UA-69458566-1

Wednesday, July 31, 2024

Iran Update, July 31, 2024

Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Knox Greene, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 30. Israeli agents appeared to have launched an explosively laden drone or missile from inside Iran to target Haniyeh, who was visiting for the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Haniyeh was staying at a facility with the IRGC Quds Force in northern Tehran.[1] The killing of Haniyeh reflects the degree to which Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security sector and is able to strike high-value targets within Iran. Hamas responded to the killing by calling on Middle Eastern countries to “deter” and “rein in” Israel.[2] Hamas also threatened to expand the war against Israel to ”new dimensions.”[3]

Iran is signaling that it will retaliate directly for Israel killing Haniyeh. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is the seniormost Iranian defense and foreign policy body, held an emergency meeting on July 31 to discuss the killing of Haniyeh.[4] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attended the SNSC meeting, which is rare but normal during serious crises, including immediately following the United States killing Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[5] Three anonymous Iranian officials told the New York Times that Khamenei ordered a direct strike on Israel during the SNSC meeting.[6] Khamenei later published a statement that blamed Israel directly and vowed retaliation.[7] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) similarly published a statement saying that the Axis of Resistance and ”especially Iran” will retaliate against Israel.[8] Iran separately raised the red flag of Imam Hossein over the Jamkaran Mosque in Qom, which signals an Iranian intent to seek revenge.[9] Iran similarly raised the red flag after the United States killed Soleimani.

One of the most dangerous courses of action would be Iran and other members of the Axis of Resistance conducting a large-scale, combined drone and missile attack into Israel. Iran could launch an attack similar to the one it conducted against Israel in April 2024, which involved around 300 drones and ballistic and cruise missiles.[10] Iran could target multiple locations in Israel or mass its fire on a single target. Using a large strike package against even a single target could still appear as a widespread attack. This scenario would also involve simultaneous attacks from other members of the Axis of Resistance, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. Such a combined Iranian-Axis of Resistance attack would be especially dangerous because attacking from multiple direction would put greater pressure on Israeli air defenses than the Iranian attack in April 2024 did. The United States and Israel were furthermore able to defend against the Iranian attack in April 2024 so effectively in part because it took the attack drones several hours to get from Iran to Israel.[11] That hours-long period gave the United States, Israel, and their regional partners time to prepare their defenses and intercept all of the drones. The United States and Israel would have far less warning and opportunity to intercept if the Axis of Resistance launched large swarms of drones from Iraq, Lebanon, or Syria toward Israel. Hezbollah may be especially incentivized to participate in such an attack given its desire to retaliate for Israel killing Fuad Shukr in Beirut, though Hezbollah has not yet indicated that it would retaliate for the killing of Shukr at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW has noted previously that Hezbollah and the Houthis have probed Israeli air defenses to better understand the strengths and weaknesses.[12]

Lebanese Hezbollah confirmed that the IDF killed one of its seniormost commanders, Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 30.[13] Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is expected to speak on Hezbollah’s “political position” at Shukr’s funeral on August 1.[14] The IDF Air Force targeted Shukr in a building in southern Beirut, where Hezbollah has a deep and long-standing presence.[15] The IDF was responding to a Hezbollah rocket attack that killed 12 Israeli children in the Golan Heights on July 27. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that Shukr gave the orders for the rocket attack.[16]

Shukr had led the Hezbollah attack campaign into northern Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began.[17] Shukr has been described as Nasrallah’s ”right-hand man” and roughly equivalent to the chief of staff of Hezbollah forces.[18] Hezbollah said in a statement mourning Shukr that he was part of Hezbollah’s founding generation and fought in the 1982 and 2006 wars in Lebanon.[19] Shukr later served on Hezbollah’s highest decision-making body—the Shura Council—as well as its top military body—the Jihad Council—since its founding.[20] The IDF stated that Shukr managed Hezbollah’s advanced weapons arsenal, including sophisticated drones, missiles, and rockets.[21] Several Palestinian militias, including Hamas, mourned Shukr’s death and lauded his central role in the war against Israel.[22]

