Karolina Hird, George Barros, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark
July 31, 2023, 5:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 30 that Wagner personnel conducted company-level training with unspecified elements of multiple Belarusian mechanized brigades.[1] The training included tactical maneuver for dismounted infantry and focused on force concealment from enemy UAVs and coordination between companies, platoons, and squads.[2] The training also reportedly featured Belarusian infantry conducting a combined arms assault with tank and artillery support.[3] The Wagner Group’s new role in Belarusian company-level training is notable. The Belarusian military typically conducts such exercises with Russian trainers and relies on Russian planners for any multi-brigade exercises, which ISW has not yet observed Wagner Group participating in. ISW previously observed Wagner personnel training with a Belarusian airborne brigade that historically trains with the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division and forecasted that the Wagner Group may seek to supplant legacy Russian–Belarusian unit relationships.[4]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely succeeded in recruiting an unknown number of Wagner personnel following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion, though Prigozhin reportedly ordered remaining Wagner fighters to assemble in Belarus by August 5. Prigozhin announced on July 30 that “unfortunately a few [Wagner personnel] agreed to transfer from the Wagner Group” and joined other unspecified Russian security services — likely the Russian MoD).[5] Prigozhin thanked former Wagner personnel for their service, stated that neither he nor Wagner’s Council of Commanders banned Wagner personnel from joining different Russian “security structures,” and expressed hope that the departed Wagner members would “keep in touch” so that they can rejoin Wagner should there ever arrive a time when the Wagner Group must reform a force.[6] Prigozhin also reiterated known details about how the Wagner Group will continue to train Belarusian forces and operate in Africa.[7] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also noted on July 31 that Prigozhin ordered all Wagner personnel currently on rest and recuperation to arrive at Wagner’s field camps in Belarus no later than August 5 to attend unspecified events that Prigozhin will personally lead on August 5.[8] Prigozhin stated that most Wagner fighters are on “vacation” as of July 30.[9]
Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting in Russia and claimed that the Wagner Group does not need to recruit more personnel and has sufficient reserves. Prigozhin stated on July 30 that Wagner has sufficient personnel and does not plan to conduct another recruitment drive until it needs more fighters.[10] A Wagner recruitment Telegram page announced on July 30 that Wagner is indefinitely suspending regional recruitment centers in Russia due to Wagner having sufficient reserves.[11] The exact reason the Wagner Group suspended recruitment is unclear, however. The Wagner Group was reportedly still recruiting fighters from across Russia as of early July 2023.[12] The Kremlin may have recently banned the Wagner Group from recruiting within Russia, and Prigozhin may simply be attempting to save face by claiming he voluntarily suspended recruitment efforts. ISW cannot independently confirm the Wagner Group’s current strength or depth of reserves.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian state as adequately supporting long-term force-generation efforts and meeting Russian weapons demand through domestic production and international cooperation.[13] Shoigu claimed that over 15,000 students enrolled at Russian military universities for the coming school year, 10 percent of whom have combat experience fighting in Ukraine. Shoigu announced the resumption of instruction at the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School in occupied Donetsk, one of the combined arms academies the Russian military requires officers to attend before commanding at the brigade or regiment level. Shoigu also reiterated positive rhetoric about the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and actively seeking international military-technical cooperation to support the war effort. Shoigu stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will sign contracts worth over 433 billion rubles (roughly $4.7 billion) with defense enterprises at the Army-2023 international military-technical forum. The claimed overall value of these contracts is at least 13.4 percent less than the over 500 billion ruble (roughly $5.45 billion) value of contracts the MoD signed at the Army-2022 and 2021 forums but a substantial increase over the 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016 forums, the overall contract values of which were roughly 1.16 trillion rubles ($17.4 billion), 1.03 trillion ($10.9 billion), 130 billion ($1.4 billion), 170 billion ($1.8 billion), and 130 billion, respectively.[14] Shoigu stated that Russia invited the heads of over 108 defense departments to attend the Army-2023 forum.[15]
Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29. Satellite imagery posted on July 30 reportedly shows damage to the Chonhar railway bridge.[16] Social media sources additionally circulated an image taken by someone standing on the bridge itself reportedly showing damage to the railway bridge.[17] One source speculated that the pictures taken from the bridge do not match the location of the damage as shown on available satellite imagery, which suggests that the full extent of the damage to the bridge is still unclear.[18] Russian milbloggers maintained their silence on damage to the Chonhar Bridge on July 31, possibly supporting ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin may have directed Russian commentators to refrain from covering the strike in an effort to exert greater control of the information space.[19]
Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war.[20] In a report on the activities “authorized by the President of the Russian Federation for children’s rights” in 2022, Lvova-Belova claimed that Russia has “received” 4.8 million Ukrainians since February 2022 and noted that the vast majority of the 700,000 children who arrived to Russia did not have parental or guardian supervision.[21] The report carefully frames these activities as humanitarian gestures of goodwill. International humanitarian law, however, defines the forced transfer of civilians to the territory of an occupying power as “deportation.” And the circumstances of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the situation in occupied territories are likely sufficiently coercive to mean that most “transfers” of Ukrainian civilians to Russia meet the threshold of forced deportation, which is prohibited under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, regardless of Russia’s claimed motive.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities are conducting a large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainians to the Russian Federation.[23]
