DOL Home > OALJ > Whistleblower > Summey v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 95-ERA-14 (ALJ Dec. 31, 1996) |
Date: December 31, 1996
Case No.: 95-ERA-14
In the Matter of:
REBECCA DARLENE SUMMEY,
Complainant
v.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,
Respondent
APPEARANCES:
Donald M. Lasley, Esquire
For the Complainant
Brent R. Marquand, Esquire
Thomas F. Fine, Esquire
For the Respondent
BEFORE: J. MICHAEL O'NEILL
Administrative Law Judge
This action arises from a complaint under the employee protection provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2622, the Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1367, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i), the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851, the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. § 6971, the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7622, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9610. The employee protection provisions of the above-referenced statutes, and implementing regulations thereunder, unanimously prohibit any employer from taking any adverse employment action against an employee, relating to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, in retaliation for the employee's assistance or participation in proceedings or any other action that furthers the purposes of the environmental statutes at issue. 29 C.F.R. § 24.2(a).
The complainant, Rebecca Darlene Summey, filed
a complaint on November 4, 1993 with the United States Department
of Labor (DOL) against her employer, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) (RX 10 at 2).1 She filed amended complaints on December 22, 1993
(RX 10 at 4-10), March 9, 1994 (RX 10 at 13-19), and October 3,
1994 (RX 10 at 21-22). The complainant alleged that she suffered
acts of retaliation and discrimination after she raised concerns
about mislabeled chemicals both to her superiors at TVA and to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and after she disclosed
the presence of asbestos to her supervisor. Further, she alleged
that TVA retaliated against her after she filed this DOL claim.
On December 14, 1994, following an
investigation, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division,
Employment Standards Administration, DOL, determined that Ms.
Summey's allegations of discrimination could not be substantiated
(RX 11). Ms. Summey timely appealed DOL's determination and
requested that the matter be set for a formal hearing.
TVA, through counsel, filed a Motion for
Summary Decision with supporting documentation on April 3, 1995,
which I denied on May 19, 1995, in order to give the complainant
the opportunity to present a prima facie case of
discriminatory retaliation under the governing statutes. A
formal hearing in this matter was conducted on July 18, 1995, in
Chattanooga, Tennessee. Each of the parties was afforded a full
opportunity to present evidence and argument at the hearing. The
findings and conclusions which follow are based upon my
observation of the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses who
testified at the hearing, and upon a careful analysis of the
entire record in light of the arguments of the parties,
applicable statutory provisions, regulations, and pertinent case
law.
1. Whether the complaint was timely filed.
2. Whether the complainant proved that the
respondent took adverse employment actions against her as a
result of protected activities.
3. Whether the respondent demonstrated
legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for its actions.
4. Provided that a dual motive is found,
whether the respondent established that it would have taken the
same employment actions absent the complainant's protected
activities.
Timeliness
TVA argued that the complainant failed to meet
the time requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 24.3(b) and therefore
her claim is untimely. Section 24.3(b) requires that "[a]ny
complaint shall be filed within 30 days after the occurrence of
the alleged violation." With the exception of the ERA, the
whistleblower provisions under which this claim of discriminatory
treatment is brought all include a thirty-day statute of
limitations for bringing a claim of discrimination. See
15 U.S.C. § 2622(B)(1) (TSCA); 33 U.S.C. § 1367(b)
(WPCA); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2) (SDWA); 42 U.S.C. §
6971(b) (SWDA); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b)(1) (CAA); and 42 U.S.C.
§ 9610(b) (CERCLA). Thus, only adverse actions taking place
on October 5, 1993 or after are timely under the CAA, TSCA, SWDA,
CERCLA, WPCA and SDWA. The ERA has a 180 day filing period. 42
U.S.C. § 5851 (b)(1); see Yule v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Serv., 93-ERA-12 @ 2 (Sec'y May 24, 1995) (stating that
Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (CNEPA) amended
ERA by enlarging time for filing from 30 to 180 days).
