation implies governmental accountability toward the represented in federal democracies (Anon, 1994). The preemptive power by local governments may be used to influence national policy-making, and to prevent the government from abusing its power. For example, local dissatisfaction over governmental spending may prompt local rep-

representatives to work against further funding of pursuing costly political actions such as conflict involvement. On the other hand, the complexity of a federal democracy may provide opportunities to obscure responsibilities for unpopular decisions. Unclear designation of political accountability may prevent this democratic mechanism to constrain decision-making. This reasoning suggests that decision-makers in majority-plurality systems, presidential or unitary systems are less constrained by accountability than those in proportional electoral systems, parliamentary or federal structures.

Whereas the principle of responsiveness shares the close association to the public with the principle of representation, the former is unique in that it grants the final decision-making authority to the political leaders. The extent to which governmental institutions adopt policies reflecting public preferences affects decision-making, but is conditioned by the political leaders' use of the right to make decisions that go against public will. *Generally, the greater the opportunities to legitimately reject public opinion, the less constrained are the decision-makers.* Some formal institutional structures encourage responsiveness more than others, for example by the consequences of not adhering to the public opinion or to the opposition. A cabinet characterized by a two-party structure produced by majority-plurality elections may be demanded to be replaced by the opposition through a vote of no confidence. For a cabinet consisting of a coalition produced by a multi-party system, minor alterations of the government can maintain a high degree of representation and responsiveness at the same time as the government is held accountable (see Lijphart, 1999). Similarly, some institutional setups make it easier to reject public opinion than others. When decision-making authority is granted in the hands of few people, such as in democracies with majority-plurality electoral systems, presidential democracies or unitary states, agreeing to use force abroad may be easier than in democratic systems that promote a plurality of views, even if it goes against the commonly expressed public will.

If political leaders fail to be responsive, the public can express their views through non-formal channels, imposing non-institutional constraints on decision-making. Rather than the public waiting to express dissatisfaction through the electoral process, public opinion can be made explicit through media and public surveys. Thus, public opinion can reject or endorse the use of aggression against another state, not only through their representatives (see Russett, 1990:54). For example, polls suggested overwhelming initial public approval of President Truman's decision to send American military forces to aid South Korea in the Korean War. This sentiment was largely based on the

public view that the only option available is to ‘stop Russia’ (Mueller, 1971:361). The degree to which public opinion is expressed through non-institutional channels may reflect the degree to which public opinion is reflected in political actions. Thus, this informal constraint is most likely exercised in the least constrained democracies. Although political leaders may face unpopularity by disregarding these views, the political consequences may only be constraining in combination with other factors, such as the stage of the electoral cycle (see Gaubatz, 1991, 1999).

The constraining impact of power-sharing is a feature common to all democracies, but still represented in varying degrees in democratic sub-systems. *Overall, the greater degree of power-sharing, the more constrained are the decision-makers.* Reaching an agreement about political decisions takes longer the more views that need to be considered. In the meantime, diplomacy may be applied to diminish tensions between states. In proportionally elected cabinets, decision-making power is shared between parties representing many different political views, whereas political opinions in a cabinet produced by a majority-plurality electoral system is more homogeneous. In a parliamentary system, the prime minister exercises power together with the members of the cabinet, but with the final approval of the parliament. In presidential democracies, power is concentrated by the president having the authority to make his or her own decisions or to veto that of others (see for example Tsebelis, 2002 for the role of veto players). This means that the voting weight of group members is different, like the dominance of the American president over the cabinet. Because of the representing role of politicians and the consequence of not abiding by this principle, it seems likely that the veto power of the president will be more frequently resorted to in foreign policy issues than the adaptation of a policy without broad approval. Finally, power is shared between the central government and the regional governments in federal democracies, whereas unitary states tend to concentrate power.

From this discussion, I conclude that some democratic sub-sets incorporate mechanisms of constraint to a greater extent than others. Logically therefore, the institutional distinctions that capture the greatest number of constraints may have the greatest impact on democracies’ conflict behavior. However, this constraining impact can be modified or enhanced by other governmental structures.

	Maj-plur	Semi-PR	PR	Pres	Semi-pres	Parl	Unitary	Semi-fed	Federal
Maj-plur	1.00								
Semi-PR	-0.08	1.00							
PR	-0.18	-0.08	1.00						
Pres	0.23	0.26	0.27	1.00					
Semi-pres	0.10	0.04	0.44	-0.11	1.00				
Parl	0.51	0.06	0.19	-0.14	-0.12	1.00			
Unitary	0.37	0.23	0.53	0.36	0.31	0.49	1.00		
Semi-fed	0.01	0.12	0.20	0.13	0.13	0.06	-0.08	1.00	
Federal	0.44	-0.00	0.08	0.24	0.19	0.17	-0.16	-0.04	1.00

Note: N=12956.

Table 4.1: Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (Pooled)

4.2.4 Institutional Interconnectedness

A democracy is made up of a combination of institutions that make them democratic in different ways. Three dimensions are especially important in determining how democracy works: electoral system, executive system, and federal system. There is no theoretical reason for mutual exclusiveness between these three institutional arrangements. In fact, the application of some types of institutions tends in practice to congregate with the application of others. For example, majoritarian governments tend to be unitary, whereas PR elections often are characteristic of federal systems (Lijphart, 1984:169). Furthermore, federal institutions typically exist in a relationship of checks and balances (Elazar, 1995:477), which is also typical for presidential democracies (Linz, 1995b:911), although the nature of the institutional dependency is different. The combination of institutions sometimes alters the impact of a single institution. For example, democracies with a president as head of state often remove authority from the parliament and the executives because they exist in a checks and balances relationship. Similarly, decentralizing of political authority in federal states transfers decision-making authority away from the legislature.

Table 4.1 shows that there is a relatively small degree of overlap between the institutional indicators globally. The existing overlaps are democracies with majority-plurality electoral systems which tend to also have a parliamentary executive structure, whereas democracies with proportional electoral systems often are unitary.

Tables 4.2-4.6 show that there is a greater degree of institutional overlap among democracies within each region. In Latin America (Table 4.2) the strongest correlations are between democracies

	Maj-plur	Semi-PR	PR	Pres	Semi-pres	Parl	Unitary	Semi-fed	Federal
Maj-plur	1.00								
Semi-PR	-0.07	1.00							
PR	-0.13	-0.09	1.00						
Pres	0.16	0.39	0.71	1.00					
Semi-pres	0.25	-0.02	0.01	-0.05	1.00				
Parl	0.66	-0.04	-0.08	-0.11	-0.02	1.00			
Unitary	0.53	0.36	0.40	0.68	0.19	0.40	1.00		
Semi-fed	-0.04	-0.03	0.34	0.25	-0.01	-0.03	-0.07	1.00	
Federal	0.06	0.02	0.35	0.38	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11	-0.03	1.00

Note: N=3319.

Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (Latin America)

	Maj-plur	Semi-PR	PR	Pres	Semi-pres	Parl	Unitary	Semi-fed	Federal
Maj-plur	1.00								
Semi-PR	-0.10	1.00							
PR	-0.35	-0.12	1.00						
Pres	0.32	0.11	-0.05	1.00					
Semi-pres	-0.09	0.10	0.53	-0.14	1.00				
Parl	0.43	0.01	0.20	-0.18	-0.30	1.00			
Unitary	0.17	0.09	0.57	0.02	0.30	0.50	1.00		
Semi-fed	-0.08	0.23	0.16	-0.00	0.20	0.01	-0.14	1.00	
Federal	0.51	-0.03	-0.06	0.34	0.13	0.09	-0.31	-0.07	1.00

Note: N=4641.

Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (The West)

with majority-plurality electoral systems and parliamentarism or unitarism, and between presidential democracies and those with PR type elections and with unitary democracies.

In the West (Table 4.3), many democracies with majority-plurality electoral systems also have a federal structure, those with proportional electoral systems are often semi-presidential or unitary, whereas parliamentary democracies often are unitary.

Among African democracies (Table 4.4), states with majority-plurality electoral systems tend to have a parliamentary executive structure or to be unitary, whereas many unitary democracies are presidential.

Since there are few and short-lived democratic states in the Middle East, the institutional variation among Middle Eastern democracies is relatively small. For example, there is an absence of some types of democratic institutions, such as semi-PR electoral systems, parliamentarism, and

	Maj-plur	Semi-PR	PR	Pres	Semi-pres	Parl	Unitary	Semi-fed	Federal
Maj-plur	1.00								
Semi-PR	-0.04	1.00							
PR	-0.08	-0.02	1.00						
Pres	0.44	0.23	0.49	1.00					
Semi-pres	0.36	-0.02	0.00	-0.06	1.00				
Parl	0.55	-0.02	-0.05	-0.09	-0.04	1.00			
Unitary	0.76	0.07	0.35	0.63	0.31	0.47	1.00		
Semi-fed	0.11	-0.01	0.20	0.28	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	1.00	
Federal	0.19	0.30	-0.03	0.21	0.12	0.12	-0.06	-0.01	1.00

Note: N=1913.

Table 4.4: Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (Africa)

	Maj-plur	Semi-PR	PR	Pres	Semi-pres	Parl	Unitary	Semi-fed	Federal
Maj-plur	1.00								
Semi-PR	-	-							
PR	-0.02	-	1.00						
Pres	0.56	-	0.37	1.00					
Semi-pres	-0.02	-	0.79	-0.03	1.00				
Parl	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Unitary	0.34	-	0.86	0.61	0.77	-	1.00		
Semi-fed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Federal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: N=1125.

Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (The Middle East)

federalism. Consequently, there is a very high level of correlation between many of the democratic institutions in the Middle East (see Table 4.5).

In Asia, Table 4.6 shows some strong correlations. Democracies with majority-plurality electoral systems tend to be parliamentary or federal, and semi-PR democracies are often unitary.

The impact of governmental institutions on decision-making is not only a product of its own characteristics, but also of how it interacts with other democratic institutions. Although some scholars have acknowledged that institutional differences may be important for democracies' conflict behavior (Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Leblang and Chan, 2003; Palmer, London and Regan, 2004), few scholars have looked at the interconnectedness between democratic institutions. Palmer, London and Regan (2004:5) suggested that the political orientation of the ruling party influences the decision to go to war. They assume that leftist parties are 'anti military' and 'pro peace' whereas rightist parties tend to be 'pro military' and in favor of using force as a strategy of self defense. They conclude

	Maj-plur	Semi-PR	PR	Pres	Semi-pres	Parl	Unitary	Semi-fed	Federal
Maj-plur	1.00								
Semi-PR	-0.10	1.00							
PR	-0.06	-0.03	1.00						
Pres	0.15	0.33	0.45	1.00					
Semi-pres	0.48	-0.05	-0.03	-0.06	1.00				
Parl	0.57	0.31	-0.05	-0.10	-0.08	1.00			
Unitary	0.36	0.52	0.30	0.46	0.16	0.46	1.00		
Semi-fed	0.26	0.10	-0.02	0.18	-0.03	0.23	-0.06	1.00	
Federal	0.62	-0.07	-0.04	0.07	0.44	0.36	-0.11	-0.04	1.00

Note: N=1958.

Table 4.6: Correlation Matrix for Democratic Institutions, Pearson's r , 1816-2002 Data (Asia)

that among parliamentary democracies, parties' political position affect conflict behavior (Ibid:17). Rather than accepting the idea that political orientation explains conflict behavior in parliamentary democracies, an alternative explanation for the observed variation may be that Palmer, London and Regan have measured the combined effect of electoral system and executive system. If a clear leftist or rightist political orientation is identifiable, then it seems likely that they are products of an electoral system that promotes representation of few groups. In more proportional systems, coalitions tend to combine parties from many different political orientations that may be difficult to classify as 'leftist' or 'rightist.' This supports further exploration of the role that institutional interconnectedness plays in foreign policy decision-making.

Disaggregating democracy by distinguishing between institutional sub-sets may be the start of discovering the role of institutional dynamism. This work argues that institutions, as well as combinations of institutions, are unique to each country, but that countries within the same region have a shared history that largely produces institutions that are applied and interpreted similarly. Pursuing this institutional dynamism and its impact on decisions about states' conflict involvement domestically or abroad are important. However, such a task requires theoretical elaboration beyond what this dissertation offers and is not pursued here.

4.3 The Intrinsic Importance of Institutions

This dissertation suggests that the impact of governmental institutions on foreign policy decision-making can be described as extrinsic and intrinsic. The intrinsic importance of institutions is their

dialectic and mutually reinforcing association with norms. Although often treated as competing explanations for democracies' conflict behavior, I suggest that democratic institutions and norms coexist in an inseparable and dynamic relation. This complementary association takes place by culture influencing the creation and evolution of political institutions and institutions shaping culture (Russett and Oneal, 2001:53). In other words, theories about the impact that norms and institutions play in decision-making are not mutually exclusive. For the most part, the association between institutions and norms are ignored by those who seek to understand the impact of domestic factors on international politics.

This interconnectedness is evident when looking at the role that compliance between norms and institutions plays for ensuring governmental legitimacy (Lockhart, 1999:884; Tsebelis, 2002). If political institutions or actions deviate from dominant norms, then their continued existence may be at risk. In some states, authoritarian norms jeopardize democratic institutions, such as in Russia under President Putin. In other states, the spread of democratic norms pushes toward democratization, such as in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War. For already established democracies, democratic norms can work to maintain legitimacy and to keep a democratic check on the institutional framework.

According to Most and Starr (1989), culture and institutions generally reinforce each other, but one can be more important than the other under certain conditions. This may be an appealing explanation for why democracies use force against autocracies, but let diplomacy or other non-violent form of sanctions work in disagreements with other democratic states. However, it does not offer a satisfactory understanding of the close association between norms and institutions. Waltz (2000:12) pointed to the inherent paradox in democracies' conflict behavior: 'that peace may prevail among democratic states is a comforting thought. That democracy may promote war against undemocratic states is disturbing.' The emphasis on governmental institutions offers important insights into this paradox, but complementary exploration of the link between norms and institutions is needed to understand how democratic leaders are constrained by domestic factors.

4.3.1 Stability

One of the main issues of disagreement among scholars in comparative politics is the stability of presidential versus parliamentary democracies. The conclusion that presidentialism is less stable than parliamentarism has been especially emphasized by Linz (1992).

The underlying assumptions of this work are that the impact of institutional constraints on decision-making will increase with a greater degree of institutional consolidation and that stability is an indication of the latter. Institutional consolidation favors legitimacy and stability and vice versa. This argument suggests a linear association between the constraining impact of democratic institutions and institutional or regime stability.

Schmitter (2004:50), however, points out that this assumption is unfairly taken for granted and suggests that new democracies might not necessarily perform less well than well established ones. Stability may be an indication of deadlock or rigidity and change may indicate flexibility. If this were the case, one can imagine the association between institutional consolidation and constraints being bell-shaped rather than linear.

As discussed earlier, governmental institutions in democracies constrain decision-making insofar as they promote the principles of representation, accountability, responsiveness, and power-sharing. These are essential features of democraticness and thus, this work assumes that stability and democracy are mutually reinforcing as long as a minimum threshold of democraticness is met. I assume that the effect of stability diminishes over time.

Are there differences in stability or duration between the democratic institutions focused on in this work? Furthermore, are there regional differences in stability among these subsets of democracy? The stability of governmental institutions in a region i is computed as,

$$\text{Institutional Stability } R_i = \left[\frac{\sum \text{Country Years of Institution } X_1}{\text{Number of Periods With Institution } X_1} \right] \quad (4.1)$$

Table 4.7 shows institutional stability in the world and regionally during 1816-2002. In the world, the most stable democratic institutions were parliamentary and federal, which were approximately the same as the average duration of autocracies. The least stable democratic institutions were the semi-PR electoral systems and presidential democracies.

The regional trends are different, however. In Latin America, the longest lasting democratic institutions were parliamentary or semi-federal, whose duration were the same as the autocratic regimes. Although the other types of institutions were less durable, all of them were relatively stable.

With the exception of semi-PR electoral systems, all democratic institutions were long-lived in the West, which is not surprising due to the modern idea of democracy being Western. The most durable institutional system is federalism, which has an average life of 70 years. In addition, democracies with majority-plurality elections or parliamentarism have proved very stable in the West.

This is quite the opposite among the young democracies in Africa; none of the democratic institutions were very long-lived. Not surprisingly, autocracies are much more durable than any democratic institution. Out of the democracies in Africa, the unitary states had the longest average life, whereas the most unstable institutions were semi-PR elections, semi-federal and federal systems.

As in Africa, democratic institutions are short-lived in the Middle East. In addition, the absence of democratic diversity makes this region even more unique. The longest-lived democratic systems in the region are PR elections and semi-presidential executive systems, but these averages are shared among a handful of democratic states. Not surprisingly, the Middle Eastern autocracies are the most stable in the world with an average life-time of 40 years.

Autocratic states are the most stable in Asia as well. However, democratic institutions are also relatively stable. Semi-federal democracies are clearly the most durable, whereas PR democracies had the lowest average life-time.

Table 4.7 showed evident differences in the duration of democratic institutions regionally and globally. This suggests that the democratization processes are at different stages in the different regions and that the impact of democratic institutions may vary within each region. Thus, the relevance of the context, affecting the association between democracy and conflict on the one hand, and on democratic subsets and conflict on the other, is dramatically different between the regions.

	LATIN AMERICA	THE WEST	AFRICA	THE MIDDLE EAST	ASIA	THE WORLD
ELECTORAL SYSTEM						
Maj-plur	21	46	10	6	14	21
Semi-PR	16	9	4	-	17	11
PR	16	28	7	13	8	21
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM						
Pres	17	21	9	6	10	14
Semi-pres	16	27	10	12	15	23
Parl	29	54	10	-	17	33
FEDERAL SYS- TEM						
Unitary	19	31	13	8	13	20
Semi-fed	32	22	5	-	22	19
Federal	17	70	4	-	17	29
Autocracy	32	31	25	40	29	30
Missing	69	28	169	13	2	281

Table 4.7: Pooled and Regional Stability of Democratic Institutions and Autocracy, 1816-2002 (Average Number of Country Years)

4.4 Conclusion: Assumptions and Hypotheses

The overarching goal of this dissertation is to explore what role governmental institutions play for democracies' conflict behavior internationally. The importance of such a test lies in theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the Democratic Peace research program. This chapter has suggested ways to extend the current focus of the Democratic Peace theory in ways that incorporate important analytical problems. Implications of these shortcomings have prompted this work's argument that the Democratic Peace idea provides an unqualified optimism for spreading democracy as a means for more peace.

Auxiliary hypotheses follow from the suggestion that democratizing for peace is premature without paying attention to temporal and spatial limitations; thus they serve to emphasize the conditional assumption underlying the primary hypotheses:

Auxiliary Hypothesis 1 *Democratic states do not outnumber autocratic states in all regions.*

Auxiliary Hypothesis 2 *The number of democratic states vary with time and is not presently increasing in all regions.*

The redefined theory suggested in this work intervenes in the already established theories about states' international behavior. The assumption about temporal and spatial conditionality apply to Realist and Liberal theories as well, proposing the following auxiliary hypotheses:

Auxiliary Hypothesis 3 *Realist explanations for war vary between regions.*

Auxiliary Hypothesis 4 *Liberal explanations for peace vary between regions.*

The DP theory is underdeveloped and based on disputable assumptions. I have suggested a refinement of the theory which focuses on democratic institutions. This effort starts out from important assumptions as well.

The first main assumption is that domestic factors influence foreign policy behavior through constraining mechanisms such as: representation, accountability, responsiveness and power-sharing. This link is most notably represented by the institutional distinctions of democracy, such as electoral, executive, and federal system. Governmental institutions put formal constraints and specify rules for decision-making in democracies.

The second main assumption is that these constraints make some democracies more prone to get involved in international conflict than others. The most constraining type of institutions are assumed to be: PR electoral systems, parliamentary executive systems, and federal systems. The least constraining institutions are assumed to be: majority-plurality electoral systems, presidential systems, and unitary systems. From this, hypotheses about conflict behavior among subsets of democracy can be formulated:

Hypothesis 1 *Democracies with proportional electoral systems are more constrained and less likely to get involved in conflict than democracies with majority-plurality electoral systems.*

Hypothesis 2 *Democracies with parliamentary executive systems are more constrained and less likely to get involved in conflict than democracies with presidential executive systems.*

Hypothesis 3 *Democracies with federal systems are more constrained and less likely to get involved in conflict than democracies with unitary systems.*

Introducing the idea that some democracies are more conflict prone than others begs for further adjustment of the analytical levels around which DP research is focused. If democracies are, on average, as conflict prone as autocracies, then further dividing democracies into sub-groups (Hypotheses 1-3) suggests that some types of democracy may be more prone to conflict than autocracies. A new hypothesis about the conflict behavior between sub-types of democracy and autocracy is formulated as:

Hypothesis 4 *The most conflict prone democracies are more aggressive than autocracies.*

The third assumption in this dissertation is that regions provide unique contexts, affecting the association between democracy and international conflict. This is the assumption about spatial non-additivity and suggests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5 *The association between democracy and international conflict varies between regions.*

Hypothesis 6 *The association between subsets of democracy and international conflict varies between regions.*

Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis

5.1 Research Design

5.1.1 Introduction: Choosing the Research Design

The research design applied here can be described as based on a quantitative approach to analyzing cross-sectional time-series data (panel data). My methodological specification indicates the approach that I found most useful and appropriate when making generalizations about the impact of governmental institutions on international conflict. My most important concern was to check whether general statements across multiple countries and over long time periods are warranted. My second goal was to make a contribution to the debate about regime type and international conflict in International Relations. The latter required taking seriously the methodological progress and ongoing debate on which the most innovative research in this field has been based during the last decade. It is important to note, however, that the impact of governmental institutions on international conflict can and ought to be studied with other and less quantitative approaches.

In this chapter, I start out by describing the unit of analysis and important temporal and spatial dimensions. I then lay out the methodologies applied and discuss advantages and problems of these analytical applications to the data. Lastly, I describe the data.

5.1.2 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis in this work is country years. States are important actors when analyzing international conflict and, therefore, much of data available to study conflict quantitatively revolves around the state. Consequently, important non-state actors are excluded. Choice of unit of anal-

ysis generally answers questions of data management and possibilities for generalization. First, in studying rare events like international conflict the focus on country years in conflict rather than on the conflict itself is a commonly used technique to enlarge a dataset. This is helpful for studying rare events quantitatively.

Secondly, the main benefit from studying conflict quantitatively is being able to generalize outside the frame of a single conflict, across different regions and over time. Countries and the wars they fight have been affected by, and are a part of, changes in the system of states as well as by regional and domestic factors. Therefore, in theory-building geared towards discovering ecumenical patterns, generalizing is the best way to start out. Once established, comparing specific conflicts can shed light on the lower-level applicability of the theory. That is the next logical step in evaluating the theory, but is outside the scope of this dissertation.⁴²

The criteria for inclusion is based on the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) revision and update of the Russett, Singer and Small (1968) list of independent states from 1816 to the present.⁴³ According to this list, an independent polity needs to meet the following criteria: a) it has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, b) it is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on, and c) it has a population greater than 250,000 (Gleditsch and Ward, 1999:398).⁴⁴

The observations defined by Gleditsch and Ward (1999) were censored according to theoretical considerations. More specifically, the observations left out of the analysis were those in which the political system of a state was defined as going through transition, being in interregnum or interrupted. These criteria are given by the lagged Polity4 index of democracy. The reason behind such censoring is that it is futile to study the impact of governmental institutions when they are by definition either absent or dysfunctional. Consequently, the total number of units included for the period 1816-2002 was reduced from 15179 to 14574.

⁴²Some scholars would argue in favor of analyzing specific conflicts. Even though that can be useful in understanding a specific conflict, King and Zeng (2001) warn against the selection bias involved by not including comparison with non-events.

⁴³Since data collection in research on conflict has largely depended on the Russett et al. (1968) list for over three decades, the research undertaken here reflects the current discrepancy between the two lists' criteria for inclusion.

⁴⁴Countries that do not meet the criteria for system membership are American Samoa, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam, Kiribati, Lichtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated State of), Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Marina Islands, Palau, Palestinian Territory (occupied), Reunion, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tonga, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna.

5.1.3 Analysis in Time

The temporal domain is 1816-2002. The benefit of looking at an almost 200 year time-period is the possibility of discovering long-term systemic patterns. Additionally, this approach opens for exploring whether and how changes in the relationship between international conflict and regime type interacts with other systemic changes. Whereas choosing to go back as far as 200 years was a focal matter, the option to go back even further was absent due to the lack of data readily available. One might argue, however, that the nature of the phenomena I am studying - international warfare and regime type - have changed dramatically over the course of two centuries and cannot be studied as a continuous process. Therefore, I complement the long-term approach by examining different sub-periods that seem theoretically warranted.

Choosing 1816 as the starting point is directly related to the end of the Napoleon Wars, which encompassed most of the Western world at that time. Along with the end of these wars came technical and intellectual revolutions that brought about changes in ideas of governance and in most realms of warfare (Wheeler, 1980:263). These changes were also intimately related to the state-building processes in the West. Although the early 19th century was the time in which democracy as we know it emerged, only a handful of countries fell into this category (France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland). It was not until the turn of the century that the system of states and governance took a more stable form. Since many new states and types of governance were established after the end of World War II, I use 1945 as a cut-off point.

Finally, the end of the period examined, the year 2002, reflects a purely pragmatic choice. After 2002, data were not available for many of the indicators I am relying on, or they were released after the final configuration of my dataset.

5.1.4 Analysis in Space

The spatial boundary is the system of states worldwide. Again, I am interested in making inference that reflects the main patterns in the relationship between regime types and international conflict. However, processes and actions of one country might affect processes and actions of another. In peace research, for example, scholars have found that contiguity matters for diffusion of conflict (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001), that neighbors tend to fight more than countries far apart (Bremer, 1992), and that the nature of borders matter for the likelihood of conflict (Starr, 2000). Similarly,

spatial connections have been suggested in research on regime types, most notably in the spread of democratic principles through what Huntington (1991) describes as ‘waves’ sweeping from region to region. It makes sense, therefore, to look for patterns across and within disaggregated spatial boundaries. I am applying spatial boundaries as defined below in the ‘region’ variable.

5.1.5 Methodologies

The general idea behind the methodologies chosen in this work is to start from exploring simple associations between the variables I am focusing on and to gradually apply more complex and sophisticated methods. The purpose of using descriptive statistics, such as cross-tabulation, is to discover whether there is an association between two variables, and possibly suggest its form (Gilbert, 1993). Similarly, I estimate correlations between variables to determine their independence and use graphical presentations to learn about simple associations over time and in different regions. Benefits of using explorative statistics in the early stages of a research project are forcing the researcher to reconsider her theoretical framework, but it can also be suggestive of the value of pursuing further and more sophisticated approaches later. There are obvious limitations of analyzing data with these simple techniques, however. Most importantly, only a small number of variables can be included and they cannot be continuous. In reality, the relationships studied are much more complex than what simple descriptive statistics can project.

The methods used when modeling the more complex associations between variables are logistic regression, multiple regression, and covariance analysis. The two first techniques are appropriate for modeling the effects of several independent variables on a dependent variable. Whereas a linear regression model requires an interval level endogenous variable, logistic regression is appropriate when the dependent variable takes only two possible values, representing the presence or absence of a given phenomenon (Beck and Katz, 1995; Rodríguez, 2002). I apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation in the linear regression models and Maximum Likelihood (MLE) estimation in the logistic regression models.⁴⁵ Maximum Likelihood estimation (MLE) is the best technique to produce parameter estimates and test hypotheses given the binary dependent variable focused on here and the large sample available (Reed, 2002; Rodríguez, 2002).

⁴⁵The difference between OLS and MLE is that the former selects the parameter estimates that yield the smallest sum of squared errors in the fit between the model and the data, whereas MLE tries to find estimates of parameters that make the data actually observed ‘most likely.’

Different statistical tests signify how well the model fits the data and assess the explanatory effect of each variable. In multiple regression analysis, Pearson's correlation coefficient, R^2 , indicates the proportion of variance explained by the model as a whole and is a calculation of a proportionate reduction in the residual sum of squares by moving from the null model to the model with x_{ij} . The t -statistic measures the impact of the individual variables and is based on the coefficient and its standard error. The regression coefficients β report the effect of each independent variable, holding all the other variables constant.

In logistic regression, there is no measure of the overall fit of the model with an equivalent interpretation to the R^2 in multiple regression (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984:56). Although not an unproblematic or universally accepted measure of fit, I report pseudo- R^2 in the logistic regression analyses. Pseudo- R^2 serves as an analog to the R^2 coefficient with an interpretation similar to the regression R^2 . It is based on the chi-square statistic of the model and ranges between 0 and 1, approaching 0 as the quality of the fit diminishes and 1 as it improves (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984:57). The coefficients β in a logistic regression model can be interpreted along the lines of linear models, but the parameter estimates can also be reported as odds ratios. β_j represents the change in the logit of the probability associated with a unit change in the j -variable holding all other variables constant. That is, how a one unit change in the j -variable affects the log of the odds when the other variables in the model are held constant. Odds ratios in logistic regression can be interpreted as the effect of a one unit of change in the j -variable in the predicted odds ratio with the other variables in the model held constant.

After estimating each model, I perform a variance-covariance analysis, which reports correlation between the independent variables in the model. This is a technique to detect multicollinearity between the independent variables in the model, which can pose statistical problems on the one hand, but can also suggest more complex interrelationships between the variables on the other.

Finally, I put the models to test in covariate analyses. Covariance analysis as performed here, implies testing whether pooling the results for all regions or time periods is legitimate in the sense that the relationship between institutions and conflict is the same in all regions and across the 200-year time span analyzed (Blalock, 1960:360-364). If the relationships vary, then the effects of

each region or time period are non-additive and have to be analyzed individually (Alker, 1968).⁴⁶ Consequently, different theories must be developed for the relevant time periods and regions.⁴⁷

How to best analyze the type of data used in this work is subject to an ongoing discussion. Since I have chosen to follow the conventions set by contributions of this debate, I will elaborate on the issues of contention below and suggest how to best handle the data for the purpose of this dissertation.

5.1.6 Using Panel Data: Advantages, Problems and Solutions

The expression ‘panel data’ indicates the structure of a dataset. A panel⁴⁸ data set contains ‘an observation for each of a set of cross-sectional units at multiple points of time’ (Berry, 1993:85; Hsiao, 1986).⁴⁹ Applied to my dataset, this terminology means that I include observations for a set of countries over time, which makes each country year the unit of analysis.

There are several advantages of applying a panel dataset: first and most importantly, it offers great flexibility in modeling differences across types of regimes. Secondly, the panel data structure allows me to incorporate the important temporal and spatial aspects of the relationships I am studying. Comparison between regions is useful knowing that types of regime tend to cluster, and the exploring of long-term trends is made possible. On a more technical note, the panel data structure is useful in that the large number of observations typical to panel datasets increase the degrees of freedom and reduce the collinearity among the explanatory variables, hence improving the efficiency of the estimates (Hsiao, 1986:1-5). Furthermore, using panel data is a means to avoid the problem of omitted variables being correlated with explanatory variables. Lastly, panel structured data are more conducive to construction and testing of more complicated models (Ibid).

Despite great advantages of using panel data, there is an ongoing and increasingly sophisticated debate among scholars in IR about how best to deal with problems associated with panel data

⁴⁶Pooling of data assumes that B sufficiently describes the relationship between X and Y for all N observations at all T time points or for all regions.

⁴⁷The potential problem of generalizing across time and space is acknowledged by Benett and Stam (2004:22-25).

⁴⁸Panel data have also been referred to as longitudinal data and as pooled cross-section data.

⁴⁹A panel data structure combines cross-sectional and time-series structures and has for the past two decades become increasingly popular among scholars in IR (Beck and Tucker, 1997; Stimson, 1985). In a cross-sectional dataset, the cases are structured as multiple units observed at a single point in time, whereas in a time-series dataset, the cases are observations of a single unit at multiple points in time.

structure. The most important problems subject to discussion are: non-independence (time and space), unmeasured heterogeneity (omitted variable bias) (Chamberlain, 1978; Green et al., 2001; Hsiao, 1986:3; King, 1988, 2001) and multicollinearity.

Autocorrelation involves temporal or spatial dependence between observations. Although in the process of changing, most studies in International Relations perform standard regression analysis on panel data, assuming both temporal and spatial independence.⁵⁰ Temporally however, it is unreasonable to assume that the probability of conflict in one year is the same as the probability of conflict in another year. A state's proneness to conflict is not only correlated with the state's experience with conflict, but also with its experience with peace. Some examples demonstrate this: countries with a history of interstate conflict are more likely to experience war than those with no history of interstate conflict. Furthermore, each war contains a potential likelihood of conflict that can change as a result of the war itself, and lastly, eruption of a temporally resolved conflict might lead to delayed temporal dependency. These types of autocorrelation problems can lead to incorrect standard errors and biased parameter estimates.

I take several steps to avoid temporal dependency between the observations of the dependent variable: First, I follow Bremer (1993) and Beck, Katz and Tucker's (1998:1272) suggestion to distinguish between onset of war and incidence of war. Technically, Bremer's approach is a good way to acknowledge that the likelihood of onset of war is different than the likelihood of continuation of war, but researchers need to be aware of the practical difficulty in determining the time of onset.⁵¹ However, as Russett and Oneal (2001:309) argue, decision-makers constantly reevaluate their positions with respect to changes in domestic and international events. In addition to singling out only the outset of a conflict therefore, I follow the example of Russett and Oneal (2001), and Bennett and Stam (2000) and examine all the years of conflict involvement. As Russett and Oneal (2001) suggest, this approach can work to give more weight to the most serious conflicts.

Another approach to correcting for temporal autocorrelation is to include a variable that controls for conflict or peace history. I utilize and compare three techniques: first, I include a lag

⁵⁰Some prominent examples are Enterline (1996), Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), and Oneal et al. (1996).

⁵¹Another way to deal with the autocorrelation problem is to analyze the initiation of conflict. Since it is not always clear which party actually initiated a conflict, what act qualifies as an initiation largely becomes a coding issue since the start of a war rarely is characterized by a leader publicly declaring that action. Additionally, determining the end of one war and the start of another is not always straightforward when the intensity of the conflict changes. Because of all these practical obstacles, I do not analyze conflict initiation here.

of the dependent variable, which measures whether the state participated in conflict during the previous year (Beck and Katz, 1995:645). In addition to making sure that conflict behavior is not a function of last year's conflict behavior, this technique assumes that the most recent historical events are the most likely to affect present decisions and actions. The second technique follows the same logic, but puts stronger emphasis on the time elapsed since a state's past conflict experiences. The variable measures the number of previous years a country stayed at peace (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998). Lastly, I follow Beck, Katz and Tucker's (1998) suggestion to estimate 'natural cubic splines' for each of the binary dependent variables.⁵² All these techniques provide good corrections of the temporal autocorrelation problem, although some scholars have preferred using 'splines' as opposed to dummy variables or a continuous variable because it facilitates less loss of information and uses few degrees of freedom (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998).

Autocorrelation can also be a problem of spatial dependence. According to Gleditsch and Ward (2000:7-8), spatial dependence in the event of international conflict can be described as 'if a country is set in a region in which many other nations are at conflict, these conflicts are likely to affect it in ways that increase the risk of war. A country that experiences war, being located in a region of other countries also at war, is said to be influenced by the local spatial context of war.' This will be evident as clustering of incidents of conflict in the data. Similarly, scholars have found that distribution of regime type shows clear spatial patterns (Gleditsch and Ward, 2000; Huntington, 1993). I have chosen two approaches to dealing with spatial autocorrelation: first, I model the relationships at stake separately for each region; secondly, I test whether country-specific clustering is prominent in the model specifications.

The problem of *unmeasured heterogeneity* or omitted variable bias (see Green et al., 2001) means that the assumption of the constant, or the intercept, being the same for all units (when all of the independent variables are zero) is violated. The substantive meaning of this assumption is that the basic proneness to international conflict should be the same across all country years. This cannot automatically be assumed to be the case - some countries might be more prone to conflict than others, which means that important explanatory variables might be omitted. In consequence, the models may estimate biased parameter estimates (Green et al., 2001:443). The degree to which this poses a

⁵²I downloaded the software necessary for performing this procedure in Stata from Richard Tucker's home page: <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/rtucker/>. The definition and function of using 'splines' to correct for temporal dependency is further described above in the 'peace year' section.

problem is best discovered through scatter plots of the data. In general, the problem of unmeasured heterogeneity is a greater problem for dyadic models than those at the monadic level because dyads amplify the cross-sectional component of panel data (Green et al., 2001:447). According to Green et al. (2001:450), the success of using panel data largely depends on ‘the nature of the dependent variable, how it is modeled, and the precision with which the predictors are measured.’⁵³

Following suggestions by Alker (1968) and Green and Yon (2002), I check the potential problem of spatial heterogeneity by comparing the pooled model to panels disaggregated according to regions. If the assumption of β sufficiently describing the association between X and Y for all N observations at all T time points is not holding, then a solution is to do an incomplete pooling. I also follow the standard procedure of including region specifying dummy variables.

The problem of *multicollinearity* or collinearity means that the independent variables are too highly intercorrelated to enable a precise analysis of their individual effects. In effect, small changes in the data can generate large changes in the estimates, coefficients may have high standard errors and low significance levels in spite of being highly significant together, and the coefficients will have the wrong sign. In order to detect and determine the impact of collinearity between the independent variables, I inspect correlation matrixes and variance-covariance matrixes. If it poses a serious problem for the specification of the model, exclusion of variables must be considered. Collinear associations can also be a problem between the independent variables and the dependent variables. I lagged all the independent variables to avoid incorporating reciprocal association to the dependent variable.

In addition to these problems related to the usage of panel data in general, analyzing binary dependent variables within the cross-sectional time-series framework involves dealing with the problem of *rare events* in a large dataset. Scholars studying international conflict and peace generally perceive of conflict as a binary event that either happened or did not happen, where peace is the description of the latter. King and Zeng (2001) argue that the infrequency of the event ($Y_i = 1$), in my case international conflict, creates biased coefficient estimates that in turn lead to an underestimation of probabilities (703). They prescribe more efficient sampling as an easy method to achieve valid inference, but argue that one accomplishes the same results by using Conditional Max-

⁵³Green, Kim and Yoon (2001) suggest the introduction of fixed effects as a solution to the problem of unmeasured heterogeneity. However, several scholars have warned that this remedy might be worse than the problem itself (Beck and Katz, 2001).

imum Likelihood estimation. Conditional (fixed effect) logistic analysis differs from regular logistic regression in that the data are stratified and the likelihoods are computed relative to each stratum (StataCorp, 2005). I apply this estimation technique in addition to regular Maximum Likelihood in order to determine whether the problem of rare events affects the individual estimates and the model as a whole.

Obviously, analyzing continuous or binary dependent variables across time and space involves dealing with several potential problems, many of which could have been resolved by applying a cross-sectional or time-series design separately. However, as Stimson (1985:945) puts it, 'dealing with space and time together carries with it the possibility of insights into the political world [...] that make it sometimes worth the prize.'

5.1.7 Conclusion: Inference in a Large-N Approach

How one sees the world determines the questions one asks, and the questions asked determine the techniques applied in pursuing the answers. Finally, the method chosen shapes the type of inference made possible. In this work, I take a large-N approach. What is the reason for this choice and how does it affect the results of the analysis?

