A Critical (& Patronizing) Survey of Western Philosophy
Russell is consistently opinionated throughout his presentation and it might confuse some of th A Critical (& Patronizing) Survey of Western Philosophy
Russell is consistently opinionated throughout his presentation and it might confuse some of the readers that he is so casual in writing off some of the major philosophers and their key ideas. This is because the book is not a mere history of philosophy, a mere account of ideas, by any stretch. Instead it is a critical survey, a long catalogue of what Russell agrees and disagrees with among all the major doctrines. The format followed is: a brief historical sketch to give context to a doctrine, an even briefer explanation, and then a long critical take that will put forward Russell’s opinions, usually about why it is misguided in the light of modern scientific approach. And more often than not, he is wary of those ideas which, from the point of view of his war-torn present, seemed 'dangerous.'
In fact, I think that three strands of vexation can be discerned:
1. Leading to orthodoxy in religion 2. Leading to rigidity in logic 3. Leading to Totalitarian fantasies
Any idea which Russell felt was tending towards these were roundly attacked and put in place. Must have felt like a humanitarian act, writing this book! After all, the long stretch of time that allowed Russell to undertake the tome was granted him by a stay in prison — his crime was distributing pacifist literature during the First World War. Hitler caused him to later renounce his pacifism, to the point that he wished he were younger so that he might don a uniform himself.
If you were to attempt a history of philosophy, you can write a history without imposing on the reader what your own opinions are. Or you can write a history just to let the reader know exactly what you (as a thinker of some standing yourself, you might add!) think of each philosopher. Or you can write a history and try to justify why you prefer some, even one, more than the others.
Russell has opted to for a mix of the last two options — and he prefers himself over all others, that’s all!
As the book progresses it becomes more and more clear that it is a summary of Russell’s views, and not of the philosophers being discussed. This means that most of them gets short shrift. And as we approach modern times it is amusing to see how Russell is almost impatient for the history to quickly reach and culminate in his own position of Logical Positivism, which he clearly thinks is the best approach to philosophy and in the light of which he judges everyone else. This allows him to narrate the entire historical progress in a patronizing and all-knowing tone that might be jarring to a reader who is not willing to take the same attitude towards Russell’s own naivete!
You have to out-patronize the patronizing author to enjoy this fully. That is the trick. And if you do, there is no end of fun to be had form this eminently readable epic....more
The Prolegomena is valuable as a summarization that is intended to be less obscure and suited for popular coHieroglyphics: A Reluctant Translation
The Prolegomena is valuable as a summarization that is intended to be less obscure and suited for popular consumption. It tries to compress Kant’s criticism of (all) previous work in metaphysics and the theory of knowledge -- first propounded in the Critique of Pure Reason, which provided a comprehensive response to early modern philosophy and a starting point for most subsequent work in philosophy.
A note on the Edition: This is a wonderful edition to approach the Prolegomena with -- meticulous introductory essay and copious notes. Plus it comes with a summary outline of all the sections! A summary of a summary. What more could you want?
Summing up the Beast
As is well known The Critique of Pure Reason is a notoriously difficult work. When first published, the early readers were not very different from modern readers — they found it incomprehensible!
Kant was a poor popularizer of his own work and when it was finally published in the spring of 1781 (with Kant nearing 57), after almost ten years of preparation and work, Kant had expected that the evident originality of the thoughts would attract immediate attention, at least among philosophers. He was… well… to be disappointed — for the first year or two he received from those whom he most expected to give his book a sympathetic hearing only a cool and uncomprehending, if not bewildered, silence.
What else would you expect for such wild intentions:
My intention is to convince all of those who find it worthwhile to occupy themselves with metaphysics that it is unavoidably necessary to suspend their work for the present, to consider all that has happened until now as if it had not happened, and before all else to pose the question: “whether such a thing as metaphysics is even possible at all.”
He had proposed a “Copernican Revolution” in thinking. He should have known that such stuff cannot come without a user manual.
Soon Kant caught on to this, and started having some misgivings about the fact that he was clearly not getting the reception he had expected for his masterpiece:
Kant is known to have written to Herz expressing his discomfort in learning that the eminent philosopher Moses Mendelssohn had “laid my book aside,” since he felt that Mendelssohn was “the most important of all the people who could explain this theory to the world.”
Mendelssohn later wrote to a friend confessing that he did not understand the work, and professing pleasure at learning that, in the opinion of her brother, he would not be “missing much” if he continued not to understand it!
Kant’s colleague in Konigsberg, Johann Schultz, in the preface to his 1784 Exposition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, mentioned the “nearly universal complaint about the unconquerable obscurity and unintelligibility” of the work, saying that for the largest part of the learned public it was “as if it consisted in nothing but hieroglyphics.”
