Solestiss

The CHA and its regional affiliate Hydrogen Ontario are pleased to welcome Solestiss as our newest small business member. The CHA team had the pleasure to sit down for a Q&A with Beth Buckmaster, Vice President of Strategic Client Relations at Solestiss, to learn more about the women-owned management consultancy that is dedicated to reshaping the energy sector. As a woman-owned business, Solestiss is committed to advancing diversity and inclusion within the energy industry, ensuring that their strategies not only foster technological and business innovations but also cultivate a positive and inclusive work environment. Their mission at Solestiss is to implement groundbreaking growth strategies within the energy sector, aiding clients as they navigate the complex landscape of today's energy challenges. Read the full press release here: https://lnkd.in/gt-vYhAZ #hydrogen #hydrogenenergy #consultancy #hydrogenindustry #womeninenergy #womeninstem #hydrogenmarket #cleanenergy #cleantech #netzero #decarbonization #energyindustry

Success teaches us nothing; only failure teaches. — Admiral Hyman #Rickover Another way to interpret this quote is to embrace and capitalize on the benefits of failing forward. Microfailures are inextricably linked to the #advancement and #innovation of any FOAK undertaking. Nothing worthwhile can be accomplished without determination. In the early days of #nuclear power, for example, getting approval to build the first nuclear submarine—the Nautilus—was almost as difficult as designing and building it. Many in the Navy opposed building a nuclear submarine and at the time, believed it to be an idea with a very high likelihood of failure. In total, it took approximately THREE years from the start of construction to the commissioning of USS #Nautilus. Let that sink in for a moment. It took the U.S 3 years to build the world’s first #SMR at a time when it was unclear if it was even possible. A reactor that was designed to go to great depths in the ocean and meet a laundry list of requirements in order for it to safely propel the submarine AND get the crew home safely. Think about that relative to the commercial deployment timescales we are facing today, particular relative to advanced fission technologies. The rapid development of our nation’s first SMR was a testament to Rickover's #leadership and the urgency of the Cold War context in which the project was undertaken. While our current reliable and clean energy demand is quickly moving past our generation capacity, the sheer scale of reliable and clean energy demand has created a modern day pressure cooker. Faster development is one thing the current administration has agreed to prioritize. But how fast is “faster”? The real question is, can they be built fast enough? Rickover loved to use an analogy between a “academic reactor” and a “practical nuclear power plant”. An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) It is simple. (2) It is small. (3) It is cheap (4) It is light. (5) It can be built very quickly. (6) It is very flexible in purpose (’omnibus reactor’). (7) Very little #development is required. It will use mostly off-the-shelf components. On the other hand, a practical #reactor plant: (1) Is being built now. (2) It is behind schedule. (3) It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. (4) It is very expensive. (5) It takes a long time to build because of the #engineering development problems. (6) It is large. (7) It is heavy. (8) It is complicated. How fortuitous! The tools of the academic-reactor designer are a piece of paper and a pencil with an eraser. If a mistake is made, it can always be erased. If the practical-reactor designer errs, he wears the mistake around his neck; it cannot be erased. Everyone can see it. We must not forget that mistakes are assumed risks for FOAK #technologies. And failing forward is likely a critical ingredient to meeting “faster deployment” goals.