The quantitative examination of the relationship between governmental institutions and international conflict implies abstractions and simplification of complex phenomena in order to fit the assumptions and requirements of scientific statistical modeling. With a few exceptions, this is the standard approach by which scholars study regime types and conflict.⁵⁴ In fact, research on the democratic peace has sparked and closely evolved together with important scientific methodological improvements. In many ways, these improvements mark scientific progress in the field of international relations, and I have chosen to adhere to these conventions in this work.

It is crucial however, to be aware of the limitations such a quantitative approach puts on the knowledge produced here. Although large-N studies produce important generalizations, they fail to capture more complex relationships that can better be uncovered by other methodologies. Typically, these relationships are non-linear, non-additive, context or process-specific. The importance of the democratic peace relative to such complexities can better be understood by applying qualitative

⁵⁴One such exception is Snyder's (2000) use of case studies when examining the prospects of democratization as a means to domestic peace.

methodologies such as comparative case studies, examining specific historical cases of positive and negative relationships, or using simultaneous equation techniques.

Furthermore, the empirical generalizations produced must not be confused with trying to establish fixed patterns about the past or the future. The knowledge upon which I base generalizations is given by selected historical observations. Since what the future holds is unknown and many observations or non-institutional aspects of foreign policy decision-making are left out, I do not claim to describe ‘reality’ here nor claim that it can ever be reached. Rather, I suggest sketches of how some aspects of governmental institutions have been associated with interstate conflict in the past.

My focus on time and space is an attempt to capture some of the complexities that exist in the role governmental institutions play in international conflict, acknowledging the importance of factors that are unique to a region’s historical and local context. In a Lakatosian fashion, I accept the core of the democratic peace, that democracies maintain peace among themselves, and introduce ‘positive heuristics’ or suggestions of how the research program should be extended through the emphasis on governmental institutions. I start out with a simple model of institutions and conflict, gradually building on the model’s complexity until the hypotheses are tested in a general model for state’s conflict behavior internationally. I suggest that scientific progress and political relevance of future research in this field is conditioned on a larger degree of cross-fertilization of theories and methodologies between different disciplines than what I am able to offer within the scope of this dissertation.

The conditionality of analysis is based on the conditionality of how the variables are measured. In the following, I will discuss data collection and management, the basis on which the analysis is performed.

5.2 Data

Data on regime type and conflict are frequent in quantitative research of international relations and have been analyzed by increasingly sophisticated statistical techniques. In fact, some scholars (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) have argued that the strong attention to methodological advancement has been at the cost of the quality of the data analyzed. Related to this claim, I found data on the different institutional characteristics of regimes to be scarce and in demand, particularly for

large-N approaches. My conceptualization of regime type as different from the usual application of democracy versus autocracy therefore, has involved collection of new data and extraction of, in this context, non-traditional regime type specifications. I describe the data collection and revision process below, before laying out and defining these regime types.

The dependent variable, international conflict, and the control variables are based on more commonly applied data.⁵⁵ In the following, I describe the sources of the data used and outline the variables.

5.2.1 Data Collection and Revision

The data gathering process involved specifying three types of governmental institutions, independently collected as described below: (1) type of electoral system to the lower chamber of the parliament; (2) whether a government is presidential or parliamentary; and (3) whether governing institutions are centralized or federal. Since they report different governmental aspects of the same country at a given time, these institutions must relate to each other in a logical way. Following the data collection therefore, I initiated a data revision process. This final step was characterized by running crosstabulations between the three institutional indicators to: (1) ensure correct recording of the ‘transition’ observations as copied from the Polity4 authority index; (2) check that ‘non-elective’ category in the presidential/parliamentary variable reports country years in which no elections were held; (3) check that the ‘military’ category of the presidential/parliamentary variable is coordinated with the electoral systems variable and the values on the Polity index; (4) check that the missing observations are correctly recorded; and (5) look for anomalies in general. I largely relied on the manuscript files (Vanhanen, 2004) documenting the basis for Vanhanen’s (2000) democracy database. These files provide unique and accurate historical records of elections held in 187 states during 1810-2000, in addition to providing related information about each state’s political situation.

Some examples illustrate the type of revisions that were made in this process. When double checking the ‘non-elective’ category of the presidential/parliamentary variable it became obvious that some regimes that were classified as non-elective were not straightforward. Despite being

⁵⁵The more than a dozen datasets, from which I have extracted these variables, existed in different forms, originally, reflecting the purpose for which they initially were collected. Since these sometimes differed substantially from my own agenda, I have, in close collaboration with two programmers, transformed and manipulated the original data into a research design that fits my research questions.

regarded as democratic according to the Polity index (it scored 5), the Maldives was classified as non-elective during 1965-67 since it was ruled by a sultan from 1965 until November 11, 1968 when the sultanate was replaced by a republican regime (Vanhanen, 2004). Yet another example of a specific observation falling into this category is Lesotho in 1985 in which parliamentary elections were held but were nullified by the non-elective regime of prime minister Jonathan (Vanhanen, 2004). In these and similar cases, the non-elective classification was sustained.

Furthermore, when checking dubious observations in the 'military' category, I identified countries that have experienced one or more coup d'états during a year, without it seeming to be reflected in the overall Polity score (meaning that some of these countries would be regarded as fairly democratic). Regardless of time of the incident(s), I chose to classify these observations as military. Three examples are: (1) Surinam received the polity score 7 in 1980, despite an armed rebellion taking place on February 25 and being in control of semi-military governments; (2) Peru scored 4 on the Polity index in 1962, despite experiencing a coup in July; and (3) following a coup, Sierra Leone held a multiparty presidential election in which Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became the country's first democratically elected president and scored 4 on the Polity index in 1996.⁵⁶ Overall, I believe these examples signify the sometimes difficult and artificial distinction between democracy and autocracy.

Ethiopia illustrates an anomaly and the degree of difficulty that sometimes arises when classifying political indicators. Ethiopia is an ancient country that, in the lifetime defined here, was an empire until the army took power in 1974 and deposed the emperor on September 12, 1974 (with exception of the period 1936-41 during which most of Ethiopia was occupied by Italy) (Vanhanen, 2004). No elections were held during this period, which the presidential/parliamentary variable correctly reports. Consequently, classifying Ethiopia correctly in the democratic electoral systems variable was not straightforward. The category non-elective is non-existent in this variable because countries that are democratic are per definition assumed to perform elections. In the case of Ethiopia, the polity score is 4 (and thus regarded as democratic according to my definition) until 1930, despite not holding elections. Again, this shows that the distinction between democracy and autocracy can sometimes be problematic. I have dealt with this by letting the observations for Ethiopia appear as missing on the democratic electoral systems variable until 1930, when its polity score drops to -5 and the country clearly is to be regarded as autocratic. The reasoning behind this decision is

⁵⁶These examples are not intended to disprove of the Polity or any other data collections, but rather, to openly discuss how the numeric abstraction of this type of information can be difficult and must be used with caution.

acknowledging that the overall polity score during these years is a function of different indicators and that I do not have the knowledge to weigh the absence of elections against these. However, in the variable in which the electoral systems in all states are classified and the non-elective category appears, I made changes that reflected the electoral absence just described. From 1946 to 1954, I regard Ethiopia as a non-elective under the rule of emperor Haile Selassie. During the period 1955-73, Ethiopia is classified as having a majority-plurality electoral system even though the circumstances associated with this description are inconsistent with practicing democratic rule. The country held its first parliamentary elections in 1955, but as was the case in the following 1961 election, political parties were not allowed to function or take part in the elections (Vanhanen, 2004). The Independents received 100 percent of the votes in all elections held during 1955-1973, and the voters were only approximately 13-16 percent of the total population. The first election in which a political party actually participated in Ethiopia was in 1987, when the Worker's Party won 100 percent of the votes as the only part-taker.

Lastly, the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 revolution exemplifies another anomaly. According to the 1979 Constitution, Iran is a democratic presidential republic. In addition to electing a president and a parliament however, an assembly of Shi'a clergy appoints a religious and supreme leader (Wali Faqih) for life. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was given this position in 1979 and Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-Khameini has held the post since 1989. The coexistence of the supreme leader and the president makes Iran difficult to classify as either presidential or non-elective, but the emphasis on the formal institutions for this variable has led me to classify Iran as presidential since 1980.

5.2.2 Democracy and Autocracy

Several attempts have been made at measuring liberal democracy, relying on different conceptualizations and measurements (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). Four efforts at providing large-N datasets are especially notable: Bollen (1993) weights several indicators of political liberties and popular sovereignty to reach a measure of liberal democracy. Another source, commonly applied by economists, is the Freedom House data which are based on annual evaluations of political and civil rights (Freedom House, 2004; Gastil, 1990). Vanhanen (2000) operationalizes Robert Dahl's polyarchy through indicators of competition and participation, and lastly, different versions of the

Polity data (Gleditsch, 2003; Gurr, Jagers and Moore, 1989; Jagers and Gurr, 1996; Marshall and Jagers, 2002) establish an index of liberal democracy based on weighted scores on authority factors originating from the work of Eckstein and Gurr (1975).⁵⁷

My choosing to rely on the Polity4 dataset,⁵⁸ version 1.0 (Gleditsch, 2003),⁵⁹ when identifying democratic and autocratic regimes is based on two main concerns: first, with the exception of Vanhanen's work, most other datasets provide only recent and limited time coverage; and second, the Polity4 data are modified and extended to fit the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) system membership definition, which I rely on. Additional excellent features of the Polity data are availability and well documented coding and coding procedures, which encourage and enable replicability. This applicability and reliability has been enforced through several phases of re-evaluating data during the past decade.

The advantages outnumber the shortcomings with respect to my application of the Polity data. One weakness of relying on this dataset is important to point out however: the exclusion of participation as an operational dimension of political freedom (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002:11), which means that many countries are allotted scores without considering the large percentages of the population that are excluded from participation. Some examples are Switzerland's exclusion of women in some elections until 1971, the exclusion of Blacks in South Africa until the end of Apartheid regime in 1994, and the United States' barring women until 1919, and American Indians, Blacks, and members from certain religious groups from voting at different levels until the mid-20th century. Marshall et al. (2002:41-43) have refuted this criticism, claiming that participation is addressed in the index component measuring 'competitiveness of political participation.'

The index is a combined polity score ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), reached by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. The democracy and autocracy indexes were originally constructed additively based on the following indicators: competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation. With the exception of Gleditsch and Ward (1997), scholars studying the democratic peace have reduced the index to a

⁵⁷Yet other important contributions to measuring political systems are Coppedge and Reinicke's (1990) polyarchy dataset and Gasiorowski's (1990) political regimes project.

⁵⁸The Polity data can be downloaded from <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm#data>.

⁵⁹From here on, I will be using the terms Polity and Polity4 interchangeably.

dichotomous measure of democracy and autocracy. Two different thresholds are frequently used for this purpose: The strictest measure defines as democratic the countries which score 6 or higher on the combined index (Raknerud and Hegre, 1997), whereas more lenient studies have taken score 3 as their threshold (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997).⁶⁰ In this work, I follow the latter example and define the regime type variable according to the following two categories:

Democracy: Countries which score in the 3-10 range on the Polity index.

Autocracy: Countries which score in the -10-(2) range on the Polity index.

As with the other regime type and governmental institutions variables, I lagged the values for political freedom one year ($t - 1$) in order to avoid problems of determining the direction of causality.

5.2.3 Measuring Institutions

5.2.3.1 Electoral Systems

Electoral systems were recorded in two different variables, which both stem from my own coding. The first variable classifies all democratic states during 1816-2002.⁶¹ Electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates, with the electoral formula applied being its most important characteristic. The electoral systems variable records legislative elections. The coding is straightforward if the national assembly or parliament has a unicameral structure, but in the event of a bi-cameral structure, the lower chamber is generally the most influential and therefore used as the basis for the coding (Druckman and Thies, 2002:760). Electoral systems come in many forms, which can be classified within three main groups: plurality-majority, semi-proportional, and proportional elections (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997:17-25).⁶² It is important to note that the establishment of an electoral system is not automatically followed by the actual performance of elections. It is reasonable to assume however, that most states with an explicit

⁶⁰Jagers and Gurr (1995) suggest using the score 7 and higher to classify democracy.

⁶¹As discussed elsewhere, I follow Gleditsch and Hegre's (1997) classification of democracies as countries scoring 3 or higher on the democracy-autocracy index from the Polity4 dataset.

⁶²Some scholars have found electoral systems best classified within four groups: majority, semi-proportional, proportional, and mixed systems (Norris, 1997).

election type apply this mechanism to select their governments.⁶³ Consequently, this variable has four categories:

Majority-plurality Systems (Maj-plur): The most common feature of these electoral systems is the application of single-member districts. With a plurality formula, the winning candidate or party gets the plurality of the votes, but not necessarily an absolute majority of the votes. Majority formulas are set up to ensure that the winner receives the absolute majority of the votes cast. The most common electoral formulas in this category are: First-Past-the Post, Block Vote, Alternative Vote and the Two-Round Electoral System.

Semi-proportional Systems (Semi-PR): Systems which inherently translate votes into seats won in a way that falls somewhere between the proportionality of proportional representation systems and the disproportionality of plurality-majority systems. The most common forms of semi-PR systems are the Single Non-Transferable Vote and Parallel formulas.

Proportional Representation Systems (PR): A system based on the idea that political party's representation, or seats allocated in the parliament, are proportionate to the overall share of the national vote in order of the winning candidates' position on the lists. Examples of PR systems are: Proportional Representation List, Mixed Member Proportional and the Single Transferable Vote formulas.

Autocracies: This category is descriptive of countries scoring less than 3 on the Polity index.⁶⁴

Two examples illustrate the use of majority-plurality formulas: The electoral system for the French National Assembly has two ballots, the first in which a majority is required whereas the second calls for a plurality of the votes and is held if no majority was achieved in the first. Another example is the British legislature in which the entire legislature is elected by a majority

⁶³See the description of the parliamentary/presidential variable for further elaboration of this situation.

⁶⁴For a closer description of the Polity index, see the definitions of democracy and autocracy above.

formula and as a result, the two largest parties (the Conservative Party and the Labour Party) get overrepresented and the smaller parties (such as the Liberal Democrats) get a disproportionate small number of seats.

Less common than any of the majority-plurality and PR systems are semi-PR arrangements. Japan is the clearest example with the use of the single non-transferable formula gives each voter one vote and the candidates with most votes win (Lijphart, 1995a:416).⁶⁵

PR-systems are used in parliamentary elections in countries such as Malta and Ireland, Guyana, Venezuela, Peru, New Zealand (after 1993), and in South Africa (after 1994).

Although distinct features mark clear differences between democracy and autocracy, classifying states as one or the other is not always straightforward. For example, elections are held in many states classified as autocratic. Iraq for instance, was classified as majority-plurality in 1953, but otherwise as being non-elective. Parliamentary elections were held during 1930-57, for the most part under the pro-Western King Faisal II, but ended when the monarchy was overthrown in a military coup d'etat in 1958. The elections held until 1952 are not recognized as such in this variable however, because the Pro-government Independents won 70 percent of the votes each time without any public support (Vanhanen, 2004). In the 1953 parliamentary election however, supporters of Nuri received 73 percent of the total votes, but 16 percent of the total population participated. In 1954, the electoral situation was reversed and the pro-government Independents won 100 percent of the votes, this time with 2 percent of the population participating. Iraq held a national referendum in 1995, in which Saddam Hussein was confirmed as president for a 7-year term, receiving 100 percent of the votes with 41.6 percent of the population voting. Since these elections are unrelated to the configuration of a parliament, they do not affect the classification of the electoral system in Iraq.

Other examples of autocratic electoral systems are Kuwait, Bhutan, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (North). Kuwait is not regarded as either a parliamentary or presidential system since all executive power has been concentrated in the hands of the Emir from independence in 1961 until today. However, in-between periods of the Emir dissolving the national assembly (1976-80 and 1986-89), parliamentary elections according to the plurality formula have been held in Kuwait. Typical in these elections however, are political parties being prohibited and the Independents winning close

⁶⁵Special arrangements can make a majority-plurality system resemble a semi-PR. For example, special Maori districts in New Zealand worked to guarantee representation of ethnic minorities before the 1993 referendum changed it to a pure PR system altogether. Furthermore, India has districts in which candidacy is only open to specific tribes and castes (Lijphart, 1995a:416). Details like these are not reflected in the electoral systems data coded here.

to or 100 percent of the seats by voters representing no more than 3-5 percent of the population (Vanhanen, 2004). Similarly, Bhutan is coded as having majority-plurality elections, despite falling into the non-elective category on the presidential/parliamentary variable. Bhutan is an absolute monarchy, but the monarch shares power with the Council of Ministers, the National Assembly, and the Head Abbot of Bhutan's Buddhist monks (Vanhanen, 2004). Since two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly are indirectly elected every three years from village constituencies, I chose to maintain an election code for Bhutan. In The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) there is no requirement to hold national elections or to seek regional governmental approval, which is also the case in the Chinese Constitution (Harrington, 1994: fn. 30). Vanhanen's (2004) documentation of parliamentary elections shows that parliamentary elections have been held in Vietnam since 1960, but that the winning party received 100 percent of the votes.

The case of Afghanistan illustrates a typical dilemma faced when classifying autocratic regimes. The king had absolute dominance and controlled the executive until the 1964 constitution, which qualified these years to be coded as non-elective. During the 1965-72 period, Afghanistan can be regarded as having a majority-plurality electoral system. However, this is not straightforward because a legislature existed and elections were held, although executive power was still vested in the king with the parliament being ineffective (Banks, 1996; Marshall and Jagers, 2002). The monarchy was overthrown in a military coup d'état in 1973 and a military regime established, which qualified for a non-elective classification. During 1980-91, Afghanistan was under doubt classified as having a majority-plurality system again because a parliament existed under communist rule, although it was inefficient (Banks, 1996). In the elections held, the winning candidates won 100 percent of the votes, but with 0 percent of the population voting (Vanhanen, 2004). After the communist regime was overthrown in 1992, various resistance movements fought amongst themselves and no stable government was formed until the Taliban seized power in 1996 and established an Islamic theocracy. During these years, Afghanistan was classified as non-elective.

In order to ensure that the causal inference tested is according to the hypothesized relation between electoral institutions and the likelihood of conflict, the values for electoral system were lagged one year ($t - 1$). That is, the logic that an act of hostility is preceded by a decision regarding this action. This idea applies to any analysis testing the impact of regime types and conflict.

5.2.3.2 Form of Executive

This variable was generated through a three-stage process: it takes as its basis information from the variables ‘type of regime,’ ‘head of state,’ ‘effective executive’ and ‘legislative selection’ from the Banks dataset. These results were largely checked and complemented by consulting historical records. Lastly, the values have been extrapolated in order to avoid the problem of missing data.⁶⁶ Specifically, this technique proved useful to overcome the problem of missing information during the two World Wars in the original data, and in order to extend the usage of the dataset from 1995 to 2002. If the code starting after the end of a World War differed from the code at the outset, the code during the war was assigned as a continuation of the code at the war outset, because major regime changes generally took place in the aftermath of the World Wars. In addition, the extrapolation technique was applied to avoid missing information created by different criteria for inclusion in the Banks dataset, and in Gleditsch and Ward (1999). One example is Wurttemberg, which was included during 1816-1869 in Banks whereas Gleditsch and Ward continue to regard it as an independent state until 1871. Consequently, the information for 1870-71 was coded based on the ending years in the Banks dataset. Another example is Hesse-Darmstadt in which the data for 1867-71 was based on previous Banks coding. Another modification of the original data was smoothing the data by recoding observations classified as ‘other’ into one of the categories below. Typically, these are countries in which the head of state is classified as ‘monarch’ for a single year within a longer period of a prime minister being regarded as the effective executive.

Presidential (Pres): Systems in which the president exercises primary influence in the shaping of most major decisions affecting the state’s domestic and foreign policy. Regimes in which the effective executive was originally classified as ‘other’ or ‘military’ and the head of state was president fall into this category. The most important feature of presidential systems is that the government is appointed by and contingent on presidential approval.

Semi-presidential (Semi-pres): Systems in which a prime minister works as the head of the government (effective executive), whereas the head of state is a president. In some semi-presidential systems, the president possesses little effective power, at least in the democratic semi-

⁶⁶Extrapolation was only performed in the cases where changes in the Polity index was equal to or less than 2.

presidential states such as Finland and Iceland. However, in other semi-presidential systems, the president has some executive powers.

Parliamentary (Parl): Systems in which the executive is depending on legislative approval and in which the prime minister exercises primary influence in the shaping of most major decisions affecting the state's domestic and foreign policy. This category also encompasses parliamentary monarchies in which the head of state is a monarch, but the formal executive is the premier. An example of a parliamentary monarchy is contemporary Spain.

Autocracies: This category is descriptive of countries scoring less than 3 on the Polity index.⁶⁷

As discussed already, the distinction between democratic and autocratic governance is not always clear, especially in cases where states normally regarded as autocratic have governmental institutions similar to those in democracies. Some states are clearly autocratic, such as states ruled by the military. Other autocracies have democratic look-alike institutions, but are without democratic constraining mechanisms. Some examples are systems in which selection of the effective executive is non-elective, such as 19th century European monarchies and theocracies in the Middle East.⁶⁸ Franco's Spain falls in this category, as well as the *nomenklatura* systems in Eastern Europe.⁶⁹ As in some examples of *nomenklatura* systems, it is possible for a country to have an electoral system without actually performing elections. Other observations in this category are autocratic regimes in

⁶⁷For a closer description of the Polity index, see the definitions of democracy and autocracy above.

⁶⁸Vanhanen (2000:254) interprets systems in which the governmental institution using the highest executive or legislative power is not based on popular elections as power being concentrated in the hands of one group. Vanhanen describes these regimes as being 'military, revolutionary, non-elective autocratic governments, and monarchies in which the ruler and the government responsible to the ruler dominate and exercise executive and often also legislative power.'

⁶⁹Nomenklatura is the communist party's system of appointing key personnel in the government and other important organizations. Determining whether communist regimes were non-elective in this sense was difficult at times. The 1959 Constitution of North Korea was explicitly communist but established a symbolic president, an assembly and a council headed by the prime minister as the formally highest executive organ, when in reality all political power laid within the Political Bureau. Constitutional changes in 1980 replaced the North Korean president with the Council of State in which all power was concentrated. In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (North), Ho Chi Minh's presidential government dominated Vietnamese politics until 1959 and from 1960 until 1991. Although parliamentary elections were held, real power lay within the Communist Party. The constitutional changes in 1992 reinstated the president as the head of state, established a national assembly, and a prime minister as the head of government.

which there are no legislative or presidential elections under democratic or autocratic rule. These are Bhutan, Brunei, China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates.

As with the other regime type and governmental institutions variables, I lagged the values for type of government one year ($t - 1$).

5.2.3.3 Federal Systems

This variable was generated from a combination of sources. I started out from the Polity III Dataset's classification of 'federalism of political authority' (Gurr, Jagers and Moore, 1989; Jagers and Moore, 1996) during 1816-1994. The variable was compared to other comprehensive data sources and literature, such as Gerring and Thacker's data on unitarism (2004), Lundell and Karvonen's dataset on institutions (2003) and Lemco's study of federal governments (1991). When these sources differed, I consulted additional sources. The data was extended by following certain rules. First, I assumed continuation backward and forward of code unless there was a transition code in-between. Secondly, I assumed continuation backward and forward of code unless there was a major change in the polity code.

Gurr, Jagers and Moore (1989:21) political authority variable builds on structural patterns layed out by Eckstein and Gurr (1975). They refer to federalism of political authority as 'an important structural property of national political systems that is related to several dimensions of authority patterns [...]. In purely structural terms it is an aspect of Conformation: federal polities have greater complexity of Conformation than do centralized polities. Opportunities for Participation also tend to be higher in federal systems, and regional units of government potentially are more responsive to local inputs than are centralized governments.'

Gerring and Thacker (2002; 2004) define federalism as 'a highly institutionalized division or sharing of responsibilities between a national authority and semi-autonomous regional units.' Gerring and Thacker's data provide records of federalism during 1900-2001. Since Gurr, Jagers and Moore's and Gerring and Thacker's universe did not always correspond to that of my own (as defined by Gleditsch and Ward (1999)), I altered and checked the applicability of the data for my purpose by consulting different sources on federalism. For example, I looked at Lundell and Karvonen's (2003) comparative data set on political institutions during 1960-2002. Furthermore, Hicken and Kasuya (2003) provided an excellent source for Asia after 1945 and McHenry (1997)

offered insightful discussions of federalism in post-independent African countries. Lemco (1991) provided historical information on federations.

Since the degree to which responsibilities are shared between central and local governmental units varies and this power-division is not always formally approved by the constitution, federalism can sometimes be difficult to determine and operationalize. For example, the existence of territorial sub-divisions in a country does not necessarily mean that these regions are guaranteed autonomy. Building on the sources layed out above, my own regime classification fall into three categories:

Unitary Democracy: Elective legislatures and constitutional sovereignty centered at the national government in countries which score in the 3-10 range on the Polity index.

Semi-federal Democracy: Elective legislatures at the regional level, but constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government in countries scoring in the 3-10 range on the Polity index.

Federal Democracy: Elective regional legislatures plus constitutional recognition of sub-national authority in countries scoring in the 3-10 range on the Polity index. In this category fall countries in which the constitution formally divides legislative authority between regional and central governmental units.

Autocracy: Countries which score in the -10(-2) range on the Polity index.

Some aspects of the federal-unitary distinction are a reminder of the complexity hidden inside categories like federal and unitary, which is difficult to capture in the form used here. For example do some formally unitary regimes, such as Japan, assure substantial authority to regional governments, whereas power is very limited in other federal regimes, such as Malaysia (Hicken and Kasuya, 2003:127-128). The Philippines is fairly unitary, but is classified as mixed since substantial power is granted to governance regionally.

Similar to the electoral systems variable, I lagged the values for federalism of political authority one year ($t - 1$).

5.2.3.4 A Question of Independent Institutions?

Whether or not the institutional indicators are independent is less of a question than a matter of how they interrelate. A democracy is made up of a combination of institutions, which make them democratic in different ways. The task of looking at subsets of democracy indicates that democratic institutions are important for decision-making individually, but also suggests that some institutional combinations may be more frequent than others.

If there is a great degree of overlap between institutional variables, then they largely measure the same and there is little to gain by running individual analyses for all of them. The correlation matrix in Table 4.1 showed that the correlation between most types of democratic institutions is unproblematic at a global level. However, the correlation between democracies with majority-plurality elections and the parliamentary democracies is relatively high (Pearson's $r = 0.51$). Similarly, the correlation between democracies with proportional elections share a Pearson's $r = 0.53$ with unitary democracies. This is not statistically problematic as long as the correlated institutions are not included in the same analysis. However, it means that there is a substantial interaction, which might prove relevant to the interpretation of the results.

This analysis acknowledges the importance of the covariance between democratic institutions. However, the scope of the work is limited to laying out a foundation for analysing the importance of institutional combinations for states' international conflict behavior.

5.2.4 Measuring International Conflict

When selecting conflict indicators for quantitative purposes, I run into the problem of limited data sources.⁷⁰ Despite great attention to issues of conflict, the vast majority of quantitative research relies on the data produced by the Correlates of War Project (COW). Two trends are evident in this regard: first, researchers in the past focused on international war as the dependent variable. The COW defines international war as sustained armed conflict between two or more state members of

⁷⁰Critically assessing and evaluating quantitative data and research on conflict was the focus of attention at the Euroconference on 'Identifying Wars: Systematic Conflict Research and Its Utility in Conflict Resolution and Prevention,' at the Uppsala University, Sweden, 8-9 June, 2001. The participants at the conference compared definitions and methodology across various data projects with the intention of improving the procedures and making data more useful for the quantitative study of internal as well as international conflicts. Information about the conference and papers are available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se>. Other scholars have discussed problems of data limitations when studying conflict as well, such as getting beyond the Eurocentric worldview, which limits the analytical scope to the Westphalian state-system (Breche, 2002; Cioffi-Revilla and Lai, 2001).

the international system with a threshold of 1,000 battle deaths during the entire conflict (Small and Singer, 1982:55). A disadvantage of relying on any data is the adoption of biases already in the data through its coding and definitions. For the COW data, one such indigenous definition bias is its focus on major power interaction, which was especially prevalent during its early years. Conceding that international conflict does not only involve interaction between major powers, the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (MID) was created (Diehl, 2001; Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Jones et al., 1996). In the wake of this consent followed the second and more recent trend in the quantitative study of conflict; greater reliance on disputes. It is important to note, however, that research on international conflict has applied conceptualizations of international conflict other than that of the COW Project. Some prominent examples are the International Crisis Behavior Project (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; Hewitt, 2003) and the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data Project (Eriksson et al., 2003; Gleditsch et al., 2002).

The application of different ways of measuring the dependent variable can assist in avoiding some practical problems related to analyzing rare events. Gleditsch et al. (2002) point to the problem of meeting statistical standards when specifying a model with rare events like wars. When analyzing conflicts that meet the strict criterion of 1,000 battle deaths for the entire period of two centuries, one deals with enough events to specify a model. However, the nature of warfare has changed during the course of the past 200 years, where variations can be as extreme as clashes between small professional armies during the Napoleonic era to today's cyberwarfare (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001:9-12). It makes sense therefore, to complement an analysis that looks for general trends across time with an analysis with brackets that reflect some of the changes in warfare. The Second World War is one of the most important such brackets. However, wars that meet the 1,000 battle deaths criterion are relatively few during the post-WWII period, and I would run into statistical problems if analyzing full-scale wars only. In this respect, the lower threshold of the three datasets identified provide a greater number of events and thus, a better basis for analysis.

How international conflict is defined and measured reflects and, in turn, determines how we understand conflict. Eberwein and Chojnacki (2001) write that '...each dataset portrays a different world of violence.' In the work undertaken here, I apply three different measurements of interstate conflict: whether or not a country entered in a militarized dispute, armed conflict, or full-scale war

in a given year.⁷¹ Through this approach, I hope to demonstrate that I acknowledge limitations on generalizing and drawing conclusions about states' conflict behavior placed by the data source used.⁷² Furthermore, I intend to address the relative importance of my independent variables - governmental institutions; whether they have greater impact on some types of conflict than others.

5.2.4.1 International Armed Conflict

This variable stems from the joint data collection project on armed conflict between Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).⁷³

An 'armed conflict' is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths during the year (Gleditsch et al., 2002).⁷⁴ Armed conflicts are classified according to four levels: first, minor armed conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict; second, intermediate armed conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year); third, war (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year); and lastly, major armed conflict (includes the two most severe levels of conflict, i.e. intermediate armed conflict and war). The 2004 release of the 2.1 version of the dataset includes 43 interstate armed conflicts during 1946-2002. I use the following interpretations of interstate armed conflicts:

Armed Conflict Onset: This variable is dichotomous with the following values: 0=no interstate armed conflict started and 1=first year of armed conflict participation. This version of the variable is limited to new outbreaks by censoring incidents of conflict after the initial year. The

⁷¹The early efforts at studying conflict based on time-series treated each country year in conflict as independent observations. Counting the initial year of entry of each country is part of the effort to diminish the temporal dependence between observations.

⁷²I wish to acknowledge the importance and quality of all these different data on conflict. The argument that any data inhibit limitations in generalizability does not automatically reflect on the quality of the data.

⁷³The Uppsala Conflict Data collection originally started in 1989 with annual updates (Wallensteen and Axell, 1993; Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998, 1999, 2001). The joint Uppsala/PRIO effort extended the data back to 1946 and can be downloaded from <http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/>.

⁷⁴Further elaboration on how the separate elements of the definition are operationalized is described in Gleditsch et al. (2002).

total number of armed conflict onsets reported in the data is 159, which was reduced to 156 in the censored version of the dataset.

Armed Conflict Incidence: This is a dichotomous variable where 0=no incidence of armed conflict and 1=international armed conflict incidence. Incidence indicates whether a country participated in an armed conflict during a given year, regardless of being the first or consecutive years.

5.2.4.2 Militarized International Disputes (MID)

The term ‘militarized interstate dispute’ is defined as ‘united historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards a government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state’ (Gochman and Maoz, 1984:587; Jones et al.1996:168).⁷⁵ The incorporation of disputes short of war signifies an effort to shift the focus away from major power politics and avoiding regarding war merely as a function of reported battle deaths. In addition to looking at disputes from all hostility levels at once, from the threatening to the actual use of force and war, I single out disputes in which force was actually used and full-scale wars. The main virtues of the MID data are its long time-period and its strict coding procedures. In this work, I apply the following operationalizations of militarized interstate disputes:

MID Onset: This variable is dichotomous with the following values: 0=no dispute or war started and 1=first year of interstate dispute or war participation. This version of the variable is limited to new outbreaks by censoring incidents of conflict after the initial year. The total number of militarized interstate disputes reported in the data is 3361, which was reduced to 3213 in the censored version of the dataset.

⁷⁵The MID data is part of the COW effort and is available at <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/cow2dslist.htm>.

MID Incidence: This is a dichotomous variable where 0=no incidence of militarized interstate dispute and 1=militarized interstate dispute incidence. Incidence indicates whether a country participated in a militarized interstate dispute or war in a given year, regardless of being the first or consecutive years.

Number of MIDs: This variable reports the annual record of the number of militarized interstate disputes and wars per country, which ranges from 0 to 27.

5.2.4.3 International War (COW)

The international war variables stem from Gleditsch's (2004) expansion of the original Correlates of War (COW) dataset. An international war is defined as 'sustained combat between/among military contingents involving substantial casualties [a minimum of 1,000 battle related deaths]' during the course of the war (Sarkees, Wayman and Singer, 2003; Singer and Small, 1972; Small and Singer, 1982:55). The main benefit of Gleditsch's version of the war data is the revised criteria for system membership, which is an effort to avoid the Eurocentric bias inherent to the COW dataset. Gleditsch (2004) argues that the inclusion of states based on recognition by European major powers has great implications for the data on war. The revised dataset contains 118 international wars during 1816-2002.

War Onset: The binary variable measures 0=no use of force short of war or start of a war and 1=first year of use of force or war. This version of the variable is limited to new outbreaks by censoring incidents of conflict after the initial year.

War Incidence: The binary variable measures 0=no incidence of use of force short of war or full-scale war and 1=incidence of use of force short of war or full-scale war. Incidence indicates whether a country participated in such conflict behavior in a given year, regardless of being the first or consecutive years.

5.2.5 Measuring Control Variables

A number of control variables are included in the analysis. These are factors that researchers have established as the determinants of international conflict and which are essential in judging the relative impact of institutions. All the control variables are lagged one year ($t - 1$).

5.2.5.1 Number of Alliance Memberships

I rely on the Correlates of War ‘Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset,’ version 3.03, to specify the alliance variable (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004).⁷⁶ The original data covers the period 1816-2000 and I extended the data to 2002 by extrapolating data from year 2000. An alliance membership is defined as membership in a written defense pact, a neutrality or nonaggression pact, or an entente. In addition to including all formal alliances in one measure, I apply a variable that only incorporates defense pacts. I log transformed the variable $\log((ALLIANCES*100)+1)$ and $\log((DEFPACTS*100) + 1)$ since the marginal effect of a new ally is likely to decrease with the number of allies.

5.2.5.2 Capability

Capability is measured as log GDP, using data for independent states during 1950-1998 from the Penn World Tables (Gleditsch, 2002). I log transformed the variable in order to avoid problems with the skewed distribution in states’ level of capability. Furthermore, I included positive or negative change in log GDP from 3 years ago, $\log GDP(t) - \log GDP(t - 3)$, as controls.⁷⁷

5.2.5.3 Contiguity

Scholars have suggested different ways to measure contiguity. Early studies suggested distance between capitals as an indicator of distance (Gleditsch and Singer, 1975). More recently, Gleditsch and Ward (2000) suggested measuring the minimum distance between the closest points of non-contiguous states whereas Starr (2000) suggested that the nature of a border is crucial for the

⁷⁶Gibler and Sarkees (2004:214, fn.2) argue that the usage of the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) system membership criteria would not alter the dataset in a problematic fashion. Consequently, I choose to apply the alliance data in its original form.

⁷⁷Theoretically, the type of change relevant here has taken place over some years already and is less likely to get reversed than are shorter-term changes. The relevance of change for decision-makers is likely to be affected by their term in office, which tends to be approximately 4-years terms. In practice however, the higher the number of years applied to measure difference, the more information is lost in the data. As a compromise between theoretical expectations and practical concerns therefore, I chose change in log GDP from 3 years ago.

likelihood of conflict between states. These approaches work well if dyads are the analyzed units. Since I compare country years however, a more appropriate way of operationalizing contiguity is to count number of neighbors.

The identification of each state's number of neighbors at a given time is largely based the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data, version 3.0, which covers the period 1816-2000 (Stinnett et al., 2002). The way contiguity is measured here therefore is: the number of states with which a country is contiguous through homeland territory in a given year.⁷⁸ I coded and corrected the file according to the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) state system for the 1816-2002 time period. I log transformed the variable $\log((NEIGHBORS * 100) + 1)$ since the marginal effect of a new neighbor is likely to decrease with the number of neighbors.

5.2.5.4 Intergovernmental Organization Membership (IGOs)

The variable intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership was obtained from the Correlates of War 2 (COW2) Project (Pevehouse and Nordstrom, 2003) and measures number of IGO memberships per state per year.⁷⁹ The 2003 release of the data covers the period 1815-2000. Wallace and Singer (1970) originally defined an IGO according to three criteria: first, an IGO must consist of at least two members of the COW-defined state system, second, an IGO must hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years, and third, an IGO must possess a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters. In the revised version of the data, the first criterion was altered to require an IGO to consist of at least three members of the COW-defined state system, rather than the original two member criteria. According to Pevehouse and Nordstrom (2003), 'this point serves to delineate IGOs from other types of international organizations, such as NGOs, that have memberships comprised of non-state actors.'⁸⁰ The second and third criteria serve the purpose of distinguishing formal IGOs from ad hoc conferences with no permanent bureaucratic structure.

The Pevehouse and Nordstrom version of the IGO data does not contain membership information for all IGOs in existence between 1964 and 2000. They acknowledge that IGOs can be

⁷⁸This definition disregards colonial bordering states.

⁷⁹This part of the COW2 project is a revision and update of Wallace and Singer's (1970) collection of IGOs during 1815-1964.

⁸⁰In the new dataset, IGOs with regional governments were not excluded because these governments were seen as nominal state actors.

formed via two theoretically different processes: first, by a state and second, existing IGOs can decide to create additional IGOs or so-called ‘emanations’ (Pevehouse and Nordstrom, 2003). Version 2.1 contains only those IGOs formed directly by sovereign states. Emanations are excluded mainly because the nature of their formation is theoretically distinct from IGOs formed by states.

I extended the dataset by annualizing the five-year intervals that were based on the original Wallace and Singer version of the data during 1816-1964. When appropriate, I coded years not corresponding with the Gleditsch and Ward system definition and updated the 2001-2002 period by extrapolating data. I log transformed the variable $\log((IGO * 100) + 1)$ since the marginal effect of a new IGO membership is likely to decrease with the number of IGO memberships.

5.2.5.5 Major Power Status

In this work, the major power status variable reflects the identification of historical cases by the Correlates of War Project (Small and Singer, 1982:41-42).⁸¹ The variable has two categories:

Major power: The countries included in this list are: Austria-Hungary, (1816-1918), China (1950-2001), France (1816-1940, 1945-2001), German Federal Republic (1991-2001), Germany (Prussia) (1816-1918, 1925-1945), Italy (1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945, 1991-2001), Russia (Soviet Union) (1816-1917, 1922-2001), United Kingdom (1816-2001), and the United States (1898-2001).

