DOL Home > OALJ > Whistleblower > McFarland v. City of New Franklin, Missouri, 86-SDW-1 (ALJ Sept. 26, 1986) |
86-SDW-00001
Sept. 26, 1986
In the Matter of:
FRED AND JOYCE MCFARLAND,
Complainants,
vs.
CITY OF NEW FRANKLIN, MISSOURI,
Respondent.
APPEARANCES:
Cullen Cline, Esquire
For the Complainants
Larry E. Tate, Esquire
For the Respondent
HEARD BEFORE:
RICHARD D. MILLS
Administrative Law Judge
This matter arises under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300 et seq., hereinafter called the Act and the regulations issued thereunder, 29 C.F.R. § 24 et seq. The Act prohibits any person from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee, who has engaged in activity protected by the Act.
Fred and Joyce McFarland, the Complainants in this matter, filed a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, alleging that they were discharged by
Respondent, City of New Franklin, on March 4, 1986, because they
were engaged in activity protected by the Act. (JX 1).1
The Wage and sour Division, on April 30, 1986, issued its
notification of findings letter finding that Complainants were
protected employees engaging in a protected activity under the
Act and that prohibited discrimination was a factor in the
discharges. (ALJX 1). It was further found that the following
disclosures were persuasive to that finding:
(ALJX 1).
On May 2. 1986, Respondent timely filed a telegraphic request
for a formal hearing. (ALJX 2).
A formal hearing was held in Columbia, Missouri, on July 29
and 30y 1986. Each of the parties was offered full opportunity
to present evidence and argument at the hearing. At said
hearing, the parties requested leave to file written post-hearing
briefs. Post-hearing briefs were filed by both parties and have
been reviewed and considered by me in reaching my findings and
conclusions. Based upon the entire record, including my
observations of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the
following:
Prior to the hearing the parties entered into the following
stipulation of facts:
(ALJX 6; Tr. 15).
The primary facts involved in this case are not in dispute.
A fire occurred in the City of New Franklin on January 14, 1986.
Because of the anticipated need for a greater water supply, Mayor
J.T. Offineer and City Council members Joe Smith and Richard
Kommrau ordered a by-pass of the water filters at the city water
plant.
Fred and Joyce McFarland on the evening of January 14, 1986,
at 5:45 p.m., had left work and gone to a nearby town, Boonville,
to shop for groceries. Upon their return to New Franklin, they
drove to the scene of the fire and observed the county water
tanker and fire truck. Since they had also seen activity at the
water plant they drove to the plant. Prior to reaching the plant
building, Fred McFarland spoke to Mayor Offineer who was leaving
the plant and the Mayor stated that they had by-passed the water
filters. Mr. and Mrs. McFarland entered the plant and spoke to
Frank McDaniels who was the licensed operator at the plant.
Joyce stated that they should call the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) and report the by-pass of the filters. (Tr.
98-103).
The McFarlands drove home and at 8:04 p.m. Joyce McFarland
called the Department of Natural Resources and Fred McFarland
advised LaVerne Heaton of the situation. (Tr. 111). Mr. Heaton
advised that a "boil water" order should be broadcast before
10:00 p.m. to the community. In addition he advised Mr.
cFarland to flush out the hydrant system and turn up the clorine
level, the following morning. Mr. McFarland returned to the water
plant and advised Mayor Offineer that he had called DNR and of
the "boil water" advise. The Mayor told Fred McFarland to go
ahead and notify the media of the "boil order." Joyce McFarland
called and so notified the television stations at 9:00 p.m. (Tr.
112).
In the next two weeks January 14, 1986 and January 27, 1986,
there appeared various articles in a local newspaper concerning
the fire and the by-pass of the water filters. Because of this
publicity Joe Smith testified that he brought the situation to
the Attention of the other council members at the January 27,
1986, executive session of the regular New Franklin Board Meeting.
r. Smith in particular strongly criticized the actions of Fred
cFarland the night of the fire. Mr. Smith in criticizing Mr.
cFarland stated, "He didn't need to counter our decisions. He
tried to make it sound as we were poisoning the people of town.
He tried to bring in other factors." (Tr. 304).
It was suggested by Mary Grindstaff, a board member, that
Fred McFarland should be asked to come to a special meeting of
the board and discuss the matter. Within a day or two after the
January 27, 1986, executive session, Mrs. Joyce McFarland called
ary Grindstaff and Ms. Grindstaff told Joyce McFarland, while
Fred McFarland was listening on the phone, that they were going
to be fired from their employment because of the January 14,
1986, report to DNR. Mary Grindstaff testified that she told
Joyce McFarland this because it was the "impression" she got from
what was said at the January 27, 1986, meeting. (Respondent's
Post-Hearing Brief, Pg. 3).
