Document Title:	Contraband and Interdiction Modalities Used in Correctional Facilities
Author(s):	Bryce E. Peterson, KiDeuk Kim, and Rochisha Shukla
Document Number:	308636
Date Received:	February 2024
Award Number:	2015-IJ-CX-K001

Contraband and Interdiction Modalities Used in Correctional Facilities

Final Summary Overview

Bryce E. Peterson, KiDeuk Kim, & Rochisha Shukla

Inquiries should be directed to:
bpeterson@urban.org
(202) 261-5809
Bryce Peterson c/o Urban Institute
500 L'Enfant Plaza SW, Washington DC 20024

Abstract

This publication presents a technical summary report of the Urban Institute's research on contraband in jails and prisons in the United States, as well the interdiction strategies correctional agencies employ to prevent, detect, and remove contraband from their facilities. The mixed-methods design consisted of (1) field testing the National Survey of Correctional Contraband (NSCC) in six state Departments of Correction, and (2) conducting in-depth case studies in eleven prisons and jails, which included facility walk-throughs, observations, and semi-structured interviews with correctional leadership and staff. Key findings are organized around the following four themes:

- **Entry Points:** Contraband that originates outside a facility, such as illicit drugs and cell phones, typically comes in via (a) incarcerated people entering or returning to the facility; (b) staff, volunteers, or other facility personnel; (c) visitors; (d) letters and packages; or (e) items being thrown or flown by drone over a facility's perimeter fence. Responses to the NSCC indicate that staff, visitors, and mail are some of the most problematic entry points.

- **Interdiction Strategies:** Administrators select and implement the interdiction strategies that best fit the needs of their agency and facilities. Some of the most frequently used interdiction strategies across agencies participating in the NSCC were walk-through metal detectors, regular pat searches, surveillance cameras, K-9 units, and staff-initiated investigation and intelligence.

- **Prevalence of Contraband:** Weapons, cell phones, and controlled substances were the most common contraband recoveries reported in the NSCC. Correctional administrators and staff also noted during interviews that these items pose significant threats to safety and security.

- **Correlates of Contraband Levels**. Based on analyses of NSCC data, reported levels of contraband are generally higher in state-operated, male prisons. The number of contraband interdiction interventions a facility employs, and its security staff-inmate ratio, also impact contraband levels.

This summary concludes with the implications of key findings for criminal justice policy and practice, as well as recommendations for future research on contraband issues and interdictions strategies.

Table of Contents

Acronyms

DOC   Department of Corrections
NSCC   National Survey of Correctional Contraband

Introduction and Purpose

In 2015, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded the Urban Institute (Urban), in partnership with the American Correctional Association (ACA), to conduct a study on the prevalence and types of contraband in correctional facilities in the United States, and the interdiction strategies and technologies in place to combat these issues. The goals of this study were to: (1) develop and field test the National Survey of Correctional Contraband (NSCC), targeting state Department of Corrections (DOC) across the U.S. with diverse populations and geographies to understand contraband prevalence and types of interdiction modalities; (2) conduct in-depth case studies to better understand the motivations of adopting contraband interdiction modalities, their implementation challenges, and effectiveness, with reference to the type, geographic location, size of facility, and governing statutes and regulations under which the facility operates; and (3) disseminate research findings and information on contraband and interdiction modalities to correctional facilities interested in selecting an interdiction modality, as well as to both practitioner and scholarly communities. To achieve these goals, the research team established connections with several DOCs around the country as site partners to provide administrative data and insights into contraband-related challenges and interdiction efforts.

The quantitative component of the project involved the field test of the NSCC with six state DOCs, including Arkansas, Florida, Oregon, Texas, Tennessee, and Wyoming, totaling 301 distinct prisons of varying security levels and geographies. The research team developed the survey instrument in collaboration with the ACA and several correctional professionals in the field. Survey questions focus on facility characteristics, population and staff counts, facility programs, contraband recoveries, contraband incidents, contraband entry points, and contraband interdiction strategies.

The qualitative component of the project involved three multi-day site visits to eleven correctional facilities managed by the Florida DOC, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and the Montgomery County Department of Correction and Rehabilitation. These visits included facility walkthroughs, observation of operations, contraband interdiction technology demonstrations, and semi-structured

1

interviews with facility leadership and line staff about the prevalence of contraband and the unique

contraband challenges faced by each facility.

This technical summary provides an overview of both quantitative and qualitative data,

methodologies used to collect the data, results from the analysis, and implications for criminal justice policy

and practice in the United States.

Background and Summary of Literature

Correctional contraband, or items that are unauthorized by the formal prison administration,[1] is a serious

safety concern for incarcerated individuals and staff. Items such as drugs, alcohol, cell phones, cigarettes,

and makeshift weapons can be used to spread violence, engage in criminal activity, create underground

economies, and exacerbate substance addictions.[2] Contraband weapons can also be used to facilitate

escapes from prison,[3] while contraband cell phones can be used to intimidate witnesses, aid criminal

activities, and compromise public safety.[4]

Prevalence of Contraband

There are currently no national statistics on the prevalence of any forms of contraband in correctional

facilities. Local and state reports, however, suggest that the volume of contraband in prisons and jails can be

substantial. For instance, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recovered nearly

50,000 cell phones in its prisons between 2010 and 2013,[5] approximately 3,000 were recovered in

Mississippi prisons in 2015,[6] more than 23,500 were recovered by the Georgia DOC between 2014 and

2015,[7] and over 8,700 were found in federal Bureau of Prisons facilities between 2012 and 2014.[8] Similarly,

drugs and alcohol are recognized as significant contraband issues within US prisons and jails. Approximately

1,000 drug incidents are reported annually in California prisons, and 1.6% of the 1,132 random drug tests

tracked in a 2008-09 study were positive.[9]

Contraband Entry

Contraband can enter facilities through external and internal mechanisms. Externally, these devices may be

brought in by visitors,[10] thrown over facility fences,[11] or even flown in on drones.[12] Internally, facility staff

2

may bring in contraband items. Smuggling contraband is lucrative, with some staff earning hundreds of dollars per phone.[13] Staff may also form inappropriate relationships with incarcerated individuals or be bribed or coerced into supplying contraband.[14] A guard's willingness to smuggle contraband is linked to negligent supervision, low pay, high turnover, poor recruitment standards, and insufficient training.[15] Contraband can also be manufactured within prisons and jails. Surveys of correctional facilities have found that razors, hard plastic, personal locks, tooth brushes, mop and broom handles, and fencing materials stolen from the facility or bought from the commissary can be modified to create weapons that pose a significant threat to corrections officers,[16] and basic food items may be used to create alcohol.[17]

Interdiction Strategies

To combat contraband, correctional administrators have adopted numerous policies, practices, and technologies aimed at keeping contraband out of facilities. There are three broad categories of interdiction modalities. First, administrators work to prevent introduction of contraband to the facility by incarcerated individuals, staff and visitors through a combination of searches and technological detection strategies, like body scanners and metal detectors.[18] Second, administrators seek to detect and remove contraband once it has entered the facility by manually searching incarcerated individuals and their cells, employing contraband detection technologies (e.g., Managed Access Systems, Cellsense detectors), and gathering intelligence.[19] Third, administrators may implement strategies designed to reduce the demand for contraband, such as through drug or alcohol abuse programs.[20]

Methods and Data

National Survey of Correctional Contraband

Quantitative data collection included the field test of the National Survey of Correctional Contraband, which aimed to address gaps in existing research and statistics on contraband.