Minor power: All other countries.

5.2.5.6 Region

Theoretical relationships as well as the importance of spatial dependence for international relations beg for attention to regions (O’Laughlin and Anselin, 1991). There are many historical examples of physical borders being altered by artificial boundaries created by such forces as ideology, religion or liberalism. It makes sense therefore, to run the analysis on regions modified according to the most important of such boundaries. This is especially evident in Africa where most countries above the

⁸¹The original classification covered the period 1816-1997, but was extended to 2001 under the assumption that countries holding major power status in 1997 also did so through 2001.

Sahara desert are classified as Middle Eastern.

Latin America: Geographic definition (Middle- and South America), including states in the Caribbean (corresponding to the country codes (ssno) 31-165).

The West: Geographic definition of Europe, including the states in the Caucasus, the United Kingdom, Iceland, plus the United States, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand (corresponding to the country codes (ssno) 2, 20, 200-395, 666, 900, 920).

Africa: Geographic definition, excluding states in the Middle East (see below) (corresponding to the country codes (ssno) 400-625).

The Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt, and the states of the Arabian Peninsula, excluding Israel (corresponding to the country codes (ssno) 630-698, excluding 666).

Asia: Geographic definition, including Oceania, excluding Australia and New Zealand (corresponding to the country codes (ssno) 700-990, excluding 900, 920).

5.2.5.7 Time Period

The nature of regimes and the nature of international conflict have changed throughout history (Pastor, 1999). These transformations have not taken place in isolation however. Rather, they are shaped by and contribute to changes on a much larger scale, such as in the system structure (Hobsbawm, 1994). Scholars have studied regimes from such a perspective (Huntington, 1968, 1991; Markoff, 1996), and conflict has been analyzed by many scholars in this vein (Brecke, 2002; Cioffi-Revilla and Lai, 2001; Lockhart, 1978; Melko, 1992; Pollins, 1996). Consequently, I expect the relationship between institutions and international conflict to vary according to the time period analyzed. In addition to looking at the entire period, I have selected the post World War II time periods as especially relevant for capturing the most recent dynamic between governmental institutions and conflict:

1816-2002: The first half of this time period is characterized by the establishment of the first modern democratic institutions and post-Napoleonic warfare can be characterized by relatively primitive techniques of warfare and low mobility. At the turn of the century, new ways of organizing the relationship between the governed and the governing were established. Most evident was proportional electoral systems which started spreading in the Western world at the turn of the century. The nature of warfare was transforming according to modernizing technology during this time, but mobility of forces was still relatively low.

1946-2002: This period marks a watershed in terms of the nature of both regimes and warfare. Decolonization and the end of many communist regimes established democratic institutions outside the Western world. Furthermore, modern technology diminished the importance of distance between the fighting states and introduced warfare in which human losses were diminishing (at least for some of the parties).

5.2.5.8 Trade Openness

Scholars have argued that trade reduces the likelihood of conflict between states (Oneal and Russett, 1999). The vast majority of studies analyzing the relationship between interdependence and conflict apply the dyad as their unit of analysis (Barbieri, 1996; Beck et al., 1998; Hegre, 2000; Oneal et al., 1996; Russett and Oneal, 2001).⁸² In this work's monadic approach, Oneal and Russett's concept of 'trade openness' indicates the importance of trade for a state's likelihood to get involved in conflict. Trade openness is an indicator of the economic importance and a state's dependence on trade. The more open an economy, the more dependent a state is on trade with other states, and consequently the less likely a state is to engage in conflicts.

The trade openness variable stems from the International Monetary Fund's *Direction of Trade* dataset which provide estimates of total trade (imports and exports) for each state and years for independent states during the period 1948-2000 (Gleditsch, 2002).⁸³ I logarithmically transformed

⁸²The results are ambiguous however (see for example Schneider et al., 2003), and Gartzke and Li (2003) argue that concept theorizing and operationalization partly causes the disparity. Specifically, Gartzke and Li suggest the differentiation between 'trade share' (Barbieri, 1996), 'trade dependence' (Oneal and Russett, 1999) and 'trade openness' (Russett and Oneal, 2001).

⁸³Data for the 1997-2000 period stems from coding based on the IMF *Direction of Trade Yearbook* done by Professor Andrew G. Long at the Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi. Kristan S. Gleditsch at the University of California, San Diego, integrated these data in his 'Expanded Trade and GDP Data.' In the expanded

the variable to avoid the problem of skewed distribution of national income data. Specifically, my measure of economic openness of a state in a given year is the sum of exports and imports relative to its national income. Thus, country i 's economic openness in year t is: $Country_{i,t} = (Trade_{i,t}/GDP_{i,t})$.

5.2.6 Duration Dependency Correction

One of the basic assumptions of a logistic regression model is independence between the observations. In time-series, this assumption gets violated because the likelihood of observing peace or conflict in a country one year is not independent of the likelihood of doing the same the following year. If not corrected for, the model is likely to suffer from biased parameter estimates, incorrect standard errors, and the true variance could be underestimated (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; Marsh and Cormier, 2002). In correcting such duration dependence in the dependent variable, Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998:1276) suggested the use of a natural cubic spline in a variable often referred to as peace years. Estimating splines is a fitted way of estimating the independent effect of each year in the sample. This technique allows for temporal dependence correction while avoiding the problem of running out of degrees of freedom, which would be a problem if one calculated dummy-variables for each year.

The 'peaceyears' variables indicate the numbers of consecutive years at peace prior to the current year, which means that it takes the value zero if the country was in conflict in the previous year. In Beck, Katz and Tucker terminology, the variable peace years can be described as follows: Peace years implies the number of years in peace prior to any given observation. If a country did not enter any conflicts previously, the peace years variable is $t - 1$ since the time index starts at zero. If a country entered an international conflict prior to a given year, the peace years variable is $(t - t_0)$, where t_0 is the time index of the most recent conflict entry.

Since I apply three different dependent variables, I need to generate three different 'peaceyears' variables, each correcting for duration dependence in the respective variable of conflict applied:

version of the dataset, Gleditsch deals with the problem of missing data due to poor coverage especially for developing and socialist countries (Gleditsch, 2002).

Armed Conflict Peaceyears: This is a control variable that measures the number of years elapsed since last participation in an armed conflict.

Militarized Interstate Dispute Peaceyears: This is a control variable that measures the number of years elapsed since the last participation in a militarized interstate dispute.

War Peaceyears: This is a control variable that measures the number of years elapsed since last participation in a full-scale war or the use of military force.

In a model containing splines, the changing likelihood of conflict entry is represented by a so-called ‘spline knot’ (Marsh and Cormier, 2002:2). In other words, the spline knots allow the slope of the regression line for the likelihood of conflict to change direction while still being connected.

5.2.7 Conclusion: The Relevance of the Data

How one understands the world shapes how one measures variables, how one measures the variables shapes how one understands the world. In other words, research is a cycle of conditional knowledge. This conditionality poses no threat to knowledge cumulation as long as it is overt, replicable and revisable.

How I measure the variables here is based on a combination of my own and other’s understanding of the world. What conditionality can I expect these perceptions to pose on knowledge produced from analyzing these data? First, global trends over 200 years do not necessarily tell the story of regional trends; secondly, regional trends do not automatically reveal what is going on in each single country. However, these data can potentially indicate whether and how trends within regime types and conflict vary and interact with other global and regional trends. Furthermore, results from analyzing these data can be a stepping-stone to identifying potential risks for conflict and promises for peace within a region or a single country.

Chapter 6: Empirical Results

6.1 Introduction

The empirical analysis unfolds in three main stages: The first replicates the already established theories about international conflict and extends the status quo by testing its consistency in time and space. Status quo in this field is dominated by Realist causes of conflict and monadic explanations for peace as suggested by the Democratic Peace theory. The second stage of the analysis examines the impact of governmental institutions as a refinement of the Democratic Peace and tests the robustness of these relationships over time and in space. The last stage of the analysis involves adjusting the model according to the outcome of stage two and assessing the generalizeability of the results. Together, these stages should provide a good stepping-stone for evaluating the importance of governmental institutions when democratizing for peace.⁸⁴

6.2 Evaluating the Dominant Theories

6.2.1 Examining Major Parameters for Explaining Interstate Conflict

In order to identify empirical trends of major parameters for explaining interstate conflict by Realist theory, I start out by estimating a logistic regression model with interstate conflict as explained by the following factors: alliance or defense pact memberships, capability, number of neighbors, and major power status, all as defined in Section 5.2. At this stage of the analysis, it is important to repeat that the present effort is not an attempt to test the complex theoretical relationships as

⁸⁴The analyses were carried out using STATA 9.0 (StataCorp, 2005), supplemented with the spline correction download from Tucker (1999). The graphs were computed in Excel and Stata.

specified by Realist theory, but merely to trace some of the major factors affecting states' interstate conflict behavior.

The starting point is a pooled time-series analysis of international conflict during 1951-1999. Despite being interested in the entire 1816-2001 time span, this shortened time period is selected based on the range of the GDP data used to measure states' capability. Unfortunately, the precision of economic indicators like GDP tends to diminish with time, and is less reliable for poor countries or at times of domestic governmental turmoil or war. The 1951-1999 time period therefore, is the longest range that all the factors associated with war can be modeled together as hypothesized in Chapter 4.4.

The probability that a country i will experience conflict at time t can be expressed as a logistic regression equation,

$$\hat{p}(C_{i,t}) = \left[\frac{1}{1 + \exp^{-(\alpha + \beta_1 \log \text{alliances}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \log \text{GDP}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \log \text{neighbors}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \text{power}_{i,t-1})}} \right], \quad (6.2)$$

where $\hat{p}(C_{i,t})$ denotes the estimated probability of interstate conflict in country i in year t , variable $\log \text{alliances}_{i,t-1}$ indicates country i 's value of the logalliances variable at time $t - 1$.

Table 6.1 shows the estimated results of equation 6.2 during 1951-1999. The four columns to the right indicate the results for the model when using four different measurements of interstate conflict incidence. The significant likelihood ratio chi-square tests show that the model yields significant improvement over the null model for all of the four conflict measures. The pseudo- R^2 statistics suggest that the overall fit of the model is weak, but consistent in terms of strength across all four conflict measures used. It is important to keep the reminder of Aldrich and Nelson (1984:59) in mind that the pseudo- R^2 should be used with caution in order to avoid misinterpretation.

Since it is the relationships rather than comparison of their exact magnitude that are important at this stage, I report coefficients rather than log odds or beta weights here.⁸⁵ The directions of the coefficients are mixed, which differs from the expectation that all these factors increase states' likelihood of participating in interstate conflict. The impact of alliance membership varies depending on the types of alliances included. Whereas alliances in general are associated with an increased

⁸⁵The relative importance of the independent indicators can only be assessed if all the independent variables are measured in the same units or if they are transformed by calculating log odds or beta weights.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE	DISPUTE INCIDENCE	WAR INCIDENCE
Log Defense Pacts, $t - 1$	-0.08*** (0.023)	-0.04*** (0.011)	-0.09*** (0.029)
Log Capability, $t - 1$	0.17*** (0.031)	0.21*** (0.015)	0.12*** (0.038)
Log Neighbors, $t - 1$	-0.07** (0.026)	0.013*** (0.015)	-0.03 (0.034)
Major Power, $t - 1$	1.38*** (0.205)	1.70*** (0.190)	1.46*** (0.252)
Constant	-6.41*** (0.723)	-6.07*** (0.356)	-5.98*** (0.899)
Model LR- X^2	133.03 (df=4)	595.46 (df=4)	71.71 (df=4)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.05	0.07	0.04
N	6558	6537	6565
Y=1	351	2337	220

Significance Level: * $p <= 0.05$, ** $p <= 0.01$, *** $p <= 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.1: Logit Regression of Interstate Conflict Incidence, 1951-1999 (Without Temporal Auto-correlation Correction)

likelihood of conflict, the relation turns negative when looking at defense pacts and proves significant for armed conflicts, disputes and full-scale wars. One very consistent effect, however, is that of major power status which is associated with an increase in the likelihood of conflict incidence across all the measurements used. This is hardly surprising since major powers per definition have the capability to engage militarily with a large number of states. The number of neighbors a country has does not significantly affect the likelihood of full-scale war, which in lieu of the importance of major power status may indicate that costly wars are the result of carefully calculated costs and benefits rather than rivalry on a smaller scale that is more easily prompted between neighbors. Furthermore, whereas having more neighboring countries is negatively associated with the incidence of armed conflicts, it is associated with a higher likelihood of disputes. These results suggest that the causes of war may vary with the operationalization of conflict applied.

The operationalization of the dependent variable is not only a function of the type of conflict one chooses to include, but also how one measures the particular conflict. The discussion of measurements and their statistical and theoretical implications is ongoing, as indicated in Chapter 5.1.6. While Russett and Oneal (2001:309) claim that conflict incidence like that reported in Table

6.1 is an appropriate way to measure conflict, other scholars argue that there is a qualitative difference between the first and the subsequent years in conflict. Russett and Oneal base their claim on the assumption of rational leaders consistently re-evaluating the decision to use force. However, acknowledging that an already started conflict may take on a dynamic of its own and the option of ending it may not merely be a matter of choice, the estimation of Model 1 is repeated, excluding ongoing conflict years as suggested by Bremer (1993) and others (see for example Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998).

Table 6.2 provides the estimated results of equation 6.2 for conflict onset, excluding the ongoing conflict years, during the 1951-1999 period. The likelihood ratio chi-square tests reject the null hypothesis and the pseudo- R^2 statistics are similar to that of conflict incidence, weak but consistent across all the measurements of conflict onset. Differently from conflict incidence, the direction of the coefficients now closely follows the expectations as hypothesized in Chapter 4.4, all being associated with an increased likelihood of conflict onset. The only exception is the impact of alliance memberships. Most importantly, it is the impact of all alliances that turns out to be significant, rather than the defense pacts. Furthermore, as long as the effects are significant, alliances in general are consistently associated with an increased likelihood of conflict as opposed to the negative impact of defense pacts. The impact of number of neighbors is positive, and the unexpected negative associations suggested in Table 6.1 are now positive, but insignificant. In addition to alliances being significantly associated with the onset of conflict as opposed to the more narrow defense pact measure, one striking result of Model 1 as estimated with the onset measure is power status being the only variable associated with the onset of full-scale wars. The overall results in Table 2 support the suggestion from Table 1 that different types of conflicts may have different explanations.

The possibility of one country being involved in more than one conflict per year is left out when measuring conflict in terms of conflict incidence or conflict onset. It makes sense to argue that a country engaged in a large number of conflicts is more aggressive than a country involved in a small number of conflicts. Model 1 is tested, therefore, in a multiple regression analysis where measuring conflict as the total number of conflicts a country is involved in per year. For such a measure to be meaningful, the dependent variable has to be measured at the interval level, with properties such as being continuous and unbounded (Berry, 1993). Since the interstate armed conflict or full-scale war

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE	WAR INCIDENCE
Log Alliances, $t - 1$	0.11* (0.043)		0.06 (0.053)
Log Defense Pacts, $t - 1$		-0.04*** (0.012)	
Log Capability, $t - 1$	0.13** (0.049)	0.21*** (0.016)	0.10 (0.064)
Log Neighbors, $t - 1$	0.11 (0.059)	0.15*** (0.017)	0.11 (0.075)
Major Power, $t - 1$	0.88** (0.31)	1.84*** (0.190)	1.24*** (0.388)
Constant	-7.99*** (1.171)	-6.42*** (0.383)	-7.52*** (1.519)
Model LR- X^2	54.79 (df=4)	616.27 (df=4)	33.90 (df=4)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.04	0.08	0.04
N	6346	6119	6426
Y=1	139	1919	81

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.2: Logit Regression of Interstate Conflict Onset, 1951-1999 (Without Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

variables are discrete, with 3 and 4 being the highest number of conflicts a country participated in per year, these conflict variables are not appropriate for a regression model.

The likelihood that a country i will experience conflict at time t can be expressed as a multiple regression equation,

$$y(C_{i,t}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log \text{alliances}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \log \text{GDP}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \log \text{neighbors}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \text{power}_{i,t-1}, \quad (6.3)$$

where equation 6.3 represents the relationship between the dependent variable number of interstate crises or disputes in country i at a time t , $E(C_{i,t})$, and the independent variables, such as $\log \text{alliances}_{i,t-1}$ which indicates country i 's value of the logalliances variable at time $t - 1$. The β_0 parameter indicates the y -intercept and β_1, \dots, β_4 are the slopes for the independent variable.

Thus, Table 6.3 provides the estimated results of equation 6.3 for number of militarized interstate disputes during the 1951-1999 period. The F-tests suggest that the model provides a significant improvement over the null hypothesis. The R^2 statistics show that the total variation of the dependent variable explained by the model is relatively high for interstate disputes (18.6 percent). The regression coefficient, β , shows the average increase in the dependent variable with one unit increase in the independent variable, holding all the other independent variables constant. Overall, the direction of the coefficients follow the same pattern as when estimating equation 6.2 by using conflict incidence and conflict onset. That is, an increase in the number of alliance memberships, number of neighbors or capability, and being a major power, are all factors associated with a greater likelihood of conflict involvement. Again, the exception is the impact of defense pacts, a subset of the general alliance variable, which is negatively associated with dispute involvement. The results from Table 6.3 support the hypothesized associations between Realist factors and conflict.

The variance-covariance matrixes for Tables 6.1-D.2 show no problematic correlation between the independent variables. One exception however, is the collinearity between the variables GDP and major power status with levels that vary between -0.50 and -0.58 for three out of the four conflict measures used. There is little covariance between GDP and major power status when looking at militarized interstate disputes, but proves highest when estimating full-scale wars. This is not a problem that needs to be corrected for, but rather an indication that the interesting covariance between the two relevant variables needs to be better incorporated in some of the models. This

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NUMBER OF DISPUTES
Log Defense Pacts, $t - 1$	-0.04*** (0.006)
Log Capability, $t - 1$	0.10*** (0.008)
Log Neighbors, $t - 1$	0.06*** (0.008)
Major Power, $t - 1$	2.35*** (0.084)
Constant	-1.85*** (0.190)
F-test	373.86 (df=4)
Prob > F	0.000
R^2	0.19
N	6537

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.3: Regression of Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1951-1999 (Without Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

finding is hardly surprising, but rather supports the notion of major powers as generally having a relatively high GDP.

Three points need to be emphasized in a summary assessment of the above efforts at estimating Model 1: First, there are strong reasons to believe that the explanations suggested by Realist theory have an impact on state's conflict behavior towards other states. Secondly, the results suggest that the impact of alliance memberships might be more complex than what is modeled here. Thirdly, the results propose that different types of conflict may encompass properties that require different explanations. In other words, although the direction of the Realist causes of war were mostly as hypothesized, they did not universally prove significant to the different measurements of interstate conflict.

6.2.2 Accounting for Temporal Dependence When Explaining Interstate Conflict

Since much of the contemporary research on conflict adopts cross-sectional time-series (CSTS) designs, an ongoing discussion has been prompted that evaluates the positive and negative aspects of these approaches. Recall, that one of the most serious problems with a CSTS structure of data

is that one can no longer assume that one observation is independent of another (the problem of autocorrelation or serial dependence). In terms of a country's likelihood of participating in interstate conflict this implies that the likelihood of a given country being involved in conflict one year is probably not independent of whether it experienced conflict during the previous year. Likewise, the probability of a country staying in peace in the future depends on its history of peace. In other words, the longer the number of years a country was peaceful, the more likely it is to remain so in the future. As discussed in Chapter 5.1.6, not taking the problems associated with this type of research seriously may lead to what is often referred to as an omitted variable bias, which may imply incorrect parameters and standard errors, and underestimating the true variance of the estimates.

It is unclear at this point, to which extent temporal autocorrelation affects the status quo of the causes of war as modeled above. To some degree, focusing on onset and censoring ongoing conflict years in the previous section deals with serial correlation between conflict years. However, a country's years in peace are also exposed to serial correlation. Taking the CSTS criticism seriously therefore, implies a closer attention to the concerns associated with temporal dependency when seeking to establish main empirical trends of the causes of war in the data material of this dissertation. Beck, Katz and Tucker's (1998) suggest how to test the impact of temporal dependence without having to specify its exact form. This duration dependence test can be represented by a linear term called 'peaceyears' and three so-called 'spline' variables. This procedure incorporates the length of the time period in peace for a country and how this affects the country's likelihood of conflict.⁸⁶ Following the approach by Gleditsch (2002b:80), I define the duration dependence term as variable $\tau_{i,t}$ indicating the number of consecutive years that unit i has not experienced conflict up to time $t-1$. Furthermore, conditioning on $\tau_{i,t}$ enables me to incorporate the effects of temporal dependence on the likelihood of new conflict in the model. This term will be somewhat affected by the problem of left censoring, or in other words, the lack of information prior to the first observation in the sample. Since I have data dating back to 1816 for disputes and full-scale wars and to 1918 for crises, this would mainly be a problem when applying armed conflict as the dependent variable. However, since the scope of

⁸⁶Despite the increasing trend in incorporating this type of serial dependency correction by scholars in International Relations, the actual interpretation of the parameters are virtually non-existent. This may be explained by the lack of a theoretical accurate expectation of how the course of time affects the likelihood of peace and conflict, but also that there seems to be little consensus about the interpretation. Some recent examples of prominent studies that incorporate the serial dependence correction without engaging much in substantial interpretation are: Gartzke and Li (2003), Oneal and Russett (1999), Prins (2003) and Walter (2004). Some exceptions to this trend are Gleditsch (2002) and Lektzian and Souva (2001).

the analysis performed in this chapter covers the 1951-1999 time period, using the armed conflict variable incorporates the history of peace and conflict dating back to 1946. Given the expectation that the impact of time at peace diminishes with each additional year at peace, the left censoring problem should not considerably affect the results.

The probability that a country i will experience conflict at time t when corrected for temporal dependency can be expressed as a logistic regression equation,

$$\hat{p}(C_{i,t}) = \left[\frac{1}{1 + \exp^{-(\alpha + \beta_1 \logdefpacts_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \log GDP_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \logneighbors_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 power_{i,t-1} + S(\tau_{i,t}))}} \right], \quad (6.4)$$

where $\hat{p}(C_{i,t})$ denotes the estimated probability of interstate conflict in country i in year t , variable $\logdefpacts_{i,t-1}$ indicates country i 's value of the logalliances variable at time $t-1$, and $S(\tau_{i,t})$ equals the smooth function of time elapsed since either the initial observations or the last observation of conflict, $\beta_5 peaceyears_{i,t} + \beta_6 spline1_{i,t} + \beta_7 spline2_{i,t} + \beta_8 spline3_{i,t}$.⁸⁷

Table 6.4 shows the estimated results of equation 6.4 using four different indicators of conflict incidence during the 1951-1999 time period. The importance of these results is to show the impact of including corrections for temporal serial correlation in peace and conflict as opposed to the uncorrected estimation of the model presented in Table 6.1. The likelihood ratio chi-square tests show that the model yields significant improvement over the null model for all of the four conflict measures, each with greatly improved values compared to the model run without the serial dependence correction. The same tendency is evident for the pseudo- R^2 statistics, which indicates that the overall fit of the model is greatly improved. Taken together, these results suggest that the model incorporates some degree of temporal dependence and that interstate conflict is much better understood by incorporating these associations. After concluding that the data applied here does incorporate serial dependence, the next steps are looking at the nature of the autocorrelation and whether it affects the other variables included in the model.

The impact of the duration of peace on a country's likelihood of experiencing interstate conflict, the 'peaceyears' variable, shows that the effect of additional years at peace decreases with time. The result is significant and strong across all conflict measures. The notably small size of

⁸⁷Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998:1270-1271) explain how smoothing is obtained by using natural cubic splines.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE	WAR INCIDENCE
Log Defense Pacts, $t - 1$	-0.03 (0.027)	-0.03* (0.013)	-0.03 (0.033)
Log Capability, $t - 1$	0.18*** (0.036)	0.13*** (0.017)	0.20*** (0.045)
Log Neighbors, $t - 1$	-0.06* (0.03)	0.07*** (0.017)	-0.04 (0.038)
Major Power, $t - 1$	0.25 (0.239)	1.27*** (0.204)	0.20 (0.291)
Peaceyears	-0.85*** (0.054)	-0.67*** (0.025)	-0.64*** (0.047)
Spline1	-0.009*** (0.0009)	-0.000008** (0.000003)	-0.003*** (0.0004)
Spline2	0.005*** (0.0006)	-0.009*** (0.0005)	0.001*** (0.0002)
Spline3	-0.0008*** (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001*** (0.00002)
Constant			
Model LR- X^2	856.15 (df=8)	2063.52 (df=8)	622.78 (df=8)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.31	0.24	0.32
N	6558	6537	6565
Y=1	351	2337	220

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.4: Logit Regression of Interstate Conflict Incidence, 1951-1999 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

the spline coefficients indicate that the relationship between years elapsed and conflict is relatively consistent, but may incorporate non-linear effects. Since there is no theoretical basis from which to choose a number of years as more important than another when testing for duration dependence, the procedure determines the so-called ‘knots’ or points in time where the likelihood of conflict changes. Trying to more closely interpret the impact of time on conflict and peace does not seem warranted at this point in the analysis therefore.

How did the model correction affect the independent variables? The impact of the correction did not seem evident in the direction of the coefficients, but rather in their size and significance. Without assessing exact magnitude, it seems pretty obvious that the great impact major power status had on a country’s propensity to participate in conflict is largely reduced. In fact, major power status is not even significant for the incidence of armed conflict or full-scale war. Another very noticeable effect of the incorporation of the temporal serial correction is defense pacts and major power status no longer being significant for the full-scale war measure. Thus, of all the independent variables included in the model, the only significant factor left to explain full-scale war is that of capability.

The censoring of ongoing conflict years as done in Table 6.2 not only serves as defining a specific aspect of conflict, but also serves as a correction of temporal dependence of conflict. As discussed earlier, the argument that looking at the first year of a conflict, censoring the ongoing conflict years, is sufficient for dealing with autocorrelation problems of CSTS data is still disputed. Table 6.5 shows the results of equation 6.4 for conflict onset during 1951-1999, using four different measures of interstate conflict. Table 6.5 shows the effect of combining the censoring of ongoing conflict observations as done in Table 6.2 with the BKT approach. Both the results for the likelihood ratio chi-square tests and the pseudo- R^2 statistics suggest some improvement in model fit as compared to the results of Table 6.2. At the same time as improving the overall fit of the model, the BKT correction did not alter the results for the model when looking at crisis and dispute onset other than slightly reducing the impact of major power status. The BKT correction does not significantly impact the likelihood of armed conflict onset, which makes me conclude that excluding the ongoing conflict years sufficiently dealt with the autocorrelation problem in this case. Similarly, the BKT correction does not explain much of the variation in the outbreak of full-scale war. However, the correction does produce the same parameter results as when correcting for serial dependence in con-

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT ONSET	MILITARIZED DISPUTE ONSET	WAR ONSET
Log Defense Pacts, $t - 1$	0.02 (0.639)	-0.03* (0.033)	0.02 (0.714)
Log Capability, $t - 1$	0.18*** (0.000)	0.14*** (0.000)	0.17** (0.010)
Log Neighbors, $t - 1$	0.13* (0.03)	0.09*** (0.000)	0.12 (0.112)
Major Power, $t - 1$	0.51 (0.124)	1.43*** (0.000)	0.73 (0.078)
Peaceyears	0.02 (0.069)	-0.51*** (0.023)	0.13 (0.067)
Spline1	0.001 (0.001)	-0.0000007* (0.0000003)	0.001** (0.0004)
Spline2	-0.0006 (0.0007)	-0.005*** (0.0004)	-0.0006** (0.0002)
Spline3	0.00004 (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)	-0.00007* (0.00003)
Constant	-8.32*** (1.230)	-3.39*** (0.425)	-8.89*** (1.567)
Model LR- X^2	70.85 (df=8)	1583.79 (df=8)	58.6 (df=8)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.05	0.21	0.07
N	6346	6119	6426
Y=1	139	1919	81

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.5: Logit Regression of Interstate Conflict Onset, 1951-1999 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

flict incidence, Table 6.4, leaving capability as the only significant explanatory factor. The general conclusion of the results in Table 6.5 therefore, is that the further impact of modeling temporal serial correlation as prescribed by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) proves less important when the ongoing conflict years are excluded from the analysis.

Finally, the significance of the BKT correction for the numbers of conflicts is tested. The likelihood that a country i will experience n number of conflicts at time t when corrected for temporal dependency can be expressed as a multiple regression equation,

$$y(C_{i,t}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \logdefpacts_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \logGDP_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \logneighbors_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 power_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 peaceyears_{i,t} + \beta_6 spline1_{i,t} + \beta_7 spline2_{i,t} + \beta_8 spline3_{i,t}, \quad (6.5)$$

where equation 6.5 represents the relationship between the dependent variable, number of interstate conflicts in country i at a time t , $y(C_{i,t})$, and the independent variables, such as $\logdefpacts_{i,t-1}$ which indicates country i 's value of the logalliances variable at time $t-1$. The β_0 parameter indicates the y -intercept and β_1, \dots, β_4 are the slopes for the independent variables.

Table 6.6 displays the estimated results for equation 6.5 during the 1951-1999 time period, using number of crises and number of disputes as dependent variables. The results for the F-tests show that the goodness of fit is reduced by 33.48, with an increase of 4 degrees of freedom when looking at disputes. However, the overall variance explained by the corrected models improved for both conflict measures. At the same time as improving the explained variance from 6 to 18 percent, the effect of all the other variables remained fairly close to the uncorrected model in Table 6.3. The same pattern is evident when looking at disputes. Taken together, these results suggest that the BKT serial dependency correction does not alter the association between the independent variables and the number of conflicts a country participates in, but that it improves the overall fit of the model.

The variance-covariance matrixes for Tables 6.4-3.6 show largely the same results as those estimated for the uncorrected models of the causes of war. Again it is the variables major power status and capability that covary. The problematic correlations are between -0.51 and -0.57, in which the strongest association is found when analyzing onset of full-scale war. The latter may explain why major power status as opposed to log GDP turned insignificant in the corrected version of the model. Per definition, the spline and the peaceyear parameters covary a great deal.

What then is the overall impression left of the impact of the correction in temporal serial dependence? First, the results of the coefficients estimated in the corrected models suggest that they may be less important in explaining interstate conflict than previously assumed. This is especially true for the major power status-variable. Secondly, the corrections do not significantly change the direction of the relationships between the independent and the dependent variables. Thirdly, the results suggest that temporal autocorrelation is less prevalent in the analyses that had already censored ongoing conflict years. The analysis above seems a reasonable basis for concluding that correction for temporal serial correlation is a necessary step to enhance the accuracy of the results. From now on therefore, all analyses performed in this dissertation will incorporate such measures.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NUMBER OF DISPUTES
Log Defense Pacts, $t - 1$	-0.03*** (0.000)
Log Capability, $t - 1$	0.03*** (0.000)
Log Neighbors, $t - 1$	0.03*** (0.000)
Major Power, $t - 1$	2.13*** (0.000)
Peaceyears	-0.27*** (0.00)
Spline1	-0.000003*** (0.000)
Spline2	-0.004*** (0.000)
Spline3	0.001*** (0.000)
Constant	-0.06 (0.767)
F-test	340.38 (df=8)
Prob > F	0.000
R^2	0.29
N	6537

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.6: Regression of Number of Militarized Disputes, 1951-1999 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

6.2.3 Spatial Variation in Explanations for Interstate Conflict

The analysis just performed has been very useful in establishing important empirical trends of explanations for interstate conflict in the data material of this dissertation. I have argued earlier, however, that the usefulness of the knowledge achieved through pooled analyses for understanding conflict and peace depends on the trends apparent in disaggregated analyses. With respect to temporal relevance, the sum of observations for an entire half a century may disguise trends in which the start of the period differs largely from the end of the period. Regardless of whether the factors shaping conflict and peace recur in history, it may be especially important to understand the factors that are most influential at the present time. After all, the impact of history diminishes with time. In terms of spatial relevance, testing whether the pooled relationships established are mirrored in a disaggregated analysis warrants attention to different regions. Countries within a region tend to experience similar political, economic and social phenomena, which in turn play multifaceted roles in shaping the conditions for conflict and prospects for peace. The presence, nature of, and interplay between these phenomena vary between different regions and in turn, generate contexts that can not automatically be assumed universal in affecting states' likelihood of conflict involvement. Acknowledging the potential limitation of pooled analyses therefore, begs for checking the spatial relevance of the knowledge established above.

Is there spatial variation and what does it look like? Two types of spatial variation are relevant: first, *inter-regional variation* suggests that the phenomena of interest are affected by systemic factors, and second, *intra-regional variation*, suggesting that each region hosts unique associations between the phenomena. Inter-regional variation can be corrected for by including dummy variables for n-1 regions, where the excluded category is the reference category. Systemic factors are relevant and interesting for understanding international conflict, but not the focus of attention in this work. Although not specifying the nature of inter-regional effects, Tables 6.4-6.6 were re-estimated, including regional dummy variables to check whether the models were affected by systemic associations. Since these results work as stepping-stones for more relevant results, the tables are not reported or elaborated on in detail. Some comments about the results are still warranted. Tables 6.4-6.6 include four dummy variables, specifying regions; Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, choosing the West as reference category. When correcting for inter-regional variation, the results largely remained the same as the previous models for international

VARIABLES	LATIN AMERICA	THE WEST	AFRICA	THE MIDDLE EAST	ASIA	TOTAL
Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	0.9 (13)	5.6 (114)	2.0 (41)	8.3 (61)	12.3 (171)	5.3 (400)
Dispute Incidence 1816-2001	22.4 (795)	28.7 (1547)	21.1 (541)	40.0 (488)	35.4 (806)	27.8 (4177)
War Incidence 1816-2002	3.5 (124)	7.3 (397)	2.3 (60)	6.9 (85)	8.3 (192)	5.7 (858)
Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	0.8 (11)	2.2 (44)	1.4 (28)	4.2 (31)	3.2 (45)	2.1 (159)
Dispute Onset 1816-2001	17.3 (613)	23.5 (1269)	17.2 (442)	32.8 (400)	28.0 (637)	22.4 (3361)
War Onset 1816-2002	1.3 (45)	3.3 (179)	0.9 (24)	3.5 (43)	2.6 (61)	2.3 (352)

Note: Compare across regions (column percentages) for each conflict indicator.

Table 6.7: Summary of Conflict Observations in Different Regions (Percentages, N)

conflict involvement with temporal dependence corrections. The only major difference was the negative impact of defense pact memberships changing to positive.

Intra-regional variation is the main focus of this dissertation, which is best analyzed by running separate analyses for each region. What are the nature of the regional differences? This question is best addressed by comparing the frequency of the conflict measures between regions and secondly, by re-estimating Tables 6.4-3.6 for each of the five regions of interest.

Table 6.7 shows the percentages of conflict observations for all the bivariate dependent variables across regions during the range of the individual variable. When assessed from the distribution of conflict indicators displayed here, the Middle East and Asia appear as the most conflict-ridden regions in general. Asia has the largest proportion of armed conflict incidence with 12.3 percent, followed by 8.3 percent in the Middle East. When looking at the onset of armed conflict, these regions still experience a higher number of conflicts than other regions. The ratio between incidence and onset indicates that the conflicts are longer lasting in Asia. The geographical distribution of interstate conflict is similar when looking at the indicators of militarized interstate disputes. The

	ARMED CONFLICTS	MILITARIZED DISPUTES	FULL-SCALE WARS
LATIN AMERICA	Defpacts (+) Neighbors (+)	Defpacts (-) Capability (+)	
THE WEST	Defpacts (+) Neighbors (-) Mpower (+)	Capability (+) Mpower (+)	Neighbors (-) Mpower (+)
AFRICA	Capability (+) Neighbors (-)	Capability (+) Neighbors (+)	Capability (+)
THE MIDDLE EAST		Capability (+) Neighbors (+)	Defpacts (+) Neighbors (+)
ASIA	Capability (+)	Capability (+) Neighbors (+) Mpower (+)	

Note: Parentheses show direction of the coefficients.

Table 6.8: Summary of Intra-regional Realist Explanations for Interstate Conflict, 1951-1999

proportion of disputes is relatively high in all regions, both when looking at incidence and on onset. However, the Middle East and Asia have proportions clearly above any of the other regions. Likewise, the results for full-scale wars suggest that the Middle East and Asia, together with the West, are among the most war-ridden regions. As in the distribution of armed conflicts, the ratio between onset and incidence of war suggests that Asian countries remain in longer-lasting wars than countries in other regions. Another aspect seems worth noting with respect to the geographical distribution of full-scale war is that less than one percent of all African observations are onset of full-scale wars.

The inclusion of regional dummy variables in the regression analyses and the regional frequencies of international conflict suggested that conflict patterns vary between geographical regions. To what extent then, are the explanations for conflict, as suggested by the Realist status quo, present in each region? In order to answer this question, Tables 6.4-6.6 were reiterated for each of the five regions specified. These tables are not listed here for the sake of saving space, but showed that different factors play the most determining role in different regions and that the likelihood of conflict involvement increases for major powers and states with a high capability level across all conflicts.

Table 6.8 summarizes the main intra-regional trends in the performance of the Realist explanations for international conflict during 1951-1999.

In Latin America, explanations vary with type of conflict. The likelihood of involvement in armed conflicts increases with higher numbers of neighbors and defense pacts, whereas capability

best explains involvements in militarized disputes. However, none of the factors specified from Realist theory explain states' involvement in full-scale international war in Latin America.

In the West, major power status is strongly associated with and increased likelihood of involvement regardless of conflict type. Countries classified as major powers during parts of the 1951-1999 time period are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Also, more neighbors are not associated with a greater likelihood of conflict involvement in the West. In addition to the impact of major power status, the likelihood of armed conflict involvement increases with an increase in defense pact memberships, whereas dispute involvement rises with capability.

The patterns are different when looking at Africa. Capability is the greatest explanatory factor, regardless of conflict type. Having more neighbors increases states' likelihood of getting involved in militarized disputes, but is negatively related to the likelihood of armed conflict involvement. Major powers are absent in Africa and do not explain states' conflict involvement by African countries. This does not imply that major status in general is irrelevant when explaining international conflicts in Africa. Rather, major power involvement in Africa is part of inter-regional explanations for conflict that is not modeled here.

In the Middle East, the explanations for interstate conflict, as specified by Realist theory, are not very successful in explaining armed conflict involvement. As in Africa, the major power status variable is dropped from the analysis due to the absence of major powers in the Middle East. The variable that most clearly increases the likelihood of conflict involvement in the Middle East is number of neighboring states. The more neighbors a state has, the more likely it is to get involved in disputes or full-scale wars. In addition, an increase in the number of defensepact memberships is associated with an increased likelihood of full-scale war and capability is positively associated with dispute involvement in the Middle East.

Despite being the overall most conflict-ridden region, the results for Asia are not good explanations for armed conflicts and full-scale war involvement among Asian countries. However, capability has a positive effect on the likelihood of armed conflict involvement. As has been evident in other regions, the strongest and most significant effects appear when analyzing disputes. The likelihood of dispute involvement increases with major power status (China and Japan), capability and more neighbors in Asia.

6.2.4 Some Stylized Facts About Explanations for Interstate Conflict

It is clear that a good understanding of the complexities of explanations for conflict needs to be based on analyses much more sophisticated than those performed here. However, the relevance of the present analysis lies in establishing a basis for pursuing the question of whether domestic institutions can influence states' conflict behavior? In this respect, I claim that the analyses are sufficient in describing the general performance of some main explanations for states' interstate conflict behavior.

