Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Agpalo Chapters 6-11
Agpalo Chapters 6-11
Generally A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. The whole and every part of a statute should be construed together. It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute to divide it by process of etymological dissertation, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some particular definitions given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the statute upon the basis of these definitions. It is as well a dangerous practice to base construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may be qualified by the other portion.
6.02. Intent ascertained from statute as whole The legislative meaning is to be extracted and ascertained from the statute as a whole. Its clauses are not to be segregated, but every part of a statute is to be construed with reference to every other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associatedand the details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of the general expression used in another part of the same act. REASON The best interpreter of a statue is the statute itself. ( Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum) In the proper interpretation of statutes, it is not permissible to inquire into motives which influenced the legislative body, except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself. The rule that the statute must be construed as a whole requires that apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized, if possible, as two seemingly irreconcilable propositions are susceptible to perfect harmony. The intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the subject statute.
6.03. Purpose or context as controlling guide Statutes must receive a reasonable construction, reference being had to their controlling purpose, to all their provisions, force and effect being given not narrowly to isolated and disjoined clauses, but to their spirit, broadly taking all their provisions together in one rational view. Neither grammatical construction not the letter of the statute not its rhetorical framework should be permitted to defeat its clear and definite purpose to be gathered from the whole act, comparing part with part. If possible, parts must be harmonized with each other and rendered consistent with its scope and object.
A statute is enacted in whole so one part of it is as important as the other. A provision or section which is unclear by itself is made clear by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute. Every part of a statute should be given effect as a statute is enacted as an integrated measure, not a hodgepodge of conflicting provisions. In construing, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider each and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious, and sensible. Ut res magis quam pereat. The construction which is to be sought is that which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word. ADOPT construction that will give effect to every part of the statute AVOID construction that will render a provision inoperative Apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
6.05. Apparently conflicting provisions reconciled. The various provisions should be read together so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect, without repugnancy or inconsistency. All the provisions, even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them. The courts shall endeavor to reconcile them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other.
6.06. Special and general provisions in the same statute. The particular or special provision is construed as an exception to the general provision.
6.07 6.09. Construction as not to render provision nugatory. Reason. Qualification. A provision of a statute should be so construed as not to nullify or render nugatory another provision. This principle is expressed in the maxim, interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat or a law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it. One portion of a statute should not be construed to destroy the other. This rule is based on the presumption that the legislature has enacted a statute whose provisions are in harmony and consistent with each other and that conflicting intentions in the same statute are never supposed or regarded. For consistency in statutes is of prime importanceall laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. However, where absolute harmony between parts of a statute is demonstrably not possible, the court must reject that one which is least in accord with the general plan of the whole statute. However if there be no such ground for choice between inharmonious provisions or sections, it has been held, the last in order of position is frequently held to prevail, unless it clearly appears that the intent of the legislature is otherwise.
Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are enacted, without doing violence to reason. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat, or that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is to be adopted. It is presumed that the law enacted by the legislature is complete by itself, that the legislature did perform its function well, and that it intended to impart to its enactment such a meaning as will render it operative and effective. It is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without violence to the spirit and language of an act, so interpret a statute as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole as expressed in the maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. In case of doubt or obscurity, that construction as will avoid any of such results (nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory) and as will instead make it fully operative and effective will be given the statute.
6.11 6.12. Construction to avoid surplusage. Surplusage unnecessary, extraneous matter Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed as to be a useless surplusage, and, accordingly, meaningless in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever therein. Nor should a word be so construed as to render other words or phrases associated with it serve no purpose. All efforts should be exerted to give some meaning to every word or phrase used in a statute. The legislature is presumed to have used the word or phrase for a purpose and is supposed not to insert a provision which is unnecessary and a surplusage. APPLICATION. Niere v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental Law involved: RA 4585 or the Charter of the City of La Carlota Section 1: the Mayor shall appoint the city treasurer, the city health officer, the chief of police and fire department, and other heads and other employees of such city department as may be created. Question raised: Does the city mayor have the power to appoint a city engineer pursuant to such law? Courts answer: and other heads and other employees of such departments as may be created, whom the mayor can appoint, refers to the heads of city departments that may be created after the law took effect, and does not embrace the city engineer. To rule otherwise is to render the first conjunction and before the word fire department a superfluity and without meaning at all.
Manila Lodge No. 761 v CA Law involved: Public Act 1360, which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay, to form part of the Luneta extension and stipulated that the reclaimed land shall be property of the City of Manila. The City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a portion thereof at the north end for a hotel site and either to lease or sell the same.
Question raised: Whether said reclaimed land is patrimonial land or of public dominion intended for public use. Courts answer: If the land is patrimonial, it can be disposed of without statutory authorization. The Act uses the phrase is hereby authorized. To authorize means to empower, to give a right act and hereby means by means of this statute or action. To hold that the reclaimed land is patrimonial property, which can be disposed of without statutory authorization, is to render the provision of the law to the effect that the City of Manila is hereby authorized to lease or sell a portion thereof superfluous. And to construe the statute as to render the phrase superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute must be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative.
6.13. Statute and its amendments construed together. The amendment should be harmonized and construed with the earlier provision of the charter to the end that said provision and the amendment are both given effect. The legislature, in making such amendments or changes, must have some purpose in making them, which should be ascertained and given effect.
B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 6.14. Statute construed in harmony with the Constitution. The statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation of, the fundamental law. The legislature is presumed to have adhered to the constitutional limitations. Courts should also presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is a well-settled rulethat a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. The constitutionality of a statute should not be prejudiced by applying the statute in a manner that will render it unconstitutional. Every intendment of the law should lean towards its validity, and the court should favor that construction which gives it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality.
6.15 6.18. Statutes in pari materia. Construction. Reason. Where harmonization is impossible. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or have the same purpose or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter. The later statute may specifically refer to the prior stature. However, in case no reference is made, it is also sufficient that the two or more statutes relate to the same specific subject matter to be considered in pari materia. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. All laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. To interpret and do it in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best method of interpretation.
Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an express national policy. The assumption is that whenever the legislature enacts a law, it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new statute is deemed enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relative to the same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose. Interpretation should be in accordance with the circumstances or conditions peculiar to each, in order that the statutes may be harmonized or better understood. This rule is based on the old legal maxim, distingue tempora et concordabis jura, or distinguish times and you will harmonize laws. In case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against implied amendment or repeal and in favor of harmonization of all laws on the subject. When there is implied amendment, the latter statute should be so construed as to modify the prior law on the subject no further than may be necessary to effect the specific purpose of the latter enactment. REASON. The legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and have taken into account, prior laws on the subject of legislation. Later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments. Whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes and, unless there is an express repeal of the old laws, they all should be construed together. Where harmonization is impossible, one has to give way in favor of the other. Either the two laws are reconciled and harmonized or, if they cannot, the earlier one must yield to the later one, it being the later expression of the legislative will.
6.19. Illustration of the rule. Dialdas v Perdices Facts: An alien who operated a retail store in Cebu pursuant to law decided to close his store and transfer it to Dumaguete. The retail trade law authorizes an alien, who on 15 May 1954 is actually engaged in retail, to continue engage therein until his voluntary retirement from such business, but not to establish or open additional stores or branches for retail business. Section 199 of Tax Code, however, provides that any business for which the privilege tax has been paid may be removed and continued in any other place without payment of additional tax. Issue: Whether the transfer by the alien of his retail store from Cebu to Dumaguete can be considered as a voluntary retirement from business. Held: The SC ruled that the retail trade law and Sect. 199 of the Tax Code are in pari materia. It stated that the trial court overlooked entirely, however, the clear provision of Sect. 199 of the Internal Revenue Code x x x which has not been repealed either expressly or impliedly by RA 1180. The legality of such transfer, therefore, can in no wise be questioned and consequently petitioners business in Dumaguete should not be considered as a new one in contemplation of the aforesaid RA 1180.