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 31. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking northwest and southwest of Bakhmut, in the western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[24] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that over the past week, Ukrainian forces liberated an additional 2 square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut area and 12.6 square kilometers in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[25]
Iran and Belarus are deepening bilateral cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin arrived in Iran on July 31 and met with his counterpart, Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and a bilateral military cooperation plan for 2023.[26] Ashtiani is primarily responsible for negotiating military acquisitions and sales in his role as Iranian Defense Minister, so Khrenin and Ashtiani likely discussed arms deals during their meeting. Belarus may have also been seeking to secure an agreement on Iranian production of Shahed drones on the territory of Belarus following initial reports that Iran was seeking to convert a plant in Belarus’ Gomel Oblast into a Shahed production plant.[27]
Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine “security guarantees” as soon as the week of August 6 – 13. Yermak stated that the security guarantees for Ukraine — including “concrete and long-term commitments that will ensure Ukraine's ability to win now and deter Russian aggression in the future” — will cover the period before Ukraine acquires NATO membership.[28] Yermak described the security guarantees as an “important prerequisite” for Ukraine’s recovery and noted that the security guarantees include financial support for Ukraine and sanctions and punitive measures against Russia.[29]
Key Takeaways:
- The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely succeeded in recruiting an unknown number of Wagner personnel following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion, though Prigozhin ordered remaining Wagner fighters to assemble in Belarus by August 5.
- Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting in Russia and claimed that the Wagner Group does not need to recruit more personnel and has sufficient reserves.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian state as adequately supporting long-term force generation efforts and meeting Russian weapons demand through domestic production and international cooperation.
- Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29.
- Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war, very likely violating the Fourth Geneva Convention.
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 31.
- Iran and Belarus are deepening bilateral cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine “security guarantees” as soon as the week of August 6 – 13.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and made claimed gains in Luhansk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
- Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified a law on July 31 increasing the fine for mobilized personnel’s or conscripts' failure to arrive at a military registration office after being summoned.
![](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/DraftUkraineCOTJuly%2031%2C2023.png)
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove on July 31 and made unconfirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations east of Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove) and near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[30] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces attempted to advance south of Novoselivske and push Ukrainian troops across the Oskil River, which runs west of Svatove.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces took up more advantageous positions near Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove).[32] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the shoreline of the Oksil River, and other milbloggers reported heavy fighting is ongoing near Novoselivske, Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove), and Nadiia (13km southwest of Svatove).[33]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack near Novoselivske on July 31.[34]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kreminna on July 31 and made unconfirmed gains. The Russian Center Grouping of Forces spokesperson claimed that Russian forces captured eight Ukrainian strongholds on the borders of Raihorodka (35km northwest of Kreminna) and Chervonopopivka (5km northwest of Kreminna).[35] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (southwest of Kreminna) towards Lyman.[36] A Russian milblogger also reported that Russian forces tried to attack towards Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) from the southeast but were unsuccessful.[37]
Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted several unsuccessful counterattacks west and south of Kreminna on July 31. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian troops repelled attempted Ukrainian attacks near Kreminna itself, Kuzmyne (2km southwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka, Berestove (30km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[38] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully counterattacked in the Serebryanske forest area, and one Russian source noted that Ukrainian forces stabilized the line of defense near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) after deploying reserves to the area.[39]
![](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Luhansk%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20July%2031%2C2023.png)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut on July 31 and did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Bakhmut near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest) and that heavy battles continue southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka (9km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest).[40] Russian sources indicated that elements of the 11st Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade and 4th Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Brigade are fighting in the Bakhmut area.[41]
Russian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attack in the Bakhmut area on July 31.