As a reaction to this lack of public appreciation for such a vital work that was to have "brought about a complete change of thinking," a great deal of Kant's effort during the decade of the 1780s had diverted away from further development of his system and towards the unforeseen task of clarifying the critical foundations of his system of philosophy that he thought he had completed in May 1781. This work took a number of different forms: the publication of a brief defense and attempted popularization of the Critique in 1783 until, finally, Kant came to think that an overview would be of great value to aid the reading public in comprehending the implications of the Critique. The Prolegomena was the result. We can only guess what more productive use could have been made of this period!
It is sometimes obvious in this work that Kant was pained by the need to summarize his great work (and with the necessity of expending valuable time on it). Only someone who has written an elaborate masterpiece would know how difficult it must be to write a summary of it. And Kant lets it slip often enough (one might even think deliberately) that he is not too amused by having to do so:
But although a mere plan that might precede the Critique of Pure Reason would be unintelligible, undependable, and useless, it is by contrast all the more useful if it comes after. For one will thereby be put in the position to survey the whole, to test one by one the main points at issue in this science, and to arrange many things in the exposition better than could be done in the first execution of the work.
Whosoever finds this plan itself, which I send ahead as prolegomena for any future metaphysics, still obscure, may consider that it simply is not necessary for everyone to study metaphysics; and that in such a case one should apply one’s mental gifts to another object.
That whosoever undertakes to judge or indeed to construct a metaphysics must, however, thoroughly satisfy the challenge made here, whether it happens that they accept my solution, or fundamentally reject it and replace it with another – for they cannot dismiss it; and finally, that the much decried obscurity (a familiar cloaking for one’s own indolence or dimwittedness) has its use as well, since everybody, who with respect to all other sciences observes a wary silence, speaks master- fully, and boldly passes judgment in questions of metaphysics, because here to be sure their ignorance does not stand out clearly in relation to the science of others, but in relation to genuine critical principles, which therefore can be praised.
Kant hoped to hit more than one bird with the Prolegomena:
It was meant to offer “preparatory exercises” to the Critique of Pure Reason — not meant to replace the Critique, but as “preparatory exercises” they were intended to be read prior to the longer work. It was also meant to give an overview of that work, in which the structure and plan of the whole work could be more starkly put across — offered “as a general synopsis, with which the work itself could then be compared on occasion”. The Prolegomena are to be taken as a plan, synopsis, and guide for the Critique of Pure Reason.
He also wanted to walk his readers through the major arguments following the “analytic” method of exposition (as opposed to the “synthetic” method of the Critique): a method that starts from some given proposition or body of cognition and seeks principles from which it might be derived, as opposed to a method that first seeks to prove the principles and then to derive other propositions from them (pp. 13, 25–6).
What this means is that Kant realized that most of the readers were dazed by his daring to start the Critique from a scary emptiness of knowledge from which he set out to construct the very foundations on which any possible structure of knowledge can stand, and also the possibility of such a foundation i.e metaphysics. There he proceeds from these first (newly derived) principles of the theory of knowledge to examine the propositions that might be derived from it that are adaptable to a useful metaphysics.
In the Prolegomena, Kant reverses this and takes the propositions (i.e structure) as a given and then seeks to expose the required foundations that are needed to support such a construction. This he feels is less scary for the uninitiated reader.
It is true. The abyss is not so stark when viewed through this approach, and we can ease into our fall!
Kant’s work is easy to summarize (well, not really — but enough work has been put into it that at there least it is easy to get good summaries) but is infinitely rich with potential for the inquisitive reader. This reviewer has no intention of summarizing and thus reducing a method/system to its mere conclusions. And to summarize the method would be to recreate it in full detail! Instead the only advice tendered would be to explore Kant’s work in depth and not rest content with a superficial understanding of only the conclusions. That is precisely what Kant criticizes (in the appendix to the Prolegomena) his reviewers of doing back in the day. We should know better by now....more
This is the best commentary I could find on The Poetics. Bywater's is a much better translation and immensely readable, except for the places where he This is the best commentary I could find on The Poetics. Bywater's is a much better translation and immensely readable, except for the places where he employs the Greek without transliteration. A good strategy could be to keep to Bywater for a first read, and then use Whalley's idiosyncratic and 'deliberately clumsy' translation while studying his notes. We can even supplement it with the Lucas notes.
The best essay length criticism can be had from Lucas and Else, both of which are referred to often by Whalley. I am planning to read at least one of them soon.
Whalley's comparisons with Coleridge is particularly useful if the reader is interested in learning to think about how Aristotle's percepts can be made to fit modern literary works.
