Zachary's Reviews > Diplomacy

Very worthwhile read. Was shocking how little I knew about these topics.

Very helpful historical context around raison de'etat, Realpolitik, balance of power, collective security, etc. Was challenging to read the historical conflicts and imagine libertarian foreign policy responses.

I was struck wondering what the response would be to a Romney-esque comment, "Nations are people, too."

Thought provoking to see the impact that individuals can have on the world. And, likewise, the power of the billions of people that give those few the authority. I'm sure there is some simplification of the lesser personalities supporting people like Bismarck and other notable statesmen ... but if their impacts were due to even a small team, amazing.

Was especially nice contrast to "The Prize"'s oil-centric focus on history; the Suez Crisis felt like a different event in each book.

I think I have a much better chance of winning Diplomacy (the game) next time around :-)

some quotes I wanted to remember...

"Metternich would have considered [Bismark's views] heresy, but Frederick the Great would have applauded a disciple's clever adaptation of his own rationale for conquering Silesia."

Bismark quote:
"We have three threats available: (1) an alliance with Russia; and it is nonsense to swear at once that we will never go with Russia. Even if it were true, we should retain the option to use it as a threat."

"Stalin was indeed a monster; but in the conduct of international relations he was the supreme realist - patient, shrewd, and implacable, the Richelieu of his period."

"According to the journalistic practice of the day [FDR], the President always met with the press off-the-record, which meant that he could neither be quoted nor identified, and these rules were respected."

"In American thinking foreign policy and strategy were compartmentalized into successive phases of national policy. In the ideal American universe, diplomats stayed out of strategy and military personnel completed their task by the time diplomacy started - a view for which America was to pay dearly in the Korean and Vietnam wars. By contrast, for Churchill, war strategy and foreign policy were closely linked. ..."

"Amazingly, the State Dept document asserted that NATO was not designed to defend the status quo... the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations happily accepted this conceit ... No history graduate student would have received a passing grade for such an analysis."

"[stopping offensive operations to in Korean conflict] was a classically American gesture. Because of their conviction that peace is normal and goodwill natural, American leaders have generally sought to encourage negotiations by removing elements of coercion and by unilateral demonstrations of goodwill. In general, diplomats rarely pay for services already rendered -- especially in wartime. Typically, it is pressure on the battlefield that generates the negotiation. Relieving the pressure reduces the enemy's incentive to negotiate seriously, and it tempts him to drag out the negotiation in order to determine whether other unilateral gestures may be forthcoming."

"According to a Newsweek poll, Americans believed that Khrushchev had finally understood "that Americans from the President on down genuinely want peace." If that was Khrushchev's actual judgement, the effect was surely double-edged. Any any event, he kept that particular insight a state secret."

"Dulles was Secretary of State to a President who was passionately opposed to war in the way only an experienced military man can be. ... To Eisenhower, the Suez crisis was not sufficiently threatening to merit the use of force. ... Dulles was caught between an adamant Eisenhower and an outraged group of European allies."

"[Addenauer] asked how much of my time was spent working as a White House consultant. When I told him about 25 percent, he replied calmly: "In that case, I shall assume you are telling me 75 percent of the truth."

"in 1959, in one of the truly original articles of the Cold War period, the then Rand Corporation analyst Albert Wohlstetter showed that common sense was not an adequate guide to nuclear relationships. The fact that nuclear weapons were carried on airplanes concentrated on a relatively few bases might make it technically possible to destroy the adversary's strategic forces before they were launched. ... According to Wolhlstetter, the nuclear balance was in fact highly unstable."

"[Chinese] negotiating style was as different from that of their Soviet counterparts as was possible. Soviet diplomats almost never discussed conceptual issues. Their tactic was to select a problem of immediate concern to Moscow and to batter away at its resolution with a dogged persistence designed to wear down their interlocutors rather than to persuade them. The insistence and vehemence with which Soviet negotiators put forward the Politburo consensus reflected the brutal discipline and internal strains of Soviet politics..."