Survey Development: The research team developed the NSCC instrument by completing three activities: (a) an in-depth literature review of scholarly papers on contraband and interdiction practices, as well as non-scholarly sources like newspaper articles and practitioner publications; (b) interviews and focus groups organized by ACA with correctional administrators and staff about their contraband policies and

3

practices, the effectiveness of the interdiction modalities they have implemented in their facilities, and the data they routinely collect related to contraband; and (c) two focus groups, organized by the Fortune Society in New York City, with formerly incarcerated individuals to get their perspective on the ways contraband comes into facilities, how staff detect and remove contraband, and whether there are particular interdiction modalities that are effective. In addition, the team met with vendors of interdiction technologies to learn more about available tools and strategies for combatting contraband. The research team also solicited feedback on drafts of the instrument from several correctional administrators and professional correctional organizations and agencies like the American Jail Association, the Correctional Leaders Association, the National Sheriffs' Association, the National Institute of Corrections, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The final instrument aimed to solicit facility-level responses on facility characteristics, population and staff counts, programs, contraband recoveries and incidents, contraband entry points, and interdiction strategies.

Pilot Test: After finalizing the instrument, Urban piloted the survey with nine facilities managed by six correctional agencies. This pilot test used paper versions of the instrument, as well as online versions created with Qualtrics software. Urban received high survey item-level response rates across pilot test participants. Participants also provided valuable feedback on how long they took to complete the survey and gave suggestions for improving the questions in the instrument. The team incorporated the feedback and lessons learned to finalize the survey instrument (Appendix A).

Administration of NSCC Field Test: Urban conducted a field test of the NSCC by sending the instrument to nine state DOCs who managed prisons of varying sizes, capacities, security levels, populations, and geographies. Three DOCs declined or were otherwise unable to participate, resulting in six state prison systems who participated in the survey: Arkansas, Florida, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. Survey administration to the six DOCs took place between August and December 2019, while survey questions focused on data and events that occurred during calendar year 2018. Participants were given the option of completing the paper versions of the surveys or completing them online.

Urban asked the participating DOCs to provide a survey response for every adult prison under their jurisdiction, including all facilities administered by the DOC, or by a private corporation on behalf of the DOC, which had a separate budget and administrator (facilities that shared a budget or administrator were reported as a single facility). Participants did not report on private prisons in the state that were not primarily housing people for the DOC, federal prisons and jails operated by local governments, and state facilities that only held juveniles. Although a single point of contact in each DOC received the survey, data was provided by numerous individuals within the DOC's central offices, as well as administrators and staff from the individual facilities.

The final analytic sample was comprised of 301 prisons across the six agencies, which represented roughly 20 percent of all state prisons in the US. Of this sample, 93 percent were operated by a government agency, while the remaining were operated by private companies. Approximately half (49.8 percent) of the facilities were classified as "maximum," "close," or "high" security, just over one-quarter (25.8 percent) were classified as "minimum/low," 15.7 percent were classified as "medium," and 8.7 percent were classified as "other/administrative." More than 70 percent of the facilities were in rural areas, followed by suburban (16 percent) and urban (11.6 percent) locations. The average rated capacity of the facilities (i.e., the number of beds authorized by a rating official for safe and efficient operation) was 1,065, while the average daily population (ADP) across facilities was 986 individuals (92.6 percent average capacity).

Data Analysis: The research team first employed descriptive statistics to analyze the NSCC data, including means and standard deviations for continuous variables and proportions for categorical variables. Though this examination was descriptive and exploratory, it offered a significant step forward in understanding the extent of contraband-related issues, such as entry points, recoveries, assaults, disciplinary actions, and interdictions strategies.

In addition to the descriptive analyses, the team developed a series of regression models to identify the correlates of contraband levels in the NSCC prisons. Specifically, negative binomial models were estimated to explain the volume of contraband recoveries involving illicit drugs, weapons, and cell phones, respectively, using two broad domains of factors – facility characteristics and population characteristics.

Results from the type-specific models were then compared to those from a general model of all contraband recoveries to discern any systematic differences in how specific types of contraband can be explained by facility and population characteristics. In addition, results from the analyses were weighted to reflect the actual distribution of US prisons in terms of key characteristics, such as the population size, security level, and private/public operation. The wide variation in contraband-related challenges and facility characteristics, as captured in the NSCC data, and the use of post-stratification weights afforded the current study the advantage of yielding empirical insights more generalizable than any prior research on correctional contraband.

In-Depth Case Studies

In addition to the NSCC, the team conducted deep dive case studies in order to formulate a detailed understanding of the issues related to contraband in prison and jail systems and the interdiction methods agencies employ to address them.

Case Study Sites: Urban visited two jails managed by the Montgomery County Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (DOCR), six jails managed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), and three prisons managed by the Florida DOC.

- In January 2018, the research team visited DOCR's Detention Center and Correctional Facility, located in Montgomery County, Maryland. The Detention Center is a pretrial booking unit responsible for the intake and processing of people charged with criminal offenses, while the Correctional Facility is responsible for the custody and care of people serving sentences of up to 18 months.

- In September 2018, the team conducted case studies in LASD's Twin Towers Correctional Facility, the Men's Central Jail, the Century Regional Detention Facility, the North County Correctional Facility, and the South Correctional Facility. The Century Regional Detention Facility houses female adults, whereas the Men's Central Jail, the North County Correctional Facility, and the South Correctional Facility house male adults. The Twin Towers is a special medical unit for people with acute physical and psychological health needs. The team also

6

visited the LASD's Inmate Reception Center, which does not house individuals but is responsible for processing people into and out of the LASD system.

- Finally, the team visited Florida DOCs in December 2019, including Taylor Correctional Institution, Hamilton Correctional Institution, and Kissimmee Community Release Center. Taylor and Hamilton house male adults with different security levels, ranging from minimum custody to maximum and close custody. Kissimmee is a minimum-security work-release center designed to prepare people for reentry by focusing heavily on vocational programming, mental health support, substance use treatment, educational programming, and employment preparedness.

Data Collection and Analysis: The case studies involved multi-day site visits to conduct in-depth observations of each facilities. This included walk-throughs of the facilities to observe cells and dorms, yards and recreational areas, visitation rooms, mail rooms, work areas (e.g., carpentry shops), classrooms, and common areas like laundry units, chapels, dining areas, and day rooms. Urban also collected information on the facilities' architectural layouts, common contraband entry points, and interdiction technologies in use. Wherever possible, the research team observed demonstrations of interdiction technologies to better understand how and when staff use them to detect contraband (see Appendix B for Urban's Case Study Protocol).

To supplement these observations, Urban met with and interviewed leadership and staff in each facility, including line officers and investigators responsible for detecting and recovering contraband on a daily basis, supervisors, and administrators involved in staff training and decisionmaking around the selection and purchase of interdiction technologies and contraband-related policymaking. The interviews focused on how each facility or system defines contraband, common types of contraband, how contraband enters facilities, the strategies and technologies used to detect contraband, policies around contraband recovery and related sanctions, and recommendations for improving interdiction (e.g., newer technologies, staff trainings). The research team then hand-coded observation and interview notes to identify high-level themes.

Findings

This section describes findings from Urban's analyses of the NSCC data and in-depth case studies. Findings are grouped into four sections: (1) entry points, (2) interdiction strategies, (3) prevalence of contraband, and (4) correlates of contraband levels.

Entry Points

Staff interviews and facility observations during case study site visits indicated that a large portion of contraband in facilities is created within the facility from otherwise permissible items. For example, a person could sharpen a toothbrush or other object and use it as a weapon, or make homemade alcohol using fruits, vegetables, and other available ingredients. In addition, the excessive accumulation of items such as commissary, newspapers, toiletries, or food, is considered contraband. However, some of the most critical forms of contraband (e.g., illicit drugs and cell phones) originate outside a facility. These items usually come in via (a) incarcerated people entering or returning to the facility; (b) staff, volunteers, or other facility personnel; (c) visitors; (d) letters and packages; or (e) items being thrown or flown by drone over a facility's perimeter fence.

Building on this, the NSCC asked respondents to rate how much of a problem specific points of entry were in their facility between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018. The responses to this question demonstrate that staff, visitors, and letters and packages are the entry points most likely to be identified as "somewhat of a problem" or "a big problem" (Table 1). In addition, while nearly half of the respondents noted that items being thrown or flown over the perimeter was "not a problem," this is highly facility specific. During the site visits to the Florida DOC, for instance, the team learned that some of their prisons were particularly susceptible to contraband being delivered via throwovers and drones because of their large open outdoor areas, relatively easy access from public roads, and trees that provided cover close to the facilities' exterior fencing.

