Pentagon Papers Part IV B 3

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.
3
NND Project Number : NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
IV.B Evolution of the War (26 Vols.)

Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961-
1963 (5 Vols.)
3. The Advisory Build-Up, 1961-67
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
IV. B. 3.
TI-m ADVJSO~Y 3iJILD-UP, 1961·-67
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IV. B. 3. THE ADVISORY BUILD- UPI 1961-67
SU MMARY AND ANALYSIS
Th~ United States decided, shortly after the Geneva Accords and
during the period of French withdrawal from Indo-Chi na, to give mil it ary
assistance and advice to the newly proclaimed Republ ic of Vi etnam. It
might as eas ily have decided not to undertake this effort to prevent
South Vi etnam from fall ing to communism.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were pessimistic. Th e creat ion of a

Vietn amese Army , they said, might not even l ead to internal pol itica l
stabil ity, much l ess assure the capabil ity to prot ect South Vi etnam
from external aggression. The JCS also believed th at the 1 imitations
imposed by the Geneva agreements on the number of U.S. mili tary personnel
would make it impractical to attempt to train a new Army -- particularly
given the pau c ity of exper ienced l eaders wh ich was th e l egacy of French
colonial ism . Th e President's mil itary adv i sors did not wish to assume
th e r espons ibil ity for failure without th e resources and i nfluence which
would offer a better chance for succe ss.
THE AMERICAN GAMBLE
The available record does not i nd ic ate any rebutt a l of the JCS's
appraisal of th e situation. What it does in d i cate is that the U.S.
decid ed to gamb l e with very 1 imited resources becaus e the potenti a l gains
seemed we ll worth a limit ed risk. III cannot guarantee th at Vietnam will
r ema i n free, even with our aid," General J. Lawton Co11 ins report ed to
the National Security Council, "But I know that without our a id Vi etnam
will surely be lo st to Communism."
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was instr umenta l in dec iding
for pol itica1 reasons to und e rtake a mod es t program of mil i tary advice
aimed at producing po l i t ica1 stabi1 ity. Once l aunched, howeve r, the
program of adv ice and assistance came to be dominated by conve ntiona l .
milit ary conceptions. In sur ing int erna l stab ility i s a "1 esser in cluded
capabi1 i tyll of armed force, th e r eason i ng went; the principal purpose of
such a force is to protect the territorial int ~gr ity of the nation.
It was such a conventional f orce that the small USMAAG attempt ed to

produce from 1955 until about 1960. Th e Army of th e Repub1 ic of Vi e tnam
(ARVN) was made to "mirror image" the U.S. Army to the extent pe rmitted
by differences in equ ipment and l oca l e. The number of U.S. adv i sors
(approx imately doubled by li The Equipment Recovery Mission" -- a thinly
ve i l ed dev ice to increase the number of Ame ricans in Vietna m) r ema in ed
stable throughout th i s period. ARVN deve l oped into a multi-divisional
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Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Secti o n 3. 3
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forc e oriented primarily toward conventional defense. The l ater

tran s ition to a force designed for counter insurg ent warfare was
thereby made more difficult.
It seemed for a vJh i l e that the gambl e aga inst l ong odd s had
succeeded. The Vi et Minh were quiescent; the Republ ic of Vi etnam
Armed Forces (RV NAF ) were markedly better armed and trained than
th ey were when the U. S. effort began (at which t ime they were un -
armed arid untrained), and President Ngo Di nh Diem showed a r emarkab l e
ab i l i ty to put down factions threatening GVN stab i l ity and to maintain
himse lf i n office.
This period of apparent stabi li ty dis appeared , however , i n th e

events of 1949-5 1 as the Vi et Minh (relabe ll ed Vie t Cong -- a contrac-
ti on for Vi etnamese Commun i st) stepp ed up terror i sm, sabotage, and
mil i tary action by incr eas i ngly l arge units. By mid - 1961, th e prospect
for South Vietn am 's i ndependence was at l east as da rk as i t had been
si x years earl ier.
But the U.S. mi l i tary advisors i n Vietnam had l earned -- or at

l east thought they had learn ed -- dur i ng this per iod of gradua l dis-
i ntegrat ion the true nature of the battle i n which they were engag ed
by Pl-oxy. Th i s was an unconventiona l , i nterna l war of counter i nsurg enc y
rather than a conve ntional struggle against an externa l f oe. It was a
batt l e for the " hearts and mi nds" of the i nd igenous (and espec ially the
r ura l) popu l at i on rath er than a cont es t to wi n and ho l d key terra i n
f eatures . It was an i ntermes hed po l i t i ca l -econom i c-m il i ta ry war rather
t han one i n wh i ch pol i tica l and economic i ssues were sett l ed by mi l i tary
vi ctory.
U.S. adv i sors i n Vi etnam - and U.S. mil it ary and c ivil i an theor i sts
in o ther p l aces, as we ll -- formu l ated dur i ng th i s per iod a r ud imentary
doctr i ne of counter i nsurgent warfare. In r esponse to Prem ier Khrushchev ' s
e ndorsement of " wars of nat iona l 1 i be rat ion " t hey proposed to he l p free
wor l d nat ions save t hemse l ves from commun i sm by a ser ies of seque nt ia l
act ions that dea l t wi th the symptoms of soc ial revo l ut ion ( t he i nsurgenc y)
a s we ll as it s causes ( the f rustrat ion of expec t at ions for soc i a l j ust i ce ).
Th us , at a l most the same t ime that the U.S. began i ts adv i sory bu il d-
up i n South Vietnam i n l ate 196 1, mil i tary and c i v il i an pract i t ioners
f ound t hemse l ves i n possess ion of a s imp l e, apparent l y l og i ca l , out l i ne
s ketch of a method by wh i ch to count e r the co~nun i st-cap t ured i nsurgency.
Phys i ca l secur i ty from the acts of the i nsurgents was a necessar y but not
a suff i c ient cond i t ion f or success. In add iti on t o secur ity the Vietnamese
government had to establ i sh the serv i ces wh i ch wou l d lin k i t i n c l ass i c
t erms of l eg i t imacy to i ts subjects. We wou l d fi ght fi re wi t h f i re and we
wou l d f ight i t wi th water , too.
THE LIMITED PARTN ERSHIP
The dec i s ions made by th e Ken ned y Adm i n i strat i on from mi d- 196 1 onwa rd,
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culmin at i ng in the expans ion of the U.S. advisory effort following

Genera l Maxwell D. Taylor's mission to Sa igon i n Octob e r, did not
simply set out to exp l a in this newly-articulated cou nt e rinsu rgency
th eory and doctr i ne to th e GVN. Th ey attempted to ind uce th e GV N to
r eform i tself so th at id ent ific ation with i ts populace wou ld be poss i -
ble. Beyond this, th ey cho se to attempt to he lp th e Vi etnamese, in
T~yl.Qr's wOI-ds, li as. fri ends and partners -- not as anns-length advisors
Lan~/ . shovJ th em how th e job mi ght be done -- not tell th em or do it for
th em. 11
Th e "1 imit ed partnership" which Genera l Taylor proposed -- and which

Presid e nt Kennedy accepted -- was des i gned to place U.S . adviso rs at man y
l e ve ls within the RVNAF and GV N structure r at he r than mere ly at the top.
An ea rli e l- proposa l, to concentrate on adv i sors at the top with wide dis -
cr et ionary author i ty and to count on influ ence as the product of the
demo nstrated comm itme nt of a caref ully selected handful of men, was
rej ec t e d in fav or of many advisors at many l e ve l s, each serv in g norma lly
only for a twe lve month period, and wi th th e adv i sory manpowe r furnish ed
through norma l personnel s e l ect ion and assignment processe s within th e
mil it ary services.
Th e expectation among U.S. pol i cymakers -- record ed in NSAM 111 --

was th at th e GV N and U.S. wou l d mutua lly agree upon necessary st eps to
end the in surgency. Th e U. S. , for i ts part, wou ld underwrite an increase
in RVNAF and provide adv i sors throughou t th e mil it ary structur e down to
bat tal ion l eve l and in each prov in cia l cap i ta l . Th e GVN wou ld ration a l i ze
its 1 in es of authority and be gin r eform measures to bring it clos e r to the
Vi etnamese people. Thi s was , of cours e , a U.S. expectation, not an agreed
quid .2..I.2.~. Diem was um~i 11 i ng to pe rmit th e U.S. to share in his
fo rmulat ion of plan s. He was even afra id to discuss the U.S. expectat ions
cand idly with his own cabinet mi n i sters . It is a matte r of r ecord that he
did not refol-m his gove l-nme nt. ("H e will not reform bec ause he canno t,11
J. Kenneth Galbraith cabl e d President Ke nn ed y.) Wh at r ema ins in is sue is
wh ether he could have done so. If he could not, the U.S. plan to end th e
insurg e ncy was foredo omed from its inc ept ion, for it depended on Vi et-
namese initi at ive s to solve a Vi etnamese probl em.
COMMITMENT AND EXP ECTATIO N

Thus the U.S. overa ll plan to end the in surgency was on shaky ground
on th e GVN side. Diem needed the U.S. and the U.S . needed a r eformed Diem.
As U.S . advisors began de ploying to Vi etnam for service with tactical
units in the field, th e gam ble of the mid - 50's was transferr ed in to a
broad commitment. Pr es id e nt Kenne dy and his advisors were determ ine d to
save Vi et nam from communism by he lping th e Vi etnamese to save th emselves.
On e side of th e dua l U.S. thrust (GV N refor m) was already in troubl e .
Wh at of th e "fr iends and partners" who Vie re to s hare th e dangers and tasks
of RVNAF in the fi e ld? What was expected of them? What advant age s would
accrue fro m th e ir pres e nce in Vi e tn am?
Th e available r ecord i s a lmost totally de void of any expl ic at ion
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Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3
(much l ess any debate) on these questions. General Taylor's report of

his mission to Saigon impl i es an unambiguous convergence of i nterests
between the advisors and the advised. All that was needed was greater
competence. More U.S. advisors at more places working on probl ems of
Vietnamese training and operations could not but have an overa ll bene-
f i cia 1 effect.
I~ i s necessary to surmise the expectations i n the pol icymakers

mi nds of just how this would come about. First, they seem to have
expected the increased U.S. advisory presence to lead d i rectly to
i ncrea~ ed RVNAF competence i n technical and tact i cal areas. Basic
mil itary skills -- how to move, shoot, and communicate -- could be
improved and the improvements sustained by a cont i nuing U.S. presence
at many operational levels. Second, the U.S. pol icymake rs could rece ive
r eports fl-om an omnipresent U.S. 1 1 ne twork" ""hich would permit them to
become better informed about what was really tak i ng place i n Vietnam,
not only wi th respec t to VC activity but with reference to ARVN plans,
operations, and problems as well. Fi na lly, the U.S. exp ec ted to real ize
i ncreased i nflu ence wi thin RVNAF from the presence of adv i sors. (And i t
expected, as NSAM I I I made clear, to rea l ize increased influence with
GVN i n exchange for i ncreas i ng i ts vis i ble commitment to South Vietnamese
i ndependence. )
Increased i nf l uence can, of course, be ga i ned i n many ways. U.S.

adv i sors could, by example, promote more aggress i ve Vi etnamese l eader-
sh i p and improved standards of conduct. A we ll - coord inated adv i sory
network could exert pe rsuas i ve pressure throughout RVNAF to adopt certa i n
pol ic i es or pract i ces. And the U.S. prov iders of the mater ial resources
cou l d, i f they wi shed, keep a tight hand on the sp igot and contro l the
fl ow. They cou l d exert inf l uence negat i vely. The U.S. was anx ious to
avo i d this l ast-ment ioned approach to i ncreased i nf l uence. "Leverage, "
as i t i s now cOnllnon l y known, was a subject rare l y d i scussed, much l ess
pract i ced. The "1 im i ted partnership" f i nessed the whole i ssue of sanc-
ti ons by assuming (or hoping or pretend i ng, one cannot know wh i ch) that
no prob l em ex i sted.
PACIFICATION AND STRATEGIC HAMLETS
The process of counter i ng i nsurgency, most commonly ca ll ed pac i f i -

cat i on, rece i ved a great amount of attent ion and pub l i c i ty at the same
ti me the U.S. was i ncreas i ng i ts fi e l d adv i sors wi t h ARVN from a handfu l
t o over 3,000. Ear l ier, in 1960, the USMAAG had pressed upon the GVN a
na ti ona l Counter i nsurgency Pl an for Vi etnam (CIP) wh i ch was rea ll y an
o rgan i zat iona l bluepr i nt for reorder ing the GVN-RVNAF 1 i nes of command
t o permit effect i ve act i on. The nub of the prob l em was that the po l it i
ca l l eaders in r ura l areas (Prov i nce and Di str i ct Ch i efs -- a l most a ll
mil i tary off i cers ) were respons i ble to Sa i gon direct l y wh il e RVNAF had
a separate chain of command. In 1961, the MAAG presented i ts complemen-
t ary Geograph ica ll y Phased P l an which spec i fi ed the re l at i ve pr ior i ty
f or c l eal- i ng out the VC, hold i ng, then bu i ld ing GVN at the " r i ce roots. "
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'I
The object, as the U.S. advisors saw it, was to have a workable
nation a l plan upon which to base the entire US GVN effort.
Th e Stra teg ic Hamlet Program soon became the unifying vehicle

to express the pacification process. The th eory was th at of physical
security first, then government programs to develop popular allegiance.
The fact was over expansion, counter-productive coercion i n some areas,
wid espread mismanagement, and dish onest y. U.S. pol icymake rs were not,
however, aware of how badly things were going until they became much
worse. Optimi sm dominated official thinking. No need was perce ived
for new departures. Throughout the period of the Strategic Ham let
Progr am -- that i s, until Diem1s regime was toppled i n l ate 1963 --
the number of U.S, advisors remained relatively stable at it s new
(1 962) plateau.
The expectat ion that more U.S. advisors would mean better informa-
tion for U.S. pol icymakers was not real ized . One cannot judge accurately
the reason s why U.S. leaders in Vi etnam and Wash in gton thought th e count er-
i nsurgent effort was making headway, but the fact that it was not is
crystal clear in retrospect. The expectat i on that GVN and U.S. in terests
were sufficiently parallel to permit greater U.S. in f l uence solely as a
result of a l arger U.S. presence found e red on th e personal iti es and the
felt necessit ies of the Ngo brothers. The extent to which RVNAF techni-
cal-tactical competence was i ncreased during this period remains a subject
of disagreement but it was not inaeased sufficient ly to "tu rn the tide"
of the war. That much i s indisputable.
ANOTH ER ROUND OF INCREASES
After Diem1s fall there was a brief per iod of optimism bas ed on the
expect at ion that the new mil i tary regime in Saigon would be more recep -
tive to U.S. advice than i ts predecessor had been. By the summe r of 1964,
when the dec isi on was made to expand the advisory effort again, this
opt imist ic hope had found e red on th e fact of continued VC victo r i es and
in stabi l i ty within the GVN.
NSAM 288 had, in March I 96l.j·, stated U.S. objectives in Vietnam in

th e most unambiguous and sweep i ng terms. If there had been doubt that
the I imited risk gamble undertake n by Eis enhower had bee n transformed
into an unl imited commitment under Ke nned y, that doubt should have been
dis pe ll ed interna lly by NSAM 288 1s statement of objectives:
We seek an in dependent non - Communist South Vi etnam.

We do not require that it serve as a Western base or
as a member of a We stern Alliance. South Vi etnam
must be free, howeve r, to accept outside assistance
as required to maintain i ts security. This assistance
should be able to take th e form not only of economic
and soc i a l measures but also police and military he lp
to root out and control i nsurgent e l ements.
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If we cannot save South Vietnam, the NSAM continued i n a c l assic

statement of the Iidomino theory,11 all of Southeast As ia wi 11 probably
fall and all of the Western Pacif i c and South As ian nations wil I come
under increased pressure.
Th ere were at this time several steps wh i ch the U.S. could have
t aken to in crease i ts ass i stance to the GVN. Carrying the war to
Hanoi was one; introd uc ing U.S. combat forces was another. Ne i ther
app ea l ed much, however, i n terms of help i ng the South Vietnamese to
win the i r war. Both were anathema i n the midst of President ia l e l ec-
ti on year pol iti cs. Bombing was discussed and p l ans l aid, but no
act i on taken. Troop commitments were not even discussed -- at least
in the wr i tt e n record of proposals and dec i s ions. Rather, a numbe r of
pall iative mea sures to help the GVN economy and RVNAF were adopted and
the advisory effort was expanded.
The 1964 expans ion of th e adv i sory effort cons i sted of th e beef i ng -
up of the batta l ion advisory teams and the establ ishment of district
( sub-sector) t eams. Thus, a new dimens ion of Amer i can p,-esence was
add ed and th e density of U.S, adv i sors i n operat i ona l un i ts was i ncreased.
There i s nothing i n th e ava il ab le record to suggest e i ther a cha ll enge to
the old, unstated assumption th at more U.S. adv i sors wou l d l ead to in-
cr eased performance or any change in the assumed expectat ions of U.S.
pol icymakers had changed. The determ inat i on rema i ned to advise rath er
than to command, to deve l op Vi etnamese l eadersh i p rather th an to supp l ant
i t, and to i nduce the GVN to take the steps necessar y to pac ify i ts own
di ss i dent elements.
ADVISORS TEMPORARILY FORGOTTEN
Th e expans ion to district l eve l placed U.S. mil it ar y adv i sors

th roughout almost the ent ire RVNAF hi era rchy (from J GS to battal ion,
with enough men at the l ower l eve l to adv i se compan i es on a Il when
needed ll basis) and the pol iti ca l hi erarchy as we ll (s ecto r/prov in ce
and sub-sector /di str ic t ) . U.S. adv i sors were not prese nt in l arge
numbers with th e old Civil Guard and Se l f-Defense Corps - now r e-
l abe ll ed th e Regional Forces and Popu l ar Forces un der provin ce and
district cont rol respect i ve ly -- but they adv i sed th e military men in
pol iti ca l positions who controlled these paramil i tary forc es.
Still the situation continue d to dete riorat e . Politica l in s ta-

bil ity within th e GVN had by 1965 become a perennial rather than a
tr ans itory problem. The U.S. had ini t iated a cont i nu ing series of
mil it ar y a ir war measures to dissuad e North Vi etnam from support of
th e war in the So ut h . The results were obviously inadequate ; th ey may
eve n have been opposite to those expected. Th en ARVN suffered a ser i es
of di sastrous defeats l ate in the spring of 1965 wh ich l ed knowledgeable
ob servers to fear an imm inent GVN collapse. U.S. combat units -- a f ew
of wh i ch were a lr eady in - country with restrictive mi ss ions -- beg an to
be deployed to South Vietnam in earnest.
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Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Secti on 3.3
NND P roject Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
When the bui ld -up of U.S. comba t forces got underway th e build - up
of U.S. adv i sors had a lr eady been essent ial ly comp l eted . Being an
adv i sor i n th e field had been the ~Jst challenging assignment a U.S.
soldi er could seek ; being wi th a U,S. unit in combat now became the
aim of most. The ad visory effort sank i nto relative obscur i ty as the
att ent io n of pol i cymakers (and of the press and publ ic ) focu sed on th e
U.S . force deploymen ts, on building the base complexes from which U.S .
mi l it a ry might could project it se l f into the countrys i de, and in ex-
plor i ng the new relationships and new opportunities occasioned by the
comm itment of U.S. land forc es to the As ian mainland.
A number of meas ures wh i ch wou ld have changed mate r i a ll y th e U.S.

advisor s 1 r e l at ions hip to th e i r Vietnamese counterparts were exam i ned
br ief ly i n mid - 1965 . Each was dropped. The encadrement of U. S. and
ARV N unit s was f avored by Pres ident Johnson. Ge ne ral Westmoreland
oppos ed i t -- apparent l y because of l anguage prob l ems and th e difficu l t
l og i st i c support problem i t would create -- and the issue qu i ckly d ied,
exce pt for th e experimental Comb in ed Act ion Platoons (CAPs ) formed by
th e Marines. The subject of a combined U.S.-RV NA F command was brought
up. Secreta ry Mctamara was more favorab l y d i spo sed toward achieving
lI un i ty of command" th an were his senior mi I i tary advisors and th e U.S.
Mi ss ion r epresentat i ves i n Sa igon . Th e y we re kee n l y aware of GVN
s ens i t i vity to any measures which wou ld exp l ic i t l y f i nger th e i ncreas-
i ng Amer ic an izat ion of th e war effort. So combin ed comma nd was sh e l ved,
too. Th e GVN even oppo sed a j oint US - JGS sta ff to coord i nat e the war
effort. The staff was never form ed.
PACIFICATION REE~PHASIZED
As th e bui l d-up of U.S. combat forces reac hed a l eve l perm i tt i ng

offens i ve forays aga inst the VC (an d Nort h Vietnamese Army ) forc es ,
t he re gradua l ly evo l ved a d i vision of responsib i l i t ies between U.S. and
Vietnamese forces in wh i ch the for me r were to concent rate on de feat i ng
the ma i n forces of th e VC/NVA and th e l a tte r were t o g i ve pr imary em-
phas i s to the pac i f i cat ion program. Ha l f of ARVN wa s t o operate in
s upport of pac i f i cat ion.
Thi s d i v i s ion of effort threw most U.S. adv i sors in to pac ifi cat ion
wi th ARVN un i ts as we ll as i n the prov i nce and d i str ict adv i sory t eams .
It a l so threw the U.S. mil i tary adv i sors i nto c l oser contact -- and
compet i t ion and conf l i ct -- wi th the growing numbe r of adv i sors on c i v il
f unct ions (many of whom were U.S. mi l i tary men on Ill oanll) repre sent i ng
t he CIA, AID, and USIA. The quest ion was ra i sed of the opt ima l interna l
U. S. organ i zat i on to support th e Vi e tna mese pac i f i cat ion program.
The resu l t of a drawn - out, occas iona ll y acr imon ious debate on th i s
q uest ion was an i nterm ixed c i v i l -m i l i tary organizat ion embrac i ng th e
ent i re pac i f i cat ion effort, headed by a c i v il ian of ambassador ia l rank
under COMUSMAC V1s d i rect ion. Ca l l ed Ci v il Ope rat ions and Revo l ut ionary
Deve l opmen t Support ( CORDS), i t r ep l aced a b ili near syst em i n wh i ch
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Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3.3
mil i tary advisors were controll ed throuah a military chain of comma nd

and all civil ian advisors were controll;d (at l eas t i n th eory) thr oug h
an Offi ce of Civil Operations (OCO). The creation of CO RDS was ha il ed
as a victory for the Ilsingle manager" concept even though some ver y
substan t ia l U.S . programs were defined as outside the pacificat ion
progr am and , hence, beyond CORDS' competence.
RF/P F ADVISORS
The cr eat ion of CORDS affected on ly th e organ i za tional context of

U.S . advice to the Sou th Vi etnamese. It did noth in g to chang e the re-
l at ionship between adv i sor and advised. U.S. expectat ions continued in
the well-worn furrows in which they had trave ll ed from the beg i nning:
be tt er informat i on, more U. S. in fluence over Vi etnamese plans and act ions,
and improved GVN (in cluding RVNAF ) performance were the hoped for products
of th e advisory effort.
This pattern was repeated in 1967 wh e n an in crease of over 2,000

mil it ary adviso rs was propo sed by MACV to ass i st th e Reg i onal and Popular
Force s -- whose s ecur i ty missions were almost exc lu s ive ly de voted to
support of the pacification progr am. Th e RF and PF were, at that time ,
the only RVNAF compon en ts wi thout a siz ea ble U.S . advisory compleme nt.
When the ques tion of improv i ng th e ir effect iveness was addressed the
old assumpt ion that more U.S. adv i sors would equate to im proved effec-
tiveness again went unchall enged.
The ques tion debated was wheth e r this new dime nsion of th e U.S.
advi so ry effort should be structured to give cont inuing adv ice to RF
comp an i es and PF platoons or shou ld be constituted on a mobile training
basi s. The dec i s i on was to form mobile teams for both t act ic a l and
logi st ica l support training. Advisors were detached from their parent
U.S. combat units and detailed to these duties pending the manpowe r
accounting ch a nge which wou ld transfer th ese ind ividu a ls to MACV
advisory control and r ep lace th em in U.S. units with newly deployed
fill e rs.
AVOID ED ISSU ES
This was the situation when th e VC/NVA l aunc hed a mass i ve series
of attacks against urb an population centers and surround ing pacifica-
tion program forc es during th e 1968 l una r new yea r (Tet) offensive.
In the confused aftermath of this radica l chang e i n VC/NVA strategy
th e U.S. announced i n Washington it s intent ion to give ren ewed attention
to modernizing RVNAF so that a larg er shar e of the war effort could be
turned back to the Vi etnamese. This pol i cy dec i s ion, following as it
did an unprecedented six-year period of U.S. attempts to wage counter-
in surgent war by proxy, constitu ted an adequate reason to r eexam in e the
exp er ience of the past and to exp lor e more fully some diffi~ult ques tions
which have been consistently avoided in th e desire to ass ist South Vi e tnam.
viii TOP SECRET - Se ns itive

Il
TOP SECR ET - Sensitive
The most basic of these questions i s whether the U.S. can in any
way serve as a makewe igh t sufficient to change the continuing unfavor-
abl e trend of the war i n South Vietnam? Can i t, that i s, overcome the
apparent fact that the Viet Cong have "captured" th e Vietname se
nationa l ist movement wh il e the GVN has become the refuge of Vietnamese
who were a ll ied wi th the French in the battle aga in st the i ndependence
6f their nation? Attempts to answer th i s quest ion are compl icated, of
cours e, by the difficult i ssue of Vi et Cong alleg iance to and control
by Communist Ch i na. But th i s i s the nature of the s i tuat ion. The i ssue
of whether the U.S. can energ i ze the GVN has been too l ong submerged by
r epeGted assert io ns that i t must do so.
A part of any tentat i ve answer to thi s fund amenta l quest ion will
turn on the i ssue of how the U.S. might better promote a more adequate
pace of GVN reform and improved RVNAF effect i veness to cope wi th th e
VC!NVA threat. (A related quest ion, of COUI-se, i s whethe r reform and
i ncreas e d effect i veness can proceed s imu l taneous ly . ) Asking this ques-
tion would open for examinat ion two aspects of the adv i sory program that
have come to be treated by reflexive respons e: where are adv i sors needed
and what should be th e r e lDt ionsh i p of the adv i sor to th e adv i sed?
The cont i nuing U.S. unstated assumpt ion has been that more advisors
somehow equate to better performance. This can be traced in the success-
ive expans i ons of th e mil itary adv i sory effort -- fir st to th e prov i nces
and down to batta l ion l eve l wi th in ARVN, th en to the distr icts, and most
r ecent ly to the param il itary forc es wit hin RVNAF. It may be th at l arge
numbers of adv i sors are, in f act , th e best way to infl uence events but
one cannot reach such a conclusion val idly without first ask i ng the
quest ion.
Th e r e l at ionsh i p of adv i sor t o adv i sed has gone through r ecurrent

c hanges relative to j udg i ng an advisor's performance accord i ng to the
per fo rmance of his counterpart. It has almost never deviated, however,
fr om the belief that the conscious an d continuing use of l everage at
many l eve ls would undercut Vi etnamese sovere i gnty and stultify th e
deve l opment of Vi etnamese l eadersh ip . Given the r esu l ts of this po li cy
ove r a number of years it is f a ir to as k wh et he r th e st i ck ought not to
be more routinely used in combination with the car rot. Aga in, the answer
is not obvious but it is obvi ous th at th ere can be no sound answer in
the absence of i nqu iry.
Finally, and closely rel ated to any examination of th e l everage

i ssue , th e re i s the question of th e adequacy of counte r i nsurgent th eory
and doctr in e. Th e progress i on from physica l secur i ty throu gh the es-
tablishmen t of soc ia lly or i ented programs (po l i tical and econom i c) to
th e o bject ive of earn i ng a nd winning popular allegiance seems both
si mp l e and logi ca l . It ma y also be s imp l i s ti c , for it s tran sformat ion
i nto ope rationa l reality bumps head - on into some ve ry diff i cult qu est ions.
Is security a precondition to l oya lty, for instance , or must some degree
of l oyalty be realized as a pr econd iti on to inte ll i gence i nformat ion
ix TO P SECRET - Sens itive

12.
TOP SECRET - Sens i tive
adequate to make security feasible? This chicken-and-egg argument

has been debated for years without l eading to any noticeable consensus·
on gu i des to operational action.
Seeking answers to any of these questions i s a difficult, frus -

trating business. There exists no " con tro 11! by which l aboratory com-
parisons of alternative courses can be made. There i s almost sure l y
no hard choice which will not carry with it very r ea l 1 i ab i1 it ies
alo ng wi th it s advantages. But i f the 1 i ves and effort expended i n
the U.S. mil itary adv isory effort in South Vi etnam in the 1960·s are
to be ju st ifi ed, a substantial port i on of that j ust i f i cat ion wi ll
cons i st of a closer examination of past assumpt ions i n order better
to gu i de future po l i cy.
x TOP SECRET - Sensitive

()
:z:
zo~
5
~
.
I
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3
IV. B. 3.
THE ADVISORY BUII,D-UP, 1961 67
CHRONOLOOY
Geneva Cease-fire Accord Ended fighting betvleen Viet

Minh and French; divided
Vietnmn at 17th parallel;
limited U. S. military person~!.e l
in RVN to current level (3l~2).
Memo, JCS for SecDef, U.S. resources could better be

Retention and Development used to support countries otr-_er
of Forces in Indochina than RVN.
11 Oct 54 Letter, J. F. Dulles (Sec Only small U. S. tra,ining forces
State ) to C. E. Wilson to RVN to promote internal
( SecDef) stability.
19 Oct 54 Mffino, JCS for SecDef, Opposed U.S. training RVN
Development and Tra.ining army. Risk not worth the
of Indigenous Forces in gamble.
Indochina
22 Oct 5~- Msg, State to Saigon 1679 Set in motion " crash program"
t o improve RVN forces.
26 Oct 54 Memo, SecDef to JCS J CS to prepare long range

program to improve RVN forces.
Memo, JCS for SecDef, Development of effective forces

Indochina. and prevention of cOlJ1J1lunist
t akeover cannot be prevented
,vi thout Vietnamese effort that
i s probably not forthcoming.
20 Jcm 55 Memo, Gen. J. Law"Gon Vietnam might be " saved " i-Jitll
Collins for SecState, U. S. aid; would be "lost " i'lithout
Report on Vietnam for the it.
National Security Council
21 Jan 55 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Outlines alternative U.S.

Reconsideration of U.S. courses of action in RVN:
Military Program in South- present program, a,dvice ivi th
east Asia l everage, U.S. forces, or
wi thdravlal.
1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive

TOP SECRET - Sensj.tive
24 Oct 55 - Lt Gen Samuel T. Wlliams,

31 Aug 60 Chief of MAAG to Vietnam.
9 Dec 55 Memo for SecDef~ l'-:!AAG needed tl'rice the current
Raising U.S. Military 3~2 personnel to train RVNAJi'.
Personnel Ceiling in
MAAG Vietnam
16 Dec 55 Memo, Director CIA fron TERM a,lso to serve as cover
SecState for intelligence gathering.
1959 Report, The ~resident ' s Emphasized need for promoting
Committee to Study the internal security, coined term
United States Military "mirror i maging. "
Assistcmce ~rogram
7 Jun 59 Msg, State-Defense-ICA- Forbids advisors to participate

CAS to Sa,igon 28 in combat.
27 Feb 60 Msg, Saigon to St te 2525 Abolished TEm4 but added e~ual
number of spaces to MAA.G,
Vietnam., increasing it from
342 to 685.
10 Jun 60 U. S. Army Command & Prepared for Gen. Lionel C.
Genera,l Staff College, McGarr, described Viet Cong
Study on Army Aspects of strategy but deprecated ARVN
the Military Assistance participation in pacification.
Program in Vietnam
1 Sep 60 - Lt Gen Lionel C. McGarr, Chi ef
5 Mar 62 of MAAG to Vietnam .
4 Jan 61 Counter Insurgency Plan Blueprint for RVNAF reorganiza-
for South Vietnam (CIP), tion, containing Gen McGarr ' s
enclosure to msg, Saigon r ecommendations for integrating
to State 276 ARVN and CG/ SDC in a common chain
of cowmand to promote internal
security.
17 Jan 61 Memo, General Lansdale Proposed extra-bureaucratic

for SecDef, Vietnam advisory effort carried out by
specially selected and ~ualified
personnel.