![](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Bakhmut%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20July%2031%2C2023.png)
Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on July 31 and did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka and Pobieda (both on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations within Marinka but were unsuccessful.[43]
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line on July 31.
![](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Donetsk%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20July%2031%2C2023.png)
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly made marginal advances on July 31. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources reported that Russian forces, including the 247th Airborne (VDV) Division, repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[44] Some Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Staromayorske is contested while other milbloggers conceded that Ukrainian forces control the settlement.[45] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew to positions on the north (left) bank of the Mokryi Yaly River south of Staromayorske to defend against Ukrainian advances further south, and that Ukrainian forces advanced near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing near the T0518 Urozhaine-Velyka Novosilka highway and that the Donetsk People‘s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” Operational Tactical Combat Formation is defending near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[47] One Russian milblogger expressed concern about Russia’s ability to defend Urozhaine and assessed that Ukrainian forces will capture the settlement within the next three days.[48]
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Donetsk–Zaporizhia Oblast border area and may have made marginal advances on July 31. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted counterattacks near Staromayorske and recaptured lost positions in the area.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the Russian attacks, however.[50]
![](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Vremivka%20Salient%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20July%2031%2C2023.png)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on July 31. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces made unspecified advances in the Mala Tokmachka (6km southeast of Orikhiv) and Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) directions.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a limited mechanized Ukrainian attack near Robotyne and a smaller ground attack on the Pyatykhatky-Zherebyanky line (23–26km southwest of Orikhiv).[52]
![](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Pryatykhatky%20and%20Robotyne%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20July%2031%2C2023.png)
Russian forces conducted an Iskander-M missile strike against a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on July 31. Ukrainian officials reported that one Russian missile struck a multi-story school building, and a second missile struck a high-rise residential building.[53] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes killed six civilians, including one child, and injured over 75.[54]
![](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Zaporizhia%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20July%2031%2C2023.png)
![](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Kherson-Mykolaiv%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20July%2031%2C2023.png)
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified a law on July 31 increasing the fine for failure to arrive at a military registration office after being summoned for mobilized personnel or conscripts.[55] The law increases the previous fines, which ranged from 500 to 3,000 rubles ($5 to $32), to a flat 30,000 ruble fine ($327).[56] The law also introduces new fines of 400,000 – 500,000 rubles ($4,360 – $6,540) and 60,000 – 80,000 rubles ($654 – $872) for legal entities and Russian government officials, respectively, which fail to submit military registration lists to recruiters.[57]
Republic of Bashkortostan Governor Radiy Khabirov announced on July 31 that authorities in Bashkortostan are forming another volunteer battalion — the “Almaz Safin Battalion.”[58] Khabirov did not specify the battalion’s planned specialized role or end strength, benefits for its members, or the timeline for its formation. Once formed, the Almaz Safin Battalion will be Bashkortostan’s seventh volunteer battalion.[59]
Russian authorities have reportedly mobilized 55,000 – 60,000 residents in Russian-occupied Crimea since early 2022. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Andriy Chernyak stated on July 30 that Russian authorities have mobilized 55,000 – 60,000 men from occupied Crimea since the beginning of 2022.[60] Chernyak stated that Russian authorities deployed many of these mobilized men to frontlines in Ukraine despite telling them that they would serve in rear areas on the second or third line.[61]
Russian civilians reportedly continue conducting arson attacks against Russian military registration and enlistment offices in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported on July 31 that a Russian pensioner attempted an arson attack against a military registration and enlistment office in Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast, on July 29.[62] Russian media aggregator Baza reported that residents in Kazan and occupied Feodosia, Crimea, attempted to set fire to Russian enlistment offices in their respective cities on July 29.[63]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian authorities continue integrating occupation legal, economic, and infrastructure structures in occupied Ukraine into Russian federal structures. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law regulating the appellate courts of the occupation administrations of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, Crimea, and the city of Sevastopol.[64] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that the (occupation) Kherson Oblast Industrial Development Fund and Moscow Industry and Entrepreneurship Support Fund signed an agreement on agricultural and industrial integration, further expanding the occupation administration’s connections with Russian federal subjects.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian authorities laid cables to connect communications and internet in occupied Mylove, Luhansk Oblast to Russian communications services.[66]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.