Ms. Summey lost her SB-4 job as a Descriptive
Indexer in Chemical Traffic Control in November, 1990. She
alleged that this action occurred because she reported mislabel-
ing of containers to the NRC and internally to TVA. Additional-
ly, the complainant contended that her position should have been
upgraded to SA-2 but was not because of her protected activities.
The last documented consideration of this classification occurred
in November 1991 (RX 9). The complainant did not file her ERA
complaint until October 4, 1993, clearly more than 180 days after
these alleged adverse actions occurred. These incidents and any
others occurring prior to 1993 cannot be considered under any of
the above statutes because they are time-barred. The complainant
concedes that claims based on events occurring in 1988, 1989 and
1990 are untimely (Tr. at 5-6). Thus, the events at issue in
this case are only those occurring in 1993 and 1994.
Background
Darlene Summey began working for TVA at the
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant on October 20, 1980 (Tr. at 14). She was
working as a Descriptive Indexer (SB-4 classification) in the
Chemical Traffic Control Department in 1988. Also in 1988, Ms.
Summey discovered mislabeled chemicals and reported this finding
to Ed Craigge, the Industrial Safety Staff Manager (Tr. at 32).
Shortly thereafter, she reported the presence of asbestos to her
supervisor, Tom Leach (Tr. at 33). In 1990, she reported
mislabeled chemicals to the NRC who told her the situation was a
management problem (Tr. at 37). Consequently, Ms. Summey
contacted Employee Concerns within TVA. In May 1990, Ms. Summey
applied to have her SB-4 Descriptive Indexer position upgraded
and reclassified as SA-2, Information Systems Specialist (RX 5).
In November 1990, she was informed that budget cuts required her
position in Chemical Traffic Control to be eliminated by a
reduction in force (RX 3). Ms. Summey exercised her roll-over
rights and took a lower position as a Clerk/Word Processor (SB-3
classification) in Human Resources (Tr. at 40, 59). In January
1991, Ms. Summey continued as a Clerk/Word Processor (SB-3
classification) in Project Controls (Tr. at 40-41). A
classification audit was conducted by Human Resources in April,
1991 to decide whether Ms. Summey's position should be upgraded
to SA-2. It was determined that the major duties described by
the Descriptive Indexer classification no longer were performed
by anyone at TVA. Therefore, Ms. Summey's SB-3 Information
Systems Clerk classification was appropriate (RX 8). The union
reviewer disagreed and classified the position as SB-4.
Evaluating both the initial review and the union comments, Human
Resources concluded that the initial TVA evaluation of SB-3 was
appropriate (RX 9). This evaluation was sent back to the union
reviewer but no additional documentation about the outcome of
this issue is present in the record. All of the correspondence
in the record occurred between May 1990 and October 1991.
Neither TVA nor the union reviewer classified Ms. Summey at the
requested level of SA-2. Due to a reduction in force, Ms. Summey
was moved from Project Controls to Mechanical Maintenance as a
Clerk/Word Processor (SB-3) in January 1992 (Tr. at 41).
On October 27, 1993, TVA notified all
employees that each would receive a $905 bonus. However, when
s. Summey received her check it was for only $438 ($605 before
taxes) (RX 10 at 2). When Ms. Summey questioned the accuracy of
her bonus, she was told that the amount was reduced because she
had taken leave without pay (RX 10 at 2). The calculation of Ms.
Summey's bonus was not made by a supervisor or anyone else at the
Sequoyah plant. A person in the payroll department in Knoxville,
Tennessee made the calculation (Tr. at 64). I find that Ms.
Summey's bonus was reduced because she took leave without pay.