8

Table 1. *Perception of Contraband Entry Points (n = 301)*

	Not a Problem	Somewhat of a Problem	A Big Problem
	%	%	%
Incarcerated individuals returning to facility	44.5	32.8	22.7
Security staff	28.4	65.2	6.4
Other/non-security staff	34.1	57.9	8.0
Volunteers	73.7	23.9	2.4
Vendors/contractors	77.8	21.5	0.7
Visitors	12.3	49.8	37.9
Letters and packages	21.6	56.2	22.3
Items thrown or flown over perimeter	49.7	24.2	26.2

Interdiction Strategies

As part of the case study site visits, Urban learned about and observed demonstrations of numerous interdiction strategies and technologies, such as walk-through and handheld metal detectors, Cellsense towers, Body Orifice Security Scanner (BOSS) Chairs, body scanners, K-9 units, surveillance cameras with motion-detection technology, and mobile trace devices. The team also learned that correctional administrators typically hear about potential interdiction solutions through either vendors or word of mouth from professional contacts, and then select and implement these strategies based on the unique needs of their agency and facilities.

The NSCC asked respondents to report on the types of interdiction strategies they used on staff, visitors, and incarcerated people (Table 2). Some of the most frequently used interdiction strategies across all groups were walk-through metal detectors, regular pat searches, surveillance cameras, K-9 units, and staff-initiated investigation and intelligence. Facilities participating in the NSCC also reported on several strategies that were only used on incarcerated individuals, the most common of which included strip searches, cell searches, and opening and searching mail.

9

Table 2. *Use of Interdiction Strategies (n = 301)*

	Security staff	Other staff	Visitors	Incarcerated Individuals
	%	%	%	%
Walk-through metal detector	75.4	75.4	79.7	69.1
X-ray inspection system	56.5	56.8	56.5	47.8
Whole-body scanner	6.3	8.0	8.0	8.0
Regular pat search	81.4	80.7	93.3	93.0
Random pat search	85.0	83.1	22.3	97.0
Random drug test	89.4	57.5	2.7	99.7
Statewide contraband interdiction team	31.2	26.9	26.9	32.9
Contraband interdiction team at facility	48.8	52.8	45.5	64.5
K-9 unit	67.4	62.8	51.2	79.4
Surveillance cameras	85.7	85.0	83.7	89.0
Mass spectrometry/hand swabs	1.3	1.0	1.3	1.3
Staff-initiated investigation/intelligence	78.1	73.4	74.1	94.0
Regular strip search	-	-	-	91.0
Random strip search	-	-	-	93.7
Cell shake downs/searches	-	-	-	97.7
Body Orifice Scanning System chairs	-	-	-	26.9
Cell phone Managed Access Systems (MAS)	-	-	-	5.6
Devices that locate and track cell transmissions	-	-	-	12.6
Staff open and search all social mail	-	-	-	97
Staff open and search all legal mail	-	-	-	83.7

Prevalence of Contraband

The NSCC offered one of the first ever systematic efforts to estimate the scope of the contraband problem across multiple state DOCs. The instrument asked respondents to report the total number and type of contraband recoveries that occurred in their facilities between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018. The NSCC defined recoveries as any incident where staff found or recovered contraband items, regardless of whether an individual was disciplined for the infraction or not. As shown in Table 3, nearly all facilities reported on all types of contraband, except "property with gang identifiers," for which 191 facilities reported any information, and "modified or altered property," for which only 50 facilities responded. Weapons, cell phones, and controlled substances were the most common contraband recoveries reported in the NSCC. Consistent with this finding, prior research has found contraband cell phones, drugs, and weapons to be longstanding, serious, and widespread issues in prisons.[21] Correctional administrators and

10

staff also noted during Urban's interviews that these contraband items pose some of the most significant threats to the safety and security of the facility.

Table 3. *Contraband Recoveries*

	Facilities Reporting	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Weapons	299	33.61	66.97	0	585
Cell phones	300	30.97	53.73	0	366
Controlled substances	299	28.46	40.05	0	296
Tobacco	299	13.03	20.61	0	150
Alcohol	299	8.07	15.93	0	117
Cash or other moneys	300	3.59	16.12	0	255
Property with gang identifiers	191	1.68	6.57	0	71
Excessive property	290	0.56	4.28	0	66
Modified or altered property	50	14.70	32.88	0	201

Correlates of Contraband Levels

Another focus area of data analysis was to identify the correlates of contraband. Drawing upon the descriptive understanding of contraband prevalence, the project team developed a series of regression models, explaining the volume of contraband recoveries, involving any contraband items (full model), illicit drugs, weapons, and cell phones, respectively. The results for those models are presented in Table 4.

The reported level of contraband is generally higher in state-operated facilities as opposed to locally or privately operated facilities (except for the weapons model). Similarly, male prisons show a higher level of contraband than female or co-ed prisons across the models. The level of surveillance and contraband control, as measured by the number of different contraband interdiction interventions employed and security staff-inmate ratio, also shows a consistently significant impact on the contraband. Of note, the outcomes are measured as the number of contraband recoveries, which reflects both the prevalence of contraband and system responses to contraband. Thus, the positive relationship between interdiction strategies and contraband levels does not necessarily mean that more strategies leads to more contraband; instead, these findings suggest that facilities suffering from contraband issues may have implemented more interdiction strategies and programs than facilities without contraband issues. The negative effect of security staff-inmate ratio should be interpreted similarly.

11

Table 4. *Negative Binomial Regression Results on Contraband Levels (n=282)*

Variable	Model 1 [Full]		Model 2 [Illicit Drugs]		Model 3 [Weapons]		Model 4 [Cell Phones]	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
State-operated facility (yes=1, otherwise=0))	0.352 *	0.153	0.481 *	0.187	-0.039	0.214	1.083 ***	0.294
Maximum security facility (yes=1, otherwise=0)	0.142	0.239	0.271	0.271	0.824 *	0.326	0.305	0.378
Architectural design (campus style =1, otherwise=0)	-0.029	0.133	0.008	0.159	-0.026	0.182	0.232	0.232
Age of facility (in years)	0.006	0.004	0.008 *	0.004	-0.001	0.005	0.011	0.006
Crowding (average daily population/rated capacity)	-0.014 **	0.005	-0.004	0.006	0.004	0.008	-0.024 *	0.009
Average daily population	0.001 ***	<0.000	0.001 ***	<0.000	0.001 ***	<0.000	0.002 ***	<0.000
Number of interdiction interventions employed	0.137 ***	0.041	0.194 ***	0.046	0.147 **	0.054	0.257 ***	0.072
Availability of work release	-0.305	0.278	0.008	0.327	-0.958 *	0.394	0.111	0.475
Security staff to inmate ratio	-0.328 ***	0.088	-0.363 **	0.119	-0.474 **	0.166	-0.413 *	0.165
Male prison (yes=1, otherwise=0)	0.278 *	0.137	0.418 *	0.169	1.132 ***	0.201	2.211 ***	0.333
Urban surrounding (yes=1, otherwise=0)	-0.401 *	0.18	-0.151	0.2	-0.892 ***	0.239	-0.201	0.306
Suburban surrounding (yes=1, otherwise=0)	-0.092	0.154	0.099	0.186	-0.317	0.215	-0.131	0.325
Local area employment rate	-0.300	1.454	1.95	2.32	5.444 *	2.683	-1.802	4.023
Local area median household income	<0.000	<0.000	<0.000	<0.000	<0.000	<0.000	<0.000	<0.000
Constant	3.128 *	1.407	-1.136	2.172	-5.575 *	2.632	0.148	3.88
BIC	2679.628		1866.448		1687.927		1393.024	
Log Likelihood	-1280.574		-873.984		-784.724		-637.272	
LR Chi^2	355.58 ***		307.90 ***		336.63 ***		279.54 ***	

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001
All models include state dummy variables.

