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Monroe v. Climax anufacturing Co., 1999-STA-20 (ALJ May 31, 2000)
U.S. Department of Labor | Office of Administrative Law Judges Seven Parkway Center - Room 290 Pittsburgh, PA 15220 (412) 644-5754 | ![]() |
CASE NO.: 1999-STA-20
In the Matter of
ROGER H. MONROE
Complainant
v.
CLIMAX MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Respondent
This case arises under Section 405 (employee protection provision) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 ("STAA") (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 31105). Congress included Section 405 in the Surface Transportation Assistance Act to insure that employees in the commercial motor transportation industry who make safety complaints, participate in STAA proceedings, or refuse to commit unsafe acts, do not suffer adverse employment consequences because of their actions. See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 262 (1987) (citing 129 Cong Rec. 29192, 32510 (1982)). The Act prohibits discipline of trucking employees who raise questions about violations of commercial motor vehicle rules or other unsafe activities. See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc. v. artin, 954 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 1992); Lewis Grocer Co. v. Holloway, 874 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989).
Finding of Facts
Roger Monroe ("Complainant") began his employment with Climax Manufacturing Company on May 27, 1997, and was discharged on August 19, 1998, based on the Company's claim that the Complainant had engaged in gross insubordination. The Respondent claims that the discharge was a direct result of the Complainant's refusal to take a driving assignment on that date.
On August 19, 1998, the Complainant informed Dispatcher, Eve Burdick, that he would be unable to take an overnight driving assignment because he had to attend a union grievance hearing for a co-worker the next day. Ms. Burdick explained that it would be impossible for the Complainant to be assigned a local trip because as the least senior driver, he was needed to make a long distance run. The Complainant ended his discussion with Burdick by refusing to take the assignment.
Burdick immediately advised Terminal Manager, Dave Parker of Complainant's refusal. Parker confronted the Complainant, who continued to insist on not taking the assignment because he wanted to attend the grievance meeting on August 20, 1998. r. Parker then informed the Human Resources Manager for the Company, Andrew Lowe, as to the situation with Mr. Monroe. Mr. Lowe contacted the Union President to ascertain whether the Union wanted or needed the Complainant at the grievance meeting on August 20, 1998. After learning from the Union President that the union had not requested the Complainant to be present, Mr. Lowe called Mr. Parker to inform him of this and to advise him that he should make the Complainant aware of the consequences under the company rules, if he was going to continue to refuse his assignment. At that point Mr. Parker gave the Complainant a direct order to drive that evening. After continued insistence on not working, Mr. Monroe was discharged.
Before the date of the discharge, the Complainant made numerous safety complaints concerning defective equipment on the trucks. It has been established that one of the safety complaints was made on August 13, 1999 only a few days before the Complainant was terminated. The Complainant mentioned to the Respondent's dispatcher that the dolly legs on a specific trailer needed repaired.
Previously, on September 16, 1997, the Complainant put a tractor out of
service due to one loose and another missing bolt. This tractor was driven by another driver to
Syracuse so that it could be repaired (TR 140, 211).1
Procedural History
The Complainant filed a grievance on August 20, 1998 alleging that he was
unjustly discharged. The grievance was denied at the second step, and was duly processed to
arbitration. An arbitration hearing was held before Thomas Rinaldo in Syracuse on December 7,
1998. The Arbitrator found just cause for the termination of Mr. Monroe and thus denied the
grievance.
On or about August 19, 1998, Complainant filed a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor alleging that Respondent had discriminated against him in violation of 49
U.S.C. 31105 (B)(I) of the STAA. The Regional Administrator investigated and issued the
Secretary's Findings on January 26, 1999. She determined that the Complainant had engaged in
protected activity as defined by the STAA, but there was no evidence linking his discharge to
protected activity. On that basis, the Secretary dismissed the complaint. The Complainant then
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.
I held a full hearing on October 21, 1999 in Syracuse, New York.
Standard
A claim of retaliatory discharge under 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(A),
is governed by the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). Texas Dept. of Comm Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)
summarized the test as:
Prima Facie Case
Mr. Monroe claims he was discriminated against by his employer in
various fashions. He testified that since September of 1997 when he refused to drive because he
felt the truck was unsafe to drive, his employer, the Respondent has continuously discriminated
against him. The testimony further suggests that the discrimination resulted from the
Complainant refusing to drive an illegal amount of hours (TR 214), making complaints about the
safety of the trailers (TR 177), disagreeing with the way the Respondent dispatched (TR 147) and
complaining about the contract that was put into place (TR 154, 229).
Although the Complainant was able to prove that all of these factual
situations did in fact take place, there is no evidence that his termination or any other type of
discrimination took place because of the above mentioned behavior.
The Complainant was terminated on August 19, 1999 because he refused
to take a driving assignment. The Complainant refused to take the assignment because it would
prevent him from attending a co-workers grievance hearing. Before the Complainant was
officially terminated, the Respondent's were careful to check with the Union President to see if
the Complainant was asked or needed at the grievance meeting. The termination was also
proceeded by repeated warnings from the Respondent that refusal to drive would result in the
Complainant being fired (TR 308).
The day Mr. Monroe refused to drive was not the first instance of his
insubordination. On July 2, 1998, Mr. Monroe was reprimanded because he was at the facilities
during normal operating hours, on a day he was not to be there, soliciting signatures on a petition
to become a union steward. The written reprimand was signed by the shop steward who was on
site and shown to the Complainant (TR 259). This reprimand came 3 days after the Complainant
was verbally asked by Dave Parker, the Distribution Manager, to discontinue solicitation of
signatures during operating hours of the facility. Mr. Parker explained that the Complainant was
allowed to talk to people during a break, a lunch hour or even after work, but not during the
actual operating hours (TR 258-59).
These facts establish that the Respondent's actions were justified. There
has been no evidence connecting these actions with any safety concern raised by the
Complainant.
The Complainant has not met his burden of proving a prima facie case of
discrimination under the STAA. All of the evidence presented provides no causal link between
the safety complaints filed by the Complainant and his eventual termination.
It is recommended that the Complaint be dismissed for the reasons set out
in this Recommended Decision and Order.
GERALD M. TIERNEY
NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order and the administrative file in this matter
will be forwarded for review by the Administrative Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor,
Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20210. See 29 C.F.R. §1978.109(a); 61 Fed. Reg. 19978 (1996).
1 Record reference is indicated as
follows:
TR - Hearing Transcript, October 21, 1999
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Administrative Law Judge