Dave Clukey, MS, MBA

September 11, 2021 marked 20 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 (911) and shortly before this solemn commemoration, on August 30, the United States (US) withdrew the last of its military forces from Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). Prior to the withdrawal, US forces had been on the ground in Afghanistan since October 7, 2001. In these two decades, the US spent over $2 trillion USD and invested over 2,300[3] in human capital to offer Afghanistan a chance for… Show more

September 11, 2021 marked 20 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 (911) and shortly before this solemn commemoration, on August 30, the United States (US) withdrew the last of its military forces from Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). Prior to the withdrawal, US forces had been on the ground in Afghanistan since October 7, 2001. In these two decades, the US spent over $2 trillion USD and invested over 2,300[3] in human capital to offer Afghanistan a chance for prosperity. Unfortunately, the way the US withdrew from Afghanistan appeared as curious as it did haphazard. On a global stage, the US orchestrated a series of diplomatic, tactical, and strategic missteps that were all preventable. Although cringeworthy and tragic, these recent missteps offer opportunity for reflection and lessons to learn from; as did the way the US approached the war in Afghanistan.

“Once we have a war there is only one thing to do. It must be won. For defeat brings worse things than any that can ever happen in war.” – Ernest Hemingway


The great irony is the US capitulated to the very terrorist group it drove from power 20 years earlier, and in doing so, created a pathway to enable the Taliban to recreate the conditions that precipitated 911 to begin with. In order to better understand the events that led to this and assist decision makers preclude a costly calamity like this in the future, this essay examines three US policy failures consisting of: (1) connection to the conflict; (2) mission creep; and (3) diplomacy, and how these lessons may shape future US foreign policy and armed conflicts. Show less

Before the US commits to withdrawing its resources from Afghanistan to justifiably end the “forever war”, it needs to consider viable and scalable options to sustain US strategic placement, continue counterterrorism, and sustain Afghan sovereignty through improved military capacity and economic development. It would behoove senior decision makers to review recent history and not reverse significant investments made, consider the impacts of relinquishing strategic competitive advantage through… Show more

Before the US commits to withdrawing its resources from Afghanistan to justifiably end the “forever war”, it needs to consider viable and scalable options to sustain US strategic placement, continue counterterrorism, and sustain Afghan sovereignty through improved military capacity and economic development. It would behoove senior decision makers to review recent history and not reverse significant investments made, consider the impacts of relinquishing strategic competitive advantage through critical asset emplacements to China, and the dire implications of ignoring viable (ISIL-K, al Qaeda) threats to U.S. national security interests. It would be extremely unfortunate to make a politically digestible strategic decision that nobly ends a forever war, yet sets forth a series of degenerative events that ultimately replicate pre-911 conditions in Afghanistan. Show less

The United States Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC, established a regimental pre-mission training, or PMT, facility at Fort Bliss, Texas, in order to better accomplish its statutory obligations to train, equip and organize forces in support of the geographic combatant commands, or GCCs. During the last 11 months, the initiative has enabled seven special operations task forces, or SOTFs, to achieve their pre-deployment training objectives in preparation for overseas contingency operations.… Show more

The United States Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC, established a regimental pre-mission training, or PMT, facility at Fort Bliss, Texas, in order to better accomplish its statutory obligations to train, equip and organize forces in support of the geographic combatant commands, or GCCs. During the last 11 months, the initiative has enabled seven special operations task forces, or SOTFs, to achieve their pre-deployment training objectives in preparation for overseas contingency operations. The unique combination of facilities and special-operations-unique resources allows SOTFs to focus on meeting their training requirements vs. dedicating the majority of their effort to creating an adequate training environment.

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As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' one-year timeline to make progress in Afghanistan approaches, the U.S. and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) still struggle to accomplish President Obama's goals in the region. I suggest that the current top down approach employed by U.S. and ISAF forces requires a corresponding and simultaneous application of a bottom-up approach to maximize operational effects.

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with… Show more

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with a district level FID/COIN methodology. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level to enhance the security, control, and influence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan. Show less