EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4585. November 12, 2004]

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant,

MARTINEZ, respondent

vs. ATTY.

FRANCISCO

P.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition[1] for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for
having been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving
moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.[2]
The dispositive portion of the same states:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in
the Information. He is imposed a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment and fine
double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS,
plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and
costs against the accused.
[3]

Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of
Judgment from this Court dated 20 March 1996.
On 03 July 1996, we required[4] respondent to comment on said petition within ten
(10) days from notice. On 17 February 1997, we issued a second resolution[5] requiring
him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to
comply with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997, we
imposed a fine of P1,000 for respondents failure to file said Comment and required him
to comply with our previous resolution within ten days.[6] On 27 April 1998, we fined
respondent an additional P2,000 and required him to comply with the resolution
requiring his comment within ten days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a
period of five (5) days or until his compliance. [7] Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost
three years later, we declared respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71,
Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he
complied with the aforesaid resolutions.[8]
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported [9] that respondent
was arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after

having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27 April
1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment[10] dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at that
time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in
respondents favor (as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a result
of his moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family
of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present administrative
case.

In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial

Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter[11] to the First Division Clerk of
Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case
before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case
involving the victims of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court
of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having
been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,[12] it
appears that herein respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of
the Doa Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was
issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths
of his wife and two daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check,
which was then deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinezs wife. When
plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty.
Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000 as his attorneys fees. Holding that it was
absurd and totally ridiculous that for a simple legal service he would collect 2/3 of
the money claim, the trial court ordered Atty. Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the
amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and the
costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinezs dilatory tactics during the
trial, citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinezs appeal from the above
judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief, despite
having been granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.[13]
On 16 June 1999, we referred[14] the present case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The report[15] of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part
that:

Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties
appeared before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for
resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the

dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June 1997
and that dismissal is warranted because the case filed by him does not survive due to
his demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death.
We disagree with respondents contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable
Supreme Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they
perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by
any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer
which requires disciplinary sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyers propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the
Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned
reflects an utter lack of good moral character.
Respondents conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation
of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and
therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102
Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina vs.
Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution[16] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating
Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Reinvestigation,[17] in the instant case alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law, although
admittedly the practice of law is a privilege;
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to
adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at
by the Investigating Commissioner; and
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various
capacities (from acting city judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter
President) for almost 17 years prior to resuming his law practice.

On 14 January 2004, we required[18] complainant to file a comment within ten

days. On 16 February 2004, we received a Manifestation and Motion [19] from

complainants daughter, Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been
furnished with a copy of respondents Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent
ostensibly lives next door to complainants family. Required to Comment on 17 May
2004, respondent has until now failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to
herein complainant. The records also show that respondent was given several
opportunities to present evidence by this Court[20] as well as by the IBP.[21] Indeed, he only
has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several occasions to
do so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to receive his
evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it
waited for his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration
of the records of the instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to support
the IBPs findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final
judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of
P8,000. The issue with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime is
one involving moral turpitude. [22]
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.[23] It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[24]
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[25] where the erring lawyer was
indefinitely suspended for having been convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22, we held that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude and stated:

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however,
it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense (emphasis supplied)
[26]

Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections[27] and disqualified a congressional candidate for having been sentenced by
final judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code, which states:

SEC. 12.
Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced
to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing
a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioners averment that he
was not a lawyer, we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect
that

(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, imports deceit and certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person. [Indeed] the effects of the issuance
of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, through
Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public
since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition,
a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule
of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. (emphasis supplied)
[28]

In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[29] we stated that:

(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her
unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July
2004] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public
interest and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyers
low regard for her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers,

seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in
high esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to
cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to
undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. And while the general rule is that
a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume
jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity,
where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so
gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.[30]
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits,
the practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.[31] A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare,
and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of
persons unfit to practice them.[32]Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as
officers of the Court.[33]
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondents plea that if given another
chance to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be
entirely different from that arrived at. We note with displeasure the inordinate length of
time respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment on the
original petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a
cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time we issued our first
Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March 1999,
when he submitted said Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years
had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to
comply, his Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he
neglected to furnish complainant.[34] And while he claims to have been confined while
undergoing medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was
issued, he merely reserved the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed,
was he able to offer any explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the time

we issued our first Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said
Comment alleged, merely, that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away
sometime in June 1997, and imputed upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for
instituting the said Petition against him, which argument has already been resolved
squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the
Commission as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was finally submitted
for Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years
to have his day in court and adduce evidence in his behalf, which inaction also unduly
delayed the courts prompt disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,[35] we reminded attorneys that there must be more
faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3]
which provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly
admonishes that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action.[36] It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers
and judges for willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellants briefs, as a
penalty for disobedience thereof. [37]
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondents old age and the fact
that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold
respondent to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence,[38] and his conduct should be above
reproach.[39] The fact that respondent has chosen to engage in private practice does not
mean he is now free to conduct himself in less honorable or indeed in a less than
honorable manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, [40] demanding a
high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission,
but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. [41] Sadly, herein respondent
falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v.
Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one years suspension for
non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months
upon partial payment of the obligation.[42] However, in these cases, for various reasons,
none of the issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or
B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands
convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda,

which is similar to this case in that both respondents were convicted for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension
from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we
have held disbarment to be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,[43] we disbarred
a lawyer convicted of estafa without discussing the circumstances behind his
conviction. We held that:

There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become
final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar.
Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to
protect the administration of justice.
[44]

2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,[45] a lawyer was convicted of the crime of

attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. And since
bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur.
p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is
constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127.[46]
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,[47] the erring lawyer
acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be a last will and
testament, which later turned out to be a forgery. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document, which the Court
held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary to justice,
honesty and good morals, and was subsequently disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,[48] Atty.
Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he was
granted a conditional pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was not
absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him.
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,[49] Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime
of estafa for misappropriating the amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently
disbarred. We held thus:

Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no
question that the term moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a
crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice,
honesty and good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962;
Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot
now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)
[50]

6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,[51] the conditional pardon extended to the erring
lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment
imposed by this court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[52] a lawyer was charged and found guilty of the
crime of falsification of public document for having prepared and notarized a deed of
sale of a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor and that
the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that disbarment follows
as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public document involves
moral turpitude, we ordered respondents name stricken off the roll of attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,[53] we upheld the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted
of estafa through falsification of public documents, because she was totally unfit to
be a member of the legal profession.[54]
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,[55] a lawyer was disbarred
for having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds
of his client.

In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. Of all

classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is
their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic.[56]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby DISBARRED and
his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo,
Sr.,
Azcuna,
ChicoNazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on official leave.
Corona, and Tinga, JJ., on leave.