

THE BENEFITS OF FAIR RECRUITMENT

RESULTS OF THE IMPACT STUDY
ON THE NEPAL-JORDAN CORRIDOR



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Fundamentals Principles and
Rights at Work Branch (FUNDAMENTALS)

Labour Migration Branch (MIGRANT)

International Labour Organization (ILO)

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Cover photo: First group of fairly-recruited garment workers from Nepal, Workers' Centre, Al Hassan industrial zone, Jordan, March 2017
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ACRONYMS

BWJ	Better Work Jordan
CAT	Compliance Assessment Tool
CRW	Conventionally Recruited Worker
FRW	Fairly Recruited Worker
FSI	FSI Worldwide
ILO	International Labour Organization
JD	Jordanian Dinar
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
NPR	Nepalese Rupee
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
SEM	Simultaneous Equation Modeling
USD	United States Dollars

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ILO conducted a fair recruitment pilot for migrants in the apparel sector moving through the Nepal-Jordan corridor during the period 2017-2018. An impact evaluation was conducted to assess the feasibility of fair recruitment, theories of fair recruitment, the role of screening and fair recruitment in mitigating contract deception and debt bondage, the role of screening in improving a match between migrants and their jobs and the impact of fair recruitment on migrants and factories.

Five apparel factories in Jordan agreed to participate in the study. Four received fairly recruited workers and a fifth served as a control.

A regression discontinuity approach was employed as an identification strategy. Prior to April 2017, migrants arriving in Jordan were recruited using conventional practices. Beginning in April 2017, the four participating factories began receiving fairly recruited migrants. The sample, then, consisted of a control group of conventionally recruited migrants arriving January to March 2017 and the treatment group consisted of fairly recruited migrants arriving between April 2017 and August 2018.

Fairly recruited migrants reported learning about actual pay and hours earlier in the migration process than conventionally recruited migrants. Migrants recruited through the Fair Recruitment Programme also reported paying NPR 1,534 (USD 13.52) less than conventionally recruited migrants for migration related fees and had less migration related debt. The probability of having migration related debt is 14 percentage points lower for fair programme participating migrants. Fairly recruited migrants also paid 11,301 NPR (USD 99.59) less toward their debt each month as compared to conventionally recruited migrants.

Fairly recruited migrants had a better understanding of their contract upon arrival in Jordan, an effect that cures over time. Fairly recruited migrants were more likely to report that their contract was in a language they understand and also more likely to report that they understood the terms of their contract. At the baseline, conventionally recruited workers reported a range of contract understanding (9.9 per cent not at all, 31.5 per cent slightly, 24.1 per cent somewhat and 34.6 per cent very well), indicating significant limits on contract understanding under conventional recruitment practices. The fair recruitment treatment effect on contract understanding is 0.6 on a four-point scale. By the endline, fairly recruited migrants indicated a very high level of contract understanding, with 81 percent reporting that they understood their contract very well, in comparison to only 51.5 percent of conventionally recruited migrants.

Fairly recruited workers were also more likely to report that they learned of actual pay and hours before making the decision to migrate (49.2 per cent). Only 11.5 percent of fairly recruited migrants reported that they learned of actual pay and hours after arriving in Jordan. In comparison, 34.9 percent of conventionally recruited migrants learned of pay and hours prior to making the decision to migrate while 38.4 percent learned after arrival in Jordan. The treatment effect of fair recruitment is 0.375 on a three-point scale.

Simultaneous equation estimation was used to test the theory of change. Programme emphasis on training migrants on the terms of their contract before the migration decision and eliminating migration fees were central to the programme's impact on worker voice, working conditions, worker well-being and key business indicators.

Contract understanding increased workers' comfort seeking help from their supervisor and confidence voicing opinions at work. Contract understanding also reduced feelings of being troubled and increased life satisfaction and working conditions satisfaction.

In contrast, migrants who reported contract deception were more likely to report a lack of control over stressful events and lack a belief that they can change their life by changing their behavior. Migrants who reported contract deception also reported more days late, more days absent and more frequent thoughts of quitting.

The pronounced treatment effect of contract understanding and contract deception point to an important aspect of fair recruitment. Several key stakeholders focus on the payment of recruitment fees as the most important aspect of fair recruitment and, secondarily, whether migrants control their official documents and whether the contract is written in a language the migrant understands. However, pre-departure training on the specific elements of the contract and providing information prior to the decision to migrate are also critical aspects of fair recruitment.

Recruitment fees were associated with a lack of clarity around pay, dehumanization, workplace abuse and migration regret. Recruitment fees had the theoretically predicted effect of reduced days late and reduced thoughts of quitting. However, migrants who felt trapped by recruitment fees and migration related debt were less productive and more likely to be absent from work.

Fair recruitment and pre-departure training selected for characteristics that increase the probability of reaching the production target. Some traits increased days absent and thoughts of quitting and others reduced those indicators.

Fairly recruited migrants reported greater comfort seeking help from their supervisors, fewer conflicts with supervisors and less sexual harassment. Reducing a hostile work environment increased the probability of reaching the production target and reduced days late and thoughts of quitting.

The impact evaluation provided substantial evidence of the benefits of fair recruitment to prospective migrants and employers. However, the fair recruiter lacked capacity to meet the demand for fairly recruited migrants generated by the programme. Contrary to expectations, participating factories resorted to conventional recruiters during the fair recruitment phase of the pilot in order to meet their workforce needs.

Further, the evaluation showed that harsh conditions at work may erode some of the benefits from eliminating recruitment fees, providing pre-departure training, and screening by the fair recruiter.

1. INTRODUCTION

The ILO conducted a fair recruitment pilot for migrants in the apparel sector moving through the Nepal-Jordan corridor during the period of 2017-2018. An impact evaluation was conducted to assess the feasibility of fair recruitment, theories of fair recruitment, the role of screening and fair recruitment in mitigating contract deception and debt bondage, the role of screening in improving a match between migrants and their jobs and the impact of fair recruitment on migrants and factories.

Human trafficking encompasses a broad range of physical, financial and psychological behaviors. In its most extreme form, trafficked workers may be forced to migrate against their will and prevented from returning home. The actual movement of migrants at work may be physically constrained or migrants may be limited in their ability to return home because they lack control of their official documents, such as their passport or residency and work permits. More commonly, migrants may incur debt in the course of migration or lack the funds necessary to return home, affecting their belief that returning home is an option. And, of course, there are a range of psychological mechanisms that may affect a migrant's beliefs about the feasibility of returning home. In particular, sunk cost fallacy may be at work. Migration-related debt may lead a migrant to ignore migration regret. Similarly, migrants may not learn of actual working conditions until after the migration decision has been made. The sunk cost fallacy or debt incurred during migration may, again, cause a migrant to ignore migration regret.

In the case of the Jordanian apparel sector, migrants are most commonly constrained by migration-related debt, control of official documents, contract deception and the cost of returning home. It is common practice for migrants in the Jordan apparel sector to sign a three-year contract. Evidence presented below indicates that conventionally recruited workers often do not fully understand the terms of their contract before making the decision to migrate. Even in the presence of migration-regret, they may not be able to return home until they accumulate adequate savings to cover the cost of a return ticket or earn work credit toward a return ticket.

Fair recruitment, as defined by the project, focused on the elimination of recruitment fees and fully informing prospective migrants of the aspects of the job for which they are migrating. The fair recruiter also screened prospective migrants for traits that might improve the match between a migrant and their employer.

Prospective migrants were first identified by the recruiter in their villages. During the recruitment process, migrants were clearly informed that they will not be paying recruitment fees. Applicants participated in a month-long pre-departure programme in Kathmandu. The programme included skills training, as well as training topics such as how pay is calculated, understanding the terms of their contract and understanding conditions of work in Jordan.

Five apparel factories in Jordan agreed to participate in the study. Four received fairly recruited workers and a fifth served as a control. The fair recruiter was FSI Worldwide Nepal.

A regression discontinuity approach was employed as a strategy to identify the treatment effect of fair recruitment. Prior to April 2017, migrants arriving in Jordan were recruited using conventional practices. Beginning in April 2017, the four participating factories began receiving fairly recruited migrants. The sample, then, consisted of a control group of conventionally recruited migrants arriving January to March 2017 and a treatment group consisting of fairly recruited migrants arriving between April 2017 and August 2018.

The study began with 134 prospective fairly recruited migrants who arrived in Kathmandu. Of the original group, 115 completed the programme and prepared to leave for Amman. Once in Amman, 81 fairly recruited migrants participated in two rounds of data collection; the first upon arrival and the second up to one year after arrival. The control group consisted of 190 conventionally recruited migrants.

The methodology of the study, including the theory of change and an assessment of internal and external validity, is presented in Section II. Findings reported in Section III test for the theory of change based on survey data. Conclusions and recommendations follow in Section IV.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 The theory of change

The theory of change for the Fair Recruitment Programme begins with a belief that factories are highly motivated by the expectations of their main customers. Thus, international buyers convey to their supplier factories the importance of fair recruitment. Responding to expectations of international buyers, factory managers then create a demand for migrants recruited using fair techniques.

Fair techniques include eliminating migration related fees and debt bondage, teaching workers about the terms of their contract thereby eliminating contract deception, informing prospective migrants about working conditions prior to the decision to migrate, ensuring migrants have control of their official documents and screening prospective migrants to match migrant skills with jobs.


The theory of change then posits that fairly recruited migrants will make better informed migration decisions that reduce migration regret, have better mental and physical health, have a greater sense of agency that allows them to advocate on their own behalf in the factory and a greater belief that they can return home when they want to.

Employers are positively impacted in part because they have responded to expectations of their main customers. Firms may also benefit if employees are more productive due to improved mental and physical health, improved match between skills and jobs and improved communication and problem solving within the factory.

A simplified version of the theory of change is presented in Figure 1. The main input is the use of fair recruitment procedures. Fair recruitment outputs involve eliminating migration related fees and debt, training migrants on the terms of their contract and sensitizing migrants to the challenges of migration and rigors of factory work.

According to the theory of change, migrants who do not have debt and do have a better understanding of the contract, pay and hours will also have a greater ability voice their opinions at work and act to improve their work and life outcomes. This greater sense of agency is then expected to result in improved mental health and a wider locus of control. Mental health can be measured narrowly by fewer episodes of sadness and depression or more broadly in terms of possessing positive personality traits. Outcomes, then, include increased confidence in voicing opinions at work and associated improvements in mental health. Ultimate impacts include reduced trafficking and better firm performance.


Figure 1: The theory of change



The logic model is a visual representation of the theory of change. Another way to conceptualize the logic model is as a quasi-lower triangular system of simultaneous equations. Such a system can be empirically analyzed using simultaneous equation modeling (SEM). Greater detail on understanding SEM is provided in Annex 1.

2.2 Data collection

In order to test the theory of change, data was collected from seven sources. The timeline of the data collection is presented in Figure 2.