2
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3
IC- TOP SECRET - Sensitive
15 Mar 61 - Frederick E. Nolting,

1 Aug 63 Ambassador to South Vietnam
28 Mar 61 NIE 50-61, Outlook in Report that VC controlled

Mainland Southeast Asia, most of countryside.
12 Apr 61 Memo, ~v8,1 t Ttl. Rostol'T to Suggested appointment of

the President Presidential Agent to oversee
Vietnam progra,ms in Washi ngton.
19 Apr 61 Memo, Gen. La,nsdale to Proposed creation of inter-

SecDef, Viei:.naID depa,rtmental task force on
Vi etnam.
20 Apr 61 Memo, SecDef for DepSec»ef McNamara asked Gilpatric for

progra,lll to I1 prevent communist
domina;t.ion l1 of Vietnam, in
re sponse to Lansdale proposal.
27 Apr 61 Memo, DepSecDef for Recorronended expanded U. S.

President, Program of effort in Vi etnam, MAAG increase
Action for Vietnam of 100, MAAG takeover of CG/SDC,
U.S . advisors i n field operations
cr eation of Presidential Task
Force. ForeshadO'\·red later
decision .
1 May 61 Memo, R. L. Gilpatric for Recommended augmenting MAAG

Presi dential Task Force by 2 tra,ining commands (1600
each) and deploy LfOO Specia,l
Forces (increasing MAAG from 685
to 2285 ). Marked shift to con-
ventional approach.
3 May 61 Memo , state Department Recommended revision of Gilpatric

to memb ers of Task Force t ask for ce , proposed interdepart-
on Vietnam mental task force under State
leadership.
11 May 61 NSAM 52 Recorded President ' s decision to

increase U,S. forces s li ght ly and
re-empha s ized U.S. commitment .
15 May 61 Msg. Sa igon to State 17~3 Recorded Di em I s r efusal of U, S.

combat troops on bilateral
treaty.

3
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECliET - Sensitive
18 May 61 Memo BG Lansdale for Recorded Diem IS accepta,nce of

DepSecDef, Vietnam U.S. forces for training but
not for fighting.
23 May 61 Memo, Vice President Report from Johnson ' s trip to
Johnson for President Vietna,m that "deeds must
Kennedy replace '\vords."
27 May 61 Letter from President to Set forth coordinating authority
each American Ambassador for ambassa,dors.
abroad. (See Memo, Presi-
dent for Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies,
29 May 1961, "Responsi-
bilities of Chiefs of
American Diplomatic Mis-
sions," Federa,l Register,
Vol. 26 Nr 22, -17 Nov 1961,
p.10749 (F.R. Doc. 61-11012).
9 Jun 61 Letter, President Diem to Proposed 100,000 increase in
President Kennedy RVNAF and corresponding expa~
sion of l'f.lA.A.G.
15 Sep 61 MAAG, Vietnam, Geograph- Suggested operational seCJ.uence
ically Phased Nationa.l of priority areas for coordin-
Level Plan for Counter- ated counterinsurgency effort
insurgency under single chain of command.
1 Oct 61 Msg, Sa,igon to State 421 Diem asked for bilateral
defense treaty with U.S.
Oct 61 JCSM 717-61 JCS proposa l to send 20,000
U.S. combat troops to central
highlands.
5 Oct 61 DF, Distribution Division, OSD decision to increase tour

DC SPER , DA to Multiple of duty to 30 months with
Addressees, Iinprovement dependents, 18 without, inste~d
of Personnel Continuity of 24 and 12. Never put into
and Effectiveness in Short effect.
Tour Oversea,s Areas.
10 Oct 61 SNIE 10-3-61, Probable Examined proposa,l for U. S.
Communist Reactions to troop intervention.
Certain SRA.TO u:nderta,kings
in South Vietnam
NND Project Number : NND 63316 . B y: NWD Date: 2011
!~
11 Oct 61 Study, Concept of Inter·· Proposed sending U.S. combat

vention in South Vietnam, troops.
n.d., discussed at NSC
meeting, 11 Oct 61
11 Oct 61 Memo for Record Roswell Recorded decision to send

Gilpatric Taylor to Vietnam and outlined
alternatives to be considered.
25 Oct 61 Msg, Saigon to State Diem ' s assurance that he

favo red deployment of U.S.
troops.
25 Oct 61 Msg, Saigon 537, General Propo sed sendjng 6-8000 troops
Taylor to Iwitc HOtlSe, under guis e of lI flood relief. lI
State, Defense, JCS;
Msg, Baguio 005, 1 Nov 61,
Eyes Only for the Presi-·
dent from General Taylor
1 Nov 61 state Dept, Bureau of Reported incr eased VC activHy

I ntelligence and Research, in first half 1961: 500 assas-
RFE-3, 1 Nov 61, Communist sinations, 1000 kidnappings,
Threat Mounts in South 1500 RVNAF KIA.
Vietnam
3 Nov 61 Report on General Taylor ' s Discus sed VC strategy and

Mission to South Vietnam. threat and the vreaknesses of
t he Diem regime . Propos ed
shift in U. S. effort 11 from
advice to l imited pa,rtnership. lI
14 Nov 61 Msg, State to Saigon 619 Recorded U.S. expectation of

sharing in GVN decision-maki2:g.
22 Nov 61 NSAM Ill, First Phase of Outlines U.S . actions and

Vi etna.Jll Program expected i mprovements in GVN .
22 Nov 61 Msg, Saigon to State 687; Ambassador Nolt ing reported

25 Nov 61 Msg, Saigon to State 708. tho, t Diem refused to bOI·} to
U.S. ])ressure.
Dec 61 Msg, state to Saigon 693 Dropped i nsistence on eX])licit

U.S. influence on GVN deCiSions,
but aSSllilled such influence as
by-product of close partnership.

5
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3_3
11
TOP SECRET - Sensjtive
16 Jan 62 Hq, CINCPAC, Record of Recorded decisions of Honolul')_

Second Secretary of Defense Conference: establish batta.lion
Conference advisory teams, province 8.dv::'sors
CG/ SDC training.
13 Feb 62 - Gen. Panl D. Harldns , COI\.'IUSj\:"~CV

1 Aug 6)+
23 Jul 62 Record of 6th Secretary McNamara plan for phased I·Ti t::-
of Defense Conference drawal of U.S. forces, based on
optimistic 1962 expecta/cions.
1 Aug 63 - Henry Cabot Lodge, Amb8.ssado:!:'

1 Jul 6~- to South Vietnam.
2 Oct 63 White House Statement Announcement by President

Kennedy of U. S. hope s for ple.:mec1
phased withdra'i'ml of troops.
1 Nov 63 Diem overthrown by military

coup d ' etat.
1 Nov 63 - Military Revolutionary Duong Van Minh, Chief of State

16 Aug 64 Council and Chairman , Military Revo-
lut j_onary Council.
26 Nov 63 NSAM 273 Reaffirmed and continued Kercedy

administration poliCies in V~et
nam; pl aced emphasis on Meko:-_g
Del ta ; maintained military assist.
ance at l east as great as to
Diem ; reiterated plans for t:coo:p
wit.hdrawa.l ; proposed no nevi
programs nor increased U.S.
assistance ; authorized opera:,ions
up t o 50 km . ,1"i thin Laos.
7 Mar 64 Briefing Paper, Establish- MACV extended U.S, advisory

ment of Critical District effort to district level in 13
Advisory Teams (C) , Brief- key districts around Saigon .
ing Book for McNaughton ,
Sai gon ffiay 1961j]

6
J(. TOP SECRET - Sensitive
17 Mar 64 NSAM 288, Implementation The situation in Vietna,:m bad

of' South VietnaJll Programs deteriorated and \'las grave;
VC controlled much of' country;
North Vietnamese support of'
V.C. had increased; RVNA.F should
be increased by 50,000; con-
tingency plans f'or opera;tions in
Laos and.. Cambodia and overt
retaliation against DRV should
be developed; h01ilever, no maj or
increase of U.S. advisory eff'ort
was called for.
J-7 Apr 64 Memo, DIA f'or SecDef', Aerial photo reconnaissance

Status of' the Vietna,mese revealed f'ar f'ev!er f'ortif'ied
Hamlet Survey ha.mlets than province officials
claimed.
22 Apr 64 Memo, DepSecDef' f'or CJCS Secretary insisted that he

personally approve every man-
power space f'or MACV.
May 6l.j Brief'ing Book, Miscellan- Reported great instability in

eous Messages, Status province governments, decline
Reports, and Recommenda- i n GVN controlled population,
tions f'or Secretary increase in VC control; important
McNamara, n.d. provinces vTere in II critical
condition. "
12 May 6)+ Dra~t Memo f'or the USOM 25% understrength, half'
Record, Lt. Col. S. B. thi s shortage in rural affairs
Berry, Jr., Mil. Asst. staff' .
to SecDef', n.d., U.S.
Embassy Brief'in.g, Saigon .
12-13 May 64 McNamara trip to Saigon Situation appeared critical.
22 May 64 Msg, JCS to COMUSlf~CV 6448, COMUSMACV asked to study

Vietna,mese Civil Guard and encadrement of' CG/SDC 'I'Ii th U S.
0
Self'-Def'ense Corps. t eams simil ar to vWi te Star

t eams i n Laos. JCS vlaS examining
alternative advisor expansions
(1,000, 2,000, 3,000).
23 May 6l.j· Msg, CINCPAC to JCS MACV opposed to " flooding " RVN
23041813,Vietnamese Civ:il with U.S. personnel; pref'erred
Guard and Self' Def'ense build-up on selective basis,
Corps cha,llenged " encadrement."

7
,'//,
TOP SECK8T - Sensitive
25 May 61~ Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6473, JCS pla,n for 6 Mobile Train:i.ng
Vietnamese Civil Guard and 1'eams in each province a,nd
Self Defense Corps training center, 70 advisors to
each critical province , increase
of 1000 personnel.
27 May 64 Msg, Co.MUSMACV to CINCPAC Gen. Harkins disputed the value
LI.259 , 2700~5 ~ . of U.S. conducted training for
CG/ SDC and of Mobile Training
Teams ; proposed advisors be used
at district level for operations ;
accepted ..1000 man increase .
27 May 64 Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, CINCPAC agreed >vUh COMUSlflACV
27 08 0 53, Vietnamese ,md outlined specifi c advisory
CG and SDC build -up reco~nended: 956 per-
sonnel by end CY 65.
27 May 64 Msg, White House to Gen. Harkins reg.ue sted to
Saigon (Personal for return to U.S.
Gen. Paul Harkins )
28 May 64 Msg, Saigon to State 2338 USOM desire for gradual, not
r apid , build·-up; need for effec-
tive local administration and.
securUy.
30 May- 6J+ JCSM-464-64 , Pilot Program One of two JCS proposa ls sub-
f or Provision of Advisory mitted to McNamara outlining
Assistance to Paramili ta,ry pil ot program f or advisory buil d-
Forces in Seven Provinces up : temas in 49 districts over
6 month period, 300 advisors .
30 May 6 L~ J CSM-465-6~ , U.S. Advisory Second proposal - Broader
Assistance to the Viet- advisory increase program:
namese Civil Guard and 1000 personnel for all 239
Sel f-Defense Corps. di stricts over 1 l~ years .
30 May 64 J CSM-466-64 , Provision of JCS opposed extending U.S.
U. S. Advi sors to Company advisors t o company l evel,
Level Withi n Vietnamese b ecause of i ncreased casualties,
Regular Ground Forces l anguage problems, ARVN opposi-
tion .
TOP SECRET - SensiU.ve

8
1 Jun 64 Honolulu Conference
25 Jun 64 Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, Elaborated decision of Hono-

MAC 7325380, Extension lulu conference to expand advisory
of U. S. Advisory Assist- effort to district level, and to
ance increase battalion-level advisory
groups to make compe,ny level
advisory teams available.
1 Jul 64 - Maxwell Taylor, Ambassador
31 Jul 65 to South Vietnam.
17 Jul 6~ Msg, COMUS~~CV to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV reached ~200 per-
MACJ-316180, Support sonnel in addition to 926
Requirements for Extension battalion and district advisors
of U.S. Advisory Progr~n. "the straw' that broke the
camel I s back" of the over-
'burdened support base.
28 Jul 64 Msg, COMUS~mcvAto JCS, COMUSlf.tACV requested 4200 per-

MACJl 70t~11., Personnel sonnel by 1 Dec 6~· and remainder
Augmentation. of 4772 total increase by
1 Feb 65.
Hop Tac Idea for Hop Tac, special com-

bined US/ GVN effort to secure
crit:ical area round Saigon,
proposed by Amb. Lodge at
Honolulu Conference.
1 Aug 6~ - Gen . William C. Westmoreland,

30 Jun 68 commander of MACV.
2 Aug 64 Tonkin Gulf Incident U,S.S. Maddox allegedly attacked

by North Vietnamese torpedo
boats.
4 Aug 6~ J CSM-665-6~,Additional McNamara Vlanted additional men

Support in RVN on Accel- provided more quickly than
erated Basis Westmore1and ' s plan.
5 Aug 64 Tonkin Gulf Resolution Congress passed joint resolu-

tion supporting "e,ll necessary
action" to protect U. S o forces
and assist Vietnam.
7 Aug 61~ Memo, SecDef for CJCS, McNamara directed the,t accel-
Additional Support for erated deplo;Ylnent be completed
Republic of VietnaID_ on by end of September.
an Accelere;ted Basis.

9
NND Project Number : NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
11 Aug 6~· Msg, COMUS~ACV to CINCPAC, Westmorelcmd replied th(),t he

MACJ3 7738, Additional could not absorb build-up in
Support for RVl\f time requested by McNaw~ra.
15 Aug 64 Msg, JCS to CSA, CNO, McNamara, cancelled a cel erated

CSAF et al, JCS 7953, deployment, services instructed
Additional Support in RVN. to deploy personne1 in accorde,nce
with Westmoreland ' s initial
recommendations.
16 Aug 64 - KhanJ1 coup. Nguyen Khanh , President, Head

26 Oct 6~· of State and Chief, Revolutionary
Military Council (30 Jan 64 to
26 Oct 6 1" 27 Jan· 65 to 21 Feb
65) .
12 Sep 64 Hop Tac Hop Ta,c launched vli th a sweep

through Gia Din]} Province.
Mission abo:rted following day
by coup.
4 Nov 64 - Phan Klac Suu, Chief of State

11 Jun 65
Dec 6~ Cri sis between Amb. Taylor and

Gen. Khanh resu1ted from Taylor ' s
att empt to use U. S. decisjon to
begin bombing DRV as lever to
get GVN reform. Taylor aban-
doned further attempts at
l everage .
Dec 6L~ Troika sign·-off lf for

If USOM Director Killen decided
piasters aboli shed to abandon joint sign-off for
release of piaster funds for
pacification - important l everage
tool.
23 Jan 65 McNama,ra approved RVNAF force

incr ease proposal for MAP sup-
port. New strength authorj_za-
tions: 275,058 Regular Forces,
137,187 IDe and 185,000 PF.
(Alternative 1).
7 Feb 65 FLAMING DART reprisal attacks

agai nst DRV launched.
10 TOP SECRET - Sensit i ve

22 Feb 65 Gen. Westmoreland recommended

sending two Marine Battalion
Landing Teams to DaNang for
base security.
26 Feb 65 ROLLING THUNDER, sustained
bombing of DRV, initiated.
26 Feb 65 Decision to send Me,rines to
DaNang made in Washington.
6 Mar 65 Marines "\'lent ashore at DaNang.
16 Mar 65 JCS message 0936 Gen. H. K. Johnson returned fro~

trip to Vietnam with recommendation
for deplo~nent of U.S. combat force s
and creation of joint command.
20 Mar 65 Westmoreland requested 8,uthoriza-

tion to implement Alterna'ci ve 2
RVNAF strength increase (greatel'
t han alternative 1 by 15,000) .
21 Mar 65 COMUSY~CV message 1566 Westmoreland oppos ed any formal

merging of commands, preferred
informal cooperation.
26 Mar 65 MACV tl Commander ' s Esti- As a strategy alternative,

mate of the Situation tl Westmoreland r ejected proposal
for accelerated RVNAF build-up
a s insufficient to prevent VC
vi ctory.
1-2 Apr 65 Washington strategy conference

with Brig Gen De Puy, Amb. Taylor.
6 Apr 65 NSAM 328 President approved dispatch of

t wo more battalions and an air
wing and authorized their employ-
ment for active combat missions.
12 Apr 65 y~CV Co®nand History 1965 McNamara approved JCS recommenda-

tion for RVNAF expansion of 17} 247.
160 additional U.S . advisors
approved.
15 Apr 65 Defense Department Defense Department sought to have

me ssage 009164, Joint U.S. Army civil affairs officers
State / Defense Message introduced in provinces to improve
civiladm:inistration. Amb. Taylor ' s
opposition killed ~~ oposal.

NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
15 Apr 65 Department of State McGeorge Bundy informed Amb.

message 2332 Te,ylol' t hat President v-mnted
to try " encadrement of U.S.
troops vIi th Vietnamese."
15 Apr 65 DOD message 151233£ DOD requested COMUSlfmCV's

opinion about feas jb:Lli ty of
encadrement of U.S. officers
in ARVN divisions to improve
effectiveness.
18 Apr 65 Honolulu Conference, Based on study by Gen. Throck-

MACV Command History morton, encadrement proposals
were rejected because of
language problem, expanded
support requirement, and adverse
effects on South Vietnamese
morale.
Apr 65 MACV Command History Westmoreland suggested joint

1965 MACV-JGS staff. Gen. Thieu and
Gen. Minh were opposed.
3 May 65 Hop Tac pacifico,tion Corps cormnanders for I, II, IV

Corps presented Hop Tac plans
for their zones, eo,ch to extend
"oil blot" pacificatj.on from its
headquarters city. (By end of
1965 became scheme for National
Priority Areas.)
11 May 65 Viet Cong attached and overran

Song Be, capital of Phuoc Long
Province, and a U.S. advisory
compound in the city.
JCS message 142228£ McNamara authorized creation of

formal combined command in Viet-
nam and coordinating MACV-JGS
staff.
21 May 65 COMDSNACV message Westmoreland recommended against

Combined Co®nand; proposed combined command becaus e
J·CS message 2L~Ob037S of Thieu ' s .and Ky ' s opposition.
26 May 65 CINCPAC msg to JCS 3027, CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV ' s

260332 t: opposition to combined command
bece,use of fears of Vietnamese
hostility.

NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 11
late May 65 VC force ambushed a,nd dec:L-

mated ARVN 51st Regiment
and 2 battalions near Ba Gia,
Ivest of Quang Ngai City.
Jun 65 Origin of CAP Several Marjnes assigned to
work with local PF near Phu
Bai, I Corps.
7 Jun 65 MACV messCl,ge to CINCPAC Moratorimn on RVNAF build-up

and JCS 19118 . re~uired b ecause trainees needed
as fillers in existing units to
replace heavy casualties.
Westmoreland re~uested ~·4 addi-
tional U.S. battalions; reported
severe ARVN deterioration.
19 Jun 65 - Nguyen Van Thieu, Chief of
pres ent State and Chairman, National
Leadership Council, 20 Jun 65
to 9 Nov 67, elected President
31 Oct 67.
Jun 65 Viet Cong attacked Special
Forces camp at Dong Xoai "l'li th
more than t\'lO regiments.
25 Jun 65 VC Central Highlands offensive

began, district head~uarters
at Tou Morong, Kontum Province,
was overrun.
26 Jun 65 MACV Military Report, MACV noted 5 ARVN regiments and
19-26 June and 9 battalions combat ineffec-
tive.
Jul 65 18 US/FW combat maneuver

battalions were in Vietnam.
Jul 65 MACV Command History, 11 of 15 ARVN trainj.ng battalions

1965 had to be disorganized to pro-
vide fillers for line units due
to heavy casualties.
7 Jul 65 Six district capitals had been

abandoned or overrun.

20 Jul 65 SecDef Memorandum for Mc]\Jame,ra urged U. S. to lay

the President down terms for continuing
assistance before introduction
of more forces; suggested
exercise leverage through control
of rice policy.
25 Jul 65 Saigon message 266 Amb. Taylor did not "rant to

appear to impose conditions
for increased aid.
28 Jul 65 President announced expanded

U.S. effort and increased troop
commitment to Vietnam.
7 Aug 65 lf~CV Command History CG III MAF designated as Senior

1965. Advisor to ARV]\J I CTL'. Commander.
Sep 65 Lodge Ambassador Lodge returned to Vietnmn for

second term as ambassador.
Term of office: 31 Jul 65 -
Apr 67.
Sep 65 COMtJSMACV eval uated 3-month

.
experlmen- t Wl· th 11 slng_e
· 1 manager 11
teams in 3 provinces, found it
partially successful but scrapped
t he i dea.
1 Oct 65 MACV Co@nand History, MACV created separate contingency

1965. fund for each subsector advisor
f or urgent projects, in attempt
t o overcome delays i n Vietnamese
pe,cification system.
16 Oct 65 State Dept msg 1039 USOM sought to restore troika

18 Oct 65 Saigon msg 1324 sign-off but State Dept. opposed
t hi s i dea . The attempt was
abandoned.
21 Oct 65 Commander of HQ Fi eld Force ,

Vietnam (FFORCEV ) des i gnated as
II CTL'. Senior Advisor. (At
i ns i stance of ARVN Corps com-
manders, who felt they would
suffer loss of prestige if
advi sed by less than Senior
U.S. ofncer in corps. )
TOP SECRET - Sens i t·i ve

?
3 Nov 65 SecDef Draft Memorandum McNamara recorded :impatience

for the President vlith GVN, recommended giving
l arger role to advisors at
province and district l evel .
5 Nov 65 MACV Crunrr~nd History Westmorelemd recommended incre&.sed
RVNAF force levels for FY 66 aej
FY 67, to limit of available
manpovler.
, Nov 65 CAP Program Agreement bet,'Teen I Corps Com-
mander and CG III M.liF permittL. . g
int egration of Marine squads ir:.to
PF platoons in DaNang a,rea to :;:~orm
Combined Action Platoon (CAP):
Marine Rifle Squad (14) and PF
Platoon (32-38).
28 Nov 65 McNamara trip t o Saigon, appro-:2s

RVNAF forc e i ncrease recommend&.-
tion.
15 Dec 65 Lodge memorandum for Lodge spe cified that GVN pacif~~a
Gen. Lansdale; MACV tion effort was primarily civiLan,
Command Hist.ory consequently on U,S. side the
t wo civilian agencjes, USAID al:j
CAS, should b e generating suppc::.'t
agencj.es .
8-11 Jan 66 Warrenton Conference Members of Saigon Mission, Viet-

Report nam Coordinabng COlmni ttee and
other senior officials met at
Warrenton, Virginia., to review
pacification problem. It fore-
shadow'ed a redirection of advisory
effort t oward pacification.
Jan 66 MACV Analysis of At Mission Council meeting, Amb .

RVNAF for CY 66 Lodge express ed conc ern that
the number of U.S. advisors not
smother the Vietna.mese at all
l evels.
4 Feb 66 State to Saigon 2252 U,S. r equested Honolulu meet i ng

with Thieu, Ky to express conce~n
about pacifi cation , economic prob-
l ems, GVN l ack of popular suppcrt.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3
NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
'j •
.I '
6-8 Feb 66 Honolulu Conference LRJ concern about the "other

VIar, " Thieu and Ky made pledges
of increased pacification,
promised elections. Amb. Hilliam
Porter VIas assigned responsibility
for civil support of RD.
28 Feb 66 Mission Council Minutes, Porter described his under-
Feb 28, 1966 standing of his duties to Mission
Council: coordinating effort for
all civil aspects of revolutior:.ary
development, through the Mission
Liaison Group.
Feb 66 MACV subsector pacification
contingency fUnd abandoned after
4-month trial period due to
oppos ition of GVN RD Minister
Thang; it would encourage
Vietnamese dependence on UoS.
Mar 66 PROVN Study SUllunary Program for Paci.fica;tion and
Statement, Mar 66 Long Term Development of South
Vietnam (PROVN ) completed for
i nternal army use. Revealed
l ack of coordination among U.S.
agencies in pacification.
23 Apr 66 Saigon to State 4160, Lodge r evievled prospects for
Apr 23 , 1966; Lf 200, Apr 26 ; i ntroduction of U.S. Jeverage
4435, May 7; 55h6, J'une 15 in Buddhist lI StrU£!:gle Movement ";
desired t o bring dissj,dents U:'1der
GVN control, but sal'l no VIay to
achieve decisive reSl.llts. Recom-
mended to Washington that a sign-
off system be r einstated to
reduce corrupU on and increase
U. S. i nfluence at 10I'Ter l evel s .
Jul 66 Stepped-up pacification effort :
Operation Lam Son, combined RD
" Search and Seal" operations ,-;i th
U.S . 1st Infantry Division and
ARVN 5th Division in Binh Duong.
U.S. 25th Division "adopted "
di stricts i n Ha.n Nghia Province.

16
Jul 66 IIRoles a,nd Missions ll Study

Group began work for Amb. Porte~.
Complet ed in August. Recom-
mendations for support for a
reemphasis on pac ification.
Sep 66 McNama,ra proposed that responsi-
bility for sole management of
pacifica,tion be assigned to
COMUSMACV, who would have a
Deputy to command all pa,dficat2.on
activities. AID, CIA, USIA.
opposed such reorganization ;
Komer and JCS concurred.
29 Sep 66 Komer, IIMemorandum for Komer stressed that u..1l.ified

Secretary McNamara, 1I management of pacification was
ne eded .
23-25 Oct 66 Manila Conference At Manila Conference Thieu and

Ky formally ac epted conuni tment
of ARVN to support RD, and
II National Reconciliation ll program
to attract VC back to governme:ct
vms announced.
Oct 66 McNa,mara trip to Saigon. Ky

a,greed to shift in combat missions
for U,S. and RVNAF forces: U,S.
to conduct la.rge-scale offensive
operations, RVNAF to provide
security to RD.
7 Nov 66 MACV/ JGS Combined Spelled out ne,·, division of l abor

Campaign Plan 1967 (AB 142 ) between UoS. and RVNAF . JGS
agreed to keep 53 ARVN battaliCls
( 50% of ARVN combat unit s ) ass:i.gned
to support RD.
7 Nov 66 Memorandum, Arab . Lodge Lodge defined terms of r eferenCe

for the Secretary of for what was established as the
State, SecDef and Komer; Office of Civil Operations (OCO).
message, Saigon 11125,
Nov. 17.

------_._---
17
r
,
,
8 Dec 66 MACV msg 52414 to Westmoreland reported to CINCPAC

CINCPAC on poor quality s.nd performance
of ARVN. First 10 months of 1966,
the nu..rnber of ARVN maneuver
bs.ttalions with m:i_nimally accept··
able operational strength fluc-
tuated from 31 to 78 of total of
121 organized units.
17 Dec 66 W. W. Rostow, Memoran- Pacification listed as third
dum to Secretary of strategic objective s.nd five
Defense and Acting Secre- programs concerned vd th pac:Lfica-
tary of State, draft tion were outlined, heralding re-
NSAM attached emphasis on pacification in 1967.
27 Dec 66 JCS Memorandum for the JCS replied to Rostow's draft
Secretary of Defense, after consulting CINCPAC; stiffen-
JCSM-792-66, line-in, ing and making more specific U.S.
line-out revised draft cornmi tment to war, introducjng
NSAtVf attached. t erm "revolutionary development,"
el iminated references to "national
reconciliation" for ex-VC, and
watered down commitment to
constitutional-electoral efforts
underi·lay.
9 Jan 67 MACV msg 009~9 I n Dec 1966 a 12-officer team
f rom each ARVN had undergone
t raining on RD support so that
each might instruct its division
on the new duties. The division
t raining programs bego.n in Jan 67 .
18 Jan 67 MACV msg 02149 to MACV described new' Hamlet Evalu-
CINCPAC from MACCORDS ation System (RES ) to CINCPAC. '
20 Jan 67 ASD ( ISA ) J'ohn T. McNaughton McNaughton draft for Vietnam
Memorandum for the Secre- st rategic guidelines incorporated
t ary of Defense, Subj ect: most JCS recommendations, empha-
Draft NSAM on "Strategic s:Lzed security, anti-infrastructure
Guidelines for 1967 in and i ntelligence in support of RID,
Vietnam; " McNaughton ' s pushed "Nations,l Reconciliation. 11
l ine--in, line-out revised
draft and the JCS revision
attached .
24 Jan 67 MA.CV msg 02916, Westmore- Westmoreland stated that the

ls.nd sends effectiveness of RVNAF must be
i ncreased and ths.t its ims,ge must
be improved.