It is time to suggest some stylized facts about the explanations for interstate conflict. Most importantly, when comparing results of the pooled analysis with subsets based on regions, the global pattern is not always reflected in the regions. This points to the difference between inter-regional and intra-regional explanations for conflict. Both types of variation are needed to understand conflict, but the effects are not additive and must be analyzed separately. Whereas one approach focuses on systemic factors, the other approach emphasized shared histories and local understandings that tend to follow regional boundaries. This work acknowledges these differences, but focuses on intra-regional complexities. One example is useful. Whereas the analysis above suggests that major power status is the strongest explanation for international conflict behavior in the pooled analysis, regional variation shows that only states in the West and Asia are classified as major powers. Major power status is useless when seeking explanations for conflict involvement among African states. Again, this does not suggest that the influence of major powers is absent from African wars, but rather that this explanation exists in a different analytical framework. Major power status is not a feature of African states that prompt international conflict.

Not only are there regional variations in explaining conflict. The results also suggest that that a binary understanding of conflict falls short of acknowledging the complexities in explanations for different types of interstate conflicts. Specifically, the analysis shows that factors affecting states' involvement in armed conflicts differ from those explaining involvement in militarized disputes or full-scale war. Taken together, these results do not disprove Realist explanations for interstate conflict, but suggest that they may be overrated and they vary spatially.

6.2.5 Examining Major Parameters for Explaining Peace

In order to build a stepping-stone for evaluating the importance of governmental institutions for the idea of democratizing for peace, accounting for Realist explanations for interstate conflict is not sufficient. Examining the major parameters of the explanations for peace is also necessary. In the framework applied here, proponents of peace are equivalent to those specified by the classical democratic peace and the more recent triangular peace theory; democratic governance, economic interdependence and networking countries. Three steps replicate the status quo of the proponents of peace. The first step looks at the bivariate relationship between democracy and interstate conflict, which takes issue with one of the cornerstones of the democratic peace, namely whether democracies and autocracies' conflict behavior differ. The second step incorporates trade and international organizations, which Russett and Oneal (2001) denote a 'triangulating peace.' The third step tests whether the hypothesized relationships are mirrored in different regions.

6.2.6 Are Democracies More Peaceful?

The essence of the democratic peace idea builds on the observation that democracies do not fight against each other, which stands in stark contrast to the observation that democracies are generally involved in conflict as much as autocratic states. Consequently, it is incorrect to conclude that democracies are more peaceful than autocratic states. Nevertheless, it is the nuances in regimes' general conflict behavior that becomes interesting when seeking to better understand the prospects for peace. At the center of such a quest stand different ways of addressing the question of whether some regimes are more peaceful than others. As opposed to the general consensus that democratic states maintain peace among themselves, the general peacefulness of democracies is still disputed. Some scholars have suggested that democracies' conflict involvement is a matter of self-defense and thus, in reality, they are more peaceful. Since this dissertation focuses on the importance of domestic properties of states for their conflict behavior internationally, testing the status of the democratic peace implies investigating whether democracies are more peaceful than autocracies?

Similar to the analysis of Realist explanations for interstate conflict, the point of departure is the pooled time-series analysis of regimes and conflict between states. Since the data on regime types covers the entire time span of the analysis, the temporal coverage of the results are determined by the coverage of the different dependent conflict indicators. Therefore, the results for armed conflicts

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	ARMED CONFLICTS 1946-2001	MILITARIZED DISPUTES 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WARS 1816-2002
Incidence	0.03	0.12**	0.002
Onset	-0.10	0.14**	-0.13
Number of Conflicts		0.06**	

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table 6.9: Summary of Logistic Regressions of Democracy on Interstate Conflict (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

cover the period 1946-2002, whereas interstate disputes and full-scale wars both date back to 1816 and end in 2001 and 2002 respectively.

Since the relevance of modeling the bivariate relationship between regime type and conflict is to establish a basis for more extensive analyses, the most relevant results for the different conflict indicators are combined in one table. The results for the temporal serial correlation parameters and the constants are excluded.

Table 6.9 summarizes logistic regression analyses of the effect of democracy on interstate conflict.

The effect of democracy shows some variation with type of conflict. The results show no significant difference between democracy and autocracy for armed conflicts and full-scale war involvement. However, democracies are significantly more likely to get involved in militarized disputes than autocratic states. Thus, the results for armed conflicts and full-scale wars support the proposition that democracies are as conflict prone as autocracies. The results for militarized disputes on the other hand, suggest that democracies may be the most conflict prone.

These diverging results warrant a closer look at the association between democracy and dispute involvement. In addition to interpreting participation at the outset of a conflict as being more aggressive than joining later, the nature of a conflict may also be seen as measuring different degrees of aggressiveness. Specifically, assuming that the actual course of a conflict reflects decision-making intentions, one could argue that participation in a full-scale war indicates greater aggressiveness than in any other dispute that never reaches this hostility level. Since the operationalization of militarized disputes incorporates both serious and less serious confrontations between states, the question is on which types of disputes the results are based? Overall, 16.45 percent of the total

number of militarized interstate dispute incidence observations involved full-scale war, which means that most of the results are based on confrontations short of war. When looking at regime types, 15.3 percent of the democratic dispute observations involved participation in war, which is only slightly higher for autocracies, 16.6 percent. These numbers suggest that dispute participation is mostly shaped by the regime's participation in less serious disputes. Table 6.9 showed that democracies were as conflict prone as autocracies when looking at armed conflicts and full-scale war. This conclusion is upheld, but modified to mostly describe aggressiveness in more serious conflicts.

Does hostility level affect the results for dispute onset as well? Only 8 percent of the total dispute onset observations were full-scale wars. Out of the total number of democratic onsets, only 6.8 percent were full-scale wars, whereas the same number for autocracies were 8.6 percent. This suggests that democracies being more prone to get involved in disputes at the onset is an effect based on the least hostile conflicts.

The results remained the same when running the analysis of democracy and dispute from Table 6.9, excluding full-scale war observations. Consequently, the results for disputes still support the proposition that democracies are more war prone than autocracies, at least for disputes short of full-scale war.

The theoretical evolution of the democratic peace theory has introduced other factors than democratic governance as proponents of peace. Specifically, Russett and Oneal (2001) link democracy, trade and international organizations in a comprehensive explanation for peace between states. In the attempt to replicate these proponents of peace, the next section incorporates the impact of trade and IGO memberships into the association between regimes and interstate conflict.

6.2.7 Are Trading and Networking States More Peaceful?

Russett and Oneal's (2001) idea of a triangular peace suggests that the likelihood of conflict between two states can be assessed by their government, how economically interdependent they are and to what degree they are connected by networking in international organizations. Examining these ideas at the nation level implies asking whether countries being democratic, relying on trade and networking are more peaceful than states that are not characterized by these features?

Given the triangular peace framework, the probability that a country i will experience conflict at time t when corrected for temporal dependency can be expressed as the following logistic regression equation,

$$\hat{p}(C_{i,t}) = \left[\frac{1}{1 + \exp^{-(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{democracy}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{trade}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \log \text{IGOs}_{i,t-1} + S(\tau_{i,t}))}} \right], \quad (6.6)$$

where $\hat{p}(C_{i,t})$ represents the estimated probability of interstate conflict in country i in year t , variable $\text{democracy}_{i,t-1}$ indicates whether country i was democratic or autocratic at time $t - 1$, and $S(\tau_{i,t})$ equals the smooth function of time elapsed since either the initial observations or the last observation of conflict, $\beta_4 \text{peaceyears}_{i,t} + \beta_5 \text{spline1}_{i,t} + \beta_6 \text{spline2}_{i,t} + \beta_7 \text{spline3}_{i,t}$.⁸⁸

Table 6.10 shows the estimated results for equation 6.6 using three different indicators of conflict incidence during the 1951-2000 time period. The likelihood ratio chi-square tests suggest that the model yields significant improvement over the null model for all the dependent variables. The pseudo- R^2 values range from 0.22 to 0.31 which indicates that the overall fit of the model is relatively good.

The impact of duration of peace on a country's likelihood of participating in interstate conflict, the 'peaceyear' and 'spline' variables, clearly show that the effect of additional years at peace decreases with time. The result is significant and strong across all conflict measures. The vast majority of the spline coefficients are small and the changing direction of the effects suggests that the association between years elapsed and conflict is relatively consistent but slightly nonlinear. Taken together, these results imply that my data incorporate serial dependence which must be included in the model.

As with the analysis of Realist explanations for interstate conflict, the size of the coefficients are not essential here. The purpose of analyzing the proponents of peace is establishing a basis to which governmental institutions will be introduced later. The direction of the coefficients are fairly consistent, though not all supporting the triangulating peace theory. Being democratic reduces the likelihood of conflict incidence, regardless of the conflict type. The effects are not statistically significant, however. Opposite of what the triangulating peace theory suggests, an increase in states' IGO memberships raises their conflict participation. The direction of the coefficients are consistent

⁸⁸Again, Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998:1270-1271) provide an explanation of how smoothing is obtained by using natural cubic splines.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE	WAR INCIDENCE
Democracy, $t - 1$	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.23 (0.17)
Trade, $t - 1$	-0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.58* (0.29)
Log IGO Memberships, $t - 1$	0.14 (0.08)	0.04 (0.04)	0.20* (0.09)
Peaceyears	-0.89***	-0.72*** (0.03)	-0.66*** (0.05)
Spline1	-0.01*** (0.001)	0.00001** (0.000003)	-0.004*** (0.05)
Spline2	0.005*** (0.0006)	-0.01*** (0.0005)	0.002*** (0.0002)
Spline3	-0.0008*** (0.0002)	0.003 (0.0001)***	-0.0001*** (0.00003)
Constant	-1.33* (0.63)	0.31 (0.35)	-1.88* (0.74)
Model LR- X^2	788.83 (df=7)	1802.17 (df=7)	573.11 (df=7)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.30	0.22	0.31
N	6282	6261	6289
Y=1	341	2236	211

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.10: Pooled Logit Regression of Democracy, Trade, IGOs and Interstate Conflict Incidence, 1951-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

across all conflicts, but only significant when looking at full-scale war. The effect of trade is less consistent. The more states trade, the lower are their chances of getting involved in armed conflicts or full-scale wars, but only the latter effect is statistically significant. An exception to this pattern is the impact of trade turning positive when looking at disputes. Taken together, these results prove only partial support for the idea of triangular peace promotion at the state level.

As should be clear by now, the impact of operationalizing aggressive and peaceful behavior can greatly affect the conclusions available. Not only does the type of conflict analyzed matter, the operationalizing of a given conflict affects the results as well. In the context of war proneness, it is appropriate to test whether the results for the incidence of conflict is consistent with the onset of conflict which many scholars regard as a more accurate way to measure countries' aggressiveness.

Table 6.11 show the estimated results of equation 6.6 focusing at the onset of interstate conflicts and excluding ongoing conflict years for the 1951-2000 time period. The likelihood ratio

chi-square tests reject the null hypothesis, but the pseudo R^2 statistics considerably decreases in three out of four conflict measurements. Only when analyzing interstate disputes does the goodness of fit statistics remain at a level similar to the results of conflict incidence. This indicates that, with the exception of disputes, the variables included in the model better explain incidence than onset of conflict.

The impact of time in peace, the ‘peaceyears’ variable, decreases with time for most conflicts. However, the impact is only significant and relatively large for the onset of disputes. The relatively small size and changing signs of the spline coefficients in general indicate that the impact of time at peace on interstate conflict onset is small and nonlinear. Earlier, I pointed to the discussion of whether the exclusion of ongoing conflict years is a sufficient autocorrelation correction. This seems to be the case for the onset of armed conflict and war since the serial correlation parameters are either statistically insignificant or minuscule. In general, temporal serial dependence is a concern, even when excluding ongoing conflict years from the analysis.

Then what does the model explain? The impact of democracy, trade and IGO memberships on the onset of conflicts is very similar to the effects on the incidence of conflict. Most notably are the effects of democracy and IGO memberships, whose direction remains the same but the size of the coefficients appear stronger and more significant for conflict onset than incidence. These results support the suggestion that democracies are more peaceful than autocracies. Furthermore, the peace promoting impact of networking states is more strongly rejected when concentrating on the onset of a conflict. In fact, states with a high number of IGO memberships seem to be much more likely to be involved in the onset of interstate conflicts, at least for armed conflicts and full-scale war. As with the results for conflict incidence, the impact of trade is ambiguous when excluding ongoing conflict years. However, the results are statistically insignificant.

The sum of the results supports the proposition that democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, but rejects the idea that trading and networking states are less conflict prone.

Finally, the analysis looks at the proponents for peace and the number of conflicts a country participates in. The likelihood that country i will experience n number of militarized disputes at time t when corrected for temporal dependency can be expressed as a multiple regression equation,

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT ONSET	MILITARIZED DISPUTE ONSET	WAR ONSET
Democracy, $t - 1$	-0.43* (0.20)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.44 (0.25)
Trade, $t - 1$	0.09 (0.07)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.17 (0.27)
Log IGO Memberships, $t - 1$	0.71*** (0.18)	0.10* (0.05)	0.84*** (0.26)
Peaceyears	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.57*** (0.02)	0.09 (0.07)
Spline1	0.001 (0.001)	-0.00001** (0.000003)	0.001* (0.0004)
Spline2	-0.0006 (0.0007)	-0.006*** (0.0004)	-0.0005* (0.0002)
Spline3	0.00006 (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)	0.00006* (0.00003)
Constant	-8.79*** (1.54)	-0.47 (0.40)	-10.74*** (2.14)
Model LR- X^2	45.47 (df=7)	1322.93 (df=7)	42.67 (df=7)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.19	0.05
N	6077	5879	6157
Y=1	136	1854	79

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.11: Pooled Logit Regression of Democracy, Trade, IGOs and Interstate Conflict Onset, 1951-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

$$y(C_{i,t}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{democracy}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{trade}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \log \text{IGOs}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \text{peaceyears}_{i,t} + \beta_5 \text{spline1}_{i,t} + \beta_6 \text{spline2}_{i,t} + \beta_7 \text{spline3}_{i,t}, \quad (6.7)$$

where equation 6.7 represents the relationship between the dependent variable, number of militarized disputes in country i at a time t , $y(C_{i,t})$, and the independent variables, such as $\text{democracy}_{i,t-1}$ which indicates whether country i is democratic or autocratic at time $t - 1$. The β_0 parameter indicates the y -intercept and β_1, \dots, β_3 are the slopes for the independent variables.

Table 6.12 shows the estimated results of equation 6.7 for states' annual number of dispute involvements during the 1951-2000 time period. The F-tests reject the null hypothesis and suggest that the model proves significant improvement. The R^2 statistic shows that the proportion of variance explained by the model is 19 percent and the regression coefficients are similar to the conclusions reached when analyzing conflict incidence and onset. Again, number of IGO memberships slightly increase the likelihood of conflict involvement, but the result is not statistically significant. Different from the results for conflict incidence and onset, being a democracy increases the likelihood of dispute involvement. The effect is small and not statistically significant. Similar to earlier findings, the effect of trade is negative and insignificant.

The parameters measuring temporal serial dependence show that the effect of additional years at peace decreases with time. In addition, the small spline effects indicate that the effect of peace on the likelihood of conflict is relatively consistent and may be slightly non-linear.

The variance-covariance matrix for all the independent variables included in this dissertation is listed in Appendix 7.3.4 and show no problematic correlation between the independent variables (democracy, trade and IGO memberships).

The classification of a regime type according to scoring above or below three on the polity index implies a somewhat static way to measure a phenomenon that may change and evolve, although most often not rapidly. In order to test the robustness of the conclusions reached here, Tables 6.10-6.12 were re-run with alternative regime type specifications that are frequently applied in International Relations. The two widely used specifications are: first, the polity index ranging from -10 to 10; secondly, classification of democracy as countries scoring six or higher on the polity index. The results of Tables 6.10-6.12 re-run with each of these specifications are remarkably similar

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NUMBER OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES
Democracy, $t - 1$	0.02 (0.03)
Trade, $t - 1$	-0.01 (0.02)
Log IGO Memberships, $t - 1$	0.03 (0.02)
Peaceyears	-0.34*** (0.01)
Spline1	-0.000004*** (0.0000001)
Spline2	-0.005*** (0.0002)
Spline3	0.001*** (0.00006)
Constant	1.10*** (0.19)
F-test	203.14 (df=7)
Prob > F	0.000
R^2	0.19
N	6261

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.12: Pooled Regression of Democracy, Trade, IGOs and Number of Militarized Disputes, 1951-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

to the ones reported here, which indicates that the results are robust across these alternative regime type specifications.

The sum of the results presented in Tables 6.10-6.12 do not support the existence of a triangulating peace at the state level. In other words, the results suggest that the peace promoting impact of these factors are relational and their mere presence in a country is not sufficient to promote peaceful behavior toward other states in general. However, the results do support the idea that democracies might be more peaceful than autocracies.

6.2.8 Spatial Variation of the Explanations for Peace

As suggested earlier, additivity and policy relevance of generalizations based on large-N studies are largely contingent on whether these relationships are present at disaggregated analytical levels, such as regions. This section addresses two types of spatial variation of the explanations for peace. First, *inter-regional variation* assumes systemic associations between democracy, trade, IGO memberships, and interstate conflict. Second, *intra-regional variation* suggests that each region provides a context within which these associations take unique forms.

The inter-regional analysis of the triangular peace involved re-estimating the results in Tables 6.10-6.12, including $n - 1$ regional dummy variables: Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The West is the reference category, just as for the estimation of the Realist model for international conflict. Since the inter-regional analysis works merely to point out spatial limitations when generalizing about the proponents of peace, the tables are not listed and only briefly discussed here. When correcting for inter-regional variation, the results largely remain the same as the previous models for the triangular peace. Clearly, networking states (IGO memberships) are consistently more likely to get involved in interstate conflict. Democracies and trading states are overall less likely to get involved in conflict, but the results are only significant when looking at full-scale wars. The significance of regions varies, indicating presence of systemic effects that are not uniform across all regions and types of conflicts.

Intra-regional variation is the main focus of this dissertation. Table 6.7 already demonstrated that the percentage of conflict observations differs between regions, Figures 3.2-3.6 showed that democracy and autocracy are unequally represented in different regions, and it seems reasonable to assume that the degree to which states engage in trade and international networking vary spatially

	ARMED CONFLICTS	MILITARIZED DISPUTES	FULL-SCALE WAR
LATIN AMERICA	Democracy (-) IGO (+)	Democracy (-) IGO (+)	
THE WEST	Democracy (+) Trade (-) IGO (+)	Democracy (+) Trade (-) IGO (+)	Trade (-) IGO (+)
AFRICA	IGO (+)	Trade (+)	
THE MIDDLE EAST		Trade (-) IGO (+)	IGO (+)
ASIA	IGO (+)		Trade (-)

Note: Parentheses show direction of the coefficients.

Table 6.13: Summary of Intra-regional Proponents for Peace, 1951-2001

as well. Whether these variations affect states' propensity to interstate conflict in each region is best addressed by analyzing each region separately.

Intra-regional variations of the triangular peace are addressed by re-running Tables 6.10-6.12 for each region: Latin America, the West, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The tables are not listed here in order to conserve space, but Table 6.13 summarizes the main intra-regional trends of the proponents of peace during 1951-2001. Generally, these tables show that different factors dominate in different regions, but that the intra-regional effects of the significant results are consistent across all types and operationalizations of interstate conflict. One variable is consistently associated with more conflict in all regions when the effects are statistically significant: Networking states, or those with a high number of IGO memberships, are the most likely to get involved in conflict with other states, globally and regionally.

The specific variations within each region suggest that, with the exception to the impact of IGO memberships, the effects of democracy and trade on interstate conflict are not additive. Different from the global analysis, Latin American democratic states appear less conflict prone than autocracies. This is true for armed conflicts and militarized disputes. The democracy variable was excluded from the analyses of full-scale war and a closer look at democracy and full-scale war shows that no democracy was involved in this type of conflict during 1951-2001 in Latin America. The effect of trade was insignificant in this region.

In the West, the effects of the independent variables are remarkably consistent across the types of conflicts analyzed. Most notably, democracies in the West are more conflict prone than autocratic states. The effects are very strong for involvement in armed conflicts and full-scale wars. The negative effects of trade are also remarkably strong in the West, supporting the idea that trading states are more peaceful in this region. These results reject the Democratic Peace proposition that democracies and autocracies are equally conflict prone.

The unclear and inconsistent results in Africa stand in stark contrast to the West. The effects of democracy, trade, and IGO membership vary with type of conflict. However, networking states (those with a high number of IGO memberships) are significantly more likely to get involved in armed conflicts than other states. Similarly, trading states are more prone to participate in militarized disputes in Africa. The effect is statistically significant and consistent across different operationalizations of disputes. The impact of democracy is not statistically significant for states' likelihood of armed conflict or militarized dispute involvement in Africa. Similarly, the democracy variable gets excluded from the model explaining full-scale war, which is explained by no democracy being classified as participating in this type of war during 1951-2001. Overall, the effects of factors often considered proponents of peace yield less explanatory power for states' conflict behavior in Africa than in Latin America and the West.

In the Middle East, the effects of the independent variables are more consistent than in Africa, although not always statistically significant. For example, none of the independent variables have significant effects on states' armed conflict participation in the Middle East. The data recorded 25 states participating at the onset of an armed conflict during 1951-2001, but none of these were democratic. Trading states are less likely to get involved in militarized disputes, but networking states are more prone to this type of conflict in the Middle East. Finally, IGO membership or networking states are more likely to get involved in full-scale wars.

Similar to Africa, the factors specified as proponents for peace suffer from lack of statistical significance in Asia. None of the variables significantly affected states' involvement in militarized disputes. The impact of democracy was not statistically significant, but had a consistent negative effect across all types of conflict. Heavily trading states in Asia are much less likely to participate at the onset of full-scale war than are less trading countries, and the effect is significant and remarkably

strong. Lastly and consistent with the trends in the other regions, the IGO membership variable is positively associated with conflict across all the different types of conflicts tested.

6.2.9 Some Stylized Facts About the Explanations for Peace

What can be concluded from the analyses of the explanations for peace just carried out? It is timely to repeat that this investigation is not intended as a test of Russett and Oneal's idea of a triangulating peace. This work has analyzed the relational triangular peace ideas from the state level. Rather than looking at whether it is the sharing of similar features that affect states likelihood of engaging in conflict with each other, this work looks at whether democratic, trading and networking states are more peaceful in general. The purpose of this exercise is twofold: first, to demonstrate the importance of regional variance for generalizations about peace and conflict, and second, to establish a basis on which the institutional extension of the democratic peace idea can be compared and contrasted.

The results of these tests enable me to suggest some stylized facts about the explanations for peace. Most importantly, the hypothesis about a general triangulating peacefulness must be rejected, both for the pooled analyses and for those incorporating regional variation. One trend is consistent across all the types of analyses performed and can be regarded as additive: States with a large number of IGO memberships are more conflict prone than other states, regardless of spatial boundaries. Once the pooled analyses were adjusted for inter-regional or systemic effects, the results became much more consistent and more supportive of a state-level triangular peace. In other words, democratic and trading states were generally associated with lower likelihoods of getting involved in any type of interstate conflict. However, the intra-regional analyses showed that these effects of the independent variables vary spatially, with the exception of networking states. Most seriously showing the relative importance of the democratic peace idea are Latin American democracies being negatively associated with conflict, whereas democracies in the West seem to be more conflict prone than autocratic states.

6.3 Governmental Institutions as a Refinement of the Democratic Peace

This work emphasizes the importance of subsets of democracy for understanding the role democracy can play in promoting peace among states. The Democratic Peace accepts that democratic states are as prone to conflict internationally as autocratic states. Their peacefulness is limited to interaction with other democracies. Although scholars have used the impact of democratic norms and institutions to explain these dyadic and monadic relationships, the theories are underspecified. Furthermore, the spread of democracy has been assumed to take on the systemic effect of more peace without much empirical testing. Regardless of the limited understanding of the democracy and conflict association, spread of democratic institutions has been the most focused on tool for practitioners in promoting peace among states. The lack of attention to the role different governmental institutions can play in states' conflict behavior internationally seems to rest on the assumption of a universal impact of democratic governance, irrespective of the type of institutions of which it is made up. Furthermore, the idea of democratizing for peace seems to assume that the relationship is globally valid.

This dissertation questions the universality of the democratizing for peace idea by suggesting that the role of democracy for conflict varies between types of governmental institutions. Furthermore, this work asks whether the impact of democratic governmental institutions varies in time and space, suggesting that each region harbors a unique context within which states interact and share common historical experiences. This context has influenced regional patterns of democracy, conflict, and the interaction between these phenomena.

The next sections will analyze the bivariate associations between governmental institutions and interstate conflict. The greatest virtue of looking at these simple relations at the outset, is allowing me to establish the scope of a more sophisticated analysis later. If the bivariate cross tabulations do not discover any variation in the associations between governmental institutions and interstate conflict, then putting the relationships to test in more complex models seems futile.

6.3.1 Global Variation Between Institutions and International Conflict

Democracies are made up of combinations of institutions that make them differently democratic. Some of these differences might be more influential than others in shaping decisions about foreign policy. This dissertation assumes that three institutional dimensions are essential in constraining or offering freedom for politicians in the making of foreign policy: electoral system, executive system, and federal system. The general hypothesis holds that *greater degree of institutional constraints on decision-makers is associated with less conflict involvement*. Specifically, this implies that *democracies with majority-plurality elections, presidential or unitary concentration of power should be more involved in conflict than democracies electing their representatives with a proportional system, being parliamentary, or having a federal system*. Analyzing the behavioral variation of these institutional subsets of democracy in time and space is necessary in the pursuit of a better understanding of the prospects of applying democracy as a means for peace. Each of the three institutional dimensions are tested on six different conflict indicators in order to check the robustness of the associations. The extensive scope of the analysis supports focusing on general trends rather than details at this initial stage.

Table 6.14 summarizes cross tabulations between subsets of democracy and autocracy, and the incidence and onset of international conflict globally. All the results are significant at the $p \leq 0.001$ level and the direction of the results remain the same, regardless of looking at the number of country years in conflict or country years at the onset of a conflict. Where the conflict patterns vary between democratic institutions, the most conflict participating type of democracy is more prone to conflict than the autocracies. The clearest results are evident when comparing conflict patterns of *electoral systems*. As anticipated, democracies with majority-plurality elections have a much higher percentage of conflict years and of participation at the outset of a conflict than democracies with proportional electoral systems. Although majority-plurality democracies are more involved in conflict than the pr systems, regardless of type of conflict, semi-pr democracies have a much higher percentage of involvement in militarized interstate disputes than majority-plurality democracies. Overall, the hypothesis of pr democratic systems being less prone to conflict internationally than all other states is supported, regardless of conflict type.

The results of the comparison of *executive systems* in the world are not as expected. The differences between the subsets of democracy is smaller than when comparing electoral systems, but

the parliamentary democracies have a larger percentage of conflict involvement than presidential systems for two of the three conflict indicators. For militarized disputes, parliamentary democracies have a smaller percentage of participation at the outset than presidential and semi-presidential democracies. Taken together, these results suggest that executive differences may be less important than electoral differences, and that the effects of type of executive are sensitive to the type of conflict in question.

The comparison of *federal systems* shows differences in conflict involvement. However, the direction of the associations are not as anticipated, it is the federal systems that have the greatest percentage of conflict involvement. The pattern is clear and consistent for nearly all conflict indicators, but washes out and shows no difference between any type of regime when looking at the outset of full-scale war. In conclusion, type of federal system seems to matter for conflict involvement globally, but in the opposite direction than hypothesized.

Table 6.14: Pooled Models: Institutions and Conflict in the World (Percentages)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
1.	Majority-Plurality	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	9.9 (115)	133.0 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		3.7 (12)	
	PR		2.3 (37)	
	Autocracy		5.3 (217)	
2.	Majority-Plurality	MID Incidence 1817-2001	35.6 (717)	608.9 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		48.1 (180)	
	PR		26.8 (512)	
	Autocracy		26.0 (2501)	
3.	Majority-Plurality	COW Incidence 1817-2002	9.1 (185)	96.5 df=4 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		3.5 (14)	
	PR		2.3 (46)	
	Autocracy		5.6 (539)	
4.	Majority-Plurality	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	3.0 (35)	93.6 df=8 $p \leq 0.005$
	Semi-PR		1.5 (5)	
	PR		1.3 (21)	
	Autocracy		2.3 (94)	
5.	Majority-Plurality	MID Onset 1817-2001	29.0 (586)	256.3 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		38.8 (145)	
	PR		22.1 (422)	
	Autocracy		21.0 (2022)	
6.	Majority-Plurality	COW Onset 1817-2002	3.0 (61)	109.1 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		1.3 (5)	
	PR		1.2 (23)	
	Autocracy		2.5 (239)	
7.	Presidential	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	5.1 (57)	69.8 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		3.8 (33)	
	Parliamentary		7.1 (76)	
	Autocracy		5.3 (217)	
8.	Presidential	MID Incidence 1817-2001	33.8 (536)	220.2 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		33.7 (375)	
	Parliamentary		29.3 (511)	
	Autocracy		26.0 (2501)	
9.	Presidential	COW Incidence 1817-2002	4.0 (66)	39.0 df=4 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		4.1 (47)	
	Parliamentary		7.9 (139)	
	Autocracy		5.6 (539)	
10.	Presidential	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	1.7 (19)	25.5 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		2.2 (19)	
	Parliamentary		2.3 (24)	
	Autocracy		2.3 (94)	
11.	Presidential	MID Onset 1817-2001	28.7 (454)	131.8 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		28.8 (320)	
	Parliamentary		22.5 (392)	
	Autocracy		21.0 (2022)	
12.	Presidential	COW Onset 1817-2002	1.2 (20)	54.1 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		2.4 (27)	
	Parliamentary		2.6 (45)	
	Autocracy		2.5 (239)	
13.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	4.0 (89)	133.0 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Federal		0.9 (2)	
	Federal		12.3 (75)	
	Autocracy		5.3 (217)	
14.	Unitary	MID Incidence 1817-2001	29.5 (972)	201.7 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Federal		30.3 (81)	
	Federal		37.4 (374)	

Table 6.14: (continued)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
	Autocracy		26.0 (2501)	
15.	Unitary	COW Incidence	5.4 (183)	30.1
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=4
	Federal		7.3 (74)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		5.6 (539)	
16.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Onset	1.5 (33)	83.3
	Semi-Federal	1946-2002	0.9 (2)	df=8
	Federal		4.4 (27)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		2.3 (94)	
17.	Unitary	MID Onset	23.9 (789)	96.6
	Semi-Federal	1817-2001	26.6 (71)	df=8
	Federal		30.9 (309)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		21.0 (2022)	
18.	Unitary	COW Onset	2.2 (73)	38.0
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=8
	Federal		2.2 (22)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		2.3 (239)	

These simple bivariate cross tabulations are important in exploring foundations for more sophisticated analyses. Although there is an implicit understanding of causality in looking at last years' institutional characteristic and conflict, cross tabulation is a descriptive procedure. For analytical purposes, therefore, logistic and linear regression analyses address strength and direction of relationships, and measure factors' independent effect on the dependent variable of interest.

Given the framework set up in the institutional peace idea, the probability that a country i will experience conflict at time t when corrected for temporal dependency can be expressed as the following logistic regression equation,

$$\hat{p}(C_{i,t}) = \left[\frac{1}{1 + \exp^{-(\alpha + \beta_1 institution1_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 institution2_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 institution3_{i,t-1} + S(\tau_{i,t}))}} \right], \quad (6.8)$$

where $\hat{p}(C_{i,t})$ represents the estimated probability of interstate conflict in country i in year t , variable $institution1_{i,t-1}$, $institution2_{i,t-1}$, and $institution3_{i,t-1}$ indicate whether country i had democratic institution1, democratic institution2, democratic institution3, or was autocratic at time $t - 1$, and $S(\tau_{i,t})$ equals the smooth function of time elapsed since either the initial observations or the last observation of conflict, $\beta_4 peaceyears_{i,t} + \beta_5 spline1_{i,t} + \beta_6 spline2_{i,t} + \beta_7 spline3_{i,t}$. The model is tested on the global sample.

Table 6.3.1 and Table 6.16 show the estimated results for equation 6.8 using three different indicators of conflict incidence and conflict onset. The likelihood ratio chi-square tests suggest that the model yields significant improvement over the null model for all indicators of conflict incidence. The pseudo- R^2 values range from 0.26 to 0.31 which indicates that the overall fit of the model is relatively good. The pseudo- R^2 values for onset of militarized disputes are good as well (pseudo- $R^2 = 0.21$), whereas the extremely low values for armed conflicts and full-scale wars suggest that the model is not fitted well for these variables.

The institutional peace model can also be expressed as the likelihood that a country i will experience n number of militarized disputes at time t when corrected for temporal dependency in a multiple regression equation,

$$y(C_{i,t}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 institution1_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 institution2_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 institution3_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 peaceyears_{i,t} + \beta_5 spline1_{i,t} + \beta_6 spline2_{i,t} + \beta_7 spline3_{i,t}, \quad (6.9)$$

where equation 6.9 represents the relationship between the dependent variable, number of militarized disputes in country i at a time t , $y(C_{i,t})$, and the independent variables, such as $institution1_{i,t-1}$ which indicates whether country i has a given democratic institutional setup or is autocratic at time $t - 1$. The β_0 parameter indicates the y -intercept and β_1, \dots, β_3 are the slopes for the independent variables. The estimated results of equation 6.9 are listed in Table 6.17.

Out of the three sets of democratic sub-systems, electoral systems yielded the strongest results and in support of the hypotheses when looking at the entire world. Most importantly, Table 6.3.1 suggests that some types of democracies are more conflict prone than autocratic states. Specifically, democracies with majority-plurality electoral systems are more likely to get involved in interstate conflict than autocracies, regardless of type. Conversely, democracies with proportional electoral systems are less likely to get involved in conflict than autocracies, but the result is not statistically significant for militarized disputes. The association between semi-PR systems and conflict vary with the type of conflict. The effect of semi-PR democracies is significant, strong, and positively related to militarized disputes. The direction of these results are identical when looking at the onset of interstate conflict in Table 6.16, although overall less significant.

Executive systems seem less relevant to states' interstate conflict behavior than electoral systems. Table 6.3.1 and Table 6.16 showed no significant impact of executive systems on incidence and onset of armed conflicts. The strongest results were evident when looking at militarized disputes with both presidential states and semi-presidential states being more conflict prone than autocracies. The results are the same for all three indicators of disputes applied: incidence, onset, and the number of disputes (see Table 6.3.1, Table 6.16, and Table 6.17). However, the conflict proneness of presidential democracies is largely explained by the United States. Running the tables without the United States changes the direction of the coefficient for presidential democracies from positive to negative when analyzing militarized disputes. Executive systems do have an impact on state's full-scale war behavior, but the effects vary between incidence and onset of war. Whereas presidential democracies are less likely to participate at the onset of a war, parliamentary democracies are more war prone when looking at their annual conflict behavior.

Similar to executive systems, federal systems seem to have less of an impact on democracies' conflict proneness than electoral systems. The one clear results when distinguishing between federal sub-systems is that federal democracies are more conflict prone than autocratic states (see Table 6.3.1, Table 6.16, and Table 6.17). With the exception of full-scale war, the difference is strong and statistically significant for all the conflict indicators applied. The federal institutional system distinction does not seem to have an impact on full-scale war. Two additional observations are interesting when distinguishing between federal sub-systems of democracy: Unitary democracies are less likely than autocracies to participate at the onset of an armed conflict and semi-federal democracies are less likely to participate in large numbers of militarized disputes than autocratic states. Since federal democracies are clearly the most conflict prone group of states, the analyses for the federal systems were re-run without the United States to see whether the variation is explained by one single democracy. The result showed that federal democracies' involvement in militarized disputes is explained by the behavior of the United States. Upon excluding the United States, federal states are less prone to participate in militarized disputes than autocracies. The effect is not statistically significant. However, federal democracies remained more prone to armed conflict than autocracies when excluding the United States.