The United States conducted a self-defense strike on July 30 targeting Iranian-backed militants in Iraq, who were preparing to launch a one-way attack drone.[23] The United States deemed the drone to be a threat to US and International Coalition forces given the recent Iranian-backed militia attacks on US positions in Iraq and Syria.[24] The US strike comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have resumed their campaign to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi militants whom the United States struck were affiliated with prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[25] The United States killed four Iraqi militants and wounded another four, according to Reuters.[26] Kataib Hezbollah claimed that the United States struck ”drone experts,” who were working to implement new security measures for Shia pilgrims.[27] Kataib Hezbollah also claimed that the United States launched the self-defense strike from Kuwait and warned Kuwait against allowing the United States to launch attacks from its territory.[28]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Iran is signaling that it will retaliate directly. One of the most dangerous courses of action would be Iran and the Axis of Resistance launching a large-scale, combined drone and missile attack into Israel.
  • Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah confirmed that Israel killed one of its seniormost commanders, Fuad Shukr, in Beirut. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah will address the killing of Shukr during his funeral on August 1.
  • Iraq: The United States conducted a self-defense strike targeting Iranian backed militants in Iraq, who were preparing to launch a one-way attack drone. Iranian-backed militias have resumed their campaign to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria in recent days.



Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 252nd Division continued operating along the Netzarim Corridor on July 31. Israeli forces conducted targeted raids and destroyed militia infrastructure.[29] Israeli forces identified a cell of Palestinian fighters planting improvised explosive devices (IED) to target Israeli forces in the area and directed an airstrike against the cell.[30] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mortared Israeli forces and vehicles stationed along the Netzarim Corridor.[31] Hamas and PIJ coordinated to launch short-range rockets at IDF units near the corridor east of Juhor ad Dik.[32] 

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in Tal al Hawa on July 31. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces near al Baraa bin Azib Mosque in Tal al Hawa.[33]

Palestinian media reported that an IDF airstrike killed a Palestinian journalist and cameraman in al Shati refugee camp, west of Gaza City, on July 31.[34] The airstrike killed al Jazeera journalist Ismail al Ghoul and cameraman Ramy al Rify inside a vehicle after the pair reported from a destroyed home in al Shati refugee camp that belonged to Ismail Haniyeh’s family.[35] An Israeli military correspondent reported that one of the two men was reportedly a Hamas operative, citing a military source.[36]

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on July 31. The IDF 401st Brigade raided militia infrastructure and killed Palestinian fighters in Tal al Sultan.[37] Israeli forces engaged four Palestinian militias in several sectors of Rafah.[38] Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades in Shaboura refugee camp.[39]

The IDF Air Force struck dozens of militia targets in the Gaza Strip from July 30 to July 31.[40] The IDF announced that it struck Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure, including underground tunnels, across the Gaza Strip.[41]

The IDF reported that its 35th Paratroopers Brigade (98th Division) directed sniper fire, tank fire, and airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis in recent days.[42] The IDF said that Israeli forces located and destroyed a long-range rocket launcher in Khan Younis.[43] The IDF Yahalom combat engineering unit destroyed an underground tunnel approximately 25 meters deep and two kilometers long.[44] The IDF said that the tunnel contained front doors and living quarters.[45] Israeli forces located a tunnel shaft within a Palestinian fighter's house from which fighters launched rockets.[46] The tunnel shaft led to a tens-of-meters long tunnel, which Israeli forces destroyed.[47]

 


West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on July 31.[48] A Hamas fighter conducted a shooting and stabbing attack targeting an Israeli civilian in Kiryat Arba settlement in Hebron on July 31.[49] The IDF claimed that the Hamas fighter first opened fire from a vehicle and then stabbed the victim.[50] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF detained the Hamas fighter after launching a search operation in the area.[51] Hamas separately fired small arms targeting Israeli forces near Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron.[52] The Hamas battalion claimed that both attacks in Hebron were the ”first rapid response” to Israel’s killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh.[53] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) separately fired small arms targeting Shaked settlement in the West Bank on July 31.[54]

Palestinians protested against Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in at least four locations across the West Bank on July 31.[55] Hamas issued multiple statements calling upon Palestinians to demonstrate across all West Bank governorates.[56]

The IDF conducted an overnight raid in the West Bank and seized a lathe for producing small arms.[57] The IDF also identified and confiscated three unspecified weapons during the raid. The IDF has also detained 40 wanted persons during two separate raids in Burqa and Dheisheh refugee camp in the past week.[58] The IDF claimed that it confiscated unspecified numbers of weapons and questioned suspects in those operations.