-: .~
'..
28 Jan 67 Deputy SecDef Cyrus Vance Vance sent McNaughton vers ion
letter to W. vf. Rostow' to Rostow as Defense Depart-
ment reply to his memor8.ndDIIl.
No NSAlI1 was ever promul g8.ted .
Feb 68 "Pacification Slowdoivn" OASD (SA) reported that pac ifica-

Southeast Asia Analysis tion effort in 1967 had failed.
Report, Feb 68, OASD(SA)
SEA Programs Directorate
18 Mar 67 MA.CV msg 09101, Westmore- Westmoreland cabled CINCPAC
l and sends requesting 8.n " OptimDIIl force "
increase of 4-2/ 3 divisions
(201,250 men ) or as a "minimum
essential force ", 2-1/3 divisions
(100,000 men). No major expa.n-
sion of RVRI\F called for: 6,307
more spaces for ARVN, 50,000
more REi PF.
20-21 Mar 67 Guam Conference President Johnson met with Thi eu

a.nd Ky i n Guam. They present ed
draft constitution and agreed to
a proclamation on National
Reconciliation .
Johnson decided to transfer control

of pacification to MACV and send
Robert Komer to head new opera-
tion in Saigon.
25 Mar 67 Embassy Saigon msg 21226, Lodge stressed i mportance of

Eye s Only for the Presi- RVNAF for lfillCV success , praised
dent from Lodge Abrams as man to oversee RVNAF
i mprovement.
Mar 67 Gen. Creighton Abrams became

l.vestmoreland deputy and assumed
r esponsibility for U.S. advisory
effort to RVNAF .
1 Apr 67 NevT South Vietnamese Constitution

promul gated.
TOP SECRET -v2nsi ti ve

19
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
~rop SECRET - Sensitive
24 Apr 67 R. VT. Komer Memorandum Komer asserted that decj.sive

for the President contest lay in pacification in
the South, rej ected VJestmorell3,nd t s
request for 8,dditional 200~000
troops, proposed methods to
improve RVNAF and pacification,
suggested increased pressure on
GVN for reforms.
1 MEW 67 New Ambassador, EllsvlOrth Bunker,

arrived in Saigon.
7 May 67 .MACV msg 1506~ Reported Jan. decision to make

a unit by unit effectiveness eval-
uation and to cut off support for
superfluous or belovT standard
units. Resulted in several
vlarnings but no suspension of
support. Also reported RVNAF
desertions were won for Jan-Feb
1967 from Jan-Feb 1966.
9 May 67 NSAM 362 Komer ' s 8,ppointment as single

manager for pacification aD~ounced
i nternally.
12 May 67 Embassy Saigon Airgr8xll Gloomy account of progress of

622, Subject: Revolu- RD in first three months of 1967.
tionary Development
13 May 67 Ambassador Bunker state- Announcement of trans fer of OCO

ments to the press in t o YlliCV, Bunker stressed combined
i n Saigon, May 13, 196'7 ci v:U-mili tary nature of pacifica-
tion.
15 May 67 Embassy Saigon msg. 25839 First meeting of Komer 1'7i th Ky.
Ky decl ined to pl ace GVN RD efforts
under JGS.
28 May 67 State Department msg MACV .' ssued directive i'Tith instruc-
DTG 09230~.g ; MACV Dir tions on nevi RD organizational
10-12 , 28 May 1967. a rrangements .
May 67 J CSM-53 0 -67 , Subject : McNamara i mposed 8, temporary

I ncrease in FY 1968 RVN~F ceiling on RVNAF to prevent
Force Level, 28 Sep 67 (a further inflation in Vietnam
review of the year ' s and to arrest some of the balance
actions ) . of payments flou of UeS . spending.

l~. Jun 67 Amb. R. W. Komer, Me:~,oran Komer recolInnended consolida,tj.on,

dum for General W. C. under his direction, of U.S.
Westmoreland, Subject: anti - :i.nfrastructure intelligence
Organization for Attack effort. Desired unified GVN/ US ,
on V.C. Infrastruct~re ci vil/ mili ta,ry "management strll.C-
t ure targeted on j.nfrastructure."
ICEX (Intelligence Coordination
and Exploitation ) structure vlaS
developed.
Emba,ssy Saigon msg 28095, Bunker described ~~CV actions

For the President from Ul1deI'\vay to improve RVNA.F:
Bunker i mproving leadership, better
pa,y, j.mprovJng com.mand structure
and equipment of RF/ PF training,
i ntegrated US/RVNAF operations,
r evj.evls.
17 Jun 67 MACCORDS, Project Ta~e Project TAI(EOFF contained anal-

off , prepared by the ysis of reasons for part failure,
ACofS, CORDS, Headq.-c.e,rters appraisal of cu..rrent situation,
MACV and recommendations for future
emphasiS in RD ; suggested increased
use of U.S. l everage and control.
ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Enthovcn claimed t,ha,t primary

Memo for the SeeDef, r eason for RVNAF ineffectiveness
Subj: Improvement in was the qua,nti ty and quality of
RVNAF Force Effectiveness l C8,dership and recommended that
t he Secretary query MACV on
l eadership problems.
13 Jul 67 ASD(SA) Alain Entho·ien In Sa:Lgon, McNamara gave pl,mning

Memorandwll for the Record, authorization fo r U,S . augmenta-
Subj: Fallout for SeeDef t ion up to 525,000 spaces, and
Tr ip to South Vietnam (TS- civilianization of 10,000 addi-
SENS-EYES ONLY for ~r. t ional spaces to fulfill \vestmore-
Heyman ) ; and OASD ( SA ) land Is lower forc e alternative.
General Purpose Forces,
W. K. Brehm, Memo fo2.° the
Record, Subj: SEA Deploy-
ments, J ul 14, 1967
14 Aug 67 ASD(SA ) Alain Enthoven New' U. S. force l evel of 525,000

Memo for the Secretaries promUlgated as Deployment Program
of the Military Depart- #5.
ments, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Assistant Secretaries
of Defense, Subj: South-
east Asia Deployment
Program #5
21
NND Project Number : NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
.
"
',)
30 Aug 67 DASD(SA) Memo for the Amb. Komer complained that the
SecDef CORDS a,dvisory element I s actu.al
strength I'T aS seriously below'
authorization due to bu.r ea,ucra"t::.c
delays.
31 Aug 67 Dept of State Msg 30023 Study of leverage by Hems

Heymann and Lt Col Volney WarneT
recommended increased use.
7 Sep 66 COJIIDSlv:lACV Memo for Westmoreland disagreed with

Ambassador Lodge Roles and Missions Study Group
recommendation to remove divi sion
from chain of cow§~nd below CTZ
l evel and strengthening role o=~
Province Chief.
15 Sep 67 JCSM 505-67, Subj: u.s. JCS submitted final detailed

Forces Deployments Vietnam troop list for Program #5. Co:--.-
(Refined Troop List) tained 2,577 additional advisors
and 666 Special Forces to perfc~n
advisor-like functions.
16 Sep 67 Review and Analysis Sys- First published Revj.e"lv and

tem for RVNAF Progress, Analysis for RVNAF appeared:
MACV-J31~1 long catalogue of RVNAF defic-
iencies.
19 Sep 67 Embassy Saigon msg 7113 Komer replied to recommendatio~-:.

for increa,sed us e of U. S. leverage
t hat it must be done dis creetl:; .
Proposed comprehensive system
of country-vride l everage was
never adopted.
28 Sep 67 JC SM-530-67, Subject: JCS forwarded "lv ith endorsement

Increase in FY 68 RVNAF the MACV -CINCPAC recommenda tio::
Force Level on FY 68 RVNAF force increases:
total increase of 63,586; 47,839
for RF/ PF and 15,747 for regu12"r
forces. MACV r equested furtheT
incr ease of 78, 20~ for FY 1969 .
7 Oct 67 SecDef Memo for CJCS, McNamara, approved the requestec.

Subj ect: Increase in FY FY 68 augmentations for RVNAF,
68 RVNAF Force Level, and against the "lvishes of Enthoven;
attached OASD(SA ) memo who would have authorized only
for the SecDef, 5 Oct 61 half as many .

22
26 Oct 67 tllnformation on MATs MACV conference on RF/PF,

(Mobile Advisory Teams ) convened to study problems of
and MALTs (Mobile Advisory RF/ PF expansion and to plan
Logistics Teams),tI 8 May for expansjon of advisory
1968, "lwrking paper pre- effort, recommended complete
pared by the ACofS MA, reorientation of advisory
N"lACV concept · for RF/PF, establish-
ment of Mobile Advisory Teams
to be used on a rotating basis.
15 Dec 67 Westmoreland approved new RF/PF

advisory system: MATs and
MALTs, to be phased in during
1968.
31 Jan 68 Tet Offensive VC/ NVA initiate massive attacks
on population centers throughout
Vietnam during Lunar New Year
(Tet ) holide,y period.
23
Declassified per Execut ive Order 13526, Section 3.3
TOP SECIlliT - Sensitive
IV. B. 3.
THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 1961-67
TABLE OF CONTENTS and OUTIJINE
INTRODUCTION............. lit ............ lit .. II ....... II 0 •• " .......... " ...... " .... " 1
PART ONE - ADVISORY STABILITY, 1954-1960 .•••••.•••••••••• •••••••••• 3
A. THE U. S. GAYlBLE WITH LIMITED RESOURCES •.•••••.• • • ••••••••• 3

Origins of the U.S. Involvement in RV1\f ••••• ·••·•·•·•·•·•·· 3
Ini tial Military- Reluctance. . • • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • . • • . . 3
The Decision to Gs.mblc vlith Limit e d Commitment. ........... 4
From Int ernal to Conventional Defens e ••. .••• •••••·••·•···• 5
The Early- MAAG and the ECluipment Recovery- Mission ..••••••• 6
B. THE TRANSITION PERIOD: 1959-1961... .. • .. . .. .. . . .. .. .. • • .. 8
Early- Steps TOvrard Empl1a.sis on Internal Security-.......... 8
The McGarr Emphasis on Counterinsurgency- ..•••.•• ·•····•·•• 8
The Counterinsurgency- Plan for South Viet-.Nam. . • . • • • • • . . . . 9
The Supporting Operational Plan ••••.•..•. • .••.••• ••··•···· 11
Sts.bility- in the Number of U.S. Advisors ..... ........ • .. ·• 11
PART TltJO - THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 1961-1967 •••..••.•••• ··•••·•··•·• 13
A. The Ke~ Programs (1961-1963) .....•.•..••.• ••·••·····•· 13
The Context of Decisions ...••.••.•••...•• ...• •··•······••• 13

Proposal fol' Extra-Bureaucratic Advisors ••.•....•...•• ··· • 15
Back to Normal Channels ...•••••..•••.•• • ••••••.• •••·••·• •• 16
Planning Begins in Earnest •....•••..••••.••.••..••. • ••.••• 22
GVN Asks for Additions.l U,S. Assistance .••.•••.• · •··••·•·• 23
The Tay-lor Missi on to Sai.gon ..•••••.•••.•.•••.•• •·•••••••• 24
The Kennedy- Decisions: NSAI'-1 111. .•••••.•.••• ••••· . . • • • • •• 26
Working Out the Basis for U.S. Advice ..••.••.•• ··••··• •••· 27
u. S. Expectations: The Benefits from More Advisors .....•. 29
Implementing the First Build-up ....•.•••• ··••·••·••· ••·•• · 31
The U.S. View': 1962 - 1963 ............ • ............ •· .... 33
The Actuality-: 1 962 - 1963 ....•.••.••••••.•• ··••·•••·••·• 3l~
The Stage is Set for "Better GVN Receptivity" . •••••••.••.• 36
i TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Secti on 3.3
., a
~-.
~' ,f
TOP SECRET - Sensi ti ve
B. District Advisors and the Beef-Up of Battalion

Advisory Teams ( 196~.":19b5l·. . . • . . . • • . . . . . . . • • • . • . • . . . • . • .. 37
Optimism TUrns to Frustration .••...•.•.•.. ·••·••••·••··•· 37

NSAl\1: 288. e ••••••• e .... " •••• 51 ••• 0 " " • •••• 0 0 CI ••• II • • • • • • • • • • • •• 38
Increasing Political Insta,bility in the Provinces........ ~·2
MACV's Gradualistic Approach to Expansion .••••..••.•••..• 43
McNamara's Willingness to Approve Expansion .•..•••••...•• 44
The Initial Proposals a,nd Responses ..•••.....•.. •·•·•···• 44
MACV Focuses on Opera,tions Rather Than Tra,ining ..•...••.• 46
The JCS Alterna,ti ve Programs ...•••.•.••..•••••. ••··•·•··• 48
MACV's Preferred Approach Accepted ..•.....•..•• ·•·•······ 49
Unresolved Issues: Speed and Discretionary Authority ..•. 51
Secretarial Pressure for a Speed-Up ..••.••••• ·.·······~·· 52
MACV's Preference Upheld Again. . • . . . . . • • • • . . . . . . . . . • . . . .• 53
Events Overtake Implementation of the Expansion .....•.... 54
C. U. S. Combat Forces and the PossibilHy of Ne"i>l

Relationships--[l965) 0 .. " " ••• 0 ••••• e • • • • • • • " • • • • • • • • • • ., ., • • • 58
The Abortive I,imited Expansion of ARVN. . • . . . • . . . . • • • . . • •. 58
l'Jew Possibili-ties ...... ., ........... e " ...................... 59
Encadrement Considered and Rejected ..•.•.....• •·•·•··••·· 59
Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAPs ) •...••...•••.••..• · 60
Joint Cormnand Considered and Rejected ....••..•. · · ······•· 61
TAORs, Senior Advisors, and a Combined Sta,ff ...••....•... 62
I,everage: The Hidden Issue •...•.•.........• ···•••·•··· .• 63
Wi thdravl"ing from Overt Influence ..•..•....•• ···· ·· ··•···· 64
MCNamara ' s Minority Position on Leverage ... . •.. ···••····· 65
U.S. Proposals for GVN Execution: An Example ...•..• . .... 66
D. Organization as the Key to Effectiveness in

PacificatiollT1966-1967) . • • • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • • • . . .. 70
The Basis for Organizational Procedures ....•.....•. · · ···· 70

Ullresolv'ed Issues ........ e CI ••••••••• " ••• " 71 " •• • •••••••••••••
vllio Shoolll LeBold? ••••••• " • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • .• 71

CORDS ReplaceS OCO .•..• . .......•...•. • ..• .• . . •••. • •.... . . ' 74
RVNAF ' s Role in Pacification ............... ··· ...... ··· .. 82
1'he 1967 Combined Campaign Plan •.•.•..•••• . ··••·•········ 84
Leverage and Sovereignty •••.••..•••.•.•• ·•··•••··• · ·•···· 92
The Inconclusive Debate Over Leverage . . . . ..•.•. ·•··•· · ·•· 94
No Decision as a Decision ..•....••.... · · · ···•···•··••···· 97
Groping Toward Better Information •... . ...•• ·• · •·••••···•· 99
RVNAF Effe ct i vene s s ..•.....••••..••••....•. •. •.• . •...••.. 104
The Latest Expansion of Advisors . . ..•.. . ..•.... . •. ·· · ··•• l07
FOOTNOTES ..................... . .... " •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 113

i i
TOP SECm~'J' - Sensitive
APPENDICES
1. U. S. Advisory Effort - Manpmver . . . ...... . .. · .. ······ 125
II . Distribution of U.S. Army Field Advisory Effort . . . . . 126
III . Total Cost of RVN Army Regjonal Forces and Popular

Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 127
IV . Distribution of US Financial Resources in Support

of RVN Army, Regional Forces, and popular Forces .... 128
V. Distribution of RVN Army F:Lnancia.l Resources in

Support of RVN Army, Regional Forces, and popular
Forces ................. , . . . . . . ... .. ...... . . . . . . . . . .. 129
VI. Annual Per Capita Costs for RVN Army, Regjonal

Forces and Popular Forces .... . . . . .. .. . ....... . . .... . 130
VII . Distribution of U. S. Army Advj.sors by Assignment. . .. 131
VIII . RVNAF Total Strength ........ .. ...... . .. . . · .. ·· ······ 132
IX. Distribution of U. S, Field Advisors by Assignment .. . 133
ii i TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per E xecutive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3
NND P roject Number : NND 633 16. B y: NWD D ate: 2011
,;
TOP SECRET - Sens~c:;ive
IV. B. 3.
I]\J"""T RODUCTIO~~
From shortly after the founding of :.he Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

in 195~· until the first year of the Kenr,:;c1y Administration the U. S.
supported RVN ",ith a MiU tary Assistance AdvisOl'y Group (IVlAAG ) which
was reo,sonably stable in size. Beginnl:c; in 1961 the number of U. S,
milHary advisors to RVN increased sharp2.y. This increase continued
unevenly througlJ.out 1967 and into 1968.
This U.S, military advisory buildup did not mark the first UoS.
attempt i,o conduct " a dvisory '<Tarfare ll in the post--Horld War II era.
The first such attempt "I'las in Greece. l'~or did i t marlt the initia,l U,S.
program ajmed at creating a, modern mili te,ry force from meager beginnings
in a foreign nation. The first attempt of this kind was made in the
Republic of Korea. Whe,t i t did ma,rk "I'las the first sustained U. S, effort
to advise foreign national forces enge,gEe: in combatting what the communists
have termed a II"Tar of national liberatio:'l, II a struggle "('Thich took the form
of a civil wnr with external assistance to both a,ntagonists and in which
winning the adherence of the population -.:a.s at l east a,s central an is sue
as \'las the tide of military battle. Th:j s h8,s been the first sustaj.ned
U,S. advisory effort to be concerned in c. major "(·ray with ll pe,cificaUon
by proxy. 1I
The present study examines the major decisions to u nc3ertal,e and to

expand this large military advisory effort. It attempts to describe th e
cont ext in which successive decisions "('lere made to send advisors to South
Vietnam, to record th e expectations of t!le policYllla,kers or, "lhen appro-
priate , to note the absence of explicit expectations , and to trace the
expansion of the U.S. lllilitary presence in the advisory role through the
various l evels of the South Vietnamese rtili tary and administrative machinery.
Finally, this study attempts to assess the impact of the U.S. advisory
buildup in terms of the extent to which U. S. expectations have been rea,lized
or frustrated.
The main study is divided into t"TO uarts . Part One describes briefly
the U.S. advisory effort in RVN from 195 h through 1960. I t sets the stage,
as it "Tere, for the more comprehensive e:;.:amina tion of the advisory buildup
from 1961 through 1967 in Pa,rt T1'!O. ( The latter year marIts roughly the
final period for ",hich informat ion is available at this writing, not any
necessary end to the general process described . ) The sunrrnary and a,nalysis
",hich accompanies this study constitutes in effect Part Three of the study.
It assesses the U.S. advjsory effort in terms of expectations and develop-
ments a,nd examines pers:i_stent issues thr oughout th e period under discus sion.
Finally, the gro"l<Tth of the U.S. military 8,dvisory effort and related data

is shown in "La,bular form at the end of the study.
The development of the U. S. mili to,ry advisory effort from 195 1j -1959
is presented in another document in the present series.* The purpose of
the initial part of the present study is not to replo"VT the sa,me :furrOi·;rs
but to higblight the lega,cy of this earlier period as it affected the
l ater advisory buildup. Although the U.S. attempt to conduct revolutionary
warfe,re by proxy may be said to have begun in 1961, i t did not proceed
entirely free of the inheritance from earlier situa;tions, attitudes, and
actions.
* Vol. IV .A., Evolution of the Har: U,S. Training of the Vietnamese

Nat ional Army, 195~-1959.

I. '
I
TOP SECRET Sensitive
PART ONE
ADVISORY STABILITY, ~954-1960
A. The U. S. Gamble "\1J"ith Limited Resources
ORIGINS _ OF TIm U. S. Il\TVOLVEMENT IN RVN
The U. S. decision to attempt, generally I',ithin the strictures imposed

by the Geneva Accords, to shore up the Govermnent of South Vietnam (GVN )
and to prevent the nevI nation I s fall jnto corrununist hands appears in
retroslJect to have been, in vlellington I s phrase, " a close run thing. "
The prevalent Alnerican atUtude in 195)-1 was that the deployment of large
U.S. forces to the mainland of Asi, should be permitted "never again. "
Spending on national security was to be pegged at tolerable levels I·Thich
",ould not threaten the vTell-being of the domest:ic economy, yet communist
expansion vms to be deterred by the threat of massive retaliation com-
bined with U,S. support for free nations capable of managing their own
internal order and j.nsuring that any act of armed aggression would appear
as just that -- the uno,mbiguous precondition for nuclear retalj.ation.
INITIAL JVJlI,ITARY RELlTCTANCE
The policy solution to this probJem in national security strategy

has been accurately and exhaustively described in recent litera,ture. 11
It need not be repeated here. The im.portant thing to note i s that the
attempt to achieve stability in RVN i·ms recognized to be a marginal
gamble to retain a small but potentially important piece in the larger
j :Lg saw puzzle 'i'Thich vms U.S. national security policy . As such, it
seemed worth the risk of a moderate outlay of assistance and advice.
Genera.1 J' . La,-rton Collins stated the case succinctly j.n his assessment
f or the National Security Council:
... There is at least an even chance that Vietnam can be saved

f rom Communism if the present programs of its govermnent are
ful l y impl emented . . .. I cannot guarantee that Vietnam will
remain free, even '\ 'lith our aid. But I kno"\-r that i-ri thout our
aid Vietnam i'I:ill surel y be l ost to Communism. ~I
The gamble consisted in making available to the GVN t hat material support
a nd advice which would enable it to assure i t s Oim viability. Much of
the military equipment "las already in RVN, the residue of eo,rlier efforts
to support the French war against the Viet Minh. The framework for mi li -
t ary advice was present, too, in the form of MAAG Indochina ",hich had
assisted (and attempted to influence -- generally uXlsuccessfully ) the
French struggl e.

..
,
The mili ta,ry establishment was not eager, hOvTever, to uJldertake

thi s effort. The JCS feared that the advisory limit i mposed by the
Geneva Accords ( 3~·2 military personnel ) was too restrictive to permit
a successful training program even if a ll administrative tasks were
p erformed by civilians and all military personnel fr eed for advisory
duties in tre,ining the army of the nevT na,tion. Even this vTould create
a situat ion, the JCS argued, in ,vh:Lch the U. S. ,vould have only very
limited influence, y et assume the responsibility for failure.]/ The
se..me resource allocations would bring a greater return, in the JCS view,
if devoted to the support of military forces in other nations. The Y
Joint Chiefs vJere agreed that the creat ion of a Vietnamese Army might not
even be adequate to the task of establj,shing a stable GVN, l et alone to
p rotecting that nation from external aggression:
The Jo:int Chiefs of Staff further consider the,t the

chaotic internal political si tuation within Vi etnam vJill
hamper the development of loyal and effective security
forc es in the support of the Diem Government and that :it is
probable that the development of such forces will not result
in poli tice,l and military stability ,vithin South Vietnam.
Unless the Vietnamese themsel ves shO'lv e,n inclination to
make the i ndividual and collective sacrifices required to
r es i st communism no anlount of external pressure e,nd assistance
can long delay a complete Communist victory in South Vietnam. 2/
Their conclusion, 11 from a military point of vie"r, 11 was that the risk vTas
not worth the gamble :
.•. LT7he Joint Chiefs of Staff cons ider the,t th e Unit ed States
should not participate in the tra ining of Vietnamese forces in
Indochina . However, if it is considered that politica l con-
siderations are overriding , the Joint Chiefs of Staff ,vould
a gree to the assignment of a tra ining mi ssion to lf1AAG, Saigon ,
with safeguards against French interference with the US
t raining effort. §}
THE DECISION TO GAMBLE ",lITH LIMITED COl'1MITMENT
Political considerations were indee d overrid ing . Reasonable f ears

of failure , claims about the i nadequacy of r esou..rces , and caveats on the
necessity for Vi etna,mese initiatives are inherently i nconcl usive argwnents
when one is speaking of a calculated gamble. Indeed, l ow value chips for
high stakes made the ge,mble all the more appealing . Secretary of State
Dulles ' position i mmedia,tely prevail ed: only rela tively small milita,ry
forc es were needed ; their principa l purpose should be to promote i nternal
stab ility rather than to guard against externa,l aggression ; nations
acting in concert (under th e umbrella of U.S. nuclear superiority )
4 TOP SECRET - S ~ns itive

wouJ.d guard against external aggression.]} On 22 October 1951~

Ambass8,dor Heath and General 0 I Daniel in Saigon were instructed to
IIcollaborate in setting in motion a crash program designed to bring
about a,n improvement in the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free
Vietnamese forces. 1I 8/ Four days later the JCS ·were directed to pre-
pare a IIlong range program for the reorganization cmd training of the
minimum number of Free Vietna.mese forces necessary for internal security.1I 88/
The earlier objections of the JCS were neither refuted nor ignored; they
were accepted tacitly as part and parcel of the policy gamble.
FROM INTERNAI,_ TO CONVEl\1TIONAT", DEFENSE
The langue,ge of this decision to train the Vietnfl,mese National Army

(VNA) , as it was then calied, would indicate t11O,t internal (rather than
external ) security would be the principal purpose of that force. That is
not the "ltray it developed, for three reasons. First, basic U.S. national
strategy (embodied in NSC 162 and NSC 5602 during the period under exam-
ination) anc1 Southeast Asia policy (NSC 5429 and NSC 5612) "ltlere both
ambiguous on a key point: to wbat degree were indigenous military forces
to be expected to defend against a conventional, IIlimited ,i'ar " attack by
a,n aggressor? The continuous, unbroken tendency throughout the 1950s
vlas to desire ever more capability for conventiona,l defense.
Second, U.S. military forces "Tere un.prepared by their own experience

to assist in the structuring of forces desie;ned for otber than conventiona,}
vrarfare. The U. S. advisory experiences that "li 'ere current in terms of
institutionalized memory vlere those of aid to Greece and Korea "li'here the
job had been one of training for technical a,nd tactical competence along
conventional lines. It was eminently natural for the U.S. advisory effort
to follo"l'l in this ident:i.fiable path. Indeed, to have expected the
advisory effort to haNe stressed IIc ounterinsurgencyll early in tbis period
would have been completely unrealistic: the term had not been invented
and its concepts had not been either developed or articulated. This
natural tendency to develop conventional forces was not only in step i'lith
the dominant trend in U. S • military strategy, j.t vms also reinforced by a
third factor, the generalized assumption that the ability to promote
internal security v-T8,S automatically provided for in tbe creation of forces
capable to promote external secuxity.
The confluence of all three factors led, in fact, to an attempt to ll

create Vietnamese forces along lines which were later called IImirror images
of conventional U.S. force structures. IVlAA.G Vietnam proposed and led in
the creation of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) in formations comprising dj.visioLS,
r egiments , battalions, and comp3,nies organi ?;ed as closely parallel to U. S.
organiz8,tion as local differences in equipment and support vTould permit. '2./
This was not, for the reasons alrea,dy indicated, an unreasonable or indefens-
ible development -- at least not until about 1959 or 1960 -- and by that
t ime efforts "I'l ere unde:nmy to transform the focus of ARVN to internal
security. These later efforts I,rere f aced vTi th the reality of a sizeable
5 TOP SECRET - Sens :\.tive

TOP SECRE'r - Sensitive
army -- conventionally organized, trained, and equipped -- which had

b een cres,ted under different circUlnsta,nces and for different purposes.
One is forced to wonder, if Vietnamese insti tut:i.ons e,re S,S difficult to
remould as their American cotLf1t erpa,rts , ,vhether the later advisory
effort was not faced from i ts inception 'i-rith an almost insurmormtable t ask.
THE EARLY MAAG Af'W THE EQUIB.\1EN'l' RECOVERY MISSIO~
The number of U.S . advisors to the fledgling Republic of Vietnam

Armed Forces (RVNAF ) were, as already indicated, l imited by the Geneva
Ac cords . Article 16 of the Accords limited military personnel in Vietnam
to the number present at the time t he Accords were signed. The mag:i.c
number \vas 3)+2. The U, S. MAAG Ch ief, General 0 ' Daniel, complained that
he needed tvlice this n1.1Jnber to train the new RVNAF and to oversee the
r edistribution of U. S, equipment 8,lready in RVN as a result of U,S.
support for the French during the war just ended. ~ The eventual out-
come , vrhen it was l earned informally tha;t the Indian Government would
instruct its representative on the ICC to interpose no objection, was
the creation of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERlI1) "rith 350
military personnel. TERlI1 served as the principal manager for the redis-
tribution of equipment , assisted i n developing RVNAF's embryonic logist ica l
support system, and provided a convenient cover for a l arger intelligence
effort. '!}j
Thi s combined administrative-advisory forc e remained stable in s ize

during the period prior to J-961. American military advisors were lo cated
physica lly at only a very few locations in RVN . They were notabl e by
t h eir absence in field units. The U.S. effort was concentrat ed in t raining
centers and in Saigon. In the former it was l argely technics,l; in the
latter i t cons isted primarily of attempts to persuade GVN to adopt measures
r ecommended by the U. S. advisory group. It vlaS essentially an attempt to
gi ve advice from the top. This does not mean that the ques tion of leverage
wa s never considered ; it was . Early in our involvement,in January 1955 ,
t he JCS l s,id out available U. S. courses of action in South Vi etnam and
urged that a de ci sion b e made at "the highest l eve l " to indicate which of
t hes e should b e follovred:
~. To continue aid to South Vi e tn8~ as currently being

developed ,vi th the cooperat ion of the French and Vietnamese .
b. To institute a unils,teral program of dir ect guidance

t o the VietnsJnese government through an " advisor" system.
Under this course of action, the amount of U.S . aid should be
dependent upon Vi etn~mese adherence to U.S, direction.
c. In the event the cours es of action in a and b above

are not sufficient to insure r etention of South Vi etnam to the

TOP SECRET - Sensitjve
Free World, to deploy self sustaining U.S. forces to South

Vietnam e:Lther unilaterally, or as a part of a SEACDT
LSoutheast Asia Con@on Defense Treaty -- a term used prior
to SEAT9..7 force.
d. To "\vithdrm'l all U. S. support from South Vietnam

and concentrate on sewing the remainder of Southea,st Asia. 12/
No such decision ,vas made. Indeed, as expla,ined in the summary a,nd

analysis, there is no reason to believe that the need for such a
decisi on was even seri.ously considered at lithe highest level. 11
MAAG Vietnam \,ms by 1960 still Clui te small in si ze, though it loomed
ever larger in imports,nce. (It was the only U. S. HAAG con@anded by a
Lieutenant General; all of the other If.tAA.G Chiefs were officers of lesser
rank.) It was essentially city-bound, training center and Saigon-
oriented, devoted to technical-tactical training and high level per-
suasion aimed at :i.nflnenc:ing RVNAF organization. The personnel limita-
tions imposed upon it resulted in highly centralized advice. But through
its efforts a,nd material support this MAAG assisted :Ln the creation of a
sizeable (1 110,000 man) conventional army and of small naval and cdr
forces of approximately 5,000 men each.
The U. S. MAAG was also conc.:erned ,.,i th the establishment and tra,ining
of paramilitary forces, but it vms not as directly concerned as i t was
wi th the cree,tion of conventional forces in ARVN. The Civil Guard ( CG )
and Self Defense Corps (SDC ) ",ere at va,rious times under the control of
t he Ministry of the Interior or directly under President Diem. In the
f ield they "l'Tere invaria,bly under the direction of the Province Chiefs.
The U. S, civilian advisors who had been called in to give assistance
"l'l i th police and internal security matters tended to favor makj.ng these
paramilitary forces less military per se and more police intelligence-
minded. MAAG tended to favor maldng them more consciously milita,ry and
t erritorially oriented in order to free ARVN for mobile, offensive opera-
tions rather than tying its forces dOlm in static defense dut:Les. 13/
By 1960, when Civil Guard training was P8,S sed to HAAG control , neither
course of action had been follo,{ed consistent l y but it ,{as highly probable
t hat MAAG I s v iews would henceforth prevail. Thus, Cluestions of l ocal
physical secu.l'ity "l'TOuld a.lmost inescapably b e decided with reference to
t he effect tbey ,wuld have on the functions of ARVN, i tself created vlith
an eye to external defense. This may be said to be an awlnmrd structure
f rom vlhich to launch an effort aimed primar i ly at internal security. It
vms, hoy/ever, the structure that existed.

