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TITLE: G.R. No. L-44059 October 28, 1977 THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., plaintiff-appellee, vs.

CARPONIA T. EBRADO and PASCUALA VDA. DE EBRADO, defendants-appellants. SUBJECT OF THE CASE: This is a novel question in insurance law: Can a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter? RELEVANT FACTS: On September 1, 1968, Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Policy a life plan. He designated Carpiona T. Ebrado as his beneficiary, referring to her as his wife. On October 21, 1969, Buenaventura C. Ebrado died as a result of an accident when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds of the Policy as the designated beneficiary therein, although she admits that she and the insured Buenaventura C. Ebrado were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds. In doubt as to whom the insurance proceeds shall be paid, the insurer, The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. commenced an action for Interpleader before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The trial court rendered judgment declaring among others, Carponia T. Ebrado disqualified from becoming beneficiary of the insured Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado and directing the payment of the insurance proceeds to the estate of the deceased insured. Carponia T. Ebrado appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the Appellate Court certified the case to the Supreme Court as involved only questions of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the common law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man can claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter? SC DECISION: The SC affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Carpiona T. Ebrado was declared disqualified to be the beneficiary of the late Buenaventura C. Ebrado in his life insurance policy. The proceeds of the policy are hereby held payable to the estate of the deceased insured. It is quite unfortunate that the Insurance Act (RA 2327, as amended) or even the new Insurance Code (PD 612, as amended) does not contain any specific provision grossly resolutory of the prime question at hand. Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "(t)he insurance shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name it is made" cannot be validly seized upon to hold that the same includes the beneficiary. The word "interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the insured and not to the beneficiary, since a contract of insurance is personal in character. Otherwise, the prohibitory laws against illicit relationships especially on

property and descent will be rendered nugatory, as the same could easily be circumvented by modes of insurance. Rather, the general rules of civil law should be applied to resolve this void in the Insurance Law. Article 2011 of the New Civil Code states: "The contract of insurance is governed by special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such special laws shall be regulated by this Code ." When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is governed by the general rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of the same Code, "any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make a donation to him." Common-law spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from each other. Article 739 of the new Civil Code provides that "the following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of donation; (2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof; (3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants or ascendants by reason of his office. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action." In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee, because from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article 739 of the new Civil Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts. The mandate of Article 2012 cannot be laid aside: any person who cannot receive a donation cannot be named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of the person who cannot make the donation. Under American law, a policy of life insurance is considered as a testament and in construing it, the courts will, so far as possible treat it as a will and determine the effect of a clause designating the beneficiary by rules under which wills are interpreted. Policy considerations and dictates of morality rightly justify the institution of a barrier between common-law spouses in regard to property relations since such relationship ultimately encroaches upon the nuptial and filial rights of the legitimate family. There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between legitimate spouses and those between illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies since the same are based on similar consideration. As pointed out, a beneficiary in a life insurance policy is no different from a donee. Both the recipients of pure beneficence. So long as marriage remains the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate that the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed upon extra-marital relationship. If legitimate relationship is circumscribed by these legal disabilities, with more reason should an illicit relationship be restricted by these disabilities.

VINALOU G. VIZCOCHO INSURANCE LLB RMTU

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