Derek Nudd's Reviews > Rules of Game: Jutland and British Naval Command

I was hesitant to pick this book up because of the size of it - 600 pages before we get to the appendices, notes, bibliography and index. I need not have been. It combines forensic analysis with superb writing.
The core of it is the battle of Jutland / Skagerrakschlacht, from which no senior commander on either side emerged smelling of violets, though some came out whiffier than others.
Gordon sets the scene and then winds the clock back to the nineteenth century debate between the 'control' and 'ratcatcher' schools of tactical thought in the Royal Navy. The former's insistence on precision seamanship and balletic fleetwork was ironically reinforced after the traumatic loss of HMS Victoria in a collision with Camperdown caused by rigid obedience to an impossible signal.
Returning to Jutland he completes his account of the battle and its sordid political aftermath. His account is compelling but other, later historians disagree in some points. It is worth the reader's while keeping an eye on the 'Courses and Directions' table in Appendix 1 if they are not familiar with boxing the compass.
He completes the book by raising the important question, what can this teach us today? Writing after the 1982 Falklands conflict and the first Gulf War he was very aware of the tension between proponents of rapid technological change (enthusiastically supported in the media) and the empirical knowledge of people who had been there. One group is accused of preparing for the last war, the other, perhaps, of optimising for peacetime conditions.
The one thing I wish he had gone into in a bit more depth (perhaps in yet another appendix) is the debate between the Dreyer and Pollen fire-control systems. He alludes at several points to the shortcomings of the Dreyer table but without being specific.
As ever, we should 'check our privileges' of safety, comfort and hindsight before passing judgement on people who had none of those benefits.