While the models show considerable similarity across a wide range of determinants, there are nuanced differences worth highlighting. Particularly, the weapons model is explained uniquely by the security level of facilities, the availability of work release programs, and the employment rate of a surrounding area (i.e., county). Similarly, the state prison and male prison indicators serve as a much stronger determinant for the level of contraband cell phones than other types of contraband. While controlling for all other factors, state-operated facilities are expected to have 32 incidents involving contraband cell phones whereas locally or privately operated facilities are expected to have 11 such incidents. The difference between male and female/co-ed prisons is even more pronounced (28 incidents versus 3 incidents). Since understanding the correlates of contraband can help create a risk profile for correctional facilities, it is important to recognize those factors specific to contraband weapons or cell phones so that a system response to identify and assist high-risk facilities can be tailored accordingly.

Implications for Criminal Justice Policy and Practice

The findings from this study have yielded several implications and lessons learned for the field of corrections. **First, contraband is a universal critical issue for correctional agencies, but some facilities face unique challenges**. Various factors, like facility type (i.e., prison versus jail), architecture, security levels, facility capacity, location in an urban environment, jurisdiction, ratio of staff to incarcerated people, staff compensation, and facility policies and procedures determine what contraband enters facilities and how. For example, some facilities are more susceptible to contraband being thrown or flown over perimeter fences, while other facilities struggle with staff members being a key source of contraband.

Second, because challenges with contraband are facility specific, interdiction strategies need to be tailored to each agency and facility. What works for one jurisdiction may not be best for another. It is crucial that facilities develop an in-depth understanding of the unique contraband issues they face and design interdiction strategies that address them. For instance, if a facility identifies staff as a major source of contraband entry, implementing policies and technologies to address that particular problem may be more beneficial than applying a generic approach to interdiction.

Third, agencies should take a robust approach to combating contraband. No single technology or strategy will solve the contraband problem. In fact, although interdiction technologies are helpful in intercepting and recovering contraband, some of the most effective strategies are still "boots-on-the-ground" investigations. Staff who participated in the case study interviews emphasized the importance of using physical or manual checks (and using

technology as a supplement) to fully intercept and detect contraband, particularly given the technical and implementation-related limitations of most interdiction technologies (e.g., the legal limits on body-scanner radiation settings that make it difficult to detect smaller, nonmetallic objects). This is consistent with responses to the NSCC questions about the use of various interdiction strategies.

Fourth, prison and jail administrators should collect timely and reliable data to inform their approaches to contraband interdiction. In many cases, the adoption of interdiction policies and technologies is driven by political concerns, funding availability, or personal connections with vendors rather than best practices and data. Prison and jail administrators should strive to collect reliable data on recovered contraband items and contraband-related incidents to systematically inform current practices and policies. Urban strongly encourages the scholarly community to replicate the NSCC data collection and analyses. Doing so can validate or contradict key metrics from this study and help track changes in contraband issues over time. Moreover, future scholarship should strive to advance the understanding of the efficacy of contraband-interdiction technologies through rigorous testing and evaluation and translate that knowledge into actionable lessons for practitioners.

End Notes

[1] Kalinich, D. B., & Stojkovic, S. (1985). Contraband: The basis for legitimate power in a prison social system. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, *12*(4), 435-451.

[2] The Center for Social Justice (2015). *Drugs in Prison*. London, England: Center for Social Justice.

Burke, T. W., & Owen, S. S. (2010). Cell phones as prison contraband. *FBI L. Enforcement Bull.*, *79*, 10.

Wolff, N., Blitz, C., Shi, J., Siegel, J., & Bachman, R. (2007). Physical violence inside prisons: Rates of victimization. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, *34*(5), 588-599.

Dillon, L. (2001, July 3). *Drug use among prisoners: An exploratory study*. Dublin: The Health Research Board. Retrieved from http://www.iprt.ie/files/drug_use_among_prisoners__l_dillon.pdf.

Swann, R., & James, P. (1998). The effect of the prison environment upon inmate drug taking behaviour. *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, *37*(3), 252-265.

Gore, S.M., Bird, A.G. & Ross, A. (1995) Prison rites: Starting to inject inside. *British Medical Journal*, 311, 1135-1136.

Turnbull, P., & Stimson, G. V. (1994). Drug use in prison. *BMJ: British Medical Journal*, *308*(6945), 1716.

[3] Peterson, B. E. (2015). Inmate-, incident-, and facility-level factors associated with escapes from custody and violent outcomes (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/606/

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2008). Report on federal escape offenses in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Washington, DC: Author.

[4] National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center Technology Center of Excellence (NLECTC) & U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (2014). Cell phone forensics in a correctional setting guidebook. Denver, C.O.: Shaffer, J.S. Retrieved from https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Cell-Phone-Forensics-1020-FINAL.pdf.

National Telecommunications and Information Administration (2010). Contraband cell phones in prisons: Possible wireless technology solutions. Washington, DC: Locke, G. & Strickling, L.E. Retrieved from http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/contrabandcellphonereport_december2010.pdf.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (2011, September). *Bureau of Prisons: Improved evaluations and increased coordination could improve cell phone detection (GAO-11-893)*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees.

Burke & Owen (2010)

[5] California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2014). Amendment to Section 3173.2 Searches and Inspections, Section 3410.1. Retrieved from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/docs/NCDR/2014NCR/14-09/Initial%20Statement%20of%20Reasons.pdf.

[6] Wiltz, T. (2016). *States Bedeviled by Contraband Cellphones in Prisons*. Washington, DC: Pew Charitable Trusts.

[7] U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Georgia (2016). More Than 50 Individuals Charged in Massive Corruption, Fraud and Money Laundering Schemes Operated from inside Georgia State Prisons. Atlanta, GA. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/more-50-individuals-charged-massive-corruption-fraud-and-money-laundering-schemes

[8] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General (2016). *Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contraband Interdiction Efforts*. Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/more-50-individuals-charged-massive-corruption-fraud-and-money-laundering-schemes

[9] The Washington Times (2010, January 27). *Drugs Inside Prison Walls*. Washington DC: The Washington Times. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/27/drugs-inside-prison-walls/

[10] Siennick, S.E., Mears, D.P., & Bales, W.D. (2013). Here and Gone: Anticipation and Separation Effects of Prison Visits on Inmate Infractions. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*. *50*(3):417-444.

[11] Brown, K. (2018, April 18). After prison riot where 7 died, South Carolina has plan to block illegal cellphone use. *USA Today*. Retrieved from: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/04/18/south-carolina-prison-riot-cellphone-blocking-plan/527797002/

Jenkins, C. (2014, April 18). Smuggled cellphone use a growing concern for U.S. prisons. *Reuters*. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-usa-prison-mobilephone-idUSBREA3H0B320140418.

[12] Inch, M.S. (2018). *Oversight of the Bureau of Prisons*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Inch-Testimony.pdf

Craig, T.R., Russo, J., Shaffer, J.S. (2016). Eyes in the Skies: The latest threat to correctional institution security. *Corrections Today*, 46-51. Retrieved from https://www.justnet.org/pdf/Craig-Russo-Shaffer.pdf

[13] Burke & Owen (2010)

[14] Allen, B. & Bosta, D. (1981). *Games criminals play: How you can profit by knowing them*. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.

Henry, M.A. (1999). *Making ethical choices: A guide for staff*. Lanham, MD: American Correctional Association.

Marquart, J.W., Barnhill, M.B., Balshaw-Biddle, K. (2001). Fatal attraction: An analysis of employee boundary violations in a southern prison system, 1995–1998. *Justice Quarterly. 18*(4): 877-910.

Worley, R.M., Tewksbury, R., & Frantzen, D. (2010). Preventing fatal attractions: lessons learned from inmate boundary violators in a southern penitentiary system. *Criminal Justice Studies. 23*(4): 347-360

[15] Capano, T.J., Gehrt, W.J., Jardine, J.W., Maxim, D.W., Murray, P.W., Rudd, J.M., & Toliver, C.H. (1987). Final report of the Delaware Governor's Task Force on Corrections Security (Pub. No. 10-01-01-87-02-01).