6.20 6.22. General and special statutes. Reason. Qualification General statute applies to all of the people of the state or to all of a particular class of persons in the state with equal force; does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to class; it is one of universal application
Special statute relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the statute only. A general and special law on the same subject matter are in pari materia. Where there are two acts, one is special and particular and the other is general, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act. The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Special law passed later regarded as an exception to or a qualification of the prior general act General law passed later special statute is still construed as an exception, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. Where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail. REASON. The legislature in passing a law of special character has its attention directed to the special facts and circumstances which the special act is intended to meet. It will not be considered that the legislature, by adopting a general act containing provisions repugnant to the provisions of the special act and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify the special act, intended to amend, repeal or modify said act. EXCEPTIONS. 1. Where the legislature clearly intended the later general enactment to cover the whole subject and to repeal all prior laws inconsistent therewith, the general law prevails (there is a repeal of the special law). 2. where the special law merely establishes a general rule while the general law creates a specific and special rule. General law prevails
6.23. Reference statutes. Reference statute statutes which refers to other statutes and makes them applicable to the subject of the legislation; frequently used to avoid encumbering the statute books of unnecessary repetition. This adoption of a statute by reference makes it as much a part of the adopting statute as if it had been incorporated therein in full. This have been recognized as an approved method of legislation, in the absence of constitutional restrictions. The adoption by reference of a statute that was preciously repealed revives the statute; the adoption takes the adopted statute as it exists at the time of adoption, unless it does so expressly. A reference statute should be so construed as t harmonize with, and give effect to, the adopted statute.
6.24. Supplemental statutes. Supplemental act intended to supply deficiencies in an existing statute and to add, to complete, or extend the statute without changing or modifying its original text; read and construed with the original to make an intelligible whole
Reenacted statute one which reenacts a previous statute or the provisions thereof Reenactment one in which the provisions of an earlier statute are reproduced in the same or substantially the same words; may also be made by reference; a legislative expression of intention to adopt the construction as well as the language of a prior act Where a statute provides that all laws not inconsistent with the provisions thereof are deemed incorporated and made integral parts thereof by reference, such previous laws on the same subject matter are deemed reenacted. RULE: When a statute or a provision thereof has been construed by the court of last resort and the same is substantially reenacted, the legislature may be regarded as adopting such construction, and the construction becomes as integral part of the reenacted statute with the force and effect of a legislative command. Thus, in the interpretation of reenacted statute, the courts will follow the construction which the adopted statute previously received.
6.26 6.27. Adoption of contemporaneous construction. Qualification. The reenactment of a statute which has received a practical or contemporaneous constructionis a persuasive indication of the adoption by the legislature of the prior practical or executive construction, the legislature being presumed to know the existence of such construction when it made the reenactment. In construing, the court should take into account such prior contemporaneous construction and give due weight and respect to it, as the joint construction placed upon the statute by the legislature that enacted it and the executive that implements it. QUALIFICATION. The rule above (adoption of construction) applies only when the statute is capable of the construction given to it and when that construction has become a settled rule of conduct.
6.28. Adopted statutes. Adopted statute statute patterned after, or copied from a statute of a foreign country. In construing, it is proper for the court to take into consideration the construction of the law by the courts of the country from which it is taken, as well as the law itself and the practices under it, for the legislature is presumed to have adopted such construction and practices with the adoption of the law. The presumption does not, however, apply to construction given the statute subsequent to its adoption, although it has persuasive effect on the interpretation of the adopted statute.
MAXIMS at a glance Distingue tempora et concordabis jura distinguish times and you will harmonize laws Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is to be adopted Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum - the best interpreter of a statue is the statute itself
Ut res magis quam pereat the construction which is to be sought is that which gives effect to the whole of the statute
Chapter 7: Strict or Liberal Interpretation A. IN GENERAL 7.01 Generally -strict or liberal interpretation: depends on the nature of the statute -the purpose to be subserved and mischief to be remedied -that will best accomplish the end desired and effectuate legislative intent 7.02 Strict c in its exact construction, generally Strict Construction- is that construction according to the letter of a statute, which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes the language used in its exact meaning, and admits no equitable consideration. -it is the antithesis of liberal construction 7.03 Liberal construction defined Liberal Construction- such equitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a statute to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or promote justice. -that construction which expands the meaning of a statute to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason thereof or within the evil which the statute was designed to remedy, or which gives a statute its generally accepted meaning to the end that the most comprehensive application thereof may be accorded, without being inconsistent with its language or doing violence to any of its terms. 7.04 Liberal construction applied, generally -where a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the literal meaning of the words may be rejected, instead the statute will be given liberal interpretation so as to save the statute from obliteration -expressed in ut res magis valeat quam pereat -this should, however, be distinguished from that act of the court in engrafting upon a law, something which it believes ought to have embraced therein (judicial legislation) -a statue may not be liberally construed to read into it something which its clear and plain language rejects. 7.05 Construction to promote social justice
-The principles of social justice as enshrined in the Constitution should be taken into account in the interpretation and application of laws. -All the laws which on the great historic event when the Commonwealth of the Philippines was born, were susceptible of two interpretationsstrict or liberal, against or in favor of social justicenow have to be construed broadly in order to promote and achieve social justice. 7.06 Construction taking into consideration general welfare or growth of civilization Based on the maxim salus populi est suprema lex Statuta pro public commodo late interpretantur- statute enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally. -Statutes and judicial decisions alike come into being and growing out of the same common roots, the supreme good of society. It is a consecrated legal axiom that the reason of the law is the life of the law. -If the judge limits himself to the printed pages of the statute, and does not go out into the open spaces of actuality and dig down deep into his common soil, he fails in his noble calling, and becomes subservient to formalism B. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 7.07 Penal statutes, generally Penal statutes- those laws by which punishments are imposed for violation or transgression of their provisions. -are those acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment Case: Yu Oh v. CA -RA No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment. It is not a penal law, and therefore, Art 22 of the RPC does not apply in the case. 7.08 Penal statutes strictly construed -Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. -penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or any equitable consideration; nor exclude cases from it that are obviously within its provision -only those persons, offenses, and penalties clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the operation of the statute. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. -Statutes, being penal, must be construed must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. Case: Laurel v. Abrogar -Issue: whether or not international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Card through the telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short, PLDTs business of providing said telecommunication services, are proper subjects of of theft under article 308 of the RPC. -Held: No. take personal property in the said provision would not include PLDTs business. It must be construed in favor of the accused. 7.09 Reason why penal statutes are strictly construed -the law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court, limited. This is not enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of a forbidden acts. 7.10 Acts mala in se and mala prohibita General Rule: a penal statute will not be construed to make t5he commission of certain prohibited acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer, unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.
Mala in Se- such as those penalized under the RPC, criminal intent, apart from the act itself, is required Mala Prohibita- the only inquiry is, has the law been violated 7.11 Application of the rule Case: Azarcon v Sandiganbayan -Issue: whather a private person can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depository of distrained property, so as to make the conversion thereof the crime of malversation falling within the jurisdiction of sandiganbayan. The prosecution argues that Art 222 of the RPC defines the individuals covered by the term officers under Art 217 of the same code. -Held: No. Art 22 of the RPC is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Art 222 is to be deemed a public officer. 7.12 Limitation of Rule Where a penal statute is capable of two interpretations, one which will operate to exempt an accused from liability for violation thereof and another which will give effect to the manifest intent of the statute and promote its object, the latter interpretation should be adopted. Ex: The law which punishes the display of flags used during the insurrection against the United States may not be so construed as to exempt from criminal liability a person who displays a replica of said flag because said replica is not the one used during the rebellion, for to so construe it is to nullify the statute altogether. 7.13 Statutes in derogation of rights Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the exercise of its police power, may enact legislations curtailing or restricting their enjoyment. They are generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope or purpose. Example: Statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land and property, allowing the taking of deposition, fixing the ceiling price of commodities, limiting the exercise of proprietary rights by the citizens, and suspending period of prescription of actions are construed strictly. 7.14 Statutes authorizing appropriations Rule: strictly construed against the expropriating authority and liberally in favor of property owners. Reason for the rule: the exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether by state or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule is that the authority must be strictly construed. 7.15 Statutes granting privileges Statutes granting special privileges are viewed with suspicion and are strictly construed. Privilegia recipient largam interpretationem voluntati consonam concedentis - privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. Strict construction requires that those who invoke a special privilege granted by a statute must comply strictly with its provisions. EX: legislative franchise to operate electric light and power 7.16 Legislative grants to local government units Rule: Legislative grants in favor of local government units are grants of a public nature, and hence, should be strictly construed against the grantee. Reason: There is in such a grant a gratuitous donation of public money or property which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in favor of the public. 7.17 Statutory grounds for removal of officials -strictly construed.