Table 6.15: Pooled Logit Regression of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR INCIDENCE 1816-2002
ELECTORAL SYSTEM			
Majority-plur, $t - 1$	0.38** (0.14)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.21* (0.10)
Semi-PR, $t - 1$	-0.28 (0.33)	0.53*** (0.13)	-0.03 (0.31)
PR, $t - 1$	-0.58** (0.20)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.46** (0.17)
Peaceyears	-0.81*** (0.05)	-0.70*** (0.02)	-0.69*** (0.03)
Spline1	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.000004*** (0.000004)	-0.004*** (0.0002)
Spline2	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0001)
Spline3	-0.001*** (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001*** (0.00002)
Constant	-0.45***	0.47***	-0.22***
Model LR- X^2	834.07 (df=7)	4224.89 (df=7)	1884.90(df=7)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.28	0.26	0.31
N	7140	13529	14092
Y=1	393	4136	843
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM			
Presidential, $t - 1$	0.09 (0.17)	0.13(*) (0.07)	-0.13 (0.15)
Semi-pres, $t - 1$	-0.26 (0.21)	0.19* (0.08)	-0.28 (0.17)
Parliamentary, $t - 1$	0.14 (0.16)	0.09 (0.07)	0.25* (0.12)
Peaceyears	-0.86*** (0.10)	-0.70*** (0.02)	-0.69*** (0.03)
Spline1	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.000004*** (0.000001)	-0.004*** (0.0002)
Spline2	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0001)
Spline3	-0.001*** (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001*** (0.00002)
Constant	-0.46***	0.47***	-0.22***
Model LR- X^2	819.86 (df=7)	4275.09 (df=7)	1893.68 (df=7)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.27	0.26	0.31
N	7148	13707	14339
Y=1	383	3923	791

Table 6.15: (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR INCIDENCE 1816-2002
FEDERAL SYSTEM			
Unitary, $t - 1$	-0.20 (0.14)	0.04 (0.05)	0.003 (0.10)
Semi-federal, $t - 1$	-1.37(*) (0.73)	-0.02 (0.16)	
Federal, $t - 1$	0.52** (0.16)	0.23** (0.08)	0.11 (0.15)
Peaceyears	-0.81*** (0.05)	-0.69*** (0.02)	-0.69*** (0.03)
Spline1	-0.01*** (0.001)	0.000004*** (0.000001)	-0.004*** (0.0002)
Spline2	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0001)
Spline3	-0.001*** (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001*** (0.00002)
Constant	-0.46***	0.50***	-0.20***
Model LR- X^2	838.67 (df=7)	4050.69 (df=7)	1777.01 (df=6)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.28	0.25	0.31
N	7117	13109	13157
Y=1	383	3928	796

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.15: Pooled Logit Regression of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

Table 6.16: Pooled Logit Regression of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Onset (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT ONSET 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE ONSET 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR ONSET 1816-2002
ELECTORAL SYSTEM			
Majority-plur, $t - 1$	0.23 (0.20)	0.25 *** (0.06)	0.01 (0.15)
Semi-PR, $t - 1$	-0.42 (0.47)	0.55*** (0.13)	-0.37 (0.46)
PR, $t - 1$	-0.48(*) (0.25)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.53** (0.22)
Peaceyears	0.01 (0.06)	-0.55*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.03)
Spline1	0.002 (0.001)	-0.000004*** (0.000001)	-0.001*** (0.0002)
Spline2	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.0002)	0.0003** (0.0001)
Spline3	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.00001)
Constant	-3.17***	0.14***	-2.5***
Model LR- X^2	46.9 (df=7)	3030.8 (df=7)	125.28 (df=7)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.21	0.04
N	6914	12794	13636
Y=1	158	3323	344

Table 6.16: (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT ONSET 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE ONSET 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR ONSET 1816-2002
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM			
Presidential, $t - 1$	-0.20 (0.30)	0.18** (0.07)	-0.56* (0.24)
Semi-pres, $t - 1$	-0.01 (0.26)	0.24** (0.08)	0.00002 (0.21)
Parliamentary, $t - 1$	-0.07 (0.23)	0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.17)
Peaceyears	0.003 (0.06)	-0.55*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.03)
Spline1	0.002 (0.001)	0.000004*** (0.000001)	-0.001*** (0.0002)
Spline2	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.0002)	0.0003** (0.0001)
Spline3	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.00002)
Constant	-0.13***	0.14***	-2.52***
Model LR- X^2	41.31 (df=7)	3070.06 (df=7)	123.50 (df=7)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.21	0.04
N	6921	12970	13877
Y=1	156	3188	331
FEDERAL SYSTEM			
Unitary, $t - 1$	-0.41* (0.21)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 0.14
Semi-federal, $t - 1$	-0.89 (0.72)	0.04 (0.16)	
Federal, $t - 1$	0.62** (0.23)	0.26** (0.09)	-0.12 (0.23)
Peaceyears	0.01 (0.06)	-0.54*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.03)
Spline1	0.002 (0.001)	0.000004*** (0.000001)	-0.0006** (0.0002)
Spline2	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.0002)	0.0003** (0.0001)
Spline3	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.00008)	-0.00003 (0.00002)
Constant	-3.17	0.17***	-2.52***
Model LR- X^2	57.05 (df=7)	2902.01 (df=7)	116.54 (df=6)
P of Chi Square	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.04	0.21	0.04
N	6890	12378	12724
Y=1	156	3191	334

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.16: Pooled Logit Regression of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Onset (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

Table 6.17: Pooled Regression of Democratic Institutions and Number of Militarized Disputes, 1816-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NUMBER OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES
ELECTORAL SYSTEM	
Majority-plurality, $t - 1$	0.15*** (0.03)
Semi-PR, $t - 1$	0.10 (0.06)
PR, $t - 1$	-0.04 (0.03)
Peaceyears	-0.29*** (0.002)
Spline1	-0.000001*** (0.0000002)
Spline2	-0.004*** (0.0001)
Spline3	0.001*** (0.00003)
Constant	1.21***
F-test	420.27 (df=7)
Prob > F	0.000
R^2	0.18
N	13529
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM	
Presidential, $t - 1$	0.09** (0.03)
Semi-pres, $t - 1$	0.16*** (0.04)
Parliamentary, $t - 1$	-0.02 (0.03)
Peaceyears	-0.29*** (0.01)
Spline1	0.000001*** (0.0000002)
Spline2	-0.004*** (0.0001)
Spline3	0.001*** (0.00003)
Constant	1.21***
F-test	427.12 (df=7)
Prob > F	0.000
R^2	0.18
N	13707
FEDERAL SYSTEM	
Unitary, $t - 1$	0.02 (0.02)
Semi-federal, $t - 1$	-0.18* (0.07)
Federal, $t - 1$	0.21*** (0.04)
Peaceyears	-0.30*** (0.007)
Spline1	0.000001*** (0.0000002)
Spline2	-0.004*** (0.0001)
Spline3	0.001*** (0.00003)

Table 6.17: (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NUMBER OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES
Constant	1.23***
F-test	402.41 (df=7)
Prob > F	0.000
R^2	18
N	13109
Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$. Standard error in parentheses.	

Table 6.17: Pooled Regression of Democratic Institutions and Number of Militarized Disputes, 1816-2001 (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

Compared with the results for the simple cross tabulations, the regressions are remarkably similar. There are a few insights to be gained by the more advanced method, however. Whereas the cross-tabulations suggested minor differences in executive systems' participation in militarized disputes, the regression analyses greatly reduce the effects of parliamentary democracies compared to presidential and semi-presidential ones. This suggests that closer attention to the nature of conflict is needed when understanding its association to regimes and institutions.

The political implications of these results on a global scale may be affected by the historical experiences with the different types of democratic institutions. The previous description of the global distribution of democratic institutions (Chapter 3.4.1, Table 6.1) showed that the total number of years with majority-plurality and PR electoral systems is the same when looking at the entire 1816-2002 time period. However, democracies with proportional electoral systems dominate both in numbers and years after World War II. In addition, semi-proportional systems that had the greatest percentage of dispute involvement are fewest in number since 1946. This increasing dominance of democracies with PR elections globally (see Figure 3.7) may promise well for states conflict involvement if their lack of conflict participation proves robust.

The executive history of the world in Table 6.2 and Figure 3.8 shows that presidential democracies largely outnumber parliamentary states, although the historical experience of both institutional setups is similar. Whether or not the most recent trend towards a growing number of presidential states in the world (Figure 3.8) will promote more peace is unclear. Although Table 6.3.1, Table 6.16, and Table 6.17 showed that presidential and semi-presidential democracies are more prone to participate in disputes than parliamentary democracies and autocracies, their negative association

with full-scale wars and armed conflicts may suggest that a large part of their conflict proneness involves less violent actions. Furthermore, as the proneness to participate in militarized disputes is largely explained by one country, the United States, further spread of presidential democracies may be no threat to the promotion of peace.

Finally, the results for the federal systems are very interesting in light of the historical trajectories of the institutions in Figure 3.9. Throughout the 200-year time period, unitary institutions dominate historically and in number of states (see Table 6.3). Figure 3.9 showed that most new states or democratizing states have adopted unitary institutional setups since World War I. This trend may be a welcoming one in light of the strong association between federal democracies and armed conflict proneness as suggested in the regressions.

In conclusion, the global patterns of conflict involvement among subsets of democracy may suggest optimism for achieving more peace if the recent spread of the least conflict prone institutional set-ups continue. However, as previous discussion of patterns of democracy and conflict has suggested, these processes and associations are affected by the historical context within which they are situated. The importance of the associations just discussed, therefore, is largely affected by whether or not they are found regionally (Alker, 1968). The next section examines spatial variance in the association between democratic institutions and interstate conflict.

6.3.2 Spatial Variation Between Institutions and International Conflict

This work has emphasized the criteria of correspondence between regional associations and global trends for generalizing about the usefulness of spreading democratic institutions as a means for peace between states.

Latin America The additivity of regional associations between subsets of democracy and international conflict is already questioned by the results for *Latin America* in Table 6.18 and in Table 6.19. In fact, most of the results for Latin America are different from the associations found globally. None of the results were significant for armed conflicts and there were hardly any institutional variation when looking at the full-scale wars only. However, there were clear and significant results when looking at militarized disputes. Whereas democracies with majority-plurality *electoral systems* were most involved in interstate conflict globally, the percentage of PR democracies involved in

conflict was more than twice that of majority-plurality systems in Latin America. Thus, the conflict behavior between democracies with different electoral systems is the opposite of the hypothesis in this region. This was further supported in the regression analyses (Table 6.19).

On the other hand, the results for differences between *executive systems* strongly support the hypothesis laid out earlier, but are different from the global results. Presidential democracies are much more involved in conflicts internationally than are parliamentary states. In fact, the percentage of semi-presidential democracies getting involved in conflict is almost as large as for presidential systems. However, the regression analyses are different. They suggest that both presidential and parliamentary democracies are less conflict prone than autocracies, but the former is related to full-scale war involvement whereas the latter effect goes for disputes.

The relevance of *federal systems* might be less important than other institutions in Latin America since the differences in conflict participation between the categories is smaller for this subset. Different from what is hypothesized, the percentage of unitary democracies involved in conflict is smaller than that of federal or semi-federal democracies. The regression analyses support the notion of unitary democracies being more peaceful than autocracies in Latin America.

The implications of these results for the prospects of peace in Latin America need to be seen in connection with the history of democratic institutions in the region. Throughout the approximately 200-year time period of this analysis, Tables 6.4, 6.6, and 6.8 showed that the experience with democratic institutions has been dominated by PR electoral systems, presidential executive systems, and unitarism. This is not such a promising trend, given that the greatest percentage of conflict involvement was found in democracies with PR elections and presidentialism. The most recent histories of democratic institutions displayed earlier in Figure 3.10, Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 showed a clear rise in the number of democracies with PR elections, presidentialism, and unitarism after the mid-1970s. In other words, Latin America is experiencing a spread of democratic institutions that are associated with more involvement in international conflict than other types of institutions.

Table 6.18: Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in Latin America (Percentages)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
19.	Majority-Plurality	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	0	5.6 df=4 $p = 0.23$
	Semi-PR		1.1 (1)	
	PR		0.5 (2)	
	Autocracy		1.6 (10)	
20.	Majority-Plurality	MID Incidence 1817-2001	12.4 (37)	50.4 df=8 $p <= 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		13.8 (19)	
	PR		26.7 (119)	
	Autocracy		23.4 (573)	
21.	Majority-Plurality	COW Incidence 1817-2002	1.6 (5)	37.1 df=4 $p <= 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		0	
	PR		0	
	Autocracy		4.5 (110)	
22.	Majority-Plurality	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	0	6.2 df=8 $p = 0.62$
	Semi-PR		1.1 (1)	
	PR		0.5 (2)	
	Autocracy		1.3 (8)	
23.	Majority-Plurality	MID Onset 1817-2001	9.7 (29)	56.8 df=8 $p <= 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		10.9 (15)	
	PR		23.8 (106)	
	Autocracy		17.7 (434)	
24.	Majority-Plurality	COW Onset 1817-2002	0.3 (1)	37.5 df=8 $p <= 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		0	
	PR		0	
	Autocracy		1.8 (43)	
25.	Presidential	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	0.6 (3)	5.1 df=4 $p = 0.277$
	Semi-Presidential		0	
	Parliamentary		0	
	Autocracy		1.6 (10)	
26.	Presidential	MID Incidence 1817-2001	21.5 (168)	51.9 df=8 $p <= 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		20.0 (6)	
	Parliamentary		5.9 (8)	
	Autocracy		23.4 (573)	
27.	Presidential	COW Incidence 1817-2002	0.6 (5)	35.3 df=4 $p <= 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		0	
	Parliamentary		0	
	Autocracy		4.5 (110)	
28.	Presidential	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	0.6 (3)	5.7 df=8 $p = 0.682$
	Semi-Presidential		0	
	Parliamentary		0	
	Autocracy		1.3 (8)	
29.	Presidential	MID Onset 1817-2001	18.4 (144)	42.7 df=8 $p <= 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		16.7 (5)	
	Parliamentary		5.2 (7)	
	Autocracy		17.7 (434)	
30.	Presidential	COW Onset 1817-2002	0.1 (1)	35.4 df=8 $p < 00.0001$
	Semi-Presidential		0	
	Parliamentary		0	
	Autocracy		1.8 (43)	
31.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	0.4 (2)	5.1 df=4 $p = 0.277$
	Semi-Federal		0	
	Federal		0.9 (1)	
	Autocracy		1.6 (10)	
32.	Unitary	MID Incidence 1817-2001	17.8 (135)	40.23 df=8 $p <= 0.0005$
	Semi-Federal		24.2 (15)	
	Federal		25.4 (33)	

Table 6.18: (continued)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
			23.4 (573)	
33.	Unitary	COW Incidence	0.6 (5)	35.5
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=4
	Federal		0	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		4.5 (110)	
34.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Onset	0.4 (2)	5.7
	Semi-Federal	1946-2002	0	df=8
	Federal		0.9 (1)	$p = 0.683$
	Autocracy		1.3 (8)	
35.	Unitary	MID Onset	14.9 (113)	33.63
	Semi-Federal	1817-2001	21.0 (13)	df=8
	Federal		23.7 (31)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		17.7 (434)	
36.	Unitary	COW Onset	0.1 (1)	35.07
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=8
	Federal		0	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		1.8 (43)	

In conclusion, the prospect for more peace through further democratization in Latin America is not optimistic if the current trends in the rise in the number of democracies with PR electoral systems and presidentialism continues. Even though there is a growth in the number of unitary democracies associated with less conflict involvement, the federalism distinction may not be that crucial in differentiating between democratic subsets. In two out of three institutional distinctions, the hypothesized relations were supported. However, the large percentage of conflict involvement among PR democracies rejects the hypothesis about electoral differences. The results for electoral and executive systems in Latin America are the opposite of the global patterns, whereas the results for the federal distinction largely conforms with the pooled analysis.

Recall the interesting combination of presidentialism and proportional parliamentary elections in Latin America. One suggestion for why this combination works well is the impact of proportional elections is mainly on domestic politics whereas the president has the major say in determining foreign policy. What this suggests is that looking at each single institution and conflict behavior only gives a limited perspective on how institutions affect foreign policy decision-making. More specifically, it might be the unique combination of core democratic institutions that shape decision-making. Exploring how institutions reinforce or modify each others' effect on foreign policy-making might lead to new and important insights about regimes and conflict.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR INCIDENCE 1816-2002	NUMBER OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES 1816-2001
ELECTORAL SYSTEM				
Majority-plur, $t - 1$		-0.52**	-0.75	-0.08*
Semi-PR, $t - 1$	-0.64	-0.40		-0.06
PR, $t - 1$	-0.31	0.01		0.02
N	1118	3311	2760	3311
Y=1	13	786	124	
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM				
Presidential, $t - 1$	-1.17	-0.11	-1.09*	-0.02
Semi-pres, $t - 1$		0.04		-0.05
Parliamentary, $t - 1$		-1.16**		-0.13**
N	1155	3380	3261	3380
Y=1	13	755	115	
FEDERAL SYSTEM				
Unitary, $t - 1$	-1.60*	-0.26*	-1.30**	-0.05*
Semi-federal, $t - 1$		0.04		0.04
Federal, $t - 1$	-0.85	-0.20		-0.01
N	1278	3380	3235	3380
Y=1	13	756	115	

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.19: Latin America: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

The West The *West* is the region containing most of the long lasting and stable democratic states. In addition to the European countries, the Western region includes North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel. Table 6.20 shows that all the results are significant, with two out of three institutional indicators supporting the idea that democratic institutions affect states' conflict involvement internationally. There are very strong indicators that democracies with proportional *electoral systems* are much less involved in conflict than both semi-PR and majority-plurality type electoral arrangements. This is true for all the conflict indicators used, but clearest when looking at the armed conflicts and the full-scale wars from the Correlates of War project. These results are hardly affected when running the analysis without the United States. Although majority-plurality democracies have a much higher percentage of conflict involvement than PR systems, Table 6.20 shows that semi-PR democracies have the absolute largest amount of country years involved in mil-

itarized disputes. This is true when looking only at the onset of conflicts as well. The peacefulness of proportional system democracies and conflict proneness of majority-plurality systems were supported in the regression analyses in Table 6.21 and remained the same when excluding the United States. The effects are clear and consistent.

The associations between *executive systems* and conflict involvement are also supporting the hypothesis in the West. Presidential democracies have a much higher percentage of involvement in militarized disputes than parliamentary states, but this institutional distinction does not seem to make a difference for involvement in armed conflicts or full-scale wars. In these types of conflicts however, the semi-presidential democracies have the lowest percentage of conflict involvement. Although the percentage of conflict involvement by presidential democracies is reduced when running the analysis without the United States, the trends remain the same. In the regressions, however, the variation seems to be between democracy and autocracy rather than between democratic sub-categories. In fact, both presidential and parliamentary democracies are more prone to conflict than autocratic states. Some of the variation between presidential democracy and conflict is explained by the United States. After excluding the United States from the analyses, presidential democracies are less conflict prone than autocracies in the West.

The trends for the *federal* distinction are also affected by the United States. When including the United States, federal democracies have the largest percentage of involvement in the armed conflicts and in full-scale war, but the difference between unitary and federal democracies turns smaller when excluding the United States. The distinction between federal systems is not meaningful for involvement in militarized disputes, but upon excluding the United States, federal democracies are less involved in disputes than unitary states. The regression analyses did not show much difference between unitary and federal states in the West, but after excluding the United States, federal democracies remained the most prone to involvement in armed conflicts.

Again, the political implications of these relationships for international conflict is affected by the dominance of democratic institutions in this region. Table 6.4 shows that proportional electoral systems have dominated in the West when looking at the 1816-2002 time period as a whole, which is a trend that becomes even stronger after the end of World War II (Table 3.5). This strong historical presence of proportional systems in the West is a welcoming trend in light of the lesser conflict involvement by these democracies. However, the large-scale involvement in militarized

disputes among democracies with semi-PR electoral systems may be reasons to worry given their strong surge in numbers after the 1980s (see Figure 3.13). Presidential democracies having the largest percentage of dispute involvement does not seem very problematic if one looks at the great dominance of parliamentarism in the West during the 200 year time period analyzed (see Table 6.6 or even after the end of World War II (see Table 6.7). However, the more recent trends in Figure 3.14 show a clear surge in the number of presidential democracies whereas the number of parliamentary states remain stable. Although the recent growth in the number of presidential democracies may be problematic in light of their association with conflict, the simultaneous growth in the number of semi-presidential states is welcoming since these are the least involved in conflict. Even though the results for the federal distinction are neither clear nor strong, the overwhelming historical and more recent dominance of unitarism may suggest that it is the conflict involvement of these democracies that are the most relevant for the prospects for peace (see Figure 3.15).

Table 6.20: Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in the West (Percentages)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
37.	Majority-Plurality	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	20.6 (71)	179.6 df=4 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		1.6 (2)	
	PR		3.0 (31)	
	Autocracy		1.4 (87)	
38.	Majority-Plurality	MID Incidence 1817-2001	43.9 (480)	437.7 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		61.5 (80)	
	PR		25.9 (343)	
	Autocracy		22.5 (568)	
39.	Majority-Plurality	COW Incidence 1817-2002	14.2 (156)	124.3 df=4 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		4.3 (6)	
	PR		3.0 (41)	
	Autocracy		6.5 (163)	
40.	Majority-Plurality	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	5.8 (20)	197.4 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		1.6 (2)	
	PR		1.8 (18)	
	Autocracy		0.8 (4)	
41.	Majority-Plurality	MID Onset 1817-2001	35.8 (391)	223.5 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		49.2 (64)	
	PR		20.7 (274)	
	Autocracy		19.0 (479)	
42.	Majority-Plurality	COW Onset 1817-2002	4.8 (53)	147.7 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-PR		2.8 (4)	
	PR		1.55 (21)	
	Autocracy		3.5 (89)	
43.	Presidential	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	10.1 (22)	71.3 df=4 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		2.3 (15)	
	Parliamentary		10.9 (67)	
	Autocracy		1.4 (7)	
44.	Presidential	MID Incidence 1817-2001	67.1 (234)	480.6 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		29.2 (267)	
	Parliamentary		31.8 (403)	
	Autocracy		22.5 (568)	
45.	Presidential	COW Incidence 1817-2002	9.8 (35)	34.1 df=4 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		4.4 (41)	
	Parliamentary		9.9 (127)	
	Autocracy		6.5 (163)	
46.	Presidential	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	3.7 (8)	76.5 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		1.5 (10)	
	Parliamentary		3.6 (22)	
	Autocracy		0.8 (4)	
47.	Presidential	MID Onset 1817-2001	59.3 (207)	327.0 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		24.6 (225)	
	Parliamentary		23.7 (300)	
	Autocracy		19.0 (479)	
48.	Presidential	COW Onset 1817-2002	3.6 (13)	51.3 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Presidential		2.4 (22)	
	Parliamentary		3.4 (43)	
	Autocracy		3.6 (89)	
49.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	5.6 (60)	57.8 df=4 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Federal		1.6 (2)	
	Federal		13.7 (42)	
	Autocracy		1.4 (7)	
50.	Unitary	MID Incidence 1817-2001	35.3 (614)	306.6 df=8 $p \leq 0.0005$
	Semi-Federal		31.5 (46)	
	Federal		36.2 (246)	

Table 6.20: (continued)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
			22.5 (568)	
51.	Unitary	COW Incidence	7.6 (134)	24.2
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=4
	Federal		10.0 (69)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		6.5 (163)	
52.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Onset	2.4 (26)	64.9
	Semi-Federal	1946-2002	1.6 (2)	df=8
	Federal		3.9 (12)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		0.8 (4)	
53.	Unitary	MID Onset	28.4 (494)	92.6
	Semi-Federal	1817-2001	26.7 (39)	df=8
	Federal		29.3 (199)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		19.0 (479)	
54.	Unitary	COW Onset	3.4 (60)	44.5
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=8
	Federal		2.6 (18)	$p \leq 0.0005$
	Autocracy		3.5 (89)	

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR INCIDENCE 1816-2002	NUMBER OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES 1816-2001
ELECTORAL SYSTEM				
Majority-plur, $t - 1$	1.89***	0.58***	0.49***	0.18***
Semi-PR, $t - 1$	-0.07	0.80***	-0.36	-0.07
PR, $t - 1$	0.52	0.04	-0.37(*)	-0.13**
N	1985	4902	5122	4902
Y=1	113	1536	394	
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM				
Presidential, $t - 1$	1.34**	0.93***	0.10	0.65***
Semi-pres, $t - 1$	0.24	0.13	-0.24	-0.04
Parliamentary, $t - 1$	1.45***	0.28**	0.46**	-0.12*
N	1985	4886	5118	4886
Y=1	111	1472	366	
FEDERAL SYSTEM				
Unitary, $t - 1$	0.94*	0.26**	0.10	-0.07
Semi-federal, $t - 1$	0.09	0.10		-0.35**
Federal, $t - 1$	1.62***	0.34**	0.29	0.17**
N	1985	4653	4600	4653
Y=1	111	1474	366	

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.21: The West: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

Taken together, the above results suggest mixed prospects for democratic institutions as means to peace among states. Two out of three hypotheses were supported; democracies with PR electoral or parliamentary systems are less involved in conflict than majority-plurality or presidential democracies. Although the growing number of states adopting proportional electoral systems may be good for the prospects for peace, the recent spread of presidential and semi-presidential institutional setups may point to a more grim future for peace in the West. The associations between institutional subsets of democracy and international conflict in the West are quite different from the results in Latin America.

Africa Table 6.22 shows that the comparison of conflict involvement among types of democracy in *Africa* yielded results quite different from Latin America and the West in that the in-between categories dominate. There is no significant difference between subsets of democracy when looking

at armed conflicts, but the results are strong and significant for militarized disputes. In support of the hypothesis, democracies with proportional *electoral systems* have the smallest percentage of involvement in militarized disputes. Majority-plurality democracies support the hypothesis by being much more involved in MIDs than PR systems. However, it is the semi-PR states that stand out with a conflict involvement four times higher than that of PR democracies. However, electoral systems have no statistically significant impact on conflict when analyzed by regressions (see Table 6.23).

Among the *executive systems*, semi-presidential democracies have the greatest percentage of involvement in militarized disputes. On the other hand, semi-presidential systems have never participated in full-scale wars. Rather, it is the parliamentary democracies that show the greatest percentage involvement in full-scale war. The same results are evident in the regression analyses. Similar to the results in other regions, the associations between *federal systems* and international conflict are less clear in Africa. However, unitary democracies are more likely than other states, democratic or autocratic, to get involved in full-scale war.

The importance of these findings for democratizing for peace in Africa is affected by the present and historical trends of democratic institutions. As Figure 3.4 showed, most of the African democratic history starts in the 1960s, with the decolonizing processes. During the 1946-2002 time period, as much as 80 percent of all country years were autocratic (see for example Table 6.5). In other words, the history of democracy in Africa is very recent. Of these relatively brief experiences with democracy, Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 show that most democratic states have applied majority-plurality types of electoral systems and very few democracies have applied semi-PR electoral systems. Which types of electoral institutions African states will be adopting in the future is difficult to predict since no system dominates the recent past. Rather, at the turn of the century, there were approximately as many states with proportional as majority-plurality type electoral systems (see Figure 3.16). Since the PR systems have the smallest percentage of conflict involvement, it is a welcoming trend that their numbers are among the most frequent and on the rise. Similarly, it may be good that semi-PR systems are the least common, since these democracies have the greatest involvement in militarized disputes. Although brief and scattered, these trends may be positive for the prospects of peace through democratization in Africa.

The large dominance of semi-presidential democracies seems at first glance to be a reason to worry since these democracies have such a large percentage involvement in militarized disputes.

However, by looking at their numbers in Table 6.6 and Table 3.7, it becomes clear that there are very few democratic years with semi-presidential institutions. Figure 3.17 is supporting this assertion, showing that it is the presidential democracies that have dominated in the past and present. If the trends described above continue, the growth in presidential numbers is not problematic for involvement in disputes. Furthermore, Table 6.22 shows that parliamentary democracies have a much larger percentage involvement in full-scale wars, then the small frequency of these institutions might be good for peace in Africa. Finally, Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 show that most experiences with democracy in Africa have been unitary. Furthermore, Figure 3.18 shows that at the turn of the century, there was an absence of federal and semi-federal democracies in Africa. Thus, the negative implications of federal democracies having the largest percentage of dispute involvement seems minor, if democracies and democratizing states continue to adopt unitary institutional arrangements.

The additivity of these relations is contestable, at least for executive differences. Although PR democracies were involved in conflict less in the West as well as in Africa, these results stand in contrast to the strong conflict involvement among similar democracies in Latin America.

The Human Security Report 2005 (Human Security Centre, 2005) concluded that the global and regional conflict patterns have been changing since the end of the Second World War. In Africa, this is especially evident in the close to absence of large-scale interstate wars today and the increase in the number of civil wars. Although the legacies of colonialism and proxy wars may still be evident in Africa, de-colonialization and the end of the Cold War have removed major factors contributing to interstate conflict in this region. When looking at the most recent years therefore, understanding the prospects for peace in Africa must focus on domestic unrest.

Table 6.22: Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in Africa (Percentages)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
55.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	1.9 (5) 5.6 (1) 0 2.2 (33)	7.4 df=8 $p = 0.491$
56.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	MID Incidence 1817-2001	24.5 (71) 43.8 (8) 10.9 (7) 22.0 (412)	283.6 df=8 $p <= 0.001$
57.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	COW Incidence 1817-2002	4.0 (12) 0 0 1.9 (36)	13.8 df=4 $p <= 0.01$
58.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	0.8 (2) 5.6 (1) 0 1.6 (24)	10.2 df=8 $p = 0.252$
59.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	MID Onset 1817-2001	20.3 (59) 37.5 (6) 6.3 (4) 18.1 (338)	129.6 df=8 $p <= 0.001$
60.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	COW Onset 1817-2002	0.7 (2) 0 0 0.8 (16)	18.9 df=8 $p <= 0.01$
61.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	0.9 (2) 0 5.7 (4) 2.2 (33)	12.1 df=10 $p = 0.28$
62.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	MID Incidence 1817-2001	15.0 (46) 44.0 (22) 15.2 (16) 22.0 (412)	186.5 df=10 $p <= 0.001$
63.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	COW Incidence 1817-2002	1.9 (6) 0 11.4 (12) 1.9 (36)	48.4 df=5 $p <= 0.001$
64.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	0.9 (2) 0 1.4 (1) 1.6 (24)	16.1 df=10 $p = 0.097$
65.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	MID Onset 1817-2001	13.0 (40) 36.0 (18) 9.5 (10) 18.1 (338)	102.8 df=10 $p <= 0.001$
66.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	COW Onset 1817-2002	0.6 (2) 0 1.9 (2) 0.8 (16)	63.7 df=10 $p <= 0.001$
67.	Unitary Semi-Federal Federal Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	1.4 (4) 0 5.1 (2) 2.2 (33)	7.4 df=8 $p = 0.492$
68.	Unitary Semi-Federal Federal Autocracy	MID Incidence 1817-2001	15.3 (73) 21.1 (4) 23.1 (9) 22.0 (412)	74.2 df=8 $p <= 0.001$
69.	Unitary	COW Incidence	4.7 (23)	16.2

Table 6.22: (continued)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=4
	Federal		0	$p \leq 0.01$
	Autocracy		1.9 (36)	
70.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Onset	0.3 (1)	12.0
	Semi-Federal	1946-2002	0	df=8
	Federal		5.1 (2)	$p = 0.154$
	Autocracy		1.6 (24)	
71.	Unitary	MID Onset	12.1 (58)	42.7
	Semi-Federal	1817-2001	21.1 (4)	df=8
	Federal		20.5 (8)	$p \leq 0.001$
	Autocracy		18.1 (338)	
72.	Unitary	COW Onset	1.4 (7)	17.9
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=8
	Federal		0	$p \leq 0.05$
	Autocracy		0.8 (16)	

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR INCIDENCE 1816-2002	NUMBER OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES 1816-2001
ELECTORAL SYSTEM				
Majority-plur, $t - 1$	-0.24	0.05	0.26	0.05
Semi-PR, $t - 1$	0.02	0.17		0.06
PR, $t - 1$		-0.48		-0.07
N	1783	2185	2200	2185
Y=1	40	532	49	
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM				
Presidential, $t - 1$	-0.82	-0.21	-0.24	-0.02
Semi-pres, $t - 1$		0.79*		0.38***
Parliamentary, $t - 1$	0.35	-0.27	0.85*	-0.05
N	1803	2297	2406	2297
Y=1	39	496	54	
FEDERAL SYSTEM				
Unitary, $t - 1$	-0.44	-0.16	0.71*	0.01
Semi-federal, $t - 1$		-0.13		-0.11
Federal, $t - 1$	0.09	-0.36		-0.05
N	1826	2018	2060	2018
Y=1	39	498	59	

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.23: Africa: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

The Middle East When looking at the results for the *Middle East* in Table 6.24 and Table 6.25, the uniqueness of this region becomes very obvious. Most importantly, quantitatively comparing democratic subsystems is difficult in a region in which democratic history is extraordinary brief and scattered as demonstrated in Figure 3.5. Furthermore, Table 6.5, Table 6.7, and Table 6.9 show that many institutions are non-existent in this region. Although both majority-plurality and PR electoral systems exist, no democracy was classified as parliamentary, semi-federal or federal. In other words, there is hardly any institutional variation among Middle Eastern democracies and comparisons are, in reality, between democracy and autocracy. However, it is interesting to look at the characteristics of the existing democracies and compare their conflict behavior to that of autocratic states.

The only conflict indicator producing significant results is militarized disputes. The armed conflicts and the full-scale wars do not yield statistically significant results. Most strikingly, democ-

racies have a much higher percentage of conflict involvement than autocracies. This observation holds true regardless of institutional setup, and is supported in the regressions as well as the cross tabulations.

Because of the extremely brief and immature historical experience of democracy, comparing democratic institutions would be futile in this region. This does not mean that regime type does not matter for states' conflict involvement internationally, but suggests that the Middle East is at an entirely different stage in the democratization processes than the rest of the world. States face domestic and international challenges that affect the association between democracy and conflict in unique ways. In order to understand the prospects for peace through spread of democratic institutions in the Middle East, analyses must include region specific challenges of factors like colonialism, domestic conflict, and political, cultural, and institutional stability. Seeking to understand the foundations for democracy in the Middle East is more important than looking for a democratic peace. The Middle East clearly questions the universality of the democratizing for peace idea, suggesting that regional trends of these relationships are not additive.

Table 6.24: Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in the Middle East
(Percentages)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
73.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	0 - 8.0 (4) 8.3 (51)	1.58 df=3 $p = 0.665$
74.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	MID Incidence 1817-2001	55.6 (5) - 75.5 (37) 38.0 (404)	30.7 df=6 $p <= 0.001$
75.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	COW Incidence 1817-2002	0 - 10.0 (5) 6.6 (71)	2.1 df=3 $p = 0.551$
76.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	0 - 2.0 (1) 4.6 (28)	2.9 df=6 $p = 0.824$
77.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	MID Onset 1817-2001	44.4 (4) - 67.4 (33) 31.7 (337)	30.6 df=6 $p <= 0.001$
78.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	COW Onset 1817-2002	0 - 4.0 (2) 3.5 (38)	3.1 df=6 $p = 0.796$
79.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	19.4 (6) 0 - 8.3	8.9 df=3 $p <= 0.05$ (51)
80.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	MID Incidence 1817-2001	70.0 (21) 77.1 (27) - 38.0 (404)	43.5 df=8 $p <= 0.001$
81.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	COW Incidence 1817-2002	16.1 (5) 2.8 (1) - 6.6 (71)	7.0 df=4 $p = 0.138$
82.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	6.5 (2) 0 - 4.6 (28)	11.1 df=6 $p = 0.085$
83.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	MID Onset 1817-2001	53.3 (16) 74.3 (26) - 31.7 (337)	47.1 df=8 $p <= 0.001$
84.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	COW Onset 1817-2002	6.5 (2) 2.3 (1) - 3.5 (38)	8.2 df=8 $p = 0.415$
85.	Unitary Semi-Federal Federal Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	9.0 (6) - - 8.3 (51)	0.7 df=2 $p = 0.714$
86.	Unitary Semi-Federal Federal	MID Incidence 1817-2001	67.6 (48) - -	30.3 df=4 $p <= 0.001$

Table 6.24: (continued)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
	Autocracy		38.0 (51)	
87.	Unitary	COW Incidence	8.2 (6)	1.4
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	-	df=2
	Federal		-	$p = 0.487$
	Autocracy		6.6 (71)	
88.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Onset	3.0 (2)	1.8
	Semi-Federal	1946-2002	-	df=4
	Federal		-	$p = 0.782$
	Autocracy		4.6 (28)	
89.	Unitary	MID Onset	59.2 (42)	28.8
	Semi-Federal	1817-2001	-	df=4
	Federal		-	$p \leq 0.001$
	Autocracy		31.7 (337)	
90.	Unitary	COW Onset	4.1 (3)	1.5
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	-	df=4
	Federal		-	$p = 0.832$
	Autocracy		3.5 (38)	

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR INCIDENCE 1816-2002	NUMBER OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES 1816-2001
ELECTORAL SYSTEM				
Majority-plur, $t - 1$		0.20		-0.08
Semi-PR, $t - 1$	-0.04	0.63	0.16	0.76**
PR, $t - 1$				
N	666	1092	1125	1092
Y=1	59	480	84	
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM				
Presidential, $t - 1$	0.86	0.54	0.53	0.34
Semi-pres, $t - 1$		0.70	-0.87	1.20***
Parliamentary, $t - 1$				
N	647	1105	1148	1105
Y=1	57	452	77	
FEDERAL SYSTEM				
Unitary, $t - 1$	0.18	0.62*	0.08	0.74***
Semi-federal, $t - 1$				
Federal, $t - 1$				
N	683	1105	1148	1105
Y=1	57	452	77	

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.25: The Middle East: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

Asia Unlike Africa and the Middle East, the results in *Asia* are very clear and statistically significant. With the exception of the federal distinction, institutional subsets of democracy seem to be associated with international conflict in ways that are unique to Asia. Overall, the effects support the hypotheses for two out of three institutional distinctions. Like Africa, Table 6.26 show that semi-PR democracies have the greatest percentage of conflict involvement when comparing electoral institutions in Asia. Democracies with proportional electoral systems have the lowest percentage of conflict involvement, regardless of conflict type, when looking at the cross tabulations. These associations change for the regressions. Table 6.27 suggests that the semi-PR and PR democracies are more conflict prone than autocracies, whereas democracies with majority-plurality elections are less likely to get involved in conflict. The result for the in-between category proves interesting in

Asia, with more than 80 percent of the semi-PR democracies in Asia being involved in militarized disputes during the 200-year time period analyzed.

When comparing *executive systems* in Asia, parliamentary democracies have the lowest percentage involvement in international conflict when looking at the cross tabulations. This association is supported in the regression analyses. However, it is the in-between category that proves particularly interesting when comparing executive systems in Asia. Semi-presidential democracies consistently have the highest percentage of conflict involvement, although the presidential systems are not far behind.

Finally, the comparison of *federal democracies* was the opposite of what was expected. Table 6.26 shows that federal democracies were consistently more involved in international conflict than semi-federal and unitary democracies. However, the regressions in Table 6.27 suggest that, among Asian states, federal and semi-federal democracies are the least likely to get involved in interstate conflict.

Table 6.26: Regional Models: Institutions and Conflict in Asia (Percentages)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
91.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	11.8 (39) 8.4 (8) 0 13.7 (116)	99.7 df=8 $p \leq 0.001$
92.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	MID Incidence 1817-2001	38.3 (124) 82.2 (74) 23.1 (6) 31.8 (544)	133.7 df=8 $p \leq 0.001$
93.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	COW Incidence 1817-2002	3.6 (12) 8.4 (8) 0 9.2 (159)	17.8 df=4 $p \leq 0.001$
94.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	3.9 (13) 1.1 (1) 0 3.6 (30)	11.4 df=8 $p = 0.182$
95.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	MID Onset 1817-2001	31.8 (103) 66.7 (60) 19.2 (5) 25.3 (434)	105.6 df=8 $p \leq 0.001$
96.	Majority-Plurality Semi-PR PR Autocracy	COW Onset 1817-2002	1.5 (5) 1.1 (1) 0 3.1 (53)	19.6 df=8 $p \leq 0.05$
97.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	19.7 (24) 20.2 (18) 2.1 (5) 13.7 (116)	132.4 df=10 $p \leq 0.001$
98.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	MID Incidence 1817-2001	57.3 (67) 62.4 (53) 35.7 (84) 31.8 (544)	96.1 df=10 $p \leq 0.001$
99.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	COW Incidence 1817-2002	12.3 (15) 5.6 (5) 0 9.2 (159)	31.4 df=5 $p \leq 0.001$
100.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	Armed Conflict Onset 1946-2002	3.3 (4) 10.1 (9) 0.4 (1) 3.6 (30)	49.23 df=10 $p \leq 0.001$
101.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	MID Onset 1817-2001	40.2 (47) 54.1 (46) 31.9 (75) 25.3 (434)	76.7 df=10 $p \leq 0.001$
102.	Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Autocracy	COW Onset 1817-2002	1.6 (2) 4.5 (4) 0 3.1 (53)	38.9 df=10 $p \leq 0.001$
103.	Unitary Semi-Federal Federal Autocracy	Armed Conflict Incidence 1946-2002	6.6 (17) 0 19.5 (30) 13.7 (116)	118.7 df=8 $p \leq 0.001$
104.	Unitary Semi-Federal Federal Autocracy	MID Incidence 1817-2001	41.1 (102) 40.0 (16) 56.6 (86) 31.8 (544)	75.8 df=8 $p \leq 0.001$
105.	Unitary	COW Incidence	5.8 (15)	16.7

Table 6.26: (continued)

RUN #	INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE	CONFLICT VARIABLE	PERCENTAGES (N)	CHI SQUARE
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=4
	Federal		3.3 (5)	$p \leq 0.01$
	Autocracy		9.2 (159)	
106.	Unitary	Armed Conflict Onset	0.8 (2)	31.0
	Semi-Federal	1946-2002	0	df=8
	Federal		7.8 (12)	$p \leq 0.001$
	Autocracy		3.6 (30)	
107.	Unitary	MID Onset	33.1 (82)	52.6
	Semi-Federal	1817-2001	37.5 (15)	df=8
	Federal		46.7 (71)	$p \leq 0.001$
	Autocracy		25.3 (434)	
108.	Unitary	COW Onset	0.8 (2)	20.6
	Semi-Federal	1817-2002	0	df=8
	Federal		2.6 (4)	$p \leq 0.01$
	Autocracy		3.1 (53)	

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ARMED CONFLICT INCIDENCE 1946-2002	MILITARIZED DISPUTE INCIDENCE 1816-2001	FULL-SCALE WAR INCIDENCE 1816-2002	NUMBER OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES 1816-2001
ELECTORAL SYSTEM				
Majority-plur, $t - 1$	-0.23	-0.19	-0.97**	-0.12(*)
Semi-PR, $t - 1$	0.63	0.92**	0.58	0.22(*)
PR, $t - 1$		-0.83		0.50*
N	1271	2039	2155	2039
Y=1	168	802	192	
EXECUTIVE SYSTEM				
Presidential, $t - 1$	0.81*	0.22	0.54	-0.19
Semi-pres, $t - 1$	-0.01	0.57(*)	-0.70	0.32**
Parliamentary, $t - 1$	-1.36**	-0.26		-0.15
N	1300	2039	1944	2039
Y=1	163	748	179	
FEDERAL SYSTEM				
Unitary, $t - 1$	-0.36	-0.02	-0.22	-0.06
Semi-federal, $t - 1$		-0.49		-0.53**
Federal, $t - 1$	0.07	0.15	-1.04*	-0.001
N	1235	1953	1941	1953
Y=1	163	748	179	

Significance Level: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.27: Asia: Regressions of Democratic Institutions and Interstate Conflict Incidence (With Temporal Autocorrelation Correction)

The political implications of the associations between democratic subsets and conflict involvement are affected by the presence of the different institutions in Asia. Since the history of democracy is largely a phenomenon of the post-World War II time-period as suggested earlier by Figure 3.6, it makes sense to adjust the comparison of democratic subsystems to this time frame. During this period of democratic experience in Asia, Table 6.5 shows that majority-plurality institutions dominated the electoral history among Asian democracies, the experience with semi-proportional setups is in-between, whereas there has been little usage of proportional electoral systems. Given the result of PR democracies having the smallest percentage of conflict involvement, the limited usage of these types of democratic institutions may not be such good news for peace in Asia. However, Figure 3.22 showed that proportional electoral setups have been increasingly replacing majority-plurality institutions, whereas the number of semi-PR democracies has remained stable since the mid-1990s. If these trends continue, the prospects for peace through democratization may be promising.