Good ideas are not adopted automatically. They must be driven into practice with courageous patience.  — #HymanRickover Let’s circle back to my last post and discuss how #SouthKorea has become such an outlier in their ability to effectively manage costs of new nuclear projects. What exactly are they doing differently to have continuous cost reductions? The answers to this question are central to our domestic aspirations for #energytransition. A short history lesson… S. Korea had an advantage from the very beginning of their commercial #nuclear ambitions in that it didn’t start entirely from scratch. They imported proven international #technologies in the 1970s and learned from other countries’ experiences before developing its own domestic reactors in 1989. The results were remarkable: overnight #construction costs fell 50 percent between 1971 and 2008 as S. Korea built 28 reactors in all. The reason for #costreductions over time are grounded in the simplest of concepts, “learning by doing”.  Over time, S. Korean companies got better at #manufacturing commercial nuclear #power plants suggesting similar cost reductions are possible for new nuclear builds in other parts of the world. Well…. maybe. Let’s take a deeper look at the variables that helped them to get there: 1) Stable regulations are essential for nuclear power to thrive. Nuclear reactors will always need safety and #environmental #regulations. The key is making sure these regulations are predictable. A rule that forces reactors to limit the temperature of its water discharge can be dealt with. But a requirement that changes midway through construction can be devastating. Predictability was a key difference between the U.S. and South Korea. 2) Standardization of design is invaluable and by extension, learning by doing is more likely to occur. This standardization is also highly attractive to key #supplychain partners since it allows them to manufacture structures and components within a highly predictable set of conditions. S. Korea has a single state-owned utility in charge of all projects.  By contrast, the balkanized US #electricity market makes it much, much harder to coalesce around a single design and standard. I predict a lot of carnage as states and customers begin to downselect. 3) Build multiple reactors at the same site. S. Korea often built anywhere from two to eight reactors at a single power plant site. That led to major efficiencies: It saved on site-related costs (like evacuation plans), it’s easier to get specialized equipment and workers, and you can consolidate control rooms. In honor of the man who built our nation’s first SMR, courageous patience has never been more essential for new nuclear in the U.S. Patience does not mean “do nothing and wait for something to happen.” The truth is, the race isn’t always about speed – it’s about pacing yourself with a virtue called patience to support the ultimate goal of achieving #greatness and “doing it right.”

“We must have a relentless commitment to producing a meaningful, comprehensive energy package aimed at #sustainability, alleviating the burden of high energy prices on consumers, decreasing our country's dependency on foreign #oil, and increasing #electricity #gridreliability.” The commonly used cost metric, levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), does not account for grid integration costs and grid flexibility. It is important to look beyond the LCOE to fully evaluate the economic potential of advanced nuclear. In general, reactors should require less grid build out, given their potential for portability and co-siting. Ever wonder how electricity gets to your home? Let me introduce you more formally to the grid: a complex network of power plants and transformers connected by more than 450,000 miles of high-voltage #transmission lines. Electric shortages within the grid have recently become more acute making the nation’s power grid less reliable and more fragile. The increased use of wind and solar sources has added to the power grid's challenges, which are far more complicated than perceived. Despite the technical solutions that engineers could provide, the reliance on regional transmission organizations (RTOs) for power transactions complicates the situation further. #RTOs are a relatively new entrant in American’s electric power equation. Before they were authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (#FERC) in 1999, huge regional #utilities managed the nation’s electric grid. The RTOs changed things radically. These regional bodies buy the lowest priced power from anywhere they can buy it. Wind and solar can compete on pricing, partially because the federal and some state governments subsidize wind and solar operations. Often times, they crowd other sources – like nuclear – out of the competition. But when the wind and solar are not available, the RTOs immediately look to other fuels. During the last 20+ years of RSO’s, a lot of nuclear assets have closed because they simply could no longer operate profitably. And the electric grid’s infrastructure has deteriorated significantly under this model. Let’s get to the punchline - no body is fully in charge and managing the U.S. grid! Let that sink in. Renewable assets get stranded where they are created. And a lack of battery storage connected to these systems creates complications. There is an increasing number of homes and businesses using “distributed generation”. To fully take advantage of this trend, utilities need to upgrade their systems, which were built to send energy in only one direction—to the customer. Our country’s aging grid is being tested in ways that we’ve never seen before. And the jury is out on whether FERC’s recent investment in grid stabilization can actually be realized. #EnergyPlan #ElectricityGrid #innovation #EnergyReliability #fusion #fission #solar #wind #RTO #sustainable

