Bethany Corbin

The revelation that menstruation tracking apps share sensitive data with third parties, like Facebook, provoked a sense of violation among users. This case highlights the need to address ethics and governance of health data created outside of traditional healthcare contexts. Commodifying health data breaches trust and entails health and moral risks. Through the metaphor of The Wizard of Oz, we argue that these apps approximate healthcare without the professional competency, fiduciary duties… Show more

The revelation that menstruation tracking apps share sensitive data with third parties, like Facebook, provoked a sense of violation among users. This case highlights the need to address ethics and governance of health data created outside of traditional healthcare contexts. Commodifying health data breaches trust and entails health and moral risks. Through the metaphor of The Wizard of Oz, we argue that these apps approximate healthcare without the professional competency, fiduciary duties, legal protections and liabilities such care requires and thus represent an innovation in the annals of snake-oil salesmanship and the systematic devaluing of women’s bodies, lives, and work. Show less

This Article tackles the difficult issues that have arisen due to the unsettled nature of copyright jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. The intersection of copyright and federal jurisdiction has been described by courts in a number of ways: as a knotty problem, as a dark corridor, and as murky waters. These visuals communicate the very problem at issue—the various tests utilized by the Circuit Courts to assess the presence or absence of jurisdiction in copyright cases have been confused… Show more

This Article tackles the difficult issues that have arisen due to the unsettled nature of copyright jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. The intersection of copyright and federal jurisdiction has been described by courts in a number of ways: as a knotty problem, as a dark corridor, and as murky waters. These visuals communicate the very problem at issue—the various tests utilized by the Circuit Courts to assess the presence or absence of jurisdiction in copyright cases have been confused, ineffective, and conflicting.

Shedding light on copyright jurisdiction is especially meaningful now as the importance of intellectual property continues to grow and courts find themselves handling a greater number of copyright disputes. The jurisdictional decisions at issue would benefit from additional clarity and a simpler approach. To that end, our Article proposes a two step approach to determining when a case will qualify for jurisdiction under section 1338. First, the court will wait for the defendant’s answer before answering the jurisdictional question. Second, the court will determine if the lawsuit as a whole requires construction of the Copyright Act, an analysis of an underlying copyright, or is seeking an exclusive remedy provided by the Copyright Act. This test should be more effective than current proposed approaches and will have the added benefit of preventing plaintiffs from manipulating unsettled law to avoid the federal forum. Show less

Discriminatory practices in the financial services industry have long been regulated by governmental entities tasked with promoting fair lending and ensuring equal opportunity regardless of race and gender. As early as the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted legislative initiatives aimed at guaranteeing non-discriminatory access to credit and housing as part of the Civil Rights movement. Specifically, two principal federal laws and corresponding regulations currently govern fair lending practices… Show more

Discriminatory practices in the financial services industry have long been regulated by governmental entities tasked with promoting fair lending and ensuring equal opportunity regardless of race and gender. As early as the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted legislative initiatives aimed at guaranteeing non-discriminatory access to credit and housing as part of the Civil Rights movement. Specifically, two principal federal laws and corresponding regulations currently govern fair lending practices in the United States: (1) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B (15 U.S.C. § 1691 and 12 C.F.R. Part 1002), and (2) the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the applicable United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations (42 U.S.C. § 3605 and 24 C.F.R. Part 100). This Article offers a comprehensive overview of fair lending legislation and analyzes the future of disparate impact under the FHA and ECOA. Show less

Domestic violence in the United States is an uncontrolled epidemic leaving virtually no family untouched. While domestic homicide is undoubtedly the leading cause of intentional death of women in the United States, its cure has been relegated solely to the reactive nature of the legal system. On March 26, 2014, the United States Supreme Court recognized the lethal interplay between domestic abuse and firearms in United States v. Castleman, and engaged in judicial activism in an attempt to save… Show more

Domestic violence in the United States is an uncontrolled epidemic leaving virtually no family untouched. While domestic homicide is undoubtedly the leading cause of intentional death of women in the United States, its cure has been relegated solely to the reactive nature of the legal system. On March 26, 2014, the United States Supreme Court recognized the lethal interplay between domestic abuse and firearms in United States v. Castleman, and engaged in judicial activism in an attempt to save women’s lives. Interpreting the Lautenberg Amendment, which prohibits domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing or purchasing guns, the Court held that any use of force, however de minimis is sufficient to constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and serve as a predicate offense under the federal firearms ban. In essence, this ruling eliminates an individual’s Second Amendment right to bear arms if he is convicted of assault or battery against an intimate partner or other domestic relation. Widely praised by the press and media outlets, this holding signified a victory for the Obama Administration, gun control organizations, and domestic violence advocates.