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has not claimed any attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on July 30. The IDF intercepted a single drone launched from Lebanon on July 31.[59] The drone did not cross into Israeli airspace.[60]

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi visited the northern border on July 31 to observe an IDF training exercise simulating combat in northern Israel and Lebanon.[61] The IDF Kfir Brigade conducted exercises to train forces for several “extreme scenarios,” including fighting in mountainous and urban terrain.[62] Halevi said that the IDF does not intend for Hezbollah to “return to October 6” or maintain a presence along the border “200 meters” from the northern Israeli border towns Metulla, Shtula, or Rosh HaNikra.[63]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with senior Houthi and Hezbollah officials separately in Tehran on July 30.[64] Khamenei met with senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdulsalam and expressed his thanks for Houthi support for Hamas.[65] Khamenei also praised Hezbollah for fighting Israel in a meeting with Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem[66] Qassem briefed Khamenei on the latest developments in Lebanon and northern Israel.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed three Houthi unmanned surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea on July 30.[67] CENTCOM determined that the USVs presented an imminent threat to US and coalition forces and merchant vessels in the area.

A senior US delegation arrived in Saudi Arabia on July 30 to discuss Yemen and recent Israel-Houthi tensions.[68] White House Middle East adviser Brett McGurk is heading the US delegation. McGurk will next travel to Cairo to discuss ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas.

The US Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals and four companies on July 31 for facilitating weapons procurement for the Houthis.[69] These sanctions target actors located in China, such as in Hong Kong, and Yemen. These sanctions build on OFAC sanctioning seven entities in June 2024 for facilitating Houthi weapons procurement.[70]

OFAC sanctioned the following individuals and companies in the latest designations:

  • Director and General Manager of Guangzhou Alshahari Ahmed Khaled Yahya al Shahare
  • Yemeni businessman Maher Yahya Muhammad Mutahar al Kinai
  • Yemen-based logistics company al Sharai United Corporation Ltd
  • Al Shahari United China-based branch Guangzhou Alshahari United Corporation Limited
  • Owner of Guangzhou Alshahari Hongkong Alshahari United Corporation Limited
  • Sanaa, Yemen-based company Yemen Telecommunication Asset Company for Information Technology

EU Deputy Secretary General Enrique Mora met with Abbas Araghchi in Tehran on July 31.[71] Iranian and Western media did not publish the details of the meeting. Amwaj media reported on July 28 that Abbas Araghchi is newly sworn-in President Masoud Pezeshkian’s nomination for foreign affairs minister.[72] Amwaj citing unspecified senior Iranian sources reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approved Pezeshkian’s nomination of Araghchi. Araghchi played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations with the West under the Hassan Rouhani administration and served as Rouhani’s deputy foreign affairs minister for policy between 2017 and 2021.[73] Pezeshkian’s nomination of Araghchi and Araghchi’s meeting with Mora indicate Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. It is unclear whether the Iranian Parliament, which is currently dominated by hardliners, would approve Araghchi as foreign affairs minister.[74]

Newly sworn-in Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continued to hold meetings with foreign officials on July 30 and July 31. Pezeshkian discussed strengthening bilateral relations with Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin.[75] Pezeshkian emphasized that one of his foreign policy priorities is developing ties with Russia and other neighboring countries. Both parties expressed a continued commitment to accelerating joint projects, including the International North South Corridor.[76] Pezeshkian stated that, if Russia and Iran strengthen their capabilities, US and western sanctions will no longer be effective. Pezeshkian also met with the Brazilian vice president, the Serbian deputy prime minister, the Azerbaijani prime minister, the Algerian parliament speaker, the Malian parliament speaker, the Senegalese parliament speaker, the Zimbabwean vice president, and the Eritrean foreign minister.[77]