See topline text.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/modmilby/30182 ; https://t.me/modmilby/30183 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/2574
[2] https://t.me/modmilby/30182 ; https://t.me/modmilby/30183 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/2574
[3] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/2574
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2023
[5] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/9251; https://newsfrol dot ru/24/12086/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2023
[6] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/9251; https://newsfrol dot ru/24/12086/;
[7] https://newsfrol.ru/24/12086/
[8] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/prygozhyn-vidklykaye-vsih-vagnerivtsiv-z-vidpustok/
[9] https://t.me/grey_zone/19764
[10] https://t.me/grey_zone/19764
[11] https://t.me/wagner_employment/88
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2023
[13] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-RF-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-s-rukovodyashchim-07-31; https://t.me/mod_russia/28795
[14] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2022/08/16/936285-ministerstvo-oboroni-podpisalo-29-kontraktov-na-summu-bolee-500-mlrd-rublei; https://tass dot ru/info/15466265; https://iz dot ru/1211783/2021-08-24/minoborony-na-forume-armiia-2021-zakliuchilo-kontrakty-na-500-mlrd-rublei; https://ria dot ru/20210824/kontrakty-1747026116.html; https://www.militarynews dot ru/story.asp?rid=0&nid=555921&lang=RU; https://mil dot ru/departament_informashion_system/news/more.htm?id=12380756@egNews
[15] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-RF-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-s-rukovodyashchim-07-31; https://t.me/mod_russia/28795
[16] https://twitter.com/hwtnv/status/1685701259771482112
[17] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1685707894476435456?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1686000671974174720?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1686003663519551489?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/3485; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28297; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28296; https://t.me/istories_media/3222 ; https://twitter.com/hwtnv/status/1685702501507751936?s=20
[18] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1685707894476435456?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1686000671974174720?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1686003663519551489?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/3485; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28297; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28296
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073023
[20] http://www.deti.gov dot ru/detigray/upload/documents/July2023/7JkHUTqLIsZL45JDp4Xl.pdf; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/30/07/2023/64c6c3119a794777ebcc7766?from=newsfeed
[21] http://www.deti.gov dot ru/detigray/upload/documents/July2023/7JkHUTqLIsZL45JDp4Xl.pdf
[22] https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/deportation-1/
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021623
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[25] https://t.me/annamaliar/978
[26] https://t.me/modmilby/30203 ; https://t.me/modmilby/30210 ; https://t.me/modmilby/30222
[27] https://www.jpost dot com/international/article-723386; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-742605
[28] https://t.me/ermaka2022/3328
[29] https://t.me/ermaka2022/3328
[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mZsPtqLFW5TzKtu2iJV8KEFsoxi7k7cbuignZYyAZekuuL8mzSU9dv9MAGnyzUCVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08XhzALxQ4pQqzqcsFMC1R5Q1YhvR6EBFiTAS4caXGSon5EEacXjb6xWsmYdSS4Cnl
[31] https://t.me/annamaliar/978
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/28809
[33] https://t.me/multi_XAM/606; https://t.me/wargonzo/14112
[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/28809
[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/28768
[36] https://t.me/readovkanews/63479; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489; https://t.me/btr80/9284; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93660
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/14112
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/28809
[39] https://t.me/multi_XAM/606; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50285
[40] https://t.me/readovkanews/63479; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489; https://t.me/dva_majors/22505; https://t.me/wargonzo/14112; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37481
[41] https://t.me/readovkanews/63493; https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10815