While well-intentioned, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Castleman is an example of judicial activism to promote social and political agendas. This Article analyzes the fundamental flaws in the Supreme Court’s reasoning, and further explains why the Court’s decision will not appreciably reduce domestic abuse. Instead, the Article advocates for the creation of mandatory domestic violence educational programs beginning in elementary school, and offers strategic advice for prosecutors and defense attorneys to enhance negotiation power at the plea bargaining table in light of Castleman. Show less

On June 9, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the latest installment in the jurisdictional saga of bankruptcy courts. As the highly anticipated sequel to Stern v. Marshall, which deprived bankruptcy judges of authority to hear certain core proceedings, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison was expected to resolve the oft-litigated issue of whether parties could consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction. Practitioners and scholars eagerly awaited the opinion, anxious to determine exactly how… Show more

On June 9, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the latest installment in the jurisdictional saga of bankruptcy courts. As the highly anticipated sequel to Stern v. Marshall, which deprived bankruptcy judges of authority to hear certain core proceedings, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison was expected to resolve the oft-litigated issue of whether parties could consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction. Practitioners and scholars eagerly awaited the opinion, anxious to determine exactly how far the Court would go in divesting bankruptcy judges of their authority. However, what the nation received instead was a classic attempt by the Court to dodge the ball on the consent issue.

In a unanimous decision, the Court resolved the Stern gap by allowing litigants to treat Stern claims as noncore proceedings but refused to address the overarching theme of consent. Tucking their reluctance away in a footnote, the Court expressly reserved the question of consent for another time, another case, and another day. This Article, however, argues that a straightforward reading of the plain language in Arkison impliedly resolves the consent issue. In light of this plain language, this Article proposes two legislative amendments to § 157(b). The first amendment statutorily resolves the Stern gap in accordance with Arkison. The second amendment authorizes consent for core claims related to bankruptcy proceedings. These amendments provide the necessary clarity and uniformity that bankruptcy courts have so desperately sought in the three years leading up to Arkison. Finally, provided the Court’s implicit authorization of consent in Arkison, this Article espouses the only logical resolution of Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, which poses the same question of consent. The Supreme Court will hear and decide Sharif during its October 2014 term. Show less

The legacy of disparate impact as a theory of discrimination recovery under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) stood ready to crumble. Although eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals upheld the disparate impact doctrine, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia called the theory into question when it determined that disparate impact lacked any textual foundation in the FHA. In light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, which held that the availability of disparate… Show more

The legacy of disparate impact as a theory of discrimination recovery under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) stood ready to crumble. Although eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals upheld the disparate impact doctrine, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia called the theory into question when it determined that disparate impact lacked any textual foundation in the FHA. In light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, which held that the availability of disparate impact liability turns exclusively on the presence of effects-based language, the lack of a textual reference to disparate impact forced the D.C. Court to wave “bye bye bye” to this method of recovery.

Resting upon the edge of a knife, the quest to save disparate impact reached its final hurdle when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, on October 2, 2014. Watching worriedly from the sidelines, activists and the Obama Administration pondered whether the Supreme Court would “gut” this landmark civil rights legislation. However, on June 25, 2015, the financial services industry and housing authorities—not civil rights activists—suffered a major and unexpected setback when the Supreme Court affirmed the viability of disparate impact claims under the FHA.

In an opinion that mangled, twisted, and ignored pertinent language of the FHA, the deeply divided Court held that the FHA’s plain text, legislative purpose, and congressional amendments clearly contemplated disparate impact liability. This decision, however, represents nothing more than an activist attempt to save discrimination claims, and is fatally flawed. Through an in-depth analysis of Justice Alito’s dissent, this Article explains why disparate impact claims are untenable and improper under the FHA, and examines the practical consequences of the Court’s decision. Show less

The phenomenon of honor killings has been marked as one of the most sensationalized and culturally specific forms of violence in the world. Rooted in patriarchal assumptions of female sexuality and purity, these murders transform the female body into a battleground where the forces of modernity and tradition collide. Colored with metaphorical images of savages and terrorists, honor killing discourse has become a medium through which the “other” is cast out and marked as fundamentally different… Show more

The phenomenon of honor killings has been marked as one of the most sensationalized and culturally specific forms of violence in the world. Rooted in patriarchal assumptions of female sexuality and purity, these murders transform the female body into a battleground where the forces of modernity and tradition collide. Colored with metaphorical images of savages and terrorists, honor killing discourse has become a medium through which the “other” is cast out and marked as fundamentally different from mainstream society. Recently, the ethnicized tone of honor killing portrayal has constructed Muslim men as barbarians who have failed to integrate and assimilate into “Western” society.