Iran is continuing to try to deepen economic and political relations with African countries. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately met with the parliament speakers of Burkina Faso and Mali on the sidelines of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration on July 30.[78] Ghalibaf stated that cultivating relations with Africa, especially west African countries, is a foreign policy priority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during Ghalibaf’s meeting with Burkinabe Parliament Speaker Usman Bokoma.[79] Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani separately met with the Egyptian and Sudanese foreign affairs ministers on July 30.[80] Bagheri Kani reiterated that pursuing relations with African countries is part of Iran’s ”neighborhood policy.“[81] The ”neighborhood policy” involves building relations with states in and around the Middle East.[82] Bagheri Kani‘s meeting comes after Sudan reopened its embassy in Tehran on July 30 after previously severing diplomatic ties with Iran in 2016.[83]

[1] https://www.iranintl.com/en/liveblog/hamas-leader-killed-iran ;

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[4] https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-the-assassination-of-a-hamas-leader-in-tehran ;

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[5] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-the-killing-of-qassem-soleimani-could-mean/

[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/31/world/middleeast/iran-orders-attack-israel.html?smid=url-share

[7] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27512/

[8] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/681682/

[9] https://x.com/ShadowofEzra/status/1818624666409291945

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-1-2024 ; https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1779503384434819454

[11] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/how-israel-foiled-irans-ballistic-missile-attack-that-focused-on-an-f-35-airbase/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/14/mapping-wide-scale-iranian-drone-missile-attacks/

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2024

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[15] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1818391387835953166; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/31/hezbollah-beirut-israel-strike-funerals/

[16] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1818648198254100653; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1818659795685060949

[17] https://t.me/mmirleb/5803 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1818391391313240488; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-8-2023

[18] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1818391391313240488; https://www.maariv dot co.il/journalists/Article-1089446

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[23] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/07/30/iraq-airstrike-iran-gaza/

[24] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/07/30/iraq-airstrike-iran-gaza/

[25] https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-carries-defensive-airstrike-iraq-officials/story?id=112424050

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosions-iraqs-pmf-security-agency-base-south-baghdad-kill-one-member-sources-2024-07-30/

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[68] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/30/us-saudi-arabia-yemen-houthis-israel

[69] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2515

[70] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2409

[71] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1818649681955573801

[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-29-2024;

https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/scoop-ex-nuclear-negotiator-named-as-iran-s-foreign-minister-sources-say

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2023; ;https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-10/iran-president-eyes-nuclear-deal-broker-for-top-diplomat-tasnim?srnd=politics-vp#:~:text=Araghchi%20was%20Iran's%20chief%20negotiator,in%20exchange%20for%20sanctions%20relief.

[74] https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/scoop-ex-nuclear-negotiator-named-as-iran-s-foreign-minister-sources-say

[75] https://president dot ir/fa/153198

[76] https://president dot ir/fa/153198

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-20-2024

[77] https://president dot ir/fa/153249

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[78] www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4295785 ; www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/750505

[79] www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4295797

[80] www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/750505 ; www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/750580

[81] www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/750580

[82] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-16-2024

[83] www.sudantribune dot com/article288898 ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-sudan-diplomatic-ties-saudi-8ce7690acb75bfaff092e63713ae52c0

 

Posted by at

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2024

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 31, 2024, 6:20pm ET

 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on July 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran to derail attempts to establish peace in the Middle East.[1] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also responded to Haniyeh's death, stating that it "strongly condemned" Haniyeh's assassination and emphasized that Haniyeh's assassination occurred during his visit to Tehran for Masoud Pezeshkian's presidential inauguration.[2] The Russian MFA did not explicitly implicate Israel but claimed that the "organizers of this political assassination" were aware of the "dangerous consequences" Haniyeh's death would have on the entire region. Russia's decision to publicly blame Israel for destabilizing peace prospects in the Middle East and indirectly threaten Israel with "dangerous consequences" demonstrates Russia's increasing willingness to publicly align with Iran amid deepening Russian-Iranian military cooperation.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin has increasingly expressed anti-Israel positions since the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023 and notably amplified information operations designed to justify Iranian aggression against Israel, including the April 13 large-scale missile and drone strikes against Israel.[4]