“Make the maximum contribution to the general welfare.” — opening clause of the Atomic Energy Act. Building a new reactor is uniquely difficult in the U.S. due to its own self-imposed bureaucratic straight jacket. It takes an average 3.2 years to generate an environmental impact statement (#EIS) for a new reactor. There are then years of additional NRC hearings to officially license any project. None of these concern safety – safety inspections occur independently of this process and largely function as designed, lasting only months. Then, years of public hearings susceptible and often systematically captured by private interests further delays construction, forcing the U.S. to burn coal and natural gas instead of the #cleanatom. What was once introduced to prevent #government planners from running roughshod over communities has become a tool of privileged interests to block construction. The road to the U.S. meeting the current #energytransition opportunity runs directly through the U.S. #NRC. Unsurprisingly, as demand grows and new #technologies move from design to deployment, the NRC is ill-equipped to efficiently and effectively meet this moment.  Progress has been incremental and woefully insufficient in positioning the NRC to support the scale of advanced reactor deployment heading their way. While America is currently behind other countries, it can certainly catch up. However, this is only true if the U.S. government is willing to invest in a long term, stable and robust national nuclear energy strategy. NRC #leadership must focus the agency’s staff on efficient regulatory processes that are timely and right-sized for the next generation of simpler and inherently safer designs. #Regulatory efficiency must come first—adding staff to an inefficient process simply slows down the system even more. In short, the NRC cannot simply hire themselves to success. Given the current demand for new #nuclear, the processing of previously approved designs should be accomplished in less than a year. This approach would provide predictability and #efficiency for customers to have a clear line of sight from order to construction to deployment within three to five years.  This demand and urgency for new nuclear has not, however, penetrated the NRC mindset.   One of the key challenges is the NRC’s historical approach of ponderous reviews and decision-making. The United States is home to the highest performing and safest nuclear fleet in the world and safety must always be assured, but efficiency must be the order of the day. The current approach is sometimes justified by saying that the NRC has no responsibility for efficiency because it is not the NRC’s responsibility to be promotional under the Atomic Energy Act. This is a false premise. The #Atomicenergyact makes it very clear in the opening clause of its declaration that it is the policy of the United States that nuclear power “make the maximum contribution to the general #welfare.”

How do the Olympics relate to #nuclear power? Don’t worry, I can solve that riddle. The simple answer is, every country in the world is responsible for either making or buying #energy needed to meet their country’s demand. And there is international competition to see who can build new reactors better, faster, safer, and for the lowest cost. If there is one thing we can all agree on in the U. S., it’s that safety and security can never be considered collateral damage to meet schedule and cost projections. But has anyone happened to notice that Canada is now out in front of the U.S. when it comes to building new reactors? Given how wary Canada has historically been regarding nuclear power, this is kind of a big deal. While the NRC is very busy sending staff all over the world to assist other countries with establishing or enhancing their own nuclear regulatory frameworks, less is happening within our own agency to move the needle on new nuclear. Which begs the question that most of us in the U.S. never expected to say out loud…. WHY IS CANADA MOVING FASTER THAN THE U.S. RELATIVE TO NEW NUCLEAR? Food for thought (or discussion): 1. Regulatory Framework: Similar to the U.S., #Canada has a well-established nuclear regulatory framework. The #CNSC oversees the #licensing and #regulation of #nuclear facilities. However, the CNSC has different variations of guidelines that allow for a more efficient licensing process. 2. Standardized Reactor Designs: Canada has focused on standardized reactor designs, such as the CANDU (CANadian Deuterium Uranium) reactor. Standardization simplifies the licensing process as it eliminates the need for extensive design review and allows for the reuse of previous safety analyses and assessments. In the U.S., there is a much greater diversity of reactor designs, leading to a more challenging regulatory approval process for the NRC. 3. Government Support and Stability: The #Canadiangovernment has demonstrated consistent, long term support for nuclear energy by providing #policy stability and long-term commitments. This consistency over long durations of time helps to create a more favorable environment for long term capital #investments. 4. Collaborative Approach: Canada has a strong culture of collaboration and cooperation among industry #stakeholders, regulatory bodies, and local communities. This collaborative approach helps expedite the licensing process by fostering open stakeholder communication, addressing lessons learned and issues proactively, and streamlining decision-making. #NEI was created to facilitate collaboration on behalf of U.S. #utilities. In reality, U.S. utilities have failed to “come together” in any measurable way to advance new reactor construction lessons learned. Several attempts have been made by the utilities themselves to band together to support advanced reactor licensing. How does everything think we are doing on that front? I’m not sure we even deserve to stand on the podium.