NND Project Number: NND 63 3 16. By: NWD D ate: 2011
B. The Transition Period: 1959-1961
EARLY STEPS TOW~RD EMPHA_SIS ON INTE~NAL SECURITY
By the time of the Draper Cormnittee (The President's Cormnittee to

Study the United States Military Assistance Program) in 1958-1959, there
V}'as an almost imperaptible but growing U. S. mrareness of the require-
ment to promote internal stability. The committee's papers, for instance,
sought to popula,rize military civic action programs and to b_nk them to
poli tically accepta,ble precedents -- such as the U. S. Army ' s role in the
development of the American West. 111/ The very term "mirror imaging"
was coined in a Draper Cormnittee staff study. 15/ One of the committee ' s
studies questioned even the easy asswnption tllat internal security vras a
"l esser included capabj.li ty" of forces structured to promote external
security:
It is seldom that a government considers its mi litary forces

to have only a mission of maintaining internal security. Their
size, organi zation, equipment, h8,bi tual deploYlnent, and so on,
are nearly ahTays related to real or supposed requirements of
defense against external att cl\:. They are usually considered
capable of performing internal security missions as part of
this larger role. However, the requirements of the t,'10 missions
are different, if overlapping; and tailoring a military force to
the task of countering external aggression -- i.e., countering
another regular military force -- entails some sacrifice of'
capabilities to counter internal aggression. The latter requires
widespread deployment , rather than conc entration. It requires
small, mobile, lightly equipped units of the ranger or cOlmnando
type. It requires different weapons, command systems, cormnunica-
tions, l ogistics .... 16/
1.!!E McGARR EMPHASI8 ON COUN'J~ERINSURGENCY
These developments were only harbingers of a da,wning awareness, hovr-

ever, not indicative of a fundamental shift in focus which had already
occurred. The degree to which ARVN and paramilitary forces should be
consciously structured to deal with internal security rather than to pro-
tect against external invasion ,'las the subj ect of a developing debate
rather than a settled issue. It fell to Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr
to head the U. S. JVlAAG during the confusing period of transition ,'lhj ch
accompanied this debate . He did not come to Vietn8,m unaware of the issues;
a long study prepared for him by his staff at the Army ' s Command 8,nd General
Staff College (his post before coming to Saigon ) laid out in some detail
t he Viet Cong ' s strategy as adapted from the Viet Minh ' s struggle with
the French:
This form of vrarfare permitted the Viet Minh to r etain the

mobility so essential to jungle and mountain operations,
facilitated the gathering of detailed, accurate, and t:iJ.nely

I .',
i ntelligence information, kept the level of violence at a 10l'T

enough level to preclude the active intervention of another
major power, accomplished the slovT attrition of the French
"I" hile permitting the Viet M:Lnh to build the regular forces
necessary for the final battles, offset the serious logistics
p roblem by the very primitiveness of transportation methods ,
and surmounted the mEmpovTer shortage by maldng po Ii tical e,nd
economic operations insepe,rable from military operations. };])
On e could conclude from this 8-ssessment that RVI!TAF should be restruc-

tured to dee,l with this essentie,lly internal challenge to South Vietnamese
stabili ty. In a statement ,,,hich may reflect the difficulty of' reversing
instit utional thought patterns -- at the U.S, Army ' s principal doctrine
fo rmulating institution, in this inste,nce -- it llaS claimed that pacif'-
cation opere,tions vTere undesi1'8,ble because they detrD,cted from training.
The suggestion vlaS the,t tbe CG and SDC takeover of pacification should
b e expedited:
The ffiouth Vietnamese7 Army is still req,uired to engage

from time to time in major pacification (internal security )
operations, pending the development of a higher state of
operational effectiveness of the Civil Guard and the Solf-
Defense Corps. Since u nits have considerable personnel
turnover and are filled out with draftees, who have had only
basic and perhaps e,dvanced individual training b efore arr i val
in un:i.ts, th e orderly p"Ltrsuit of a progressive unit t raining
sche dule is essential to unit effectiveness. Each commitment
to e,n operational (pac ification ) miss ion, though of some
training value, in general interrupts the planned training
of participating unit s and delays arr ive,l at a sat i sfactory
state of operational r ead i ness. ~
THE COUl\1TERINSlJRGENCY PIAN FOR SOUTH VIET-NAN
General MCGarr ' s approach I'JaS to give emphasis in bis a dvic e to

r ecommendations designed to i ntegrate the activities of ARVN and the
CG/ SDC. He consistently (and p erSis t ently ) recommended the establishment
of a single chain of military command to guide all three forc es . He
also pushed for steps ,yhich would f ree ARVN from static secur:i.ty ( pacifi-
cation ) missions in f avor of offensive operat ions against the Vi et Cong.
The vehi cle for the first of McGarr ' s des ired r eforms was the " Counter-
in surgency Plan for Viet-Nam" (CIP), produced in late 1960 . J2.I
The
CIP ,'las a bluepr int for RVNAF r eorganization , not an outline of the
strategy to be pUrsued. Not u ntil September 1961 did MAAG present GVN
wi th a set. of operational pro1)osa l s in the fo rm of a "Geographically
Phs.sed National Level Operations Plan for Counter insurgency. " ?!})
The CIP marks something of 8. ha lf\.ray house b et"reen concern I"ith

external defense and internal security . Both military t asks Here recog-
nized, but int erns,l security ass"LUned primacy for the f irst time:

/' I '
,- '
Military force, in the form of increased cormmmist insur-

gency, is clearly the immediate threat to the st8,bility of
Viet-Nam tods,y. South Viet-Nam is uniq,ue in that it is the
only country in the world ,.;hich is forced to defend itself
age,inst a cOlfllmmist internal subversion action, I'lhile at the
sanle time being subj ect· to the militarily supports,ble threat of
a conventional ext-erne,l s,ttack from corn.munist North Viet-Nam.
The RVNAF. force basis is inadequate to meet both these threats.
The problem is twofold, although at present the counter-

insurgency phase is the more dangerous and jmmediate. In this
counterinsurgency fight RVNAF is on the defensive. Approxi-
mately 75% of ARVN is committed to pacification missions, about
half of these being committed to sta,tic gua,I'd and security
roles ...• The guerrilla, problem has Las a result of fragmented
lines of authori tilbecome much more serious tha,n the Civil
Guard can manage, thereby req,uiring a disproportionately large
RVNAF commitment, which has further resulted in a serious
weakening of the RVNAF capa,bility for defense against internal
or overt a tte,ck in force. g}j
This last point reflected GeneTal McGarr r s appa,I'ently very real con-
cern that ARVN vIas becoming incapable to meet interne,l (as l'lell as
external) threats posed by the VC in conventional troop formations. As
the VC becs,me stronger and formed larger regular units -- as distinct
fX'om guerrilla bands - the differences between conventional and u.ncon-
ventional we,rfare seemed to disappear. The problem, as Iv1AAG vie'\'Ted i t ,
b ecame one of gua.rding against a spectrum of dangers by means of a short
run emphasis on meeting the internal challenge in both its conventional
and unconventional ( guerrilla ) form. In this vie\·r ARVN should become
the conventional offensive and mobile defensive force, the CG should be
the static force in support of pacification efforts. The two should be
under a common chain of cor!11:.rls,nd, it vIas argued in the CIP, as should the
logistical orge.nization for their support. Such a conlllon chain of COll-
mand did not exist in 1960-1 961 :
The mill tary chain of cOriuna,nd has u sually been viols.ted

at the expense of unity of effort and command. No adeq,uate
opere.tions control or overall planning system presently
exjsts • ... The President has exercised arbitrary control of
operations , by-passing command channels of the JGS gOint
General Staff7 and often Corps and Division staff . Resources
have been fragmented to provj_ncial control. The above prac-
tices appear to have been designed to divide responsibility
i n order to guard against the possibility of a military coup
through placing too much power in the hands of a single sub-
ordinate. ~
Poor organization, then, ''las seen as the principal roadblock i n the viay

of organi zing the military and paramili te,ry forces of South Vietnam into
an effective combination. Only through a single chaj_n of command could
ARVN be freed to take the offensive, the CG be built up to cope uith
l ocal guerrillas , cmd the GV.N pJ_ace itself in a position to start devel-
oping useful intelligence a, field 'I'Thich Vias j udged to have been, thus
far, a notable faiJ_ure. ?:J.I
THE SUPFDRTING OPERATIONAl, PIAN
The Geogra,phically Phased National Plan l aid out the priority areas
fo r this coordinated effort under a single chain of command. A three
phase sequence of actions (preparat,ion, military action to clear and
secure, and combined action to establish civilian politica,l control and
consolidate intelligence and security programs ) would take place, sequen-
tially, in each of these priority areas. The process would be repeated
in expa nding spheres as successive areas became pacified. ~
Toge-[,her these hlO AmericEm-generated and proposed plans constituted

a comprehensive blueprint for GVN action to end the ins urgency . TvlO
th ings comm.on to each should be noted for the purposes of the present
inquiry. The first is the simple fa,ct tha.t each was U. S. -generated and
proposed. The proposals addressed President Diem ' s persistent f ears of a
coup by a,sking him to ignore those fears. The second point i s that neither
h ad anything to say about U. S. a,dvisors. Each was an attempt to give
advice, but neither recommended tha,t the U.S. advisory effort in RVN be
expanded in scope, size, or content.
STABILITY IN TIlE NUMBER OF U. S. ADVISORS
The number of military advisors had r emained fairly l evel throughout

this transition period (roughly, 1959 to mid-1961 ) . TERM had fin8,11y
been abolished but an approximately equal nUJnb e r of spaces was added to
MAAG Vietnam , increas i ng it from 342 to 685. 25/ The ICC a,greed that
this i ncrease was consistent 'I'Tith the limitations imposed by the Geneva
Accords.?!i/ MAAG advisors had been authorized dOi'in to r egi mental leve l
but express ly forbidd en to participate directly in conibat operations or to
go near the South Vi etna,mes e national boundary. 27/ The U. S. ha d b egun
to prov id e Special Forces t eams to GVN in a,n effort to train Vietnamese
range r companies in anti-guerrilla t act ics , but thi s was regarded as a
t empora,ry unde~taking.?:§) As l ate as November 1 961, the total U. S: mili-
t ary strength In South Vietnam 'I'TaS only about 900 personnel.?!}) DJ.s-
cus sions and arguments h ad b een underway for some time , however, with a
view tOvTard incr eaS ing U. S. involvement :l.n South Vietnam . The nature of
this debate, vThich took place l arge ly during 1961 and termina;ted in the
deci sions at the end of that y ear to establish a " limited partnership"
vlith GVN, is i mportant to an account of the U.S. advisory build-up. It
was in the shadow of oppo sing contentions about hOH to make the U.S.
~ SECRET - Sens itive

11
TOP SECRET - Sensi the
contribution most effective in hel:9:ng GVN to defeat the insurgents

that the advisory build-up 'I'laS to b-2gir-c in earnest in late 1961. These
opposing view's, in turn, were cas t &.ge.inst the situational. develop-
ments already outlined: U.S. mili:.:;:.::cy desires to make RVNAF morc effec-
tive in counterinsurgency by impro'.-::'ng the milita.ry chain of cOTIllila.nd ,
increasing the mobility 8.nd effect:",-en':!ss of ARVN, and upgrading the
CG/ SDC for the performance of paci=::'cation tasks.

---
-~-~
PART T~\TO
THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 1961-1967
A. The Kennedy Programs (1961-1963)
THE CONTEXT OF DECISIONS
By the end of 1961, the U.S. had decided to double its military
e,dvisory effort j n South Vietne,m by establishing advisory teams at the
province ( sector ) level and '\vithin ARVN ' s batte,lions. The decision to
t ake this step '\Vas one of a large number of decisions designed to "buy
time" in RVN so that GVN could mobilize its resources and s'\Ving over from
the defensive to the offensive. All of the major participa,nts e,ppear
to have agreed that the situation in RVN wa,s bad and becoming worse, that
additional U. S. actions vlere needed if South Vietnam vTaS to be saved, and
t hat the iss ue 1'n3,S of sufficient importance in terms of U.S. interest to
j ustify doing iV'hatever 'Ims necessary. The Cluest ion was vlhat should be
done, not if anything could be done. Defeat was too catastrophj c an outco~:;e
to b ear examination. Mor:eover, decisions about Vietnam in 1961 were, until
t he very end of the year, made in th e she,dow of' more pressing emergencies--
the Berlin crisis and events in Laos. ·x- It is most import ant to recognize
thi s relative l ack of centrality if one is to understand the appa,rently
i ncomplete process by 'Vlhich decis ions on Vietnam were reached. Moreover,
the .d.~mens:ions of the Vietne,mese problem vlere clear and agreed to by all.
Elus:i ve solutions had to b e sought i n t he interstices, as it were , of the
poli cyn~kers ' limited time.
It i s difficult to imagine any responsible individual or group, for

i nstance, taking exception to the litany of problems ticked off by General
Taylor in his report following his i mportant October 1961 mission to South
Vietna,m:
Lack of intelligence
ARVN's defens ive posture
Poor command and control
Poor GVN administrative procedures
Lack of initiative
GVN failure to communica te with and mobilize its people,

particula:cly the intellecturals and the young p eopl e . ;{})
-x- This period is described more fully in a volume in the pres ent series,
IV. B.l., Evolut ion of the 1;\Tar : The Kennedy Programs, 1961.

NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 2011
But various individu8,ls and groups \'lOuld stress the importance of different
ll
s hortcomings and propose quite different methods of "persuading GVN to
overcome them.
The prevalent military vievv, a.s already sugge sted in the surmnary
explanation of the ClP and the Geographically Phased P18,n, Vias that organ'-
i zat:i.onal reform Emd national planning Ivere prerequisites to effective
action. If these could be achieved, the military foresai'l a pacification
process vlhich would proceed from the provision of physical secLU'i ty in the
rural areas t hrough the esta,blishment (or reestablishment) of civilian
polit ical administr8,tion to a state of political stability. The first nut
to crack \-las that of military security. poli tica,l anal ysts, including those
of the Depa,rtment of State, emphasized the need for the Diem government to
liberalize it se l f, to attract dissident groups at least i nto a l oyal active
opposition and a,way from indj fferenc:e and disaffection. In tbi s vie,,, the
h eart of the matter vla,s essentia,lly political , rather tha,n military.
In both views, it should be noted, advocates agreed that t he GVN mus t

b e p ersuaded to take certain necessary steps. Just hoYT such persuasion Vias
to b e achieved vms a prime subject for discuss:i.on. \wo was to p ersuade whom
and in ,vhat organizations,l fre,mework 'ivas another such subject. But although
these sub j ects were bound to be discussed, neither Has the central issue --
by l ate 1961 the question of \vhether or not to send U. S. combat forces to
South Vietnam had clearly earne d that title.
The U. S. determina,tion of li'ha t steps to take Vias driven as much by

events as by arguments. By'late 1961 the cour se of events dictated that
physi cal security would take primacy over governmental lib eralizatjon , not
because the arguments for security ,,,ere inherently more persuas ive but
because of the very r eal f ear that there would b e no GVN to SEwe if the
U.S. did not do something very quickly. During the first half of 1961,
ter rorists and guerrillas had assassinated over 500 loca l officia ls and
civiliEms , kidnapped more than 1,000, and killed almost 1,5 00 RVNAF p er-
sonnel. 31/ The VC ha d gained the upper hand i n most of the countrys ide
and were drawing an increas i ngly tight cinch around Saigon.]5} Viet
Cong reg1..11ar forces v,ere nOv7 estimated to numb er 25,000 and were bein g
organi zed i nto i ncreas ingly large r egular for ma,tions. The terrorist-
guerr illa 8,pparatus h ad gro,m to embrace an estimated 17,000 . 1]./ The
operative quest ion was not ",h e ther the Diem government as it Ivas then
moving could defeat the i nsurgents but ",hether it could scwe its elf.
The deteriorating situation was one reason 'why the military security
argument quickly gained the as cendancy. Another reason 'i'TaS the military ' s
recognition that, while s ecur ity was an i mportant precondition , political,
economic, and social reforms ,',ere necessary to the realization of viability
within South Vietna,m . Thus, s ecurity was recognized as a means to a poli t-
iC8,1 end . The process outlined in .M.AAG ' s Geographica lly Phased Plan, des-
crib ed e8,rlier, gave recognition to this fact. This process would shortly
beeome kno\m as the " pa cifi cation process, " wide ly accepted throughout
important p18,ces in the U. S. Government ( specifi.cally to i n clu.de vhat is
u sually r eferred to euphemistically as "the highest level " ) and still
widely accepted 8,t this 'IH' i ting (1968 ) .

TOP SECRE'I' - Sel:.si ti ve
A PROPOSAL FOR EXTRA-BUREAUCRATIC ADVISO~S
If the deteriorating situat i on a,nd the potential breadth of the

military l s view of the pacification process both augured for at least the
short run prima,cy of security considerati.ons, that still l eft the question
of hO'IV best to enhance security and to lay the groundi·;ork for the govern-
menta.l programs which I-!ould, hopefully, begin to operate behind a geo-
graphically expanding security screen. These questions vrere addressed,
but in a rather one-sided way. An approach to U.S, advice-giving and
the organizational context in which it should proceed vras tabled a,s a
ra.dical proposal. Fj.rst the approach, then the organize,tional framework
were struck down. The U.S o decided to t2,ke an opposite advisory approacb
in a very different organizational context as much because of disa/Sree-
ment with the debe.ted proposals as because of reasoned elaboration of the
benefits to be realized from the course 'I·,hich I·18.S eventually follo\·Ted.
In the process, the difficult question of U.S. leverage got shunted off
to the side. GVN reform. was simply stated a,s an expected quid pro quo for
increased U.S. aid. What the U.S. should do if no reforms materialized
was apparently a subject too unpleasant to be considered.
The radical proposals vTere first floEl.ted in January 1961 by a 'Lmiquely

qualified professiona,l military officer serving in Secretary McNamara I s
office: Brigadier General EdvTard Lansdale. Altbough an Air Force officer,
Lansdale had worked closely in the Philippines 'I'ri th Ramon Magsaysay in the
l atter l s successful campaign against the Huk rebellion and served lat er as
h ea.d of the U. S. intelligence mission in South Vietnam in the mid-50 I S. He
kne'li President Diem well a.nd \vas trusted by the GVN l eader . He had gained
some notoriety as the real-life h ero of the pseudo-fictional be st seller,
li The Ugly American. II His views on counterinsurgency commanded attention .
Lansdale l s proposals lend themselves to surmnari:;;ation, not to compre-

hensive description. That is, he put forvra.rd a proposed attitude of mind
which should govern U. S. actions, not a progra.m jn the usual sense. The
thrust of his argument pertaining to advisors vlaS that the U. S. should
select dedicated Americans with empathy for the Vietna.mese and send them
to advise GVN "wi th sensi ti ve understandi ng and 'I'lisdom . II 31+
/ The course
of a.ction h e recommended Ivas to get su.ch men on the scene,give them total
r esponsibility to match the:Lr total cOJlunitment , and free them from the
encumbrances of the regular bureaucratic machinery (be it mili ta.ry or
c ivilian ) in order that they might operate effectively according to the
situation:
When there is an emer/Sency, the .vise thing to do i s to pick

the best people you have, people who are experienced in dealing
with this pr ecise type of emergency, and send tbem to the spot
vTith orders to remedy the situation. f'7hen you get the people
in position and free them to work, you should then ba.ck them up
i n every practical I·lay you can. The real decisions vTill be made
i n little da.ily actions in Vi etnam , not in Hashington. That I s

why the best arc needed on the spot.
Our U.S. team in Vietnam should have a hard core of experi-

enced Americans "\.Jho know and really like Asia and the Asicms,
dedicated people \-Tho are willing to risk their lives for the
ideals of freedom, and "I.Jho will try to influence and guide the
Vietnamese touards U. S. policy obj ectives with the viarm friend-
ships and affection which our close allicmce deserves. He
should break the rules of personnel assignment, if necessa ry,
to get such U.S. mi.litary and civilians to Vietnam . 35/
Not only should the U,S. depend on advisors vTho earn the trust of
their counterpe.rts , Lansdale argued , it should depend-on-them to get the
job done \-Ji thout coercion and threats. Leverage should b e the product
of persuasion and trust, not the result of control over funds arid
materiel:
. •. Many of the Vietna.mese in the courrLryside who "I. Jere right up

against the Viet Cong terror were full of patriotic spirit.
Those who seemed to be in the hardest circumstances, fighting
barefoot I,d th makeshift ,veapons, had the highest morale. They
still can lick the Viet Cong with a little help. There t s a
lesson here on our giving aid . Maybe vre should learn that our
funds cannot buy friends or a patriotic spirit by mere mated.-
alist:ic giving. Perhaps we should help those vrho help themselves,
and not have a lot of strings on that help. 36/
If the U. S. could adopt this free-,.Jheeling approach to 8.dvice, said

Lansdale, it vTould do ,vell to do it at the action level, to get down B.nd
share the risks and discomforts of the ARVN rather than to restrict its
advice to paper plans and confrontations in offices :
..• U.S. military men in Vietnam should be freed to work in

the combat areas . Our MAAG has a far greater potential than
i s now being utilized. U.S. military men are hardly in a
position to be lis tened to when they are snug in r ear area.s
and give advice to Vietnamese officers "\I'"ho have attended the
same U. S. military schools and who are now in a combat in vThich
few Americans are experienced. MAAG personnel from General
McGarr on dO"\-Tl1 expressed desire to get more into real field
work ; l et t s give them vThat they want as far as U.S. permission
is concerned and let them earn their way into positions of
gree.ter i nfluence ,'lith the Vietnamese military in the field . JJJ
BACK TO NORMAL CHANNELS
In swn, General Lansdale urged an extra-burea.ucratic , uninhibited

8.dvisory system consciously built on shared U. S. -Vietnamese goals (vali-
dated by shared experiences ) and based on mutual trust and admiration.
16 TOP SECRET - Sens itive

Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3
-l "
It w'as--he Hould be the first to e,dmit--the kind of, unstructured, unpro-

grammed, "non-organization" which was antithetical to that which the
professional military might be expected to propose and so foreign to the
typical views of the State Department, with its tra,ditional anti-oper2.tional
bias, that diplomats \-[Quld inevitably regard it as a propose,l for power
without. responsibility. Thus, one contemporary account suggests that
La,nsdale ' s approach ,'JaS eventually rej ected because of governmental inertia
and buree,ucratic in-fighting:
vmen La,nsdale returned to Washington '- after he had submitted

his report to his olm superiors - he ,'JaS suddenly summoned one
afternoon to the 1Vhite House and, much to his surprise, ushered
into a conference room vJhere the President ,vas presiding over a
mixed group of high Pentagon, State Department, and National
Securi ty Council officia,ls. To his further surprise, President
Kennedy, after commending his report, indicated that Lansda,le
would be sent ba.ck to Vietnam j n a high capacity. Kennedy ' s
declaration at the meeting obviously raised the hackles of many
officials whose agencies had been criticized by Lansdale. The
upshot ,vas that nothing further happened about Lansdale ' s appoint-
ment. It is nO,'l knovll1 that obj ections to it were raised in the
highest levels of the Kennedy administration ; in fact, there
were three,ts of resignation . In the sense that some drastic action
in Vietnam should have been taken at this time, vlhether it involved
Le,nsdale or not, this vJaS another vi tal turning point in the long
and tortuous history of America ' s Vietnamese involvement. There
was stj.ll a cha,nce to do something to save the Diem regime, depending
l argely on getting Nhu out of the country. Difficult as it would
have been to ach:ieve at this late date, Lansdale might have been
able to persl.l.ade Diem to do it, because he had remained one of the
few Americans Diem had ever trusted. More important, some feasible
ideas about how to fight a. guerrilla war might have been set i n
motion, and the miscalculation of what had always been essentially
a revolutionary situation might thereupon have been altered. ]§)
This account simply does not square vlith th e existence of several

cogent objections to Lansdale ' s proposals for "unfettered quality"--though
there most certainly vTaS a fair share of bureaucratic in-fighting as the
proposals vJere studied, expanded, and reshaped. Moreover, it compresses
the time frame lvithin v1hich Lansdale ' s tlVO major theses vJ e re struck dovll1 .
His first proposal, for selected individuals to act as advisors, i mplied
--at the very minimum--continuity of personnel selected by an extra-
b ureaucratic proc ess. Extra-bureaucratic selection vlas dead by mid-1961 ;
the issue of continuity was fina lly settled in favor of year-long tours
in December 1 962 (and has rema ined in effect since that time ). The i ssue
o f a supra-departmental organization was fought out i n mid-1 961. It
succumbed to an organizational principle with very deep roots.
17 TOP SECRET - Se~sitive

NND Project Number: NND 63 3 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
The specific form which Lansdale's supra-departmental organizationa.l

proposal advanced was that of a Presidential Agent to manage the U.S.
effort in RVN. On 12 April 1961, vIalt W. Rostow sent a memorandum to
President Kennedy I'lhich suggested, among other things, that it was i mpera-
tive to appoint a " fUlltime, first-rate back-stop ma.n in I'lashington" to
overs ee th e U.S. involvement in RVN.]2/ Lansdale was either aTtlare of
a meaning not conveyed literally by the memorandum or interpreted it to fit
his preferences. In any event, he used this springboard to propose, in a
19 April memorandum to Secreta.ry McNamara. and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric,
that the Pres:ident create an int erdepartmenta.l ta.sk force on Vietnam to
" supervise and coordinate the activities of every U.S. agency carrying
out operations ... in Vietnam to ensure success of the ffresident'iJ approvec.
plan." ~ On the follo\\'ing day Secretary McNamara., presumably after
discus sing the matter with the President, requested Gilpatricto prepare
within a vleek a report for the President, setting forth any actions
necessary to "prevent communist domination of that country. " !Qj
On 27 A.pril Secretary Gilpe.tric submitted his recommendations. Much

of the fla,vor of the earlier Lansdale pleas for 8. select, individualistic
advisory effort \'Tas missing from this product of an interdepartmental
commi ttee. The earlier recommende.tions for 8.n expanded U. S. effor t were
still there, hovlever. These included an RVNAF force incr ease of 20,000
wi th 8. corresponding increase of 100 MAAG advisors, a MAAG takeover of
the entire CG and SDC programs, the employment of U.S. advisors in fi e l d
operations , the continuation of U.S, Mission efforts to get GVN to carry
out reforms, the initiation of covert operations with CIA assistance
against lines· of cOllmmnications in Laos and North Vietnam , and a U. S.
economic t eam to h elp GVN speed up na.tional development . ~ One would
b e hard press e d to ident ify any other document which, over six months
b efore the operative deciSion, so closely foreshadovled the U. S. acti ons
that would be agreed to at the end of 1961 .
But beyond these programmatic recommendations ( hence, contrary to

Lansdale ' s initial proposals) Gilpatric recollmlended the creation of a
President i a l Ta.sk Force to provide " over-all direction, interage ncy
coordination and support " for this program of action. Gilpatric wa.s to
be Director of the Task Force; Lansdale its operating hea.d in Vietnam.
In order to appear not to fly into the face of Ambassa,dorial primacy in
Saigon the memo vl8.s forced into some rather fancy obfuscation :
The Ambassa.dor as h ee.d of the Country Team i s assigned

the authority and the r es'ponsibility to see that the Program
i s carri e d out i n the field a.nd to determine the timing of
t he actions. He is authorized to advise the Director of the
Task Force of a.ny changes which he believes should be made in
the Program .
I n carrying out his duties in the field, the operations

offic er of the Task Force will cooperate with the Ambassador
and the Country Team. ~

rCi
,-' I TOP SECRET - Sensitive
This equivocation charged directly against the mainstream of current

thought as it related to the question of integrating operations abroad.
The "Country Team" concept of the 18,te 1950 s, buttressed by a series of
f
increasingly comprehensive Executive Orders on the subject, assigned

clear primacy to the Ambassador. The State Department was not long in
asserting its claim to leadership in accordance with this prevailing
concept. On 3 May it provided a recormnended revision of Gilpatric s f
t ask force proposal in which it proposed an interdepartmental task force

under State Department leadership to coord:inate the vJ8,shington effort and
a counterpart taslt force in Saigon under Sterling J . Cottrell, then
POL.A.D to CINCPAC. 4i~/ It was this proposal which vms i ncorporated into
NSAM 52 later in May. ~
In retrospect, the lansdale-Gilpatric proposal to conduct the U.S.

participa tion in the Vietnamese I'mI' through 8, supra-departmental agency--
whether by a Presidential Task Force or by some other means--probably
never had much of a chance. The Department of Defense had too large an
opera tional role to agree to leadership of such an undertaking by 8.nyone
other than one of its own principals. (Thus, Gilpatric was acc eptable ,
but few others ,vould have been; Lansdale almost surely was not acceptable
as the operating chief in RVN. ) The State Department had 8.t stake both
the legacy of theoretic interdepartmental primacy and the oft-expressed
hope of giving this theory more meaning abroad. Indeed, it was during this
same month (May 1961) that President Kennedy sent hi s oft-quoted letter to
each American Ambass8,dor, reminding the recipient of his coordinating
duties even while reaffirming that these did not extend to supervising
operations,l milit8,ry forces. The effect in South Vi etnam, 8.S distinct
from s'ome other countries, was to preserve cIajms for independent authority
for each of the ma jor governmental departments involved. The Presidential
l etter to Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting in Saigon r ead in part :
In r egard to your person8,1 authority and r esponsibili t JT , I

shall count on you to oversee and coordinate all the activities
of the Unit ed States Government in the Repub li c of Vietnam .
You are in charge of the entire Unit ed States Diplomatic

Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its opera-
tions. ' The Mission incl.udes not onl.y the personnel of the
Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the
r epresentatives of all other Unit ed States agencies ,vhich have
programs or activities in the Republic of Vj,etnam . I sha ll give
you full support and backing in carrying out your ass i gnment .
Needless to say , the r epresent at ives of other agencies are

expected to communicate directly with the ir offices here in
Washington , and in t he event of a dec ision by you in which
they do not concur , they may ask to have the decis ion revi ewed
by a hj_gher authority in Washington.
HO,vever , it is their r espons ibility to keep you fully

informed of their views and activities and to abide by your
decis ions unless in some particular instance you and they

TOP SECRET - Se,_siti ve
are notified to the contrary.
If in your judgment individual :::~embers of the Mission are

not functioning effectively, you stould take I'Tha tever action
you feel may be required, reporting the circwllstances, of
course, to the Depa,rtment of State.
In case the departure from the ~epublic of Vietnam of

any individual member of the Missic:'l is indicated in your
judgment, I shall expect you to mak::: the decision and see
that it is carried into effect. Such instances I am confident
will be rare.
Now one "lvord abOllt your relatic,:s to the military. As

you know, the United States Diplome..-:ic His sion includes Service
Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups and other Mili-
tary components attached to the Mission. It does not, hO~lever,
include United States military forces operating in the field
,.,here such forces are under the cor;--2:_and of a United States
area military commander. The line of authority to these
forces runs from me, to the Secretc.:c'Y of Defense, to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in We,shington and to the area commander in the
field.
Although this means that the cL~ef of the American Diplo-

matic Missj.on is not in the line of military cOIDTl1and, nevertheless,
as Chief of Mission, you should wor~~ closely ,.,ith the appropriate
ar ea military commander to assure t:te full exchange of information .
If it is your opinion that activities by the United Sta,tes mili-
tary forces may adversely affect OUY over-all relations w'i th the
people or governments of the Republic of Vietnam you should
promptly discuss the matter with the military commander and, if
necessary, request a decision by higher authority . 46/
It i s reasonable to surmise that i n mid - 1961 events did not se em

pressing enough to cast aside a developed--if imperfect--concept of opera-
t ional integration in favor of an untri ed substitute arrangement. In
fact, if one wanted firm l eadership one -,,-ould have had less radical
alternatives to which to turn. To mention tl-10, Secretarial involvement
to a degree tantamount to taking cha,rge of the war (much as Secreta,ry
McNamara did in 1962) or the appointment of a,n Ambassador to RVN with
such military preeminence that he need not defer to other military judg-
ments (as, General Taylor in 1964 ) .
The decision to supervise the American effort in a more or l ess

conventional r,.,ay had a direct bearing on the nature of the advisory build-
up then being discus sed . It was highly \.mlikelJT that General Lansdale ' s
radical advisory proposals would be kindly received und er a system managed
along conventional lines. Even before the Presidential Task Force idea

was abandoned LansdaJ_e I s proposals for a select, corumi tted advisory

group he,d been reshaped by interdepar tmental committee. Instead of
1I 01d Vietnam hands ll in key spots, the discussion turned to the use of
existing organh:ations and much larger nwnbers of advisors:
Augment the WV\G with two US tr£dning comma nds

(comprised of approximately 1600 instructors each) to
enable the MAAG to establish in the II h1gh plateau ll
r egion of South Vietnam two divisional field training
areas to accelerate the U.S. training program for the
entire GVN army .••.
Deploy, as soon as possj.ble, a Special Forces Group

( approximately ~·OO U.S. military personnel ) to Nl1a Trang
in order to accelerate GVN Special Forces training. ~
Under this proposal the siz.e of HAAG Vietnam "Tould be increased from
685 to 2285, not including the Special Forces or training comma,nds
mentioned above or the 100 man increase already proposed to advise the
20,000 men "Thich were to be added to RVNAF. lj}j
After the shift to thinking in terms of existing military organiza-

tions (or, alternatively, of individua ls dravll1 as it Here by II reg,uisitions ll
in normal che.nnels) and the underste,ndable--if not inevitable--dem:i.s e of
the Gilpatric-Lansdale proposal for supra-departmental direction, U.S.
thinking about possible steps in Vietnam reme,ined firmly 'Ivi thin conventional
channels. There were subsequent attempts to reintroduce an alternative
advisory scheme and an organizational framework compatibl e with it but
these appear to have not be en seriously considere d.
President Kennedy did not p ermit the Gilpatric Task Force recommenda-
tions to commit him to action. Rather, he us e d them in an attempt to
demonstrate th e U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The proof of this contention
is in NSAM 52, which records the President I s decisions. Only about lLf
p ersonnel were to b e assigned, for instance, j n U.S . Army civic action
mobile training teams to assj.st ARVN with health, welfare, and public
works proj ects . Although it "las decid ed to deploy the Specie,l Forces
group of L,OO men to Tourane fJ5a Nani/, this was in support of a CIA-
directed effort which could be kept l argely covert. Increased aerial
surveillance assistance required only 6 u. S. personnel. The establish-
ment of a Combe,t Development and Test Center in RVN r equired only 4
addi tiona l U. S. personnel. 49/ The pOint is not hO'\v much was done but,
in retro spect, hOH firmly the probable lines of f uture actions had been
drawn as a result of what it had been agreed not to do.
21 TOP SEC RE '1' - Sensibve

PlANNING BEGINS IN EARNEST
'J'he President did, however, issue several "hunting licenses. "

The Defense Department vTas directed to examine fully (under the
guidance of the State Department ' s Director of the continuing Task
Force on Vietnam ) " the size and composition of forces vlhich ,vould be
desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U.S . forces to
Vietnam. " 50 / The Ambassador was authorized to sound out Diem on
a bila tera,1 defense treaty . 51/ President Kennedy also apparently
decided to feel out Diem ' s reaction on the subject of U.S. combat
troops in Vietnam. Vice President Johnson left a,lmost immediately
to visit South Vietnam and other Asian nations . He ,'TaS empowered
to bring up the question of troops a,s vlell as the treaty.
But discussions are one thing; firm commitments are quite a·nother.
The range of alternatives that President Kennedy was ,villing to consider
seems clear. What he was willing to do vTaS quite another matter:-D:O.IeSs
he vTas most unlike other poli ticicms and unless the many personal accounts
of his style are completely erroneous he ,vas willing to do \vhat he believed
h e had to do -- and events in mid-l96l did not force action even though
the"drill" that the Admin:i.stration went through was i nstrumental in
defining the probable responses when events did force action.
As it quickly turned out, P'.cesident Diem vTanted neither U. S. troops

nor a, treaty at tha,t time. He told Vice President Johnson that h e wa,nted
troops only in the event of overt invasion and sho"led no interest in a
treaty. 52/ Nevertheless , the Vice President, upon his return, ,vas trenchant
i n his observations that the time for deeds to replace vTords was fast
approaching if the U.S. was to make its declared commitment cred j.ble :
Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the