- **FAIRLY RECRUITED MIGRANTS** were surveyed when first arriving in Kathmandu prior to any training, just before departing from Kathmandu for Amman, upon arrival in Amman and up to one year after beginning work in Jordan.
- **A SELECTION OF FAIRLY RECRUITED MIGRANTS** were also interviewed on their migration experience at each of the four points in the study.
- **CONVENTIONALLY RECRUITED MIGRANTS** were surveyed when first arriving in Amman and one year after beginning work in Jordan.
- **A SELECTION OF CONVENTIONALLY RECRUITED MIGRANTS** were also interviewed on their migration experience at each of the two points in the study.
- **MANAGERS IN THE PARTICIPATING FACTORIES** were interviewed before the programme started and after one year of experience with fair recruitment.
- **INTERNATIONAL BUYERS** sourcing from Jordanian firms were interviewed at the time of the beginning of the programme and after one year of experience with fair recruitment.
- **BETTER WORK JORDAN** assessment data was used to measure the impact of fair recruitment on the industry overall.

Using data from worker surveys, the analysis is able to assign discrete variables to each of these outputs and outcomes and to mathematically measure their impact. For example, one key element of the Fair Recruitment Programme is the training prior to departure which helps workers better understand their contract, manage their expectations of work in Jordan and ensure they are well informed of their rights and responsibilities. The survey given to workers measures directly how well they understand their contract. This output of the Fair Recruitment Programme is predicted to lead to outcomes such as wider

locus of control, improved mental health, etc. The survey again discretely measures these outputs through questions about depression, stress, anxiety, sense of control in their lives, etc. By mapping the logic model directly to the dataset, we are able to produce estimates of complex relationships between these multiple variables. The SEM analysis focuses specifically on the measurable aspects of the logic model, namely how treatment affects outcomes and impacts.

The findings presented below identify the causal linkages identified by the statistical analysis. A complete set of results is available in Annex 3.

2.3 Internal validity

After the baseline, power analysis was conducted to determine whether the originally anticipated sample size of 200 treatment and 200 control participants was adequate to detect a treatment effect. We found that, with the exception of a treatment effect on pay, a sample size of 400 was sufficient to detect treatment effect across the variables of interest. Further, interviews of key informants were included in order to substantiate the interpretation of findings from the survey data.

However, the sample of fairly recruited migrants was smaller than originally planned. Therefore, in the case of some null findings, a treatment effect might emerge with a larger sample size. Though it is worth noting at this point that the analysis identified many significant findings even with the smaller than anticipated sample size. Further, additional worker interviews were conducted at the endline to corroborate the statistical analysis.

2.4 External validity

An important question, of course, is whether findings from the pilot can be generalized to all factories in Jordan or to factories outside of Jordan. The factories selected for the pilot are industry leaders. Each started in a different place, with some older and more established and others younger, some with a history of severe compliance violations and others with a history of humane treatment of their workers, etc. Further, the pilot factories differ in terms of the demands of their most important customers.

However, as of the start of the pilot, all of the treatment factories had achieved a record of compliance on human trafficking, understood the importance of protecting the reputation of Jordan as being compliant on human trafficking and saw their role as promoting compliant practices throughout the sector. The pilot factories appear, at least, to accept the basic principles of fair recruitment.

It is possible that the treatment effect measured in this study under-estimates a general treatment effect. As a consequence of previously achieving a record of compliance, it is possible that the pilot factories had already addressed many of the issues associated with human trafficking at the time that the pilot began. In such a case, we could observe very little treatment effect, not because the treatment is ineffective, but because many of the issues had already been addressed in the study factories. Indeed, most of the pilot factories argued along these lines.

Alternatively, it is possible that the study over-estimates a general treatment effect as it might apply to a wider population of factories. Study factories had already bought into the importance of addressing human trafficking and were, therefore, more receptive to treatment.

As discussed above, we detect a strong treatment effect despite the small sample, providing evidence that even the best factories can benefit from a fair recruitment intervention. It remains to be determined whether factories resistant to compliance would be similarly affected.

Importantly, it should be noted that some of the treatment effects of fair recruitment are measured before the migrants leave Kathmandu or even make a decision whether to migrate. The treatment effect for indicators measured pre-departure are robust to variations in the receiving factories.

3. KEY FINDINGS

Two forms of quantitative analysis were conducted. We first test for reduced form treatment effects on the output, outcome and impact variables. We then test the theory of change using simultaneous equation estimation. In both cases, regression equations are controlled for individual worker characteristics and factory fixed effects.

The findings from qualitative interviews with employers and workers were used to triangulate survey data and to guide the selection of questions in the analytical process when testing elements of the theory of change. The comparison between baseline and endline data was used to understand the duration of treatment effects.

A complete set of reduced form empirical results are presented in Annex 2 and the SEM findings are reported in Annex 3. A summary of findings is presented below.

3.1 Baseline and endline survey data

3.1.1 Personality traits

Analysis of the baseline indicates that either as a result of screening or as a result of pre-departure training, fairly recruited migrants exhibited more positive personality traits than conventionally recruited workers. At the baseline, fairly recruited migrants were more likely to feel proud of their work (Table A2-1; $\beta=0.247$ on 5-point scale), to feel comfortable seeking help from their supervisor (Table A2-1; $\beta=0.184$ on 5-point scale), to believe that they have a wide locus of control (Table A2-1; $\beta=0.218$ on 5-point scale), to see themselves as a planner (Table A2-3; $\beta=0.274$ on 5-point scale) and to see themselves as emotionally stable (Table A2-3; $\beta=0.238$ on 5-point scale). Fairly recruited migrants were also less likely to worry about finishing all of their work (Table A2-1; $\beta=-0.248$ on 5-point scale) and less likely to see themselves as someone who is helpless when bad things happen (Table A2-2; $\beta=-0.485$ on 5-point scale).

However, only one of these treatment differences in traits persisted to the endline. At the endline, fairly recruited migrants were more likely to feel pride in their work (Table A2-1; $\beta=0.514$ on 5-point scale). Three additional characteristic differences emerged at the endline. At the endline, fairly recruited workers were more likely to report seeing themselves as curious (Table A2-2; $\beta=0.190$ on 5-point scale) and trusting (Table A2-2; $\beta=0.114$ on 5-point scale) but less likely to see themselves as emotionally stable (Table A2-3; $\beta=-0.208$ on 5-point scale).

Changes in personality traits while working also have consequences for mental health. Fairly recruited migrants have higher life satisfaction upon arrival (Table A2-15; $\beta=0.473$ on 5-point scale), but the treatment effect disappears at the endline.

According to the theory of change, fair recruitment practices may help migrants weather the transition to work and help them advocate for themselves and protect them from dehumanizing treatment. It is also possible, however, that treatment at work undoes some of the beneficial effects of fair recruitment.

Among indicators of dehumanization, fairly recruited migrants are less likely to have conflicts with their supervisors and managers upon arrival (Table A2-7; $\beta=-0.371$ on 5-point scale).

3.1.2 Contract deception and debt bondage

Protections against contract deception and debt bondage are more robust. Fairly recruited migrants reported learning about actual pay and hours earlier in the migration process than conventionally recruited migrants. Fairly recruited migrants also reported paying NPR 1,534 (USD 13.52) (Table A2-4) less than conventionally recruited migrants and have less migration related debt. The probability of having migration related debt is 14 percentage points lower for fairly recruited migrants (Table A2-4), and they pay less toward debt each pay period. Fairly recruited migrants also pay 11,201 NPR (USD 99.59) less toward their debt each month as compared to conventionally recruited migrants.

Fairly recruited migrants also have a better understanding of their contract at the baseline, an effect that cures over time. Fairly recruited migrants are more likely to report that their contract is in a language they understand and are also more likely to report that they understand the terms of their contract (Table A2-6; $\beta=0.589$ on 5-point scale).

Findings related to contract understanding point to another important aspect of fair recruitment. Several key stakeholders focus on the payment of recruitment fees as the most important aspect of fair recruitment and, secondarily, whether migrants control their official documents and whether the contract is written in a language the migrant understands. However, pre-departure training on the specific elements of the contract and providing information prior to the decision to migrate are also critical aspects of fair recruitment.

3.1.3 Pay and hours

One expectation of fair recruitment is that fairly recruited workers would have a better match between their abilities and their job and have better mental health. Both factors would contribute to higher productivity. Further, fairly recruited workers would be better able to advocate on their own behalf. Both factors might contribute to a treatment effect on pay.

However, upon arrival, fairly recruited workers earned 41.7 USD less per week than conventionally recruited workers (controlling for days worked) (Table A2-8). Fairly recruited workers also report working 1.225 fewer days per week at the baseline, but the difference disappears by the endline (Table A2-8). Fairly recruited workers also desire fewer days of overtime, -1.496 days per week, (Table A2-9) and are more likely to report concern with overtime upon arrival (Table A2-10; $\beta=0.173$ on 5-point scale).

The findings on weekly pay are contrary to expectations since fairly recruited migrants should have a better understanding of pay and hours. There are several possible explanations for this surprising result. Possibly, fairly recruited workers may simply be more willing to articulate their true experiences. It is also possible that fairly recruited migrants have been at the factory a shorter period of time, though it should be noted that the equations are controlled for work experience.

3.1.4 Working conditions and harsh treatment

Fairly recruited and conventionally recruited workers report equal amounts of verbal abuse, but fairly recruited workers report less physical abuse (Table A2-11; $\beta=-0.183$ on 5-point scale).

Fairly recruited workers were less likely to be sexually harassed. They are less likely to believe that there will be serious adverse consequences for reporting harassment (Table A2-12; $\beta=-0.801$ on 5-point scale) and less likely to report that they have been sexually harassed (Table A2-12; $\beta=-0.270$ on 5-point scale).

3.1.5 Productivity

One theory of fair recruitment is that fairly recruited workers are more productive. Productivity gains would arise due to more careful screening, better mental health and a better understanding of the link between pay and effort.

Fairly recruited migrants are more likely to be in the job for which they were recruited (Table A2-16; $\beta=0.189$ on 5-point scale), less likely to be absent upon arrival (Table A2-14; $\beta=-0.367$ on 5-point scale) and less likely to be late upon arrival (Table A2-14; $\beta=-0.0963$ on 5-point scale).

Fairly recruited migrants are less likely to be sick at the endline (Table A2-15; $\beta=-0.179$ on 5-point scale), less likely to be injured upon arrival and less likely to report feeling stressed, tense, restless, nervous or unable to sleep at the endline (Table A2-15; $\beta=-0.220$ on 5-point scale).

In terms of productivity, upon arrival, fairly recruited workers were actually less likely to reach their target and less likely to receive a production bonus than conventional recruits. Fairly recruited workers are also less likely to be injured at the baseline (Table A2-15; $\beta=-0.136$ on 5-point scale).

3.2 Testing the theory of change

We now turn to test the theory of change. As discussed above, the log frame can be thought of as a recursive system of equations which can be tested using simultaneous equation estimation. Each of the main programme transmission mechanisms is considered below.

3.2.1 Understanding the contract

Understanding the contract is a central piece of pre-departure training. We will look at several channels through which contract understanding impacts migrants and factories.


Worker voice

Prior to the fair recruitment pilot, considerable attention was paid to ensuring that a worker's contract is in a language they can understand. However, fair recruitment focuses on helping prospective migrants actually understand the terms of the contract. Among the many benefits of understanding the contract is that migrants may feel that they can voice their opinions at work.

SEM analysis is used to test the contribution of fair recruitment through understanding the contract to worker voice. Communication is measured by whether the contract is in a language the migrant understands and whether they understand their contract. Voice is measured by how comfortable a migrant is in seeking help from the supervisor, their comfort in making a complaint or suggestion and their confidence in voicing their opinion at work.