While employed as a Clerk/Word Processor in
echanical Maintenance, Ms. Summey experienced a variety of
health problems. She underwent knee surgery, required physical
therapy at least one day per week, passed multiple kidney stones,
and had a heart condition requiring recurrent hospitalization
(Tr. at 51). Because of her various medical problems and therapy
requirements, Ms. Summey had exhausted all of her accumulated
annual leave and sick leave (Tr. at 46). According to Al Black,
a human resources officer, Ms. Summey used all annual leave and
sick leave, which she had earned, as well as hundreds of hours of
leave without pay, during 1993 and 1994 (Tr. at 223). During
February 1994, when Ms. Summey was passing kidney stones, she was
absent from work without notifying her supervisor and without
following company policy on absences (RX 13; Tr. at 175-76).
After she returned to work, she requested and was denied leave
without pay (Tr. at 47). On February 11, 1994, Ms. Summey
received a leave control letter and was the subject of a
disciplinary meeting. Ms. Summey's supervisor, Ray Rinehart,
along with Marcia Cooper, issued a leave control letter to Ms.
Summey, reminding her of company policies about obtaining
approval for unpaid leave and citing instances in which Ms.
Summey had failed to obtain approval for leave and had been
absent from work without notice (RX 13).
In the spring of 1994, Ms. Summey indicated a
willingness to leave TVA and take early retirement, provided an
acceptable settlement package was offered (Tr. at 220). In the
fall of 1994, Ms. Summey was given paid administrative leave to
consider TVA's settlement offer (Tr. at 55-56). After rejecting
TVA's offer, she was transferred to the Planning group in October
1994, where she works as a Clerk/Word Processor (SB-3) (Tr. at
60). At the time of the hearing, Ms. Summey was still employed
by TVA in the Planning group at the SB-3 level (Tr. at 14).
Discussion
Following the Secretary's instruction, I will
not conduct a detailed analysis of whether the complainant has
established a prima facie case. The Deputy Secretary
stated in Creekmore v. ABB Power Sys. Energy Servs., Inc.
that "[w]here a respondent has introduced evidence to rebut
a prima facie case of a violation of the ERA's employee
protection provision, it is unnecessary to examine the question
of whether the complainant established a prima facie
case." 93-ERA-24 @ 5 (Dep. Sec'y Feb. 14, 1996);
accord Yule v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 93-ERA-12 @
3 (Sec'y May 24, 1995). After a case is tried on the merits, the
Administrative Law Judge must weigh all of the evidence and
determine whether the complainant has proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that the respondent intentionally discriminated
against the complainant because of protected activities.
Jackson v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 93-WPC-7, @ 6 n.1 (Sec'y
ar. 4, 1996). The Secretary has held that the complainant's
burden of proof under the ERA whistleblower provision is
applicable to all environmental whistleblower claims. Wagoner
v. Technical Prods., Inc., 87-TSC-4 (Sec'y Nov. 20, 1990).
Thus, my analysis will begin with the determination that the
complainant has established a prima facie case and that
TVA has produced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of
the prima facie case.
The complainant engaged in protected
activities when she made internal safety complaints in 1988 and
1990, see Jones v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258,
264 (6th Cir. 1991), and when she contacted the NRC about
mislabeled chemicals in 1990. Additionally, the complainant's
filing of this DOL complaint constituted a protected activity.
See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1); Bryant v. Ebasco
Servs., Inc., 88-ERA-31 @ 3 (Sec'y Apr. 21, 1994) (stating
that filing ERA complaint with DOL is protected activity);
McCuiston v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 89-ERA-6 (Sec'y Nov.
13, 1991) (same).
Although the complainant alleged that TVA took
adverse employment actions against her in response to her
protected activities, TVA has demonstrated non-discriminatory,
valid business reasons for the employment actions taken. "An
employee's engagement in protected activities does not auto-
matically render him or her immune from discharge or discipline
for legitimate reasons or from adverse action dictated by non-
prohibited considerations." 10 C.F.R. § 50.7(d). TVA
has no burden to prove legitimate motives, but has merely a
burden of production, which it has met. See Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981);
Dartey v. Zack Co., 82-ERA-2 @ 5 (Sec'y Apr. 25, 1983).
After a respondent meets its burden of production, the
complainant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that the articulated reasons for the adverse employment actions
are a mere pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 256.