However, Turkey’s European Union accession prospects have challenged this notion of Muslim brutality and have attempted to undermine the generalized association of honor killings with Islam. Instead, in hopes of addressing its human rights deficits and promoting accession negotiations, Turkey has altered the ethnicization of honor crimes by blaming the Kurdish minority. Simultaneously targeting both its Kurdish and human rights problems, the Turkish state adopted harsh criminal sentences against honor killing perpetrators in late 2004 as the result of EU pressure to modernize its criminal code. Although Turkey’s revised Penal Code was expected to eliminate honor killings, scholars and reporters have noticed a startling new trend: the transformation of honor killings into honor suicides. This Article represents the first work of scholarship to challenge the conclusion that Turkey’s revised Penal Code caused the metamorphosis of honor killings into honor suicides. Show less

Fired Because A Man Can’t Control Himself.
Fired for Being Beautiful.
Bosses Can Fire Hot Workers For Being ‘Irresistible’: All-Male Court.

The newspaper headlines following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C. adequately captured public outrage over the court’s affirmation of Melissa Nelson’s employment termination. Fired for being “irresistible,” Ms. Nelson lost her job of ten years when her employer, Dr. Knight, admitted he would have an… Show more

Fired Because A Man Can’t Control Himself.
Fired for Being Beautiful.
Bosses Can Fire Hot Workers For Being ‘Irresistible’: All-Male Court.

The newspaper headlines following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C. adequately captured public outrage over the court’s affirmation of Melissa Nelson’s employment termination. Fired for being “irresistible,” Ms. Nelson lost her job of ten years when her employer, Dr. Knight, admitted he would have an affair with Ms. Nelson if she continued working at his practice. The jealousy displayed by Dr. Knight’s wife further convinced the dentist to terminate Ms. Nelson’s employment to save his marriage. Despite her assertion of gender discrimination, the all male Iowa Supreme Court denied Ms. Nelson’s claim and determined that a consensual relationship existed between Ms. Nelson and Dr. Knight, which justified the adverse employment action. This holding, however, is misguided and misinformed, and incorrectly relies on factually distinguishable precedent.

As the first Note to comprehensively address the Nelson decision, this paper critically analyzes the Iowa Supreme Court’s rationale and highlights fatal flaws in the court’s reasoning. Currently applied, the Nelson decision creates an unprecedented “one free bite” rule for gender discrimination actions and hinges on faulty logic. Moreover, the Iowa court perpetuates the rapidly evolving Goldilocks dilemma, which posits that an individual’s appearance must be “just right” in the workforce to avoid harassing and demeaning behavior. Ms. Nelson, the most recent victim of the Goldilocks dilemma, highlights the downfalls of being “too hot” in the workplace, and is afforded no redress under the current Title VII framework. Thus, this paper advocates for the adoption of a sex-plus totality of the circumstances test to remedy the Goldilocks dilemma and address the evolving doctrines of lookism and appearance-based discrimination. Show less

The fugitive is a puppet and the bondsman is his master. The bondsman may pull the puppet's strings at any time and for any reason, track the defendant, and return the fugitive to prison on a whim. These are the historic powers of the bondsman granted by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Taintor, and have become nearly undisputed. But a more recent tale has also begun to unfold, illuminating that the bondsmen may have strings of their own. Controlled by the the courts, the bondsmen's strings… Show more

The fugitive is a puppet and the bondsman is his master. The bondsman may pull the puppet's strings at any time and for any reason, track the defendant, and return the fugitive to prison on a whim. These are the historic powers of the bondsman granted by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Taintor, and have become nearly undisputed. But a more recent tale has also begun to unfold, illuminating that the bondsmen may have strings of their own. Controlled by the the courts, the bondsmen's strings operate as a check on the bondsmen's activities and the procedures by which they recapture fugitives. One movement out of line, and the courts can snap the bondsmen's strings, subjecting them to timely and costly litigation. The only freedom comes in the form of qualified immunity, a judicially created doctrine that serves as a bar to civil liability.

This Note addresses the applicability of qualified immunity to bail bondsmen, specifically in the context of the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Gregg v. Ham, which denied bondsmen access to this doctrine, and the Supreme Court's qualified immunity analysis in Filarsky v. Delia, which granted qualified immunity to special prosecutors. Particularly, this paper supports three central propositions: (1) the current qualified immunity analysis can be reduced to a determination of whether a party receives private or public compensation; (2) this qualified immunity test leads to irrational and inequitable results in the case of bondsmen; and (3) a functional analysis test is a better alternative for the qualified immunity standard because it eliminates the arbitrary and unfounded distinctions between public and private employees. Under the current qualified immunity test, a bondsman's strings can never be cut. Only with the introduction of a more realistic and transparent qualified immunity standard can equitable treatment finally be afforded to the bondsman. Show less