[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08XhzALxQ4pQqzqcsFMC1R5Q1YhvR6EBFiTAS4caXGSon5EEacXjb6xWsmYdSS4Cnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mZsPtqLFW5TzKtu2iJV8KEFsoxi7k7cbuignZYyAZekuuL8mzSU9dv9MAGnyzUCVl
[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/14112
[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/28809; https://t.me/rybar/50274; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50292; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50323; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93648; https://t.me/rusich_army/10184; https://t.me/romanov_92/40789; https://t.me/kommunist/17975; https://t.me/wargonzo/14125
[45] https://t.me/rybar/50274; https://t.me/dva_majors/22505; https://t.me/romanov_92/40789; https://t.me/batalyon15/2466
[46] https://t.me/multi_XAM/606
[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50292; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489 ; https://t.me/kommunist/17975; https://t.me/wargonzo/14125
[48] https://t.me/romanov_92/40789
[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/14112; https://t.me/batalyon15/2460; https://t.me/kommunist/17975; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489; https://t.me/batalyon15/2466
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mZsPtqLFW5TzKtu2iJV8KEFsoxi7k7cbuignZYyAZekuuL8mzSU9dv9MAGnyzUCVl
[51] https://t.me/annamaliar/978
[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50330; https://t.me/readovkanews/63479; https://t.me/rybar/50271
[53] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/6347; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/6356; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/7219; . https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/142 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93655; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93653; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/31/rossiyskie-voyska-atakovali-krivoy-rog-rakety-popali-v-universitet-i-zhiloy-dom; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/7216
[54] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/6347; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/6356; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/7219;
[55] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/07/31/987776-putin-utverdil-uvelichenie-shtrafa; https://t.me/readovkanews/63504; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/14377
[56] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/07/31/987776-putin-utverdil-uvelichenie-shtrafa
[57] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/07/31/987776-putin-utverdil-uvelichenie-shtrafa; https://t.me/readovkanews/63504; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/14377
[58] https://t.me/idelrealii/29353 ; https://gorobzor dot ru/novosti/obschestvo/184480-chto-izvestno-ob-almaze-safine-v-chest-kotorogo-nazovut-novyy-bashkirskiy-batalon; https://gorobzor dot ru/novosti/obschestvo/184477-v-bashkirii-sozdadut-esche-odin-dobrovolcheskiy-batalon-imeni-almaza-safina; https://www.bashinform dot ru/news/svo/2023-07-31/v-bashkirii-novomu-dobrovolcheskomu-batalonu-budet-prisvoeno-imya-geroya-rossii-almaza-safina-3365499; https://bash dot news/news/206774-v-baskirii-novyi-dobrovolceskii-batalyon-budet-nosit-imia-geroia-rossii-almaza-safina; https://resbash dot ru/news/Vremya%20geroev/2023-07-31/v-bashkirii-budet-sformirovan-eschyo-odin-dobrovolcheskiy-batalon-dlya-svo-imeni-almaza-safina-3365675
[59] https://www.idelreal.org/a/32527394.html
[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SCKlp9-trgU&ab_channel=%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%96%D0%BE%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-ukrainy-rosiia-prymusovo-mobilizuvala-blyzko-60-000-cholovikiv-andrii-cherniak.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/31/razvedka-ukrainy-s-nachala-vtorzheniya-60-tysyach-zhiteley-anneksirovannyh-territoriy-prinuditelno-mobilizovali-v-rossiyskuyu-armiyu
[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SCKlp9-trgU&ab_channel=%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%96%D0%BE%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-ukrainy-rosiia-prymusovo-mobilizuvala-blyzko-60-000-cholovikiv-andrii-cherniak.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/31/razvedka-ukrainy-s-nachala-vtorzheniya-60-tysyach-zhiteley-anneksirovannyh-territoriy-prinuditelno-mobilizovali-v-rossiyskuyu-armiyu
[62] https://t.me/severrealii/18858
[63] https://t.me/bazabazon/20054; https://t.me/bazabazon/20049
[64] https://crimea-news dot com/society/2023/07/31/1144100.html; https://t.me/readovkanews/63507
[65] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/11547
[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08XhzALxQ4pQqzqcsFMC1R5Q1YhvR6EBFiTAS4caXGSon5EEacXjb6xWsmYdSS4Cnl