On January 30, 1986, a story appeared in a local paper
regarding what went on at the January 27, 1986, executive session
of the New Franklin Board of Alderman as told to the paper by
ary Grindstaff. (CX 6).
On February 10, 1986, the New Franklin Board of Alderman held
its first regular meeting of the month of February. After the
regular meeting the board went into executive session. In the
meeting the job performance of Joyce McFarland was discussed as
she was not at the regular meeting. The discussion centered
around her leaving work early, leaving the meetings early or not
attending at all. The amount of coffee drinking and loafing
going on at City Hall in New Franklin was also discussed. It was
agreed that Joyce should be asked to appear before the board on
February 11, 1987.
Fred McFarland was brought up again and the events the night
of the fire and complaints of work performance were discussed.
The board decided to ask Fred McFarland to appear also before the
board.
Copies of the memos left at City Hall on February 11, 1986,
were introduced into evidence and are a part of the record. (RX
4 and 5). The copies contain the notes of Fred and Joyce
cFarland that they would not attend the meeting set for February
11, 1986. Also admitted into evidence are two letters written by
Fred McFarland and one by both Fred and Joyce McFarland. One of
these letters, signed by Fred McFarlands address the January 14,
1986, DNR matter. The letter signed by both Fred and Joyce
cFarland states they will not come before the board, except
after given 48 hours notice and that the appearance before the
board be open to the general public. (RX 6 and 7).
The response and letters were given to the board at the
February 11, 1986 meeting by Mary Grindstaff.
A call was made to the City Attorney and legal advice
requested. The board was told that no hearing was legally
required, that one could be given if the board so felt inclined.
The Board of Alderman of the City of New Franklin consists of
six members and the Mayor. On February 11, 1986, the board had
one vacancy, leaving five members voting. Fred and Joyce
cFarland were terminated from their employment with the city by
a vote of four (4) for, one (1) against.
Neither Fred McFarland nor Joyce McFarland had previously
received any oral or written warnings or any other type of
disciplinary action relating to their work activities. (Tr. 41,
42, 90, 128 181).
In April, 1985, when Mayor James Meler first took officer
personality problems developed immediately with the McFarlands.
They were called in to speak to the council about this situation
and Mr. Meler stated that their attitude toward him immediately
changed, for the better. (Tr. 41).
The Respondent argues that the primary reason for the
discharges of Fred and Joyce McFarland was their refusal to
attend the requested meeting of the board on February 11, 1986.
Respondent stress that both of the Complainants would have
been terminated regardless of their report to DNR, because of
their failure to attend the meeting with the Board of Alderman.
The Complainants argue that the stated reason for their
discharges by the Respondent, namely for failure to appear at the
February 11, 1986 meeting, was a pretext and was only used to
cover up the real reason for their discharge, their protected
activities. In the event that the reason advanced for the
terminations are found not to be pretextual in nature, the next
area of inquiry is whether the Respondent has satisfied his
burden of proof in a dual motive discharge as set forth by the
National Labor Relations Board. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981).
In that case, it was held that where there is shown proper
and improper motives for an employee's action, then the burden of
proof shifts to the Employer to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision in the
absence of the protected conduct.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Wright Line approach to the
question of burden of proof in retaliatory discharge cases in
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S.Ct. 2469, 462 U.S.
393 (1983). In that decision, the Court stated " . . . to
establish an unfair labor practice the General Counsel (of the
N.L.R.B.) need show by a preponderance of the evidence only that
a discharge is in anyway motivated by a desire to frustrate union
activity . . . . ", supra at 2473. The Court further pointed out
that the employer can avoid the conclusion that it violated the
Act by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employee would have been fired for permissible reasons even if he
had not been involved in protected union activities.
I find from the facts of the instant case that the reason for
Complainants' discharges were pretextual. In any event, I find
that Respondent has failed to carry his burden of proof under the
Wright Line test by failing to prove that Fred and Joyce
cFarland would have been discharged notwithstanding their
complaint to the DNR. I find that Complainants have proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that their discharges were
motivated by their protected activity (their complaint to the
DNR).
An important factor contradicting Respondent's position and
establishing the pretextual firing was the timing of the
discharges. Only one month elapsed after the Complainant's
telephone call to DNR. The timing factor is buttressed by the
testimony of Mary Grindstaff, a board member. After the January
27, 1986 board meeting; Ms. Grindstaff was contacted by Joyce
cFarland and she told both Complainants that "they were after
Freddie's hide." (Tr. 52). Ms. Grindstaff based this opinion
on various statements that had been made at the meeting. Her
testimony regarding this point includes the following:
(Tr. 78).