Results of the SEM are depicted in Figure 3. Note first that there is a positive relationship between contract language and contract understanding. Contract understanding is then associated with all three of the voicing items.

Figure 3: Effect of fair recruitment and better contract understanding on worker voice



Notes: Statistical analysis is reported in Table A3-1. Blue arrows indicate statistically significant theoretically predicted outcomes and impacts driven by treatment. The green arrow indicates theoretically predicted channels that are not driven by treatment. Fairly recruited workers are more likely to understand their contract. Contract understanding increases comfort seeking help from their supervisor, comfort making a complaint or suggestion and comfort voicing opinions at work.


However, fairly and conventionally recruited migrants do not differ in terms of the contract language (as indicated by the green arrow). The treatment distinction is in whether they understand their contract (as indicated by the bold blue arrow). The investments that the fair recruitment pilot made in helping migrants actually understand the terms of their contract is the key driver to migrant voice.

Worker well-being

We then test whether contract understanding has further downstream impacts on migrant job and life satisfaction and mental health. Four impact indicators were tested: job satisfaction, life satisfaction, working conditions satisfaction and pride at work. Three items measure mental health. These are depression, feeling troubled and feeling homesick. The SEM results are depicted in Figure 4. As for Figure 3, blue arrows indicate outcomes that are consistent with the theory of change that are driven by treatment. Green arrows indicate channels that are consistent with the theory of change that are not driven by treatment.

As above, contract language increased contract understanding. However, treatment directly affects contract understanding, not contract language. Contract understanding is then positively associated with life satisfaction and working conditions satisfaction and negatively associated with feeling troubled. We do not detect a link to job satisfaction, pride at work, depression or feeling homesick.

Figure 4: Effect of fair recruitment and better contract understanding on worker well-being




Notes: Statistical analysis is reported in Tables A3-2 and A3-3. Blue arrows indicate statistically significant theoretically predicted outcomes and impacts driven by treatment. The green arrow indicates theoretically predicted channels that are not driven by treatment. Contract understanding reduces feelings of being troubled and increases life satisfaction and working conditions satisfaction. No statistically significant effect is detected linking contract understanding to depression, homesickness, job satisfaction or pride at work.

3.2.2 Contract deception

One strategy commonly employed by human traffickers is to manipulate migrants by controlling information. For example, during the recruitment process workers may be provided information about pay and hours. Additional detail may not be provided until the migrant arrives at the airport to depart for Jordan. At this point, the sunk cost fallacy may prevent them from reversing their decision based on the new information. In the key informant interviews, it was learned that migrants often do not learn that the pay they have been promised can only be earned with overtime or if they reach their production target. More information may be revealed when the migrant actually begins work. This is the point at which they learn about verbal abuse, dusty and polluted air, etc.

The earlier prospective migrants learn about actual pay, hours and working conditions, the more likely they are to be able to make an informed decision about migration. Factories may also be adversely affected when information is delayed. Factories and recruiters may believe that withholding information about actual conditions of work increases the extraction of rents from the migrant. However, if a migrant has been deceived into migrating, there may be adverse productivity effects.

We first test whether contract deception in the form of learning about pay and hours later in the migration process affects the locus of control or the perception on the part of a migrant that they can control events around them. Locus of control is measured by whether a migrant feels that they can control stressful events in their life, change their life by changing their behavior and lack control over important things in their life. We then explore how the timely learning about actual working conditions affects days late, absenteeism and thoughts of quitting. Results are depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Investment in explaining the terms of the contract**expands the benefits of fair recruitment**

Notes: Statistical analysis is reported in Table A3-4, A3-10, A3-11 and A3-13. Yellow and red arrows indicate statistically significant theoretically predicted impacts and outcomes. Fair recruitment reduces contract deception. Workers who report contract deception are also more likely to report a lack of control over stressful events and lack a belief that they can change their life by changing their behavior. Migrants who report contract deception also report more days late, more days absent and more frequent thoughts of quitting. Contract deception is not the only mediator of treatment effect. Fair recruitment affects the ability to control stress, a feeling that the migrant lacks control over important things in their life, days late and thoughts of quitting, independent of its impact on contract deception.

Note first that fairly recruited migrants experience less contract deception than conventionally recruited migrants in that they learn about actual pay and hours earlier in the migration process. Contract deception, in turn, has an adverse effect on locus of control. The later a migrant learns about actual pay and hours, the less likely they are to believe that they can control stressful events in the life and less likely to believe that they can control their life by changing their behavior.

Fair recruitment has an independent effect on locus of control that does not work through contract deception. There are direct causal arrows from fair recruitment to a migrant's belief that they can change their life by changing their behavior and a belief that they lack control over important things in their life.

Contract deception also has negative effects on the firm. The later a migrant learns about actual pay and hours, the more likely they are to be late or absent from work and to spend more time thinking about quitting. As with locus of control, fair recruitment has a treatment effect on key performance indicators beyond its impact through contract deception. There is also a direct link from fair recruitment to days late and thoughts of quitting.

3.2.3 Recruitment fees

Payment of recruitment fees has a wide array of consequences for migrants and firms. Detected effects are depicted in Figure 6. Note first that there is a treatment effect from fair recruitment to recruitment fees. Fair recruitment reduced payment for a contract by NPR 1,534 (USD 13.19), on average, though it should be noted that there is wide variance on recruitment fees. Some conventionally recruited migrants report paying as much as NPR 85,000 (USD 731.12). By comparison, the highest reported fee by a migrant recruited through the Fair Recruitment Programme is NPR 20,000 (USD 174.04).

Figure 6: Paying recruitment fees**is associated with**

Notes: Statistical analysis is reported in Tables A3-5, A3-6, A3-7, A3-9, A3-11 and A3-13. Fees are associated with lack of clarity around pay, dehumanization, abuse, migration regret, lower productivity and more days absent. Benefits to the factory of recruitment fees are limited to their contribution to rent extraction, reduced days late and reduced thoughts of quitting.

Turning to outcomes and impacts, consider the consequences of recruitment fees on migrants. Fees are associated with dehumanization. The larger the fee the more likely a migrant is to feel angry and frustrated or small and unimportant after interacting with supervisors. Their mental health is also poorer. The larger the recruitment fees the more often a migrant reports feeling troubled. Fees are also associated with more abusive working conditions. Migrants paying fees report less satisfaction with working conditions and more frequent thirst, verbal abuse and sexual harassment.

Recruitment fees have negative effects for factories, as well. Migrants who pay fees do have fewer late days and fewer thoughts of quitting, but they are less likely to reach their production target. Migrants who pay fees also report a poorer match between their job skills and the job for which they were recruited.

A failure to reach the target is often connected to perceptions of pay. Migrants who pay fees are less likely to trust the factory to pay all the money they are owed and less likely to perceive a link between how hard they work and how much they are paid. Missing the link between effort and pay is one of the critical causes of low productivity.

Finally, the payment of fees is associated with greater migration regret and a desire to return home. The theory of change predicts such an outcome. Migrants who pay fees suffer from a sunk cost fallacy. Once the fees are paid, migrants often feel uncomfortable reversing their decision to migrate even if they realize migrating is not the decision they actually want.

3.2.4 Screening and firm performance


Traits screened for by the fair recruiter produced more productive workers. Findings are depicted in Figure 7.

Fairly recruited workers were more likely to feel proud of their work, less likely to see themselves as helpless, more likely to be curious, more likely to be emotionally stable and more likely to be comfortable seeking help from their supervisors. These traits are all associated with being more likely to reach the production target.

A second set of traits that are screened for identifies migrants who are less likely to be late for work. Fairly recruited workers who are less likely to worry about finishing their work and less likely to see themselves as helpless are also less likely to be late for work.

Interestingly, there are two characteristics selected that are associated with being more likely to be late to work. These are believing that they can change their life by changing their behavior and perceiving themselves as emotionally stable. Perhaps these migrants may have a greater sense of empowerment that leads them to choose to be late for work when the circumstances are such that being late is entirely appropriate.


A third set of traits reduces the likelihood that a migrant will want to quit and return home. Fairly recruited migrants are more likely to feel proud of their work, less likely to worry about finishing their work, less likely to see themselves as helpless and more likely to be trusting. With the exception of being trusting, all of these personality traits are, in turn, associated with reduced thoughts of quitting.



Notes: Statistical analysis is reported in Tables A3-8, A3-9, A3-10 and A3-12. Green arrows indicate statistically significant theoretically predicted outcomes and impacts. Yellow arrows indicate statistically significant outcomes and impacts contrary to the theory of change. Fair recruitment and pre-departure training select for characteristics that increase the probability of reaching the production target. Some traits increase days absent and thoughts of quitting and others reduce those KPIs.

3.2.5 Improving the factory environment

A final important treatment channel concerns the impact of fair recruitment on factory organization and implications for firm performance. Fairly recruited workers are more comfortable seeking help from their supervisors, less likely to find themselves in conflict with their supervisors and less likely to be sexually harassed. Making the work environment less hostile has positive benefits for factories. In particular, reducing sexual harassment also reduces the number of late days and thoughts about quitting. Reducing conflict with supervisors increases the probability of reaching the production target, reduces days late and reduces the frequency of thoughts of quitting. These effects are depicted in Figure 8.



Notes: Statistical analysis is reported in Tables A3-9, A3-11, and A3-13. Blue arrows indicate statistically significant theoretically predicted outcomes and impacts. Fairly recruited migrants report greater comfort seeking help from their supervisors, fewer conflicts with supervisors and less sexual harassment. Reducing the hostile work environment increases the probability of reaching the production target and reduces days late and thoughts of quitting.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The impact evaluation confirms that a programme of fair recruitment that includes screening, the elimination of recruitment fees and pre-departure training on pay, hours and working conditions is feasible and produces better outcomes for workers and, potentially, for factories than conventional practices.

While commonly emphasized in the human trafficking literature, control of official documents is not a significant factor for Jordan. All interviewed migrants had control of their official documents unless documents were taken for the purpose of securing work and residency permits.

However, the elimination of recruitment fees contributed significantly to the improved outcomes for migrants, indicating that recruitment fees in and of themselves are a factor whether or not they contribute to debt. Fees may contribute to a sunk cost fallacy. Once fees are paid, migrants may feel that they must migrate because of the financial investment made.

Pay deception is also significant for worker wellbeing. In global labour markets, factories who control access to jobs have significant leverage over prospective employees. Recruitment fees are one mechanism for exploiting that power and extracting rents from workers.

SEM analysis confirmed the main elements of the theory of change. Fair recruitment improved contract understanding, reduced contract deception, reduced recruitment fees and screened for the qualities in migrants that improve firm performance. These elements of fair recruitment proved to have an array of positive benefits for migrants and these benefits translated into improved firm performance as measured by reaching the production target, days absent, days late and thoughts of quitting.

The impact evaluation also has some important lessons for improving worker wellbeing. Interestingly, exploitive behaviors such as harvesting recruitment fees and deceiving workers about the contract are associated with poorer firm performance across many dimensions. Migrants who do not pay fees and understand the terms of their contract before making the decision to migrate are more likely to reach the production target and less likely to be late to work or think about quitting. Further, the screening conducted by the fair recruiter increased the probability that a migrant would have the traits associated with higher productivity and reduced thoughts of quitting.