McCarthy, B.J. (1981). *Exploratory study of corruption in corrections* (Doctoral dissertation). NCJ 085051.

Petherick, W., Turvey, B., & Ferguson, C. (Eds.). (2009). *Forensic Criminology*. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Academic Press.

Riley, M. (2017, September 30). Southern Prisons Have a Cellphone Smuggling Problem. *NBC News.* Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/corrections/southern-prisons-have-smuggled-cellphone-problem-n790251

[16] Biermann, P. (2007). *Improving correctional officer safety: Reducing inmate weapons*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.

[17] Center for Disease Control (2012, October 5). Botulism from drinking prison-made illicit alcohol, Utah 2011. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6139a2.htm.

[18] American Correctional Association. (2008). Correctional officer resource guide: 4th edition. Alexandria, VA: Duncan, P.

[19] American Correctional Association (2008)

National Telecommunications and Information Administration (2010).

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons (2014, November). Privacy Impact Assessment for the Forensic Laboratory. Washington, DC: Thompson, D.

[20] U.S. Government Accountability Office (2011).

Holsinger, A.M. (2002). National Institute of Corrections Drug-Free Prison Zone Project: Evaluation component for each of eight states: Final report. Kansas City, MO.

[21] Grommon, E., Carter, J., & Scheer, C. (2018). Quantifying the size of the contraband cell phone problem: Insights from a large rural state penitentiary. *The Prison Journal*, 98(5), 630-648.

Riley, M. (2017, September 30). *Southern prisons have a cellphone smuggling problem*. NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/corrections/southern-prisons-have-smuggled-cellphone-problem-n790251

US Department of Justice. (2003, January). *The Federal Bureau of Prisons' drug interdiction activities* (O.I.G. report No. I-2003-002). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluations and Inspections Division. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/BOP/e0302/final.pdf

Appendix A: NSCC Instrument

National Survey of Correctional Contraband

National Survey of Correctional Contraband: With funding from the *National Institute of Justice* and in partnership with the *American Correctional Association*, the *Urban Institute* is working on a project to better understand contraband and contraband interdiction. As part of this effort, your agency was selected to participate in the National Survey of Correctional Contraband (NSCC). The NSCC is being administered to a sample of state Departments of Corrections .

The NSCC has four objectives:

♦   To estimate *the prevalence and types of contraband* known to administrators.

♦   To determine the *methods by which contraband is introduced to inmates* (e.g., through visitation, mail, or correctional staff; by modifying items found in the facility; etc.).

♦   To quantify *the occurrence of contraband-related violence and misconduct* in correctional facilities.

♦   To understand *the types of interdiction modalities* used in these facilities and what kinds of contraband these modalities target.

Why participate in the NSCC? At its conclusion, this project will provide clear and practical information to correctional agencies about the prevalence of contraband in the U.S., the methods by which contraband enters correctional facilities, which interdiction modalities are used to prevent and remove contraband, how administrators can select and implement these interdiction modalities, and lessons learned related to the cost, implementation challenges, and efficacy of these modalities.

Survey instructions: We are seeking one survey response per facility in your state, including facilities operated directly by your agency and those privately operated but contracted to house inmates on behalf of your agency. This survey should be completed by the person or persons in your agency most knowledgeable about your data and/or your current practices and policies regarding contraband. This may require the input of multiple people across multiple departments within your agency. **We ask that you complete the survey by September 30, 2019**.

Burden statement: Each survey takes approximately 60-90 minutes to complete.

Research protections: Your participation in this survey is voluntary and the name of the responding individual (s) will be confidential. By providing answers to these survey questions, you consent to participate in this study. However, you may stop at any time or decline to answer any question.

Once all surveys have been collected, we will archive survey responses with the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research's National Archive of Criminal Justice Data. These data will not be made available to the public and through data use requests to ICPSR.

Disclaimer: This project was supported by Award No. 2015-IJ-CX-K001, awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this survey are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice.

Thank you in advance for your participation. If you have any questions about the survey, please contact Urban Institute at **NSCC@urban.org** or call the toll-free NSCC helpline at **(844) 288-4427.**

RETURN TO

Urban Institute
500 L'Enfant Plaza SW
Washington, DC 20024

National Survey of
Correctional Contraband
State Prison Form

DATA SUPPLIED BY

Name	Title
_____	_____

OFFICIAL ADDRESS	Number and Street or PO Box _____	City _____	State _____	Zip _____

TELEPHONE	Area Code _____	Number _____	Extension _____

E-MAIL ADDRESS	_____

FACILITY INFORMATION

Facility Name
_____

FACILITY ADDRESS	Number and Street or PO Box _____	City _____	State _____	Zip _____

What types of facilities are included in this survey?

This survey includes all correctional facilities administered by state governments or by private corporations primarily for state governments, which are intended for adults but may sometimes hold juveniles. For purposes of this survey, a facility has a separate budget and administrator. Facilities that share budgets or administrators should be reported as a single facility.

- INCLUDE prisons, penitentiaries, correctional institutions, and other correctional facilities primarily holding sentenced inmates for a state department of corrections (which are sometimes called boot camps; residential community correction centers; prison farms; reception, diagnostic, and classification centers; road camps; forestry and conservation camps; youthful offender facilities; vocational training facilities; prison hospitals; and drug and alcohol treatment facilities for prisoners)
- INCLUDE state-operated local detention facilities in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Vermont
- EXCLUDE privately-operated facilities that do not primarily house state inmates
- EXCLUDE facilities operated and administered by local governments that do not primarily house state prisoners
- EXCLUDE facilities that hold only persons under the jurisdiction of juvenile correctional authorities

URBAN INSTITUTE

NIJ | National Institute of Justice

Reporting instructions

- ♦ Please provide one survey response for each facility in your jurisdiction.
- ♦ If the answer to a question is "not available" or "unknown," write "DK" in the space provided.
- ♦ If the answer to a question in "not applicable," write "NA" in the space provided.
- ♦ If the answer to a question is "none," or "zero," write "0" in the space provided.

> When the exact numeric answers are not available, provide estimates and check the box beside each figure that is estimated. For example: 789 ☑

Section I—Facility Characteristics

1. Who operates this facility?

Select only one option.

01. ○ State authority
02. ○ Local authority
03. ○ Joint state and local authority
04. ○ Private contractor

2. What is the primary level of physical security for this facility?

Select only one option.

01. ○ None (e.g., jail without a security classification)
02. ○ Super maximum
03. ○ Maximum/close/high
04. ○ Medium
05. ○ Minimum/low
06. ○ Administrative (e.g., medical facilities)
7. ○ Other: specify _____
   _____
   _____

3. What type of area is this facility located?

Select only one option.

01. ○ Urban
02. ○ Suburban
03. ○ Rural/Frontier

4. Are the majority of housing units or inmates in this facility under <u>direct supervision</u>?

Direct supervision occurs when correctional staff are physically stationed inside a housing unit and directly observing inmates.

01. ○ Yes
02. ○ No

5. What type of architectural design does this facility look most like?

Select only one option.

01. ○ **Radial**—a linear-like design with many cells in a row straight through each cell block
02. ○ **Telephone-pole**—a linear design in which inmates and staff move along the main corridor
03. ○ **Campus**—a design made up of several buildings spread across a large area
04. ○ **Courtyard**—a mix of telephone-pole and campus design, in which a building is built around a center (e.g., a courtyard)
05. ○ **Other:** Specify_____
   _____
   _____

Radial   Telephone-pole   Courtyard   Campus

6. Does this facility have a secure perimeter or barrier, such as walls, to keep inmates from leaving the facility?

01. ○ Yes
02. ○ No

7. On December 31, 2018, what was the design capacity and rated capacity of this facility?

Design capacity is number of inmates that planners or architects intended for this facility.