The history of executive institutions after the end of World War II (see Table 6.7) shows a clear dominance of parliamentary institutions in Asia. This is a welcoming trend from a peace perspective, since parliamentary democracies have the smallest percentage of conflict involvement. Recent trends in Figure 3.23 show a slight reduction in the number of democracies with parliamentarism and a slight increase in the number of semi-presidential systems at the turn of the century. If the number of democracies with semi-presidential institutional setups continues to grow, the prospects for interstate peace in this region may be in danger.

Even though the presence of federalism has been considerable since 1946, Figure 3.23 shows that unitary democracies are growing in numbers and federal democracies were close to absent in Asia at the end of the 20th century. If these trends continue, federal democratic institutions will not be a threat to maintaining peace among states.

Democratic institutions may play a role in interstate conflict in Asia, though the patterns discovered are not revealing very clear trends. A closer look at Asia as a contextual backdrop for the democracy and conflict nexus may provide important insights. Unique to Asia is that it includes many very large countries, which have strong impacts on the region. Japan, India and China are particularly essential to stabilizing or destabilizing relations between states in Asia, potentially promoting domino effects from their actions. For example, stable relations between China and India may help stabilize relations between India and Pakistan.

Another factor that comes into play in Asia is the importance of the 'Asian miracle' or economic growth. The close link between economic and political liberalization in Southeast Asia has made some scholars ask whether a local 'democratic peace' has been forming there since the 1970s.⁸⁹ This argument points to the enormous variation among Asian states. Consequently, understanding the association between democracy and conflict in this region may benefit from further geographical sub-division.

Some important conclusions about the association between subsets of democracy and involvement in different types of international conflicts must be made. Most importantly, regional relations are unique, and adding these results in a pooled analysis for the world fails to acknowledge the impact of context on the regime and conflict debate. The results prove clearest and strongest in regions in which democracy is best established, such as in Latin America, the West, and in Asia.

⁸⁹Thanks to Stein Tønneson, director at PRIO, for providing historical insight on this topic.

This encourages stronger emphasis on the context-specific foundations for democratic governance in regions with scarce democratic histories. For example, democratization processes take place in ways that may be unique and presently exist at different phases in each region. Democratization is not a universal, uniform, or irreversible process. Rather, democratization may happen through leaps and bounds, frequently going through reversal processes. For institutions to play a role in constraining decision-making, they need to be well established. In other words, regime stability may be of essence in democracy-sparse regions like Africa and the Middle East. In other words, the hypothesized relations between institutional constraints and conflict are not globally supported and suggests a closer look at the local conditions in which these institutions need to function. The variation in conflict involvement between different types of democracy, some being more frequently involved in international conflict than autocracies, and the regional variations suggest that the optimism for peace through democratization is premature.

6.3.3 Summarizing the Importance of Governmental Institutions to Conflict

The above analysis of simple bivariate associations between democratic subsets and international conflict is very useful in specifying the scope of a more statistically sophisticated analysis.⁹⁰ Specifically, it makes obvious which institutional distinctions are the most important to each region and specifies the time-period of relevance. What the above analysis is implying, but still lacking, is a similar understanding of the usefulness of the conflict indicators used. The relevance of regional associations between democratic institutions and international conflict are not only affected by the frequency of the institutions. They must also consider the types of conflict most common in each region, especially with respect to the most recent trends.

Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2⁹¹ show regional frequencies of the different conflict variables applied in this analysis.⁹² Both figures show that militarized interstate disputes dominate in all regions,

⁹⁰Simple bivariate associations obviously do not suggest a satisfactory understanding of the institutions-conflict nexus. However, they lay out the basis for more sophisticated analyses. Most importantly, two variables share a time span much greater than what is possible in analyses with a greater number of variables.

⁹¹The armed conflict variable covers the time period 1946-2001 and can only be compared to the other conflict indicators during these years.

⁹²See also Table 6.7, showing the specific percentage of conflict observations in different regions.

regardless of time period. Most of the dispute observations and the full-scale war observations are located in the West, but the disputes are frequent also in Latin America and Asia during 1816-2001 (see Figure 6.1). The trends change when looking at the post-World War II period separately. Although the West still harbors the greatest frequency of militarized dispute observations, Figure 6.2 shows that Asia is not far behind, followed by Africa during 1946-2001. In this time period, Asia, followed by the West, are the regions with the greatest frequency of armed conflicts and full-scale international war. Conversely, both types of conflicts are close to absent in Latin America, whereas the frequency of full-scale war observations is relatively small in Africa.




Figure 6.1: Regional Distribution of Conflict Incidence (Country Years), 1816-2001

As emphasized earlier, the nature of conflict between states has changed throughout the 200-year time span covered in this analysis. Although all conflict observations from this time-period are important in understanding the democracy-conflict nexus, the most recent trends are most relevant for understanding the role democratic institutions may play for states' conflict involvement in the future. Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show that militarized interstate disputes are dominant in all regions after the end of World War II, and the numbers have generally been increasing at the end




Figure 6.2: Regional Distribution of Conflict Incidence (Country Years), 1946-2002

of the 20th century in the West, Africa, and Asia. Although only three wars fall into the full-scale war category after 1990; the Kosovo War, the Gulf War, and the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, two of them are characterized by involvement of multiple actors. The magnitude of these few wars, especially in light of the present conflict in Iraq, suggests that they are still relevant to the analysis of democratic institutions and conflict. Quantitative statistics might not be the best approach to such studies, though. When looking at armed conflicts, they seem to be most frequent in Asia and the Middle during this time-period.

Table 6.28 summarizes region-specific variations of democratic institutions and interstate conflict. The hypothesized expectations were that the most peaceful states are those with proportional elections, parliamentarism, and federal systems. Likewise, I expected that majority-plurality democracies and those headed by a president or being unitary are the most conflict prone, and that the most conflict prone democracies are more aggressive than autocracies. Finally, I hypothesized that the impact of democratic institutions on conflict vary between regions.

The exploration of these associations clearly rejects the idea of universally valid associations between democratic institutions and interstate conflict. None of the democratic sub-systems affected states' conflict behavior in the Middle East, which is not surprising based on the near absence of democracy in the region. Electoral systems did not have a significant impact on interstate conflict in Africa, but had strong and varying impacts on democratic conflict behavior in Latin America, the West, and Asia. The results did not always support the hypothesized effect of electoral systems. Whereas majority-plurality democracies are less conflict prone than autocracies in Latin America, majority-plurality democracies were more conflict prone than autocracies and PR democracies in the West. Electoral systems may have quite a unique impact on interstate conflict in Asia, where semi-proportional systems were more conflict prone than autocracies and other democracies. Why this is the case is unclear.

The impact of executive democratic sub-systems vary between regions as well. Whereas parliamentary democracies are more peaceful than other democracies and autocracies in Latin America and Asia, the opposite is true in the West. In fact, Western democracies are more conflict prone than autocracies, regardless of being presidential or parliamentary. Similarly, parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies are more prone to interstate conflict than autocracies in Africa.

Finally, distinguishing between federal sub-systems yielded the weakest results, which may in part be explained by lack of variation between the institutional categories. Historically, the choice of a federal institutional structure may have been a pragmatic choice for managing domestic politics in large countries. Although there is a growth of confederations, large sovereign nation-states have disintegrated recently. As a result, the relevance of a federal distinction based on state sovereignty may be diminishing. The most interesting impact of federalism was evident in Asia where semi-federal and federal democracies had evident pacifying impacts on interstate conflict. Unitary democracies are the most peaceful in Latin America, but the most conflict prone in Africa. In the West, both unitary and federal democracies are more conflict prone than autocracies.

The summary in Table 6.28 suggests that regions provide important contexts for the association between subsets of democracy and international conflict behavior. It shows that some types of democratic institutions may be more important and function differently in each region. These differences are fundamental to an understanding of how democratic institutions affect decisions about conflict involvement. In other words, these regional variations are not additive with respect

	DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS	CONFLICT VARIABLE
LATIN AMERICA	Majority-plurality Elections (-) Parliamentary Executive (-) Unitary Democracies (-)	Militarized Disputes Militarized Disputes Full-scale War Armed Conflicts Militarized Disputes Full-scale Wars
THE WEST	Majority-plurality Elections (+) Semi-PR Elections (+) PR Elections (-) Presidential Executive (+) Parliamentary Executive (+) Unitary Democracies (+) Semi-federal Democracies (-) Federal Democracies (+)	Armed Conflicts Militarized Disputes Full-scale War Militarized Disputes Militarized Disputes Full-scale Wars Armed Conflicts Militarized Disputes Armed Conflicts Militarized Disputes Full-scale War Armed Conflicts Militarized Disputes Militarized Disputes Armed Conflicts Militarized Disputes
AFRICA	Semi-pres Executive (+) Parliamentary Executive (+) Unitary Democracies (+)	Militarized Disputes Full-scale War Full-scale War
THE MIDDLE EAST	Absence of institutional variation	
ASIA	Maj-plur Elections (-) Semi-PR Elections (+) PR Elections (+) Presidential Executive (+) Semi-presidential Executive (+) Parliamentary Executive (-) Semi-federal Democracies (-) Federal Democracies (-)	Full-scale War Militarized Disputes Militarized Disputes Armed Conflicts Militarized Disputes Armed Conflicts Full-scale Wars Full-scale Wars

Table 6.28: Summary of Intra-regional Variation: The Importance of Democratic Institutions to Interstate Conflict Types

to supporting optimism for more peace in the world through further democratization. Rather, the prospect for interstate peace supported by democratic institutions is regional. Regions hold borders for histories and processes that are largely shared among the states within. In the context of democratizing for peace, the different stages of each regions' democratization processes offer unique challenges to the adaptation and functioning of democratic institutions. Furthermore, the extreme variation in each regions' historical experiences and present ratio of democratic states points to the great range of outside challenges the existing democracies are exposed to. Ironically, the most fragile democratic states in Africa are surrounded by the largest numbers of autocratic neighbors. These are the regions where type of democratic institutions may matter the most.

Obviously, democratic institutions are not the only factor influencing states' conflict behavior vis-a-vis other states. States generally face challenges at different levels that may prompt the decision to get involved in a conflict with other states. As discussed at an earlier point, the most recognized and analyzed of such factors have been identified in theories about the causes of war and explanations for peace. Exploring regional variation of these factors suggested that they may have different influences depending on the context in which they work. Together, the spatial distribution of causes of war, explanations for peace and governmental institutions point to directions for further analyses, suggesting special attention to region specific associations.

6.4 Conclusion: Theoretical and Analytical Adjustments

The results of the analyses in this work point to the need for theoretical and analytical adjustments. Theoretically, there is a strong need to focus on the role domestic factors play in foreign policy-making, especially with respect to mechanisms that may constrain or promote decision-making relevant to conflict involvement. The understanding of how such mechanisms work within institutional setups may be especially fruitful in light of democracy's role as 'peace-maker.'

Analytically, the relevance of this work is showing the inferential problems of assuming spatial and temporal universality of aggregated analyses. The association between democracy and conflict is dynamic, it varies over time and is shaped by context specific factors. Analytically, this suggests closer attention to the individual parts that create the whole, and to how the single parts relate to each other. In other words, research must explore inter- and intra-regional variation before

VARIABLES	LATIN AMERICA	THE WEST	AFRICA	THE MIDDLE EAST	ASIA
Electoral System	1.9 (69)	0.5 (28)	6.5 (169)	1.05 (13)	0.1 (2)
Executive System	0.1 (5)	0.9 (47)	2.9 (76)	0.5 (6)	0.13 (3)
Federal System	0 0	0.2 (12)	0.2 (5)	0 0	0.04 (1)

Table 6.29: Regional Distribution of Missing Observations in the Institutional Variables (Percentages, N)

making conclusions about the world. This begs for analyses based on combinations of quantitative and qualitative methods.

The analyses performed in this dissertation have serious implications for academic scholars and policy-makers who are interested in the peace promoting role of democracy. Democracy and democratic institutions may promote peace between states, but may, under certain circumstances, be advocates for interstate conflict. This work suggests that such circumstances are largely shaped by, and within, the regional context in which the institutions function.

On a final note, I would like to emphasize that empirical results are shaped by the data. Data and analyses of the data are important indicators of the validity of the results produced. The question of whether the missing data observations are non-random is important. Collecting data about stable democracies in Europe is a task quite different from determining which institutions are applied during brief democratic moments in African states.

In order to assess the validity of the data from this perspective, Table 6.29 presents the regional distribution of missing observations for the different institutional distinctions analyzed. Overall, there are very few missing observations in all the regions analyzed. This suggests that the chances of systematically excluding important information is low. The largest percentage of missing observations is evident for democracies in Africa, especially when looking at electoral systems. Since African states' periods with democracy are brief, it is important to keep in mind that even the low rate of 6.5 percent missing observations may affect the results.

Chapter 7: Conclusion: Prospects for Peace by Democratization

‘Peace is the noblest cause of war’ (R.H. Tawney)⁹³

‘[T]hat peace may prevail among democratic states is a comforting thought. [...] [T]hat democracy may promote war against undemocratic states - is disturbing’ (Waltz, 2000:13)

7.1 Main Arguments and Findings

This dissertation has explored institutional variation of states’ international conflict behavior over time and across regions. It was motivated by the optimism among policy-makers and academics of spreading democracy as a means for more peace among states. This hope is based on the absence of international conflict between democratic countries and the idea that the point in time is reached, after which increasing the number of democratic countries in the world will produce more peace (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre, 1999). This dissertation argues that such optimism is premature as long as its regional validity has not been analyzed and the theoretical arguments remain underdeveloped.

The Democratic Peace theory explains states’ conflict behavior by norms and institutions constraining politicians’ decision-making. I have extended this theoretical argument by differentiating between institutional subsets of democracy and distinguishing between their intrinsic and extrinsic relevance for interstate conflict. The former combines norms and institutions in a dialectic

⁹³Quoted in Waltz (2000:13).

tic and mutually reinforcing association, whereas the latter questions whether institutions have an independent effect. Such an approach regards norms and institutions as inter-connected aspects of domestic constraints rather than competing theories. This dissertation has pursued theoretical elaboration and empirical variation of democratic institutions' extrinsic role in interstate conflict.

The extrinsic importance of governmental institutions is that they put formal restrictions on the decision-making process and possible outcomes. The most important mechanisms through which politicians are constrained are representation, accountability, responsiveness, and power-sharing. I have argued that the general impact of these mechanisms can best be expressed by three institutional subsets of democracy: electoral, executive, and federal systems. The varying representation of constraints in democratic institutions was the basis for asking whether interstate conflict behavior varies between institutional subsets of democracy.

Derived from Alker's (1965) specification of fallacies in political inference (Figure 1.1), this dissertation shows how problematic assumptions about temporal and spatial universality prevents the Democratic Peace from remaining a progressive research program. I have emphasized how regional contexts hold shared histories that affect the association between governmental institutions and conflicts. Furthermore, I suggested that institutions and conflicts exist in inter- and intra regional dynamics. This implies that the association is shaped by systemic patterns on the one hand and on region specific patterns on the other. This dissertation has underscored that the prospect for more peace in the world through democratization is determined largely by regional prospects. Furthermore, the prospects for regional peace may be affected by recent trends of institutional dominance. In other words, it has questioned the additivity of a global Democratic Peace based on spatial uniqueness, and it has questioned the regional prospects for peace based on temporal conditionality.

What can be learned about the democracy and peace association from the results of the empirical analysis? The main proposition in this work is that institutional subsets of democracy analyzed with sensitivity to temporal and spatial dynamism can provide a better understanding of the association between democracy and peace. Motivated by the unqualified optimism of democratizing for global peace, I started out examining the regional validity of this association. Specifically, the first auxiliary hypothesis was confirmed: although democratic states outnumber autocracies globally, this is not the case in all regions. The optimistic prospect for peace is shared between Latin America

and the West, but is not reached yet in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Whether democracies have outnumbered autocracies or not, it is clear that the association between democracy and conflict is dynamic and non-linear. Mitchell, Gates and Hegre (1999:788) confirm a dynamic association between the number of democracies and the propensity of conflicts globally, suggesting that time is required for the positive association to take hold (see also Cederman and Rao (2001), 2001). James, Solberg and Wolfson (1999) make a similar argument about the Cold War period. However, they fail to recognize the spatial limitations of such a conclusion.

The second auxiliary hypothesis suggested that the number of democratic states vary with time and is not presently increasing in all regions. *With the exception of the near absence of democracy in the Middle East, the analysis confirmed that all regions have experienced a non-linear ebb and flow in the number of democratic states. Furthermore, regional prospects for further democratization are not always clear when looking at the most recent trends.* Continued dominance of democracy seems quite likely in Latin America and the West, which harbors the longest experiences with democratic governance. Although the trends are less consistent in both Africa and Asia, the prospects for closing the gap between democracy and autocracy may be within reach in Asia. It seems quite clear therefore, that the motivation for focusing on temporal dynamic and regional patterns is warranted.

One underlying assumption of the proposition about the role of democratic institutions was their ability to intervene in the already established ideas about the conditions for war and proponents for peace as suggested by Realist and Liberal theories. Rather than performing a thorough examination of these theories, I examined their spatial relevance in order to show that the associations in which institutions are assumed to intervene are subject to spatial conditionality as well. Thus, the third and fourth auxiliary hypotheses suggested that Realist and Liberal explanations for war and peace vary between regions (see also Lemke, 2002). Both were supported in my analyses.

In Latin America, defense pacts and the number of neighbors are associated with states' armed conflict involvement, while the financially strongest states have the greatest involvement in militarized disputes. Among the Liberal indicators, IGO memberships increase states' likelihood of conflict involvement whereas Latin American democracies are less likely than autocracies to engage in interstate conflict.

States' conflict involvement is quite different in the West. The major powers are quite clearly the most conflict prone, regardless of the type of conflict fought. This trend was also evident in

the ranking of the most conflict prone states since 1946 by the Human Security Centre (2005), and is further supported by the positive association between capability and involvement in disputes in this work. The number of neighboring states has a negative effect on states' conflict involvement in the West, which is not surprising knowing that most wars fought by Western major powers take place in other regions. The Human Security Report 2005 identifies the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, followed by Russia, as the most war prone countries since the end of World War II, having experienced the highest number of international armed conflicts. These states are former colonial powers and/or superpowers of the Cold War, which points to the relevance of systemic factors (inter-regional variance) for conflict between states. The recent decline of the most serious interstate conflicts may be caused by systemic factors, such as the increasing economic interdependence working to reduce the economic benefits of warfare, at least for the richest and most powerful states. In recent years, Western major powers and financially well-off states have tended to be democratic. From this perspective, the result that democracies are more conflict prone than autocracies in the West is not surprising, though somewhat ironic given that this region has the greatest prospect for enduring peace.

In Africa, the financially strongest states are the most conflict prone, regardless of conflict type. Neighborhood matters for their involvement in disputes, but does not explain African states' involvement in the most serious interstate conflicts. Regime type did not affect conflict involvement, but trading states were more likely to get involved in disputes, and networking states were more involved in armed conflicts.

Few of the Realist and Liberal factors explored had much explanatory power for states' involvement in armed conflicts in the Middle East. However, neighborhood and networks matter, both increasing the likelihood of dispute and full-scale war involvement. Trading states were less likely to get involved in smaller-scale conflicts with other states, whereas regime type had no effect.

In Asia, Realist explanations have the greatest explanatory impact on states' involvement in militarized disputes. Major powers (China and Japan) are more likely to engage in disputes, and conflict involvement increases with capability and number of neighbors. Among the Liberal factors, regime type had no significant effect on states' conflict behavior. Whereas networking states were more likely to get involved in armed conflicts in Asia, trading states were less prone to full-scale war.

These results show regional variation of factors identified by Realist and Liberal theories as explanations for conflict. This further underscores inferential problems of assuming global universality in analyses that fail to investigate regional variation of the associations at stake. This task is especially important for the Democratic Peace because of its unique behavioral commitment to spread democracy.

The overall goal of this dissertation has been to explore institutional variation of the most essential Democratic Peace observations and to assess their temporal and spatial validity. The analyses performed confirm the relative importance of inference about institutional subsets of democracy and interstate conflict. Distribution and prevalence of democratic institutions have varied over time and is unique to each region (see Chapter 2.5, Section 3.4). Large parts of these variations are quite clearly products of inter-regional and intra-regional factors. The regional details of the role governmental institutions play for interstate conflict are summarized in Table 6.28. Some results were clearly more interesting than others. For example, electoral systems have the most consistent impact on interstate conflict, with effects varying with region. Although not always in the expected direction, this sub-division of democracy demonstrated that the most conflict prone democracies were even more aggressive than autocratic states. This finding clearly questions the motivation behind many democratization efforts.

Furthermore, whereas democracy in itself proved insignificant to interstate conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and in Asia, different democratic institutions were relevant in Africa and Asia. This may further support the argument that institutional features of democracy matters to conflict involvement, not democracy per se. Specifically, Asia was the region in which the institutional sub-divisions of democracy most successfully demonstrated differences between types of democracy in addition to differences between institutions and autocracy.

Other than the seeming absence of democracy's relevance for states' conflict behavior in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, some results were quite unexpected. With the exception of the strong pacifying impact of democracies with PR electoral systems, most democracies in the West were consistently more conflict prone than autocracies. This is quite ironic given the considerable success of democracy and peace within the region. Conversely, all of the statistically significant institutional sub-divisions in Latin America had pacifying effects on interstate conflict. Both of these observations are in line with the regional analyses of the proponents for peace (see summary

in Table 6.13), that Latin American democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, whereas the opposite is true in the West. This may suggest that institutional setup is less relevant in consolidated democracies and in regions where democracy is dominant. If democratization is premature in the Middle East and democratic institutions are largely unimportant to conflict in Latin America and the West, then democratic institutions may be most relevant as a means for peace in Africa and Asia. Furthermore, this result suggests closer attention to states that fall in-between the strongly autocratic states and the stable democracies. As many of these democracies are likely to be short-lived and unstable, further attention to the role of regime transitions for democracy and for conflict is warranted.

It is clear that all the associations explored in this dissertation are subject to regional differences. As explanations for many of these variations are still not identified and seem to depend on the type of conflict analyzed, further attention to region-specific associations are needed. Institutions have an impact on democratic states' involvement in interstate conflict, but the effects vary with region and conflict type. Overall, these results support the hypotheses of temporal and spatial conditionality of explanations for conflict and peace.

Binary distinctions, such as democracy versus autocracy or peace versus war, are typical for International Relations and often result from assumptions of a hierarchical ranking order between the phenomena studied (see Tickner, 1992:8). Although this work started out from a binary conceptualization of regime type, it has rejected the generally assumed hierarchy of the democratic peace, concluding that some types of democratic countries are more conflict prone than autocracies. In other words, it rejects the automatic association of democracy as peaceful and autocracy as conflictual and points to the political dangers of this assumption.

7.2 Policy Relevance and Recommendations

With the end of colonialism and the Cold War, some of the most important systemic or inter-regional driving forces of interstate war have vanished. Although they have been replaced by factors such as globalization and economic liberalization, the global fear of terrorism, and global warming, the recent absence of the traditionally strong systemic forces suggests that transformations are underway in the systemic or inter-regional conflict patterns.

The inherent paradox of the West as being the most stable and democratic ‘zone of peace,’ while at the same time counting as the states ranked the most aggressive worldwide (Human Security Centre, 2005), may be explained by a combination of inter and intra-regional factors. Although traditionally systemic conflict promoting conditions are absent, recent conflict involvement, such as in Iraq, suggest that they are being replaced. How these emerging global forces relate to conflict between states may be relevant to the idea of democratizing for peace.

These systemic changes support greater attention to region when exploring conflict and peace. For example, what is the relevance of the analyses done here for the Middle East? At this moment in time, the Middle East is the region in which democratization has the most discouraging prospects. In light of the work done here, the near absence of democracy in this region imply that achieving the point at which democracies outnumber autocracies is unthinkable, even in the far future. Many other context-specific factors support this gloomy prediction for the Middle East, such as domestic unrest spilling over into tension between states, as in the cases of Israel and Turkey. Furthermore, domestic instability and the absence of democratic norms and cultures may make it difficult for democratic institutions to get established, maintained, and to function. For example, Muslim culture and society incorporate power structures such as clans and loyalty to God that are not automatically thought of as being compatible with democratic ideas. Another strong feature of this region is the political structure in oil rich countries, in which unique systems of power and wealth support authoritarian rule. Finally, democracies in this region will have to interact with many autocratic neighbors, which may be perilous according to the Democratic Peace. An understanding of the prospects for democracy and democratizing for peace in the Middle East needs to build on a thorough examination of economic, cultural and social foundations for democracy (see Issawi, 1956 and Krämer, 1993). Democracy may survive in the Middle East if it is based on respect for already existing cultural and political frameworks. A democracy founded on Islamic values may be possible, as long as the Muslim population regard democracy as serving the purpose of Islam. With respect to the institutional setup of an Islamic democracy, exploration of how Islamic culture and beliefs can exist in different institutional setups would be needed in addition to evaluating these institutions chances of promoting domestic stability.

This work has demonstrated that the optimism for more peace through democratization is overrated. The prospects for peace are conditioned on regional peace; for this reason, scholars are

urged to disaggregate their analytical frameworks. Consequently, some quantitative tools may be less applicable. A deeper understanding of the complexities of geopolitical region for democracy and conflict may require combining quantitative generalizing with qualitative approaches such as comparative case studies and the analysis of historical trajectories.

For political leaders, this work puts limitations on pursuing democratization as a means for peace. *Achieving enduring peace requires more than just ‘adding democracy.’ It requires attention to the type of democratic institutions promoted, to the domestic and regional context in which they have to function, and to destabilizing conditions such as domestic and interstate conflict.*

7.3 Suggestions for Future Research

What has yet to be learned about the prospect for more peace through spread of democracy? This dissertation suggests the need to develop a theoretical framework that better describes and understands observed variation in the democracy and conflict nexus. The institutional refinement of the Democratic Peace theory is one way to develop a new theoretical framework at the same time as maintaining the core of the Democratic Peace idea. However, further development of the ideas presented here is needed. I suggest that the most important tasks involve exploring institutional interconnectedness, investigating decision-making constraints in autocracies, and the role of regime transitions.

7.3.1 Theoretical Elaboration

Exploring the impact of a single governmental institution is a good starting point, but the constraining impact of governmental institutions on states’ conflict behavior cannot be fully understood in isolation. Democracies consist of combinations of institutions that make them democratic in different ways. The form of institutional interconnectedness may emphasize or weaken democratic mechanisms’ constraining effects on foreign policy decision-making. The complexity with which institutional arrangements relate to each other can be illustrated with the case of Peru (Tavera, 2000:122-128).⁹⁴ Peru is a presidential system, which since 1950 has applied a proportional formula

⁹⁴I am indebted to Alba Quionnes Hesselroth for providing information and sources about the political system in Peru.

(d'Hondt) in parliamentary elections.⁹⁵ Despite installing a system that by first sight encourages proportional representation, additional features of this system largely jeopardize this idea and center power in the hands of the presidential office. Most importantly, the lack of a well-developed party system removes the basis for accountability of representatives to their constituencies, which in turn contributes to the empowerment of the presidency over the parliament. Another important aspect of the electoral system is the fixed number of seats for each geographical district, which makes some districts under-represented whereas others are over-represented. Consequently, an artificial majority for the winning political party, which in practice has been the president's party, tends to give the president greater decision-making freedom. Finally, the presidential and legislative elections are held simultaneously in Peru, which prevents the political system from reflecting changes in the opinion, and of the presidential and parliamentary offices to check each other with respect to representing different public sentiments.

In addition to the amplifying or modifying effects democratic institutions may have on decision-making when combined, the individual institutional categories may hide relevant variation (see Palmer, London and Regan, 2004). For example, grouping parliamentary democracies together may have disguised considerable variation with respect to decision-making constraints of a prime minister. The prime minister in a Westminster style parliamentary system has greater decision-making freedom than prime ministers in other parliamentary systems, such as in Norway and Belgium (Lijphart, 1984). This may explain the Human Security Report 2005 (Human Security Centre, 2005) ranking of the United Kingdom as the world's most conflict prone country, having experienced the highest number of interstate armed conflicts during 1946-2003. Combined with the surprising empirical result that parliamentary democracies are more prone to participate in conflict than other states in some regions, the UK ranking warrants a closer look at the parliamentary category.

Yet other institutional structures, such as civil-military relations, may be relevant when identifying constraining mechanisms on foreign policy-making (see Choi and James, 2008; Kubik, 2001). In Turkey, for example, the military takes on a 'guardianship' role, thus preventing democratic norms and institutions from maturing (Tank, forthcoming). Finally, the debate about the causal direction of the democracy and peace association needs further attention and is relevant when looking for a

⁹⁵The proportional electoral law was even endorsed by the army in 1962.

causal direction between democratic institutions and conflict (see Gates, Knutsen and Moses, 1996; James, Solberg and Wolfson, 1999; Rasler and Thompson, 2004; Thompson, 1996). Addressing this question of endogeneity requires better theorizing and analysis with special attention to geopolitical regions.

7.3.2 Constraints in Autocracies

Whereas most scholars theorize about domestic constraints in democratic states, Geddes (1999a:121) points out that autocratic leaders are constrained when making political decisions as well (this argument was also made by Morgan and Campbell (1991)). According to Geddes, ‘different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy. [...] They have different procedures for making decisions, different ways of handling the choice of leaders and succession, and different ways of responding to society and opponents’ (Ibid:121). As in democracies, differences in politics and competition in authoritarian regimes vary and result in different political consequences. Examples of mechanisms that may constrain autocratic leaders are the role and strength of the military and domestic prospects for revenue extraction (see Gowa, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Olson, 1993; Tullock, 1987). Furthermore, elections may play a role in autocratic policy-making. For example, Golder (2005) argues that, since 1945, almost as many elections have been held in autocratic states as in democracies. With the exception of the work of Golder and Wantchekon (2003), the role of electoral institutions and elections in autocracies has not been given much attention and is not well understood. Exploring constraining mechanisms imposed on autocratic leaders may prove relevant to the prospects for peace in regions where democracy is sparse or where democratic states share borders with many autocratic neighbors.

7.3.3 Transition

Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995, 2005) argument that democratization leads to conflict is one of the most serious criticisms of the Democratic Peace. The conclusion that autocratic states are still in majority in many regions suggests closer attention to the claim that democratization leads to more conflict in the short run. I have excluded periods of regime change from this analysis based on a defining element of regime transitions being the inability of governmental institutions to affect a polity. However, this does not automatically imply that the association between democracy or

democratic institutions and interstate conflict is irrelevant. Interesting venues for exploring these associations are questions as to whether the type and length of transition affect the nature of the new regime? For example, does the type of institution established during times of transition influence the duration and ending point of such a period? These types of questions are relevant to the idea of democratizing for peace because periods of transition are the main ways in which governmental institutions are established or changed.

7.3.4 A Call for Attention to Spatial Complexity

One of the most important contributions of this dissertation is the emphasis on temporal and spatial conditionalities of major theoretical explanations for states' conflict behavior internationally. This implies a call for attention to regions as unique contexts for the democracy and conflict nexus.

The relevance of regional analyses for understanding the impact of institutional constraints is to identify the context in which a theory must be understood. Even when states adopt similar institutions, different contexts can make them function differently (Watts, 1999:2). For example, it is not very hard to imagine that a democracy in a poor country operates differently from a democracy in a rich country. In the latter, the socioeconomic situation ensures the presence of acceptable exit options for political decision-makers and in turn supports the accountability process. A political leader losing his or her term in office in a poor African democracy is faced with an entirely different range of professional and personal options from a politician in Europe. If the personal consequences of being removed from office are very unfavorable, then politicians may have a stronger incentive to be responsive towards the public or balancing institutions. However, achieving a political power position may be especially attractive in states with few other options for influence. If that is the case, politicians may search for ways not to be held accountable, for example through bribery or information control. Given the lack of alternate routes to influence, leaders in poor countries may be more determined to maintain office than politicians in richer democratic states. As a result, constraining mechanisms of one type of democratic system may work in different ways depending on regional context.

Scholars studying international relations have not given much attention to regional trends of interstate conflict. Why this is the case is unclear, but the Human Security Report (2005) focuses attention on 'the changing face of global violence' both globally and in regions. Based on data for

armed conflicts from the PRIO-Uppsala Data Project (Eriksson et al., 2003; Gleditsch et al., 2002), they describe the trends in warfare as changing. ‘In the past decade, armed conflict has declined in almost every region. There are fewer crises that can grow into war, and fewer people are killed in battle. [...] Major conventional wars have declined, while low-intensity conflict has increased, making warfare less deadly’ (Human Security Centre, 2005:14, 23).

This dissertation has shown that the prospects for peace are more complex than the Democratic Peace research program proposes. A good understanding of the role democracy and democratic institutions can play in promoting peace requires re-examination with special emphasis on regional and temporal variations. Finally, the field of International Relations must also respond to global forces, such as the changing nature of warfare if prospects for peace are to be successful.

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Appendix A: List of Variables

I. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: REALISM

ALLIANCES Number of alliance memberships, 1816-2002, log-transformed.

DEFPACTS Number of defense pact memberships, 1816-2002, log-transformed.

LOGGDP GDP, 1950-1998, log-transformed.

MPOWER Major power status, 1816-2002: 0=minor power, 1=major power.

NEIGHBORS Number of neighbors, 1816-2002.

II. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: DEMOCRATIC PEACE

DMA3 Democracy and autocracy ($\text{dem-aut}_i = 3$), 1816-2002: 1=democracy, 2=autocracy.

NUMIGOS Number of NGO memberships, 1816-2002, log-transformed.

TRADE Trade openness, 1950-2000, log-transformed: the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP.

III. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: EXTENDED DEMOCRATIC PEACE

ELECTION Type of democratic electoral system, 1816-2002: 1=majority-plurality, 2=semi-PR, 3=proportional representation, 4=autocracy.

PARLPRES Type of democratic executive system, 1816-2002: 1=presidential, 2=semi-presidential, 3=parliamentary, 4=autocracy.

FEDERAL Type of democratic federal system, 1816-2002: 1=unitary, 2=semi-federal, 3=federal.

IV. DEPENDENT VARIABLES: INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

P2_INCIDENCE Armed conflict incidence, 1946-2002: 0=no interstate armed conflict, 1=interstate armed conflict.

P2_ONSET Armed conflict onset, 1946-2002: 0=no interstate armed conflict onset, 1=onset of interstate armed conflict.

MID_INCIDENCE Militarized interstate dispute incidence, 1816-2001: 0=no dispute incidence, 1=at least incidence of one interstate dispute.

MID_ONSET Militarized interstate dispute onset, 1816-2001: 0=no dispute started, 1=onset of at least one interstate dispute.

MID_NO Annual record of the number of militarized interstate disputes per country, 1816-2001: Ranges from 0 to 27.

COW_INCIDENCE Full-scale international war incidence, 1816-2002: 0=no full-scale war incidence, 1=incidence of full-scale war.

COW_ONSET Interstate war onset, 1816-2002: 0=no interstate war onset, 1=onset of at least one interstate war.

V. CONTROL VARIABLES: TIME AND SPACE

REGION Regions: 1=Latin America, 2=The West, 3=Africa, 4=The Middle East, 5=Asia.

TIME PERIOD1 Time period: 1816-2002

TIME PERIOD2 Time period: 1946-2002

DMA3_DUR Lifetime of democratic system, 1816-2002.

MAJPLUR_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a majority-plurality electoral system, 1816-2002.

SEMIPR_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a semi-PR electoral system, 1816-2002.

PR_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a PR electoral system, 1816-2002.

PRES_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a presidential executive system, 1816-2002.

SEMIPRES_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a semi-presidential executive system, 1816-2002.

PARL_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a parliamentary executive system, 1816-2002.

UNITARY_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a unitary system, 1816-2002.

SEMIFED_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a semi-federal system, 1816-2002.

FEDERAL_DUR Lifetime of democracy with a federal system, 1816-2002.