There is also some evidence that fair recruitment developed resilience in migrants and actually had a positive impact on the overall work environment. Fairly recruited workers are more able to voice complaints or suggestions, less likely to engage in conflict and less likely to be sexually harassed. It is important to note that willingness to voice, reduced conflict and reduced sexual harassment are, in turn, associated with reduced late-coming and thoughts of quitting and increased productivity.

Key stakeholders concerned about human trafficking often focus on recruitment fees, official document control and ensuring that the contract is in a language the migrant can understand. The impact evaluation confirms the importance of recruitment fees. However, controlling contract deception requires that recruiters go beyond simply making sure that the contract is in the migrant's native language. Pre-departure training that carefully instructs prospective migrants on how to calculate pay and hours and ensures that prospective migrants are learning this information before making the decision whether to migrate is critical to controlling human trafficking.

Controlling human trafficking starts with fair recruitment. The impact evaluation showed however that the benefits of fair recruitment were offset by the ongoing harsh conditions of work in the apparel factory in Jordan. Improving social compliance particularly as it relates to verbal abuse, excess hours and target setting might reduce migration regret.

The central finding of the impact evaluation is that the pilot design identified and remediated the main weaknesses related to recruitment and initiated a move in the apparel industry in Jordan to adopt fair recruitment practices. That is, the pilot was successful in developing a demand for fair recruiters.

The reach of the programme was greatly limited by the lack of capacity of the fair recruiter to achieve scale. Greatly increasing capacity of fair recruiters should be a focus of the next stage of implementation.

ANNEXES


Annex 1: Understanding Simultaneous Equation Modeling (SEM)

Simultaneous Equation Modeling (SEM)¹ is an econometric technique which allows for complex estimation of multiple variables and the relationships between them. In standard regression analysis, we look at the impact of one variable of interest on the outcome variable (including demographics). For example, “Does understanding of contract impact job satisfaction?”

In SEM, we measure the impact of multiple variables on one another as a system. “Does the contract language impact contract understanding? Does this contract understanding in turn impact job satisfaction, and ability to speak up at work?” In this way, we measure the full impact of training through multiple output and outcome variables and gain a holistic view of whether the theory of change is validated in the data. Output variables are those variables which are directly affected by the training, but which are not the ultimate outcome of interest. For example, an output variable might be a worker’s understanding of how their pay is calculated. This is directly impacted by the fair recruitment training but is not the final outcome of interest. Ultimately, we would like to understand whether workers experience greater overall well-being, satisfaction, etc., as a result of the output variables impacted by training.

This survey asks questions which specifically measure the output variables identified by the logic model. Output variables are essentially the drivers in the theory of change which are directly altered by the Fair Recruitment Programme and which ultimately impact worker well-being. Debt, contract deception, abusive treatment, and deceptive recruitment practices are measured with specific variables in the survey. The theory of change thus translates into output variables of contract understanding, pay understanding, no debt, abusive treatment in the built environment, abusive treatment in the social environment and expectation vs reality. Each chapter of this report focuses on one specific output variable, and first tests whether the Fair Recruitment Programme has an impact on this variable for participants. For example, has the programme helped workers better understand their contracts?

Next, the chapter uses simultaneous equation models to test the underlying theory behind that variable, and whether it has a relationship with the indirect outcome variables. Does understanding of contract really have an impact on worker satisfaction? This two-stage analysis demonstrates both the programme impact on the output variables and the ultimate positive impact of these output variables on outcomes in terms of worker well-being. (For the purposes of this report, expectation vs reality is only reported in the appendix given the lack of variation in responses which made it untestable at this stage in the analysis.)



¹ Details of SEM analysis can be found at <http://gauss.stat.su.se/gu/e/slides/Time%20Series/Simultaneous%20equation%20model.pdf>.

The SEM can be represented as a visual web of variable relationships. The grey variables at the top are standard exogenous demographic controls (gender, age, education, marital status, and work experience). We include these controls to account for any variation among participants due to their gender, age, etc., though in general we are not interested in the variables themselves. The one exception is female which is of interest in exploring gender as a mediating variable in the relationship between outputs and outcomes. Gender is included in the analysis discussion where applicable.

The variables in the middle of the “web” are the output variables—these are the variables which the Fair Recruitment Programme directly changes. We are interested in these variables and especially how they impact indirect variables further down the logic model. The variables at the bottom are the ultimate outcome variables—those measures of the theory of change in which we are most interested.

The results of the SEM are presented both visually and in standard regression format. The visual representation of the SEM is the easiest to understand and maps directly to the traditional logic model format. The relationship between the variables is represented by colored arrows for ease of interpretation. A green arrow represents a positive (“good”) and statistically significant relationship, while a red arrow represents a negative (“bad”) and statistically significant relationship.

The actual numerical results of the SEM analysis are also presented as traditional regression tables. Each variable has a numerical coefficient which represents its relationship with the other variables in the model. The analysis presented here explains the regression results both in detail and more broadly.

The detailed analysis of the results focuses both on the magnitude of the coefficients (the numerical relationship between each variable) and the degree of statistical significance. The term statistical significance can often be confusing, but it is an important measure used by statisticians to understand numerical results in analysis. If a result is statistically significant it means that it is unlikely to occur randomly. Statistical significance does not indicate anything about the magnitude or positive or negative impact of the result; it simply tells us that we are confident the result is “true” and not a fluke. Statistical significance comes in various degrees, indicating our level of confidence from somewhat confident ($p < .1$) to very confident ($p < .01$).

This SEM analysis presented in this baseline report tests the following output variables:

- understanding of contract
- understanding of pay
- debt
- abusive treatment in the built environment (canteen, dorm, safety, thirst, hunger)
- and abusive treatment in the social environment (physical abuse, verbal abuse, sexual abuse, access to documents, overtime)

and how these output variables impact the more interesting outcome variables:

- voice
- agency
- work and life satisfaction
- pride
- mental health
- sense of control

Annex 2: Reduced form results

Table A2.1: Personality traits

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	D6_Proud	D6_Proud	D8_	D8_	D9_	D9_	D12_	D12_
	Arrival	Endline	Comfortable	Comfortable	Worry	Worry	Life	Life
		_Help	_Help	_Finish	_Finish	_Behavior	_Behavior	
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	0.247*	0.514*	0.184*	0.0935	-0.248***	-0.0827	0.218*	0.0266
	(0.0950)	(0.202)	(0.0861)	(0.126)	(0.0509)	(0.101)	(0.0788)	(0.113)
FEMALE	-0.437	-0.385	-0.318	0.0879	-0.163	-0.216	0.0345	0.275***
	(0.363)	(0.294)	(0.339)	(0.352)	(0.159)	(0.281)	(0.264)	(0.0369)
EDUC	0.0440	0.0548	0.148*	0.235*	0.163	0.0138	0.136*	0.180+
	(0.0360)	(0.133)	(0.0544)	(0.0937)	(0.0965)	(0.118)	(0.0617)	(0.0937)
FULLTIME	0.0117	0.0470	0.0924+	0.0572*	-0.00301	-0.0325	-0.0118	0.0570
	(0.0280)	(0.0999)	(0.0459)	(0.0247)	(0.0649)	(0.0571)	(0.0400)	(0.0454)
MARRIED	0.238*	0.304	0.228	0.0540	0.288**	0.238*	0.0152	0.0920
	(0.110)	(0.284)	(0.161)	(0.0650)	(0.0822)	(0.100)	(0.0466)	(0.130)
CONSTANT	3.682***	2.411***	3.007***	2.400***	3.062***	3.598***	3.094***	2.601***
	(0.487)	(0.310)	(0.552)	(0.323)	(0.463)	(0.660)	(0.363)	(0.384)
OBSERVATIONS	193	88	255	184	252	177	249	180
R-SQUARED	0.080	0.256	0.075	0.237	0.067	0.058	0.065	0.069

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.2: Personality traits

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	D13_Lack	D13_Lack	G2_Helpless	G2_Helpless	G4_Curious	G4_Curious	G8_Trusting	G8_Trusting
	Control	Control						
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	-0.194***	-0.00356	-0.485**	0.0423	0.119	0.190**	0.117	0.114**
	(0.0399)	(0.164)	(0.108)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.0647)	(0.129)	(0.0281)
FEMALE	-0.554	-0.0286	-0.0845	-0.662*	-0.198	-0.272	-0.126	0.220*
	(0.321)	(0.339)	(0.0687)	(0.299)	(0.208)	(0.344)	(0.193)	(0.0987)
EDUC	0.0529	0.0760+	-0.131	0.0376	0.0571**	0.0640	0.0347	0.0148
	(0.0676)	(0.0422)	(0.0851)	(0.0639)	(0.0129)	(0.155)	(0.0708)	(0.113)
FULLTIME	0.120**	0.0353	-0.0372	-0.00548	0.00520	-0.00409	0.0923+	0.000927
	(0.0321)	(0.0681)	(0.0428)	(0.0286)	(0.0585)	(0.0431)	(0.0469)	(0.0479)
MARRIED	0.0333	0.181	-0.156	-0.0249	0.105	0.221+	-0.182*	0.0633
	(0.164)	(0.128)	(0.178)	(0.128)	(0.228)	(0.119)	(0.0765)	(0.149)
CONSTANT	2.660**	2.283***	4.185***	3.771***	3.490***	3.225**	3.075***	3.060***
	(0.635)	(0.412)	(0.285)	(0.470)	(0.371)	(0.776)	(0.440)	(0.573)
OBSERVATIONS	252	178	249	180	249	180	250	179
R-SQUARED	0.065	0.057	0.062	0.079	0.050	0.060	0.039	0.037

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.3: Personality traits

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	G11_Planner Arrival	G11_Planner Endline	G13_Stable Arrival	G13_Stable Endline
TREATED	0.274*** (0.0391)	0.0537 (0.109)	0.238*** (0.0397)	-0.208* (0.0890)
FEMALE	0.130 (0.219)	0.375 (0.220)	-0.154 (0.127)	-0.00235 (0.0655)
EDUC	0.103 (0.0658)	0.0736 (0.0594)	-0.0193 (0.0861)	-0.0348 (0.0359)
FULLTIME	0.0678* (0.0291)	0.0148 (0.0638)	0.00653 (0.0294)	0.0108 (0.0443)
MARRIED	0.0538 (0.132)	0.0545 (0.121)	0.317* (0.117)	-0.107 (0.0939)
CONSTANT	2.915*** (0.362)	3.032*** (0.237)	3.443*** (0.357)	3.805*** (0.235)
OBSERVATIONS	249	179	248	180
R-SQUARED	0.065	0.060	0.078	0.051

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.4: Contract deception and debt bondage

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	L6_Learn_ Pay_Hours Arrival	L6_Learn_ Pay_Hours Endline	L12_Contract _Amount Arrival	L12_Contract _Amount Endline	L14_Still _Debt Arrival	L14_Still _Debt Endline
TREATED	-0.375*** (0.0325)	-0.115 (0.184)	-1,534** (397.6)	113.5 (738.0)	-0.140** (0.0436)	0.112 (0.0786)
FEMALE	0.0110 (0.261)	-0.0425 (0.167)	-964.8** (304.4)	2,480 (2,381)	0.0903 (0.120)	0.104 (0.0768)
EDUC	-0.0218 (0.0600)	0.0175 (0.0964)	142.0 (303.8)	240.5 (197.3)	-0.0144 (0.0408)	0.0477 (0.0397)
FULLTIME	0.0104 (0.0283)	0.0792** (0.0281)	-88.16 (165.4)	387.1 (650.3)	-0.0268 (0.0310)	0.0138 (0.0394)
MARRIED	-0.113 (0.179)	0.262 (0.181)	88.42 (665.5)	-769.1 (1,372)	0.0194 (0.0885)	0.301*** (0.0588)
CONSTANT	2.013*** (0.359)	1.781** (0.585)	2,297 (1,684)	-4,174 (4,410)	1.391** (0.303)	0.754** (0.182)
OBSERVATIONS	232	91	268	191	261	185
R-SQUARED	0.081	0.191	0.017	0.118	0.190	0.175