A. Design Capacity _____ ❑

Rated capacity is the maximum number of beds or inmates authorized by a rating official for safe and efficient operation. It may exceed design capacity due to double bunking. However, beds in an area not designed as sleeping space, such as day rooms and multipurpose rooms, should not be included in rated capacity.

B. Rated Capacity _____ ❑

8. In what year was the original construction completed on this facility?

If more than one building, provide the year for the oldest building that includes a sleeping area for inmates.

Year of original construction _____ ❑

Section II—Inmate and Staff Counts

9. Between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018, what was the average daily population of this facility?

To calculate the average daily population, add the number of persons for each day during the period between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018, and divide the result by 365.

Average daily population _____ ❑

10. On December 31, 2018, how many inmates in this facility were:

A. Unsentenced (i.e., pretrial) _____ ❑
B. Sentenced less than 1 year _____ ❑
C. Sentenced 1 year or more _____ ❑
D. Total _____ ❑

11. On December 31, 2018, how many inmates in this facility were:

Include all inmates temporarily absent from this facility (e.g., for court appearances, brief furloughs, and medical leave.)

Exclude all inmates who were on escape or absent without leave (AWOL).

A. Males under age 18 _____ ❑
B. Females under age 18 _____ ❑
C. Males age 18 or older _____ ❑
D. Females age 18 or older _____ ❑
E. Total _____ ❑

12. Between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018, how many <u>volunteers</u> were allowed into this facility?

Count each volunteer only once.

Volunteers may include service providers, educators, religious/ministry leaders, etc.

Male_____ ❑ Female _____ ❑

13. On December 31, 2018, how many <u>full-time and part-time staff</u> employed or contracted by this facility were:

Count each employee only once.

Classify employees with multiple functions by the one performed most frequently.

A. **Security staff**

Officers of all ranks and other uniformed staff who, regardless of their staff title, are in direct contact with inmates, and involved in their daily custody, care, supervision or monitoring. Includes correctional officers, line staff, and supervisors.

Male_____ ❑ Female _____ ❑

B. **Other/non-security staff**

All non-uniformed/civilian employees, such as treatment staff, educational staff, clerical staff, maintenance staff, medical personnel, and other professional and technical staff.

Male_____ ❑ Female _____ ❑

C. **Total**

Male_____ ❑ Female _____ ❑

Section III—Facility Programs

14. How many inmates in this facility were participating in each type of <u>work assignment</u> on December 31, 2018?

Include all that apply. For example, if an inmate is involved in prison industries as well as farming/agriculture, he/she should be counted once under each category.

A. Prison industries (e.g. license plates, wood product, textiles, etc.)

_____ ❑

B. Facility support services (e.g. office/administrative work, food services, building maintenance, etc.)

_____ ❑

C. Farming/agriculture

_____ ❑

D. Public works assignments (inmates work outside the facility and perform road, park, or other public maintenance work)

_____ ❑

E. Other: specify_____

_____

_____

_____ ❑

15. How many inmates in this facility were enrolled in or receiving the following types of treatment programming or services on December 31, 2018?

Include all that apply. For example, if an inmate is involved in substance abuse/addiction program as well as mental health services/treatment, he/she should be counted once under each category.

A.   Substance abuse/addiction treatment

_____❏

B.   Alcohol abuse/addiction treatment

_____❏

C.   Mental health services/treatment

_____❏

D.   Other: specify_____

_____

_____❏

16. Does this facility operate work release, educational release, and/or treatment release programs that allow inmates to work in the community unsupervised by facility staff, but require them to return to the facility at night?

01.   ❍   Yes—How many inmates were participating on December 31, 2018?   _____❏

02.   ❍   No

Section IV—Contraband Recoveries

17. Please report the total number of contraband recoveries in this facility between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018, and indicate what items were included in this number

Contraband is defined as any item that is (a) not approved for possession by an inmate or for admission into the institution, and/or (b) presents a threat to security or its condition or excessive quantities of it present a health, fire, or housekeeping hazard.

Contraband recoveries include any incident where staff found or recovered contraband items, regardless of whether an inmate was disciplined for the infraction or not. Please count each type of contraband recovered as a single recovery. For example, if a weapon and cell phone were recovered during the same cell search, mark this as two recoveries. But, if two cell phones were recovered, mark this as one recovery. If your agency calculates or defines "recoveries" differently, please include the total number of recoveries as they are recorded in your system and fill out sub-question A below.

A.   Provide any additional detail on how recoveries are calculated (*optional*):_____

_____

_____

_____

B.   Total contraband recoveries _____❏

C.   Which types of contraband were included in this number?

Select all that apply.

01.   ❍   **Controlled substances** — illegal narcotics and unauthorized prescription medications, such as cocaine, amphetamines, heroin, methadone, suboxone, marijuana, etc.

02.   ❍   **Tobacco**

03.   ❍   **Alcohol** — alcohol from outside the facility and alcohol made inside the facility such as hooch, pruno, prison wine, etc.

04.   ❍   **Weapons** — explosives, ammunitions, chemical compounds, shivs, shanks, zipguns, etc.

05.   ❍   **Cell phones**

06.   ❍   **Cash or other moneys** — checks, credit cards, debit cards , etc.

07.   ❍   **Property with gang identifiers** — gang signs, symbols, language, or information

08.   ❍   **Modified or altered property** — not including weapons

09.   ❍   **Excessive property** — food or commissary items, pictures, etc.

10.   ❍   **Other**: specify_____

_____

18. Please report the number of recoveries between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018, for each type of contraband.

A.   Controlled substances   _____❏

B.   Tobacco   _____❏

C.   Alcohol   _____❏

D.   Weapons   _____❏

If different than the above, how many total weapons were seized in 2018? _____❏

E.   Cell phones   _____❏

If different than the above, how many total cell phones were seized in 2018? _____❏

F.   Cash or other moneys   _____❏

G.   Property with gang identifiers   _____❏

H.   Modified or altered property   _____❏

I.   Excessive property   _____❏

J.   Other: specify_____

_____

_____❏

Section V—Contraband Incidents

19. **Please report the number of contraband-related injuries between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018.**

A. Number of inmate-on-staff assaults with weapons
_____ ❑

B. Number of inmate-on-inmate assaults with weapons
_____ ❑

C. Number of inmate hospitalizations or other medical interventions for drug overdoses
_____ ❑

D. Number of inmate hospitalizations or other medical interventions for weapons-related injuries
_____ ❑

20. **Please report the number of punitive actions taken against <u>inmates</u> for contraband-related infractions between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018.**

A. Number of contraband-related infractions that resulted in new charges
_____ ❑

B. Number of contraband-related infractions that resulted in placement in restricted housing
_____ ❑

C. Number of contraband-related infractions that resulted in disciplinary reports
_____ ❑

21. **Please report the number of punitive actions taken against <u>staff</u> for contraband-related violations between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018.**

A. Number of contraband-related staff arrests
_____ ❑

B. Number of contraband-related staff terminations
_____ ❑

C. Number of contraband-related staff suspensions
_____ ❑

D. Total number of contraband-related staff violations
_____ ❑

22. **Please report the number of punitive actions taken against <u>visitors</u> for contraband-related violations between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018.**

A. Number of contraband-related visitor arrests
_____ ❑

B. Number of contraband-related visitor violations
_____ ❑

Section VI—Contraband Interdiction

23. **Which of the following does this facility use on <u>security staff</u> for detecting/confiscating/removing contraband?**

Select all that apply.

01. ❍ Walk-through metal detector
02. ❍ X-Ray conveyor /x-ray inspection system
03. ❍ Whole-body scanner/wave scanner
04. ❍ Regular pat search
05. ❍ Random pat search
06. ❍ Random drug test
07. ❍ Statewide contraband interdiction team
08. ❍ Contraband interdiction team at facility
09. ❍ K-9 unit for contraband detection
10. ❍ Surveillance cameras
11. ❍ Mass spectrometry/hand swabs
12. ❍ Staff-initiated investigation and intelligence
13. ❍ None
14. ❍ Other: specify _____
_____
_____

URBAN INSTITUTE

NIJ | National Institute of Justice

24. Which of the following does this facility use on <u>non-security staff</u> (including medical personnel, service providers, program staff, etc.) for detecting/confiscating/removing contraband?