Rule: Removal is to be confined within the limits prescribed for it; the causes, manner and conditions fixed must be must be pursued with strictness; where the cause of removal is specified, the specification amounts to a prohibition to move for a different cause, which is a paraphrase of the maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius. Reason: the remedy is a drastic one and penal in nature. Example: A statutes which provides that a public official may be removed for neglect in office, the phrase in office should be construed to qualify the enumerated grounds, in that the grounds must be such as affect the officers performance of his duties as an officer and not such as affect only his character as a private person. 7.18 Naturalization laws Rule: Naturalization laws are strictly construed against an applicant for citizenship and rigidly followed and enforced. Reason: The right of an alien to become a citizen by naturalization is a statutory rather than a natural one. 7.19 Statutes imposing taxes and customs duties Taxation- is a destructive power which interfered with the personal and property rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property for the support of the government. Rule: Tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. 7.20 Statutes granting tax exemptions Rule: Laws granting tax exemptions are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. Basis: To minimize the different treatment and foster impartiality, fairness and equality of treatment among taxpayers. Case: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v CA -Facts: The BIR claimed that there should be no tax credit pursuant to The proviso of Sec. 168 of the tax code which reads xxx Provided, finally, That credit for any sales, millers or excise taxes and raw materials or supplies used in the milling process shall not be allowed against the millers tax due, except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory as provided hereunder. -Issue: whether containers and packaging materials can be credited against the millers deficiency tax. -Held: The proviso should be strictly construed to apply only to raw materials and not to containers and packing materials which are not raw materials; hence the miller is entitled to tax credit. Tax exemptions cannot be created by mere implication but must be clearly provided by law. In case of doubt, non-exemption is favored. Example: Where PD No. 1955 withdrew all tax exemptions, except those embodied in the Real Property Code, a law which grants certain industries real estate tax exemptions under the Real Estate Code, the intention to limit the exemption to only those provided in the Code and to exclude those prescribed in other laws is clear. Case: PLDT v Province of Laguna -Facts: PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise, pursuant to which it is exempt from the payment of franchise tax. However, the LGC of 1991 withdrew existing tax exemptions, which included that of PLDT. Consequently, the province of Laguna, in the exercise of its taxing power under the LGC imposed franchise taxes on PLDT. Thereafter, RA 7925 was enacted, Sec. 23 of which grants Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. Invoking Sec. 23, PLDT filed a claim for refund of taxes, contending that Sec.23 grants it tax exemptions. -Issue: Whether PLDT is exempted -Held: Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, it was ruled that Sec. 23 of RA 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioners franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes. Tax exemptions are highly disfavored.
7.21 Qualification of rule For where the law provides no qualification for the granting of tax exemption, the court is not at liberty to supply one. The rule of strict construction of a statute granting tax exemptions in favor of the government itself or its agencies. Example: The statute granting the NAPOCOR, which is a government instrumentality, exemption from all forms of taxes embraces exemption not only from direct but also from indirect taxes. 7.22 Statutes concerning the sovereign Rule: Restrictive statutes which impose burdens on the public treasury or which diminish rights are strictly construed so no matter how broad their terms are, they still do not embrace the sovereign, unless the sovereign is specifically mentioned. Example: PD No. 851 which requires employers to pay a thirteenth month salary to their employees receiving a basic compensation of not more than 1k a month does not embrace the Republic of the Philippines. 7.23 Statutes authorizing suits against the government Doctrine of non-suability- State may not be sued without its consent. Nullum tempus occurit regi- there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Rule: A statute by whereby the state gives its consent to be sued is strictly construed, and the waiver of immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. The States immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the state and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant. 7.24 Statutes prescribing formalities of will Rule: Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are strictly construed. This means that a will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements, otherwise it is entirely void. 7.25 Exceptions and provisos Rule: Exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. An exception excludes all others. The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly construed, being an exception to the general rule. A preference is an exception to the general rule and it is what its name implies. The law as to preference should be strictly construed. A proviso should be strictly construed because the purpose set forth in the general enactment expresses the legislative policy and only those expressly exempted by the proviso should be freed from the operation of the statute. C. STATUTES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED 7.26 General social legislation General welfare legislations- statutes which have been enacted to implement the social justice and protection-to-labor provisions of the constitution Rule: General welfare legislations which include labor laws, tenancy laws, land reform laws and social security laws are construed liberally. However, this holds true only when there is doubt or ambiguity in the law and not when the law itself is clear and free from doubt. Case: Asian Transmission Corp v CA -Issue: When two holidays fall on the same date, will the worker be entitled to only one holiday pay?
-Held: No, applying the liberal interpretation of labor laws. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. 7.27 General welfare clause General welfare clause on the power of local government has two branches: 1. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon local legislative bodies by law. 2. Second branch is much more independent of the specific functions enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the LGU and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. Rule: The general welfare clause should be construed liberally in favor of the LGUs. It should be interpreted, in case of doubt, as to give more powers to local governments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare, and material progress of the people in the community. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. 7.28 Grant of power to local governments Old rule: Construed strictly and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the national government and against the political subdivision concerned. New Rule: Following the constitutional mandate of local autonomy, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the LGC, which provides in Sec 4 thereof that any power of a barangay, municipality, city or province shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the exercise of power shall be interpreted in favor of the LGU concerned. 7. 29 Statutes granting taxing power Old rule: Construed strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting that power must be resolved against the LGU because LGUs, unlike the sovereign state, are allocated with no inherent power to tax. New Rule: Since the policy of local autonomy is advanced by the new constitution, statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing power of LGUs must be strictly against the national government and liberally in favor of the LGUs, and any doubt as to the existence of the taxing power will be resolved in favor of the local government. 7.30 Statutes prescribing prescriptive period to collect taxes Rule: The laws on prescription being a remedial measure should be interpreted liberally in a way conducive to bringing about the beneficial purpose of affording protection to the taxpayers. 7.31 Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of tax Rule: Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of taxes within the period required are liberally construed in favor of the government and strictly construed in favor of the government and strictly observed and interpreted against the taxpayer. Provided, however, that such construction will not result to injustice to the taxpayer. Reason: By reason of public policy. Such laws are intended to hasten tax payments or to punish evasions or neglect of duty in respect thereto. 7.32 Election laws Rule: Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their representatives for the application of the election laws involves public interest and imposes upon the COMELEC and the courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected by the people. Three parts of election laws for purposes of applying the rules of statutory construction:
1. The provisions for the conduct of elections which election officials are required to follow. -mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the elections, they are held to be directory only. -If not complied with by the election officials, the law provides a remedy against them. They should be prosecuted, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld. 2. The provisions which candidates for office are required to perform. -generally regarded as mandatory. Thus, the provisions prescribing the qualifications of candidate requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy, defining election offenses, and limiting the period within which to file election contests, are mandatory and failure to comply is fatal. 3. The procedural rules which are designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the elections. -liberally construed. -example: laws governing election protests. Technicalities should not be sanctioned when it will be an obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of the public officials. 7.33 Amnesty proclamations Rule: Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed as to carry out their purpose, which is to encourage the return to the fold of the law of those who have veered from the law. Hence, in case of doubt as to whether certain persons come within the amnesty proclamation, the doubt should be resolved in their favor and against the state. 7.34 Statutes prescribing prescription of crimes Rule: Statutes of limitations are liberally construed in favor of the accused Reason: It is not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. 7.35 Adoption statutes Rule: Adoption statutes are liberally in favor of the child to be adopted. Reason: Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for the unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter. 7.36 Veteran and pension laws Veteran and pension laws- are enacted to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered in line of duty. Rule: Veteran and pension laws, being remedial in character must be construed liberally to the end that their noble purpose is best accomplished. Cases: Ortiz v COMELEC -Issue: whether a commissioner of the COMELEC is deemed to have completed his term and entitled to full retirement benefits under the law which grants him five-year lump sum gratuity and thereafter lifetime pension, who retires from the service after having completed his term of office, when the acceptance of his courtesy resignation submitted in response to the call of the President following the EDSA Revolution is accepted. -Held: The acceptance of of his courtesy resignation is not resignation in contemplation of law because it was not voluntary. He is entitled to retirement benefits. In Re Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana
-Issue: whether Justice Plana is entitled to gratuity and retirement pay when, at the time of his courtesy resignation was accepted following the EDSA Revolution and establishment of a revolutionary government under the Freedom Constitution, he lacked a few months to meet the age requirement for retirement under the law but had accumulated a number of leave credits which, if added to his age at the time, would exceed the age requirement. -Held: Applying the liberal approach, he is entitled. Failure to serve the required length of service is beyond his control. In Re Martin -Issue: whether a justice of the SC, who availed of the disability retirement benefits pursuant to the provision that if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement he shall receive only a gratuity equivalent to ten years salary and allowances aforementioned with no further annuity payable monthly during the rest of the retirees natural life, is entitled to a monthly lifetime pension after the ten-year period. -Held: if at the time of retirement he was already entitled to retire under Sec 1 of RA 910 and to receive his 5-year lump sum plus a lifetime pension after 5 years, his having applied for disability retirement under Sec 3 of the law in order that he may receive the 10-year lump sum gratuity, should not result, should not result in the forfeiture of his right to a lifetime pension if he should still be alive after ten years from his retirement. The law is not intended to deprive him of his lifetime pension if he is also alive after 10 years. The retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his old age, not to punish him for having survived. Cena v CSC -Issue: whether or not a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, may be allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an old-age pension under Sec 11 par. (b) of PD No. 1146. -Held: There is no justifiable reason to avail such. There is no indication that Sec 11, par. (b) of PD No. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of government service, i.e., only a few months short short of the age-old requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension. 7.37 Rules of Court Rule: The Rules of Court, being procedural, are to be construed liberally with the end in view of realizing their purposethe proper and just determination of a litigation. Technicalities, when they are not an aid to justice, deserve scant consideration from the courts. However, where a decision of a court is satisfactorily supported by the records and is in strict accordance with the rules, a liberal construction of such rules so as to justify setting aside the decision is not warranted. The literal strictures of the rules have been relaxed in favor of liberal construction in the following cases: 1. Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; 2. Where the interest of substantial justice will be served; 3. Where the resolution of the emotion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and 4. Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 7.38 Other statutes Curative statutes- are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are retroactive. Redemption laws- being procedural in nature, are to be construed liberally to carry out their purpose, which is to enable the debtor to have his property applied to pay as many debtors liabilities as possible. -similarly, statutes providing exemptions from executions are interpreted liberally in order to give effect to their beneficent and humane purpose; and to this end, any reasonable doubt should be construed in favor of the exemption from execution.
Warehouse receipts- as instruments of credit, warehouse receipts play a very important role in modern commerce, and accordingly, warehouse receipt laws are given liberal construction in favor of bona fide holders of such receipts. Probation- gives second chance to first-hand offenders to maintain his place in society through the process of reformation -probation law is liberally construed by extending the benefits thereof to any one not specifically disqualified. Statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution- liberally construed for the advancement of purposes and objectives for which it was created. MAXIMS Statuta pro public commodo late interpretantur- statute enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally. Privilegia recipient largam interpretationem voluntati consonam concedentis - privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. Nullum tempus occurit regi- there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Chapter VIII MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES
A. In General
8.01. Generally.
Statutes may be classified either as madatory or directory. The classification is important in resolving the question of what effect should be given to the mandate of the statute.
Mandatory statute- commands either positively that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something be not done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey.
-contains words of command or prohibition, the omission to follow which renders the proceeding to which it relates illegal and void, or the violation of which makes the decision therein rendered invalid.
Directory statute- permissive or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result obtained. The nonperformance of what it prescribes will not vitiate the proceedings therein taken.
There is no absolute test for determining whether a statutory direction is to be considered mandatory or directory. The primary object is to ascertain legislative intent. When a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, ordely and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory where no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. A provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance is mandatory.
Mandatory -words of command and prohibition -shall, must, ought, should, cannot, shall not, ought not Directory -permissive words -may
As a general rule, the use of the word shall in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory. The presumption is that the word shall in a statute is used in an imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different meaning. Like the word shall, the term must or ought is a word of command. It connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. The word must and shall in a statute are not always imperative. It may be consistent with discretion. If the language of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the word must to be directory, it should be given that meaning. One test used to determine whether the word shall is mandatory is whether non-compliance with what is required will result in the nullity of the act. If it results in the nullity of the act, the word is used as a command.
Illustration. In Director of Lands vs. CA, the law requires in petitions for land registration that upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published in the Official Gazette and once in a nespaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Court held that the law expressly requires that the initial hearing be published not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation because due process demands it and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as other newspapers. These make the use of the word shall imperative, so that the decision in the land registration case which was tried without the initial hearing being published in a newspaper of genral circulation is a nullity.
The word shows opportunity or possibility. Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase may be implies the possible existence of something. Generally speaking, the use of the word may in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature. The word may is generally permissive only and operate to confer discretion.
Illustration. The word may in Sec. 63 of the Corporation Code to the effect that shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates endorsed by the owner is merely permissive and indicates that transfer of the shares may be effected in a manner different from that provided for in law.
The word may will, as a rule, be construed as shall where a statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where it vests a public body or officer with power and authority to take such action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals. On the other hand, the word shall may be construed as may when so required by context or the intention of the legislature. It shall be construed merely as permissive when no public benefit or private right requires that it be given an imperative meaning.
Illustration. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provides that an appeal from an adverse decision against a local executive elective official to the President shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. It has been held that the word shall in the provision is not mandatory because there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision and there is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order.
A negative statute is mandatory. A negative statute is one expressed in negative words or in the form of an affirmative proposition qualified by the word only, said word having the force of an exclusionary negation.
B. MANDATORY STATUTES
Statutes which confer upon a public body or officer power to perform acts which concern the public interests or rights of individuals, are generally regarded as mandatory although the language used is permissive only since such statutes are construed as imposing rather than conferring privileges. It is placed with the depository to meet the demands of rights, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, and who could otherwise be remediless.
Statutes which require certain steps to be taken or certain conditions to be met before persons concerned can avail of the benefits conferred by law are, with respect to such requirements, considered mandatory. For this reason, failure of a person to take the required steps or to meet the conditions will ordinarily preclude him from availing of the statutory benefits. The rule is based on the maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, or the laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure he who is first in time is preferred in right.
Statutes prescribing the various steps and methods to be taken for acquisition for jurisdiction by the courts or tribunals over certain matters are considered mandatory.
Statutes or rules prescribing the time for litigants to take certain actions or to appeal from an adverse decision are generally mandatory.
In statutes relating to procedure, every act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the part affected, is mandatory. A statute which requires a court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner, follow a particular procedure, or subject to certain limitations, is mandatory, and an act beyond those limits is void as an excess of jurisdiction.