Also his approach is no to treat every word A. uses as a technical term, which is an unfortunate tendency of most academic works. So we usually end up talking very particularly about terms which Aristotle probably wanted to give a wider ambit to. This is when it becomes easy to lapse into thinking that Aristotle is too formalistic and hence dismissing him. That would be poor form for a student....more
Heraclitus is all rolled into one. His fragments are tantalizing, hinting at a wisdom lost to us, but I am sure tha Philosopher-Poet-Prophet-Proverbist
Heraclitus is all rolled into one. His fragments are tantalizing, hinting at a wisdom lost to us, but I am sure that he meant them to be fragmentary, so that all he does for the reader is a quick nod in the direction of a distant window, leaving the reader to make the journey, to peep out, and to make of the sight what he will. In the sure knowledge that Heraclitus had pointed him there and whatever he sees there is worth interpreting.
“Things keep their secrets.”
Herclitus is often called a Wisdom-Poet, sharing kinship with the authors of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job. Such Wisdom-Poetry specializes in a special sort of pessimism -- one that frees the reader from the shackles of a cherished belief. Heraclitus does this repeatedly:
They raise their voices
at stone idols
as a man might argue
with his doorpost,
they have understood
so little of the gods.
Like Buddha, Heraclitus is known to have given up his throne to seek wisdom. He became the author of what is today often considered to the first philosophical treatise of the Western mind -- that tries to arrive at the truth through a discourse.
However, the philosophy is nascent in these writings, being more prophetic and poetic than a structured discourse, with ideas leading one into the other.
These aphorisms tread lightly, avoiding being an elitist composition open only to the initiated. Heraclitus makes himself mysterious and accessible at the same time. it is no wonder that most philosophers after him refer to him with an awe reserved for a master who first teaches one to truly see the world anew.
Why does the Judge-penitent address you directly, as if he has found a kindred soul in you?
In this world responsibility is infinite and The Anti-Christ
Why does the Judge-penitent address you directly, as if he has found a kindred soul in you?
In this world responsibility is infinite and that is why The Fall is inevitable - even for a Christ. But back then Christ made a mistake — he saw (was) the nausea of the world, he saw (was) the complete guilt of each man (and his own) and he decided to redeem man (himself) by setting a supreme example. He sacrificed himself because he found himself guilty. It was only an example, a call to action -- to make men recognize and alter their way of life. He wanted man to see the depravity of his own existence by this one magnificent act. But his sacrifice was merely self-elevating, it could not elevate man. For man cannot be elevated before being shown the depths he roils in currently. And man cannot see faults where he looks to see heroes. He cannot see himself in Christ. Man cannot see man in the Ideal.
No, the faults had to be shown through an anti-hero. That is why the prophesy of an anti-christ was our true hope. That is why Christ had to return as the Anti-Christ. The Anti-Christ has to be closer to man, he has to be able to whisper to him as if he was just another man. He has to be able to make man see himself by looking at him. To make you see yourself as you really are by seeing in him yourself — yourself after The Fall.
That is why the Judge-penitent addresses you directly. He has found a kindred soul in you.
The Judge-Penitent
You are personally guilty for every fault that exists in the world. And The Fall is to not acknowledge your guilt — to withdraw from the world into aestheticism (recall Kierkegaard’s A in Either/Or) and make your life’s central concern one of making yourself feel good about yourself and thus about the world.
By the time Jean-Baptiste’s confession is over, you should realize that in fact the Judge-penitent is you. The story was yours. It is time to begin your own confession. It is time to stop being Kierkegaard’s A, and to be the B. To polarize yourself. Time to take responsibility and stare into the abyss.
Of course you might let someone else take The Fall for you, but from then on you would have to worship him. You would have to worship the guilty. You would have to worship the Judge-Penitent. But in this modern religion, to worship is to laugh at The Fallen.
That is the true role of the modern Christ. To take The Fall for you, so that he becomes the mirror in which you see the horror of your life.
The Fall
This necessary and continuous fall is the theme of the novel. It is one unforgiving, vertiginous descent. It is not a story of gradual discovery and ascent as in Sartre’s Nausea. In Nausea you see the picture that you should be painting of yourself. In The Fall you see the anti-thesis that you should use as your anti-model, as the one point which gives meaning to your picture by not being painted.
Here you are made to continuously disagree with a person who goes more and more towards that abyss. You are made to define yourself in your disagreement, to define yourself as a negation. And by doing that you are the one who discovers the nausea of such an existence, even as the narrator finds ingenious and pathetic ways to avoid it. And you are the one who moves away from the abyss.
You are the hero of the story, or at least the would-be hero — the one who is going to have the transformation that will change your world. The polarization is external to the novel.
Jean-Baptiste is one of the most powerful anti-heroes of literature, but you never root for his redemption. Instead you root for him to fall and fall — to Fall as horribly and as deep into the abyss as possible. Because that is the only way to root for yourself. Because the more he falls, the more you can see of what consists the abyss, and the further away you get from it. His Fall will save you. Mon cher, he is your personal Christ....more
The history of all hitherto existing society* is the history of class struggles.
* That is, all written history.