Select all that apply.

01. ○ Walk-through metal detector
02. ○ X-Ray conveyor /x-ray inspection system
03. ○ Whole-body scanner/wave scanner
04. ○ Regular pat search
05. ○ Random pat search
06. ○ Random drug test
07. ○ Statewide contraband interdiction team
08. ○ Contraband interdiction team at facility
09. ○ K-9 unit for contraband detection
10. ○ Surveillance cameras
11. ○ Mass spectrometry/hand swabs
12. ○ Staff-initiated investigation and intelligence
13. ○ None
14. ○ Other: specify _____
    _____
    _____

25. Which of the following does this facility use on <u>visitors</u> for detecting/confiscating/removing contraband?

Select all that apply.

01. ○ Walk-through metal detector
02. ○ X-Ray conveyor /x-ray inspection system
03. ○ Whole-body scanner/wave scanner
04. ○ Regular pat search
05. ○ Random pat search
06. ○ Random drug test
07. ○ Statewide contraband interdiction team
08. ○ Contraband interdiction team at facility
09. ○ K-9 unit for contraband detection
10. ○ Surveillance cameras
11. ○ Mass spectrometry/hand swabs
12. ○ Staff-initiated investigation and intelligence
13. ○ None
14. ○ Other: specify _____
    _____
    _____

26. Which of the following does this facility use on <u>inmates</u> for detecting/confiscating/removing contraband?

Select all that apply.

01. ○ Walk-through metal detector
02. ○ X-Ray conveyor /x-ray inspection system
03. ○ Whole-body scanner/wave scanner
04. ○ Regular pat search
05. ○ Random pat search
06. ○ Regular strip search
07. ○ Random strip search
08. ○ Random drug test
09. ○ Statewide contraband interdiction team
10. ○ Contraband interdiction team at facility
11. ○ K-9 unit for contraband detection
12. ○ Surveillance cameras
13. ○ Mass spectrometry/hand swabs
14. ○ Cell shake downs/searches
15. ○ Staff-initiated investigation and intelligence
16. ○ BOSS (Body Orifice Scanning System) chairs
17. ○ Other: specify _____
    _____
    _____

27. Which of the following does this facility use for detecting/confiscating/removing <u>cell phones</u>?

Select all that apply.

01. ○ Generic metal detecting technologies or specialized/enhanced metal detectors that are specifically designed to detect cell phones and other types of correctional contraband
02. ○ Cell phone specific detection technologies (devices used for locating, tracking, and identifying various sources of radio transmissions)
03. ○ Cell phone detection canine teams (e.g., canine teams trained to sniff out cell phones)
04. ○ Cell phone access management systems (systems that intercept calls in order to prevent inmates from accessing carrier networks)
11. ○ None
12. ○ Other: specify _____
    _____
    _____

NIJ | National Institute of Justice

28. Which of the following best describes the inmate visitation policy in this facility?

Contact visits (options 1 and 2) include visits where the inmate and visitor are allowed to hold hands with and/or hug their visitors for an extended period of time or at multiple times during the visit .

Note: If visits are in-person (e.g., inmates and visitors sit at a table together without a glass barrier between them) but inmates are not allowed to touch their visitors, or are allowed only a quick hug/kiss at the beginning or end of the visit, please select option 3.

Select all that apply.

01. ❍ All inmates are allowed contact visits (with the exception of inmates placed in restrictive housing for punitive purposes)

02. ❍ Some inmates, such as those in a special program (e.g., a family strengthening program), are allowed contact visits

03. ❍ Inmates are allowed in-person visits without contact (a visit without a glass barrier, but where inmates are not allowed to have contact with their visitors)

04. ❍ Inmates are allowed visits through a barrier (e.g., a glass wall)

05. ❍ Inmates are allowed video visitation

06. ❍ Drug sniffing dogs are kept in the visiting room or are available upon request

07. ❍ Visitors must complete a background check

08. ❍ Visitors with any criminal history are denied access

09. ❍ Visitors who were previously incarcerated are denied access

10. ❍ All visitors are subject to mass spectrometry/hand swabs

11. ❍ Some visitors are subject to mass spectrometry/hand swabs

12. ❍ Visiting rooms are under video surveillance

13. ❍ Other: specify _____
_____
_____

29. Which of the following describe the inmate legal mail policy in this facility?

Legal mail includes correspondence relating to an open or closed legal case, including letters from lawyers, judges, probation or parole officers, or parole board.

Select all that apply.

01. ❍ Staff open and search all inmate legal mail

02. ❍ Staff open and search some inmate legal mail based on intelligence

03. ❍ Staff open and search inmate legal mail at random

04. ❍ Staff only provide photocopies of original legal mail to inmates

05. ❍ Staff use mass spectrometry on all legal mail

06. ❍ Staff use mass spectrometry on some legal mail based on intelligence

07. ❍ Staff use mass spectrometry on legal mail at random

08. ❍ Other: specify _____
_____
_____

30. Which of the following describe the inmate social mail policy in this facility?

Social mail includes any correspondence not relating to an open or closed legal case, including letters from friends, family, clergy members, etc.

Select all that apply.

01. ❍ Staff open and search all inmate social mail

02. ❍ Staff open and search some inmate social mail based on intelligence

03. ❍ Staff open and search inmate social mail at random

04. ❍ Staff only provide photocopies of original social mail to inmates

05. ❍ Staff use mass spectrometry on all social mail

06. ❍ Staff use mass spectrometry on some social mail based on intelligence

07. ❍ Staff use mass spectrometry on social mail at random

08. ❍ Other: specify _____
_____
_____

NIJ | National Institute of Justice

Section VII—Contraband Entry

31. Between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018, how much of a problem were the following entry points for contraband that was brought into the facility from the outside?

Contraband entry points are the means by which contraband that originated outside the facility is brought into the facility.

	Not a problem	Somewhat of a problem	A big problem
Inmates returning from work-release, medical appointments, court visits, transfers, etc.	○	○	○
Security staff	○	○	○
Non-security staff	○	○	○
Volunteers	○	○	○
Vendors/contractors	○	○	○
Visitors	○	○	○
Letters and packages	○	○	○
Items being thrown over the facility's perimeter or flown over by drone	○	○	○

Definitions

1. **Facility security level**—*Super maximum*—in addition to the characteristics of a maximum/close/high security facility (described below), "supermax" facilities are stand-alone units and are designated for violent or disruptive inmates. They typically involve placing inmates in singlecell confinement up to 23-hour per day for an indefinite period of time. Inmates in supermax housing have minimal contact with staff and other inmates.

   Maximum/close/high—is characterized by walls or double-fence perimeters, armed towers and/or armed patrols. Cell housing is isolated in one of two ways: within a cell block so that a prisoner escaping from a cell is confined within the building; or by double security from the perimeter by bars, steel doors, or other hardware. All entry or exit is via trap gate or sally port.

   Medium—is characterized by a single or double fenced perimeter with armed coverage by towers or patrols. Housing units are cells, rooms, or dormitories. Dormitories are living units designed or modified to accommodate 12 or more persons. All entry or exit is via trap gate or sally port.

   Minimum/low—is characterized by a fenced or

dormitories. Normal entry and exit are under visual surveillance.

   Administrative—facilities charged with special missions, such as treating or housing geriatric inmates or those with serious medical issues. In some states, reception, classification, diagnostic, or transfer centers may be administrative facilities.

2. **Design capacity**—the number of inmates that planners or architects intended for this facility.

3. **Rated capacity**—the maximum number of beds or inmates authorized by a rating official for safe and efficient operation. It may exceed design capacity due to double bunking. However, beds in an area not designed as sleeping space, such as day rooms and multipurpose, should not be included in rated capacity.

