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The federal courts deference to government agencies expertise and discretion (called Chevron deference) may well be at an end. Wednesday's oral arguments on January 17, 2024, before the United States Supreme Court in Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce appear to signal that Chevron may well be on the chopping block. To learn more, read our latest #LegalAlert authored by Brett Johnson, Ryan Hogan, and Savannah Wix. https://bit.ly/493Ujbp #ChevronDeference #AdministrativeLaw #SpecialLitigationandCompliance

📢Landmark #SCOTUS Decisions Restrain Federal Administrative Agency Power⚖️ The Supreme Court has issued landmark decisions in 𝘓𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳 𝘉𝘳𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵 𝘌𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘷. 𝘙𝘢𝘪𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰 and 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘌𝘹𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘷. 𝘑𝘢𝘳𝘬𝘦𝘴𝘺, drastically changing the landscape of federal administrative authority. The end of Chevron deference and new limitations on SEC in-house tribunals mark a significant shift in how agencies operate. Read the full update by Husch Blackwell's Gregg Sofer and Joseph Diedrich to understand the implications for businesses: https://lnkd.in/gqZNab-G

For nearly four decades, the Chevron deference has been a hallmark of administrative law. This doctrine, under which federal courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency is charged with administering, has been criticized as an insurmountable obstacle to those wishing to challenge an agency action. Two forthcoming decisions, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless Inc. v. Department of Commerce, will be argued on January 17, 2024, potentially providing avenues for the Supreme to walk back or even eliminate the doctrine. To learn more, read our latest #LegalAlert authored by Brett Johnson, Ryan Hogan, and Savannah Wix. https://bit.ly/3S4FBd8 #ChevronDoctrine #AdministrativeLaw #SpecialLitigationandCompliance

Kean Miller is closely following the recent challenges to the Chevron Deference standard established by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As applied by federal courts for the last four decades, the Chevron Deference standard first requires that a court determine whether a statute is ambiguous. Learn more at https://lnkd.in/gSEwPXcx by Louis Grossman and Michael Levatino

It finally happened: as widely expected, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron, the doctrine of deference due by courts to the legal interpretations made by federal agencies.   And Ars Technica found it timely to requote Pantelis Michalopoulos, whose past statement withstood the seismic change brought by this action: "I think the whole sturm und drang about Chevron is a little bit overdone. Because in the end, the judges and the justices know how to defer to the agency when they agree with it and how to not defer to the agency when they think they know better, as they often do." These thoughts remain as relevant after the court’s decision as they were long before. The full article, entitled “SCOTUS Kills Chevron Deference, Giving Courts More Power to Block Federal Rules,” can be found here. Read the full article in Ars Technica: https://lnkd.in/ek4KuUjJ

Sharing the message below from one of my K&L Gates partners because the message is perfectly stated (and because it is almost 5pm on Friday and it has been a long week). Check out the latest insights regarding the #Chevron decision by #SCOTUS and sign up for our webinar on Monday!

Da decisão: “Perhaps most fundamentally, Chevron’s presumption is misguided because agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do. The Framers anticipated that courts would often confront statutory ambiguities and expected that courts would resolve them by exercising independent legal judgment. Chevron gravely erred in concluding that the inquiry is fundamentally different just because an administrative interpretation is in play. The very point of the traditional tools of statutory construction is to resolve statutory ambiguities. That is no less true when the ambiguity is about the scope of an agency’s own power—perhaps the occasion on which abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate”. A íntegra pode ser acessada em https://lnkd.in/dw6ieFhe.