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We read the same written history and The history of all hitherto existing society* is the history of class struggles.
* That is, all written history.
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We read the same written history and read it as progress, as stories, etc. The real history, on the other hand, is something else. Played out differently. Yeah, that is the catch.
This was a reading of only the bare text (along with the many prefaces!). It was very powerful and I am now reading the Penguin edition with the really long introduction next. Will write more about this important book there.
In the mean time, it is hardly 40 pages - why haven't you read this yet? It is not often that you get the summary of one of the most influential thought-structures in history in under 40 pages! It was a rhetorical masterpiece too, by the way. ...more
Hegel’s Lectures on the ‘Philosophy of History’ are considered to be valuable as an accessible introduction to hi The Evolution & Perfection of Germany
Hegel’s Lectures on the ‘Philosophy of History’ are considered to be valuable as an accessible introduction to his system. Since he works with familiar historical examples here to illustrate his metaphysical system, it is certainly an easier read than some of his purely abstract works (this reviewer ought to know, having entered those hallways and retreated in incomprehension and terror many times by now).
Here Hegel visualizes the major instances of history (for the most part just regurgitating Herodotus) from inside a new theoretic framework, wherein he tracks the movement of the Idea of Freedom and of the Spirit of History (or rather the Idea of Germany! :) ) through the whole of human history and points out its evolutions and the condition that felicitated these changes to his readers.
Samples
“The life of the ever present Spirit is a circle of progressive embodiments, which looked at in one respect still exist be-side each other, and only as looked at from another point of view appear as past”.
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God is thus recognized as Spirit, only when known as the Triune. This new principle is the axis on which the History of the World turns. This is the goal and the starting point of History. “When the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son,” is the statement of the Bible. This means nothing else than that self- consciousness had reached the phases of development [Momente], whose resultant constitutes the Idea of Spirit, and had come to feel the necessity of comprehending those phases absolutely. This must now be more fully explained.
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...“Part IV: The German World. The German Spirit is the Spirit of the new World. Its aim is the realization of absolute Truth as the unilimited self-determination of Freedom — that Freedom which has its own absolute form itself as its purport.25 The destiny of the German peoples is, to be the bearers of the Christian principle. The principle of Spiritual Freedom — of Reconciliation [of the Objective and Subjective], was introduced into the still simple, unformed minds of those peoples; and the part assigned them in the service of the World- Spirit was that of not merely possessing the Idea of Freedom as the substratum of their religious conceptions, but of producing it in free and spontaneous developments from their subjective self- consciousness.”
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“Germany was traversed by the victorious French hosts, but German nationality delivered it from this yoke. One of the leading features in the political condition of Germany is that code of Rights which was certainly occasioned by French oppression, since this was the especial means of bringing to light the deficiencies of the old system. The fiction of an Empire has utterly vanished. It is broken up into sovereign states. Feudal obligations are abolished, for freedom of property and of person have been recognized as fundamental principles. Offices of State are open to every citizen, talent and adaptation being of course the necessary conditions. The government rests with the official world, and the personal decision of the monarch constitutes its apex; for a final decision is, as was remarked above, absolutely necessary. Yet with firmly established laws, and a settled organization of the State, what is left to the sole arbitrament of the monarch is, in point of substance, no great matter. It is certainly a very fortunate circumstance for a nation, when a sovereign of noble character falls to its lot; yet in a great state even this is of small moment, since its strength lies in the Reason incorporated in it. Minor states have their existence and tranquillity secured to them more or less by their neighbors: they are therefore, properly speaking, not independent, and have not the fiery trial of war to endure. As has been remarked, a share in the government may be obtained by every one who has a competent knowledge, experience, and a morally regulated will. Those who know ought to govern, not ignorance and the presumptuous conceit of “knowing better.” Lastly, as to Disposition, we have already remarked that in the Protestant Church the reconciliation of Religion with Legal Right has taken place. In the Protestant world there is no sacred, no religious conscience in a state of separation from, or perhaps even hostility to Secular Right. This is the point which consciousness has attained, and these are the principal phases of that form in which the principle of Freedom has realized itself; — for the History of the World is nothing but the development of the Idea of Freedom. But Objective Freedom — the laws of real Freedom — demand the subjugation of the mere contingent Will — for this is in its nature formal. If the Objective is in itself Rational, human insight and conviction must correspond with the Reason which it embodies, and then we have the other essential element — Subjective Freedom — also realized.45 We have confined ourselves to the consideration of that progress of the Idea [which has led to this consummation], and have been obliged to forego the pleasure of giving a detailed picture of the prosperity, the periods of glory that have distinguished the career of peoples, the beauty and grandeur of the character of individuals, and the interest attaching to their fate in weal or woe. Philosophy concerns itself only with the glory of the Idea mirroring itself in the History of the World. Philosophy escapes from the weary strife of passions that agitate the surface of society into the calm region of contemplation; that which interests it is the recognition of the process of development which the Idea has passed through in realizing itself — i.e., the Idea of Freedom, whose reality is the consciousness of Freedom and nothing short of it. That the History of the World, with all the changing scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and the realization of Spirit — this is the true Theodicaea, the justification of God in History. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of the World — viz., that what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not “without God,” but is essentially His Work.”