United States. It di d not -- in my j udgment _.- r estore
any confidence already lost. The leaders vlere as explicit ,
as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it clear
that deeds must follow words -- soon .
We didn't buy time we were given it.
If these men I saw at your request vlere bankers, I vTOuld

know -- without bothering to ask -- that there would be no
furth er extensions on my not e . '2J./
Diem may not have been quite so disinterested in U.S. troops as he
appea,red to be. NSAM 52 of 11 May had discussed, inconclusively, the
proposed buildup of RVNAF from 170,000 to 200,000 in ord er to create two
new divisions to help seal the Laotian border. When President Diem
responded ( on 9 June) to Vice President Johnson ' s i nvitation to prepare
a set of proposals on South Vietna,m ' s mi l itary needs , h e recommended a
quantum jump in strength to 270 , 000 and suggested a substantial increas e
in the US MAAG , perhaps even tn the form of U.S. units :

NND Project Number: NND 63 3 16. By: NWD D ate: 2011
To accomplish this 100,000 man expansion Labove the strength

recommended in the CIP, i·rhich vms 20,000 above the existing
strength? of our military forces, which is perfectly feasible
from a manpower vie\vpoint, will require a great intensifi cation
of our training programs in order to produce, in the minimum of
time, those qualified cOY!lba t l eaders and technical specialists
needed to fill the ne"l'T lU1i ts and to provide to them the technical
and logistical support required to insure their complete effec -
tiveness. For this purpose a ~onsiderable expansion of,thE;.
United States Military Advisory Group is an essential r equire-
ment. Such an expEmsion, in the form of selected elements of
the American Armed Forces to establjsh training centers for
the Vietnamese Armed Fo'('ces, would serve the dual purpose of
providing an expression of the United States ' determination
to halt the tide of comr..'J.nist aggression and of preparing
our forces in the minimm,1J. of time. 54/
The respons e to this l etter is not part of the available record. No

doubt the initial reaction Has one of surprise. The U.S. VTas not accus-
t omed to GVN initiatives; i t seldom sought them. "We have not become
accustomed to being asked for our ovm views on our needs, " Diem remarked
in his letter to Kennedy. 55/ But Diem ' s proposa l did certa,inly strike
one appealing chord: the j oint benefits of training coupled to demonstra,ted
commitment through the deplo~-ment of existing troop units. As the situ-
ation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate throughout the summer and
early fall the issue of U.S. military advice continued to be addressed
i n terms of U.S. units. These could, of course, do even more than had
b een suggested by PresIdent Diem: they could fight as units. Diem ' s
generally consistent position, however, continued to be that he would
accept U.S. combat forces, but only to train GVN forces. He had se,id
as much to Vice President Johnson:
General McGarr, vTho was also present at t h i s discussion

ffietween Johnson and DieEi7 reported that \vhi l e Pres i dent Diem
woul d not want U.S. combat forces for the purpose of f i ghting
Communists in South Vietnam , he ,oTQuld accept deplo;yment of U. S.
c ombat . forces as trainers for the Vietnamese f orces at any time. 2!iJ
GVN ASKS FOR ADDITIONAL U.S. ASSISTANCE
By October the situation within South Vietnam had b ecome sufficiently

grim for President Diem to r eve rse his earl ier sentiments and to ask for
a b ilateral defense treaty "\'Tith the U,S. 21/
His new willingness , coupled
with the deteriorating situation, kicked off a new series of proposals
within the U,S. Government. I'Talt RostovT proposed that t he U,S . place an
i nternationalized force of about 25,000 men into RVN to perform a border
sealing mission. The JCS respond e d "\vi th e, counter proposal emphasizing Laos
and calling for the deployment of a sizea,ble ( initially 20 , 000 ) U. S o
contingent to the central highlands. :2!i/
Another proposal blended elements

NND Project Number : NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 2011
I r
TOP SEC~K:: - Ssnsitive
of both the JCS and Rostow p8.pers. 59/ A Special Na tiona.l Intelligence
Estimate i'leighcd in with a hard. lc:~~ e.:' this rash of proposals. §!}j
The President's react ion, on 11 Oc:ober, ,·ms to decide to send General
Taylor on a mission to South Vietr.e.:'l to examine several alterne.tive
courses of action:
( a) The plan for militar:,' intervention discussed at this

morning ' s meeting on tlle basi.:: of the Vietnam task force paper
entitled !! Concept for Interve;'.tic'l in Vietnam!!;
(b) An alternative plc.n :'01' stationing in Viet-l1am felver

U. S. combat forces than thOSe called for 1..mder the plan referred
to in (a) above and with a mc~~ li mite d objective than deal:i. ng
with the Viet Cong; in other ',·,'ords, such a sma.ll force would
probable go in at Tour&.ne [j5a :Tan.i! and possibly anothe r southern
port principally for the p·,lrp::.se of establishing aU. S. !!presence !!
in Vietnam;
( c) Other alternatives ie. lieu of putting any U.S. combat

forces in Vietnam, i.e. stepp~ng up U.S. assistance and training
of Vietnam'units, furnishing c::: more U.S. equipment, particularly
helicopters and other ligrlt a~rcraft, trucks and other ground
transport, etc. 61/
THE TAYLOR MISSION TO SAIGOn
This range of alterna.tives sv.~ges~s, even vdthout !!20/20 hindsight, !I

tha t if something was going to be :::one, and if the President VTere to decide
not to send U.S. combat lmits to V~etna.m, there \oJ'Ould b e an advisory build-
up of some kind almost by defau .t. Thjs is close enough to what happened
to warrant the risk of oversimpliLcation. It does not do justice to thE:
Taylor Report, of course, but Tayler ' s mission and his reports have been
covered fully in another study in :he present series.* For their impact
on the advisory effort, and to place this in perspective, it is sufficient
to describe only a few salient fec.:ures . First, the Viet Cong were pur-
suing, in Taylor ' s appraisal, c. po2.i tical-mili tary stra.tegy aimed at
overthrowing Diem: and opening the ',·;ay to unificaU.on of Vietnam on Hanoi ' s
t erms. Military action by the ins·-.:.rgents was aimed at this objective
r ather than at a complete military victory :
The military strategy bei"g pursued is, evidently, to

pin down the ARVN on defer..sive missions ; to create a pervD.sive
sense of insecurity a.nd frustration by hi t-8.nd-run raids on
self-defense corps a.nd militie. fC.cfJ units ... and to dramatize
t he inability of the GVN to gcvern or to build ....
Despi te the considerable 0lelTilla capabilities of the

Viet-Cong, Communist strategy no\'~ appears, on balance , to
-l(. Volume IV. B. , Evolution of the ~'~e.r: Kennedy PrograD~ and Co~i tments ,
1961 (TS).

TOP SECRE'!, - Sensi ti ve
aim at an essenUally political denouement rather than the

total military capture of the country, as in the case of
Mao ' s campaign in China ..•. The enemy objective seems to be
to produce a political crisis by a combin8,tion of mil:L ta,ry and
non-mili tary means out of which ,vould come a South Vietnamese
Souvanna Phouma, "Tilling to contemplate unifica,tion on terms
acceptable to Hanoi, :Lncluding disengagement from the U. S. §Y
In order for the Diem government to defeat this insurgency, General

Taylor reasoned, the Saigon regime must reform itself. It had allm·red
two vicious circles to develop vlhich vitiated its effectiveness. In the
first, poor military intelligence resulted in a defensive military posture
which put most of the forces under provincial control. This, in turn,
meant that reserves could not be expeditiously employed. The resultant
high losses in unsuccessful defensive battles further dried up the sources
of intellj.gence and completed the circle. The second vicious circle was
attributable to Diem ' s instinctive attempts to centralize pow'er in his
Ol'ln hands vTh:i.le fragmenting it beneath him. His excessive mistrust of
cri ticj.sm and fears of a coup caused large elements of society to stand
aside from the struggle while the province chiefs and generals were forced
into frustrating struggles, further increasing Diem ' s fears and his
inclination to fractionalize authority. The task, then, was to strengthen
Diem while , at the same time, inducing him to reform so as to brea,k both
of these vicious circles.
In order to strengthen Diem \vi th aU. S. military presence--very much

along the lines of the smaller US deployment discussed at the NSC meeting
prior to his trip--Taylor recommended the deployment to South Vi etnam of
a task force of 6-8,000 troops under the guise of flood relief vlOrk . This
task force, primarily logistical, ,vould necessarily become involved i n
some defensive operation and sustai n some casualties, but its deployment
n eed not commit the U.S. to a land war on the Asian mainland :
As the task is a specific one, we can extricate our

troops when it is done if we so desire . Alternatively, we
can phase them into other activities if we wish to r emain
longer ....
Needless to say, this kind of task force ,viII exercise

little direct influence on the campaign against the VC. It
will, however, give a much needed shot in the arm to national
morale, particularly if combined with other actions shovring
that a more effective working relationship in the common
cause has been established betw'een the GVN and the U. s. f:.!!J
Taylor had already received President Diem ' s assura,nces that he favored
the deployment of U. S. forces for this pm·pose. §J}
In conjunction vlith this U.S. troop deployment, Taylor argued that

t he U. S. should initiate increased assistance to GVN in a ne'\v rela,tionship:

Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Secti o n 3.3
A shift {Should occui! in the American relation to the

Vietnamese effort from advice to l:i.mited partnership. The
present character and scale of the war i n South Vietnam
decree only that the Vietnamese can defeat the Viet-Cong ;
but at all l evels Americans must, as friends and partners--
not as arms-length advisors--sho'I';' them hOv7 the job might be
done--not tell them or do it for them. §§}
General 1'aylor was most explicit that the purpose of the proposed
troop deployments and the new "limit ed partnership" "las to buy time for
the Vietnamese so that they could marshall their considerable resources
and assume the offensive against the VC. As mentioned above , this ,vould
r equire i nterns,l reform in GVN. The limited partnership would contri-
bute to b oth of these interacting objectives:
The pr esent war cannot be won by direct US action; it must

b e won by the Vietn8,mese. But there is 0, general conviction
among us that th e Viennamese performance i n every doma in can
b e substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work
side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems. Mor e-
over , there is evidence that Diem is, in principle , prepared
for this st ep, a nd that most--not all--elements in his establish-
ment O.re e8,ger ly almi ting it. §])
THE KEJ\TIIJEDY DECISIONS: NSAM 111
It is us eful to approach the effect of General Taylor ' s mission on

the advisory effort from the simple r ecollection of w'hat Pr es ident Kennedy
decided not to do. He dec ided not to deploy U.S, combat forces to South
Vietnam . This meant -- given the U.S. assessment of the i mportance of
RVN and the felt necessity to do something -- that the expansion of U.S.
assistance was a foregone . conclusion. This was the general course of
action that would be followed 8,S the ineluctable result of having decided
not to do something else "Thich was more dramatic , involved more risk,
and Ivas more cont entious.
Given the decision not to send troop units , then , the general thrusts
of U. S. 8,ctions were determined - - but the specifics Ivere not. Just how
did Taylor ' s "limited partnership, " for instance, propose to influence
GVN ' s attitudes and organization, to develop initiative matched by compe-
tence, and to insure that the Vi etnamese w'ould assume successfully the
responsibility for winning the struggl e which it was s aid only they could
win? How "Tas this expanded U. S. effort to be organi zed? From whence
..Tould come the new junior partner s of the firm? vma t would be the ir
preparation , their instructions, their duties?
The fir s t of these tl"'o groups of questions is more easily answered

than the second ; the anS"lver to ne ither of them is retrospectively very

(,, '{I
satisfying in terms of suggesting that the U.S. entered into its expanded
effort at the beginning of 1962 with its eyes ,-ride open and fully avrare
of just what it 'vas doing. The available record indicates that the U.S.
hopefully assumed that ma,terial aid and good intentions vTould be adequate
to the task, tha t a, la,rger U,S. presence would spur the Vietnamese to
effective action without incurring the stigma of a U.S. "takeover, " and
that the increa,se in assista,nee ,-rould be - - in and of itself -- accepted
as an adequate quid pro quo for the desired reforms within GVN.
-----
GVN orgcmizationa l reform vTOuld be realized, NASM 111 suggested, by
getting Diem to agree to clean up his lines of authority in excha,nge for
the U.S. commitment to the limited partnership. One section of the docu-
ment is a list of approved U.S. actions; another sets forth the expected
improvements to be accomplished by GVN. 68/ Ambassador Noltin~ was
instructed "Lo use the sUbstance of thesedecisions in talks to secure
Diem ' s approval. He found Diem despondent that the U.S. asked so much in
r eturn for so little, played into the hands of those "Tho claimed undue
American infringement upon Vi etnamese sovereignty, and placed him in a
posi tion where he feared even to make kno"lm to his own cabinet the Ameri-
can expectat:lons. 69/ Unless the U.S. Vlere to suspend its increased aid,
and at the very t:ilne it Ivas just gearing up to provide it, Diem had made
it clear at the beginning that he would govern South Vietnam in his way
and that the U.S. had no choice but to support him wholeheartedly, get out;
or find an acceptable alternative to him. The U.S., in turn, had refused
to consider "Lhe last two of these alternatives. It was stuck ,-rith sup-
porting him, at l east for the time being.
WORKING OUT THE BASIS FOR U.S. ADVICE
But the U.S. approach was only partially framed to secure Diem ' s
acc eptance. There was a parallel suggestion that the existence of U,S.
advisors in the field, working hand-in-hand in a counterpart relationship
with Vietnamese, would reform GVN from the bottom up. This line of policy
was neither spelled out in detail nor thought out in terms of operationa l
i mplications, risks, and costs . But it clearly existed :
Through this working association at all l evels , the U.S.

must bring about de fa,cto changes i n Diem ' s method of admin-
i stration and seek:to bring all elements of the Vietnamese
GoverlTInent closer to the Vietnamese people -- thus helping
break the vicious political circle.
By concurrent actions in the fields of intelligence ,

command and control, mobility , and training, the U. S. must
bring a,bout a situation \'There an effective r eserve is
mObilized and brought to bear offensively on clearly estab-
lished and productive offensive t argets -- thus helping
27 TOP SECRET Sensitive

br eal~ the vicious military circle ....
Behind this concept of a strategy to turn the tide and

to assume the offensive lies a general proposition: v1hen an
interacting process is yielding a degenerative situation, the
w'isest course of act:ion is to create a £osi tj ve thrust a,t as
many: points as are accessibl e . 707
Thus, the U.S. addressed the critical l everage i ssue as the expected
product of its mm Vlillingness to incre8,se it s participation i n the
counterinsurgency effort. It did so, moreover, vlithout any conscious
examination of the question beyond stating it s expectations. There was
no plan to make the provision of additional assistance contingent upon
GVN actions, only a statement that GVN e,ctions vrere expected. There
was no willingness, in fact, to consider the conscious exercise of l everage;
the situation vla,S too critical, the avail El,bl e time too short , the i ssue
too i mportant.
The effect of this avoidance of hard choices -- for good and under-
standable reasons, but avoidance nonetheless -- was to place a very l arge
burden on the b enefits to be realized by a,n expansion of the advj.sory
effort. The l anguage of General Taylor I S report is r eminiscent of Le,nsdale I 13
earli er proposa,ls for an unstructured, flexible advisory effort comprising
totally committed , carefully sel ected individuals Ivho v10uld earn the respect
and cooperation of the Vi etnamese . Lo,nsdale had r enevred these proposals
at the time the Taylor Report uas prepared . J.}) But when it vms suggested
t o the GVN tha t the U.S. would erpect to share in decisions the Vietnamese
reaction l ed the U. S. almost inunediately to modify this expectation. Th e
origina l communication on the subject to Ambassador Nolting stated that
" . .. we would expect to share in the dec ision-making process in the p olitical,
economic and military fields as they affected th e s ecurity si tua,tion" as
compared to t he earlier arrangement of "act i ng in an advisory ca,paci ty
onl y . II 72/ By early Decemb er insistence on this point vlaS quickly dropped
i n f avor of a vie"iv which suggested that close collaborat ion would produce
automatic unanimity:
What we have in mind is that, in operations directly

r elated to the security situation , pa rtnership \vill be so
close that one party Ivill not t a,ke decisions or actions
affecting the other vTl thout full and frank prior consulta-
~ions . . . .'JJ/
Unless such exchanges invariably r esulted in unanimity one of the partn ers
would have to give "ivay to the other or inactivity would r esult. What
line to follow if this o ccurr ed seems not to have been examined. This
simply Vlould not happen.
The " close partnershi p " envisaged by General Taylor -- and endorsed
by President Kennedy -- suggested something a,kin to the " total commitment "
ivhich General Lansdale had earlier urged as one criterion in selecting

TOP SECRE'I.' - Sens i ti ve
advisors for South Vietnam. ~[,his, in turn, implied at the very mlnl-
mun a period of long exposure to the operational problem (and personal-
ities) with which these advisors would deal. In the event, i t vTaS
decided to expand both the military a.nd sector (provincial military )
advisory efforts ,'li thout any such long term exposure. These questions
were settled in detail when Secretary McNamara met in mid-January 1962 at
Honolulu Hith the principal managers of the U.S. effort. It was decided
to establish battalion level military advisory teams within ARVN, each
to consist of either 5 (infantry batta1:Lon) or 3 (artillery battalion)
personnel. Each province (sector) ,\Tould receive 3 u. S. advisors, one
officer and 2 enlisted intelligence specialists. The Civil Guard would
be tra.ined in a series of 6 training centers by 120 advisors (20 in ea,ch
center) plus 12 mobile teams of 3 men each. The SDC I'lould be trained in
30 centers. 74/ Secretary McNamara made it clear that he wanted these
deployments completed as quickly as possible. He suggested that if an
ARVN unit was not prepared to receive :Lts advisors the designated indiv-
iduals be sent to RVN a,nd placed temporarily with another unit to gain
experience. 75/ He agreed that temporary duty assignments to Vietnam
vlere generally undesirable and asked the JCS to address the question of
optimum tour length for advisors. 76/
The length of time a military member spent in Vietnam at that time

varied slightly from service to service, according to "Thether or not
dependents accompanied the serviceman and whether he served i n Saigon or
in some other part of the country. In October 1961 it was allegedly
decided at OSD level -- without consulting the serv:Lces -- to make the
tour of duty 30 months i'li th dependents and 18 without dependents rather
than the 24 and 12 month tours that were then typical. 77/ The effect
of this decision \-Tould ha.ve been to increase the field advisors ' tours of
duty from one year to one and a half years. Each of the assignment
branches vii thin the Army opposed this change as one which vlOuld be
inequitable unless reflected in changed tour l ength for other tl unaccom-
panied tl (by dependent ) tours. The order was not put i nto effect. Thus,
there was some background against l'lhich to reexamine the time i'lhich
advisors ( among others ) should spend in RVN. The deci sion -- again
based on considerations of equity :l.n "hardship" assignments, health, and
x
re sultant morale i ssues -- was to retain the one year tour in the field'- -
U. S. EXPECTATIONS: THE BENEFITS FROM MORE AnVI SORS
To sum up the decision to expand the advisory effort to battalion

and province level, it was one reached ,-rithout extended study or debate .
There l'las neither opposition to it nor any comprehensive explication of
* It has remained basically unchanged, it should be noted, until the

pres ent. An unstructm"ed program of voluntary 6 month eArtensions was
inaugurated throughout Vietnam in 1 967, a voluntary extension program
b egun for tl selected officers " i n key positions in the same year , and
a small program initiated in 1968 by ,'lhich selected Province Advisors
would agree to serve tw'o years in Vi etnam, then receive a.lmost one'
year ' s training prior to deployment . No officers have departed the
U. S. under this l ast program as of the pre sent I'Triting (mid -1968 ).

TOP SECRET .- Sensitive
what vTould be involved and the benefits to b e expected. Thi s i'TO,S due i n
l arge pa,rt to the fact that it was a decision made almost offhandedly i n
the shadow' of a larger issue, the deployment of U. S. combat forces t o RVN .
When it was decided not to send the combat forces it Ivas a foregone con-
clusion that more advisors i'Tould be sent. This was consistent with the
U.S. desire in l ate 1961 to demonstrate it s commitment to South Vietnam
and apparently compatible vri th the oft-expressed belief that only the
South Vietnamese could bring their struggle to a sa,tisfactory conclus:Lol1.
But the dec:Lsion to expcmd the adviso:cy e ffort e:ttempted, at the

SCl,me t ime , to finesse the que stion of leverage. GVN was informed tha,t the
U.S. expected certain reform measures to be adopte d i n exchange for increased
U.S. assistance. I t received no clear signals about \vithholding U.S. help
if these actions i'Tere not taken. The U.S. had, in fact, made no decisions
along this line ; it had avoided addressing the iss ue because of conflicting
desires to act forcefully, yet to Ewoid Americanizing t he vTa,r . Thus, the
U.S. did not knoH i'The;t it would do if GVN f a iled to respond as it W8,S hoped
that it would. In this sense t he U.S . advisors became potential pawns i n
a l everage game of uncertain intensity with no set rules. This de f acto
po sition was i n continuous potential conflict Ivith the expressed hope that
a grea,ter U.S, presence i'lOuld l ead -- by exampl e , p ersuasion, and mutual
interest -- to incr eased effectiveness both within ARVN and i n the politi cal
administration of the provinces governed by U.S. advised ARVN officers.
Not only did the Kennedy Administration decide to enter in General

Taylor ' s !!limited partnership!! without a careful examination of the
relationships being established, it a lso apparently did not state or
debate precisely i'lhat b ene fits I'Tere expected as a r esult of an increased
advisory effort. There was, it appee,rs, a generalized and unchallenged
assumption that more Americans in more places addres s ing Vietnamese training
and operat ions could not but have em overall beneficial effect. The avail-
able re cord reflects no explicit discussion of expected benefits. v-ll1i1e
oral discussions must ha ve addressed this point at some time, it seems most
l ikely that policy~~ke rs agreed t acitly on three overlapping categories
of expectations -- each susc ept ible to varying interpre t e,tions and degre es
of relative i mportance e,nd emphasis -- vThich >'Tere neither clearly stated
nor critica,lly examined.
The first, and most obvious, "Tas the expectation that a,n increas ed
U. S. military pre s ence with tactical units and a,t training centers would
l ead to improved technical-tactica l competence within ARVN . The assumption
which underlay this expe ctation vIas that the teaching of bas ic milita,ry
skills "Tas prob ably a suffici.ent (rather than mere l y ne cessary ) condition
to enable ARVl'-T to b egin to operate more effectively - - and more energetically
and aggress ively. Earlier experience i n Greece and Korea would have seemed
to valida,te this expectat ion vri thin rea sonable l imits.
Second, U,S. policymakers probably expected the i ncreased military

e,dvisory effort to result in a more effective informational !!network. !! .
30 TOP SECRET - Sens i tive

TOP SECRE~1.' - Sensitive
It must have seemed reasone,ble to expect that an increased but diffuse

U.S . presence would not only enhance information on VC actions and
probable plans but a l so improve U. S. knowledge of AP:TN plans and per-
fo rmance.
Finally -- e,nd most difficult to pinpoint i n terms of "That policy-

maker or policymaking group emphasized which aspects -- the U.S. expected
to gain additional influence from an increased advisory effort. General
Tayl or viewed this as the natural product of individuals with parallel
interests working hand-in-glove in the field (as distinct from large
h eadquarters ) . This woul d enable them to escape the petty differences
which grow up in the absence of opere,tional responsibility and permit
the U S. advisors to 1I1ead by examplell even though they "lould not be
0
te chnically empowered to l ead .
Other expecte,tions of increased U. S. inf l uence could take a variety

of forms . I mproved information, for i nstance, in a hierarchically ordered
U.S , advisory system, would permit the U,S. to push more effect i vely any
line of endeavor 'which it wished GVN to adopt . This potentia l for improved
" se,lesmanship" was not unrelated to an incree,sed potent ial for coercive
influence. What the U.S . would give i n material support it mi ght a l so
withhold selectively. Influence need not be dependent upon example alone.
None of these expectations were , however, articulate d fully or spelled

out in terms \'lhich 1vould provide operational guidelines for the new U. S.
advisors who Ivere being deployed to SVN. The expectations of benefits were
i mplicit and generalized. The potential existed for a comprehensive , co-
ordinated U.S. approach to advising but the potential was not the reality.
IMP]~EMENTING THE FIRST BUILD-UP
The decision just examined to increase the U.S. advisory effort was
preceded by a series of marginal increases in the U. S. m:Lli te,ry strength
in Vi etnam. (Actual " in- country" strengths are available for only a fevT
months during the earl y build-up period so it will fr equentl y be necessary
to use authorization figur es and to r ealize t hat newly authorized spaces
were generally not filled until some time had passed after their establish-
ment. ) President ial decisions in April and May 1961, t aken in the l ight
of a central concern with Lcws rather than Vietnam, increased the authorized
si ze of 1VlAAG Vietnam from 685 to 785. The 100-man increas e vTaS divided
almost equally b etween t e chnical advisors and advisors for ARVN ' s tactical
tre,ining centers . 78/ In Octob er 1961 the authorized strength '\vas
increased a,gain, to972 , of vThich 948 spaces were for U. S. Army personne l;
603 of these 948 spaces were act ually filled by the end of November . 12/

'/.~ TOP SECRET - Sensitive
The increases in advisory strength vlhich reflected the NSAl'!! III

decisions ",ere authorized in December 1961 and January 1962. By the
end of 1961 .MA..A_G ' s authorized strength had been more than doubled, to
2067. This number 'Iva,s increased age.in in Janua,ry to more than 3000.
Included in these increa,ses were the ne"r dimensions of U. S. advice:
battalion advisors, province advisors, and an additional 500 Special
Forces advisors (making a nevT total of 805 in the Special Forces program
under CIA control). §g/
It has already been noted that Secretary McNamara gave forceful

impetl1s tomanl1ing these newly crea,ted positions in the shortest possible
time. They were, indeed, filled quickly. By April 1962 the total number
of Army field advisory personnel in RVN exceeded the authorized number.
By this time, too, the authorized total for all services had been stabilized
at about 3l~00. This total "TaS reduced in November to 3150, then remained
essentially constant until a, new rO\md of increases vTas inaugurated in
mid-196~. §l) Thus, the build-up e,ssociated with the Taylor mission
consisted of a fourfold increase in U. S. advisory presence (e, much larger
i ncrease if one counts U. S. support units ) . After the build-up was
completed, in the spring of 1962, the number of advisors rer~.ined stable
until me,ny months after the f all of the Diem govelonment.
While the total number of e,dvisors remained fairly constant, ho\vever,

shifts occurred in the distribution of advisor;y personnel. From the
completion of the build -up , for instcmce, until the coup vlhich overthrew
Diem, the number of field advisors e,t corps and division l evel increased
severe,lfold and the number of province advisors doubled "rhile other field
advisory strengths remained about the same. These developr.,ents are shown
in dete,i1 in the te,bular summa,ry at the end of this study and summarized
i n the following table:
Selected Field Advisors, 6:Eril 1962 and November 1963 8cJ

Activity Advised ~ri l 1962 November 1963
Corps 63 380
Divisions 162 446
Regiments 15 0 134
Battalions 366 ~17
Provinces 117 235
Schools & Training Centers 212 201
CG/ SDC 281 215

---
Total 1351 2028
/"

NND P roject Number : NND 633 16, B y: NWD D ate: 2011
TOP SECRE~.' Sensitive
THE U.S. VIh~: 1962 - 1963

Six months after Diem fell the U.S. would. conclude that these
advisory levels "Tere inadequate, but during the Diem area the predom-
inant officia,l attitude w·as one of susta.ined optimism. The war was
being won, it vTaS maintained, by adherence to the newly articulated
theory of counterinsurgency. The U,S. even made tentat ive plans to
begin reducing the American presence in VietnaJJ1. By the time the U.S.
began seriously to consider attempts to exercise leverage against the
Ngo family's conduct of affair s Diem ! s regime "lvas already Ivell down the
road to its eventual overthroVT.
1'he Stra,tegie Hamlet Program Has the principa,l operationa,l vehicle

by Ivhich the recently a,rticulo,ted theory of counterinsurgency was to be
translated into real:Lty. In general, the plan vTas to begin by providing
to the rural populace a degree of security sufficient to serve as a pre-
condition for further military and political action. In the military
field the pea,sants ! increased secur'i ty 'vas to be the wedge by which more
effective intelligence gathering could take pla,ce. The rural population
could not be expected to inform on VC vlhereabouts , it VTaS rea,soned, unless
it was safe from reta.liatory acts by the insurgents. poli tica.l action to
promote identification betvTeen the central government and the rural popu-
lation was also to take place in the shadOlv of these improved physical
secu.ri ty arrangements. Security vTas viewed, then, as the precondition to
the military and political gains at "Thieh General Taylor ! s mission had
aimed its recommendations.
The evolution cmd demise of the Strategic Hamlet Program is examined

in a,nother volume of the present series. * It is pertinent to the present
study, hOvTever, to note the points of stress in this program as they
pertaj_ned to RVNA:F'. Most of the new American advisory effort was directed
to improving ARVN, in its equipment and mobility capability and in its
aggressiveness . The central U. S. expecta,tion was tha,t a greater capability
to move quickly could be combined ,{ith improved leadership so that ARVN
could, on one hand, be capable of responding quickly and in force wherever
and whenever the VC chose to concentrate for loca l super iority and, on
t he other, be made aggressive enough to beat the Viet Cong at their own
game -- to !! take the night away!! from the VC and to use guerrilla techniques
to hunt down and defeat the insurgents in their olm bailiwicks .
The realization of these expectations wa.s dependent upon several

developments , each of vIhich had to occur if ARVN was to become ca,pable
of turning the~e in the insurgent . battle. First, the CG and SDC had
t o b ecome sufficiently effective to permit ARVN to be used as a mobile
reserve for protective purposes rather tha n as part of the static pro-
tection force. Second, ARVN had to be given adequate capab ility to move
quickly, "Thether in reacting or in seizing the initiative . Finally, both
ARVN ! s leaders e,nd the political leaders to whom they Here responsible
had to accept and put into operat ional practice a spirit of aggressiveness
to take advantage of the existing static defenses and the newly-gained
mobility .
-)(- Volume IV . B. Evolution of the War: The Stre.tegic HE;mlet Program, 1961-
1963 (l'S ).
33 -TOP SECRET - Sensitive
I I r
I f
THE ACTUALITY: 1962 - 1963.
What happened during 1962 - 1963 is th8,t only the second of these
developments actually occurred to any significant degree. The U.S.
provided helicopter companies for rapid ta,ctical transport, small arms
and automatic weapons for increased firepol'Tel', and tactical air and
artillery support to assure ARVN firepower superiority over the insurgents.
There were complaints -- as there have been ever since -- that individual
weapons Ivere too heavy for the Vietnamese , that one helicopter company
for each Corps area \\Tas too little, e,nd that supporting air and artillery
were an inducement to rely on indiscriminate firepower as a substitute
for aggressiveness. But the basic tools were provided.
The other develop!Eents did not take place. Training of the CG a,nd SDC
was speeded up at Secretary MCNamara ' s insistence in order to get a more
effective pl"otective force quickly in being. Even by cutting the course
of instruction in half it req"l).ired the remainder of CY 1962 to give a
b e,sic familiarization course to even the hulk of the CG ,,!.no. SDC. GVN vlas
not eager to put weapons into SDC hands, fe a:dng that the \\Tea pons might
..dnd up in the possession of the VC. '§]/ In the event, both forces emerged
as something much less effective than had been expected. The strategic
hamlets which they were to protect proliferated in quantity in an uncontrolled
manner and varied widely in quaHty. It never really became possible for
ARVN to free itself from static defensive duties.
Even if it had become po ssible for ARV?~ to be cut loos e from static
duties it is questionable that it could have ris en to U.S. expectations .
The period in question is one in \'Thich the Hgo fami l y felt itself con-
strained constant ly to playoff the military against the provincial officials
(who controlled the CG e.nd SDC) in order to foresta ll attempts at a coup
0. ' etat. Military leaders seemed inclined to rely increasingly on firepolver
as a substitute for aggressive maneuver . Rosy reports from the provinces
made it unappealing to sustain casualties engaging an enemy who we,s said
to have a lr eady been driven from the area . 84/ The all-too-common result
was that ARVN did not improve as the U. S. had expected i t ,vould . U. S.
advisors became frustrated and embittered. Even rare opportunities for
dec i sive engagement on the ground vlere a lloi'7e d to pass or were mishe,ndled.
The debacle at Ap Ba,c , i n , 1962, stands as a la,ndmark of this
conti nued impotence.
The failure of ARVN to develop as expected was, however, not officially

recognized until much l ater . Even then the reasons f or this fai l ure were
variously interpreted. In mid-1962 , after the i nit i al advisory build-up
had been completed , the COlTlIllander of the r ecently established U. S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (n<\cv ) , General Pa,ul D. Harkins, estimated
that the U. S. task 'vas simply one of traini ng ARVN l eaders on a one-time
b asis and that the VC could be eliminated as a disturbing force vii thin
a year a,fter this had been accomplished. ( This "Tas a clear instance of

NND Project Number : NND 633 16, By: NWD D ate: 2011
'" TOP SECRET - Sensitive
the I I technical-tactical competence ll expectation. ) Secretary McNama,ra

- - probably vrishing also to form prudent contingency plans and to have
the capability to exert pressure on the Diem regime -- directed that
the U. S. plan for a phased 'vli thdrav18,1 of U. S. forces over a three yea,r
period. 85/ This decision and the subsequent plans for its implementa-
tion, chronicled in another volume of this series, -J(- indicates the extent
to Iyhich o;>timistic expectations exi.sted at some high official U. S.
levels even v7hile (as 'lye lVere later to learn ) the si tua tion in tbe
countryside continued to deteriorate. ThiS, in turn, helps to explain
why the advisory build-up completed in April 1962 ,'laS not follo'l'led by
any addi tiona,l increases in advisors for more than t'lyO years.
The central problem in this regard was the,t the U. S. had neither
a firm grasp on reliable indicators to determine how the war was pro-
gressing nor a willingness to accept claims that :i.t was not going well.
The second of these tendencies was attributable to the approach vlhich
finally emerged from the decisions follol'ling the Taylor mission: The
U.S . would support Diem unstintingly and expect, in return , meaningful
reforms and improvements I'Ti thin GVN. But it was caught in a dilemma,
when the expected reforms did not take place. To continue to support
Diem Ivithout reforms meant quite simply that he, not we, lvould determine
th e cours e of the counter insurgent effort and that the steps h e took to
assure his continuance in power would continue to take priority over all
els e. To deny him support in any of a variety of w'ays would erode his
power without a viable alterna,tive in sight. The tendency may not have
been precisely to II sink or svTim with Ngo Dinh Diem, II as Homer Bigart
phrased it, but it came very close to this.
The inability to knovl just ho,y things were going presented an even
more difficult pro·blem. The tendency was to use forces retrained or
newly equipped, stra,tegic ha,mlets constructed, and trends in VC activity,
as indicators of the progress of the v7ar. But training does not neces-
sarily equal effectiveness, the number of hamlets constructed does not
tell one of the loyalty of their populations, and enemy attacks might be
a misleading guide. Were GVN making progress in a contested area, for
i nstance, Viet Cong rea,ctions might be expected to increase ra,ther than
to diminish in frequency and i ntensity. Converse l y , the insurgents v70uld
have no good reason to attack populated area,s ,'1hich they had already
succeeded in penetrating and over which they had establ ished effective
de facto control. Q§/ Data and observations could b e variously inter-
preted -- so va,riously, :Ln fact, that President Kennedy Ivas l ed to ask
t wo observers just returned from Vietnam l'1ho gave him divergent reports,
lI you two did visit the same country, didn l t yoU? 1I §])
-x- Volume IV.B . 4., Evolution of the l<Tar: Phased Withdralyal of U.S. Forc~
1962-196l~ (TS).