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.5: Contract deception and debt bondage

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	L15_Debt_Payment	L15_Debt_Payment	L17_Debt_Not_Paid_Concern	L17_Debt_Not_Paid_Concern	P3_Contract_Language	P3_Contract_Language
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	-11,301**	-96,349	0.140	1.150***	0.0454*	-0.0848+
	(3,341)	(68,251)	(0.161)	(0.229)	(0.0168)	(0.0468)
FEMALE	2,196	209,826**	0.376	-0.300	0.0106	-0.0114
	(10,183)	(45,901)	(0.218)	(0.214)	(0.0311)	(0.00693)
EDUC	1,756	16,059	-0.0461	0.278	-0.000714	0.00238+
	(2,013)	(43,153)	(0.105)	(0.236)	(0.00349)	(0.00130)
FULLTIME	147.3	-69,527**	-0.0446	-0.216	-0.00360	0.00886+
	(1,266)	(22,794)	(0.0922)	(0.141)	(0.00943)	(0.00435)
MARRIED	5,193	-178,437+	-0.203	0.234*	0.00484	0.0140+
	(6,939)	(89,885)	(0.236)	(0.0910)	(0.0319)	(0.00683)
CONSTANT	8,129	112,955	1.894**	0.600	0.948***	1.069***
	(7,634)	(282,610)	(0.429)	(1.232)	(0.0488)	(0.0454)
OBSERVATIONS	53	17	51	17	219	81
R-SQUARED	0.246	0.353	0.168	0.600	0.023	0.102

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.6: Contract deception and debt bondage

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	P4_Understand_Contract	P4_Understand_Contract	L10_Passport_Possession	L10_Passport_Possession
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	0.589**	0.530***	-1.091**	0.0508
	(0.131)	(0.0799)	(0.244)	(0.263)
FEMALE	-0.348+	0.373***	-0.367	-0.107
	(0.184)	(0.0659)	(0.296)	(0.286)
EDUC	0.133*	0.190+	0.229***	0.188**
	(0.0504)	(0.102)	(0.0360)	(0.0670)
FULLTIME	-0.0207	0.0904**	0.0596	0.0372+
	(0.0190)	(0.0273)	(0.0672)	(0.0185)
MARRIED	0.207	-0.176	-0.0283	0.0756
	(0.158)	(0.187)	(0.176)	(0.150)
CONSTANT	2.808***	2.804***	3.069***	2.954***
	(0.196)	(0.454)	(0.567)	(0.495)
OBSERVATIONS	220	83	265	191
R-SQUARED	0.154	0.274	0.295	0.076

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.7: Dehumanization

VARIABLES	(1) D2_Angry Arrival	(2) D2_Angry Endline	(3) D3_Small Arrival	(4) D3_Small Endline	(5) D4_Conflicts Arrival	(6) D4_Conflicts Endline
TREATED	-0.0406 (0.158)	-0.303 (0.288)	-0.577+ (0.305)	-0.0484 (0.332)	-0.371** (0.122)	-0.366 (0.207)
FEMALE	-0.333* (0.121)	-0.364* (0.156)	-0.326* (0.148)	-0.989** (0.351)	-0.181+ (0.0924)	-0.691*** (0.0548)
EDUC	0.0876 (0.106)	0.159* (0.0590)	0.176+ (0.0931)	-0.0593+ (0.0287)	0.103 (0.0615)	0.137+ (0.0757)
FULLTIME	-0.0647 (0.0513)	0.0756 (0.0529)	0.0519 (0.0558)	0.0686 (0.0674)	-0.0282 (0.0496)	0.117 (0.109)
MARRIED	-0.120 (0.0993)	-0.184 (0.282)	-0.00155 (0.245)	-0.263 (0.230)	-0.175** (0.0600)	-0.0801 (0.203)
CONSTANT	2.477*** (0.496)	1.458** (0.524)	2.069** (0.717)	3.350*** (0.272)	1.728*** (0.289)	1.745** (0.496)
OBSERVATIONS	198	88	197	89	199	89
R-SQUARED	0.075	0.265	0.093	0.133	0.070	0.148

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.8: Pay and hours

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Weekly_Pay_USD Arrival	Weekly_Pay_USD Endline	Days_Worked Arrival	Days_Worked Endline
TREATED	-41.70*** (6.323)	2.130 (2.520)	-1.225* (0.520)	0.0453 (0.244)
DAYS_WORKED	0.0668 (9.385)	1.021 (0.733)		
B22_DAYS_WORKED_OT	9.948 (12.32)	-0.429 (0.543)		
SEWER	-50.72 (48.20)	6.970 (22.28)		
CUTTER	-91.40 (75.05)	-0.337 (12.05)		
UNSKILLED	-22.92 (22.12)	-0.932 (6.098)		
WHITE_COLLAR	-81.57 (82.82)	15.37 (12.80)		
FEMALE	-124.0 (124.7)	4.293 (10.73)	-0.238 (0.621)	1.085 (0.715)
EDUC	10.56 (8.514)	4.825 (2.863)	0.390** (0.134)	-0.0665 (0.184)
FULLTIME	40.17 (41.88)	-1.071 (0.797)	0.0634 (0.234)	-0.173 (0.105)
MARRIED	-84.47 (88.27)	4.324 (3.356)	-0.110 (0.331)	0.0755 (0.293)
CONSTANT	64.10 (81.19)	31.27*** (5.171)	3.915** (0.967)	-0.437 (1.555)
OBSERVATIONS	191	86	258	185
R-SQUARED	0.071	0.254	0.116	0.709

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.9: Overtime, understanding pay and pay discrimination

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	B22_Days_ Worked_OT	B22_Days_ Worked_OT	B23_Days_ Worked_ Desired	B23_Days_ Worked_ Desired	C4_ Understand _Pay	C4_ Understand _Pay	C5_Pay_ Other_ Factors	C5_Pay_ Other_ Factors
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	-0.798	1.122**	-1.496**	-0.823**	0.613*	0.240	-0.398*	0.560
	(0.751)	(0.321)	(0.354)	(0.236)	(0.251)	(0.321)	(0.151)	(0.651)
FEMALE	-0.0316	-0.287	-0.387	0.228	0.200+	-0.460	0.302	0.416**
	(0.343)	(1.209)	(0.431)	(0.347)	(0.105)	(0.511)	(0.498)	(0.0995)
EDUC	-0.108	-0.0973	-0.173	-0.0380	0.133	0.00874	-0.124**	-0.0956
	(0.233)	(0.286)	(0.257)	(0.240)	(0.114)	(0.142)	(0.0436)	(0.176)
FULLTIME	0.141	-0.256	-0.0800	0.0222	-0.00781	0.0229	-0.0253	0.164**
	(0.111)	(0.146)	(0.0647)	(0.0376)	(0.0314)	(0.0962)	(0.0429)	(0.0461)
MARRIED	-0.0121	0.197	0.772	0.209	-0.0624	0.614*	0.539+	0.405+
	(0.422)	(0.503)	(0.491)	(0.737)	(0.168)	(0.268)	(0.287)	(0.216)
CONSTANT	6.085***	6.419***	7.350***	1.440	2.502**	3.565***	2.745**	0.646
	(1.113)	(0.822)	(1.230)	(1.688)	(0.578)	(0.515)	(0.729)	(1.212)
OBSERVATIONS	210	94	210	94	194	89	196	87
R-SQUARED	0.026	0.212	0.107	0.246	0.107	0.204	0.128	0.226

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.10: Working conditions

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	P16_Dorm_Safe	P16_Dorm_Safe	P19_Thirsty	P19_Thirsty	B21_Overtime_ Concern	B21_Overtime_ Concern
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	-0.167**	-0.113	0.224	-0.613***	0.173**	0.173
	(0.0497)	(0.199)	(0.180)	(0.121)	(0.0405)	(0.111)
FEMALE	-0.211	0.391	-0.314	-0.203	0.141	-0.761**
	(0.387)	(0.311)	(0.296)	(0.832)	(0.166)	(0.184)
EDUC	0.0512	-0.0757	0.235**	0.0757	0.0576	0.0161
	(0.0677)	(0.126)	(0.0804)	(0.0460)	(0.0742)	(0.0476)
FULLTIME	0.0162	-0.0508	-0.00999	0.0160	-0.0696*	-0.0330**
	(0.0392)	(0.0595)	(0.0384)	(0.145)	(0.0254)	(0.00764)
MARRIED	0.337*	-0.00412	-0.307+	-0.0443	-0.0284	-0.256+
	(0.128)	(0.383)	(0.156)	(0.328)	(0.0356)	(0.129)
CONSTANT	3.297***	2.928***	3.170***	3.693**	0.920+	4.845***
	(0.610)	(0.416)	(0.469)	(1.029)	(0.433)	(0.274)
OBSERVATIONS	235	95	234	94	209	93
R-SQUARED	0.126	0.147	0.166	0.151	0.089	0.389

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.11: Abuse at work

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	R3_Verbal_Abuse Arrival	R3_Verbal_Abuse Endline	R3_Verbal_Abuse Pool	R4_Physical_Abuse Arrival	R4_Physical_Abuse Endline	R4_Physical_Abuse Pool
TREATED	-0.0330 (0.128)	-0.0730 (0.385)	-0.0330 (0.137)	-0.312+ (0.160)	0.168 (0.516)	-0.183** (0.0845)
FEMALE	0.00738 (0.183)	-0.281 (0.353)	-0.102** (0.0433)	0.431 (0.276)	-0.244 (0.303)	0.247* (0.133)
EDUC	-0.0881+ (0.0458)	-0.0628 (0.0773)	-0.0937*** (0.0334)	-0.132** (0.0445)	-0.194+ (0.0922)	-0.181*** (0.0507)
FULLTIME	-0.0741 (0.0419)	0.00764 (0.114)	-0.0537 (0.0458)	-0.0122 (0.0580)	-0.0282 (0.0736)	-0.0213 (0.0385)
MARRIED	-0.124 (0.228)	-0.0125 (0.341)	-0.0843 (0.241)	-0.116 (0.231)	0.234*** (0.0424)	0.000467 (0.154)
ENDLINE			-0.234+ (0.152)			-0.0782 (0.179)
CONSTANT	3.728*** (0.365)	4.485*** (0.933)	3.830*** (0.230)	1.696** (0.417)	4.257*** (0.700)	2.055*** (0.239)
OBSERVATIONS	232	91	324	227	91	318
R-SQUARED	0.038	0.168		0.102	0.225	
NUMBER OF UNIQUEID			40			41