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Reader, Beware
This approach means that Hegel is quite disappointed with those civilizations which, according to his framework, stayed static and did not move in the required directions. So china and India gets a very dismissive treatment, which should be enough to irk most readers from those parts of the world. And then Europe gets a very favored and biased treatment as Hegel waxes on about the perfection it has attained in the current stage where the Idea of Freedom has finally triumphed. It is almost an advocation of the End of History and of Perfection already attained.
The book is interesting only as a way to understand Hegel’s system. If one attempts to use it so as to understand history itself or goes in with such expectations, it is going to be a very tiresome ride. Hegel is not an easy co-passenger to have when having a tour of the highlights of history. ...more
OK, was thrown into an inverted Faust here, but with Faust helping Mephistopheles in his conquests! What then? Should the mor A Wound Masked As a Boast
OK, was thrown into an inverted Faust here, but with Faust helping Mephistopheles in his conquests! What then? Should the morality change in any way?
Mephistopheles is a seducer, the poor devil. The eternal seducer, but the one who bores of his victims at the cusp. Or is that just what he tells himself? (yeah, the "wills evil, does good" bit.)
"In the vast literature of love, The Seducer's Diary is an intricate curiosity--a feverishly intellectual attempt to reconstruct an erotic failure as a pedagogic success, a wound masked as a boast."
Descartes probably had the best questions ever and the worst answers ever.
Questions: How can I know if reality is as I perceive it? If I exist? If GodDescartes probably had the best questions ever and the worst answers ever.
Questions: How can I know if reality is as I perceive it? If I exist? If God exists?
Answers: I can think, hence my mind exists, hence I exist. I can think of a god hence God exists. God must be good. A good God wouldn't fool me. So reality exists as I perceive it....more
Too haphazard a collection. The commentary is decent, but the selections don't stand so well on their own. Readers would do better to take up the orig Too haphazard a collection. The commentary is decent, but the selections don't stand so well on their own. Readers would do better to take up the original works and come back to this only for the introductory essays on each topic....more
“With regard to the philosophy for which you reproach me it teaches me how to suffer the indignities of Anitus and your How to make use of Philosophy:
“With regard to the philosophy for which you reproach me it teaches me how to suffer the indignities of Anitus and your reproaches. To love you despite your temper.”
How to get rid of Philosophy:
“Socrates is right. But he's wrong to be right so publicly.
Where, after all, is the evil in poisoning a philosopher, especially when he's old and ugly?
Anyway, it's late, we're wasting his time! To death, to death and no more discussion about it.”
How to be resigned to Philosophy:
SOCRATES: “I’ve been prepared for death for a long while. All that worries me now is that my wife, Xantippe may come trouble my last moments and interrupt the sweet composure of my soul: I mustn't be occupied except with the Supreme Being before whom I must soon appear. But here she is: I've got to be resigned to everything.”...more
‘Doubt Truth to Be a Liar’, ostensibly the book being reviewed here, is a championing of the ideas of Book 3: The Basic Instruments Of Philosophy
‘Doubt Truth to Be a Liar’, ostensibly the book being reviewed here, is a championing of the ideas of dialetheism, which argues that some contradictions can indeed be true. Priest mounts an effective challenge against Aristotle’s fundamental Law of Non-Contradiction (as we will see, it is the heart of Book 3), and against the many philosophies and arguments that have grown up around Aristotle’s First Principle. This book is much more than a discussion on this particular book of the Metaphysics and touches on a variety of other Aristotelean works. But since I want to have something on each book of my Metaphysics reading up (so that I am forced to move to the next book only after I organize and summarize my notes of the former and because this book was a fascinating and well-argued counter to Aristotle’s flat-out assertion, and especially since the Symposium Aristotelicum is not available for this particular book) I have chosen this review as a place to primarily discuss Book 3 -- This is a disservice to Priest’s book which is wonderful reading if you want to explore further the role that contradiction plays in our thinking and logical maneuvering. Do check out other reviewers for more on the book.
I am using my parallel readings on Aristotle & Metaphysics to keep my notes/understanding of each book in separate pockets before bringing them together in a final review, if that is possible.
Book Gamma: Going Further
After the historical surveys and problems discussed in the first two books, Aristotle is now in a position to give his famous assertion on what is presumably his definitive statement of what philosophy and especially metaphysics is — It is the study of "being qua being". That is, while other sciences investigate limited aspects of being, metaphysics investigates being itself. This study of being qua being amounts to be the same thing as the study of the primary causes and principles, which has previously been said to be the task of philosophy, because the primary causes and principles are the causes and principles of being qua being.