CUBIC SPLINES

FEDERAL Type of democratic federal system, 1816-2002: 1=unitary, 2=semi-federal, 3=federal. [Comparison of Gerring and Thacker (2003), Karvonen and Lundell (2003), Jagers and Gurr (1996) (the variable 'Centralization' as coded before World War II), but modified and completed where appropriate]

Appendix B: Timeline

Theory	Variable	1816	1918	1946	1950	1953	1965	1995	1998	2000	2001	2002
REALIST EXPLANATIONS FOR INTERSTATE CONFLICT	Alliances											
	Defense Pacts											
	Capability											
	Neighbors											
	Major Power											
TRIANGULAR PEACE	Regime Type											
	IGO											
	Trade											
INSTITUTIONAL PEACE	Electoral System											
	Executive System											
	Federal System											
CONTROL VARIABLES	Region											
	Time Period											
CONFLICT	Armed Conflicts											
	Militarized Disputes											
	Full-Scale Wars											

Appendix C: Correlation Matrix

Table C.1: Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables, Pearson's R , 1950-1998

	Log Alliances	Log Defense Pacts	Log GDP	Log Neighbors	Major Power	Democracy	Log IGO	Trade	Maj-plur	Semi-PR	Pres	Semi-pres	Parl	Unitary	Semi-federal	Federal	Latin America	The West	Africa	The Middle East	Asia	
Log Alliances	1.00																					
Log Defense Pacts	0.85	1.00																				
Log GDP	0.19	0.17	1.00																			
Log Neighbors	0.20	0.13	0.16	1.00																		
Major Power	0.18	0.18	0.39	0.09	1.00																	
Democracy	-0.12	-0.04	0.26	-0.26	0.09	1.00																
Log IGO	0.24	0.25	0.50	0.12	0.13	0.29	1.00															
Trade	-0.003	0.02	-0.04	-0.21	-0.04	0.009	-0.07	1.00														
Maj-plur	-0.11	-0.10	0.06	-0.36	0.19	0.52	0.02	-0.03	1.00													
Semi-PR	0.02	0.02	0.15	-0.10	0.03	0.23	0.06	0.03	-0.24	1.00												
Pres	0.06	0.04	0.20	0.05	-0.08	0.62	0.30	0.03	0.03	0.03	1.00											
Semi-pres	-0.20	-0.17	0.18	0.02	0.12	0.49	0.13	-0.08	0.20	0.31	0.00	1.00										
Parl	-0.04	0.03	0.09	-0.36	0.04	0.44	0.13	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.48	-0.16	1.00									
Unitary	-0.08	-0.01	0.07	-0.30	0.05	0.49	0.15	0.08	0.48	0.08	0.11	-0.18	0.33	1.00								
Semi-federal	-0.05	-0.04	0.13	0.05	-0.04	0.78	0.19	0.02	0.34	0.20	0.52	0.38	0.10	0.09	1.00							
Federal	-0.04	-0.04	0.27	0.003	0.11	0.35	0.13	-0.02	0.32	0.01	0.12	0.17	0.16	-0.20	-0.06	1.00						
Latin America	0.16	0.25	-0.08	-0.07	-0.10	0.11	0.11	-0.04	0.007	0.06	0.09	-0.15	-0.05	0.11	0.01	-0.002	1.00					
The West	0.08	0.14	0.35	0.04	0.23	0.38	0.24	0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.45	-0.09	0.41	0.24	0.28	0.10	0.14	1.00				
Africa	-0.11	-0.14	-0.36	0.11	-0.12	-0.31	-0.06	-0.09	-0.04	-0.10	-0.29	-0.07	-0.18	-0.19	-0.22	-0.08	-0.13	-0.31	1.00			
The Middle East	0.20	0.13	0.002	0.13	-0.06	0.20	-0.05	0.03	-0.12	-0.06	-0.10	-0.11	-0.05	-0.13	-0.14	-0.06	-0.15	-0.18	-0.19	1.00		
Asia	-0.27	-0.36	0.09	-0.21	0.02	-0.04	-0.30	0.11	0.15	0.07	-0.22	-0.09	-0.07	0.09	-0.09	0.01	-0.22	-0.27	-0.28	-0.13	1.00	

Note: N=5720.

Appendix D: Codebook

D.1 Overview

This codebook refers to annual classifications of governmental institutions in the world along three dimensions:

1. Type of Electoral System: Majority-Plurality, Semi-proportional or Proportional Representation.
2. Form of Executive: Presidential, Semi-presidential or Parliamentary.
3. Federalism of Political Authority: Unitary, Semi-federal or Federal.

The data was created as part of the dissertation 'Institutional Variance of the Democratic Peace, 1816-2002: Electoral, Executive, and Federal Systems in Time and Space.'

D.1.1 Variable Definitions

Column Variable	Description
SSNO	Country codes from Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
Year	Year in which country is observed.
Name	Country name.
Primkey	Primary key for the purpose of merging datasets, (SSNO*10000)+year.
Systemmember	System membership as defined by Gleditsch and Ward (1999): 0=No, 1=Yes.
Election_dem	Electoral system in democracies (dem-aut>=3), 1816-2002: 1=Majority-Plurality, 2=Semi-PR, 3=PR, 4=Autocracy.
Parlpres	Form of executive, 1816-2002: 1=Presidential, 2=Semi-presidential, 3=Parliamentary, 4=Non-elective.
Federal	Degree of Federalism, 1816-2002: 1=Unitary, 2=Hybrid, 3=Federal.
Electiondem_dur	Duration of electoral system in democracies, 1946-2002.
Electionall_dur	Duration of electoral system in all states, 1816-2002.
Parlpres_dur	Duration of presidential/parliamentary system in all states, 1816-2002.
Federal_dur	Duration of federal system in all states, 1816-2002.
Indexksg	Authority index from the Polity4 dataset (democracy-autocracy), ranging from -10 to +10, plus -66=Interruption, -77=Interregnum, -88=Transition.

D.1.2 Cases Included

The criteria for inclusion is based on the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) revision and update of the Russett, Singer and Small (1968) list of independent states from 1816 to present. According to this list, an independent polity needs to meet the following criteria: a) it has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on, and c) has a population greater than 250,000 (Gleditsch and Ward, 1999:398).⁹⁶

I base the identification of democracy on the Polity4, version 1.0 (Gleditsch, 2003). This version of the Polity data has been modified and extended to fit the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) system membership definition. Scholars have used different thresholds on the democracy-autocracy index to classify democratic states, with a score of 6 is considered a strict level and a score of 3 is seen as lenient. In order to leave the choice of strictness to each user of this data, electoral systems are recorded in all countries that receive a score of democracy-autocracy ≥ 3 on the Polity4 index.

D.1.3 Classification of Electoral Systems

Electoral systems 'translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates. The key variables are the electoral formula used' (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997:7). Furthermore, an electoral system is 'a set of elements of the electoral regulations that have a direct influence on the conversion of votes into seats by parties and candidates. It is the basic lines of mediation that all electoral laws apply between votes and representation integrating, as such, the core decisions that all

⁹⁶Countries that do not meet the criteria for system membership are American Samoa, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam, Kiribati, Lichtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated State of), Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Marina Islands, Palau, Palestinian Territory (occupied), Reunion, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tonga, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna.

legislators must adopt when it comes to drafting an electoral laws, those that are able to bring about different results in terms of representation with the same numbers of popular votes. It is a way to constitute government bodies' (ACE Project, 2003). The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997) and the ACE Project (2003) apply the same definitions of electoral systems.

The data here records legislative elections, including democracies only. The coding is straightforward if the national assembly or parliament has a unicameral structure, but in the event of a bi-cameral structure, the lower chamber is generally the most influential and therefore used as the basis for the coding (Druckman and Thies, 2002:760). Electoral systems come in many forms, which can be classified within three main groups: plurality-majority, semi-proportional, and proportional elections (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997:17-25).

1. Majority-Plurality Electoral Systems (Maj-Plur): Systems that use single-member districts and favors allocating many seats to few parties or candidates. The winner is the one who receives the most votes or the majority of the votes.
2. Semi-Proportional Electoral Systems (Semi-PR) Systems which inherently translate votes into seats won in a way that falls somewhere between the proportionality of proportional representation systems and the majoritarianism of plurality-majority systems.
3. Proportional Representation Electoral Systems (PR): Representation proportionate to the overall share of the national vote in order of the winning candidates' position on the lists.

There are several difficulties involved in coding electoral systems. First, no sources systematically record electoral systems annually for the entire 200-year period of interest. Most sources available classify electoral systems at the time of coding, which very often is not explicitly stated. Second, electoral systems exist in many different forms and discrepancies between different classifications seem largely due to the application of unlike definitions and confusion of similar labels used to classify different systems. A third problem refers to the failure of making the focus of attention explicit, for example whether referring to presidential or parliamentary elections, local or central elections, or to the upper- or lower chamber of the parliament. All these problems are dealt with by consulting different sources of information, among them are many excellent case studies and comparative case studies. When sources are conflicting, the choice made is made explicit in footnotes (see below in coding scheme).

Another problem is that of classifying the years immediately following a period of authoritarian rule or transition. Many of the newly independent countries are former colonies in which the first year of democratic rule is characterized by the former colonial power appointing a government or holding elections, whereas the first truly independent legislative election tends to follow within the next 5 years. In this situation, each country receives a code also for the first year upon independence because the governmental setup tends to be in the spirit of the electoral system, which is often constitutionally accepted, although not always practically applied at that point.

Lastly, coding electoral systems rely on already made operational definitions of democracy. It is important to keep in mind the likely bias inherently present in classifying democracy and autocracy: the fewer democracies in a region, the laxer the region-specific criteria for classifying a country as democratic (Geddes, 1999:13).

D.1.4 Classification of Executive

Executive systems define formal political authority between the head of state, the cabinet, and the legislative. The two main forms of executive systems are presidentialism and parliamentarism.

The 'Executive Systems' variable was generated through a three-stage process: It takes as its basis information from the variables 'Type of Regime,' 'Head of State,' 'Effective Executive'

and ‘Legislative Selection’ from the Banks dataset (1986). These results were largely checked and complemented by consulting historical records. Lastly, the values have been extrapolated in order to avoid the problem of missing data. Specifically, this technique proved useful to overcome the problem of missing information during the two World Wars in the original data, and in order to extend the usage of the dataset from 1995 to 2002. If the code starting after the end of a World War differed from the code at the outset, the code during the war was assigned as a continuation of the code at the war outset, because major regime changes generally took place in the aftermath of the World Wars. In addition, the extrapolation technique was applied to avoid missing information created by different criteria for inclusion in Banks (1986, 1996) and Gleditsch and Ward (1999). The general criteria for extrapolating being changes in the Polity4 index score of less than 3 during the relevant time period. One example is Wurttemberg, which was included during 1816-1869 in Banks whereas Gleditsch and Ward continue to regard it as an independent state until 1871. Consequently, the information for 1870-71 was coded based on the ending years in the Banks dataset. Another example is Hesse-Darmstadt in which the data for 1867-71 was based on previous Banks coding. Another modification of the original data was smoothening the data by recoding observations classified as ‘other’ into one of the categories below. Typically, these are countries in which the head of state is classified as ‘monarch’ for a single year within a longer period of a prime minister being regarded as the effective executive.

1. Presidential (Pres): Systems in which the president exercises primary influence in the shaping of most major decisions affecting the state’s domestic and foreign policy. In this category fall regimes in which the effective executive was originally classified as ‘other’ or ‘military’ and the head of state was president. The most important feature of presidential systems is that the government is appointed by and contingent on presidential approval.
2. Semi-Presidential (Semi-Pres): Systems in which a prime minister works as the head of the government (effective executive), whereas the head of state is a president. In some semi-presidential systems, the president possesses little effective power, at least in the democratic semi-presidential states such as Finland and Iceland. However, in other semi-presidential systems, the president has some executive powers.
3. Parliamentary (Parl): Systems in which the executive is depending on legislative approval and in which the prime minister exercises primary influence in the shaping of most major decisions affecting the state’s domestic and foreign policy. This category also encompasses parliamentary monarchies in which the head of state is a monarch, but the formal executive is the premier. An example of a parliamentary monarchy is contemporary Spain.
4. Military: Direct rule by the military, mostly following a coup d’etat, or an outwardly civilian government that is effectively controlled by a military elite. Some of these observations are regimes in which the government achieved power through coup d’etat.
5. Non-elective: Systems in which selection of the effective executive is non-elective, such as 19th Century European monarchies and theocracies in the Middle East.⁹⁷ Franco Spain falls in this category, as well as the *nomenklatura* systems in Eastern Europe.⁹⁸ As there are examples of in some *nomenklatura* systems, it is possible for a country to have an electoral system without

⁹⁷Vanhanen (2000:254) interprets systems in which the governmental institution using the highest executive or legislative power is not based on popular elections as power being concentrated in the hands of one group. Vanhanen describes these regimes as being ‘military, revolutionary, non-elective autocratic governments, and monarchies in which the ruler and the government responsible to the ruler dominate and exercise executive and often also legislative power.’ Vanhanen’s description encompasses most of the regimes that I classify as non-elective.

⁹⁸Nomenklatura is the communist party’s system of appointing key personnel in the government and other important organizations. Determining whether communist regimes were non-elective in this sense was difficult at times. The

actually performing elections. Other observations in this category are autocratic regimes in which there are no legislative or presidential elections under democratic or autocratic rule. These are Bhutan, Brunei, China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates.

D.1.5 Classification of Federalism

In most democratic states, the constitution determines the territorial distribution of powers (Hague and Harrop, 1987:163), or in other words, the national and the sub-national concentration of political authority. The two main forms are unitary states, in which sovereignty is placed at the central government, and federal states where there is a formal distribution of power between the central and the sub-national government.

This variable was generated from a combination of sources. The starting point was the Polity III dataset's classification of 'federalism of political authority' (Gurr, Jagers and Moore, 1989; Jagers and Gurr, 1996) during 1816-1994. The variable was compared to other comprehensive data sources and literature, such as Gerring and Thacker's data on unitarism (2004), Lundell and Karvonen's dataset on institutions (2003) and Lemco's study of federal governments (1991). When these sources differed, additional sources were consulted. The data was extended by following certain rules. First, assuming continuation backward and forward of code unless there was a transition code in-between. Secondly, assuming continuation backward and forward of code unless there was a major change in the polity code.

Gurr, Jagers and Moore (1989:21) political authority variable builds on structural patterns laid out by Eckstein and Gurr (1975). They refer to federalism of political authority as 'an important structural property of national political systems that is related to several dimensions of authority patterns [...]. In purely structural terms it is an aspect of Conformation: federal polities have greater complexity of Conformation than do centralized polities. Opportunities for Participation also tends to be higher in federal systems, and regional units of government potentially are more responsive to local inputs than are centralized governments.'

Gerring and Thacker's (2002, 2004) data and definition of federalism as 'a highly institutionalized division or sharing of responsibilities between a national authority and semi-autonomous regional units.' Gerring and Thacker's data provide records of federalism during 1900-2001. Since Gurr, Jagers and Moore's and Gerring and Thacker's universe did not always correspond to that of my own (as defined by Gleditsch and Ward (1999)), I altered and checked the applicability of the data for my purpose by consulting different sources on federalism. For example, I looked at Lundell and Karvonen's (2003) comparative data set on political institutions during 1960-2002. Furthermore, Hicken and Kasuya (2003) provided an excellent source for Asia after 1945 and McHenry (1997) offered insightful discussions of federalism in post-independent African countries. Lemco (1991) provided historical information on federations.

Since the degree to which responsibilities are shared between central and local governmental units varies and this power-division is not always formally approved by the constitution, federalism can sometimes be difficult to determine and operationalize. For example, the existence of territorial

1959 Constitution of North Korea was explicitly communist but established a symbolic president, an assembly and a council headed by the prime minister as the formally highest executive organ, when in reality all political power lay within the Political Bureau. Constitutional changes in 1980 replaced the North Korean president with the Council of State in which all power was concentrated. North Korea was classified as non-elective therefore. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (North) was similarly classified as non-elective during 1954-91: Until 1959, Ho Chi Minh's presidential government dominated Vietnamese politics and from 1960 until 1991, parliamentary elections were held, but the real power lay within the Communist Party. During 1960-1991 therefore, North Vietnam is classified as non-elective. The constitutional changes in 1992 reinstated the president as the head of state, established a national assembly, and a prime minister as the head of government, which qualified North Vietnam to be classified as semi-presidential.

sub-divisions in a country does not necessarily mean that these regions are guaranteed autonomy. Building on the sources layed out above, my own regime classification fall into three categories:

1. Unitary: Elective legislatures and constitutional sovereignty centered at the national government.
2. Semi-Federal: There are elective legislatures at the regional level, but constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government.
3. Federal: Elective regional legislatures plus constitutional recognition of subnational authority. In this category fall countries in which the constitution formally divides legislative authority between regional and central governmental units.

Classification of the above outlined categories was not always straightforward. For example do some formally unitary regimes such as Japan assure substantial authority to regional governments, whereas power is very limited in some formally federal regimes, such as Malaysia (Hicken and Kasuya, 2003:127-128). The Philippines is fairly unitary, but is classified as mixed since substantial power is granted to governance regionally. Such aspects of the federal-unitary distinction are a reminder of the complexity hidden inside categories like federal and unitary, which is difficult to capture in the form used here.

D.2 Coding Scheme, Governmental Institutions, 1816-2002

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
700	Afghanistan	1816-1888 1919-2002	1816-1888: Autocracy 1919-1977: Autocracy 1979-1991: Autocracy 1996-2000: Autocracy	1816-1888: Non-Elective 1919-1972: Non-Elective 1973-1977: Military 1979-1979: Military 1980-1991: Pres 1996-2000: Non-Elective	1816-1888: Federal 1919-1924: Federal 1925-1977: Unitary 1979-1991: Unitary 1996-2000: Unitary
339	Albania	1913-2002	1913-1914: Autocracy 1925-1938: Autocracy 1946-1991: Autocracy 1992-1995: Semi-PR 1996-1996: Autocracy 1997-2002: Semi-PR	1913-1914: Unitary 1925-1938: Unitary 1946-2002: Unitary	
615	Algeria	1816-1830 1962-2002	1816-1830: Autocracy 1962-2002: Autocracy	1816-1830: Non-Elective 1962-1964: Pres 1965-1975: Military 1976-2002: Pres	1816-1830: Missing 1962-2002: Unitary
540	Angola	1975-2002	1975-1990: Autocracy 1997-2002: Autocracy	1975-1990: Pres 1997-2002: Pres	1975-1990: Unitary 1997: Missing 1998-2002: Unitary
160	Argentina	1816-2002	1816-1828: Autocracy 1835-1851: Autocracy 1853-1936: Autocracy 1937-1942: Maj-Plur 1943-1945: Autocracy 1948-1954: Autocracy 1957-1972: Autocracy 1973-1975: PR 1976-1982: Autocracy 1983-2002: PR	1816-1828: Pres 1835-1851: Pres 1853-1929: Pres 1930-1930: Military 1931-1945: Pres 1948-1954: Pres 1957-1965: Pres 1966-1972: Military 1973-2002: Pres	1816-1828: Federal 1835-1851: Federal 1853-1945: Federal 1948-1954: Federal 1957-2002: Federal

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
371	Armenia	1991-2002	1991-1995: Semi-PR 1996-1997: Autocracy 1998-2002: Semi-PR	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
900	Australia	1901-2002	1901-2002: Maj-Plur	1901-2002: Parl	1901-2002: Federal
305	Austria	1918-2002	1920-1932: PR 1934-1937: Autocracy 1946-2002: PR	1920-1932: Semi-Pres 1934-1937: Semi-Pres 1946-2002: Semi-Pres	1920-1932: Semi-Fed 1934-1937: Semi-Fed 1946-2002: Semi-Fed
300	Austria-Hungary	1816-1918	1816-1917: Autocracy	1816-1917: Non-Elective	1816-1866: Missing 1867-1917: Semi-Fed 1991-2002: Unitary
373	Azerbaijan	1991-2002	1991-2002: Autocracy	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
267	Baden	1816-1871	1816-1871: Autocracy	1816-1871: Non-Elective	1816-1871: Unitary
31	Bahamas	1973-2002	1973-2002: Maj-Plur	1973-2002: Parl	1973-2002: Unitary
692	Bahrain	1971-2002	1971-2002: Autocracy	1971-2002: Non-Elective	1971-2002: Unitary
771	Bangladesh	1972-2002	1972-1973: Maj-Plur 1974-1990: Autocracy 1991-2002: Maj-Plur	1972-1974: Semi-Pres 1975-1975: Military 1976-1981: Semi-Pres 1982-1985: Military 1986-2002: Semi-Pres	1972-2002: Unitary
53	Barbados	1966-2002	1966-2002: Maj-Plur	1966-2002: Parl	1966-2002: Unitary
245	Bavaria	1816-1871	1816-1871: Autocracy	1816-1871: Non-Elective	1816-1871: Unitary
370	Belarus	1991-2002	1991-1994: Maj-Plur 1995-2002: Autocracy	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
211	Belgium	1830-2002	1830-1852: Autocracy 1853-1898: Maj-Plur 1899-1913: PR ⁹⁹ 1915-1938: PR 1944-2002: PR	1830-1913: Parl 1915-1938: Parl 1944-2002: Parl	1830-1913: Unitary 1915-1938: Unitary 1944-1969: Unitary 1970-1992: Semi-Fed 1993-2002: Federal
80	Belize	1981-2002	1981-2002: Maj-Plur	1981-2002: Parl	1981-2002: Unitary
434	Benin	1960-2002	1960-1962: Autocracy 1965-1989: Autocracy 1991-2002: PR	1960-1962: Pres 1965-1967: Military 1968-1968: Pres 1969-1969: Military 1970-1989: Pres 1991-2002: Pres	1960-1962: Unitary 1965-1989: Unitary 1991-2002: Unitary
760	Bhutan	1949-2002	1949-2002: Autocracy	1949-2002: Non-Elective	1949-2002: Unitary
145	Bolivia	1825-2002	1825-1840: Autocracy 1842-1870: Autocracy 1873-1951: Autocracy 1956-1981: Autocracy 1982-2002: PR	1825-1840: Pres 1842-1870: Pres 1873-1929: Pres 1930-1930: Military 1931-1951: Pres 1956-1963: Pres 1964-1965: Military 1966-1966: Pres 1967-1978: Military 1979-1979: Pres 1980-1981: Military 1982-2002: Pres	1825-1840: Unitary 1842-1870: Unitary 1873-1951: Unitary 1956-2002: Unitary
346	Bosnia-Herzegovina+	1992-2002	1992-2002: Missing	1992-2002: Missing	1992-2002: Missing
571	Botswana	1966-2002	1966-2002: Maj-Plur	1966-2002: Pres	1966-2002: Unitary

⁹⁹Belgium was the first country to adopt a PR system in 1899, followed by Finland in 1906, and Sweden in 1907 (Farrell, 1997:61-62).

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
140	Brazil	1822-2002	1822-1929: Autocracy 1934-1944: Autocracy 1946-1963: PR 1965-1984: Autocracy 1985-2002: PR	1822-1888: Non-Elective 1889-1929: Pres 1934-1944: Pres 1946-1963: Pres 1965-2002: Pres	1822-1890: Unitary 1891-1929: Federal 1934-1944: Semi-Fed 1946-1963: Federal 1965-2002: Federal
835	Brunei	1984-2002	1984-2002: Autocracy	1984-2002: Non-Elective	1984-2002: Missing
355	Bulgaria	1878-2002	1878-1912: Autocracy 1914-1933: Autocracy 1935-1942: Autocracy 1946-1989: Autocracy 1990-2002: PR	1878-1883: Non-Elective 1884-1893: Parl 1894-1912: Non-Elective 1914-1918: Non-Elective 1919-1933: Parl 1935-1942: Non-Elective 1946-1971: Semi-Pres 1972-1990: Pres 1991-2002: Semi-Pres	1878-1912: Unitary 1914-1933: Unitary 1935-1942: Unitary 1946-2002: Unitary
439	Burkina Faso	1960-2002	1960-1976: Autocracy 1978-1979: PR 1980-2002: Autocracy	1960-1965: Pres 1966-1969: Military 1970-1976: Pres 1978-1979: Pres 1980-1982: Military 1983-1990: Non-Elective 1991-2002: Pres	1960-1976: Unitary 1978-2002: Unitary
516	Burundi	1961-2002	1962-1964: Autocracy 1966-1991: Autocracy 1996-2002: Autocracy	1962-1964: Parl 1966-1986: Pres 1987-1987: Military 1988-1991: Pres 1996-2002: Pres	1962-1964: Unitary 1966-1991: Unitary 1996-2002: Unitary
811	Cambodia	1954-2002	1955-1969: Autocracy 1972-1974: Autocracy 1976-1978: Autocracy 1993-2002: Autocracy	1955-1969: Parl 1972-1974: Pres 1976-1978: Non-Elective 1993-2002: Parl	1955-1969: Unitary 1972-1974: Unitary 1976-1978: Unitary 1993-2002: Unitary
471	Cameroon	1960-2002	1960-2002: Autocracy	1960-2002: Pres	1960: Unitary 1961-1972: Federal 1973-2002: Unitary

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
20	Canada	1867-2002	1867-2002: Maj-Plur	1867-2002: Parl	1816-2002 1867-2002: Federal
402	Cape Verde	1975-2002	1975-1991: Autocracy 1992-2002: PR	1975-2002: Pres	1975-2002: Unitary
482	Central African Republic	1960-2002	1960-1992: Autocracy 1993-2002: Maj-Plur ¹⁰⁰	1960-1965: Pres 1966-1978: Military 1979-1980: Pres 1981-1985: Military 1986-2002: Pres	1960-2002: Unitary
483	Chad	1960-2002	1960-1977: Autocracy 1985-1990: Autocracy 1992-2002: Autocracy	1960-1977: Pres 1985-1989: Pres 1990-1990: Military 1992-2002: Pres	1960-1977: Unitary 1985-1990: Unitary 1992-2002: Unitary
155	Chile	1818-2002	1818-1873: Autocracy 1874-1923: Maj-Plur 1925-1954: Autocracy 1955-1972: PR 1973-1988: Autocracy 1989-1989: PR 1990-2002: PR ¹⁰¹	1818-1825: Military 1826-1923: Pres 1925-1972: Pres 1973-1980: Military 1981-2002: Pres	1818-1825: Unitary 1826-1827: Semi-Fed 1828-1923: Unitary 1925-2002: Unitary

¹⁰⁰The National Assembly was suspended following a coup 15 March 2003 (IPU, 2003).

¹⁰¹Both Colomer (2004:97) and Reynolds and Reilly (1997) characterize the Chilean electoral system as proportional representation. However, Reynolds and Reilly (1997:93) concede that this electoral system largely works as two-party system. According to Blais and Massicotte (1997:111), Chile is the only democracy that does not fit into any of the three electoral system categories.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
710	China	1816-2002	1816-1859: Autocracy 1862-1910: Autocracy 1912-1912: Autocracy 1914-1936: Autocracy 1946-2002: Autocracy	1816-1859: Non-Elective 1862-1910: Non-Elective 1912-1912: Pres 1914-1923: Pres 1924-1927: Military 1928-1936: Pres 1946-1958: Pres 1959-1982: Non-Elective 1983-2002: Pres	1816-2002 1816-1859: Unitary 1862-1910: Unitary 1912: Unitary 1914-1936: Unitary 1946-2002: Unitary
100	Colombia	1831-2002	1830-1859: Autocracy 1861-1866: Autocracy 1867-1885: Maj-Plur 1886-1929: Autocracy 1930: Maj-Plur 1931-1947: PR 1948-1956: Autocracy 1957-2002: PR	1830-1859: Pres 1861-1952: Pres 1953-1958: Military 1959-2002: Pres	1830-1852: Unitary 1853-1859: Federal 1861-1885: Federal 1886-2002: Semi-Fed
581	Comoros	1975-2002	1975-1975: Maj-Plur 1976-1989: Autocracy 1990-1994: Maj-Plur 1996-1998: Maj-Plur 1999-2001: Autocracy 2002-2002: Maj-Plur	1975-1994: Pres 1996-1998: Pres 1999-1999: Military 2000-2002: Parl	1975-1994: Federal 1996-2002: Federal
484	Congo	1960-2002	1960-1962: Maj-Plur 1963-1990: Autocracy 1992-1996: Maj-Plur 1997-2002: Autocracy	1960-1990: Pres 1992-2002: Pres	1960-1990: Unitary 1992-2002: Unitary
490	Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire)	1960-2002	1965-1991: Autocracy	1965-1991: Pres	1965: Federal 1966-1991: Unitary

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
94	Costa Rica ¹⁰²	1840-2002	1840-1852: Autocracy 1853-1892: Missing 1893-1952: Semi-PR 1953-2002: PR	1840-2002: Pres	1816-2002 1840-2002: Unitary
437	Cote D'Ivoire	1960-2002	1960-1998: Autocracy 2000-2002: Maj-Plur	1960-1998: Pres 2000-2002: Pres	1960-1998: Unitary 2000-2002: Unitary
344	Croatia	1991-2002	1991-1998: Autocracy 2000-2002: Semi-PR	1991-1998: Pres 2000-2002: Pres	1991-1998: Unitary 2000-2002: Unitary
40	Cuba	1902-2002	1902-1927: PR 1928-1932: Autocracy 1933-1947: PR 1948-1951: PR 1955-1958: Autocracy 1961-2002: Autocracy	1902-1951: Pres 1955-1958: Pres 1961-1975: Semi-Pres 1976-2002: Pres	1902-1951: Unitary 1955-1958: Unitary 1961-2002: Unitary
352	Cyprus	1960-2002	1960-1962: Maj-Plur 1968-2002: PR	1960-1962: Pres 1968-2002: Pres	1960-1962: Federal 1968-2002: Unitary
316	Czech Republic	1993-2002	1993-2002: PR	1993-2002: Semi-Pres	1993-2002: Unitary
315	Czechoslovakia	1919-1992	1919-1938: PR 1945-1946: PR 1948-1967: Autocracy 1969-1989: Autocracy 1990-1992: Semi-PR	1919-1938: Semi-Pres 1945-1946: Semi-Pres 1948-1967: Non-Elective 1969-1989: Non-Elective 1990-1992: Semi-Pres	1919-1938: Unitary 1945-1946: Unitary 1948-1967: Unitary 1969-1992: Federal

¹⁰²According to Lijphart (1984:39), the long Costa Rican democratic rule was interrupted by civil war in 1948. This interruption is not recorded in the Polity4 dataset.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
390	Denmark	1816-2002	1816-1900: Autocracy 1915-1919: Maj-Plur 1920-1939: PR 1945-2002: PR 1816-1848: Non-Elective 1849-1900: Parl 1915-1939: Parl 1945-2002: Parl	1816-1900: Unitary 1915-1939: Unitary 1945-2002: Unitary	1816-2002
522	Djibouti	1977-2002	1977-2002: Autocracy	1977-2002: Pres	1977-2002: Unitary
42	Dominican Republic	1845-2002	1845-1860: Autocracy 1865-1913: Autocracy 1925-1929: Autocracy 1932-1960: Autocracy 1963-1963: PR 1966-1977: Autocracy 1978-2002: PR	1845-1860: Pres 1865-1913: Pres 1925-1929: Pres 1932-1960: Pres 1963-1963: Pres 1966-2002: Pres	1845-1860: Unitary 1865-1913: Unitary 1925-1929: Unitary 1932-1960: Unitary 1963: Unitary 1966-2002: Unitary
860	East Timor+	2002-2002	2002-2002: PR	2002-2002: Semi-Pres	2002: Missing
130	Ecuador	1830-2002	1830-1967: Autocracy 1968-1968: Semi-PR 1969-1969: PR 1970-1978: Autocracy 1979-2002: Semi-PR	1830-1962: Pres 1963-1965: Military 1966-2002: Pres	1830-2002: Unitary
651	Egypt+	1827-1855 1922-2002	1827-1855: Autocracy 1922-1927: Missing 1930-1933: Autocracy 1935-2002: Autocracy	1827-1855: Non-Elective 1922-1927: Non-Elective 1930-1933: Non-Elective 1935-1951: Non-Elective 1952-1952: Military 1953-1956: Non-Elective 1957-2002: Pres	1827-1855: Unitary 1922-1927: Unitary 1930-1933: Unitary 1935-1957: Unitary 1958-1960: Semi-Fed 1961-2002: Unitary

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Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
92	El Salvador	1840-2002	1840-1854: Autocracy 1858-1947: Autocracy 1950-1978: Autocracy 1984-2002: PR	1840-1854: Pres 1858-1947: Pres 1950-1959: Pres 1960-1960: Military 1961-1978: Pres 1984-2002: Pres	1840-1854: Unitary 1858-1947: Unitary 1950-1978: Unitary 1984-2002: Unitary
411	Equatorial Guinea	1960-2002	1960-2002: Autocracy	1960-1978: Pres 1979-1981: Military 1982-2002: Pres	1960-1967: Missing 1968-2002: Unitary
531	Eritrea	1993-2002	1993-2002: Autocracy	1993-2002: Pres	1993-2002: Unitary
366	Estonia	1918-1940 1991-2002	1919-1932: PR 1936-1940: Autocracy 1991-2002: PR	1919-1919: Semi-Pres 1920-1932: Parl 1936-1940: Pres 1991-2002: Semi-Pres	1919-1932: Unitary 1936-1940: Unitary 1991-2002: Unitary
530	Ethiopia+	1855-2002	1855-1929: Missing 1930-1935: Autocracy 1942-1973: Autocracy 1975-1990: Autocracy 1995-2002: Autocracy	1855-1935: Non-Elective 1942-1973: Non-Elective 1975-1986: Military 1987-1990: Pres 1995-2002: Semi-Pres	1855-1935: Unitary 1942-1951: Unitary 1952-1962: Federal 1963-1973: Unitary 1975-1990: Unitary 1995-2002: Federal
950	Fiji	1970-2002	1970-1986: Maj-Plur ¹⁰³ 1987-1989: Autocracy 1990-1999: Maj-Plur 2001-2002: Maj-Plur	1970-1986: Parl 1987-1989: Military 1990-1999: Semi-Pres 2001-2002: Semi-Pres	1970-1999: Unitary
375	Finland	1917-2002	1917-1929: PR 1931-2002: PR	1917-1929: Semi-Pres 1931-2002: Semi-Pres	1917-1929: Unitary 1931-2002: Unitary

¹⁰³Upon independence from Britain, British rule sustained a powerful institutional framework for the Fiji government (Norton, 2002:137). The Legislative Council instituted in 1970 was strongly disproportionate to the ethnic composition of the state at the time (Norton, 2002:151).

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
220	France	1816-2002	1816-1847: Autocracy 1848-1850: Maj-Plur 1852-1859: Autocracy 1863-1869: Autocracy 1877-1939: Maj-Plur 1940-1943: Autocracy 1946-1957: PR ¹⁰⁴ 1958-2002: Maj-Plur	1816-1847: Non-Elective 1848-1850: Pres 1852-1859: Non-Elective 1863-1869: Non-Elective 1877-1878: Pres 1879-1943: Semi-Pres 1946-1957: Semi-Pres 1958-2002: Pres	1816-1850: Unitary 1852-1857: Unitary 1858: Semi-Fed 1859: Unitary 1863-1869: Unitary 1877-1943: Unitary 1946-2002: Unitary
481+	Gabon	1960-2002	1960-1989: Autocracy 1991-2002: Autocracy	1960-1989: Pres 1991-2002: Pres	1960-2002: Missing
420	Gambia	1965-2002	1965-1993: Maj-Plur ¹⁰⁵ 1994-2002: Autocracy	1965-1993: Pres 1994-1995: Military 1996-2002: Pres	1965-1989: Unitary 1991-2002: Unitary
372	Georgia	1991-2002	1991-2002: Semi-PR	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Semi-Fed
265	German Democratic Republic	1949-1990	1949-1988: Autocracy	1949-1988: Non-Elective	1949-1988: Unitary
260	German Federal Republic	1949-2002	1949-2002: PR	1949-2002: Semi-Pres	1949-2002: Federal
255	Germany (Prussia)	1816-1945	1816-1866: Autocracy 1871-1917: Autocracy 1919-1932: PR 1933-1944: Autocracy	1816-1866: Non-Elective 1871-1889: Parl 1890-1917: Non-Elective 1919-1944: Semi-Pres	1816-1866: Unitary 1871-1917: Semi-Fed 1919-1932: Semi-Fed 1933-1944: Unitary

¹⁰⁴ According to Lijphart (1984:151-154) the French IV Republic (1950-1957) exercised a PR electoral system with majoritarian elements, and a majority-plurality system during the French V Republic (1958-1962). Reilly (2001:15, fn. 10) writes that the two-round run-off majority system in legislative elections is typically associated with France. LeDuc et al. (1996:54, 65-66) classify France as a country that uses different electoral formulas: it uses majority-runoff for presidential elections, majority-plurality in single-member districts for legislative and departmental elections, majority-plurality in multi-member districts for senatorial and smaller municipalities.

¹⁰⁵ Gambia gained independence from Britain in 1965. Until 1984, the president of Gambia was elected by the House of Representatives, but subsequently, there has been separate elections to the legislature and the president (Saine, 2003:377).

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
452	Ghana	1957-2002	1957-1968: Autocracy 1970-1971: Maj-Plur 1972-1977: Autocracy 1979-1980: Maj-Plur 1981-1990: Autocracy 1992-2000: Autocracy 2001-2002: Maj-Plur	1957-1959: Parl 1960-1965: Pres 1966-1968: Military 1970-1971: Pres 1972-1977: Military 1979-1980: Pres 1981-1990: Military 1992-2002: Pres	1816-2002 1957-1968: Unitary 1970-1977: Unitary 1979-1990: Unitary 1992-2002: Unitary
99	Great Colombia	1821-1830	1821-1830: Autocracy	1821-1830: Pres	1821-1830: Federal
350	Greece	1827-2002	1827-1861: Autocracy 1864-1914: Maj-Plur 1915-1915: Autocracy 1920-1921: Autocracy 1924-1925: Autocracy 1926-1927: PR 1928-1931: Maj-Plur 1932: PR 1933-1935: Maj-Plur 1936-1940: Autocracy 1944-1951: PR 1952-1955: Maj-Plur 1956-1957: Semi-PR 1958-1966: PR 1967-1973: Autocracy 1975-2002: PR	1827-1843: Non-Elective 1844-1861: Parl 1864-1915: Parl 1920-1921: Parl 1924-1924: Parl 1925-1925: Military 1926-1934: Parl 1935-1940: Military 1944-1966: Parl 1967-1973: Military 1975-2002: Semi-Pres	1827-1861: Unitary 1864-1915: Unitary 1920-1921: Unitary 1924-1940: Unitary 1944-1973: Unitary 1975-2002: Unitary
90	Guatemala	1840-2002	1840-1870: Autocracy 1873-1943: Autocracy 1944-1949: Semi-PR 1950-1965: Autocracy 1966-1969: Semi-PR 1970-1984: Autocracy 1986-2002: Semi-PR	1840-1870: Pres 1873-1981: Pres 1982-1984: Military 1986-2002: Pres	1840-1870: Unitary 1873-1984: Unitary 1986-2002: Unitary
438	Guinea	1958-2002	1958-2002: Autocracy	1958-2002: Pres	1958-2002: Unitary

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
404	Guinea-Bissau	1974-2002	1974-1993: Autocracy 1994-1997: PR 2000-2002: PR	1974-1979: Pres 1980-1983: Military 1984-1997: Pres 2000-2002: Pres	1974-1997: Unitary 2000-2002: Unitary
110	Guyana	1966-2002	1966-1991: Autocracy 1992-2002: PR	1966-1969: Parl 1970-1979: Semi-Pres 1980-2002: Pres	1966-2002: Unitary
41	Haiti	1816-1914 1934-2002	1816-1914: Autocracy 1934-1945: Autocracy 1950-1985: Autocracy 1988-1989: Autocracy 1990-1990: Maj-Plur 1991-1993: Autocracy 1994-1998: Maj-Plur 2000-2002: Autocracy	1816-1819: Military 1820-1914: Pres 1934-1945: Pres 1950-1950: Military 1951-1985: Pres 1988-1989: Military 1990-1991: Pres 1992-1993: Military 1994-1998: Pres 2000-2002: Pres	1816-1914: Unitary 1934-1945: Unitary 1950-1985: Unitary 1988-1998: Unitary 2000-2002: Unitary
240	Hanover	1816-1871	1816-1871: Autocracy	1816-1871: Non-Elective	1816-1871: Missing
275	Hesse-Darmstadt	1816-1871	1816-1871: Autocracy	1816-1871: Non-Elective	1816-1871: Missing
273	Hesse-Kassel+	1816-1871	1816-1871: Autocracy	1816-1871: Non-Elective	1816-1871: Missing
91	Honduras+	1840-2002	1840-1851: Autocracy 1854-1893: Autocracy 1894-1903: Missing 1904-1906: Autocracy 1908-1911: Missing 1913-1918: Missing 1920-1923: Missing 1925-1929: Missing 1930-1935: Maj-Plur 1936-1979: Autocracy 1982-2002: PR	1840-1851: Pres 1854-1906: Pres 1908-1911: Pres 1913-1918: Pres 1920-1923: Pres 1925-1955: Pres 1956-1956: Military 1957-1962: Pres 1963-1964: Military 1965-1971: Pres 1972-1979: Military 1982-2002: Pres	1840-1851: Unitary 1854-1906: Unitary 1908-1911: Unitary 1913-1918: Unitary 1920-1923: Unitary 1925-1979: Unitary 1982-2002: Unitary

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Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
310	Hungary	1918-2002	1919-1943: Autocracy 1948-1955: Autocracy 1957-1988: Autocracy 1990-2002: Semi-PR ¹⁰⁶	1919-1943: Non-Elective 1948-1955: Non-Elective 1957-1988: Non-Elective 1990-2002: Semi-Pres	1919-1943: Unitary 1948-1955: Unitary 1957-1988: Unitary 1990-2002: Unitary
395	Iceland	1944-2002	1944-1958: Semi-PR 1959-2002: PR	1944-2002: Semi-Pres	1944-2002: Unitary
750	India	1947-2002	1947-2002: Maj-Plur	1947-2002: Semi-Pres	1947-2002: Federal
850	Indonesia	1945-2002	1945-1947: Autocracy 1948-1949: PR 1950-1998: Autocracy 1999-2002: PR ¹⁰⁷	1945-2002: Pres	1945-1948: Unitary 1949-1950: Federal 1951-2002: Unitary
630	Iran, Islamic Republic of (Persia)	1816-2002	1816-1905: Autocracy 1925-1952: Autocracy 1955-1978: Autocracy 1982-1996: Autocracy 1997-2002: Maj-Plur	1816-1905: Non-Elective 1925-1952: Non-Elective 1955-1959: Parl 1960-1962: Non-Elective 1963-1975: Parl 1976-1978: Non-Elective 1982-2002: Pres	1816-1905: Unitary 1925-1952: Unitary 1955-1978: Unitary 1982-2002: Unitary
645	Iraq	1932-2002	1932-2002: Autocracy	1932-1957: Non-Elective 1958-1978: Military 1979-1994: Non-Elective 1995-2002: Pres	1932-2002: Unitary

¹⁰⁶This code is supported by Birch (2001); Blais and Massicotte (1996:66); Norris (2003); Shugart and Wattenberg (2001:231-254). However, Reynolds and Reilly (1997) and International IDEA (2003) claim that Hungary has a PR system.