Initially, I wish to dispose of a number of
issues raised by the complainant that do not show adverse or
discriminatory actions on the part of TVA. Ms. Summey alleged
that her coworker, Tammy Roberson, harassed her by using foul
language, having a hateful tone in her voice, and giving the
complainant nasty looks (RX 10 at 6). Tammy Roberson was not
acting on behalf of TVA when engaging in this alleged conduct.
Nor has the complainant shown any connection between Ms.
Roberson's actions and Ms. Summey's protected activities. Ms.
Summey also contended that coworkers in the Mechanical
aintenance group made derogatory comments about her use of the
freight elevator although she was physically unable to use the
stairs (RX 10 at 17). Interpersonal conflicts and comments made
between coworkers are not compensable under any of the governing
environmental statutes in this case. Cf. Crawford v.
edina Gen. Hosp., No. 95-3243, slip op. at 11 (6th Cir.
Sept. 24, 1996) (stating that ADEA not intended to remedy minor
social slights and resulting hurt feelings).
Ms. Summey also alleged a failure of TVA to
pay her chiropractic bills (RX 10 at 7). Ms. Summey provided no
link to show that this action was in any way related to her
protected activities. Moreover, unpaid medical bills are not an
issue to be decided in this claim, but must be resolved, if at
all, under the governing worker's compensation statute.
The remaining issues in this claim are Ms.
Summey's reduced bonus, TVA's issuance of a leave control letter
to Ms. Summey on February 11, 1994, and her transfer to the
Planning Group after being placed on paid administrative leave.
With regard to her bonus, the complainant contended that she
received only $438 when she was entitled to $905. TVA informed
s. Summey that her bonus was reduced because she had taken leave
without pay. Although Ms. Summey asserted that another TVA
employee who took leave without pay received the full bonus
amount, she has provided no documentation of this occurrence, nor
did counsel elicit at the hearing any information about potential
disparate treatment in the issuance of bonus checks. Thus, the
complainant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that TVA discriminated against her in this instance or
had any illegitimate motives for its action.
The major points of contention at the hearing
were the leave control letter and Ms. Summey's transfer to the
Planning Group. TVA asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory
business reasons for its actions under the circumstances.
ultiple personnel of TVA testified at the hearing that well-founded and verified reasons existed for issuing Ms. Summey a
leave control letter. Ray Rinehart, TVA's Mechanical Maintenance
anager and Ms. Summey's supervisor during 1993 and 1994,
recorded in his daily planner when Ms. Summey was absent from or
late for work and dates on which he counselled her about her
leave problems (RX 12; Tr. at 177). TVA issued the leave control
letter because Ms. Summey failed to obtain prior approval for
unpaid leave as required by company policy and because she failed
to notify her supervisors when she would be arriving late to work
or would not be coming to work (RX 13; Tr. at 175). The issuance
of a leave control letter under these circumstances comported
with company policy and with actions taken in similar
circumstances with other employees. (Tr. at 182).
Marcia Cooper, the Acting Maintenance Manager
from November, 1993 to March, 1994, concurred in the issuance of
the leave control letter after examining Mr. Rinehart's
documentation of Ms. Summey's leave problems (Tr. at 106) and
after consulting with human resources personnel and the plant
manager on the appropriate course of action under the circum-
stances (Tr. at 107-08). Ms. Cooper also drew from her own
experience in similar situations, stating that she had issued a
leave control letter to an employee in circumstances similar to
s. Summey (Tr. at 103).
Before agreeing to issue the leave control
letter, Al Black, a human resources officer and labor relations
specialist, spoke with Ms. Cooper and Mr. Rinehart to verify the
dates and times mentioned in the letter and to make sure that Mr.
Rinehart had verbally counselled Ms. Summey in the past about her
leave problems (Tr. at 210, 212). Mr. Black testified that Ms.