This is because Being itself is primarily identified with the idea of substance, and also with unity, plurality (as we are later told, philosophy will interest itself in plurality, the contrary of unity, since all sciences study contraries, and so consider difference, dissimilarity, etc.), and a variety of other related concepts. Aristotle implies that he will be investigating these soon.
But before he sets out on the investigation, Aristotle needs to make his readers familiar with the basic tools of argumentation since proper, rigorous philosophy is also concerned with logic and the principles of demonstration, which are also very general, and hence concerned with being itself — In making this addition, he is resolving the dilemma posed by puzzle 2 of book Beta. Ideally, Aristotle seems to be saying, the reader should already be familiar with the Organon’s arguments before he/she goes further than this book. The bulk of the rest of book Gamma is, accordingly, devoted to the defense of the fundamental principles of demonstration/logic. Aristotle evidently feels that it will not be possible to be certain about the conclusions later to be drawn about substance, unless the principles of demonstration itself have first been vindicated.
The most fundamental principle according to Aristotle, the only thing he is prepared to elevate to the level of an axiom, is the principle of noncontradiction: nothing can both be something and not be that same something. To Aristotle, this is the First Principle of logical demonstration, which though not of course deducible, is the ultimate principle governing all being and all knowledge. Aristotle defends this principle exhaustively by arguing that it is impossible to contradict it coherently. Aristotle also presents in this connection the principle of non-contradiction is the Principle of the Excluded Middle, which states that there is no logical middle position possible between two contradictory positions. That is, a thing is either x or not-x, and there is no third possibility in-between those two positions.
Back on The Attack
Book Gamma concludes by looking back at Books 1 & 2 and uses the new principles the readers have now been made familiar with to launch another attack on, and reject, the several general claims of earlier philosophers: that everything is true, that everything is false, that everything is at rest, and that everything is in motion.
Aristotle proves that these claims amount to a rejection of the principle of non-contradiction. First, he deals with those who claim either that everything is true or that everything is false. Each of these claims is in fact self-destructive: if everything is true, then so is the denial that everything is true, and if everything is false, then so is the claim that everything is false. Secondly, he also refutes those who claim either that everything is at rest or that everything is in motion. That everything is not at rest is shown by the fact that the very proponent of the claim himself came into existence at some time in the past. That everything is not in motion is shown by the fact that for anything to be in motion there must be something which is not in motion and also by the fact that there are some things that are eternal.
The question of Motion, whether there is something permanently in motion and whether there is primary cause of motion which is itself permanently unmoving, is to be explored at greater length in book Lambda. In this book Aristotle expertly connects this fundamental exploration of metaphysics to the mistakes of his predecessors by subjecting them to the scrutiny of, according to him, the most basic techniques of demonstrative philosophy. After Book 2’s seemingly ‘unsolvable’ puzzles, if any reader felt that they might be in for a shaky and doubtful ride, this book shows that Aristotle is completely in control of the voyage and knows exactly where he is sailing. No worries....more
-- The 16th Symposium Aristotelicum, dedicated to Book Beta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, organized Book 2: An Introduction to Philosophical Problems
-- The 16th Symposium Aristotelicum, dedicated to Book Beta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, organized by Michel Crubellier and Andre Laks, was held in Lille from 20 to 24 August, 2002, in the premises of the Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Lille. --
I am using my parallel reading of Symposium Aristotelicum (SA) to keep my notes/understanding of each book in separate pockets before bringing them together in a final review, if that is possible.
This was a wonderful book to have a Symposium on since Aristotle poses the 14+1 questions and leaves them open ended. So it is good to discuss them further and in detail by ourselves before going on to see how Aristotle resolves them indirectly.
Each of the Aporia are tackled in turn (starting from Zero!) in this SA.
Fifteen Metaphysical Puzzles
The Book Beta consists of a series of fifteen metaphysical puzzles (also called Aporia, since they are left unresolved) on the nature of first principles, substance, and other fundamental concepts. In each case, Aristotle presents a thesis and a contradicting antithesis, both of which could be taken as possible answers to the puzzle.
Here are the puzzles, in summary form:
(i) Can one science treat of all the four causes?
(ii) Are the primary axioms treated of by the science of substance, and if not, by what science?
(iii) Can one science treat of all substances?
(iv) Does the science of substance treat also of its attributes?
(v) Are there any non-sensible substances, and if so, of how many kinds?
(vi) Are the genera, or the constituent parts, of things their first principles?
(vii) If the genera, is it the highest genera or the lowest?
(viii) Is there anything apart from individual things?
(ix) Is each of the first principles one in kind, or in number?
(x) Are the principles of perishable and of imperishable things the same?
(xi) Are being and unity substances or attributes?