THE STAGE IS SET FOR "BETTER GVN EECEPTIVITyll
While the U. S. gro:ped for a better vTay to determine how the counter-
i nsurgent effort was going and debated hOvT ( or if' ) to exercise l evere,ge
against Diem, it was overtaken by events. The 1963 Buddhist crisis in
RVN 1-TaS met by increasingly re:pressive measures by the GVN. These
develo:pments finally led the U,S. to reassess its su:pport for Diem and to
consider other non-comImmist alternatives to his leadership. ·x- On
1 November 1963 Diem was overthrown by a mill te,ry coup d l eta t. The
:pacification effort organized around the Stre,tegic Ham1et P.cogram died
with him; the advisory effort "\V·as left untouched in terms of size e,nd
scope. To the extent that Diem and h is family vTere the one s preventing
ARVN from mee ting the ex:pe cte,tions of late 1961, it 1-TaS reasoned, nOH vTaS
t he time for the military e,dvisory system to begin to function more
effectively. To the extent that ARVN commanders in the field had been
unres:ponsive to U.S. advice because of indifference and op:position in the
Gia Long Palace, i t was ho:ped the difficulties of the :p8,st might be
r ectified by the new mi l itary regime.
-x- See Volu.me IV . B. i n the present series , Evol ution of the Wa· 1'he
Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May- November 1963 (TS).
36 TOP SECRET Sensitive

:... ,"~'
B. District Advisors and the Beef-Up of

Battalion Advisory Tee,ms ~-1§31
The initial U.S. reaction to the Diem coup was thus one of modest
optimism. Even given the U. S. disappointment e,t the death of the Ngo
brothers the fact remained that the nel-7 regim.e in the Saigon saddle
vlaS expected to be more responsive to U.S. advice than the previous
government had been. It was necesse,ry that GVN programs be redirected
i nto more realistic channels , that the efficiency of operations be
increased, that additional steps be taken to seal the infiltration
routes through Laos, and that the U.S. reaffirm its commitment to GVN
in a credible way. The key to success--the pacification process--had
already been discover ed; the task was one of skillful, sustained execu-
tion.
Each of these points was addressed by Nationa,l Security Action
Memorandu.m 273, approved 26 November 1963. The immediate cause for
NSAM 273 "ivas the assassination of President Kennedy four da,ys earlier;
newly-installed President Joln1son needed to reaffirm or modify the policy
lines pu~sued by his predecessor. President Johnson quickly chose to
reaffirm the Kennedy policies. Emphasis should be placed, the document
stated, on the Mekong Delta e,rea, but not only in military terms. Polit-
ical, economic, social, educational, and informational activities must
also be pushed: "We should seek to tu.rn the tide not only of battle
but of belief . ••• " §§). Military operations should be initiated, under
close political control, up to within fifty kilometers inside of Laos.
U.S, assistance progra,ms should be maintained at levels at l east equal
to those under the Diem government so that the new GVN would not be
t empted to regard the U.S, as seeking to disengage. ~
The same document also revalidated the planned pha,sed withdrav7al

of U.S. forces announced publicly in broad terms by President Kennedy
shortly before his death:
The objective of the United States with respect to the

withdrawal of U. S. military personnel remains as sta,ted in
the vfuite House statement of October 2, 1963 . 2Q/
No ne"\v programs were proposed or endorsed , no increases in the level or

nature of U.S. assistance suggested or foreseen. The emphasis was on
persuading the new government in Saigon to do ,vell those things which
the fallen government was considered to have done poorly.
OnIMISM TURNS TO FRUSTRATION
Thi s attitude of cautious optimism changed gradually by the early

summer of 196)+ to one of deepening gloom.. No radical shift m8,rked this

TOP SECRE" - Send ti ve
transi tion; it was one of a, heighte::-~ed awareness of instability in the

central government in Saigon (the IC:-,e,nh coup and maneuvel'ing for
advantage by the generals), of a de-'-eriora,ting situation in the country-
side, and of the discovery that thir.gs had been vTorse to begin with than
the U.S. had suspected. Not only did events indicate a Viet Cong ascen-
dancy in the CO"lilltrys ide; the U. S. \,~as not even able to determine with
assurance just hOYl things stood. The informational returns were i nadequate
from the existing advisory effort, ARVN he,d not become an effective fighting
force, and the extent of U.S. influence was questionable.
This deteriora,tion of the cODl1:'erinsurgent effort (including the

groi'ling awareness that earlier reports had been unrea,listically rosy) vTaS
one factor ",hich was to lead to an expansion of the U,S, military advisory
effort. A second, and complementa,ry, factor 'i'laS the increasing conviction
in official circles that the struggle in Vietnam was so important that we
could not afford to lose it. Although these two factors in juxtaposition
created a determination to take 'lVhatever steps i'Tere necessary to ensure
a, free non-communist South Vietnam, this commitment operated in the shadow
of an equal determination to i'lork t}1..rough the GVN rather than around it .
and to avoid radical policy departu~es du..ring the Presidential el ections.
A further buildup in U.S. advisors was not the major product of this
determined commitment. Ra ther, there i'TaS in 1 96~ a growing conviction
that only by 'consciously expanding the 'i'Tar -- by "going North!! in order
to punish and dissuade the DRV from support of the i nsurgency -- could
the deteriorating situation be arrested and reversed. Governmental
stability in South Vietnam and the reduction, if not the elimination, of
pr essures from the north came to be regarded as desiderata \'lhich would
t urn upon actions outside RVN rathe~ than within it . The decisions to
expa,nd the U. S. advisory effort were overshadowed by plans to carry the
war to the DRV.*
NSAM 288
NSl\M 273 had, as described above, limited cross-border operations to

an area 50 kilometers within Laos . NSAM 288, published in March 1964 ,
r eaffirmed these measures but went considerably fu..rther in authorizing
contingency preparations to be employed in the event that bord er control
operations proved inadequate:
To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours '

notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian
"Border Control actions " (beyond those authorized ... above )
and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to
be in a position on 30 days ' notice to init iate the program of
"Graduated Overt Military Pressure " against North Vietnam. 2J}
* The sensitive files of the Secretary of Defense for the period under
di scussion consist in l arge part of .deta,iled plans to bring increasing
military pressure against DRV under careful political control and under
" scenarios" which woul d ensure adeCluate domestic and foreign support
for these actions.
'1
7I TOP SECRET - Sensitive
This initial official signal to prepa,re to expand the "lar Vias

cast against a conviction that U.S. objectives in South Vietnam "Tere
critically i mportant :
We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam .

We do not r eCluire that it serve as a vIes tern bas e or as a
member of a Western Alliance. South Vietna,m must be fre e,
hOivever, to accept outside assistance as reCluired to maintain
its sec-cU'i ty. This e,ssiste,nce should be able to take the
form not only of economic and socia,l mee,sures but also police
and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.
Unless we can achieve this obj ective in South Vietnam,

almost all of Southeast Asie, ivill probably f a ll under Communist
domine,nce (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to
Conmnmism so e,s to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist
i nfluence (Burma ), or fall under the dominat ion of forces not
now explicitly Communist but likely· then to become so (I ndonesia
t aking over Malays ia ) . Thailand might hold for a period "Ti th
our help, but would be QDder grave pressu~e. Even the Philippines
would become she,ky , and the threat to India to the west, Australia
and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea , and J apan to the
nor th and east would be greatly increased.
All of these conseCluences ,-TOuld probe,bly have b een true

even if the U.S. he,d not since 1954, and especially since 1961,
b ecome so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. Ho,vever, that fact
accentuates the impact of a Cow~unis t South Vietnam not only
in Asia, but in the rest of the world , where the South Vietnam
conflict is regarded as a test ca,se of U.S. ca,pa,city to help a
nation meet a Cow~unist "we,r of liberation. II
Thus, purely i n terms of foreign policy, the stakes ar e

h igh ..•.
The situation has unCluestionably be en growing wors e , at

least since September:
1 . I n terms of govermuent control of the country-

side , about 40% of the t err itory i s under Vi et Cong
control or predominant influence. In 22 of the 43
provinces , the Viet Cong control 50% or more of the
l and area, including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh
Duong; 75% of Hau Nghia ; 90% of Long An ; 90% of Kien
Tuong ; 90% of Dinh Tuong ; 90% of Kien Hoa ; and 85%
of An Xuyen.
2. Large groups of the population are no,v shovTing

signs o f apathy and indifference, and there are some
signs of frustration "l'Ti thin the U. S. cont ingent :
a. The ARVl'if and paramilitary desertion rate s ,

Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3
and pa,rticularly the latter, are high and increasing.
b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong

are recruiting energetically and effectively.
c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of

the Self Defense Corps, in i·,hich the security of
the hamlets depends, is poor and falling.
3. In the last 90 days the "reakening of the govern-

ment's position has been particularly noticeable. For
example:
a. In Quang Nam province, in the I Corps, the

militia in 17 hamlets turned in their weapons.
b. In Binh Duong province (III Corps) the

hamlet military were disa,rmed because of suspected
d i sloy",lty •
c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps,

75 hamlets were severely dam8,ged by the Viet Cong
( in contrast, during the tivelve months ending
June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic hamlets were
few and none was overrun ) .
d. In Quang Ngai province, at the northern

edge of the II Corps, there '\'Tere 413 strategic
hamlets under government control a year ago. Of
that number, 335 have been dama,ged to varying degrees
or fallen into disrepair, and only 275 rema,in under
government control.
e. Security throughout the IV Corps hasdeteri-

orated badly. The Viet Cong control virtually all
facets of peasant life in the southernmost provinces
and the government troops there 8,re reduced to
defending the administrative centers. Except in An
Giang province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious
sect ) armed escort is req,uired for almost all move-
ment in both the southern and northern areas of the
IV Corps .
~. . ~'he political control structure extending from Saigon

down into the hamlets disappeared follovling the November coup.
Of the ~·l incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have
b een replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in
three months; one province had four). Scores of lesser
Officials w'ere replaced. Almost all maj or military com-
mands have changed ha,nds tvlice since the November coup. The

TOP SECRET - Sensit ive
faith of the peasants has been shaken by the disruption in

erperienced leadership and the loss of physical security.
In many areas , power vacuu.ms have developed causing con-
fusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.
5· North Vietnamese support, all'lays significant , has been

increasing. 92/
The major new action under consideration to help achieve critically

important U.S. objectives in the face of this gloomy recording of recent
events wa.s, as already noted, that of carrying the vlar to North Vietnam.
Secreta,l'Y McNama,ra , vThose memorandum to the President vlaS published en
toto as NSAM 288, did not fores ee the need at that time for a further
major buildup of the advisory effort or for U.S. steps to take greater
control of the ''lar . Again, the approach already selected was deemed
ade<luate. Only <lualitative improvement was needed:
A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/ US effort

8,re generally sound and ade<luate .•.• Substantially more can be
done in the effective emplo~nent of military forces and in the
economic and civic 8,ction areas. These improvements may require
some selective increases in the U.S. presence, but i t does not
appear likely that major e<luipment replacement and additions
i n U. S. personnel are indicated w1der curl"ent policy.
B. The U. S. policy of reduci.ng existing personnel where

South Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is
still sound. Its application will not l ead to any major reduc-
t ions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as such
has a sound effect in portraying to the U.S. and the ,'lOrld that
we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese
must win and t ake ultimate responsibility for. SubstEmtia,l
r eductions in the numbers of U.S. military training personnel
should be pos sible before the end of 1965. HOvTever, the U. S.
should continue to rei t era te that· it will provide all the
assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of
2J.I
hO'I'l l ong it takes. .
Two actions which 'Ivere explicitly considered and rejected indicated that
t he U.S. would still adhere to its oft-stated (and sometimes i gnored )
posi tion that the South Vietnamese must win their mm 'I'rar through their
own efforts:
Furnishing a U.S, Combat Unit to Secure the Saigon Area.

It is the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon ,
wi th which 'Ive concur, that this action would now have serious
advers e psychological conse<luences and should not be undertaken.
U.S. Taking Over Command. It has b een suggested that the

U,S. move from its present advisory role to a role that ,'lOuld
I TOP SECRET - Sensitive

amount in practice to effective command . Again, the judgment

of all senior people in Saigon, w'ith which vIe concur, is that
the possible military adV8,ntages of such a,ction would be far
out-weighed by its adverse psychological impact. It would
cut ac.ross the whole b asic picture of the Vietnamese Ivinning
their Olin war and lay us wide open to hostile propa,ganda both
within South Vietnam and outside. Moreover, the present
respons iveness of the GVN to our advice -- although it has not
yet reduced military reaction time -- makes it less urgent.
At the same time, MACV is steadily taking actions to bring
UoS. and GVN operating staffs closer togethe r at all l evels ,
including joint operating rooms at k.ey command levels. 94/
Thus, it Vias stated national policy that the critically important

struggle in South Vietnam must be won by the South Vietnamese, tha,t the
U.S, vTould do alll'Tithin its pOlder to help f),rrest and reverse a deteri-
orating situation, a,nd that plans should be ma,de to employ gradua,ted
overt military pressures against the supporters of the insurrection, the.
DRV. This was the principa l thrust of NSAM 288 even though a sizeable
portion of the document was devoted to programmat ic steps vlhich GVN and
t he U,S. should take in order better to mobilize South Vietnam ' s assets.
Specifically, RVNAF needed to be increased in size by at least 50,000
men, reorganized, and provided with selected items of modern equipment. 95/
These programs presaged more U.S, advisors because there would be more
RVNA.F units to advise, but there vTas no mention of more advisors for given'
units or advisors to perform new functions.
INCREASING POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE PROVINCEp
The dark picture painted in NSAM 288 in March had become even darker
by May 1964. Secretary McNamara visited Saigon on 12 and 13 May t o inquire
i nto progress in the " oilspot " national pa,cification program. What he
l earned could scarcely be called encouraging. A fo l low-on conference
was scheduled for 1 June in Honolulu and the planning wheels began to
turn - or , more acc1)~~ately, t he wheels bega,n to churn -- for there was
barely tvlO weeks I time in which to. propose and coordinate U. S. actions
acceptable to t he GVN vlhich might reverse the downward spiral of events ,
and "going North " vTas not yet feasible in terms of domestic U.S. politics.
Illustrative statistics (the same which Secretary McNamara sali ) give

t he tone of events in South Vietnam. In an effort to determine exactly
h ow many rural communities even existed -- much less whose control they
were under -- the Department of Defense had earlier i nitiated an aerial
photographic survey of the rurs,l areas of RVN . Even t his expensive under-
t aking l eft great factual gaps. In Tay Ninh Province , for example ,
photointerpreters identified 39 fortified hamlets; U.S. reports from
:provincial officials claimed that there Ivere 106 . ~ The discrepa,ncy
was not one to a:p:peal to those '\'Tho vTished to base :policy determinations
on solid facts.

Other facts were more easily ascertainable. Since the Diem coup,
for instance, only 5 of RVN ' s 42 provinces had not experienced a change
in Province Chief. Change is, of course, inescapable in the aftermath
of a coup, but by 8 May 15 provinces were under their third chief since
1 November 1964, 7 had their fourth, and 2 provinces were governed by
the fifth officer since the Diem government fell. Instability in a,dmin-
istra/cion was accompanied by a marked GVN decline in number s of population
controlled and a comparable increase in VC population control. These
trends Here reflected in the official estims,tes (themse lves suspect of
being overly optimistic) of control in the rural villages:
Comps,rison, Number of Rural Villages Controlled W

~ 63 ~r 64
RVN 1682 1485
VC 709 866
Cont ested 139 187
Of the 14 provinces considered critical in terms of location and popula-
tion, all were reported by their advisors to be in "critical" condition.
The prospects in 10 of these were judged to be "poor. " Four provinces
were regarded to have " fair " prospects. 98/ It was apparent tha,t the
U. S. could not depend on eventual actionS-against DRV to save the day in
South Vietnam. By the time such actions were politically feasible there
might b e nothing to save. It was time to tal~e some further direct action
within South Vietnam itself -- a,nd to take it q,uickly. Increasing U.S.
advisors was s.n obvious and available action.
MACV ' S GRADUALISTIC APPROACH TO EXPANSION
As early as December 1963, MACV had studied the desirability of

extending the U.S. advisory effort to district l evel in 13 certain key
districts, mostly around Saigon. No action was taken at tha,t time but
the proposal '\-Tas revived in February and i mplemented during late March
1964. 99/ Each of the original 13 "key districts " was assigned one
Captain and one noncomraissioned officer. Of the original 26 persons
selected for this pilot project, 21 were ne'\dy arrived in RVN. 100/
This gradualistic, experimental approach to expanding the advisory

effort typified the method preferred both by the mil:Ltary and civilian
agencies in Vietnam -- although for somewhat different reasons. ·MACV
was concerned with the experience and skill levels it could command among
necessarily lower ranks as it expanded deeper into ARVN and the political
( staffed by ARVN ) hierarchy, a,bout increased support req,uirements, and
about increased casualties. USOM claimed that its operatives could "Tork
effectively at the " spigot" end of the aid pipeline only where the local

NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 20 11
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administration was energetic "md effective and where some modicum of

security had already been provided. 101/ USOM had severe recruiting
difficulties, too. Secretary McNamara-discovered on his 12-13 May visit
to Saigon that it Has about 25 per cent understrength and that approxi-
mately half of this personnel shortage was concentrated in the expanding
rural affairs staff. 10~
McNAMARA I S WILLINGNESS TO APPROVE EXPANSION
Thus, the general attitude among the U.S . agencies in Saigon was to
go slowly, to avoid the danger, as it vias frequ ently expressed, of "strewing
Americans allover the countryside. " Secretary McNamara a,ppa,rently had
other thoughts a,fter his May visit in Sa,igon. The available record does
not reflect that he directed an expansion of the advisory effort -- but the
J'oint Staff vl'as almost immediately hard at work examining which of several
l evels of increase Hou~d be most desirable. The available record leaves
little doubt that the Secretary of Defense wanted it made clear that he
would approve any reasonable proposals for personnel, ma,teriel, or funds.
Those sections of NSAM 288 which dealt with recommendations for South
Vietnam ha,d concentrated on programs which vTould assist GVN to mobilize
its resources. By May it was clear that the hoped-for actions had not
t aken effect. The obvious conclusion -- given the importance which the
U.S, attached to success in South Vietnam -- was that additional steps
must be ta,ken to halt the deterioration i n the countryside.
THE INITIAL PROPOSALS AND RESPONSES
The i nitial recorded exchange among the planners occurred when

COMUSMACV was asked on 22 May 1964 to provide an input to a JCS study then
in progress on " . •• encadrement of South Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self
Defense Corps with U.S. teams along lines of White Star teams in Laos ,
with objective of making these units as effective as possible in Vietnamese
pacification plan. " 103/ The messa,ge made it clear that the JCS 'I'las
examining alterna,tive levels of increased advisory effort (1,000, 2,000
and 3,000 personnel), not asking if the advisory effort sho'uld be increased.
The compressed time frame available for prior coordination on a recommended
course of action was also clear: COMUSMACV vIas asked to provide h is com-
ments on the dra,ft JCS proposal by the follovving day (23 May ). "Regret
circumstances do not permit more time ,!! the message stated. 104/
The r eply from Saigon, processed through CINCPAC , adhered to the

established MACV preference to undertake new departures only in a selective ,
experimental way:
I do not think we shoul d floo'd RVN with nwnber of personnel

you mention. Think better solution is to do [thi~7 on selective
basis starting 'I'lith critica,l districts and provinces and once vIe
get fee l of problem expand to remainder of RVN a,s experience
dictates. 10.2/

Then, in a significant passage, the reply from the field asked in blunt
language just what the intended purpoGe \-1as for the proposed expansion
of the advisory effort. The rtvmite Star Teams rt used in Laos, the message
noted, had the purpose and effect of establishing U.S. control over foreign
forces:
The question a,rises as to i>lhether you mea,n encadrement or

increase of rtadvisoryrt effort. Do you ,-;rant to take control
or improve the performance of CG and SDC by step-up vri thin
current policy1 106/
Although this direct question i,;ras never ansi'iiered, the JCS I initial
proposal for encadrement v;ras quie tly dropped. The U. S. might ,-r1.sh to be
in a position to control elements or all of RVNAF but it would not con-
sciously follow 8,ny scheme explicitly a:i.med at such control. Instead,
the JCS countered with a plan for six Mobile Training Teams in each
province ba,cked up by a, Trcdning Center Team and a small Provincial Training
Detachment. This proposal i>lould put an addi tiona,l 70 U. S. training advisors
in each selected province in an effort to improve the l evel of effective~
ness of the paramilitary forces. Its recommendation vlas that the U. S.
military advisory effort should be increased by 1000 personnel, enough to
provide this new dimension of advice in the fourteen critical provinces
which had experienced so much recent instability. 1 07/
This JCS proposal for Mobile Training Teams for the RVNAF paramilitary
forc es was tied to an explicit statement of how best to organize this
effort without any mention of how much influence or leverage the U.S. would
or cou~d exert through this expanded system. The problem vlas treated as
one in the development of technical proficiency'; the issue of the extent
of U.S. control was largely ignored- -though surely not forgott en:
concept of US Advisory Effort
a. General
(1) An underlying principle in the oil-spot concept
is accordance of maximum flexibility to province officials in
solving individual province problems which vary widely from
province to province. This study recognizes that principle
and outlines a plan for assigmnent of additional US instructor
and training resources to the province to provide the training
and advice needed to improve the effectiveness of the provincial
paramilitary forces.
(2) The shortage of trained personnel is acute in the

paramilitary forces because of the nature of the forces themselves.
They are recruited at province or district level to perform mili-
tary tasks in those same regions. ~fuile the CG and SDC are con-
sidered full-time troops, ma.ny of the individuals , in f act , must
combine earning their livelihood with military duties. Movement
of these people long distances aHay from their homes to training
centers disrupts their lives, cr eates morale problems , and

TOP SECRET - SS:!lsi ti ve
undoubtedly contributes greatl:- to the high desertion rates

which have been experienced. 1.'(, appears appropr j.8,te , there-
for e , to bring t he trainers ar:.:3. training facilities to the
areas vThere the paramilitary forces live and operate.
(3) According 'L o US standards , the military training

needs of t he Vietnamese paramilitary are extremely modest.
There is no requirement for el~borated technical schools or
complex instructional courses. Instead, the Vietnamese para-
military require military schooling a t the most basic levels,
with emphasis on basic in-fantl";;' ,-lea,pons and small unit tactics.
Such instruction would be pro'!' de5. by the additional nUI{I.bers of
US military persoID1el.· .
b. Organization for Adviscry Effort . The trai ning defi-

ci encie s and problems of the pc,ramiE tary are as many and varied
as the number of prov:i.nces and distri cts in which those forces
operate . Needs in Quang Ngai , for example, may b e extremely
different from those i n DiD_~ Tuong. Within the provinces , each
di strict also may have differe~t traini ng needs . The reasonable
method of appr08,ching this pro'olem, then, appears to be establish-
ment of highly flexible trainbg detachments operating under
supervision at province level, which can provide l ocal mobile
training teams, small training centers , and temporary encadr e-
ment for the smaller paramilitary units when dictated by a
specific situation. 108/
MACV FOCUSES ON OPERATIONS RATHER rr-iA.N TRA.INING
COMUSMACV and CINCPAC were asked to comment I'd thin two days on this
study which had been fI • • • considered at the highest levels, where initial
rea ction h8,s been favorable . fI 109/ The ir repli es , in which the theater
commander supported his nominal subordinate in Sa igon, contested the value
of U. S. -conducted training for RVN:.~ pa.ramili tary forces, pr opos ed th8,t
advisor s be used at the district l evel to assist in operations , accepted
the 1,000-man magnitude , but stretc~ed out t he t arget date 18 months --
thereby proposing a gradualistic approach without candi dly saying so.
General Harkins devoted most of his r eply to the question of training
t eams :
A. A basic premis e of the study is that training at the

established centers is at the roo t of many moral e and desertion
problems. This premise is incorrect as regards the Civil Gua rd
(Regi onal Forces ). It is in part true ,'lith respect to SDC
(Popular Forces ); but the 1l..11derlying cause thereof - l ack of
per diem - i s in the process of being r emoved by the new 0,110'"-
ances that are about to be pro::~ulgated. This i s not to say there
~·6 TOP SECRET - Sensitive

{
...'
• I
are not formidable more,le problems ( one manifestation of vlhich

is desertion ) within both categories of forces. These need to be
and are being tackled. However, basic point is that they do not
stem from the present system of training.
B. Mobile training teams he,ve been organized under special

circumste,nces 'when units have had prior combat experience and/ or
as an expedient measure only. Experience has proved that units
trained by such teams have subsequently required formal training
at an established training center where proper facilities are
available. The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps had many units
trained by mobile training teams in 1962 in order to provide an
immediate operational force. Almost e,ll of these units have since
been retrained in the complete unit poi fjrogre,m of instructio~7
because it was determined that the mobile team training was inade-
quate. The mobile training teams consisted of U.S, person~el and
Vietnamese interpreters.
C. ~~ile the training requirements of paramilitary forces are

rel atively modest by U.S. standards, an adequate poi must be backed
up by firing ranges, training areas, class rooms, training aids and
other facilities. These requirements are met by the regional and
popular forces training centers. There are five regional force
unit training centers; nine regional force/ popular force leader
training centers; and thirty-seven popular force training centers .
They are properly distributed geogre,phice,lly; they are staffed
with qualified Vietnamese i nstructors ; and can be expanded, with
l ittle difficulty to support programmed force increase . Some
augmentation of the U. S. advisory element e,t these several centers
i s desirable , on a selected basis.
D. The concept of U.S. personnel conducting training for the

paramilitary forces on either a training 'center or MTT basis (and
especially the latter ) is not realistic .
(1) The Vietnamese have an adequate tre,ining base vlith

experienced instructors; the latter are doing a satisfactory
j ob. For t he U.S. to assrune the i nstructional effort , vice
t he Vietnamese , woul d generate serious moral e problems and
would probably be unacceptable.
(2 ) The interpreter support requirements would be pro-

hibitive.
(3) Previous experience ( sub-paragre,ph B above ) of using

U. S. advisors as instructors vias unsuccessful due to the
i nability to communicate.
2 . As indicated above, the c~Trent method of training both the

regional and popu~ar forces is adequate, although ",7e do have
under revievv the l ength and content of t he training. Where the

Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3,3
, ,
U.S. can make its best contribution to the paramilitary forces

effectiveness is in the area of operations. Our formula, dis-
cussed in 23 May telecon on this subject, is to increase greatly
the U.S. advisory effort at the district level. Therefore,
strongly u~ge that you support our position that approximately
1000 advisors, in the genera,l proportion of one officer to three
NCO's be authorized as district deta,cbments, with the precise
composi tion a,nd deployment of said teams left to the determination
of COMUSMACV. 110/
CINCPAC informed the JCS tha,t he agreed 'w ith COMUSI!1A.CV's arguments and
quoted the telecon referred to above to explain the course of action pre-
ferred by the military commanders in the field:
1. Our comment is based on CG/SDC reorganization concept

of 7 May which includes elimination CG Bn Hq in provinces and
establisrunent 90 man sector Hq in .lieu thereof with TAC CP
capability, and sub-sector Hq 16 men at each 239 districts.
This is expected to be accomplished in tw'o to three months.
2. Recommend use of one team composed of mature company

grade officer and other specialist as you suggest (Wpns/ Demo,
Commo Med) per district.
3. Propos8,1 para 2 represents end requirement for 239 teams,

totaling 239 officers, 717 enlisted spec aggregate 956 personnel,
by end calendar year 65.
4. MACV current plans call for 1 officer and 1 NCO at 116

district s by June 65. Requisitions have been submitted for 100
of the se by end CY 64. ~TO man detachments now assigned to 13
districts .
5. Assume GVN will agree to use US teams at district "'i'rhich

represent reasonable security risk. At present time ap~ox 40
of 239 districts are not sufficiently secure to enable use of
US advisors. 111/
THE JCS ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS
The J"CS, given the very few days remalnlng until Secretary McNamara
was to meet in Honolulu with COMUSMACV and Ambassador Lodge, did not
attempt to reconcile the time-phasing and eventual size of the proposed
advisory effort at district l evel. Rather , it submitted to the Secretary,
just prior to his departure for the conference, t¥10 separate memoranda:
~De laid out a prospective program for district advisors throughout RVN;
the other outlined a pilot program at the district level. The purpose
of both outline advisory efforts vTas the sa,me -- "improving the effective-
ness of these paramilitary units in the Vietnamese pacification plant! --
but the rate of advisor buildup differed.