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.12: Sexual harassment

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	R2_SH_Norm	R2_SH_Norm	R2_SH_Norm	R5_Sexual_Harassment	R5_Sexual_Harassment	R5_Sexual_Harassment
	Arrival	Endline	Pool	Arrival	Endline	Pool
TREATED	0.00277 (0.249)	-0.801*** (0.0614)	-0.196 (0.161)	-0.270*** (0.0188)	0.231 (0.146)	-0.149* (0.0837)
FEMALE	0.127 (0.376)	0.821*** (0.0384)	0.310 (0.353)	0.243+ (0.133)	0.492*** (0.0411)	0.340*** (0.0980)
EDUC	-0.0420 (0.0818)	-0.214* (0.0798)	-0.0720* (0.0380)	-0.0987* (0.0424)	-0.119 (0.153)	-0.115** (0.0580)
FULLTIME	-0.0374 (0.0531)	-0.0935 (0.0854)	-0.0502+ (0.0315)	-0.00518 (0.0494)	0.0284 (0.0399)	0.00547 (0.0274)
MARRIED	0.0602 (0.187) (0.405)	0.350 (0.209) (0.196)	0.174+ (0.114) (0.277)	-0.00511 (0.0824) (0.188)	-0.118 (0.300) (0.0945)	-0.0522 (0.0484) (0.110)
ENDLINE			0.0323 (0.133)			-0.0621 (0.156)
CONSTANT	2.316** (0.676)	2.151*** (0.257)	2.332*** (0.456)	1.483*** (0.263)	0.605 (0.621)	1.367*** (0.327)
OBSERVATIONS	196	82	278	229	90	320
R-SQUARED	0.085	0.208		0.085	0.304	
NUMBER OF UNIQUEID			39			40

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.13: Productivity indicators: Reach target, efficiency rate, productivity bonus

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Reach_Target	Reach_Target	Efficiency_Rate	Efficiency_Rate	B4_Productivity_Bonus	B4_Productivity_Bonus
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	-0.119** (0.0273)	0.143* (0.0590)	-11.03 (19.43)	-26.46 (17.82)	-1.676** (0.461)	-0.573*** (0.106)
FEMALE	-0.146 (0.0915)	0.0350 (0.247)	51.14 (31.79)	9.969* (4.243)	0.341 (0.630)	-1.170*** (0.169)
EDUC	0.000453 (0.0252)	0.0413 (0.0634)	9.732 (6.936)	13.00** (4.507)	-0.00114 (0.0546)	0.00612 (0.199)
FULLTIME	0.0203 (0.0256)	0.00255 (0.0203)	4.798 (15.26)	-0.691 (2.998)	0.0894 (0.115)	0.169* (0.0713)
MARRIED	0.0966 (0.0567)	-0.0400 (0.0358)	-5.186 (17.12)	-11.79 (18.04)	0.210** (0.0527)	0.340 (0.297)
CONSTANT	1.004*** (0.143)	-0.224 (0.442)	42.82 (68.90)	103.0** (28.55)	3.132*** (0.561)	2.222** (0.573)
OBSERVATIONS	144	69	129	66	193	84
R-SQUARED	0.092	0.166	0.057	0.043	0.253	0.246

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.14: Absenteeism, late coming and separation intention

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	C8_Days_Absent	C8_Days_Absent	C9_Days_Late	C9_Days_Late	D11_Think_Quit	D11_Think_Quit
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	-0.367***	0.469	-0.0963+	-0.212*	-0.132	-0.624**
	(0.0674)	(0.413)	(0.0477)	(0.0950)	(0.127)	(0.162)
FEMALE	-0.127	-0.185	-0.0374	0.150	0.00555	-0.300
	(0.308)	(0.279)	(0.169)	(0.0932)	(0.337)	(0.549)
EDUC	-0.294**	-0.181*	-0.0849	-0.0411	0.0788+	-0.0700
	(0.0796)	(0.0776)	(0.0870)	(0.0392)	(0.0392)	(0.0692)
FULLTIME	-0.0256	-0.0545*	0.0262	-0.0123	0.0128	-0.0266
	(0.0631)	(0.0224)	(0.0296)	(0.0269)	(0.0357)	(0.0923)
MARRIED	-0.0296	0.181	0.0565	-0.0240	-0.152	-0.149
	(0.0762)	(0.231)	(0.0827)	(0.0744)	(0.238)	(0.134)
CONSTANT	2.826***	0.950	1.490**	1.180***	2.446***	3.239***
	(0.572)	(0.958)	(0.417)	(0.235)	(0.496)	(0.567)
OBSERVATIONS	193	87	196	87	189	87
R-SQUARED	0.122	0.074	0.053	0.068	0.027	0.079

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.15: Health

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	G14_Sick	G14_Sick	F6_Troubled	F6_Troubled	H3_Injured	H3_Injured	K4_Satisfied_Life	K4_Satisfied_Life
	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline	Arrival	Endline
TREATED	-0.0233	-0.179**	-0.0971	-0.220*	-0.136**	0.0494**	0.473*	-0.150
	(0.0989)	(0.0549)	(0.0906)	(0.0986)	(0.0478)	(0.0103)	(0.184)	(0.204)
FEMALE	0.00352	-0.0137	0.151	0.0810	0.528**	0.182	0.0197	0.169
	(0.153)	(0.193)	(0.254)	(0.267)	(0.165)	(0.286)	(0.295)	(0.324)
EDUC	-0.0406	-0.204	0.0637	0.151*	-0.0733+	-0.0986+	0.127**	-0.0270
	(0.0801)	(0.123)	(0.0553)	(0.0552)	(0.0395)	(0.0425)	(0.0454)	(0.123)
FULLTIME	-0.0548	0.0883**	0.00216	0.109***	-0.0340	0.107	-0.136***	-0.00405
	(0.0332)	(0.0196)	(0.0176)	(0.0199)	(0.0204)	(0.0950)	(0.0249)	(0.0639)
MARRIED	-0.206+	-0.298+	-0.0605	-0.0106	-0.0547	-0.144	0.183	0.231
	(0.104)	(0.166)	(0.141)	(0.241)	(0.0420)	(0.149)	(0.177)	(0.270)
CONSTANT	2.321***	3.379***	2.094***	1.946***	1.177***	1.404***	2.896***	3.201***
	(0.379)	(0.632)	(0.317)	(0.110)	(0.247)	(0.0938)	(0.455)	(0.307)
OBSERVATIONS	252	182	253	181	225	90	248	182
R-SQUARED	0.035	0.087	0.085	0.135	0.110	0.133	0.054	0.142

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Table A2.16: Employee quality

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	A9_Job_Recruited Arrival	A9_Job_Recruited Endline	C6_Promoted Arrival	C6_Promoted Endline	C10_Warn_Sup_Absent Arrival	C10_Warn_Sup_Absent Endline
TREATED	0.189*	-0.139	0.0115	-0.182	0.167	0.307
	(0.0878)	(0.182)	(0.132)	(0.219)	(0.224)	(0.391)
FEMALE	0.336***	0.256**	-0.361**	-0.173	0.440	-0.624
	(0.0341)	(0.0762)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.363)	(1.408)
EDUC	-0.00435	-0.0749+	-0.0355	0.0826	0.304**	0.209
	(0.0232)	(0.0367)	(0.0983)	(0.138)	(0.0751)	(0.125)
FULLTIME	0.0291	-0.00566	0.144**	-0.0378	0.0106	0.203**
	(0.0239)	(0.0440)	(0.0423)	(0.0305)	(0.0101)	(0.0730)
MARRIED	-0.0358	-0.0439	0.0530	-0.0726	0.0932	-0.342
	(0.0563)	(0.0991)	(0.135)	(0.317)	(0.215)	(0.398)
CONSTANT	0.149	0.0821	1.500**	1.300	1.448*	3.038+
	(0.112)	(0.149)	(0.441)	(0.894)	(0.643)	(1.467)
OBSERVATIONS	224	92	194	84	186	88
R-SQUARED	0.131	0.177	0.099	0.134	0.051	0.104

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Annex 3: SEM empirical results

Table A3.1: Contract understanding and voice

VARIABLES	(1) P3_Contract_ Language	(2) P4_Understand_ Contract	(3) D5_Complaint_ Report	(4) D8_Comfortable_ Help	(5) D7_Confident_ Voice
P3_CONTRACT_ LANGUAGE		1.226*** (0.347)			
P4_UNDERSTAND_ CONTRACT			0.202*** (0.0499)	0.340*** (0.0281)	0.311*** (0.0868)
TREATED	0.0129 (0.0226)	0.640*** (0.110)	-0.0841 (0.144)	0.0648 (0.0828)	0.0148 (0.0723)
AGE	0.00226 (0.00462)	-0.0855*** (0.0206)	-0.0741 (0.0559)	-0.0908*** (0.0253)	-0.00481 (0.0923)
EDUC	-0.00272 (0.00316)	0.143*** (0.0515)	0.215*** (0.0536)	0.160*** (0.0273)	0.0678 (0.0513)
FULLTIME	-0.00149 (0.00849)	-0.0166 (0.0141)	0.0262 (0.0380)	0.0825** (0.0324)	-0.0288 (0.0363)
MARRIED	0.0113 (0.0170)	0.116 (0.117)	0.217 (0.179)	0.116 (0.153)	-0.154 (0.216)
ENDLINE	0.0107 (0.00922)	0.303 (0.214)	-0.0496 (0.106)	0.243 (0.201)	0.119 (0.143)
CONSTANT	0.974*** (0.0226)	1.386*** (0.255)	1.694*** (0.160)	1.812*** (0.109)	2.427*** (0.485)
OBSERVATIONS	299	299	299	299	299

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.2: Contracts and job and life satisfaction

VARIABLES	(1) P3_Contract_ Language	(2) P4_Understand_ Contract	(3) K3_Satisfied_ _Job	(4) K4_Satisfied_ _Life	(5) K2_Satisfied_ Working_ Conditions	(6) D6_Proud
P3_CONTRACT_ LANGUAGE		1.226*** (0.295)				
P4_ UNDERSTAND_ CONTRACT			0.436 (0.737)	0.610* (0.369)	0.515*** (0.0738)	0.302 (0.252)
TREATED	0.0129 (0.0226)	0.640*** (0.109)	-0.117 (0.636)	-0.131 (0.281)	0.137 (0.191)	0.140 (0.276)
AGE	0.00226 (0.00462)	-0.0855*** (0.0205)	0.0938 (0.127)	0.109 (0.0676)	-0.0856 (0.0923)	0.00807 (0.0693)
EDUC	-0.00272 (0.00316)	0.143*** (0.0517)	-0.0887 (0.140)	-0.0655 (0.0416)	-0.228*** (0.0364)	0.00373 (0.107)
FULLTIME	-0.00149 (0.00849)	-0.0166 (0.0140)	-0.0783*** (0.0145)	-0.0847** (0.0412)	-0.0567* (0.0301)	-0.00450 (0.0341)
MARRIED	0.0113 (0.0170)	0.116 (0.116)	0.196 (0.171)	0.0853 (0.0966)	0.418*** (0.0846)	0.120 (0.147)
ENDLINE	0.0107 (0.00922)	0.303 (0.215)	-0.148 (0.265)	0.344 (0.210)	-0.107 (0.209)	-0.0356 (0.160)
CONSTANT	0.974*** (0.0226)	1.386*** (0.240)	2.269 (1.789)	1.743* (0.955)	2.723*** (0.435)	2.376*** (0.394)
OBSERVATIONS	299	299	299	299	299	299