(xii) Are the objects of mathematics substances?
(xiii) Do Ideas exist, as well as sensible things and the objects of mathematics?
(xiv) Do the first principles exist potentially or actually?
(xv) Are the first principles universal or individual?
The characteristic structure of these problems is that of a plausible seeming thesis and an equally plausible but contradictory antithesis — well defined questions announced in the form of an alternative: ‘Is it ___ , or rather ___ ?’
The care with which the contrasting arguments are balanced and the constant repetition of the same procedure for each of the fifteen aporiai give the appearance of a practice governed by strict rules. One might well think that such presentation of the question in a standard form, which would require perhaps certain methodological rules and criteria of success for its development and resolution, would constitute part of dialectic, in the Aristotelian sense of the term, that is to say, the technique of discussion.
Usually, the thesis and antithesis are taken one from the extreme naturalists or Atomists, the other from the Idealists, Pythagoreans and Platonists. The purpose of the whole exercise is to illustrate the poverty of both these extreme positions, so as to prepare the way for the exposition of Aristotle’s own solution throughout the rest of the Metaphysics, which will in many respects be a compromise between materialism and idealism.
Thus we could consider them as the statement of Thesis & Antithesis of each of these positions and we can assume the rest of Metaphysics as a mediation, i.e., as a Synthesis.
Aporia as a Dialectical Instrument
In the brief introduction before plunging us into the puzzles, Aristotle gives a quick explanation for the employment of this method:
We must, with a view to the science which we are seeking, first recount the subjects that should be first discussed. These include both the other opinions that some have held on the first principles, and any point besides these that happens to have been overlooked.
For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is advantageous to discuss the difficulties well; for the subsequent free play of thought implies the solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a knot of which one does not know.
But the difficulty of our thinking points to a ‘knot’ in the object; for in so far as our thought is in difficulties, it is in like case with those who are bound; for in either case it is impossible to go forward. Hence one should have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand, both for the purposes we have stated and because people who inquire without first stating the difficulties are like those who do not know where they have to go; […] while to him who has first discussed the difficulties it is clear.
Further, he who has heard all the contending arguments, as if they were the parties to a case, must be in a better position for judging.
This excerpt (slightly modified for brevity) shows clearly that Aristotle sees the Aporia as a the logical next step after the Book 1, which was a literature survey, or a ‘doxographical’ survey.
Doxography and Aporia are two means of beginning a philosophical inquiry, ones which can be rivals, but which can also be employed together. In particular, aporia presupposes, to a certain extent at any rate, the existence and the consideration of opinions on the question, but it is not reducible to this.
Doxography is oriented toward the past, while Aporia anticipates the pursuit of inquiry —
The former is to know what others have thought, to try to under stand what they have wished to say and even, to a certain point, to sort out what is true and what false in this, while the latter is to methodically to construct a philosophical problem in the belief that this represents a step in the apprehension of a matter that is difficult to comprehend.
Book Beta and The Project of Wisdom
The principal presupposition, which is found in the background of all the books of the Metaphysics is of a programmatic nature: This is the grand project/quest — of a knowledge called ‘wisdom’, or ‘Primary Knowledge.’ We can call this The Project of Wisdom as short for “The Project of a Primary Knowledge.” Or we can just call it Metaphysics, even though Aristotle never called it that!
Thus this ‘Project of Wisdom’, or 'Metaphysics', mobilizes philosophical material that had been progressively developed, beginning with Plato, right down to Aristotle himself in Book Alpha. And this is why, despite the difference of form, Book Beta is in a sense the proper continuation of Book Alpha. It takes up the story where the other left it off, since the sequence covered by the Aporia of Beta proceeded from Thales to Plato — proving clearly that Aristotle was continuing his presentation in this book.
Aristotelian doxography of Book Alpha presents us the views of his predecessors, even if in a slightly sarcastic and personal way — Aristotle must have realized that his listeners might be tempted to take sides in such a presentation, even (occasionally) against his own very strong position. At least, this reader was!
But the Aristotelian Aporia of Book 2 submits the contents of their statements (of the predecessors’) to the test of argumentation and to a standard that requires rational coherence. When the aporia is presented as a contradiction, the tension is maximal — Here the serious reader will have to let go of any last whimsical fancies and biases; and one finds oneself in definite impasses, where the choice between two given theoretical positions presents itself as being at once necessary — and yet impossible.
Aristotle audaciously assures us, though, that the formal structure of the difficulty, once well understood, can teach us something about the nature of the object that has given birth to the difficulty, and that if we move forward with him, we will reach satisfactory resolutions.
This is an assurance that is hard to believe easily after this harrowing Book, but Aristotle now has our undivided attention!