In the proposed Itpilot program, " for instance, the conc ept envisaged
the phased estabJ_isbment of teams in 49 districts of seven key provinces
during a six-month p er iod. This would require approximately 300 addi-
tional advisors. 112/ The broader progrs,m called for s,n additional 1,000
advisory personnel, phs,sed over a period of l-It years, to cover all 239
districts by the end of CY 1965. 113/ The more comprehensive progrsffi
estimated that 63 districts ( compared to 49 districts in the It pilot
program") vTould be manned by the end of CY 1964. Both were represented
as suitable ba,ses for the Secretary ' s impending discussions in Honolulu.
Both were hurriedly dra;vm up alternative schemes for expanding the
advisory effort to district level. Both, moreover, incorporated the
arguments of COMUSMACV: concentration on operations rather than training
and a time-phased buildup with due attention to existing secusity con-
ditions and interpreter availability. The point was also made that the
total number of additional personnel vlOu1d necessarily include a support
slice of approximately 35%. IlJ+/
One other question of expansion was addressed before the Secretary

of Defense's conference in Honolulu in J1.me. The JCS studied the possi-
b ility, also in late May, of extending the advisory effort to regular
ARVN units at the company level. The JCS agreed with the COMUmllA.CV and
CINCPAC reasoning that such an extension would be undesirable because it
wou~d l ead to grea,tly incr eased U. S. casualties, would be unsupportable
in t erms of necessary l anguage tre,ining (one year to 18 months necessary
to provide 500 "b ilingual lt advisors), and would meet resistance from
ARVN conunanders faced ivith strange new relationships and potential loss
of face. 115/
MACV ' S PREFERRED APPROACH ACCEPTED
The prevailing military advice , then, when the Secretary met on

1 June vTith the principal U.S. managers of the Vietnamese effort , was
that i t "VTas desirable to expand the advis ory effort to district l evel
on a careful basis in order to promote better effectiveness in the
paramilitary forces engaged i n pacification activities , but that U. S.
advisors should not be extended to company level in the regular forces.
The avails,ble record does not make clear the exact positions and argu-
ments put fOTITard at Honolulu. What is clear is that i t was decided,
following bs,sically the revised estimates proposed by COMUSMACV, to
expand the advisory effort to d.i strict l evel at some rate ( to be worked
out l ater in deta,il) and to i ncrease the si ze of ba ttalion-level advisory
groups by t"lVO noncommissioned officers in infantr y battalions and cavalry
t roops and by one conunissioned and two noncommissioned of fi cers in
artillery battalions . 116/ The aCknOi'TJ.e dged effect of the l atter
decision vTaS to make company- level 8,dvisory t eams available on s,n ad hoc
bas i s without assigning them on a pel~nent bas is. ~ It is unclear
h mv this scheme solved the previous reservations relative to ls,nguage
t re,ining, higher casual ties , and Vietnamese sensibilities. A likely

Declassified per Exec uti ve O rder 13526, Sectio n 3,3
NND Project Num ber: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
". ... 1
explcmation is that MACV 'I'las u11der a new commander, General lrJ'estmoreland,

who vlaS more willing to expand the advisory effort and less inclined to
c ite the potential disadvanta,ges of a larger American presence. General
Harkins had already returned to the United States to receive the Distinguished
Service Medal in a ceremony on 24 JU11e and, at the request of President
Johnson, remained in the U.S. until he retired. l~
At any rate, it was a new COMUSMACV \'Tho cabled on 25 J1)11e his pro-
posals for the buildup discussed at the beginning of the month in Honolulu.
In sum, he asked for 900 additional advisors for battalions and districts,
suggested a small increase at province level, and noted that " significant"
nmnbers of personnel would be needed for administrative cmd logistical
support of the ne'l'1 advisors. He also suggested, in the emphasized portion
of the message quoted below', that many of the distr i ct advisory teams
could complete their work and be moved to new areas for pacification
wi thin a year: '
1. Augmentation of current US Advisory detachments at

t he battalion l evel and further extension of the advisory
effort at the district l evel are necessary now to infl uence
the successful planning and execution of the National Pacif-
i cation Pla,n. These additions to t he currently authorized
advisory detachments have been discussed with and agreed to by
GVN, and will enable us to place advisors at the l owest level,
as needed, in order to insure that all possible actions are
properly coordinated •• • •Extension of US Advisory effort to t he
districts as an i nitial step toward intensifying t h e Pacification
Program at the l owest l evel i s essential. This vlill insure
supervi sion and coordination in the employment of paramilitary
f orces and a general reinforcement of the pacification effort
at dist rict level. Initiall y, teams of t\'1O (2 ) officers and
three (3) enlisted men ( one (1) of 'vlhom will be a radio opera-
t or ) be pl aced i n the forty-five (45) di stricts of t he eight
(8) priority provinces . I n ten of t hese districts , and :in
t hree (3) districts of t'lVO other provinces, a l imited effort
i s now being made by district teams of one (1 ) officer and one
(1 ) enl isted man ; these t eams wi ll be i ncreased t o full strength
di strict teams. I n the provinces outs i de of the eight t op
pr i ority provin ces teams wil l be placed i n another sixt y-ei ght
(68 ) districts. Starting 1 Jan 65 i t i s envisaged t hat an
a dditional fifty ( 50 ) t eams can be placed , and that by 1 Jul 65
t eams from the or i ginal districts can be placed i nto the
r emaining districts in SVN. Thi s extension of US Advi sory
effo r t t o t he di str ict level must be conducted on a phased
bas i s with actual composition and empl oyment as determined by
C O~IDSMACV . Two (2 ) officers and three (3) enli s t ed men are
cons i dered as average t eam strengths for planning puxposes .• ..

NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD D ate: 2011
2. RECA~ITULATION OF REQUIREMENTS
Capts/Lts
E5/4 E6
123 Inf Bns (Incl 4 Marine) 123 123
29 Arty Bns (Incl 1 Marine ) 29 58
14 Ml13 Troops, Armd CA Sqdns 14 14
45 District Adv Teams (P"riority province ) 90 90 45
68 District Adv Teams (Other provinces ) 136 136 68
255 363 308
TOTA.L, adjusted for 13 districts teeJns now' in place, 900 (242
officers; 658 enlisted).
3. While this message deals only with the increased advisory

effort at the battalion and district levels consideration is also
being given to increases at sector level, also discussed at Honolulu.
Those recommendations which will be submitted separately "\.,rill not
approach the magnitude of the incree,ses recommended in this message
for battalion and district levels ...•
5. Administrative and logistical support personnel and equip-

ment requirements will be studied separately. From our earlier
stUdies it is apparent that requirements "l'Till be significant.
6 . An increase of approximately eighty (80) US Naval Advisors

will also be recommended. Ch:ief US Naval Advisory Group, . in coordina-
tion with CNO VNN., he,s identified areas in need of additional e,dvisory
effort. I concur in the need and will support recommendation to be
submitted separately. 119/
UNRESOLVED ISSUES: SPEED AND DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY
The decision to increase the advisory effort in the magnitude and

fashion just cited had already be en made in effect. It was necessary,
however, for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense personally to
approve every manpower space for "M.A..CV or MAAG Vietne,m -- not because such
decisions could not be delegated but because t he Secretary cho se to
res erve them to himself. 120/ The questions ,.,rhich remained vlere , first,
how much freedom to adjust numbers to situations (a discretionary e,uthori ty
COMUSIV.1A.CV had consistently requested) would be permitted and , second, the
rate at "l'Thich the agreed expe,nsion would take place. There could have
b een other questions, of course: should the di strict advisory effort
spr ead in close geographic relation to the pacification plan or follow
some other scheme ; should the advisors b e conscious agents to increase
U.S . leverage or essentially technical-tactical assistants to their
counterparts; how deeply involved should advisors b ecome in loca l polit-
ical administration? There is no indication that these and other related
questions of the advisors ! role were brought II Up the t ape !! for examina-
tion. The principal issue was simply how quickly they should be brought·
into South Vietnam and at what level discretionary authority vTould be
exercised.

The latter question was settled by default. MACV ' s proposed

Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) of 15 May.1961f, replete vlith errors
and omj_ssions and antedating the decision to exp:;md the advisory
effort, became the base line for authorizations to expand. Nobody i.n
the game seemed quite able to keep the detailed numbers straight. OSD
came quickly to focus on the 'Lotal authorization for U.S~ personnel in
Vietnanl and, as the papers in the Secretary ' s files demonstrate, found
i tself pencilling new numbers in even final draft copies whi.ch had
undergone several checks and redrafts. 121/ The product of thjs con-
centra,tion on minutiae at high Washington l evels w'as almost complete
fre edom of employment in the field. The Washington policymakers asked
how many men 'I.vere authorized in various activities and hO'l-l mEmy were
assigned. There is no evidence that, once the decision wa,s made to
establish district advisory teams, these same policymakers probed into
priorities of employment or the roles of these advisors.
The rate of the build-up was a much more complicated ma,tter , not
b ecause of the additional battalion advisors and the new district
advisors but because the numbers represented solely by the a.dditional
advisors quickly became a relatively small percenta.ge of the total U. S.
build-up -- all of which was justifi ed as contributing to the GVN pacifi-
cation plan and a sizeable portion of which was specifically earmarked to
provide administrative and logistical support to the newly arriving
advisors. By mid-July COMUSMACV was recommending 4200 personnel in
addi tion to the 926 battalion and district advisors, at l ea.st two more
helicopter companies, one Caribou company, and numerous major items of
equipment as part of the required build-up. 122/ The i ncreased a.dvisory
effort was identified as the cause of this large i ncrease:
The i ncreases envisaged ... will provide for the extension

and reinforcement of the advisory effort at the combat unit
l evel and, concurrently, a major extension and reinforcement
of the advisory effort a.t the district l evel in order to i mprove
and accelerate pacification operations. That e)~ension and
augmentation of effort has an i mmediate i mpact upon the adminis-
trative and logistical support base. In a sense the addition of
advisors in this quantity b ecomes the "straw that broke the
came l's back" to an already overburdened support base. 123/
SECRETARIAL PRESSURE FOR A SPEED-UP
The Secretary of Defense a,nd JCS met on 20 July to discuss these

requir ements. The JCS supported CO~IDSMACV . Secretary McNamara had no
argument with the levels of men and equipment requested; his question
was why they could not be provided more quickly than indicated by the
t ime-phasing in General Westmoreland ' s detailed breakdown. 124/ COlvIUSI'1A.CV

had a,sked for almost ~200 p ersonnel by 1 December 196~ and the balance
( comprising only Special Forces units) of the ~·772 total increa,se by
1 February 1965. 12~ Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to study the
feasibility of accelerating the build-up so that it vlOuld be completed
by 30 September. The JCS replied that the advisory personnel could be
made available this quickly but that several support units -- particu-
l arly aviation lmits -- could not reach South Vietnam by 30 September
without ca,using extreme difficulties and the degradation of tests of
the airmobile concept then in progress. 126/ The Secretary of Defense
directed on 7 August that the accelerated deployment, except for certa,in
critical aviation items and jeeps, be completed by the end of September.
He further directed that COMUSMACV be queried as to his ability to absorb
these personnel and units by that date. 127/ .
Genera,l Westmorelcmd r s reply stated that he could not reasonably

absorb thi s build-up in the time desired by Secretary McNamara. To do
so, he said, would generate an unorderly situation "lo[ith respect to support
f acilities a,nd an l.mdesirable hump in personnel rotation. The proposed
acceleration would not, moreover, satisfy the desired standards of advisor
training or dovetail with the planned expansion of the advisory effort:
The required training/ schooling of Bn/ District advisors

will be further sacrificed under the proposed compression. A
t"lO[o week in-country orienta tion is being esta,blished to handle
the Sep-Oct increments which v!ill not receive CONUS schooling
prior to arrival. Any further compression would create a
r equirement for in-country training "lo[hich is beyond our capa-
b ility.
Districts must be able to accept advisors ba,sed on their

status of pacification. The present scheduling of district
advisors is phased with the pacification plan and projected to
coincide with its progress ....
In summary , t he compression of personnel a,nd units would

overload our existing facilities and create adffiinistra,tive prob-
lems b eyond our capacity to handle in an orderly manner . COMUSMACV
has discussed with Amb. Taylor who concurs. 128/
MA.CV r S PREFERENCE UPHELD AGAIN
Faced with this reply from the individual responsibl e for ma,naging
t he U.S. contribution to the advisory and support effort, Secretary
McNamara cancelled the accelerated deployment. The military services
were instructed to deploy personnel and l.mi ts to South Vietnam in accordance
with General Westmoreland I s initial recommendation fOI'lo[arded to Washington.
a month earlier, in mid-July. 129/

The effect of this sequence of decisions stretching from mid-May-

to mid-August 196~. was to increase the advisory effort by over 1000
persormel:
District Advisors: 553

Battalion Advisors: 350
Naval (and Marine) Advisory Group: 82
Air Force Advisory Group: 80
TOTAL 1065 13 0/
This expa,nsion, and the rate at ,vhich it was to proceed, was the product
of what may be termed "tacit bargaining ll between Ivashington and Saigon.
Washington typically asswued the initiative in proposing increases and in
reconmending that they- be accomplished as quickly- as possible. The
dominant concern Ivas the fear that the countryside was being l ost to the
VC and that the impending U.S. moves to exert direct military- pressure
against DRV might come too la,t e unless the pacification program could be
vitali zed. U.S, officials in Saigon tended to prefer to expand gradually-
and to insure that adequate support fa,cilities were in place before addi-
tional advisors were deployed to the field. The product of desires driven
by- political awareness of impending failure, on one hand, and desires
driven by managerial a\'Jareness of operational concIi tions, on the other,
was an advisory incr ease almost precisely of the magnitude and rate pre-
ferred by the managers in the field.
EVENTS OVERTAKE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXPANSION
The really- important points to be noted, however, do not concern the

r elative influence of General Westmoreland, Secretary McNamara, the JCS,
or other participants in determining the size and rate of this buildup.
Rather, the important points are , first , tho,t the carefully studied deci-
sions did not address some central issues and, second , that events acted
to overtake the decisions which \'Jere made. The policymakers did not really
examine how district and additional battalion advisors vmuld improve the
execution of the pacification plan : they simply assumed that a greo;ter U.S.
presence "Tould produce beneficial effects. The basis for operational
advisors for the paramilitary forces wa,s , quite simply-, COMUSMACV ' s reasoned
elaboration of the disutility- of training advisors. There was no comple-
mentary assessment of the usefulness of operational advisors. It \'Jas
necessary to do something in South Vietnam to try- to reverse a clearly
deteriorating position. The provision of more advisors co,me very close
to being a reflexive response to this situation.
The overall magnitude of the advisory increase bears directly on the

second major point, in which events i n RVN overtook the new' U.S, response.
This is particularly true in the instance of the nelV dimension in the

advisory effort, the provlslon of advisory t eams at the district ( sub-

sector) level. Thirteen teams of one officer and one noncommissioned
officer had been deployed in critical districts, it will be recalled,
in March 1964. The final August decisions to make 553 district advisors
available in RVN by 1 December vIe,s designed to provide for a larger team
(2 officers, 3 EM) for each of 113 of the total 239 districts. The MACV
plan, then, was to provide U.S. military advisors only to about one-half
of the total number of districts in RVN.
By the end of CY 1964 all 113 teams vTere actually deployed. Their
total strength at that time Has 532 a,s against the authorized total
strength of 565. -)(- By January 1965 the number of district advisors
assigned exceeded the number authorized. These teams I-[ere deployed, it
vrill be recalled, in the ex-pectation that by some time in 1965 a sub-
stantial number of them vwuld have ,.wrked themselves out of a job and
be available for reassignment to new areas. This expectation was, to
put it mildly, not validated by events.
In February 1965, roughly a month after the limited expansion to

district advisors had been completed,the Khanh government was replaced
by the Q,uat regime. Over a year of U. S. effort to bring about politica,l
stabili ty within the GVN seemed to have been fruitlessly ,"lasted. The
U. S. began the susta,ined bombing campaign against North Vietnam, ROLLING
THUNDER, on 26 February. Shortly thereafter, tw'o Marine Battalion Landing
Teams (BLTs ) were la,nded at Da Nang for air base security. These measures
presaged a growing U.S. material commitment; the trend was heightened by
ARVNfs performance later in the spring of 1965.
During May and June ARVN suffered a series of near catastrophic

defeats that "rere instrumente,l in deciding the Johnson Administration to
act on General Westmoreland ' s recommendation for a greatly expanded U.S.
ground combat role in the war. On 11 May, the Viet Cong attacked and
overran Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province, and a U.S. advisory
componnd in the city with more than a regiment of troops. Both the U.S.
and Vietnamese took heavy casualties. Before the end of the month, a VC
force of undetermined size ambushed and decimated the ARVN 51st Regiment near
the small outpost of Ba Gia a few kilometers west of Q,uang Ngai City in
I Corps. The ARVN cOll1ID~nder in the area immediately rushed reinforcements
to the battle scene only to have them become victims of a second ambush.
The battle dragged on for several days, but ended in a tota l defeat for
ARVN. Two battalions were completely decimated, but more importantly, the
ARVN senior commanders on the scene he,d displayed tactical stupidity and
cowardice . With a crisis of confidence in leadership clearly developing
-x- The discrepancy between the 553 additional authoriza,tion a,nd the total
district advisor authorization of 565 is accounted for by the transfer
of some of the spaces involved in the initial e:A'Ilerimental program at
district level. 565 is the correct tota,l -- 113 teams of 5 men each.

Of
within the armed forces, the very real possibility of a complete ARVN
collapse could not be excluded. COMUSMACV summarized the situation in
his 7 June cable to CINCPAC:
ARVN forces ... are already experiencing difficulty in coping

with this increased VC capability. Desertion rates are
inordinately high. Battle losses have been higher than
expected; in fact, four ARVN battalions have been rendered
inef'f'ective by VC action in the I and II Corps zones.
Therefore, effective fighting strength of many infantry
and ranger battalions is unacceptably low. As a result,
ARVN troops are beginning to show signs of reluctance to
aSS1)~e the offensive and in some cases their steadfastness
under fire is coming into doubt. 13~/
If anything, Westmoreland ' s assessment may have been too generous. The
next week the Viet Cong launched an attack on the new Special Forces
camp and adjoining district headquarters at Dong Zoai on the northwest
corner of War Zone D. ARVN forces ,'Tere committed piecemeal to the
engagement and successively chewed up by more than tw'o regiments of
enemy troops. The battle lasted for five days cmd marked some of the
b itterest fighting of the war to that date . The VC summer offensive
continued una,bated through June and July. On 25 June, the long expected
offensive in the central highlands began vThen a district headquarters at
Tou Morong in Kontum Province vms overrun, reportedly by an NVA regiment
reinforced with local guerrillas. Other remote district capitals came
under attack in the following "Teeks and by 7 July a total of six had been
abandoned or overrun.
Casualties soared on both sides; ARVN alone sustained 1 , 672 in the

second week of June . But the important factor was the dangerous degrada-
tion of ARVN unit integrity . By the end of May, the heavy fighting had
r endered two ARVN regiments and three battalions combat i neffective by
MACV ratings. By 26 June, MACV was forced t o rate ·5 ARVN regiments and
9 separate battalions ineffective . 132/ Losses were so high that in
J uly , 11 of 15 ARVN training battali ons had to be temporaril y disorganized
t o provide fillers for the line units. 133/ I t was this maj or degradation
of unit effectiveness that evoked the alarm and sense of crisis in Saigon
and Washington and constituted the seemingl y incontestable arguments in
f avor of substantial American forces. ARVN units "Tere defeated in most
cases by their own tact ical i neptness, cowardice , and l ack of lea,dership
rather than by overall Iveight of numbers or i nferiority of firepovler.
The U. S. advisory effort had sought to strengthen precisel y t hese mili-
t ary i ntangibles, in addition to equipping , training and generally sup-
porting ARVN t roops. These skills and qualities are , of course, difficult
to t each or impart, but a successful advisory effort must at some point
produce a force capable of enga,ging the enemy and defeating him when the
ratios of strength and firepower are roughly equal.
Far from finding many of its advisory teams finishing their ta,sk
and moving on to ne"l areas or to new units , the U.S. found i tself in

mid-1965 beginning the cOll1.m.itment of major grolmd forces to South Viet-

nam. The deployment of these forces marked the end of a major phase in
Iradvisory "larfare. II From this time forward the role of U. So military
and poli tical-mili tary a,dvisors IV"ould be determined and practiced in a
r adically cha.nged environment.
57 TOP SECRET - Sensit i ve

Declassified per Execut ive Order 13526, Section 3.3
To.P SECRET - Sensitive
C. U.S. Combat Forces and the Possibility

of New Relationships (1965)
THE ABORTIVE LIMITED EXPANSIo.N OF ARVN
During the spring of 1965 General Westmoreland's staff prepared a

full-blown IICommander ' s Estimate of the Situation. 1I The estimate,
deliver ed to Washington at the beginning of April, examined three
cours es of action for dealing with the crisis in South Vietnam. Among
t hese was an accelerated RVNAF build-up.
Even by accelera,ting the rate of ARVN expansion, COMUSIVlACV con-

cluded, the ratio of ARVN to VC battalions would decline by the end of
1965 from 1.7:1 to 1.6:1. General Westmoreland rejected this alterna-
tive on the grounds that it could not prevent a VC victory. It "wuld
t ake too long to accomplish the build -up and there was little a,s surance
that ARVN performance would match that of a constEmtly improving enemy .
(His lack of confidence in ARVN is further reflected in his argument
f or U.S. forces, in 'which he estimated that one U.S. Army battalion is
the fighting equivalent of two ARVN battalions and one Marine BLT the
equivalent of three ARVN battalions. ) 134/
The se reservations notvTi thstanding, Westmoreland had requested

authorization on 20. March to implement the Alternative 2 RVNAF strength
increas es proposed by him the previous November. After the April 1-2
conference in Washington and a review of the IIComma,nder ' s Estimate, II the
JC S r ecommended approval a,nd Secretary McNa,mara agreed on 12 April to
expand RVNA.F by an additional l7,2L~7 spaces. An additional 160. U.S.
advisors were approved at the same time. 135/ In la,te May , the JCS
asked the Secretary of Defense to authorize MAP support for another
2,369 ARVN spaces to fatt en out division bases for the eventual creati on
of a t enth ARVN division out of exist:Lng separate regiments. 136/ This
request was approved on 4 June . 137/
Thus , while it was decided not to continue to depend exclusively on

l arger Vietnamese forces with U.S. a,ir and naval support, the plan wa,s
to conduct a modest expansion of ARVN in conjuncti on with the deployment
of U.S. forces. In the event , even the modest plans went down the drain
in t he aftermath of the heavy casualt ies susta,ined in combat during late
May and early June. On 7 June, General Westmoreland informed CINCPAC
and t he JCS that a moratorium on RVNAF build-up was unavoidable because
trainees in the pipeline would have to be used as fi llers for existing
units. 138/ .
The U.S. build-up continued during the spring and early swmner ,
particularly as a result of ARVN reverses in combat . By the end of July
there were 18 US/ FW combat maneuver battalions deployed in South Viet-
nam. In the same message in which he advised of the halt in ARVN
To.P SECRET - Sensitive

expansion, General Westmoreland had requested a significant increase

in the number of U,S, troops for Vietnam (the famed 11 4~·-Battalion"
request ) . After more than a month of deliberation, the President
finally approved the reCluest sometime in mid-July. His historic
announcement of the expanded U, S, effort came on 28 July'-x- Under-
standably, this momentous eKpansion of the U.S, i nvolvement in the
"Tar completely overshado"\<Ted the advisory progre,m and the gro"rth of
RVNAF dur'ing the remainder of 1965.
NEW FOSSIBII,ITIES
But the deployment of U. S, force s to South Vietnam did, how·ever ,

open up a nel'1 range of possible relationships which would not have
been possible "\<Tithout the pres ence of substantial U.S, combat forces.
Each of these relationships might conceivably promote one or all of
the several purposes "\<Thich this study has reasoned to be behind the
U.S. military advisory effort: the development of improved tactical
and technical competence in RVNAF, the generation of better intelligence
(both friendly and enemy), and increased U.S. influence.
Two categories of ne,'T relationships "\<Tere consider ed : the encadre-

ment of U.S. and ARVN units (in several forms ) and the establishment of
a joint command to conduct the war. Both of these cours es were r ejected
by COMUSMACV. In their place General Westmoreland attempted to create
a Joint US -RVNAF staff to coordinate independent national efforts . The
basic arrangement enabling tactical independence--within limits- -was the
creation of mutually· exclusive Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORs )
for each combat maneuver force.
ENCADREME1~ CONSIDERED AND REJECTED

Deficiencies in ARVN leadership had long been r ecognized by U.S.
military advisors as one of the key impediments to increased ARVN
performance. In April, "Then the first major imput of U, S. combat troops
took place, consideration "\<Tas given to the enca,drement of U. S. officers
i n ARVN units as a way of solving this problem. The proposal was touched
off by a DoD reques t on 1 5 April for COMUSM.A.CV's opinion about the feasi-
bility of using U.S. cadres to improve effectiveness in the ten ARVN
divisions. lW The same day, McGeorge Bundy sent , a persona\NODIS
message to Ambassador Taylor stating among other thlngs, that The
President has repeatedly emphasized his per sone,l desire for a strong
exper iement in the enc8,drement of U. S. t roops with the Vietnamese . 11 140/
General Westmoreland turned the i ssue over to his deputy, Genera,l .
Throckmorton, for a recommendat ion. Throckmorton ' s study considered
-)(- See Task Force Pape'r Iv.c.6., Phase One in the Build-Up of U.S. Forces :
The Debate, March-July 1965.

three alternative encadrement possibihties: (1) ass'Wnption of officer

and senior NCO command positions by U. S. personnel i'li thin the designated
ARVN battalions; (2) assignment of U.S. personnel as staff officers, and
i n technical and specialist positions within the battahons; cmd (3) the
employment of U. S. troops e,s fire support elements ,<1i thin ARVN·- commcmded
battalions. Two critical difficulties apphcable to all of these schemes
were identified: the l anguage barr ier and the expanded support require-
ment that would be generated for U.S. personnel. Another negative factor
we,s the expected adverse effect of any such step on South Vietne,mese
morale. These formed the basis for Genera l Throckmorton ' s recommendat ion
that encadrement be r e jected. COMUSMACV endorsed his deputy ' s recommenda-
tion and the general encadrement idee, ,<10,13 officially pronounced dead
during the 18 April Honolulu Conference. 141/ Only three days had
elapsed from the birth of the proposal to its burial.
MARIl\1E COMBIl\1ED ACTION PLATOONS (CAPs )
But while general encadrement was effectively killed by COMUSI~CV

a specific, limited experiment in encadrement was begu..Yl l ater in the
year almost off-handed1y by the U,S. Mar ines near Phu Bai. Since the
Marine units had been assigned TAORs l arger than they could secure,
innovative commanders sought ways to maximize local security resources.
In June , a company commander of the 3d Battalion, ~·th Marines near Phu
Bai assigned a few Marines to the villages in his tactical area to work
with the Popular Forces platoons. Marine l eadership, training, and access
to powerful fire support brought measurable improvement in the PF units.
As a result the Commanding General, 1st ARVN Division, placed six PF
platoons under the operational control of the Marine battalion.
By November, the effort rea. achieved such results that it Vias brought
to the attention of the CG III MAF . Later that month an agreement was
r eached between the I Corps Commander and the CG III MAF permitting the
integrat ion of Marine squads into PF platoons in the DaNang area to
improve their effectiveness and stiffen their combat performance. The
basic unit of the nevI venture '1<10,13 the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) formed
by adding a Marine Rifle Squad of 14 men plus a Navy corpsman to a PF
platoon (32-38 authorized strength ). The PF platoon retained its own
organization and the int egrated Marines advised the entire unit, living
with it, sharing its food, conducting combined patrols, and training
counterparts. At the end of 1965 , there were seven such Combined Action
Platoons, but the success of the experiment in enhancing PF performance
and extending security prompted a r apid expansion during the next year~
The Marines have continued to press for expansion of this program and to
see in it an effective method by which to produce incr ee,sed performance in
PF units. Critics have noted tha t the Marine advisors quickly become
de facto leaders of the CAPs and argued that a higher level of current
p erformance is purchased at the cost of stultifying the development of
South Vietnamese lea dership. No general consensus has developed on the
relative merits of this assumed trade - off.

1:- ,
! _' I TOP SECRET - Sensitive
JOINT COMMAND CONSIDERED AND REJECTED
The 1965 commitment of U.S. forces also prompted a high level

U.S. debate on the advisability of creating some form of unified
combined command. The question was first raised in Wa,shington in
mid-March when General H. K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, r eturned
from a visit to Vietnam vlith the recommendation for deployment of
U.S . combat forces. 142/ The idea had the same conceptual origins
as the encadrement proposals, namely that if RVNAF could be commanded
by or associa,ted with U.S. troops it might be molded at last into an
effective fighting force. In addition, such a, unified allied command
would have given the senior commander --presumably CO~illSMACV--far
greater freedom to deploy forces and fight the war in the straight··
forward pursuit of unambiguous objectives, rather than restricting
him to coordination with Vietnamese counterparts whose motivations at
all times were a composite of political and personal as well as mili-
tary considerations.
When queried on the matter, General Westmoreland opposed any

formal merging of comma,nds, preferring instead the maintenance of
informal cooperation and coordination together with a limited combined
staff under an American chie f with a Vietnamese deputy. This arra,nge-
ment would better assuage the GVN ' s sensitivities to questions of sover eignty
and "neo-colonialism. " Full integra tion of cOImU8,nd, General Westmoreland
advis ed, should be deferred Ul1til some later time when the influx of U.S.
forces might require it and GVN sensibilities might be more dispos ed to
its acceptance. 143/ In May, Secretary McNama ra authorized the creation
of a formal combined authority in Vietnam. 14)+/ But since both Ky and
Thieu had just publicly condemned any joint cOlmnand idea in press inter-
views, both Ambassador Taylor and General vlestmoreland recommended against
the proposed action. 14 5/ CINCPAC backed up COMUSMACV's concern about
alienating the South Vietnamese :
Refs A and B [flaigon message 3855, 2~ May; and COMUSMACV

message 17292, 240603Z May? again point out the formidable
disadvantages which obstruct early establishment of a,ny formal
combined command authority in South Vietnam. I am fully in
accord with the views of the Ambassador and General Westmoreland
in this regard.
The long-range nature of the actions directed by Ref C

PCS msg 3159, 142228z Mail is recognized. At the same time
it is apparent that we should anticipate continued public
speculation as to the purpose and illotive of any consolidation
of multi-national forces into a single command if we pursue
even the most limited measures. Although a combined command
might generate an outward illusion of unity, rne,ny divisive influ-
ences will remain at work beneath the surface to exa cerbate cla ims
of American neo-colonialism and self-assmned leadership.
61 TOP SECRET - Sensit ive

Conventional operations of Corps-level magnitude, in

contrast to counterinsurgency operations, would of course
require closer coordination and possibly some form of inter-
national comma,nd mechanism. Until a combined command is
clearly in Our best interests we should continue to stimulate
RVN resolve to. fight a counterinsurgency vlar which is and
must remain their primary responsibility. Premature experi-
mentation vIi th new command arrangements "ivould be counter-
productive should it weaken nationa l uBity within the RVNAF
or promote a feeling of apathy in the countryside. 146/
TAORs, SENIOR ADVISORS, AND A COMBINED STAFF
These exchanges effectively ended the question of unified command .

