Can the Knicks find a way to limit Hawks’ Trae Young, or has he become too skilled to contain?

With rare exceptions, a star cannot be effective in the playoffs as a “one-pitch pitcher,” reliant on a single move or action to make things work. In elucidating the concept of a “16 game player,” Warriors GM Bob Myers has frequently spoken about how an opponent will initially work to take a player’s first move away, then their second, and so on as a series progresses. The result is that the best playoff performers tend to come in two stripes. The first: their ability is so overwhelming that one cannot simply take away favorite moves. This is generally the result of physical advantage, where the size, speed or explosive athleticism involved is too much even for a well-prepared defense to handle. The other avenue is variety; having multiple skill areas so that the defense is forced into whack-a-mole, but the star in question has options.

While the line between the two avenues for continued dominance is blurry, Trae Young likely falls more to the variety side, if only due to his size. Of guard-sized players, only Stephen Curry and Damian Lillard really stand out as having the same sort of “unhittable fastball” with their off-the-dribble shooting as do players like LeBron, KD and increasingly Jokic and Embiid. Young, of course, can shoot off the dribble, just not quite to that level.

Semantics aside, this means playoff series involving Young are likely to be a bit cat-and-mouse. This first series against the Knicks has been a case in point. Young was largely dominant for the first six quarters of the series, using his off-the-dribble passing and floater game to brunoise New York’s defense. Then came the first adjustment. After largely guarding Young with like-sized players through halftime of Game 2, the Knicks switched up the plan and began to attack Young with more size.

In particular, Reggie Bullock moved into a more prominent role trying to stop Young. In particular, Bullock was called upon in the fourth quarter of Game 2.

In addition to the change of primary defenders, the Knicks also went to more aggressive coverage of ball screens. According to Second Spectrum data provided to The Athletic, the Knicks had played drop coverage on nearly 80 percent of ball screens involving Young through six quarters. In the second half of Game 3, the man defending the screener was far more active, with around 40 percent drop coverage. One wants to avoid the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc as shooting variance is often as much of a factor as anything schematic, but Young and the Hawks found tougher sledding in the second half of New York’s lone win these far.

Qualitatively, the larger defenders and more aggressive coverage certainly seemed more effective at forcing Young to speed up his decision making (while taking away some of his floor vision) than had the conservative scheme, which had simply turned given Young the time and space to pick the right pass over and over again.

So Young established an advantage, the Knicks found their first counter and to Game 3 we went. In that third game, the Knicks went to Bullock on Young even more:

However, the Hawks and Young adjusted. After an average of 52 ball screens per game in the first two contests, this fell to 36 in Game 3. Rather than bring a second player to the ball, why not simply let Young work his way past larger but slower defenders on his own? This, combined with a surge in Atlanta’s own shotmaking, following up a below-par showing in Game 2 by shooting 16-27 from 3 in Game 3, allowed Atlanta’s offense to get untracked a bit and cruise to a relatively easy victory:

Leaving aside their own offensive foibles, it is now New York’s turn to see if they can force Young and the Hawks towards their third choice, after the pick-and-roll heavy approach of the first two games moving to more one-on-one play in the third. Perhaps the Knicks don’t have a counter to the counter, with the question of whether he is being guarded by small or large opponents dictating whether Young calls for a pick or decides to go it alone. Or perhaps New York will find another option, such as working aggressively to make Young give up the ball and then denying him the ability to get it back.

Over much of the season and indeed his career, Young has not been much of an off-ball player, often deactivating by standing out near half-court once he enters the ball into another player in the offensive zone. While that approach has some appeal, it’s easier said than done. Unless the Knicks are willing to live with Frank Ntilikina’s considerable offensive limitations, they don’t really have the personnel to execute a full-court pressure scheme against as accomplished and wily a ballhandler as Young. Further, there are some indications that Young has been a more active participant off the ball in this series than during the season. According to data from NBA Advanced Stats, Young spent just under 50 seconds per game above the hash mark when the Hawks had the ball below the foul line during the regular season. In the playoffs this has fallen to just over 30 seconds per game, as the Hawks have even run some sets apparently designed to ball back to Young while he is on the move, further complicating the defensive mountain New York must climb.

But we won’t know if whatever the Knicks try will work until they’ve tried it in Game 4. If they find something, the ball is back in Young’s court to find the counter to the counter to the counter. With a 2-1 lead, the advantage remains with Young and the young Hawks, but it will be fascinating to watch the game-to-game and even in-game adjustments play out.

(Photo: Scott Cunningham/NBAE via Getty Images)