The Symposium Aristotelicum series is a splendid companion to have while reading Aristotle. This volume Book 1: A Preliminary Outline of Philosophy
The Symposium Aristotelicum series is a splendid companion to have while reading Aristotle. This volume offers a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Alpha, the first book of the Metaphysics, along with comprehensive essays on various topics.
It is important to understand Alpha well. Here Aristotle presents what he means by philosophy and what is involved in the search for truth. Aristotle opens the book by broaching a topic which is to be of recurring concern throughout the work -- What is the nature of philosophy?
Aristotle tells us that we can tackle this tricky question by first exploring a few by-ways. He does this by inviting us to first figuring out what should be the proper object of philosophical interest. The simple answer is: Wisdom. But that only leads us to more question: What is wisdom? How can we reach it with our limited human capabilities? Can we?
What is wisdom? Aristotle tries to answer this by listing out the characteristics of ‘wisdom’ (philosophy) -- he claims that wisdom is a process with many constituent steps: we reach it by advancing from 1) sensation (or, sense-perception) through 2) memory to 3) experience, and 4) art, to 5) theoretical knowledge.
Once we are capable of applying this experience/knowledge of the particular to the universal, then we approach Wisdom. But it is not just any knowledge that is enough. Aristotle also ranks types of wisdom/knowledge. The that knowledge of universals is somehow higher or more valuable than that of particular things, and that kind of universal knowledge is the Highest, which tries helps to understand the fundamental causes and principles of all things. This is the Highest Science and since Philosophy is study of the Highest Science, it is thus proved that this is the True Domain of the True Philosopher.
True Philosophy is thus the search for the most fundamental causes and principles of the most general aspects of the world. And a true philosopher will demonstrate his wisdom by being able to teach and impart his knowledge to others. That is the final test, which apparently A was passing in flying colors even as he was delivering this very lecture!
The Doxographical K.O.!
Before he embarks on this himself, he catalogues and examines the paths taken by earlier philosophers, and surveys these previous philosophies,from Thales to Plato, especially their treatment of causes --There are four kinds of cause, or rather kinds of explanation, for how things are: (1) the material cause, which explains what a thing is made of; (2) the formal cause, which explains the form a thing assumes; (3) the efficient cause, which explains the process by which it came into being; and (4) the final cause, which explains the end or purpose it serves.
In this ‘doxographical’ survey, Aristotle condescends that the explanations of earlier philosophers have conformed to these four causes but not as coherently and systematically as Aristotle’s formulation. Aristotle acknowledges that Plato’s Theory of Forms gives a strong account of the formal cause, but it fails to prove that Forms exist and to explain how objects in the physical world participate in Forms. It is only fair to say that he takes them apart mercilessly.
Conclusion? Most tried to search for material causes, a few searched for efficient causes and a select few stumbled close to searching for the formal causes, but all of them without any systematic understanding about the objectives of philosophy, all of them stumbling in the dark... they were either naive, wrong or obscure in their formulations. To be of any use, they have to be integrated into Aristotle's system of thought. Thus he draws his survey of earlier thought to a triumphant conclusion, vindicating his claim that every serious attempt at explanation of the world must fit into one of his four approved styles. It is just that they did not know it yet!
By laying out the historical path/development of Philosophical thought in an organized way, Aristotle also pioneers a 'sense of development', as if whole of philosophy was developing, even if unaware of it, towards his grand synthesis. This conception (or conceit?) of science and knowledge is something that we moderns love to embrace with elation.
A Personal Note
To me Alpha was a fun read, to have demonstrated by the "Master' himself how it is done -- to challenge openly and without question all established doctrines, no matter how prestigious. Though the effect is spoiled a bit by Aristotle’s evident hostility towards anything remotely tending towards poor Pythagoras. It is a miracle that he still has a decent reputation.
But it also showed me an important contrast between Plato/Socrates and Aristotle. Plato shows a more lenient, accepting way of challenging conventional wisdom, while Aristotle prefers to tackle and reject, almost heedlessly. Current scholarly opinion seems to be of the view that Aristotle was slightly on the reckless side, perhaps reducing the arguments he was challenging into straw-men that he could easily knock down without acknowledging fully their importance or contributions to his own thought.
In any case, it is great that Metaphysics opens on such an entertaining and personal note. It makes the first acquaintance less intimidating than would have been expected....more
From Book 4 onwards, it becomes slightly harder to talk about the books in isolation. Also, A became easier to follow - so I stopped using so many supplementary resources. I will try to put up a review here incorporating my reading notes, additional thoughts, criticisms, doubts, ideas and a few unwarranted digs at Aristotle as soon as I can. Meanwhile, I am planning to now move into The Organon and Physics next.
The original plan was to progress in an orderly fashion through the great philosophical works before reading the modern ones (all first-hand) but Sartre has thrown a spanner into that plan by being so irresistible. So now the new plan is to read in parallel the moderns and the ancients - and to meet somewhere in the middle, some day......more
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