 

The Russian State Duma revised some aspects of a recent bill criminalizing Russian soldiers' use of personal devices on the battlefield following outcry in the Russian ultranationalist community. The Russian State Duma Defense Committee recommended on July 30 that the Duma repeal its prior approval of the bill, and the State Duma adopted a new version of the bill on July 31 clarifying that Russian soldiers will not be subject to disciplinary arrest for using or wearing devices to perform combat operations.[5] Russian milbloggers largely celebrated the revision, with most praising the State Duma for its willingness to listen to the Russian ultranationalist information space.[6] Some milbloggers were still cautious, however, advocating for the State Duma to completely repeal the law and noting that the State Duma should repeal other unspecified laws in line with "common sense."[7] One milblogger continued to criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for this bill, claiming that the MoD has failed to change ineffective structural entities responsible for the MoD's public relations and noting that the MoD should consider how this bill hurts its image.[8] Russian milbloggers largely ignored the fact that the State Duma's revisions do not address many of the milbloggers' initial concerns, including the lack of MoD-provided devices for Russian soldiers to use for their duties, the lack of criteria for distinguishing between a personal device and a service device, using this bill as an excuse to justify harsh punishments against conscripts or disliked subordinates, and depriving Russian soldiers of their ability to contact family members and raise awareness of corruption or incompetence of their commanders.[9] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will be able or willing to enforce punishment for the use of personal devices in Ukraine, and the Russian military will likely find it extremely difficult to eliminate its dependence on insecure personal devices for many frontline tasks.[10]

 

Russian officials may be taking steps to address domestic security issues following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and June 2024 shootings in the Republic of Dagestan. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov stated on July 31 that the Crocus City Hall and Dagestan attacks challenged Russian law enforcement and society and showed that the Russian government has made "mistakes" in its counter-terrorism policies.[11] Krasnov stated that the Russian government needs to inspect its policies and respond to terrorist threats in a "fundamentally different way." Actors affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) conducted the Crocus City Hall and likely conducted the Dagestan attacks, and Russian security personnel largely failed to rapidly and sufficiently respond to both events.[12] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed it prevented a terrorist attack in the Republic of Adygea on July 11, and Russian security forces may by intensifying proactive counter-terrorism operations in response to government pressure, although ISW cannot confirm the veracity of the FSB's reporting.[13] The Russian government, however, has largely chosen to posture that it is adequately combating the threat of domestic terrorism, but it is unclear what change, if any, in Russian counterterrorism policies may come from Krasnov's proposals.[14]

 

Ukrainian forces struck a weapons and equipment warehouse in Kursk City on the night of July 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a warehouse in Kursk City and that Ukrainian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment.[15] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified facility in Kursk Oblast and caused the facility to catch fire.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed an unspecified number of Ukrainian drones and missiles, including at least one Neptune anti-ship missile, over Kursk Oblast.[17] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov told Radio Svoboda on July 31 that recent "explosion[s]" at the Olenya Airfield in Murmask Oblast damaged the frames of two Tu-22M3 bombers.[18] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike against the airfield on the night of July 26 to 27.[19]

 

Russian border guards withdrew from Armenia’s main international airport. Armenian and Russian sources reported on July 31 that Russian border guards left Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan, Armenia.[20] Armenian authorities requested in March 2024 that Russia remove its border guards from the airport by August 1 because Armenia can conduct its own border control without the help of Russian border guards who had been stationed at the airport since 1992.[21]

 

Key Takeaways:

·         Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran to derail attempts to establish peace in the Middle East.

·         The Russian State Duma revised some aspects of a recent bill criminalizing Russian soldiers' use of personal devices on the battlefield following outcry in the Russian ultranationalist community.