The provisions of election laws governing the conduct of election and prescribing the steps election officials are required to do in connection therewith are mandatory before the elections, however, when it is sought to enforce them after the elections, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part.
The rule that election laws are mandatory before but not after the election applies only to those provisions which are procedural in nature. The rule does not apply to provisions of the election laws prescribing the time limit to file certificates of candidacy and the qualifications and disqualifications to elective office. These provisions are mandatory even after the elections.
Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of the term and during the occupancy of the office. This means that if a person is not qualified at the time he assumed office, or if he loses such eligibility or qualifgications during the continuance of his incumbency, he may be ousted from office.
It is a general rule that the provisions of a statute relating to the assessment of taxes, which are intended for the security of the citizens, or to insure the equality of taxation, or for certainty as to the nature and amount of each others tax, are mandatory; but those designed merely for the information or direction of officers or to secure methodical and systematic modes of proceedings are merely directory.
Statutes authorizing public auction sale of properties and prescribing the procedure to be followed are in derogation of property rights and due process, and are construed, with respect to the prescribed procedure, to be mandatory.
C. DIRECTORY STATUTES
There are statutory requisitions intended for guidance of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them which do not limit their power or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual. Provisions of this character are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless accompanied by negative words importing that the acts required shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated.
Statutes prescribing the requirements as to the manner of judicial action that judges should follow in the discharge of their functions are, as a rule, merely directory. Non-compliance therewith is not necessary to the validity of the proceedings.
The question as to whether time provision is mandatory or directory is one of legislative intent. If by the terms of the statute or by necessary implication the judge or public official loses jurisdiction to resolve the case after the prescribed period and any judgment thus rendered is null and void for want of jurisdiction, then the statute is mandatory. The better rule is that where a construction of a time provision as mandatory will cause great injury to persons not at fault or result in a miscarriage of justice, such consequence should be avoided by construing the statute as directory, for reasons of fairness, justice and fair play require such construction.
Is a decision rendered beyond the period prescribed in the Constitutio twenty four months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for other lower courts null and void? Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the trial or verdict, have been held by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would clearly have indicated it. Additionally, constitutional provisions are directory and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural. Chapter 9 - Prospective and Retroactive Statutes
A. IN GENERAL 9.01. Prospective and Retroactive statutes. Prospective statutes one which operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statutes take effect, one that looks and applies to the future. Retroactive law law which creates a new obligation imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past. Statute is not made retroactive because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words, part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn a time antedating its passage. A retroactive law, in legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transaction or consideration already past. 9.02. Laws operate prospectively, generally. Statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the legislature to give tem a retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. A statute ought not to receive a construction making it retroactive unless the words are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. Lex prospicit, non respicit the law looks forward, not backward Les de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis a new statute should affect the future, not the past. 9.03. Presumption against retroactivity. It depends upon legislative intent. The presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly, and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. Presumption applies whether the statute is in the form of an original enactment, an amendment, or a repeal. 9.04. Words or phrases indicating prospectivity. hereafter or thereafter to take effect immediately or at affixed future date from and after the passing of this Act, shall have been made, from and after indicates that the statute is prospective in operation only shall implies that the lawmakers intend the enactment to be effective only in future.
9.05. Retroactive statutes, generally. Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of retroactive statutes which do not impair the obligations of contract, deprive persons of property without due process of law, or divest rights that have become vested, or which are not in the nature of ex post facto laws. Retroactive laws: remedial or curative statutes as well as statutes which create new rights Statutes applied retroactively must not violate any of the constitutional restrictions B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT 9.06. Penal statutes. Penal laws operate prospectively No act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed Based on the maxim: nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis there is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law. 9.07. Ex post facto law. It is any of the following: 1.) A law which makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such act. 2.) A law which aggravates a crime, or make it greater than it was, when committed 3.) A law which changes the punishment and inflict s a greater punishment than that annexed to the crime when committed 4.) A law which alters the legal rule of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time f the commission of the offense 5.) A law which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful 6.) A law which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty The prohibition against ex post facto law is limited in scope and applies only to penal matters and criminal proceedings, which impose punishment or proceedings, which affect private rights retroactively. Retroactive laws, which are not criminal in nature, do not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws 9.08. Bill of attainder. A legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial It is doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features
If a statute is a bill of attainder, it is an ex post facto law If a statute is an ex post facto law, it does not provide that it is a bill of attainder 9.09. When penal laws applied retroactively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive unless they are favorable to the accused, who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the application of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same ( favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda) 2 laws affecting the liability of the accused: (1) in force at the time of the commission of the crime (2) enacted during or after the trial of the criminal action If during the pendency of a criminal action and a statute is passed reducing the penalty and it is favorable to the accused, it will be applied retroactively. If there is already a final judgment and the accused is already serving sentence, the remedy of the accused is to file a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that his continued imprisonment is illegal Exceptions: (1) accused is habitual delinquent (2) the later statute expressly provides that it shall not apply to existing actions or pending cases (3) the accused disregards the later law and invokes the prior statute where he was prosecuted 9.10. Statutes substantive in nature. A law which creates, defines, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs Substantive right one which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them Procedural rule if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right (i.e. where to prosecute an appeal or transferring the venue of appeal) Substantive rule if the rule creates right such as the right to appeal
9.11. Effects on pending actions. A statute which affects substantive rights and not merely procedural matters may not be given retroactive operation so as to govern pending proceedings, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary. Example: In Cang vs. CA, RA No. 7691 was not yet in force at the time of the commencement of the cases in the trial court. It took effect only during the pendency of the appeal before the CA. Therefore, petitioners claim that RA No. 7691 should be retroactively applied was not given merit. The court held that, a law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court cannot be given retroactive effect. 9.12. Qualification of rule. A substantive law will be construed as applicable to pending actions if such is the clear intent of the law. Or if the statutes purpose is to promote social justice A case must be decided in the light of the law as it exists at the time of the decision by the appellate court. Example, in the case Municipality of Sta. Fe v. Municipality of Aritao, petitioner contends that, provisions of the 1987 constitution and the LGC of 1991 on the settlement of municipal boundary disputes should be applied prospectively. When the court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over
a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The court held that a law may be given retroactive effect if it so provided expressly or retroactivity is necessarily implied there from. No vested right is impaired and it does not deprive the person of property without due process of law. Provisions of 1987 Constitution are intended to apply to all existing political subsidiaries. 9.13. Statutes affecting vested rights. A vested right or interest may be said to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established and id no longer open to doubt or controversies Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons, as a present interest Rights which have not been acted are not vested A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively if it impairs substantive right that has become vested While a law creating a new right in favor of a class of persons may be given retroactive operation. It may not be so applied if the new right collides with or impairs any vested right acquired before the establishment of the new right. Example, the abolition of death penalty and its imposition. Those accused of crimes prior to the re-imposition of the death penalty have acquired vested rights under the law abolishing it. 9.14. Statutes affecting obligations of contract. Any contract entered into must be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of the execution Such law forms part of, and is read into, the contract even without the parties expressly saying so Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contract itself A statute which authorizes any deviation from the terms of contract should not be applied retroactively
9.15. Illustration of rule. In People v. Zeta, a lawyer entered into a contract for professional services on contingent basis and actually rendered service to its successful conclusion. This is pursuant to the then existing law authorizing a lawyer to charge not more than 5% of the amount involved as attorneys fees in the prosecution of certain veterans claim. A statute was enacted prohibiting the collection of attorneys fees before they were collected. The lawyer in this case was prosecuted for violating the statute. The court said that the said statute cannot be applied retroactively. The court concluded that the 5% fee allowed by the old law is not unreasonable. 9.16. Repealing and amendatory acts. Although a repealing act is intended to be retroactive, it will not be so construed if it will impair vested rights or the obligations of contract, or unsettle matters that had been legally done under the old law While an amendment is generally construed as becoming a part of the original act as if it had been contained therein, it may not be given a retroactive effect unless it is so provided expressly or by necessary implication and no vested right or obligations of contract are thereby impaired.