Ms. Grindstaff also notified the local press and from her
actions and testimony it is clear to this Court that she believed
Fred McFarland's job was in jeopardy. She also got the
impression that after the January 27th meeting the board at least
attempted to change the focus from what had occurred the night of
the fire to Fred McFarland's entire job performance. (Tr. 53).
However, Ms. Grindstaff testified that the McFarlands had been
average to good employees and they had no previous disciplinary
problems to her knowledge. (Tr. 55-57).
It is clear from her testimony that Mary Grindstaff believed
that the paramount issue with the board members was the
Complainants' call to DNA and that the subsequent discharges were
due to this protected activity by the Complainants.
(Tr. 62 and 63).
Complainants' contention that their discharges by the board
for their failure to attend the February 11, 1986 meeting was
pretextual is supported also by the different type action by the
Board compared with its past practice. In April of 1985 when
ayor James Meler took officer the board summoned the McFarlands
to a closed session. However on that occasion the board was
careful to inform the McFarlands that they had no fear of losing
their jobs but that the board simply wished to hear all sides of
the problem and straighten out any problems between the
cFarlands and the new Mayor.
At the hearing, none of the board members explained why this
same procedure wasn't followed prior to the requested attendance
of the McFarlands at the February 11th meeting. Considering the
publicity of the incident the board members should obviously have
realized that Fred and Joyce McFarland were deeply concerned over
possible termination of their employment. The McFarlands were
not orally informed of the proposed closed meeting. Instead a
February 10, 1986 memo signed by all members of the board was
left for them stating "Council requests your presence on February
11, 1986 at 7:00 p.m. for a meeting with the council." (RX 5).
The "request" was refused by both Complainants and letters were
delivered to the board outlining the McFarland's position as to a
meeting. (RX 6 and 7). This court finds that the board members
conveniently used the failure of the McFarlands to comply with
the request for a meeting as a pretext to justify their
discharges.
The fact that Fred and Joyce McFarland had not received prior
discipline is also a factor which substantiates the subterfuge of
the board.
I therefore find that Complainants have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that their discharge was motivated
by their protected activity.
Even had this Court not found the Respondents actions
pretextual, I find that Complainants would prevail in the "dual
motive" application. The Complainants clearly met their burden
of making a prima facie showing that their protected conduct was
a motivating or substantial factor in the discharge decision,
NLRB v. Wright Line at 2516, and it is the Respondent who must
establish justification independent of the protected activity,
for the McFarlands' discharges. Instead they have established
that the protected activity played a part in the dismissal. If
two or more reasons combine to justify the dismissal, and any one
of the reasons is an illegal motives then the Respondent has
violated the Act. The Respondent bears the risk that the
"influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated
because the risk was created by his own wrongdoing." National
Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management, 103 S.C. 2469
at 2475 (1983).
In the instant case I find Respondent has failed to carry its
burden of proving its justification for dismissal independent of
the protected activity.
I affirm the findings of the Wage and Hour Division, U.S.
Department of Labor, that Respondent, City of New Franklin
discharged Fred McFarland and Joyce McFarland on February 11,
1986, because they had engaged in a protected activity namely
notifying the Department of Natural Resources about the by-pass
of the water filters.
For the foregoing reasons, I ORDER that the April 30, 1986
decision of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division,
Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, be
and is hereby affirmed and that Fred McFarland and Joyce
cFarland be reinstated to their former positions with full back
pay with interest, fringe benefits and with reimbursement for all
their costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees.
Back pay is to be offset by any and all interim earnings
complainants may have had between the time of their unlawful
termination and the date they either accept or reject
Respondent's offers of reinstatement.
This Decision and Order becomes final 90 days following the
date of the filing of the Complaint in this case, unless modified
or vacated by the Secretary of Labor. (29 C.F.R. § 24.6).
Thereafter, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by the
final Order may obtain review thereof in the United States
District Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation,
with respect to which the Order issued, allegedly occurred. (42
U.S.C. § 5851(c); 29 C.F.R. § 24.7).
RICHARD D. MILLS
1 In this decisions "JX"
refers to the Joint exhibits, "ALJX"
refers to the Administrative Law Judge's exhibits, "CX" refers to
the Complainant's exhibits and "RX" refers to Respondents
exhibits.
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Administrative Law Judge