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.3: Contract understanding and mental health

VARIABLES	(1) P3_Contract_ Language	(2) P4_Understand_ Contract	(3) F5_Depressed	(4) F6_Troubled	(5) F7_Homesick
P3_CONTRACT_ LANGUAGE		1.226*** (0.363)			
P4_UNDERSTAND_ CONTRACT			-0.117 (0.122)	-0.171*** (0.0436)	-0.197 (0.146)
TREATED	0.0129 (0.0226)	0.640*** (0.110)	0.125 (0.151)	-0.0563 (0.160)	0.224 (0.298)
AGE	0.00226 (0.00462)	-0.0855*** (0.0206)	-0.102** (0.0474)	-0.0689 (0.0541)	-0.102 (0.141)
EDUC	-0.00272 (0.00316)	0.143*** (0.0515)	0.0873* (0.0477)	0.148*** (0.0500)	0.124* (0.0693)
FULLTIME	-0.00149 (0.00849)	-0.0166 (0.0141)	-0.00674 (0.0449)	0.0400*** (0.0128)	-0.0184 (0.0400)
MARRIED	0.0113 (0.0170)	0.116 (0.117)	0.0795 (0.0620)	-0.0903** (0.0384)	-0.344*** (0.0980)
ENDLINE	0.0107 (0.00922)	0.303 (0.215)	-0.252*** (0.0683)	-0.0941 (0.0639)	0.145 (0.177)
CONSTANT	0.974*** (0.0226)	1.386*** (0.253)	3.256*** (0.451)	2.689*** (0.309)	3.487*** (0.460)
OBSERVATIONS	299	299	299	299	299

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.4: Transparency and locus of control

VARIABLES	(1) L6_Learn_Pay _Hours	(2) D10_Control _Stress	(3) D12_Life _Behavior	(4) D13_Lack _Control
P3_CONTRACT_ LANGUAGE		-0.109** (0.0444)	-0.0806** (0.0329)	0.0955 (0.0809)
TREATED	-0.311*** (0.0999)	0.243* (0.130)	0.161 (0.102)	-0.195** (0.0853)
AGE	-0.0198 (0.0313)	0.0608 (0.101)	0.173* (0.0939)	0.0257 (0.0776)
EDUC	-0.0382 (0.0382)	0.136*** (0.0224)	0.199*** (0.0750)	0.0537 (0.0529)
FULLTIME	0.0582*** (0.0128)	0.00216 (0.0438)	0.000724 (0.0282)	0.0503*** (0.0121)
MARRIED	-0.00299 (0.131)	0.184** (0.0737)	-0.107 (0.0981)	-0.0856 (0.0902)
ENDLINE	-0.0702 (0.129)	-0.0501 (0.157)	0.0768 (0.0519)	-0.207*** (0.0737)
CONSTANT	2.085*** (0.193)	2.925*** (0.200)	2.500*** (0.480)	2.045*** (0.512)
OBSERVATIONS	323	323	323	323

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.5: Recruitment fees and pay deception and dehumanization

VARIABLES	(1) L12_Contract_ Amount	(2) C2_Trust_ Factory_Pay	(3) C3_Link_Pay_ Effort	(4) F6_Troubled	(5) D2_Angry	(6) D3_Small
L12_CONTRACT_ AMOUNT		-1.18e-05*** (4.16e-06)	-8.27e-06*** (1.82e-06)	1.67e-05* (8.81e-06)	1.88e-05*** (1.76e-06)	1.42e-05** (6.53e-06)
AGE	-41.81 (131.6)	-0.0589** (0.0253)	-0.00972 (0.0336)	-0.0120 (0.0294)	-0.156* (0.0827)	-0.0608 (0.0596)
EDUC	92.30 (163.9)	0.0577 (0.0539)	0.0907 (0.0708)	0.0513 (0.0319)	0.123** (0.0513)	0.101*** (0.0342)
FULLTIME	70.58 (234.4)	0.0262 (0.0807)	-0.0260 (0.0413)	0.00797 (0.0174)	-0.0142 (0.0402)	0.0204 (0.0328)
MARRIED	-232.4 (548.2)	0.489*** (0.0734)	0.308*** (0.0803)	-0.0334 (0.0353)	-0.0638 (0.0754)	-0.0447 (0.125)
TREATED	-858.7*** (250.0)	0.141 (0.248)	0.211 (0.194)	-0.289** (0.125)	-0.0525 (0.135)	-0.344 (0.319)
ENDLINE	224.8 (487.8)	0.267** (0.105)	0.0554 (0.148)	0.177* (0.107)	0.265** (0.119)	-0.0708 (0.0701)
CONSTANT	536.7 (735.5)	3.276*** (0.376)	3.039*** (0.241)	2.435*** (0.147)	2.324*** (0.289)	2.188*** (0.471)
OBSERVATIONS	706	706	706	706	706	706

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.6: Recruitment fees and migration regret

VARIABLES	(1) L12_Contract_ Amount	(2) K2_Satisfied_ Working_Conditions	(3) L3_Job_Actual_ Expect	(4) L5_Prefer_Return	(5) L8_Migrate_Again
L12_CONTRACT_ AMOUNT		-2.88e-05*** (6.97e-06)	-2.30e-05*** (5.70e-06)	2.69e-05*** (4.21e-06)	-1.03e-05*** (3.09e-06)
AGE	-41.81 (131.6)	-0.0782 (0.0517)	0.0347 (0.0937)	-0.124*** (0.0432)	-0.0320 (0.0223)
EDUC	92.30 (163.9)	-0.0384 (0.0249)	-0.0281 (0.0519)	0.150** (0.0612)	-0.00209 (0.0371)
FULLTIME	70.58 (234.4)	-0.0378 (0.0276)	0.0407* (0.0222)	0.0228 (0.0489)	0.0456** (0.0192)
MARRIED	-232.4 (548.2)	0.368*** (0.103)	0.175 (0.112)	-0.0233 (0.111)	0.0245 (0.0432)
TREATED	-858.7*** (250.0)	0.431*** (0.166)	0.0854 (0.175)	0.136 (0.388)	0.239 (0.154)
ENDLINE	224.8 (487.8)	0.121 (0.259)	0.149 (0.131)	0.225 (0.263)	-0.0427 (0.156)
CONSTANT	536.7 (735.5)	3.278*** (0.348)	2.731*** (0.189)	3.047*** (0.197)	1.945*** (0.0840)
OBSERVATIONS	706	706	706	706	706

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.7: Recruitment fees and abuse at work

VARIABLES	(1) L12_Contract_Amount	(2) P19_Thirsty	(3) R3_Verbal_Abuse	(4) R5_Sexual_Harassment
L12_CONTRACT_AMOUNT		1.76e-05*** (6.47e-06)	2.61e-05*** (8.82e-06)	1.03e-05*** (1.61e-06)
AGE	-41.81 (131.6)	-0.141*** (0.0514)	-0.124 (0.0842)	-0.00244 (0.0475)
EDUC	92.30 (163.9)	0.197*** (0.0558)	-0.101*** (0.0377)	-0.126*** (0.0469)
FULLTIME	70.58 (234.4)	-0.00611 (0.0643)	-0.0548 (0.0585)	0.0186 (0.0261)
MARRIED	-232.4 (548.2)	-0.101** (0.0396)	0.0277 (0.214)	-0.0338 (0.0507)
TREATED	-858.7*** (250.0)	0.0868 (0.0992)	-0.00463 (0.115)	-0.202** (0.0905)
ENDLINE	224.8 (487.8)	-0.299*** (0.0887)	-0.272* (0.139)	-0.0484 (0.160)
CONSTANT	536.7 (735.5)	3.420*** (0.233)	4.089*** (0.377)	1.788*** (0.188)
OBSERVATIONS	706	706	706	706

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.8: Personality traits and reaching target

VARIABLES	(1) D6_Proud	(2) Reach_ Target	(3) G2_Helpless	(4) Reach_ Target	(5) G4_Curious	(6) Reach_ Target	(7) G13_Stable	(8) Reach_ Target
TREATED	0.342** (0.143)	-0.0502* (0.0296)	-0.270*** (0.0845)	-0.0417 (0.0358)	0.129*** (0.0379)	-0.0394 (0.0364)	0.127*** (0.0326)	-0.0397 (0.0416)
D6_PROUD		0.0575** (0.0284)						
G2_HELPLESS				-0.0290* (0.0164)				
G4_CURIOUS						0.0221*** (0.00800)		
G13_STABLE								0.0383*** (0.0117)
AGE	0.0605 (0.0632)	-0.0235 (0.0309)	-0.101 (0.0622)	-0.0250 (0.0253)	0.0336 (0.0379)	-0.0191 (0.0260)	0.0477 (0.0554)	-0.0266 (0.0275)
EDUC	0.0868 (0.0700)	0.0111 (0.0344)	-0.0797 (0.0630)	0.0149 (0.0347)	0.114* (0.0608)	0.0146 (0.0336)	0.0239 (0.0444)	0.0134 (0.0327)
FULLTIME	0.0178 (0.0312)	0.0103 (0.00972)	-0.00673 (0.0273)	0.0107 (0.00900)	-0.0255 (0.0253)	0.0126 (0.00864)	0.0146 (0.0228)	0.0113 (0.00946)
MARRIED	0.223* (0.122)	0.0406 (0.0458)	-0.0691 (0.0694)	0.0427 (0.0519)	0.108 (0.0937)	0.0467 (0.0551)	0.0945 (0.0891)	0.0444 (0.0535)
ENDLINE	0.124 (0.260)	-0.0344 (0.0586)	-0.0755 (0.162)	-0.0249 (0.0416)	-0.000946 (0.0687)	-0.0169 (0.0489)	0.108 (0.0932)	-0.0216 (0.0467)
CONSTANT	2.757*** (0.320)	0.669** (0.271)	3.988*** (0.285)	0.952*** (0.154)	2.852*** (0.165)	0.748*** (0.179)	3.065*** (0.0823)	0.730*** (0.205)
OBSERVATIONS	292	292	684	684	682	682	684	684

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.9: Work terms and reaching target

VARIABLES	(1) D8_Comfortable_ Help	(2) Reach_Target	(3) L12_Contract_ Amount	(4) Reach_Target	(5) D4_Conflicts	(6) Reach_Target
D6_PROUD		0.0430**				
		(0.0214)				
G2_HELPLESS				-8.06e-06*		
				(4.29e-06)		
G4_CURIOUS						-0.0484***
						(0.0180)
TREATED	0.297***	-0.0477	-858.7***	-0.0471	-0.306**	-0.0523**
	(0.0319)	(0.0324)	(250.0)	(0.0329)	(0.124)	(0.0253)
AGE	-0.0326	-0.0188	-41.81	-0.0247	-0.0907	-0.0261
	(0.0369)	(0.0310)	(131.6)	(0.0287)	(0.0781)	(0.0291)
EDUC	0.220***	0.00641	92.30	0.0119	0.125***	0.0227
	(0.0490)	(0.0338)	(163.9)	(0.0364)	(0.0298)	(0.0365)
FULLTIME	0.0772***	0.00708	70.58	0.0163	0.0330	0.0134
	(0.0137)	(0.00870)	(234.4)	(0.0106)	(0.0464)	(0.0103)
MARRIED	0.110	0.0308	-232.4	0.0375	-0.114	0.0341
	(0.0822)	(0.0509)	(548.2)	(0.0431)	(0.132)	(0.0442)
ENDLINE	0.179	-0.0399	224.8	-0.0184	0.286***	-0.0108
	(0.183)	(0.0496)	(487.8)	(0.0537)	(0.0780)	(0.0473)
CONSTANT	2.442***	0.729***	536.7	0.856***	1.572***	0.912***
	(0.308)	(0.259)	(735.5)	(0.218)	(0.266)	(0.201)
OBSERVATIONS	682	682	706	706	301	301