Example: RA No. 401 was amended by RA No. 671; according to the said amendment, a debtor who paid his pre-war obligation with interests before the amendment was approved into law is not entitled to a refund of the interest paid, because the phrase makes voluntary payment in the said act denotes a present or future act. C. STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT 9.17. Laws not retroactive; exception. Procedural laws and curative laws are given retroactive operation Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion. They refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. In criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. Remedial statutes which do not create new or take away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy r confirmation of rights already existing do not come with the legal concept of a retroactive law. No vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. 9.18. Exceptions to the rule. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Example: In Tan, Jr. v. CA, the issue is whether or not the redemption of subject property valid under the then existing rule of procedure at the time of redemption remains valid even if the new rule, if applied retroactively, makes the redemption void. The CA applied the new rule retroactively and validated the redemption. The court reversed the appellate court and ruled in favor of the validity of the redemption. 9.19. Procedural laws. Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion. They refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Include rules of pleadings, practice, and evidence. 9.20. Exceptions to the rule. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. It may not be also applied to pending actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts.
9.21. Curative statutes. These are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. Their purpose is to give validity to acts that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Example: Frivaldo vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 87193. June 23, 1989.) Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Issue: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. Held: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress as well as to the elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon. 9.22. Limitations of rule. Curative statutes are not given retroactive effect if to do so will impair the obligations of contract or disturb vested rights. Exception is a remedial or curative statute which is enacted as a police power measure.
9.23. Police power legislations. Statutes which are enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate certain activities are applicable not only to those activities or transactions coming into being after their passage, but also to those already in existence. Reason: non-impairment of the obligations of contract or of vested rights must yield to the legitimate exercise of the power, by the legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. 9.24. Statutes relating to prescription. Being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after its effectivity. Such a statute is both prospective in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued and will accrue after it took effect, and retroactive in the sense that it applies to causes accrued before its passage. A statute of limitations will not be given retroactive operation to causes of action that accrued prior to its enactment if to do so will remove a bar of limitation which has become complete or disturb existing claims without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon. 9.25. Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription. Example: In Corales v. Employees Compensation Commission, issue is whether a claim for workmens compensation which ensued under the old Workmens Compensation Act is barred by the provisions of New Labor Code which repealed the former act. It says that, workmens compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of the act shall be filed on or before the specified date otherwise, they will be barred. But the court ruled that, the provisions do not apply on the said claims because the prescriptive period for claims which accrued under the Workmens Compensation Act is, as amended is 10 years. This is a right founded on statute, a vested right, that cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Labor Code. 9.26. Prescription in criminal and civil cases. The laws on prescription of actions supply as well to crimes committed before the enactment as afterwards. The statutes are enacted by the legislatures as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. 9.27. Statutes relating to appeals. A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural in nature and applies to pending actions in which no judgment has yet been promulgated at the time the statute took effect. It may not be construed retroactively so as to impair vested rights.
Lex prospicit, non respicit the law looks forward, not backward
Les de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past.
Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis a new statute should affect the future, not the past.
Favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda penal laws cannot be given retroactive unless they are favorable to the accused, who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the application of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same
Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis there is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law.
CHAPTER 10 Amendment, Revision, Codification and Repeal I. Amendment a. Power to Amend Legislature has the power to amend, subject to constitutional requirement any existing law. Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or change the law.
b. How Amendment Effected By addition, deletion or alteration of a statute which survives in its amended form. By enacting amendatory act, modifying or altering some provisions of the statute either expressly or impliedly
Express Amendment: Done by providing amendatory act that specific sections or provisions of a statute are amended; indicated as to read as follows c. Amendment by Implication There is implied amendment where a part of a prior statute embracing the subject as the latter act may not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent provision of the latter in which event, prior act is deemed amended to the extent of the repugnancy.
d. When Amendment Takes Effect After 15 days following the publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.
e. How Construed f. A statute and its amendment should be read together as a whole meaning, should be read as if the statute has been originally enacted in its amended form. Portions not amended will continue to be in force with the same meaning they have before amendment.
Meaning of Law Changed by Amendment General rule: An amended act would be given a construction different from that of the law prior to its amendment for it is presumed that legislatures would not have amended the statute if it did not intend to change its meaning.
g. Amendment Operates Prospectively General rule: Amendment operates prospectively unless the contrary is provided or the legislative intent to give it a retroactive effect is necessarily implied from the language used and no vested rights are impaired. However, amendments relating to procedures should be given retroactive effect.
h. Effect of Amendment in Vested Rights i. Rule: After the statute is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the amendment or to obligations that were contracted under the prior act.
Effect of Amendment on Jurisdiction Rule: A subsequent statute amending a prior act with effect of divesting the court of jurisdiction may not be construed to operate to oust jurisdiction that has already attached under the prior law.
j.
Effect of Nullity of Prior or Amendatory Act An invalid or unconstitutional law does not in legal contemplation exist. Where a statute amended is invalid, nothing in effect has been amended. The amended act shall be considered the original or independent act. When the amended act is declared unconstitutional, the original statute remains unaffected or in force.
II.
Revision and Codification a. Generally: restating the existing laws into one statute in order to simplify complicated provisions. b. Construction to Harmonize Different Provisions The different provisions of a revised statute or code should be read and construed together. Where there is irreconcilable conflict: that which is best in accord with the general plan or, in the absence of circumstances upon which to base a choice, that which is later in physical position, being the latest expression of legislative will, will prevail.
c. What is Omitted is Deemed Repealed When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. Illustration: Mecano v. Commission on Audit Issue: Claim for reimbursement by govt official of medical and hospitalization expenses pursuant to Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. CA denied the claim since RAC of 1987 that revised the old Administrative code, repealed Sec. 699. Held: SC ruled that the legislature did not intend, in enacting the new Code to repeal Sec. 699 of the old Code. d. Change in Phraseology Rule: neither an alteration in phraseology nor omission or addition of words in the latter statute shall be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts.
Rule: The rearrangement of section or parts of a statute, or the placing of portions of what formerly was a single section in separate section, does not operate to change the operation , effect and meaning of a statute, unless changes are of such nature as to manifest the clean intent to change the former laws.
III.
Repeals a. Power to Repeal Legislature has plenary power to repeal, Supreme Court, while it has the power to promulgate rule of procedure, it cannot, in the exercise of such power, alter, change or repeal substantive laws.
b. Repeal: Total or Partial, Express or Implied 1. Total: Rendered revoked completely 2. Partial: Leaves the unaffected portion of the statute in force 3. Express: There is a declaration in a statute (repealing clause) 4. Implied: All other repeals c. The Constitution prohibits the passage of irrepealable laws; all laws are repealable.
d. Repeal by Implication Two well-settled categories: 1. Where the provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilable, the latter act repeals the earlier one. 2. Latter act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as substitute. e. Irreconcilable Inconsistency Rule: Repugnancy must be clear and convincing or the latter law nullifies for the reason and purpose of the earlier to call for repeal. Mere difference in the terms will not create repugnance. Leges posteriors priores contraries abrogant: A latter law repeals an earlier law on the same subject which is repugnant thereto.
f.
Implied Repeal by Reversion or Codification Rule: Where a statute is revised or a series of legislative acts on the same subject are revised and consolidated into one, covering the entire field of subject matter, all parts and provisions of the former act or acts that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. Illustration: Revision of the Agricultural Act by the Agricultural Land reform Code A substitute statute, and evidently intended as the substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute. The revising statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute prevails and whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded.
g. Repeal by Reenactment Where a statute is a reenactment of the whole subject in substitution of the previous laws on the matter, the latter disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law is deemed repealed. Illustration: GSIS v. City Assessor of Iloilo Issue: Whether RA 8291, a subsequent law which grants tax exemptions to GSIS funds and properties, has repealed Sec. 234 of Local Government Code of 1991 which withdrew tax exemptions. Held: The court answered the issue in negative. h. Other Forms of Implied Repeal 1. When two laws are expressed in the form of a universal negative: a negative statute repeals all conflicting provisions unless the contrary intention is disclosed. 2. Where the legislature enacts something in general terms and afterwards passes another on the same subject, although in affirmative language, introduces a special condition or restrictions. i. Repealing Clause All laws or part thereof, which is inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Nature of this clause: Not an express repeal rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter Ex proprio vigour
j.