·         Russian officials may be taking steps to address domestic security issues following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and June 2024 shootings in the Republic of Dagestan.

·         Ukrainian forces struck a weapons and equipment warehouse in Kursk City on the night of July 30 to 31.

·         Russian border guards withdrew from Armenia’s main international airport.

·          Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Torestsk, and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

·          Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 31 increasing financial incentives for signing a Russian military service contract, likely to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

 

·         Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

·         Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

·         Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

·         Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast

·         Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

·         Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

·         Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

·         Russian Technological Adaptations

·         Activities in Russian-occupied areas

·         Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

·         Russian Information Operations and Narratives

·         Significant Activity in Belarus

 

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

 

A Russian insider source claimed on July 31 that Ukrainian forces ambushed elements of the Russian 322nd Spetsnaz Training Center (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) as the Russian unit was conducting sabotage and reconnaissance operations in Semenivskyi Raion, Chernihiv Oblast border area.[22] The insider source claimed that the Ukrainian ambush killed five Russian soldiers and that Russian military leadership concealed this failure following the insurgent ambush of Wagner Group personnel in Mali.[23] ISW is unable to confirm this report. Ukrainian sources stated that the Ukrainian ambush occurred on July 28.[24] A Chernihiv Oblast-focused Ukrainian source claimed on July 29 that Russian forces have increased their reconnaissance activity in the oblast and changed their tactics to mine Ukrainian logistics routes rather than ambush Ukrainian forces.[25]

 

Fighting continued north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and seized two heights near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[26] Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City), Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk), and Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) on July 30 and 31.[27] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that Russian forces have deployed elements of the 1st Assault Company of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade to frontline positions near Tykhe and are transferring elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) from an unspecified area in occupied Luhansk Oblast to the Starytsya area.[28] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), including its "Tigr" Battalion, reportedly continue to operate near Lyptsi.[29]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and southwest of Svatove amid continued Russian assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 31. Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[30] Additional geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Novoyehorivka (southwest of Svatove).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seized two unspecified Ukrainian positions south of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna).[32] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Berestove, Pishchane, Kolisnykivka, Stepova Novoselivka, and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, and Novoserhiivka; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on July 30 and 31.[33]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 30 and 31, but there were no confirmed advances in the area.[34] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction, and elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Pereizne.[35]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on July 31. Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced and crossed the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal north of Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within Novyi and Zhovtnevyi microraions, and one milbloggers claimed that Russian assault groups used underground tunnels to advance behind Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the canal (which flows south).[37] Russian forces also conducted assaults north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka.[38] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[39]

 

Russian forces advanced within Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) amid continued offensive operations near Toretsk on July 30. Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces advanced within northwestern and southwestern Zalizne and have seized most of the settlement.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to a kilometer in depth near Zalizne and Pivdenne (east of Toretsk) and advanced near Druzhba (east of Toretsk) and within Niu York (south of Toretsk).[41] Russian forces are also conducting assaults within Toretsk itself and near Panteleymonivka (south of Toretsk) on July 30 and 31.[42] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in Niu York.[43]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on July 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing northwest of Avdiivka towards Ivanivka, along the railway line south of Vesele and Serhiivka, and west of Lozuvatske and west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka.[44] Russian forces are also conducting assaults northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Tymofiivka, Lysychne, Novooleksandrivka, and Zhelanne and west of Avdiivka near Kalynove and Karlivka.[45]

 

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Heorhiivka (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced northeast of Heorhiivka during a reinforced-platoon sized mechanized assault.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and up to the northwestern outskirts of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), but noted that some Ukrainian assault groups remain in northern Krasnohorivka.[47] Russian forces also continued assaults southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka on July 30 and 31.[48] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating within Krasnohorivka.[49]

 

Russian forces continued ground assaults near Velyka Novoseilka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 30 and 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[50]

 

Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces may have used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian helicopter taking off in Donetsk City. Russian milbloggers insinuated on July 31 that a Ukrainian FPV drone downed an Mi-8 helicopter in Donetsk City and footage purportedly shows the wreckage of a helicopter in the area.[51] A Russian milblogger amplified footage purportedly showing Ukrainian FPV drones unsuccessfully attempting to strike rotary wing aircraft mid-flight in May and mid-July 2024, which suggests that Ukrainian forces have recently improved their drone capabilities.[52]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

 

Russian forces advanced east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of July 31. Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although this advance is likely not recent.[53] Russian sources claimed on July 31 that Russian forces also advanced further northwest of Robotyne, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[54] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting near Robotyne; east of Robotyne near Verbove; northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka; and northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka on July 30 and 31.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[56]

 

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including on islands in the Dnipro River Delta, on July 31.[57]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59 cruise missile from occupied Kherson Oblast and 89 Shahed-136/131 drones from the Yeysk, Seshcha, Kursk, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk directions, and that Ukrainian forces downed all 89 drones and the Kh-59 missile.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force Command noted that this is one of the largest Russian Shahed strikes against Ukraine since January 1, when Russian forces launched the same number of Shaheds at Ukraine. Kyiv City officials reported that Ukrainian forces downed roughly 36 Shaheds over Kyiv City alone and that falling debris damaged residential areas.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of "Gerbera" plywood and foam drones, which look like Shaheds and are used to test and distract Ukrainian air defenses, in the July 30 to 31 strike.[60]

 

The Belarusian Hajun project reported that at least five Russian Shaheds flew into Belarusian airspace during the July 30 to 31 strike, the largest number of Shaheds that crossed into Belarusian airspace during a strike series.[61] The Hajun project reported that Belarus scrambled a Belarusian fighter jet in response to the drone intrusion and that one drone flew more than 260 kilometers into Belarus from northern Chernhiv Oblast and reached Stolin, Brest Oblast, and the other drones flew near Loyev, Asarevichi, and Kirovo, Gomel Oblast.[62]

 

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 31 increasing financial incentives for signing a Russian military service contract, likely to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. The decree established a one-time minimum payment of 400,000 rubles (about $4,700) to Russians and foreigners who sign a Russian military service contract from August 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024.[63] The decree also recommends that senior Russian regional officials give cash one-time payments of no less than 400,000 rubles to individuals who sign Russian military service contracts. Many Russian federal subjects (regions) have already advertised a one-time payment of over one million rubles (about $11,800).[64] Putin previously signed a decree in November 2022, shortly after the start of partial mobilization, providing a one-time payment of 195,000 rubles (about $2,300) to individuals who signed a Russian military service contracts after September 21, 2022.[65]

 

The Kremlin continues efforts to groom Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine for positions in the Russian government through the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program. Altai Republic Head Andrei Turchak announced on July 30 that he appointed Russian veteran and "Time of Heroes" program participant Captain Alexander Surazov Chairperson of the republic's Physical Culture and Sports Commitee.[66] Turchak stated that Surazov will work to develop combat sports and martial arts at educational institutions in the republic. Russian authorities likely intend to prepare and recruit Russian youth for military service through the promotion of combat sports.

 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to address complaints over a lack of benefits for military personnel and formalize Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR/LNR) proxy units. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a proposal to the Russian presidential administration that Russia provide a one-time disability payment of roughly 4.4 to six million rubles (about $51,600 to $70,600) to individuals who fought in proxy formations in the DNR and LNR since 2014 — the same disability payment that regular Russian military personnel receive.[67]

 

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

 

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that the Russian military began to deliver computerized sights for Russian AGS-17 and AGS-30 automatic grenade launchers "in bulk" to Russian forces on the frontline.[68] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military began testing the computerized sights on the frontline in 2023.

