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ARB CASE NO. 96-184
ALJ CASE NO. 96-ERA-5
DATE: February 11, 1997
In the Matter of:
TRACY A. JAMES,
v.
PRITTS-MCENANY ROOFING, INC.,
COMPLAINANT,
RESPONDENT.
BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD1
This case arises under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). The parties submitted a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Full Waiver of Claims to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) seeking approval of the settlement and dismissal of the complaint. The ALJ issued a Recommended Decision and Order on January 23, 1997 approving the settlement.
The request for approval is based on an agreement entered into by the parties, therefore, we must review it to determine whether the terms are a fair, adequate and reasonable settlement of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 24.6. Macktal v. Secretary of Labor, 923 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1991); Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 556 (9th Cir. 1989); Fuchko and Yunker v. Georgia Power Co., Case Nos. 89-ERA-9, 89-ERA-10, Sec. Order, Mar. 23, 1989, slip op. at 1-2.
Review of the agreement reveals that it may encompass the settlement of matters under laws other than the ERA. See Settlement Agreement ¶ 1. As stated
in Poulos v. Ambassador Fuel Oil Co., Inc., Case No. 86-CAA-1, Sec. Order, Nov. 2, 1987, slip op. at 2:
We have therefore, limited our review of the agreement to determining whether the terms thereof are a fair, adequate and reasonable settlement of Complainant's allegation that Respondent violated the ERA.
Paragraph 10 provides that the agreement will be governed by the laws of Florida. We construe this to except the authority of the Secretary of Labor and any Federal court which shall be governed in all respects by the laws and regulations of the United States. See Phillips v. Citizens' Ass'n for Sound Energy, Case No. 91-ERA-25, Final Ord. of Dismissal, Nov. 4, 1991, slip op. at 2.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 could be construed as a waiver by Complainant of any causes of action she may have which arise in the future. As the Secretary has held in prior cases, see Johnson v. Transco Products, Inc., Case No. 85-ERA-7, Sec. Ord., Aug. 8, 1985, such a provision must be interpreted as limited to the right to sue in the future on claims or causes of action arising out of facts or any set of facts occurring before the date of the agreement. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974); Rogers v. General Electric Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Board requires that all parties requesting settlement approval of cases arising under the CAA provide the settlement documentation for any other alleged claims arising from the same factual circumstances forming the basis of the federal claim, or to certify that no other such settlement agreements were entered into between the parties. Biddy v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, ARB Case Nos. 96-109, 97-015, Final Order Approving Settlement and Dismissing Complaint, Dec. 3, 1996, slip op. at 3. Accordingly, the parties have certified that the agreement constitutes the entire and only settlement agreement with respect to the complainant's claims.
We find that the agreement, as so construed, is a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement of the complaint. Accordingly, we APPROVE the agreement and DISMISS THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE. See Settlement Agreement, p. 2.
SO ORDERED.
DAVID A. O'BRIEN
Chair
KARL J. SANDSTROM
Member
JOYCE D. MILLER
Alternate Member
1 On April 17, 1996, a Secretary's Order was signed delegating jurisdiction to issue final agency decisions under this statute to the newly created Administrative Review Board. 61 Fed. Reg. 19978 (May 3, 1996). Secretary's Order 2-96 contains a comprehensive list of the statutes, executive order, and regulations under which the Administrative Review Board now issues final agency decisions. Final procedural revisions to the regulations implementing this reorganization were also promulgated on that date. 61 Fed. Reg. 19982.