Summey was not treated any differently than other employees who
were denied leave without pay (Tr. at 211). Moreover, Mr. Black
concurred that TVA's standard business practice was to first
counsel employees about leave issues verbally and to follow the
verbal counselling with a written warning or leave control letter
if the problem did not improve (Tr. at 211).
The union representative also agreed that
issuing a leave control letter to Ms. Summey was consistent with
normal company practice even though Ms. Summey alleged that she
was being treated unfairly by TVA (Tr. at 113).
Although Mr. Rinehart, Ms. Cooper and Mr.
Black all were aware of Ms. Summey's contact with the NRC and her
complaint to DOL, none of them considered her protected
activities factors in the decision to issue the leave control
letter (Tr. at 113-15, 186, 217). Additionally, as promised, the
letter was removed from Ms. Summey's personnel file after six
months without further leave problems (RX 14; Tr. at 219).
A meeting to discuss the leave control letter
and Ms. Summey's leave problems also occurred on February 11,
1994, in conformance with company practice (Tr. at 213). Mr.
Black described the purpose of the meeting. "It was a
session where we were trying to assist Ms. Summey, to get her
back in the work environment. It was clearly noted to her that
nobody was trying to adversely affect Ms. Summey or terminate her
employment, it was simply to get her back in the fold because she
was a very vital part of the Sequoyah organization" (Tr. at
216).
I find that TVA had valid business reasons for
issuing the leave control letter to Ms. Summey and for holding a
disciplinary meeting with her. Various TVA employees testified
that TVA handled Ms. Summey's discipline in accordance with
company policy and procedure. Moreover, I find Mr. Black's
testimony about the purpose of the February 11, 1994, meeting to
be credible. TVA has produced evidence showing not only
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions but also
concern for Ms. Summey and a willingness to assist her despite
her violations of company policy and frequent absence from work.
It is Ms. Summey's burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that TVA's proffered explanation is mere pretext. Ms.
Summey has failed to meet that burden. Ms. Summey offers only
her testimony that she "feels" TVA was motivated by
improper reasons. At the hearing, Ms. Summey stated "I feel
like that it all goes back because I raised the safety concerns.
I honestly feel that. . .[a]nd then because of the knee surgery
and then the kidney stones and the heart problem." (Tr. at
52-53). On the other hand, TVA has provided evidence and
documentation from several sources that the actions taken by TVA
were not discriminatory or adverse. Rather, the actions resulted
from Ms. Summey's own physical and occupational needs and her
neglect of proper administrative procedures. Ms. Summey has
failed to prove that TVA acted with improper motives.
The other major issue in this case is Ms.
Summey's transfer to Planning after being placed on paid
administrative leave in 1994. I first note that Ms. Summey
failed to specifically raise this issue in her DOL complaint
(See generally RX 10). However, time and effort was spent
on this issue at the hearing and I will address its merits. In
1992, Ms. Summey was working in Mechanical Maintenance at a SB-3
level. In the spring of 1994, Ms. Summey informed the Human
Resources Department that she was interested in leaving TVA,
provided an acceptable settlement package was developed (Tr. at
220). Ms. Summey was considering the possibility of taking
disability retirement. In order for Ms. Summey to acquire the
necessary medical documentation and to study TVA's proposed
offer, Ms. Summey was given paid administrative leave from
September 1994 to October 1994 (Tr. at 221-22). Upon Ms.
Summey's rejection of TVA's offer, Mr. Black analyzed each
department's needs and available positions and found a suitable
position for Ms. Summey available only in the Planning group (Tr.
at 225). Ms. Summey did not return to her previous Mechanical
aintenance SB-3 position because of that department's need for a
full time weekday clerk and Ms. Summey's inability to fulfill
that role (Tr. at 162, 224-25). Although Ms. Summey stated that
she felt ostracized from the Planning group because her cubicle
was on the first floor and the rest of the group was on the
second floor, she admitted on cross-examination that the group
had tried to accommodate her (Tr. at 70).