 

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

 

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

 

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

 

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

 

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

 

Russian authorities have renewed their informational attacks against Moldova following reports that Moldovan authorities are investigating two Moldovan civil servants for espionage. Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL)'s Moldovan service reported on July 31 that Moldovan authorities are searching offices of Moldovan parliamentarians in connection with an espionage case against the Parliamentary Legal Department Head Ion Creanga for providing information to Russia.[69] Another Moldovan source reported that Moldovan authorities detained Creanga and another civil servant.[70] The Russian Embassy in Moldova claimed that Moldovan authorities are preparing to expel Russian diplomats in connection with a "treason" case involving Moldovan officials.[71] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reiterated narratives accusing Moldova of following the "path of Ukraine and the Baltics" and more closely cooperating with the West.[72] The Kremlin likely aims to take advantage of any Moldovan effort to distance and protect itself from Russian interference by intensifying narratives intended to discredit the Moldovan government and set conditions for further interference in Moldova.

 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 31 that elements of the Russian Central and Southern military districts (CMD and SMD) have begun the third stage of tactical nuclear exercises, likely as part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign intended to influence Western states into decision-making favorable to Russia.[73]

 

The Kremlin continues efforts to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. Russian MFA Deputy Press and Information Director Andrey Nastasin threatened Japan with unspecified countermeasures if Japan allocates lethal military assistance to Ukraine.[74] The Kremlin routinely levies threats against NATO states and their partners to deter them from providing military assistance to Ukraine.[75]

 

Ukrainian military officials continue to warn about Russian disinformation efforts, including those targeting Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on July 31 that Russian forces are using Leer-3 systems to spread false information to Ukrainians through faked SMS and Telegram messages.[76] The Kharkiv Group of Forces also warned that Russian propagandists are spreading a false narrative that Ukrainian forces are using prohibited chemical substances on the battlefield. Russian forces have frequently used chemical substances on the battlefield in Ukraine, and Russia likely aims to distract from these instances by falsely deflecting blame onto Ukraine.[77]

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

 

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/263494 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/21495531

[5] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21496887; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21492495

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[7] https://t.me/dva_majors/48472; https://t.me/dva_majors/48514 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/12021 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48515

[8] https://t.me/dva_majors/48509; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424

[11] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21496753

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0o8B5uFvXvA8JQoTc94RiivZJVDMNKxD1ftngq2JfzyWS5xcREPs3A4qa4BM6dvSyl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/16436 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/31/genshtab-zsu-syly-oborony-zavdaly-udaru-po-vijskovomu-obyektu-bilya-kurska-v-rosiyi/

[18] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-hur-udar-olenia/33056642.html ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/30/gur-pid-chas-udaru-po-aerodromu-v-rosiyi-buly-poshkodzheni-odrazu-dva-litaky-tu-22m3/

[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/48523 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/263555 ; https://news dot am/eng/news/836502.html ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/rous-sahmanapahnery-dours-en-ekel-zvartnots-%D6%85danavakayanits-lratsvogh-/33058069.html

[21] https://armenpress dot am/en/article/1196821; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2024 ; https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-russia-guards-airport-withdrawal/33058381.html; https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

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[30] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/25320; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6212

[31] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wURh-J-U1ZU; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/17829

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[57]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l; https://t.me/dva_majors/48466

[58] https://t.me/ComAFUA/363

[59] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/7117 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/31/najbilsha-ataka-udarnymy-dronamy-za-rik-poblyzu-kyyeva-znyshhyly-ponad-30-bpla/

[60] https://t.me/milinfolive/127240

[61] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8025

[62] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8025

[63] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/973313; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202407310001 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41583

[67] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/07/31/minoborony-predlozhilo-vyplatit-po-neskolko-millionov-rubley-separatistam-donbassa-poluchavshim-raneniya-s-2014-goda ; https://regulation dot gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=149492

[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13259

[69] https://moldova.europalibera dot org/a/sis-si-pccocs-au-descins-cu-perchezitii-in-parlament/33057505.html

[70] https://agora dot md/2024/07/31/seful-directiei-juridice-a-parlamentului-ion-creanga-si-inca-o-persoana-retinuti-intr-un-dosar-de-spionaj

[71] https://t.me/tass_agency/263568

[72] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43762; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43762

[74] https://tass dot `ru/politika/21494749

[76] https://t.me/otukharkiv/498 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-vs-ukraine-biggest-war-fake-news-era-2024-07-31/

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