4. **Security staff**—correctional officers of all ranks and other uniformed staff who, regardless of their staff title, are in direct contact with inmates, and involved in their daily custody, care, supervision or monitoring. Includes correctional officers, line staff, and supervisors.

5. **Other/non-security staff**—all non-uniformed and civilian employees who work inside the correctional facility, such as treatment staff, educational staff, clerical staff, maintenance staff, medical personnel, and other professional and technical staff.

6. **Contraband**—any item that is (a) not approved for possession by an inmate or for admission into the institution, and/or (b) presents a threat to security or its condition or excessive quantities of it present a health, fire, or housekeeping hazard.

7. **Contraband recoveries**—any incident where staff found or recovered contraband items, regardless of whether an inmate was disciplined for the infraction or not.

8. **Assault**—is an attack that results in physical injury ranging from minor bruises or cuts needing no first-aid to death or serious harm requiring immediate hospitalization. *Inmate-on-inmate assaults* are perpetrated by inmates against other inmates, while *inmate-on-staff assaults* are perpetrated by inmates against any staff member.

9. **Contact visits**— visits where the inmate and visitor are allowed to hold hands with and/or hug their visitors for an extended period of time or at multiple times during the visit.

10. **Legal mail**—correspondence relating to an open or closed legal case, including letters from lawyers, judges, probation or parole officers, or parole board.

11. **Social mail**—any correspondence not relating to an open or closed legal case, including letters from friends, family, clergy members, etc.

Appendix B: Case Study Protocol

Urban-ACA Contraband Project
Case Study Protocol

Information Collection Mode	Description	Required from Facility
Observations in the facility	Urban will visit/tour the outdoor and indoor areas within and immediately outside the facility, with a focus on contraband entrance ports (e.g., mail/package room, visitor lobby, sally port, perimeter, etc. if applicable).	Permission to access facility and staff member to accompany us on the facility tour.
Documents	Urban will receive copies of whichever policy manuals, rule books, form templates, and reports are available and related to contraband or contraband interdiction.	Access to available (shareable) documents (originals, photocopies, or electronic copies).
Demonstrations	Urban will view a demonstration or presentation of commonly-used contraband interdiction strategies and technologies (e.g., the screening process for visitors and contractors; devices used to search inmates upon entering or reentering the facility, etc.). Although Urban would prefer to see a live demonstration of these strategies, this could also include a staff member describing the process to Urban and/or showing how a piece of equipment *would* be used.	Staff member to serve as "demonstrator." This person should be familiar with security rules and methods (including technology used for contraband detection).
Interview with administrators/policy makers	Urban will interview administrators in the facility who create and/or implement policies related to contraband definitions, rules, detection strategies, consequences, and methods of dealing with detected contraband.	Access to facility administrators or other policy makers for 30-60 minutes interviews.
Interviews with front-line staff	Urban will interview frontline staff who are responsible for carrying out contraband policies, enforcing rules, finding contraband, and/or dealing with detected contraband. This could include staff who search visitors, patrol the perimeter, carry out cell searches (e.g., CERT teams), etc.	Access to staff members for 30-60 minutes interviews.

Urban-ACA Contraband Project Case Study
Checklist

Information Collection Mode	Done (Y/N)	Details	Notes
Observing the Facility		Perimeter from inside and outside	
		Guard Tower	
		Outdoor spaces (yard, storage spaces, greenhouse)	
		Facility entrance for staff, incarcerated individuals, volunteers and visitors	
		Facility entrance for goods and mail (back door/sally port)	
		Mail/package room	
		Visitor areas	
		Meeting rooms (for meetings with lawyers)	
		Offices that incarcerated individuals may spend time in	
		Medical room	
		Kitchen	
		Classrooms (if any)	
		Laundry room	
		Common spaces inside facility (common room, dining room, living room, entertainment space, bathrooms)	
		Personal spaces (cells/sleeping areas)	
		Unsupervised work spaces (if any)	
		Solitary confinement (if applicable)	
		Other	

Documents		Contraband policy manual (rules, policies, punishment structure) (if any)	
		Report on contraband (statistics on number of incidents, type of contraband, etc.)	
		Incident report examples/form templates	
		Visiting rules	
		Other	
Demonstrations		Security protocols (at entry and exit)	
		Contraband interdiction modalities (demonstration of technology used)	
		Contraband interdiction modalities (demonstration of non-technology methods used, like bed searches)	
		Other	
Interview with Administrators/Policy Makers		Read interview protocol script	
		How do you encounter contraband at work?	
		What are the primary means by which contraband is brought into this facility?	
		How does contraband enter facility from outside the perimeter?	
		How are consequences determined?	
		How was policy related to contraband developed? Does it change from time to time? Why	
		What are different contraband interdiction modalities used in this correctional facility?	
		Is there a common entrance for all people entering the facility (Staff, incarcerated individuals, volunteers, visitors, others)?	

		What security measures are in place for these different populations?	
		Who brings mail/packages/goods inside the facility?	
		How are mail/packages/goods processed to ensure contraband is not coming into the facility with them?	
		Which technology is used to prevent/detect/remove technology?	
		What is the efficacy or impact of these interdiction modalities?	
		How did you decide what interdiction methods to use? Is it based on empirical evidence?	
		What are the costs and implementation challenges associated with implementing these interdiction modalities?	
		Other	
Interview with Front-Line Staff		Read interview protocol script	
		How do you encounter contraband at work?	
		How is contraband processed, confiscated and stored?	
		How are incidents recorded?	
		How are consequences determined?	
		What policies are enforced? How?	
		What are the primary means by which contraband is brought into this correction facility?	
		Who has physical contact with incarcerated individuals?	

		What are ways in which contraband is passed between people with physical contact?	
		What are different contraband interdiction modalities used in this correctional facility?	
		What is the search policy? How are searches conducted?	
		What is the efficacy or impact of these interdiction modalities?	
		What are the challenges associated with implementing these interdiction modalities?	
		Other	

Research on the Efficacy of Different Contraband Interdiction Modalities Used in Correctional Facilities
Correctional Staff Interview Protocol

Introduction

Hello, my name is [NAME OF FACILITATOR]. I'm part of the Urban Institute (UI) team that is studying contraband and the policies and practices in place in jails and prisons to prevent, detect, and remove contraband. This is [UI STAFF NAME] who will be taking notes to make sure we get a complete record of today's discussion. UI is a non-profit research organization based in Washington, DC. This study is funded by the National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice, to learn more about how contraband is brought into prisons and jails, how correctional staff keep contraband out of these facilities, what their priorities are in terms of contraband, and what type of data are routinely collected on contraband.

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. The content of our discussion will focus on administrative matters related to your observations and experiences, as well as your agency's procedures and practices. We will not ask you for any personal or sensitive information about you or anyone else you work with.

Participation in this interview is completely **voluntary**. You may **decline to answer** any question that you are not comfortable answering or stop the discussion at any time. We will not use your name in preparing any reports and will disguise your comments so that no one can identify what you tell us. We will not share any of your individual comments with anyone outside the room and if you decline to participate, we will not share your decision with anyone outside of the research team. After the report is written, we will destroy all notes. After the project is complete, we will de-identify all of the data we collected and archive them with the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research's National Archive of Criminal Justice Data. These de-identified data will not be made available to the public and can only be accessed through special restricted data use requests to ICPSR.

We plan on using the information we gather from this interview to develop a case study of your particular facility, highlight the success and challenges your agency has encountered keeping contraband out of the facility, including the types of interdiction modalities you have used, the reasons for selecting and using these modalities, and the efficacy of interdiction policies and technologies. The case study of your facility— and several other facilities around the country—will be used to highlight best and promising practices in preventing, detecting, and removing contraband from correctional institutions.

We will be taking detailed notes during this interview, though we will not attribute any information to you as an individual. We anticipate that this interview should last no longer than 60 minutes.

Do you have any questions before we get started?

If there are no questions (or once all questions are addressed): Do we have your consent to continue?