Rule: The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicating the intent is not to repeal any existing law on the matter unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.
Repeal by Implication Not Favored Rule: Repeal by implication is not favoured. Presumption is against inconsistency and against implied repeals for it is presumed that legislatures know existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Illustration: National Power Corp. v. Angas Issue: Whether Central Bank Circular No. 416 has impliedly repealed or amended Article 2209 of the Civil Code. Held: This principle, as answering the issue in negative, was used.
k. Leges posteriors priore contraries abrogant later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which is irreconcilable or inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails. l. General Law Rule: general law on a subject does not operate to repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended the later general act to modify the earlier special law. Generalia specialibus non derogant: a general law does not nullify a specific or special law. Reason: The legislature should make provisions for all circumstance of the particular case. Illustration: National Power Corp. v. Arca Issue: Whether Sec. 2 of Com. Act 120, creating the National Power Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and empowering it to sell electric power and to fix the rates and provide for the collection of the charges for any service rendered has been repealed by RA 2677 amending the Public Service Act and granting the Public Service Commission the jurisdiction to fix the rate of charges of public utitlities owned or operated by the government or goccs. Held: The Court answered the issue in the negative since special law like Com. Act. No. 120, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms like the RA 2677, although the terms of the general statute are broad enough to include cases embraced in the special law, in the absence of a clear intent to repeal. m. When Special or General Law Repeals the Other
Rule: Where a later special law on a particular subject is repugnant to or inconsistent with a prior general law on the same subject, a partial repeal of the latter is implied to the extent of the repugnancy or exception granted upon the general law. Legislative intent to repeal must be shown in the act itself, the explanatory note to the bill before its passage into a law, the discussion on the floor of the legislature and the history of the two legislations. Rule: General law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law by mere implication. Rule: If intention to repeal the special law is clear, the special law will be considered as an exception and the general law will not apply. Special law is repealed by implication. Illustration: Gerlan v. Catubig Issue: Whether Sec. 12 of the RA 170, as amended the City Charter of Dagupan City, which fixed the minimum age qualification for members of the city council at 23 years, has been repealed by Sec. 6 if RA 2259 which fized the age qualifications for the positions of mayor, vice-mayor, and councillors in chartered cities at 25 years. Held: There was an implied repeal of Sec. 12 of the Charter of Dagupan City.
n. Effects of Repeals 1. Statute is rendered inoperative. 2. Does not undo the consequences of the operation of the statute while in force. 3. Does not render illegal what under the repealed act is legal. 4. Does not take legal what under the former law is illegal. o. On Jurisdiction Jurisdiction to try and decide actions is determined by the law in force at the time the action is filed. General rule: Where the court or tribunal has already acquired and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation repealing the statute which originally conferred jurisdiction unless the repealing statute provides otherwise expressly or by necessary implication.
p. On Jurisdiction to Try Criminal Cases Jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted.
The general rule is that the repeal of the statute defeats all actions and proceedings including those which are still pending.
r. On Vested Rights Repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that accrued and became vested under the statute before its repeal.
s. On Contracts t. When a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law, when obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law does not affect the terms of the contract and does not impair the right of the parties thereunder.
Effect of Repeal of Tax Law Repeals do not preclude the collection of taxes assessed under the old law before its repeal unless the repealing statute provides otherwise.
u. Repeal and Enactment Simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does not affect the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statue since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption.
v. Effect of Repeal of Penal Laws Repeal without qualification of penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Where the repeal is absolute, crime no longer exists. Exception: 1. The repealing act reeenacts the statute and penalizes the same act previously penalized under the repealed law, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be a crime. 2. Where the repealing act contains a saving clause providing that pending actions shall not be affected, the latter will continue to be prosecuted in accordance with the old law. Distinction as to effect of repeal and expiration of law: In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated. In expiration of penal law by its own force does not have that effect.
w. Effect of Repeal of Municipal Charter Superseding of the old charter by a new one has the effect of abolishing the offices under the old charter.
x. Repeal of Nullity of Repealing Law Law first repealed shall not be revived unless expressly provided. Where a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will have no effect of repealing the former statute. CHAPTER XI CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION What is a CONSTITUTION? It is a fundamental law which sets up a form of government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and those of its officers, reserving to the people themselves plenary sovereignty. It is a fundamental law or basis of government, established by the people in their sovereign capacity to promote their happiness and to secure their rights, property, independence and common welfare. It is a written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a government for them is established and by which the people give organic and corporate form to that ideal thing, the state, for all time to come. It is an instrument of a permanent nature, intended not merely to meet existing conditions, but to govern the future. It does not deal in details but enumerates general principles and general directions which are intended to apply to all new facts which may come into being and which may be brought within those general principles or directions It is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It is the fundamental and paramount law of a nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
What is the PRIMARY PURPOSE of CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION? To ascertain the intent of purpose of the framers of the constitution as expressed in the language of the fundamental law, and thereafter to assure its realization. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of its organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. The interpretation of the Constitution should be done with a view to realizing its fundamental objective to protect and enhance the peoples interests, as a nation collectively and as persons individually.
Constitution construed as ENDURING FOR AGES. A constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but is to endure through a long lapse of ages. It governs the life of the people not only at the time of its framing but far into the indefinite future. It is adaptable to various crisis of human affairs. It embodies not only rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future as well. It is something solid, permanent, and substantial. Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of the rich and the poor alike. A constitution should be construed in the light of WHAT ACTUALLY IS, a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. A constitution must be construed as A DYNAMIC PROCESS intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. Its construction ought not to change with emergencies or conditions. Words employed therein, however, are not to be construed to yield fixed and rigid answers but as impressed with the necessary attributes of flexibility and accommodation to enable them to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store. The constitution should be given such meaning and should be so applied as to meet new or changed conditions as they arise. The Constitution must be viewed as a continuously operative charter of government. It must not be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impractical; or as affecting the unreasonable or absurd. Courts should always endeavor to give such interpretation that would make the constitutional provision CONSISTENT WITH REASON, JUSTICE, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
How Language of Constitution construed The primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the constitution itself. The PRESUMPTION is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. The words of the consti do not have a narrow or constricted meaning, but are used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document (it is essentially that of the people), its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Where the constitution does not specifically define the terms used therein, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. Ordillo v COMELEC o Issue raised: Whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly be constituted the Cordillera Autonomous Region under Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which states that There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of the constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Held: the keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. In its ordinary sense, region means two or more provinces. Following the rule that the language of the Consti, as much as possible, should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms are employed, the province of Ifugaocannot be constituted the Cordillere Autonomous Region under Section 15, Art. X of the Consti
When words used in a constitution have both restricted and general meanings, the rule is that the general meaning prevails over the restricted unless the context in which they are employed clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended. A word or phrase in one part of the constitution is to receive the same interpretation when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning should be applied. Words which have acquired a technical meaning before they are used in the constitution must be taken in that sense when such words as thus used are construed. It may be presumed that what the members of the constitutional convention had in mind when they drafted the constitution are the well-known technical meanings of the words then prevailing.
Aids to construction, generally Language of the constitution primary and intrinsic aid Extraneous aids history or realities existing at the time of the adoption of the constitution, proceedings of the convention, changes in phraseology, prior laws and judicial decisions, contemporaneous constructions, and consequences of alternative interpretations The purposes of many of the broadly phrased constitutional limitations are the promotion of policies that do not lend themselves to definite and specific formulation. The courts have had to define those policies and have often drawn on natural law and natural rights theories in doing so. The interpretation of the constitution tends to respond to changing conceptions of political and social values. The extent to which those extraneous aids affect the judicial construction of a constitution cannot be formulated in precise rules, but their influence cannot be ignored in describing the essentials of the process.