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.10: Personality traits and days absent

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	D9_Worry _Finish	C8_Days _Absent	D12_Life _Behavior	C8_Days _Absent	G2_ Helpless	C8_Days _Absent	G13_ Stable	C8_Days _Absent	L6_Learn _Pay_ Hours	C8_Days _Absent
D6_PROUD		0.146***								
		(0.0436)								
G2_HELPLESS				0.0699***						
				(0.0192)						
G4_CURIOUS						0.0866**				
						(0.0416)				
G2_HELPLESS								0.130*		
								(0.0684)		
G4_CURIOUS										0.184*
										(0.100)
TREATED	-0.144***	-0.120	0.178***	-0.0945	-0.270***	-0.0537	0.127***	-0.161	-0.316***	-0.0846
	(0.0536)	(0.178)	(0.0349)	(0.151)	(0.0845)	(0.134)	(0.0326)	(0.165)	(0.0174)	(0.157)
AGE	-0.0347	-0.144	0.0833	-0.167*	-0.101	-0.157*	0.0477	-0.172*	-0.0618**	-0.157
	(0.0573)	(0.0980)	(0.0739)	(0.0942)	(0.0622)	(0.0950)	(0.0554)	(0.0957)	(0.0310)	(0.0986)
EDUC	0.0902***	-0.254***	0.148***	-0.260***	-0.0797	-0.241***	0.0239	-0.228***	-0.0355	-0.229***
	(0.0215)	(0.0590)	(0.0566)	(0.0534)	(0.0630)	(0.0573)	(0.0444)	(0.0581)	(0.0590)	(0.0525)
FULLTIME	0.0269	-0.00120	0.00792	-0.000834	-0.00673	0.0117	0.0146	-0.000539	0.0332***	-0.000235
	(0.0348)	(0.0487)	(0.0226)	(0.0515)	(0.0273)	(0.0490)	(0.0228)	(0.0487)	(0.0126)	(0.0512)
MARRIED	0.204***	0.0628	-0.0336	0.135	-0.0691	0.151	0.0945	0.110	0.0162	0.115
	(0.0623)	(0.157)	(0.0541)	(0.149)	(0.0694)	(0.146)	(0.0891)	(0.163)	(0.141)	(0.141)
ENDLINE	0.0704	0.0912	-0.00316	0.116	-0.0755	0.164	0.108	0.111	-0.0919	0.123
	(0.103)	(0.219)	(0.0376)	(0.209)	(0.162)	(0.194)	(0.0932)	(0.203)	(0.108)	(0.260)
CONSTANT	3.080***	2.239***	2.854***	2.497***	3.988***	2.324***	3.065***	2.314***	2.187***	2.352***
	(0.279)	(0.322)	(0.391)	(0.382)	(0.285)	(0.339)	(0.0823)	(0.489)	(0.290)	(0.370)
OBSERVATIONS	684	684	687	687	684	684	684	684	323	323

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.11: Work terms and days late

VARIABLES	(1) L6_Learn_ Pay _Hours	(2) C9_Days _Late	(3) L12_ Contract _Amount	(4) C9_Days _Late	(5) D4_Conflicts	(6) C9_Days _Late	(7) R5_Sexual_ Harassment	(8) C9_Days _Late
L6_LEARN_PAY_HOURS		0.0595**						
		(0.0293)						
L12_CONTRACT_AMOUNT				-3.20e-06**				
				(1.28e-06)				
L15_DEBT_PAYMENT								
D4_CONFLICTS						0.0732*		
						(0.0402)		
R5_SEXUAL_HARASSMENT								0.159*
								(0.0814)
TREATED	-0.316***	-0.102**	-858.7***	-0.125***	-0.306**	-0.102*	-0.203**	-0.117***
	(0.0174)	(0.0425)	(250.0)	(0.0399)	(0.124)	(0.0531)	(0.0919)	(0.0430)
AGE	-0.0618**	-0.0519	-41.81	-0.0443	-0.0907	-0.0373	-0.00505	-0.0421
	(0.0310)	(0.0326)	(131.6)	(0.0300)	(0.0781)	(0.0311)	(0.0464)	(0.0300)
EDUC	-0.0355	-0.0580	92.30	-0.0589	0.125***	-0.0714	-0.126***	-0.0408
	(0.0590)	(0.0550)	(163.9)	(0.0549)	(0.0298)	(0.0622)	(0.0487)	(0.0494)
FULLTIME	0.0332***	0.0324	70.58	0.0331	0.0330	0.0310	0.0232	0.0284
	(0.0126)	(0.0217)	(234.4)	(0.0210)	(0.0464)	(0.0190)	(0.0233)	(0.0199)
MARRIED	0.0162	0.0696*	-232.4	0.0525	-0.114	0.0633	-0.0428	0.0575
	(0.141)	(0.0400)	(548.2)	(0.0404)	(0.132)	(0.0401)	(0.0597)	(0.0489)
ENDLINE	-0.0919	-0.0713	224.8	-0.0566	0.286***	-0.0722	-0.0405	-0.0337
	(0.108)	(0.0810)	(487.8)	(0.0736)	(0.0780)	(0.0675)	(0.172)	(0.0936)
CONSTANT	2.187***	1.379***	536.7	1.475***	1.572***	1.371***	1.793***	1.209***
	(0.290)	(0.256)	(735.5)	(0.277)	(0.266)	(0.243)	(0.195)	(0.206)
OBSERVATIONS	323	323	706	706	301	301	319	319

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.12: Personality traits and intention to quit

VARIABLES	(1) D6_Proud	(2) D11_Think _Quit	(3) D9_Worry _Finish	(4) D11_Think _Quit	(5) G2_Helpless	(6) D11_Think _Quit	(7) G8_Trusting	(8) D11_Think _Quit
D6_PROUD		-0.0677*						
		(0.0386)						
D9_WORRY_ FINISH				0.219***				
				(0.0708)				
G2_HELPLESS						0.267***		
						(0.0271)		
G8_TRUSTING								0.174***
								(0.0268)
TREATED	0.342**	-0.225***	-0.144***	-0.213***	-0.270***	-0.200***	0.149**	-0.281***
	(0.143)	(0.0348)	(0.0536)	(0.0161)	(0.0845)	(0.0772)	(0.0738)	(0.0279)
AGE	0.0605	-0.0639	-0.0347	-0.0366	-0.101	-0.0415	-0.0289	-0.0663
	(0.0632)	(0.100)	(0.0573)	(0.0955)	(0.0622)	(0.0948)	(0.0362)	(0.101)
EDUC	0.0868	0.0598*	0.0902***	0.0309	-0.0797	0.0643	0.0631	0.0423
	(0.0700)	(0.0360)	(0.0215)	(0.0386)	(0.0630)	(0.0499)	(0.0723)	(0.0309)
FULLTIME	0.0178	0.0331	0.0269	0.0254	-0.00673	0.0337	0.0519	0.0211
	(0.0312)	(0.0521)	(0.0348)	(0.0412)	(0.0273)	(0.0448)	(0.0415)	(0.0456)
MARRIED	0.223*	-0.156	0.204***	-0.239*	-0.0691	-0.113	-0.0232	-0.169
	(0.122)	(0.138)	(0.0623)	(0.144)	(0.0694)	(0.121)	(0.0439)	(0.132)
ENDLINE	0.124	-0.0306	0.0704	-0.106	-0.0755	0.0443	0.155**	-0.122
	(0.260)	(0.185)	(0.103)	(0.180)	(0.162)	(0.189)	(0.0785)	(0.192)
CONSTANT	2.757***	2.955***	3.080***	2.000***	3.988***	1.730***	2.922***	2.281***
	(0.320)	(0.312)	(0.279)	(0.295)	(0.285)	(0.336)	(0.330)	(0.300)
OBSERVATIONS	292	292	684	684	684	684	682	682

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table A3.13: Work terms and intentions to quit

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	L6_ Learn_ Pay_ Hours	D11_ Think _Quit	L12_ Contract _Amount	D11_ Think _Quit	P4_ Understand _Contract	D11_ Think _Quit	D4_ Conflicts	D11_ Think _Quit	R5_Sexual_ Harassment	D11_ Think _Quit
L6_LEARN_ PAY_HOURS		0.130**								
		(0.0625)								
L12_CONTRACT _AMOUNT				-1.72e-05*						
				(9.36e-06)						
P4_ UNDERSTAND _CONTRACT						-0.200***				
						(0.0265)				
D4_CONFLICTS								0.208***		
								(0.0579)		
R5_SEXUAL_ HARASSMENT										0.310***
										(0.0633)
TREATED	-0.316***	-0.248***	-858.7***	-0.266***	0.624***	-0.109**	-0.306**	-0.192***	-0.203**	-0.203***
	(0.0174)	(0.0180)	(250.0)	(0.0229)	(0.134)	(0.0495)	(0.124)	(0.0520)	(0.0919)	(0.0487)
AGE	-0.0618**	-0.0561	-41.81	-0.0735	-0.0422***	-0.0509	-0.0907	-0.0508	-0.00505	-0.0384
	(0.0310)	(0.0994)	(131.6)	(0.0983)	(0.0105)	(0.116)	(0.0781)	(0.0900)	(0.0464)	(0.0957)
EDUC	-0.0355	0.0533	92.30	0.0591	0.150***	0.0900	0.125***	0.0273	-0.126***	0.0860***
	(0.0590)	(0.0384)	(163.9)	(0.0365)	(0.0568)	(0.0611)	(0.0298)	(0.0264)	(0.0487)	(0.0324)
FULLTIME	0.0332***	0.0258	70.58	0.0370	-0.000957	0.0246	0.0330	0.0209	0.0232	-0.00138
	(0.0126)	(0.0478)	(234.4)	(0.0514)	(0.0159)	(0.0489)	(0.0464)	(0.0447)	(0.0233)	(0.0503)
MARRIED	0.0162	-0.142	-232.4	-0.151	0.0981	-0.126	-0.114	-0.113	-0.0428	-0.126
	(0.141)	(0.156)	(548.2)	(0.141)	(0.131)	(0.144)	(0.132)	(0.143)	(0.0597)	(0.151)
ENDLINE	-0.0919	-0.0580	224.8	-0.0269	0.316	-0.00324	0.286***	-0.101	-0.0405	-0.0369
	(0.108)	(0.176)	(487.8)	(0.181)	(0.194)	(0.207)	(0.0780)	(0.167)	(0.172)	(0.192)
CONSTANT	2.187***	2.498***	536.7	2.760***	2.452***	3.154***	1.572***	2.459***	1.793***	2.215***
	(0.290)	(0.207)	(735.5)	(0.239)	(0.320)	(0.207)	(0.266)	(0.221)	(0.195)	(0.313)
OBSERVATIONS	323	323	706	706	302	302	301	301	319	319

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1


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