The record is replete with examples of TVA's
attempts to accommodate Ms. Summey's physical limitations and
medical requirements. TVA transferred the complainant to
Planning so that she could work in a department that did not
require her presence during the normal shift period of 7:30 a.m.
to 4:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. Rather, in Planning many
employees are on a schedule of four ten-hour workdays (Tr. at
199). With this schedule, Ms. Summey is able to attend doctor's
appointments and therapy sessions on Wednesdays without taking
leave without pay. TVA had a legitimate business interest in its
decision to transfer the complainant to Planning because the
demands of the transferring department, Mechanical Maintenance,
required the presence of employees Monday through Friday from
7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (Tr. at 198). Additionally, Ms. Summey
was given a cubicle on the first floor of the building while the
rest of the employees of the Planning group were on the second
floor in order to accommodate her physical limitations. Ms.
Summey told Mr. Ridge, a human resources officer, that she could
not walk up the flight of stairs to the second floor (Tr. at
166). Thus, TVA's placement of the complainant on the first
floor was not an act of retaliation, but rather an act of
kindness to Ms. Summey and a recognition of her physical
limitations.
I have considered the complainant's argument
that TVA's motives were improper, but I find her argument
unpersuasive. Ms. Summey has not shown that TVA's proffered
reasons are pretextual. She has failed to show that TVA's given
reasons are not the true reasons or that a discriminatory reason
is the more likely motive. Thus, the complainant has failed to
meet her ultimate burden of persuasion.
Moreover, the complainant has produced no
direct evidence that shows the use of an illegitimate criterion
in the challenged decisions. "Direct evidence means evidence
showing a specific link between an improper motive and the
challenged employment decision." Carroll v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 78 F.3d 352, 357 (8th Cir. 1996). Dual
motive analysis is necessary only when the complainant provides
direct evidence linking adverse employment actions to protected
activities. Id. In this case, Ms. Summey has failed to
provide any direct evidence of a connection between her protected
activities and adverse employment actions.
However, assuming arguendo that TVA did
act with a dual motive, under the ERA, TVA must show by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same employment
actions absent Ms. Summey's protected activities. See 42
U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(D); Yule v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Serv., 93-ERA-12 @ 4 (Sec'y May 24, 1995). No precise
definition of clear and convincing evidence exists, but "the
courts recognize that it is a higher burden than 'preponderance
of the evidence' but less than 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
Yule, 93-ERA-12 @ 4; see Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslipi, 499 U.S. 1, 22 n.11 (1991); Grogan v.
Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 282 (1991). Under the other
environmental statutes involved in this case, TVA's burden is
only a preponderance of the evidence. Obviously, if TVA meets
the clear and convincing standard of the ERA it also satisfies
its burden of proof under the remaining statutes.
TVA has shown through the testimony of Ms.
Summey's supervisors and members of the human resources
department, as well as through documentary evidence, that TVA was
justified in the employment actions taken with regard to Ms.
Summey. TVA has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it
was Ms. Summey's absence from, and tardiness to, work and her
disregard of company leave policies that necessitated the
issuance of the February 11, 1994 leave control letter and
meeting. Moreover, it was Ms. Summey's inability to work Monday
through Friday during the normal business day that necessitated
her transfer from Mechanical Maintenance to Planning. TVA has
shown that it has treated Ms. Summey the same as other employees
with leave problems who did not engage in protected activities.
TVA's decisions were based on legitimate business concerns and
accommodations of Ms. Summey. TVA has met its burden of proof in
showing that it would have taken the same employment actions
absent Ms. Summey's protected activities.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the complaint filed by
Rebecca Darlene Summey be DISMISSED.
J. MICHAEL O'NEILL
NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order and the adminis-
trative file in this matter will be forwarded for final decision
to the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of
Labor, Room S-4309, Francis Perkins Building, 200 Constitution
Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20210. See 61 Fed. Reg. 19978
and 19982 (1996).
1 In this
decision, "RX" refers to Respondent's Exhibits and
"Tr." refers to the transcript of the formal
proceeding.
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Administrative Law Judge
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