Realities existing at the time of adoption; object to be accomplished History many a time holds the key that unlocks the door to understanding. For this reason, the courts look to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing when the constitution was framed and adopted, and interpret it in the light of these factors. Legaspi v Minister of Finance o Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the charter. The ancient and familiar rule of constitutional construction that has consistently maintained its intrinsic and transcendental worth is that the meaning and understanding conveyed by the language, albeit plain, of
any of its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events and developments but likewise the inescapable environment at the time of its adoption and thereby caused their being written as part and parcel thereof.
11.08 Proceedings of the convention - The proceedings of the convention are less conclusive on the proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, for in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the courts seek, while in the former, courts seek to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and the deliberations of their representatives. - The history of the constitutional provision until it was finally approved by the convention is usually inquired into as it sheds light into what the framers of the constitution had in mind at the time. The debates, interpretations, and opinions expressed concerning particular provisions yield additional insight on the intent or meaning thereof. Montejo v COMELEC The issue is whether COMELEC has the power to transfer, by resolution, one or more municipalities from one congressional district to another district within a province, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Said Sec. 2 reads: The COMELEC is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reappointment herein made. In ascertaining the meaning of the phrase minor adjustments, the Court relied on the proceedings of the Consti. Comm., which revealed the intent that the phrase minor adjustments refers only to an instance where municipality which has been forgotten is included in the enumeration of the composition of a congressional district and not to the transfer of one municipality from one district to another, which has been considered a substantive or major adjustment. Being possessed of only the power to make minor adjustments, and what it decreed was a substantive adjustment, the Court declared the resolution as void. -However, while historical discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive. 11.09 Contemporaneous construction and writings - Contemporaneous or practical construction of specific constitutional provisions by the legislative and executive departments, especially if long continued, may be resorted to resolve, but not to create ambiguities. Though not conclusive, contemporaneous constructions are generally conceded as being entitled to great weight. - However, the practical construction of a constitution is of little weight, if any, unless it has been uniform. as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous construction has any application. where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous construction is entitled to no weight and will not be allowed to change in any way its meaning. The reason is that the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions, and that except as to matters committed by the constitution itself to the discretion of some other departments, contemporaneous construction is not necessarily binding upon the court even in a doubtful case. 11.10 Previous laws and judicial rulings - A constitution shall be held to be prepared and adopted in reference to existing statutory laws, upon the provisions of which in detail it must depend to be set in a practical operation. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. Courts should take into consideration such laws in construing the constitution.
- The framers of the constitution are presumed to be aware of prevailing judicial doctrines or rulings concerning which are to subject of constitutional provisions. 11.11 Changes in phraseology - Provisions of the constitution are the result of proposals that had undergone a number of revisions and changes in phraseology before the final adoption. Such changes in phraseology may be inquired into to ascertain the intent or purpose of the provision as finally approved. The mere deletion of a phrase from a proposed provision before its final adoption is not determinative of any conclusion. Deletions in the preliminary drafts of the convention are, at best, negative guides which cannot prevail over the positive provisions of the finally adopted constitution. Example: The original provision of the organic law to the effect that no person shall becompelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. The deletion of the phrase in criminal cases connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. 11.12 Consequences of alternative construction - Where a constitutional provision is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that construction which would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences must be rejected. Example: the provision of the Constitution requiring judges to render judgment within specific periods from the date of submission for decision of cases has been construed as directory and not mandatory, for to construe it as mandatory is to make such judges lose jurisdiction over the cases in the event they fail to decide them within the period, which consequence will cause greater injury to the public than when it is interpreted to be merely directory. 11.13 Constitution construed as a whole - The constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. - The constitution should be construed to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions, unless the contrary is clearly provided. - It is a well established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. - Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. Thus, the court must harmonize them if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which make the words idle and nugatory. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance - It was contended that RA No. 7716 (VAT Law)did not originate exclusively in the H. of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 130. It is further claimed that to be considered as having originated in the House, RA No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197. The Court rejected such interpretation of the constitutional provision. it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate in the H. of Rep. what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of
the law must substantially be the same as the H. bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of the legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills must come from the H. of Representatives. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing of the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. 11.14 Mandatory or directory - The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the fundamental law. - In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions arise as to whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory and not to leave any discretion to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. The analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are of little value in this connection and are rarely applied in passing upon the provisions of a Constitution. - The reason why provisions of the constitution, are generally regarded as mandatory is that in a constitution, the sovereign itself speaks and is laying down rules which for the time being at least are to control alike the government and the governed. Its provisions are binding upon all departments of the government. However, the fact that the legislature failed to enact the necessary legislation as required by the constitution does not make the legislature illegal or its members de facto officers. Neither the political law nor the law on public officers in particular, support the view that the failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to that effect. ACORD v Zamora (G.R. No. 144256, June 8, 2005) Example of mandatory provision in Art. X, Sec. 6 of the Constitution: Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. This section was invoked in the given case which raises the constitutionality of the GAA provisions which make the release of the internal revenue allotment (IRA) due to local government units subject to the condition that revenue collections would meet the revenue target originally submitted by the President. It was claimed that said GAA violates the said section. Respondent argue that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. The court rejected respondents arguments and declared the GAA provisions unconstitutional. As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is patently absurd. 11.15 Prospective or Retroactive
The rule is that a constitution should operate prospectively unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retroactive effect. Filoteo, Jr. v Sandiganbayan: The court ruled Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of the counsel. Morales, Jr. v. Enrile: Issued guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The court specifically ruled that the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Co. vs Electoral Tribunal (Illustrative of Rule of Retroactivity) The court held that Sec 1 par 3 of Art 4 of 1987 Constitution which states that Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are citizens of the Philippines, has retroactive effect, the clear intent of the framers as shown by the language of the provision being to make it not only prospective but also retroactive.
11.16 Applicability of rules of statutory construction A good number of the rules of statutory construction are applicable to the construction of the constitution. In appropriate cases, they may be employed in construing constitutional provisions. Sarmiento vs Mison: Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Customer or Customs is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Held: The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. It should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. The intent of the framers is clear that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16, Art VII are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
11.17 Generally, constitutional provisions are self-executing Constitutional provisions are self-executing, except when the provisions themselves expressly require legislations to implement them or when, from their language or tenure, they are merely declarations of policies and principles.
A self executing provision is one which is complete by itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected. A self executing provision does not preclude legislature from enacting laws which facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution. The operation of self-executing provisions prescribe a practice to be used for their enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self executing. The rule is that in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered seld executing rather than non self- executing. Example of self executing provision: Sec 10 par 2 of Art XII 1987 Constitution states that in the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS Issue: Whether in the sale at public bidding of the majority ownership of the Manila Hotel a qualified Filipino entity can match the winning bid of a foreigner and be entitled to the award of the contract of sale thereof. Held: The court ruled that the qualified Filipino entity must be given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the provision is self executing. 11.18 Three maxims employed as aids to construe constitutional provisions. Verba legis; ratio legis est anima; and ut magis valeat quam pereat. Verba legis wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Ration legis est anima where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. Ut magis valeat quam pereat The constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary: It is well established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. The court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
11.19 Constructions of US Constitutional provisions adopted in 1987 Constitution It is settled that in construing constitutional provisions adopted or copied in the 1987 Constitution, it is proper for the courts to take into consideration the construction of provisions by the courts of the country from which they are taken. Philippine courts have invariably cited or quoted US Supreme Court decisions in deciding constitutional issues arising from provisions similar to or taken from that of US. Most provisions on police power, eminent domain, taxation and on the Bill of Rights in the 1987 Constitutions as well as in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, were taken from or patterned after the US Constitution.