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Associate Professor of Economics

I am happy to share the first draft of our paper, Labor Markets, Wage Inequality, and Hiring Selection https://lnkd.in/e2xKKSsk jointly written with Alessandra Pizzo (Paris 8). Hiring and poaching workers are essentially selective processes. Employers receive a number of applications, interview them, and select and hire the most qualified. This implies that workers with higher productivity earn more and are employed more often. CPS data is consistent with this story: we robustly show that states with a higher employment rate and a lower job finding probability exhibit more wage inequality. How to explain these facts? We offer a new theoretical framework to rationalize these ideas and the evidence. These *obvious* points are NOT captured in sequential search models: employers optimally set a threshold and hire everyone above it. In contrast, our nonsequential model generates an endogenous distribution of wages that is shaped by the selection of firms. In turn, hiring selection affects the composition of the applicants. The solution of the model is a differential equation whose solution maps quantiles from the population distribution of worker productivities into the applicant distribution. We also show that, compared to a Walrasian benchmark, hiring selectivity stretches the right tail of the distribution and compresses the left tail, which matches the empirical evidence. We estimate/calibrate the model and find that an increase in mean productivity of workers explains the positive relation between unemployment and inequality. As productivity increases, vacancies increase, implying fewer applicants per vacancy and less selectivity. The distribution of employed and unemployed becomes more alike, reducing inequality. Finally, we find the most efficient allocation given search/selectivity frictions. For non-college workers, unemployment is too high. We show that optimality is achieved through a regressive tax schedule. Why? Top workers make it attractive for employers to post more vacancies, but few of them end up hiring stars. Top workers create a positive externality for the rest, who find more jobs available. By subsidizing top workers, the government would increase vacancies and employment.

Labor Markets, Wage Inequality, and Hiring Selection*

Labor Markets, Wage Inequality, and Hiring Selection*

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