¹⁰⁷According to Lipset (1995:86-91), Indonesia was occupied by the Japanese during 1942-1945, followed by a declaration of independence and a four-year revolutionary struggle against the Dutch colonial power (Lijphart, 1977:183). Indonesia was granted formal independence in 1949 and a constitutional parliamentary democracy during its first nine years as a sovereign republic, 1950-1959, holding a legislative election in 1955. The PR electoral system resulted in a weak and divided government, which was replaced by a 'guided democracy' in 1959. According to the constitution, the House of Representatives functions as a single-chamber legislature and have 400 directly elected members and 100 presidential appointees, three quarter of whom represent the armed forces. Elections are held every five years (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1996:145).

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
205	Ireland	1921-2002	1921-2002: PR	1921-1936: Parl 1937-2002: Semi-Pres	1816-2002 1921-2002: Unitary
666	Israel	1948-2002	1948-2002: PR	1948-2002: Semi-Pres	1948-2002: Unitary
325	Italy/ Sardinia	1816-2002	1816-1921: Autocracy 1928-1942: Autocracy 1948-1992: PR 1993-2002: Semi-PR ¹⁰⁸	1816-1860: Non-Elective 1861-1921: Parl 1928-1942: Parl 1948-2002: Semi-Pres	1816-1860: Missing 1861-1921: Unitary 1928-1942: Unitary 1948-2002: Unitary
51	Jamaica	1962-2002	1962-2002: Maj-Plur	1962-2002: Parl	1962-2002: Unitary
740	Japan	1816-2002	1816-1857: Autocracy 1868-1944: Autocracy 1952-2002: Semi-PR	1816-1857: Military 1868-1884: Non-Elective 1885-1894: Parl 1895-1909: Non-Elective 1910-1931: Parl 1932-1944: Military 1952-2002: Parl	1816-1857: Unitary 1868-1944: Unitary 1952-2002: Unitary
663	Jordan	1946-2002	1946-2002: Autocracy	1946-2002: Non-Elective	1946-2002: Unitary
705	Kazakhstan	1991-2002	1991-2002: Autocracy	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
501	Kenya	1963-2002	1963-2001: Autocracy 2002: Maj-Plur	1963-2002: Pres	1963-1965: Federal 1966-2002: Unitary
730	Korea	1816-1910	1816-1910: Autocracy	1816-1910: Non-Elective	1816-1910: Unitary
731	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North)	1948-2002	1948-2002: Autocracy	1948-1971: Parl 1972-2002: Non-Elective	1948-2002: Unitary

¹⁰⁸Italy went through an electoral reform in 1993 that abolished the list PR system for the Senate and to change the electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies (Farrell, 1997:80). In the Chamber of Deputies' system, the voters have two separate votes, one for constituency politicians and one for party lists. Farrell writes that this implies that the Chamber of Deputies' system share features common with the two-vote or a mixed system.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
732	Korea, Republic of (South)	1948-2002	1948-1959: Autocracy 1960-1960: Maj-Plur 1961-1962: Autocracy 1963-1971: Semi-PR ¹⁰⁹ 1972-1986: Autocracy 1988-2002: Semi-PR	1948-1986: Pres 1988-2002: Pres	1948-1986: Unitary 1988-2002: Unitary
690	Kuwait	1961-2002	1961-1989: Autocracy 1991-2002: Autocracy	1961-1989: Non-Elective 1991-2002: Non-Elective	1961-1989: Unitary 1991-2002: Unitary
703	Kyrgyz Republic	1991-2002	1991-2002: Autocracy	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
812	Laos	1954-2002	1958-1959: Maj-Plur 1960-1960: Autocracy 1975-2002: Autocracy	1958-1959: Parl 1960-1960: Military 1975-2002: Semi-Pres	1958-1960: Unitary 1975-2002: Unitary
367	Latvia+	1918-1940 1991-2002	1918-1933: Missing ¹¹⁰ 1934-1940: Autocracy 1991-2002: PR	1918-1940: Semi-Pres 1991-2002: Semi-Pres	1918-1940: Unitary 1991-2002: Unitary
660	Lebanon	1944-2002	1944-1969: Autocracy 1970-1974: Maj-Plur	1944-1974: Pres	1944-1974: Unitary
570	Lesotho	1966-2002	1966-1969: Maj-Plur ¹¹¹ 1970-1992: Autocracy 1993-1997: Maj-Plur 2002-2002: Maj-Plur	1966-1969: Parl 1970-1985: Non-Elective 1986-1992: Military 1993-1997: Parl 2002-2002: Parl	1966-1997: Unitary 2002: Unitary

¹⁰⁹South Korea has applied Semi-PR combining electoral formulas from 1962 to present (Hicken and Kasuya, 2003:133-136).

¹¹⁰The multiplicity of parties in the parliament (Saeima) (22 in 1922 and 24 in 1931) made it impossible to form a stable government during 1920-1934 (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2003).

¹¹¹Reynolds and Reilly (1997:17) describe Lesotho as a classical majoritarian FPTP system, and the website lists Lesotho as having a plurality system in 1965, 1970, 1993, and 2002. IPU (2003) describes Lesotho's system as mixed in 2002.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
450	Liberia+	1847-2002	1847-1883: Missing ¹¹² 1884-1989: Autocracy 1997-2002: Autocracy	1847-1979: Pres 1980-1983: Military 1984-1989: Pres 1997-2002: Pres	1847-1989: Unitary 1997-2002: Unitary
620	Libya	1816-1835 1951-2002	1816-1834: Autocracy 1951-2002: Autocracy	1816-1834: Non-Elective 1951-1968: Non-Elective 1969-2002: Military	1816-1834: Missing 1951-1963: Federal 1964-2002: Unitary
368	Lithuania	1918-1940 1991-2002	1918-1925: PR 1928-1940: Autocracy 1991-2002: Semi-PR	1918-1925: Semi-Pres 1928-1940: Pres 1991-2002: Semi-Pres	1918-1925: Unitary 1928-1940: Unitary 1991-2002: Unitary
212	Luxembourg	1867-2002	1867-1889: Autocracy 1890-1918: Maj-Plur 1919-1939: PR 1946-2002: PR	1867-1839: Parl 1946-2002: Parl	1867-1839: Unitary 1946-2002: Unitary
343	Macedonia	1991-2002	1991-1997: Maj-Plur ¹¹³ 1998-2002: Semi-PR	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary

¹¹²Liberia was founded in 1820 as a place of refuge for freed slaves from the United States and the Caribbean, whose descendants are today's Americo-Liberians. The area was a de facto American colony, governed by agents of the American Colonization Society, until 1847, when it made a formal declaration of independence as the Republic of Liberia. For 133 years after independence, Liberia was a poor but peaceful one-party state ruled by the Americo-Liberian-dominated True Whig Party (Carr, 2003). The 1847 constitution was drawn using that of the United States as a model (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2003).

¹¹³IPU (2003) describes the Macedonian legislative election system as party list proportional system, established by the electoral law from September 21, 1990. International IDEA (2003) describes Macedonia as having a parallel TRS system in the 1994, 1998, 2002 legislative elections. The Carr (2003) election archive describes Macedonia as having PR legislative election in 1998.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
580	Madagascar/ Malgasy	1816-1896 1960-2002	1816-1896: Autocracy 1960-1990: Autocracy 1992-2002: PR ¹¹⁴	1816-1896: Non-Elective 1960-1971: Pres 1972-1975: Military 1976-1990: Pres 1992-2002: Pres	1816-1896: Missing 1960-1990: Unitary 1992-2002: Unitary
553	Malawi	1964-2002	1964-1993: Autocracy 1994-2002: Maj-Plur	1964-1965: Parl 1966-2002: Pres	1964-2002: Unitary
820	Malaysia	1957-2002	1957-1968: Maj-Plur 1969-1970: Autocracy 1971-2002: Maj-Plur	1957-2002: Parl	1957-2002: Federal
781	Maldives	1965-2002	1965-1975: Maj-Plur 1976-2002: Autocracy	1965-1967: Non-Elective 1968-2002: Pres	1965-2002: Unitary
432	Mali	1960-2002	1960-1990: Autocracy 1992-2002: Maj-Plur	1960-1967: Pres 1968-1978: Military 1979-1990: Pres 1992-2002: Pres	1960-1990: Unitary 1992-2002: Unitary
338	Malta	1964-2002	1964-2002: PR	1964-2002: Semi-Pres	1964-2002: Unitary
435	Mauritania	1960-2002	1960-2002: Autocracy	1960-2002: Pres	1960-2002: Unitary
590	Mauritius	1968-2002	1968-2002: Maj-Plur	1968-1991: Parl 1992-2002: Semi-Pres	1968-2002: Unitary
280	Mecklemburg- Schwerin+	1816-1871	1816-1871: Autocracy	1816-1871: Non-Elective	1816-1871: Missing

¹¹⁴Different sources disagree on how to classify the election system in Madagascar. According to Library of Congress (2003), the Madagascar legislative election is a proportional representation list-system. International IDEA (2003) classifies the Madagascar legislative election system as Parallel FPTP, which differs from the List PR description from the Reynolds and Reilly (1997). IPU (2003) classify Madagascar as a semi-PR system.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
70	Mexico	1821-2002	1821-1833: Autocracy 1835-1845: Autocracy 1848-1862: Autocracy 1864-1875: Autocracy 1880-1910: Autocracy 1917-1993: Autocracy 1994-2002: Semi-PR ¹¹⁵	1821-1833: Pres 1835-1845: Pres 1848-1862: Pres 1864-1875: Pres 1880-1910: Pres 1917-2002: Pres	1821-1833: Federal 1835-1845: Unitary 1848-1862: Unitary 1864-1875: Unitary 1880-1910: Unitary 1917-2002: Federal
332	Modena	1816-1861	1816-1861: Autocracy	1816-1861: Non-Elective	1816-1861: Unitary
359	Moldova	1991-2002	1991-2002: PR ¹¹⁶	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
712	Mongolia	1921-2002	1921-1991: Autocracy 1992-2002: Maj-Plur	1921-1951: Non-Elective 1952-1991: Parl 1992-2002: Semi-Pres	1921-1928: Semi-Fed 1929-2002: Unitary
341	Montenegro+	1868-1915	1868-1915: Autocracy	1868-1915: Non-Elective	1868-1915: Missing
600	Morocco	1816-1904 1956-2002	1816-1904: Autocracy 1956-2002: Autocracy	1816-1904: Non-Elective 1956-1962: Non-Elective 1963-1964: Parl 1965-1969: Non-Elective 1970-1971: Parl 1972-1976: Non-Elective 1977-2002: Parl	1816-1904: Missing 1956-2002: Unitary
541	Mozambique	1975-2002	1975-1993: Autocracy 1994-2002: PR	1975-2002: Pres	1975-2002: Unitary

¹¹⁵Reynolds and Reilly (1997) and International IDEA (2003) characterizes Mexico as a MMP PR system. According to Shugart and Wattenberg's case study of the Mexican electoral reforms (2001:209-230, 598), Mexico switched from PR to a MMM system (Mixed Member Majoritarian) in 1994.

¹¹⁶Reynolds and Reilly (1997) classify the Moldova electoral system as a TRS majority system in 1997.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
775	Myanmar (Burma) ⁺	1816-1885 1948-2002 ¹¹⁷	1816-1885: Autocracy 1948-1961: Maj-Plur 1962-2002: Autocracy	1816-1885: Non-Elective 1948-1961: Parl 1962-2002: Military	1816-1885: Missing 1948-1962: Federal 1963-2002: Unitary
565	Namibia	1990-2002	1990-2002: PR	1990-2002: Pres	1990-2002: Unitary
790	Nepal	1816-2002	1816-1956: Autocracy 1959-1989: Autocracy 1990-2001: Maj-Plur 2002-2002: Autocracy	1816-1956: Non-Elective 1959-1989: Non-Elective 1990-2001: Parl 2002-2002: Non-Elective	1816-1956: Unitary 1959-2002: Unitary
210	Netherlands	1816-2002	1816-1916: Autocracy 1917-1939: PR 1945-2002: PR	1816-1847: Non-Elective 1848-1939: Parl 1945-2002: Parl	1816-1939: Unitary 1945-2002: Unitary
920	New Zealand	1907-2002	1907-1992: Maj-Plur 1993-2002: PR ¹¹⁸	1907-2002: Parl	1907-2002: Unitary
93	Nicaragua	1840-2002	1840-1925: Autocracy 1928-1978: Autocracy 1981-1989: Autocracy 1990-2002: PR	1840-1925: Pres 1928-1978: Pres 1981-1984: Military 1985-2002: Pres	1840-1925: Unitary 1928-1978: Unitary 1981-2002: Unitary
436	Niger	1960-2002	1960-1990: Autocracy 1992-1995: Semi-PR 1996-1998: Autocracy 1999-2002: Semi-PR	1960-1973: Pres 1974-1986: Military 1987-1990: Pres 1992-2002: Pres	1960-1990: Unitary 1992-2002: Unitary

¹¹⁷According to Lipset (1998:51), the British colonial rule ended in 1948. Upon independence, Burma adopted a multi-party democratic system dominated by a political coalition, which gave way to a military regime in 1958. Democratic rule was re-instituted through elections in 1960 and lasted until 1962. Interestingly, Burma receives the score 8 on the Polity4 authority index throughout this period, including the 1958 military regime.

¹¹⁸The new PR (MMP) system in New Zealand was institutionalized in 1993, but the first election applying the new system did not take place until 1996.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
475	Nigeria	1960-2002	1960-1965: Maj-Plur 1966-1977: Autocracy 1979-1983: Maj-Plur 1984-1997: Autocracy 1999-2002: Maj-Plur	1960-1965: Semi-Pres 1966-1977: Military 1979-1983: Pres 1984-1997: Military 1999-2002: Pres	1960-1977: Federal 1979-1983: Federal 1984-1997: Unitary 1999-2002: Missing
385	Norway	1905-2002	1905-1919: Maj-Plur 1920-1939: PR 1945-2002: PR	1905-1939: Parl 1945-2002: Parl	1905-1939: Unitary 1945-2002: Unitary
698	Oman	1816-2002	1816-2002: Autocracy	1816-2002: Non-Elective	1816-1919: Unitary 1920-1956: Federal 1957-2002: Unitary
564	Orange State+	1854-1910	1854-1910: Missing ¹¹⁹	1854-1910: Pres	1854-1910: Unitary
770	Pakistan	1947-2002	1947-1948: Autocracy 1949-1957: Maj-Plur 1958-1968: Autocracy 1973-1976: Maj-Plur 1977-1987: Autocracy 1988-1998: Maj-Plur 1999-2002: Autocracy	1947-1955: Parl 1956-1968: Pres 1973-1976: Pres 1977-1985: Military 1986-1998: Pres 1999-2002: Military	1947-1954: Unitary 1955-1968: Federal 1973-2002: Federal
95	Panama	1903-2002	1903-1954: Autocracy 1955-1955: PR 1956-1967: Semi-PR 1968-1988: Autocracy 1989-1989: PR 1990-2002: Semi-PR ¹²⁰	1903-1967: Pres 1968-1968: Military 1969-2002: Pres	1903-2002: Unitary

¹¹⁹According to Encyclopeædia Britannica (2003), the political structure of the former British colony combined traditional Boer institutions with Dutch and American constitutional theory. The members of the unicameral legislative assembly, the Volksraad were elected by white adult males only.

¹²⁰Panama has a unicameral legislature, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), which has 71 members elected for five-year terms from single-member and multi-member constituencies (Carr, 2003).

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
327	Papal States	1816-1870	1816-1847: Autocracy 1850-1870: Autocracy	1816-1847: Non-Elective 1850-1870: Non-Elective	1816-1847: Unitary 1850-1870: Unitary
910	Papua New Guinea	1975-2002	1975-2002: Maj-Plur	1975-2002: Parl	1975-2002: Semi-Fed
150	Paraguay	1816-2002	1816-1868: Autocracy 1870-1991: Autocracy 1992-2002: PR	1816-1839: Pres 1840-1840: Military 1841-1868: Pres 1870-2002: Pres	1816-1868: Unitary 1870-2002: Unitary
335	Parma	1816-1860	1816-1861: Autocracy	1816-1861: Non-Elective	1816-1861: Unitary
135	Peru	1824-2002	1828-1834: PR 1835-1880: Autocracy 1883-1918: Autocracy 1920-1929: Autocracy 1933-1949: Autocracy 1950-1967: PR 1968-1977: Autocracy 1980-1991: PR 1992-1999: Autocracy 2001-2002: PR	1828-1880: Pres 1883-1918: Pres 1920-1929: Pres 1933-1947: Pres 1948-1949: Military 1950-1961: Pres 1962-1962: Military 1963-1967: Pres 1968-1977: Military 1980-1999: Pres 2001-2002: Pres	1828-1836: Unitary 1837-1838: Federal 1839-1880: Unitary 1883-1895: Unitary 1896-1918: Federal 1920-1929: Unitary 1933-1977: Unitary 1980-1999: Unitary 2001-2002: Unitary
840	Philippines	1946-2002	1946-1949: Autocracy 1950-1968: Maj-Plur ¹²¹ 1969-1985: Autocracy 1987-1994: Maj-Plur 1995-2002: Semi-PR ¹²²	1946-1985: Pres 1987-2002: Pres	1946-1971: Unitary 1972-1985: Semi-Fed 1987-2002: Semi-Fed

¹²¹According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2003), the Philippines has been governed under three constitutions, the first of which was promulgated in 1935, during the period of U.S. administration. It was closely modeled on the U.S. Constitution and included provisions for a bicameral legislative branch, an executive branch headed by a president, and an independent judiciary. During the period of martial law (1972-81) under President Ferdinand E. Marcos, this constitution was abolished and replaced by a new constitution (adopted in January 1973) that changed the Philippine government from a U.S.-style presidential system to a parliamentary form.

¹²²International IDEA (2003) classifies the Philippine system as Parallel FPTP and plurality, whereas Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996:545) and Carr (2003) classify it as a mixed system. Hicken and Kasuya (2003:136-137) define the Philippines as having an electoral formula with both Plurality and Mixed PR from 1995. 'The

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
290	Poland	1918-2002	1918-1925: PR ¹²³ 1926-1938: Autocracy 1947-1988: Autocracy 1989-2002: PR	1918-1925: Pres 1926-1938: Military 1947-1980: Non-Elective 1981-1981: Military 1982-1988: Non-Elective 1989-1996: Pres 1997-2002: Semi-Pres	1918-1938: Unitary 1947-2002: Unitary
235	Portugal	1816-2002	1823-1832: Autocracy 1834-1909: Autocracy 1911-1925: PR 1930-1973: Autocracy 1976-2002: PR	1823-1832: Non-Elective 1834-1909: Non-Elective 1911-1925: Parl 1930-1973: Parl 1976-2002: Semi-Pres	1823-1832: Unitary 1834-1909: Unitary 1911-1925: Unitary 1930-1973: Unitary 1976-2002: Unitary
694	Qatar	1971-2002	1971-2002: Autocracy	1971-2002: Non-Elective	1971-2002: Unitary
360	Rumania	1878-2002	1878-1915: Autocracy 1917-1939: Autocracy 1941-1943: Autocracy 1948-1988: Autocracy 1990-2002: PR	1878-1915: Non-Elective 1917-1937: Parl 1938-1939: Non-Elective 1941-1943: Parl 1948-1965: Non-Elective 1966-1988: Pres 1990-2002: Pres	1878-1915: Unitary 1917-1939: Unitary 1941-1943: Unitary 1948-1988: Unitary 1990-2002: Unitary
365	Russia (Soviet Union)	1816-2002	1816-1904: Autocracy 1906-1991: Autocracy 1992-2002: Semi-PR	1816-1904: Non-Elective 1906-1990: Non-Elective 1991-2002: Pres	1816-1904: Unitary 1906-1921: Unitary 1922-2002: Federal
517	Rwanda	1962-2002	1962-1992: Autocracy 1994-2002: Autocracy	1962-1972: Pres 1973-1977: Military 1978-1992: Pres 1994-2002: Pres	1962-1992: Unitary 1994-1995: Missing 1996-2002: Unitary

provision for a mixed-member system was included in the 1987 Constitution but a law fully implementing the measure was not passed until 1995 and not used in an election until 1998. In the interim, both President Aquino and President Ramos appointed some sectoral representatives to the lower chamber' (Ibid).

¹²³ According to Encyclopædia Britannica (2003), the constitution of 1921 made the parliament supreme vis-à-vis the executive. The proportional system of universal suffrage (which included women) necessitated coalition cabinets, and, except at times of national crisis, the left and the right hardly cooperated.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
670	Saudi Arabia	1932-2002	1932-2002: Autocracy	1932-2002: Non-Elective	1932-2002: Unitary
269	Saxony	1816-1871	1816-1847: Autocracy 1849-1871: Autocracy	1816-1847: Non-Elective 1849-1871: Non-Elective	1816-1847: Unitary 1849-1871: Unitary
433	Senegal	1960-2002	1960-1961: Autocracy 1963-1999: Autocracy 2000-2002: Semi-PR	1960-1961: Pres 1963-2002: Pres	1960-1961: Unitary 1963-2002: Unitary
340	Serbia+	1878-1915	1878-1902: Autocracy 1903-1914: Missing	1878-1914: Non-Elective	1878-1914: Missing
451	Sierra Leone	1961-2002	1961-1966: Maj-Plur ¹²⁴ 1967-1995: Autocracy 1996-1996: PR 2002-2002: Semi-PR	1961-1966: Parl 1967-1967: Military 1968-1970: Parl 1971-1991: Pres 1992-1996: Military 2002-2002: Pres	1961-1969: Federal 1970-1996: Semi-Fed 2002: Missing
830	Singapore	1965-2002	1965-2002: Autocracy	1965-2002: Semi-Pres	1965-2002: Unitary
317	Slovakia	1993-2002	1993-2002: PR	1993-2002: Semi-Pres	1993-2002: Unitary
349	Slovenia	1991-2002	1991-2002: PR	1991-2002: Semi-Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
940	Solomon Islands	1978-2002	1978-2000: Maj-Plur 2001-2002: Autocracy	1978-2002: Parl	1978-2002: Federal

¹²⁴ According to Encyclopædia Britannica (2003), parliamentary institutions were introduced in stages during the 1950s on the British pattern. The last stage was reached on April 27, 1961, when Sierra Leone became an independent state within the British Commonwealth. International IDEA (2003) lists Sierra Leone as having an FPTP electoral system on the voter turnout URL, which according to several sources seems to be the case until the constitutional revision in 1991 (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1996:396-397; Hirsch, 2001:114-115). notes that Sierra Leone had a PR system in 1997 (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997) and in 2002, whereas Carr (2003) describes Sierra Leone's legislative electoral system as PR with some modifications. According to Hirsch (2001:114-115), Sierra Leoneans voted overwhelmingly in favor of introducing a multi-party system in a 1991 referendum. The new law was endorsed and passed into law the same year. CIA - The World Factbook (2002) lists the percentages of vote by party in the 2002 legislative elections as: SLPP 70.06%, APC 22.35%, PLP 3%, others 4.59%; and the seats distributed by party: SLPP 83, APC 27, PLP 2, which supports the claim that Sierra Leone uses a semi-PR electoral system during its recent period of democratic government.

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Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
520	Somalia	1960-2002 ¹²⁵	1960-1968: Semi-PR 1969-1990: Autocracy	1960-1968: Pres 1969-1975: Military 1976-1990: Pres	1816-2002 1960-1968: Federal 1969-1990: Semi-Fed
560	South Africa	1910-2002 ¹²⁶	1910-1991: Maj-Plur 1994-2002: PR ¹²⁷	1910-1960: Parl 1961-1983: Semi-Pres 1984-1991: Pres 1994-2002: Pres	1910-1991: Unitary 1994-2002: Semi-Fed

¹²⁵According to the World Factbook (2002), Somalia became independent on 1 July 1960 (from a merger of British Somaliland, which became independent from the UK on 26 June 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on 1 July 1960, to form the Somali Republic).

¹²⁶During 1910-1991, South Africa receives a score of 4 on the Polity IV democracy-autocracy index, which theoretically means the country is a democracy during the apartheid regime. South Africa is a special case and not representative for other countries that receive the same score on the authority index. I make an exception to the obvious autocratic characteristics in this case, and treat South Africa as democratic.

¹²⁷South Africa's first democratic election with universal suffrage took place in 1994.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
230	Spain	1816-2002	1816-1835: Autocracy 1837-1867: Autocracy 1871-1873: Autocracy 1876-1878: Autocracy 1879-1922: Maj-Plur ¹²⁸ 1923-1929: Autocracy 1931-1938: Maj-Plur 1939-1974: Autocracy 1978-2002: Semi-PR ¹²⁹	1816-1835: Non-Elective 1837-1839: Non-Elective 1840-1845: Parl 1846-1846: Non-Elective 1847-1867: Parl 1871-1872: Parl 1873: Pres ¹³⁰ 1876-1922: Parl 1923-1929: Military 1931-1936: Semi-Pres 1937-1974: Non-Elective 1978-2002: Parl	1816-1835: Unitary 1837-1867: Unitary 1871-1873: Unitary 1876-1929: Unitary 1931-1974: Unitary 1978-1979: Unitary 1980-2002: Semi-Fed
780	Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	1948-2002	1948-1978: Maj-Plur ¹³¹ 1979-2002: PR	1948-1977: Parl 1978-2002: Pres	1948-2002: Unitary

¹²⁸Library of Congress (2003) describes 1898 as a turning point in the Spanish democratic government. The Spanish defeat by the United States in the war over Cuba, prompted political reevaluation in Spain. A plethora of new, often short-lived, personalist parties and regional groups on both the left and the right (that broke the hegemony of the two-party system and ultimately left the parliamentary structure in disarray) sought solutions to the country's problems. By 1915 it was virtually impossible to form a coalition government that could command the support of a parliamentary majority. The November 1932 election combined electoral lists and encouraged coalitions, which intended to prevent parliamentary fragmentation in the multiparty system. However, Lipset (1998:160) describes the electoral law in 1933 as 'favoring the conservative coalition against a divided left.'

¹²⁹Spain has a semi-PR system according to IPU (2003), which corresponds to Blais and Massicotte (1996:67) who characterize Spain as having a PR system which contains many modifications which make it strictly disproportional. Mackie and Rose (1991) describe how the deputies to the assembly are elected according to different rules depending on the electing province. The North African territories of Ceuta and Melilla and the islands (Mallorca, Gran Canaria and Tenerife) all elect their deputies by a plurality system whereas the general election system is multi-member constituencies by d'Hondt electoral system.

¹³⁰The First Spanish republic was headed by president Emilio Castelar y Ripoll and lasted from September 1873 until January 1874 (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2007).

¹³¹Sri Lanka has one of the longest experience with holding democratic elections of the Asian states (Reilly, 2001:115). Sri Lanka moved from a British type parliamentary system to a mixed presidential-parliamentary system like the French in the 1978 constitutional changes. A PR electoral system was introduced to parliamentary elections in 1978, but was not applied until the subsequent election a decade later (Hicken and Kasuya (2003:138, fn. G; Reilly, 2001:117).

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
625	Sudan	1956-2002	1956-1957: Maj-Plur 1958-1963: Autocracy 1965-1968: Maj-Plur 1971-1984: Autocracy 1986-1988: Maj-Plur 1989-2002: Autocracy	1956-1957: Parl 1958-1963: Military 1965-1968: Parl 1971-1984: Pres 1986-1988: Pres 1989-1992: Military 1993-2002: Pres	1816-2002 1956-1963: Unitary 1965-1968: Unitary 1971: Unitary 1972-1984: Semi-Fed 1986-1997: Semi-Fed 1998-2002: Federal
115	Surinam	1975-2002	1975-1980: PR 1981-1988: Autocracy 1989-1990: PR 1991-1992: Autocracy 1993-2002: PR	1975-1979: Semi-Pres 1980-1987: Military 1988-2002: Pres	1975-2002: Unitary
572	Swaziland	1968-2002	1968-2002: Autocracy	1968-2002: Non-Elective	1968-2002: Unitary
380	Sweden	1816-2002	1816-1906: Autocracy 1917-2002: PR	1816-1882: Non-Elective 1883-1906: Parl 1917-2002: Parl	1816-1906: Unitary 1917-2002: Unitary
225	Switzerland	1816-2002	1816-1917: Maj-Plur 1918-2002: PR	1816-1847: Missing 1848-2002: Semi-Pres	1816-2002: Federal
652	Syria+	1946-2002	1946-1948: Missing ¹³² 1949-1953: Autocracy 1954-1957: Missing 1961-2002: Autocracy	1946-1948: Pres 1949-1953: Military 1954-1957: Pres 1961-2002: Pres	1946-1957: Unitary 1961-2002: Unitary
713	Taiwan/ Republic of China	1949-2002	1949-1991: Autocracy 1992-2002: Semi-PR	1949-1974: Military 1975-1975: Parl 1976-1977: Semi-Pres 1978-2002: Pres	1949-2002: Unitary
702	Tajikistan	1991-2002	1991-2002: Autocracy	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
510	Tanzania/ Tanganyika	1961-2002	1961-2002: Autocracy	1961-2002: Pres	1961-2002: Semi-Fed

¹³²Syria was administered by the French until independence in 1946, which might have affected their adaptation of democratic system.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System 1816-2002	Executive System 1816-2002	Federalism of Political Authority 1816-2002
800	Thailand	1816-2002	1816-1931: Autocracy 1935-1940: Autocracy 1942-1967: Autocracy 1969-1972: Autocracy 1974-1975: Maj-Plur 1976-1976: Autocracy 1978-1987: Autocracy 1988-1990: Maj-Plur 1991-1991: Autocracy 1992-1996: Maj-Plur 1997-2002: Semi-PR ¹³³	1816-1931: Non-Elective 1935-1940: Parl 1942-1946: Parl 1947-1948: Military 1949-1950: Parl 1951-1951: Military 1952-1956: Parl 1957-1957: Military 1958-1958: Parl 1959-1959: Military 1960-1967: Parl 1969-1972: Parl 1974-1975: Parl 1976-1976: Military 1978-1987: Military 1988-1990: Parl 1991-1991: Military 1992-2002: Parl	1816-1867: Semi-Fed 1868-1931: Unitary 1935-1940: Unitary 1942-1967: Unitary 1969-1972: Unitary 1974-1976: Unitary 1978-2002: Unitary
711	Tibet	1913-1950	1913-1950: Autocracy	1913-1950: Non-Elective	1913-1950: Missing
461	Togo	1960-2002	1960-1990: Autocracy 1993-2002: Autocracy	1960-1990: Pres 1993-2002: Pres	1960-1990: Unitary 1993-2002: Unitary
563	Transvaal+	1852-1910	1852-1910: Autocracy	1852-1910: Pres	1852-1910: Missing
52	Trinidad and Tobago	1962-2002	1962-2002: Maj-Plur	1962-1975: Parl 1976-2002: Semi-Pres	1962-2002: Unitary
616	Tunisia	1816-1881 1956-2002	1816-1881: Autocracy 1956-2002: Autocracy	1816-1881: Non-Elective 1956-2002: Pres	1816-1881: Missing 1956-2002: Unitary

¹³³In contrast to International IDEA (2003) which defines Thailand as having a Maj-Plur system during all years as a democracy, Hicken and Kasuya (2003:137) classify Thailand as a Semi-PR system from 1997 to present, combining List PR and Plurality electoral formulas.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
640	Turkey/ Ottoman Empire	1816-2002	1816-1917: Autocracy 1923-1945: Autocracy 1946-1959: PR 1961-1970: PR 1971-1972: Autocracy 1973-1979: PR 1980-1982: Autocracy 1983-2002: PR	1816-1917: Non-Elective 1923-1959: Pres 1961-1979: Semi-Pres 1980-1981: Military 1982-2002: Semi-Pres	1816-1917: Federal 1923-1959: Unitary 1961-2002: Unitary
701	Turkmenistan	1991-2002	1991-2000: Autocracy 2001-2002: Missing	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
337	Tuscany	1816-1861	1816-1861: Autocracy	1816-1861: Non-Elective	1816-1861: Unitary
329	Two Sicilies	1816-1861	1816-1861: Autocracy	1816-1861: Non-Elective	1816-1861: Unitary
500	Uganda	1962-2002	1962-1965: Maj-Plur 1967-1978: Autocracy 1980-1984: Maj-Plur 1986-2002: Autocracy	1962-1965: Parl 1967-1978: Pres 1980-1984: Pres 1986-2002: Pres	1962-1965: Federal 1967-1978: Unitary 1980-1984: Unitary 1986-2002: Unitary
369	Ukraine	1991-2002	1991-1997: Maj-Plur 1998-2002: Semi-PR	1991-2002: Semi-Pres	1991-2002: Semi-Fed
696	United Arab Emirates	1971-2002	1971-2002: Autocracy	1971-2002: Pres	1971-2002: Federal
200	United Kingdom	1816-2002	1816-1836: Autocracy 1837-1866: Maj-Plur 1867-1883: Semi-PR 1884-2002: Maj-Plur	1816-2002: Parl	1816-2002: Unitary
89	United Provinces of Central America	1823-1839	1823-1839: Autocracy	1823-1839: Pres	1823-1839: Federal
2	United States of America	1816-2002 ¹³⁴	1816-2002: Maj-Plur	1816-2002: Pres	1816-2002: Federal

¹³⁴Most African-Americans could not vote in the South until 1960 (Carr, 2003). Nevertheless, the United States has scored the maximum of 10 on the Polity4 authority index since 1872.

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
165	Uruguay	1830-2002	1830-1918: Autocracy 1919-1933: Maj-Plur ¹³⁵ 1934-1951: Autocracy 1952-1970: Maj-Plur 1973-1984: Autocracy 1985-2002: Maj-Plur	1830-1970: Pres 1973-1974: Military 1975-2002: Pres	1830-1970: Unitary 1973-2002: Unitary
704	Uzbekistan	1991-2002	1991-2002: Autocracy	1991-2002: Pres	1991-2002: Unitary
101	Venezuela	1829-2002	1829-1934: Autocracy 1936-1957: Autocracy 1958-2002: PR	1829-1934: Pres 1936-1947: Pres 1948-1958: Military 1959-2002: Pres	1829-1863: Unitary 1864-1869: Semi-Fed 1870-1934: Unitary 1936-2002: Federal
815	Vietnam	1816-1893	1816-1893: Autocracy	1816-1893: Non-Elective	1816-1893: Missing
816	Vietnam, Democratic Republic of	1954-2002	1954-2002: Autocracy	1954-1959: Pres 1960-1991: Non-Elective 1992-2002: Semi-Pres	1954-2002: Unitary
817	Vietnam, Republic of	1975-2002	1954-1975: Autocracy	1954-1962: Pres 1963-1963: Military 1964-1964: Semi-Pres 1965-1966: Military 1967-1975: Semi-Pres	1954-1975: Unitary
271	Württemberg	1816-1871	1816-1871: Autocracy	1816-1871: Non-Elective	1816-1871: Unitary
678	Yemen (Arab Republic of)	1918-2002	1918-1945: Autocracy 1948-1989: Autocracy 1993-2002: Autocracy	1918-1945: Non-Elective 1948-1961: Non-Elective 1962-1977: Military 1978-1989: Pres 1993-2002: Pres	1918-1945: Unitary 1948-1989: Unitary 1993-2002: Unitary
680	Yemen, People's Republic of	1990-2002	1967-1990: Autocracy	1967-1990: Pres	1967-1990: Unitary

¹³⁵National officials in Uruguay are elected every five years. All Uruguayans 18 years of age and older are required to vote. Elections have been secret and obligatory since 1918, and a 1932 law granted women the right to vote (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2003).

(continued from previous page)

Country Code	Country	System Membership	Democratic Electoral System	Executive System	Federalism of Political Authority
345+	Yugoslavia (Serbia)	1918-2002	2000-2002: PR	1921-1936: Non-Elective 1939-1940: Non-Elective 1945-1951: Semi-Pres 1953-1962: Semi-Pres 1963-1979: Pres 1980-2002: Semi-Pres	1816-2002 1921-1936: Unitary 1939-1940: Unitary 1945-1951: Federal 1953-2002: Federal
551	Zambia	1964-2002	1964-1990: Autocracy 1991-1995: Maj-Plur 1996-2002: Autocracy	1964-2002: Pres	1964-2002: Unitary
511	Zanzibar	1963-1964	1963-1964: Autocracy	1963-1964: Parl	1963-1964: Missing
552	Zimbabwe	1965-2002	1965-1978: Maj-Plur 1980-1982: PR ¹³⁶ 1983-2002: Autocracy	1965-1969: Parl 1970-1978: Semi-Pres 1980-1986: Semi-Pres 1987-2002: Pres	1965-1978: Unitary 1980-2002: Unitary

+ Information missing.

¹³⁶ According to Reynolds (1999:64-67), Zimbabwe switched electoral systems from plurality to PR in the 1980 parliamentary election, but reverted back to a plurality system in 1984.

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