In the absence of unity of command , General Westmoreland had already
accepted the concept of the Tactics,l Area of Responsibility (TAOR ) ,
an expedient coordinating mechanism originally worked out between the
local ARVN commanders and the Marines defending the DaNang perimeter .
The concept was a practical one for a war in which there are no front
lines and in which military units operate throughout the country.
Specific geographic areas were assigned to specific units who then
had exclusive authority and responsibility to operate ,·d .thin them.
Military units could not enter or fire into another unit ' s TAOR without
the permission of its commander. Subsequently, the concept would raise
some problems as the requirement for rapid redeplo~nent and the extensive
use of air mobility made such formal, fixed arrangements awkward . But
in 1965 the TAOR provided a simple and effective solution to the coordine,-
tion problem raised by units under different conwands operating throughout
the country . Its adoption may be viewed as an attempt to provide limited,
t erritorial unity of comma nd in the absence of an overall, national
unifying mechanism.
. General Westmoreland attempted to compensate for this absence of

unity (\vhich he had endorsed for non-military reasons ) by the creation
of a combined coordinating staff at the national l eve l and by making
the senior U.S. military commanders a l so the senior mil itary advisor
within their respective areas of concern . In April he decided to r aise
with the GVN the question of a combined MACV-JGS staff . (He had alree,dy
extended the tour in RVN of the general of'f i cer he had chosen to head
t his staff. ) Such e, staff might have permitted the devel opment of
agreed operational plans based upon agreed priorities . I t would have
b een a possible intermediate step toward unity of effort . But the
GVN (represented by Generals Thieu and "Little " Minh ) resisted any.
suggestion for an integrating mechanism of this kind . The proposal vias
quietl y dropped. ~~
.,.,.... ,

On the U.S. side, where his suggestions had the force of orders,
General lilestmorela,nd took one step to integrate the U.S. combat a,nd
advisory functions. The Commanding General,· III Marine Amphibious
Force, the senior U.S. officer in the area, WB,S designated on 7 August
as the Senior Advisor to the ARVN I CTZ Commander. The former U.S.
Senior Advisor became th e Deputy Senior Advisor under CG, III MAF,
although no further integration of the advisory structure into the
U. S. chain of command wa,s attempted. This pattern was soon extended
to the other two Corps a,reas "\\There major U.S. units vTere operating.
The latter changes ·were made at the insistence of the ARVN Corps
Commcmders vlho felt that they vTOuld suffer a loss of prestige i f they
were " advised" by anyone other than the senior U.S. officer in the .
zone. Thus, on 21 October, the cormnander of Hq, Field Force, Vietnam
(FFORCEV), with operational control of all U.S. units in II Corps,
was also named II Corps Senior Advisor. On 1 December, CG, 1st Infantry
Division was named III Corps Senior Advisor, fol101·ring the pattern
already established. No such arrangement "\"as made, however, in IV Corps
since the U.S. he,d no major units deployed there. 1~8/ Later, when
U.S. force deployments had led to the establishment of another FFORCEV
h eadquarters, ea,ch ARVN Corps Commander vms advised by a U.S. Lieutenant
General "Tith equivalent U. S. responsibilities and aU. S. general officer
was appointed Senior Advisor in the Delta, area, vThich had no U.S. combat
maneuver units.
LEVERAGE: THE HIDDEN ISSUE
It is relevant to ask why Ca~SMACV (backed up without exception

by the Ambassador and CINCPAC) uniformly opposed integrative measures
de signed to provide that "Thich was and is almost an article of faith
in the military profess:l.on--unity of command. U.S. troops in both
World Wars and in Korea had fought under at least nominal command unity .
There had been reservations for national integrity, to be sure, but the
principle of unified comma,nd was both established and generally accepted.
Why then did the U. S. military commander in Vietnam recommend a,gainst
i ts adoption?
The answer to this question is not to be found by an examination of

military factors. The issue, rather, vlas a political one, as CINCPAC ' s
message quoted above makes clear . The U.S. military leaders feared the
exacerbations of US-SVN differences which they thought would accompany
an overt Americanization of the WB,r. They vrished to increase U. S. influ-
ence in the conduct of the ,,,ar but only as a result of persuasion and
example. They tended to eschew the use of leverage . A unified comma nd
arrangement would have provided- - assmuing that a U.S. officer would have
been the overe,ll comma,nder--an open and obvious means by vThich to
exerci se l everage . The U.S. leaders in Saigon rejected its adoption
for this reason.

WITHDRAWING FROM OVERT INFLUENCE
~'h e r e j ection of a unified mili ta,ry command is only one example

of the tendency in 1965 to renounce leverage oriented mechanisms at
the very time that the U.S. was committing major land forces to the
·war. It was a,s though the U. S. increased its determination to avoid
arrangements which smacked of direct, open leverage at the same time
that the inadequacy of earlier, indirect measures was made obvious by
the deployment to South Vietnam of U. S. ground comba,t forces.
This may, in fact, be what happened. Some sporadic earlier attempts

at leverage had not borne the desired fruit. Ambassador Taylor had had
a disastrous experience in trying to use the U.S. decision to commence
bombing North Vi etnam as a lever to get GVN reform in December 1964. The
net outcome vms a violent react ion by General Khanh, vlho very nearly
had Taylor thrown out of the country as personna non gre,ta. In the end,
it was Khanh who went, but the politica l turmoil that this produced in
the first months of 1965, when the course of the Vial' was taking a drama,tic
turn against the GVN, convinced Taylor that such a,ttempt s should not be
made aga in at the na;tiona l level. -x-
Concurrently, one of the most direct U.S. tools for influencing

policy implementat ion at lower l eve ls, the j oint sign-off for release
of piaster funds for pacification, was a l so being abandoned . The decision
was made in December 1964 by the USOM Director, Mr. Killen . Early in
1965, AID stopped buying piaster s for the U.S.-controll ed sector funds and,
i n June, agreement was reached with the GVN for province chiefs to begin
r equisitioning and releasing AID commodities on their own authority. 149/
Thus , the "troika sign-off" came to an end. While elaborate a,rrangements
w·ere made for getting reports of U.S. advisor concurrence or non-concurrence,
t he practical effect was to remove the advi sor ' s l everage and restrict
h is i nfluenc e . In October, USOM began to have second thoughts on the
wi sdom of abandoning control of its resources in the fie l d and proposed
a r estoration of the "troika, sign-off. 11 The Mission Council endorsed the
plan and had a,lready la,unched discussions vlith the GVN vlhen the State
Department objected to the i dea, insisting that it would undermine our
efforts to make the Vietnamese more independent and effective. 150/ There
the matter died.
I n a somewhat related effort to overcome the delays i n the Vietnamese

pacification system, lf~CV acceded to its advisors ' recmnmendations and ,
on 1 October, created a separate contingency fund of 50 , 000 pia,sters for
each subsector ( district ) advisor to be used for urgent proj ects. Se ctor
a dvisors were also given access to special funds . The program was highly
success.fLJ.l and toward the end of the year consideration was given to
permanent establishment of such revolving funds. 151/ The plan Vlas
* See Task Force Paper IV . C., Evolution of the War : US/ GVN Relations,
1963-67, Part I , pp. 5Lf-59 .

abandoned, however, after the four-month trial period due to the strong
opposition of the GVN Minister for RD, General Thang, who contended that
such funds were undermining the legitimate efforts of his organization
to meet urgent province needs; it would encourage Vietnamese dependence
on the U,S, 152/
But USOM did use successfully a form of direct, selective leverage

in the late summer of 1965. The Province Chief of Binh TUy Province,
Lt Colonel Chi, wa,s accused of misusing some $250,000 in AID :funds.
\<]hen USOM pressure on the GVN for his removal produced no results, aid to
the province was suspended on 23 Sept~mber, and USOM field personnel were
wi thdral'll1. In spite of Chi 1 S friendship with the Defense Minister and
Deputy Premier, General Co, Premier Ky removed him six weeks later.
Aid to the province then restuned, but Ambassador Lodge made it clear to
the Mission COUllCil that he disapproved of the action and did not want
it repeated (particularly the press coverage ). 153/
As already indicated, both Ambassadors Taylor (aft er his near-

disastrous experience in December 1964 ) and Lodge preferred not to force
the GVN or attempt to use high-level pressure to reach solutions we
felt necessary. The fragility of the political arrangements in Saigon
at any point in time seemed to dictate against any U.S. action that
might precipitate coups or disruption from elements even less disposed to
be cooperative than the current group, whoever they might be . In this
vi ew , the successive Ambassadors were strongly supported by the State
Department, Thus, 1iThile ,'I"e resented the Ky coup in June, we did nothing
to exacerbate our delicate relations with Ky . In July, during Secretary
McNama,ra 1 s visit, the GVN requested a devaluation of the piaster and a
hefty incr ease in aid. 15 Lf/ Rather than us e the request as an oppor-
tunity to press the GVN for action on matters of U,S. concern, Ambassador
Taylor preferred to restrict our counter-demands in the interest of quick
agre ement :
We would avoid gl vlng the impr ess ion of asking for ne1iT
agreements or imposing conditions for our increa.se AID .. , .
We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be
r ejected or to require prolonged debate . 155/
Consequently, agreement was reached between the two governments on

~8 July, providing only for " joint discussions to precede policy
decisions ... for control of inflation," a,nd scarcely mentioning GVN
obligations. 156/
McNA.MARA 1 S MINORITY POSITION ON LEVERAGE
The only consistent supporter of increasing and exercising U,S.

l everage with the GVN during 1965 was Secretary McNamara. As previously
noted, he vIas one of the pri.ncipal proponents of the j oi.nt comma.nd idea
and a supporter of the encadrement proposals. In April, the Defense

/ C.( TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Department had l e,unched an ill-fated effort to have U,S, Army civil

affairs officers introduced in the provinces to assure competent ,
corruption-free civil administration in the combat zones. 157/ Ambassa-
dor Taylor's stout opposition he,d killed the proposal, but the Secretary
continued to push for stronger U. S. action "ri th the GVN. After his
July visit to Saigon he sent a memorandum to the President urging the
U. S. to l ay do,m terms for its continuing assistance before the intro-
duction of more U, S. forces. He suggeste.d that "re exercise l everage
through our control of rice policy and gain a "veto on major GVN
commanders , statements about inv8,ding NVN, and so on. " 158/
Again in November, McNama,ra recorded his impatience with the GVN

and his belief that we should give a larger and more active role to our
advisors at the province and district level. 159/ But the overall U,S.
approach to the GVN in 1965 was dominated by our felt need for any kind
of governmental stability which lv-ould provide a bas e from Iv-hich to
conduct the war. Proposals for taking a, tough line were Ividely regarded
as rugs that if pulled out from under the GVN "rould bring it crashing
do,m, rather than as levers that might bring effective change .
U. S. PROPOSALS FOR GVN EXECUTION: AN EXAMPLE
With leverage-oriented arre,ngements effectively ruled out, U,S,

advisors in South Vietna,m were left with the alternatives of advising
their counterparts only on ho1'7 best to conduct a decided course or of
expanding their advice to embrace what ought to be undertaken. The
t endency was to fo11o,-7 the latter COil'rse, to urge upon GVN plans and
programs American in concept and design for execution by the South Viet-
namese. The Chieu Hoi ( "Open Arms" for VC who return voluntarily to
GVN control ) program was one example of this tendency . The Hop Tac
(" cooperation, " in Vietnamese ) program, to clear and hold the immediate
area around Saigon, is a,nother. Hop T8,C ' s significance with respect
t o U.S, advisory activities resides in the fact that i t was the most
concerted attempt to apply the "oil blot" concept to rural pacification
since the demise of the Strategic Hamlet Progr8Jl1 . Its failure can be
attributed in large measure to GVN lack of interest in and support for
what was widely regarded 8,S an "American" program .
The idea of a special combined US/ GVN effort to secure the critical
area ringing Saigon ,vas first advanced by Ambassador Lodge in July 1964,
at the Honolulu Conference . His concern with the problem vlent back to
l ate 1963 when the re-appraisals of the war following Diem ' s overthrow
r evealed a dangerous deterioration in the III Corps area. A special
USOM report on Long An Province had particul8,rly troubled the Ambassa,dor.
In July 1964, as he was returning from his first tour in Vietnam, he
proposed a special effort in eight provinces (Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Hau
Nghia , Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Vinh Long, and Quang Ngia ) , all but
one of which was near Saigon. The proposal was picked up by Ambassador
Taylor and the program set in motion during the S1.UD1ner of 1964. The
.. 66 TOP SECRET - Sens itive

Declassified per Exec utive O rder 13526, Section 3,3
r?
, '
initial objective ,'laS to stabilize the situation around Saigon and

protect the capital, then extend the zone of security in an ever
w'idening ring around the city. MACV appointed Colonel Je,sper J. Wilson
to head the effort and by September 1964 a plan had been produced and
the Vietnamese reluctantly induced to set up 13, special council to
coordinate the multiple commands operating in the area. The ple,n
created fOUr roughly concentric zones around the capite,l, each to be
successively cleared a,nd secured, working from the fl inside of the
doughnut out. fI Conceptually, three phases ,{ere involved in each zone:
first, search and destroy missions to eliminate main force units ; then
a clearing phase using primarily squad and pla,toon size forces in patrols
and ambushes; and finally, the securing phe,se in uhich ARVN turned over
responsibilities for security in 13, zone to RF/ PF and natione,lpolice e,nd
i n vfhich heavy emphasis was to be laid on positive rural economic and
social development efforts.
Hop Tac was launched on 12 September 1964, 'I'lith a sweep through

Gia Dinh Province to the west and south'l'lest of Saigon by the ARVN 51st
Re giment. The mission vias aborted the following de,y, however, by wi th-
dra,'lal of the forces to participate in a coup. Nevertheless, organizational
ef'forts continued and more ARVN forces VTere concentrated in the Hop Tac
area. A special survey of the e,rea by USOM, USIS, a,nd MACV in October
r evee,led that little real progress was being made. In spite of the lack
of any visible evidence of genuine momentum, the Ambe,sse,dor and MACV
c ontinued to be encouraged by the modest statistical progress of Hop Tac
at a time when nearly every other activity in the country lool<;:ed blacker
and blacker . The 1964 MACV Command History reflects the official view:
fiA t the end of 196~" Hop 'I'ac wo,s one of the few p8,cificat:Lon areas that
shovTed some success and greater promise. fI 160/
Whether in response to Hop Tac or not , the VC substantially incr ee,sed

their forces in the Hop Tac area in the first six months of 1965 . ~~CV
estimated the growth at 65 percent and also noted that the ne,'l troops
were frequently equipped I'd th Chinese vleapons . This growth in enemy
strength in turn prompted some r e deployment of RVNAF to strengthen capa-
bilities in the Capital Milita,ry Region. In February, 1965, just at
the time the U. S .. 'I'las initiating the sustained bombing of North Vietnam
and beginning the first Me,rine combat deployments i n the South, COMUSMACV
asked the I and IV Corps senior advisors to review current programs and
to develop Hop Ta c-like plans for their respective areas as a, bas is
for discussion with their counterparts . Ge nera,l Westmoreland hoped to
concentrate the available resources of each Corps into its most critical
ar eas at a time when VC activity and successes we re continually mounting
and enemy control of the country increasing dangerously . Again, the
operative concept vras to be the oil blot. By April General We stmoreland
had convinced Minister of the Armed Forces Minh to ask each of the ARVN
Corps Comme,nders (except III Corps, in 'I-Thos e area Hop Tac was b e ing
conducted ) to dra.w up similar plans for their ovm areas of re sponsibility .

Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3
It "'; TOP SECRET - SensUi ve
The U.S. effort was clearly aimed at spurring the practical

application of the "oil blot" analogy. The effects, however, Here
to demonstrate how difficult it w'as to translate simple counter insurgent
theory into practice, hOyT convoluted and persona,l were the ARVN lines
of influence, and hOI'!' frustrating it vJaS under these circumstances to
exercise influence by persuasion.
In May, the Prime Minister proposed organizational changes in

Hop Tac to retur'n much of it to the operational control of the III
Corps commander. These changes vTere rej ected by CO]\1USJVlACV, but he did
agree that the III Corps commander might be named chairman of the
Hop Ta,c Council. In June, before anything could be done on this pro-
posal , a coup ,'lith General Kyat its head returned the military to
power . By the summer of 1965, Hop Tac was being completely aver-
shadawed by the build-up af U.S. farces.
In September, Ladge returned to' Vietnam far his secand stint as

Ambassadar. He immediately asked a U.S. Missian afficer far a private
assessment af the Hap Tac pragram. The repart frankly described Hap Tac
as a failure and stressed as reasans the unrea,listic gaals af the program,
th e irr elevance of the cancentric circle concept to' actual areas af GVN
and VC strength, the fact that it Vias an American plan never really given
first priority by the Vietnamese, the area ' s pali tical vulnera,bili ty to'
fallaut fram Saigon palitica,l changes, and General Ky ' s lack af suppart
far it. The repart recammended letting Hap Tac slavTly die. On September
15, the Missian Cauncil deliberated incanclusively an the fate af the
pragram:
General Westmoreland said that while Hap Tac cauld be

said anly to' have been abaut 50% successful, i t had undoubtedly
a verted a VC seige af Saigan. Ambassadar Ladge then briefly
r eviewed the original reasans far the emphasis place d an the
area surraunding Saigon and said that they v{ere still valid,
primar ily because of the heavy density of population . He nated ,
however , l ack of a clear cammitment to' Hap Tac an the part af
the GVN, possibly due to the fact that the Vietnamese consider
the program an American scheme . The view was also expressed
that the trouble may also lie in US/GVN differences over some
fundamental concepts in Hap Tac. 161/
By the end of 1965, the prapa sal for Hop Tac programs in I, II, and
IV Corps had refined itself into the scheme for National Priority Areas
that became the focus of attention in 1966. Hap Tac itself, i n the
Saigon vicinity, continued on intO' 1966 to be finally phased out at the
end of the year and r eplaced by the III Carps R/ D Council and a U.S.
military effort to protect the capital known as Operation FAIRFAX.

As a test case for the ever popular oil blot theory of pacifica-
tion, Hop Tac left much to be desired. It did, hOlvever, point up some
of the difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to implement this
appealingly simple--and perhaps simplistic--concept. The oil blot theory,
like all abstract analogies, emphasizes the similarity between phenomena
and ignores the differences. The important similarity of the pacification
problem to the oil blot is the expressed goal of progressively extending
the secure zone until it embraces the entire country. Unlike a blank
piece of paper, however, the enviromnent in which pacification must take
place is neither neutral nor passive; and unlike the oil blot, the
pacification forces are not impervious. Moreover, implicit in the theory
is. the notion that the secure a,rea, like the oil blot, \vill expand in all
dir ections simulta,neously, at roughly the same speed, and tha,t expansion
is irreversible and irrevocable. Further, the analogy fails to take into
account unique problems of terrain or variances in government and insurgent
strength in different areas. One need not belabor the point; the concept
is fine as a theory, but not as a program design. In fairness, it must
be said that the idea does focu s the need for concentra,tion of resources
in priority areas. All this notwithstanding, III Corps was less than the
optimum pla,ce to test such a program. It contains several longtime Viet
Cong strongholds and base areas and is extraordinarily sensitive to polit-
i cal changes in Saigon (28 of 31 district chiefs were replaced during the
lifetime of Hop Tac ) .
The most important reason for the failure of Hop Tac, however, was
the lack of South Vietnamese support for it. From its inception to its
demise, it was an American idea, plan, and program. While the GVN adopted
it, established a high-leve l council. to supervise it, and committed some
troops and other resources to it, this was seen as a way of appeasing the
Americans. The South Vietnamese never accorded Hop Tac a high priority
in their own thinking. Moreover, its l ow status vIas further emphasized
by the massive U.S. force build-up. As this U.S. build-up became rela-
t ively routinized, however, the issue of pacification reasserted itself . *
When it did so, the primary U. S. concern came to focus on the issue of ho'\v
b est to organi ze the military, paramilitary, a,nd civilian advisory efforts.
Since even the civilian advisors in the field were military personnel on
loan in many instances, the account of the military advisory build-up
decisions became essentially an account of organizing advice for pacifica-
tion.
* See Task Force Paper, Vol. IV.c.8., Reemphasis on Pacification: 1966-

1967.
/ I~- TOP SECRET - Sensitive
D. Orga,nization a,s the Key to Effectiveness

in Pacification (196b-i9b7)
THE BASIS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL PREOCCUPATION
Several factors contr1buted to the persistent U.S. preoccupation

in 1966 and 1967 with reorganizing the advisory effort in order better
t o support pacification activities. First , it ha,d been an article of
faith for several years within U.S. policym0,king circles that only by
winning the "other war" of pacification could the U.S. hope to realize
i ts obj ecti ves in South Vietnam. Secondly, the pac ifica,tion struggle
was still regarded essentially as a taslt to be performed by the GVl\T --
as the "main force wB,r " no longer was after the introduction of ·major
U.S. combat forces. Reinforcing this belief was a third factor, the
widely held conviction that U.S. forces could best concentrate on the
main force war while RVNAF focused on pacification .
Such a U.S. RVNAF division of effort, it was reasoned, would permit

U. S. forces to take a,dvantage of their greater ta,ctical mobility and fire
support without enda,ngering civilian life and property, employ RVNAF in
a manner calculated to minimize the adverse effects of its persistent
inability to generate an offensive-minded ~, and avoid the cultural
acclimitization and langua,ge difficulties "l'lhich would face U. S. forces
i n the pacification role. It seemed, in short, that RVNAF concentration
on pacification and U.S. concentration on the main force enemy would con-
stitute the optimal use of available resources.
This division of effort meant that most U. S. military advisors "I"ould

be directly involved in pacification -- at l east periodically if not con-
tinuously . Advisors to regular ARVN units could expect to spend a consid-
erable portion of their time securing pacification programs . Those
advisors whose counterparts had political and administrative responsibil-
i ties (e.g., province and district advisors) and paramilitary advisors
(RF and PF ) could expect pacification to be their major concern.
But "lvhile the maj ori ty of U. S. military advisors would be engaged

i n pacification activities they would not be the only U.S. advisory
personnel whose responsibilities focused on pacification programs .
Advisors from USOM, CAS, and USIS had overlapping and in some instances
competing responsibilities. Thus it "lvas l ogical for the U. S. to attempt
to devise an organizational framework which would serve to coordinate
adequately the activities of the lar ge and diverse body of advisors and
which would be ca,pable to integrate their overla,pping functions .

Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Secti on 3,3
NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
At the beginning of 1966, three important issues concerning the

pacification effort were unresolved. Ea.ch of these issues vTaS tenta-
tively resolved during late 1966 or in 1967 -- i n the sense that
decisions were made rather than tha.t these decisions were final. The
remainder of 1967 ~l1d early 1968 (until the Tet offensive ) constituted
a period of consolidation and refinement based on limited experimentation .
The shock caused by the Tet offensive then brought to the fore new ques-
tions of RVNAF effectiveness and of U.S.-RVNAF roles and missions.
The first of the unresolved issues in 1966 was tha.t of which U. S.

agency or group should take the lead in coordinating pacification programs .
The role which RVNAF should assume in support of pacifica.tion VTas the
second unresolved issue. Finally, the extent to which the U.S. should
be willing to exert leverage in order to influence pacifica.tion acti vi ties
was also unresolved a.t the beginning of 1966.
The following account of the decisions addressed to these three

issues may seem to suggest that a master list of probl ems was somehoi'T
approached as part of an orderly, comprehensive , logica~ process. This
i s not, of course, the way it happened. The policy process was confusing
and the policymakers were occasionally confused. Decisions were made in
the reflection of both U.S. and South Vietnamese domestic pressures and
in the shadow of an on-going war . They were a.ffected by personalities
on all sides and involved no small a.mount of bureaucratic in-fighting.
The account that fo l lows attempts to reorder and to expl ain this evolu-
t i on , not to recreate it.
WHO SHALL LEAD?
The "reemphasis on pacification, " as a.nother study in this series

aptly names it , may conveniently be dated from the Honol ulu Conference
of February 1966. * With the build-up of U. S. combat forces proceeding
rapidly and with expectations high that 1966 would see the U. S. take the
offensive, policy attention returned to address the "other war " in \·rhich
t he object was to provide rural security followed by steps to improve
l iving levels and establish a link between the GVN and its populace.
President Johnson made it clear in'his informal remarks to the conferees
at Honolulu that he vTanted concrete results to follovT t he spl endid
phrases of the U. S. -GVN communique:
Preserve this communique, because it is one we don ' t

want to forget. It will be a kind of bible that we are
going to follovl. When we come back here 90 days from no,v ,
or six months from now, we are going to ste.rt out to the
-x- Task Force Paper, Evolution of the v.[ar : Reemphe.sis on Pacification,

1965-1967, Part 11:----

Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3
NND Proj ect Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1
the announcements that the President, the Chief of State

and the Prime Minister made ... . You men VIho are responsible for
thes e dep8,rtments, you ministers and the staffs associated
with them in both governments, bear in mind VIe are going to
give you an examination and the "finals" will be on just what
you have done .
• • • How have you built democracy in the rural areas? HOvl

much of it have you built, vThen 8,nd where? Give us dates,
times, numbers .
. .• Larger outputs, more efficient production to improve

credi t, handicraft, light industry, rural electrific8,tion
are those just phrases, high-sounding words, or have you
"coonskins on the VIall?" 162/
All parties r eg8,rded it as necessary for some mechanism to coordinate

the U.S. advisory activities vrhich would help the Vietnamese to turn
promises into solid accomplishments. But they did not agree on how broad
should be the unit of the coordinator. Was he, or his office, to be
primus inter pares or a single manager? Did effective coordination
require policy primacy or operational supervision -- or both? Above
all, the participants did not agree on which individual or agency should
exercis e whatever supra-departmental authority was needed.
Ambassador Lodge , who had cons istently stressed the centrality of

the "other war, " began by assigning responsibility for all civil support
f or Revolutionary Development (r ead "pacifi cation") to his deputy,
Ambassador Porter. The latter described his concept of his duties in
t raditionalist Foreign Service Officer terms:
Ambassador Porter described briefly his neVI responsi-

bilities as he sees them in the pac ification/ rural develop-
ment area . He pointed out that the basic idea is to place
total responsibility on one senior individual to pull together
all of the civil aspects of revolutionary development . He
sees this primarily as a coordinat ing effort and does not
intend to get into the middle of individual agency activities
a£d responsibilities . As he and his staff perceive areas
"rhich require attention and action by a responsible agency,
he will call this to the attention of that agency for the
purpose of emphasis ; he intends to suggest rather than to
crit i cize. 163/
Porter ' s "coordination by suggestion" approach VIas not only an example

of extremely l imited effective authority, it was al so r estricted explicitly

NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD D ate: 2011
to the civil side of support for pacific8,t ion. Wlether the coordinator-
in-chi ef emerged as a persuader or a director it vTaS cle,3,r that his
charge had to embrace both military and civil advisors. (In this respect
I1 civill1 is more accurate than I1 c ivilian l1 , for 8, sizeable number of the
civil advisory duties had devolved upon active duty military officers
who were 1110aned l1 to other agencies for this purpose.)
It is not surprising that MACV vi ewed itself as preeminent in this

area. It was, as General Westmoreland rightly claimed, the only U.S.
organization Q,dvising the GVN at all l evels and -- in one way or another
in all functions. It was to MACV that General Thang, the Minister of
Rural Construction (read I1pacificationl1) looked for advice and assist-
ance. 164/ It is equally unsurprising that Arnbassador Lodge vTaS of a
differ ent persuasion, as he explained clearly in a memo setting forth his
views to General Lansdale in December 1965:
I consider the government of Vietnam ' s effort in this

domain (apart from the military clearing pha,se ) to be prim8,rily
civilian, economic, SOCi8,1 and political in nature and in its
aims. Consequently , on the American side, it is preferable
that the t wo civilian agencies most directly concerned , i.e.,
USAID and CAS, be the operating support agencies upon whom you
should rely for the implementation of the necessary progra.ms
as they develop. Other sections of the Mission, including MACV ,
JUSPAO ••• should cons ider themselves ass ociated with ••. USAID and
CAS, but not as 8,gEmcies directly responsible for operations .
The foregoing is intended to insure that the number of

persons and agencies contacting the GVN and particularly the
Ministry of Rural Construction, on the subject of pacification
and development is reduced , and in fact is limited to yourself
or your representative, plus the representatives of the two
operating agencies, USAID and CAS. 165/
Operationa l and coordina tive responsibilities remained on this particu-

l ar wicket throughout most of 1966 while Washington fumed over the slow
pace of pacification. These months saw the development of sufficient frus-
t ration in Washington to permit the growth and final acceptance of the
proposal that all U.S. advice for pacification be placed under MACV . An
account of this development is treated more fully in another document in
t his series and will only be summarized here . -l(-
President Johnson ' s Washington coordinator for pacification, Robert W.

Komer , set forth in August 1966 three alternative organizational approaches:
-x- Task Force Paper, Evolution of the War: Reemphasis on Pacifica tio n, 1965-
1967.

NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date : 2011
I f ,(
I'
Alternative No. 1 -- Give LPeputy Ambassador? Porter

operationa l control over all pacification activity .•.•
Alternative No. 2 -- Retain the present separate civil

and military command cha nnels but strengthen the management
structure of both IVJfl.CV and the U. S. Mission ••••
Alternative No.3 -- Assign res onsibility for e,cification

civil and military, to COMUSMACV. 1
Mr. Komer ' s categorization Vlas prescient.Ambe,ssador Lodge ' s personal

preference and the fact that most pe,cification advisors were military
seemed to rule out the first course of action. 167/ The second alter-
native described essentially the organize,tion followed under the. Office
of Civil Operations (OC 0) from November 1966 wTtil June 1967. By this
late date the U,S, decided to follow the third of Komer's alternatives.
The first of these reorganizat ions, that Vlhich created OCO, ·was
quite literally forced upon Ambassador Lodge. Particularly in viel," of
the fact that OCO was to be given only a 90-120 day trial to produce
identifiable results, he vlas not eager to undergo the turmoil and lost
motion of one major reorganization only as a prelude to yet another
reorgani zation. He wanted to retain as much non-military flavor to the
pacification effort as possible -- regarding it as complementary to
military programs, yet separate from them. Military security activities
were, in his view, essentially the negative precondition to pacification
activities which were the positive acts leading the GVN to vitalize
i tself at the same time the,t it developed real ties to its olm people. 168/
CORDS REPLACES OCO
Thus OCO entered the vlOrld foredoomed by the combination of too

short a prescribed life span and the tendency of some of its unwilling
partners to do more than support it tacitly while they maneuvered to
get their blue chips into another basket . Secretary McNamara had recom-
mended in October 1966 that MACV take responsibility for pacifi cation.
Undersecretary of State Katzenbach had marshalled a strong case against
t his step at least until embassy leadership of civil operations vlas given
a chance. The upshot was that it was given half a chance - - which may
have been worse than none at all.
OCO did, however , accomplish the creation and selection of Regional

Directors and OCO ProvInce Representatives. One individual was made
respons ible for all civil operations in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ )
and in each province. The U,S. military chain of command had already
adapted itself to parallel the RVNA,F organization, but bel ow· Corps level
it was more compl ex. Each division \'lithin ARVN ""Tas advised by a senior
advisor (a colonel ) who was given supervisory authority over the mili-
tary Sector ( Province ) Advisors within the Divisional Tactical Area (DTA )

......
for which his division had responsibility. Thus, while civil lines
of authority went directly from corps level (the region ) to province,
the military advisory chain added an additional link at division .
Sector advisors under this arrangement fou,,'1.d themselves \vorking under
a military officer ,.;hose advisory responsibilities ,.;ere a,ctually mili-
tary whereas theirs ,.;ere only partly (and sometimes only nominally )
milite,ry.
OCO attempted to have the ARVN divisions removed from pacification

r esponsibilities, but without success. When the Office of Civil Opere,-
tions and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Has established under
MACV in mid-1967 as the single manager for all pacification a,dvisors, the
is sue could not be argued vIi th the se,me force. For by the time COMUSMACV
asstuued responsibility for pacification (through a civilian deputy --
Ambas sador Komer ) , ARVN had a,lso expanded its role in the pacification
effort. The ARVN division, it could be argued, wa,s a,s much a part of
the pacification effort as were the programs supported by the U.S. civil
a gencies.
But although the argu~ent for removing the Senior Division Advisor
from the U.S. chain of command over provincial advisors lost theoretic
weight vTith i:;he creation of CORDS, the new civilian deputy to COMUSMACV
secured General Westmoreland ' s approval to r emove the division advisors
from the pacification chain of comme,nd and to 'I'lOrk to get ARVN to take
parallel action . This step illustrates the extent to which civil i nflu-
ences were able to operate vTi thin this new se ction of MACV . CORDS was
of such size that it became quasi-independent. One 'I'lould have to carry
an issue in dispute all the vlay to COMUSMA.CV before it moved outside of
CORDS channels.
The comprehensiveness of this reorganization may be seen in the

following MACV Directive, reproduced in its entirety, and especially in
the schematic diagra..rn l aying out the nevI U.S. command structure for a
Corps area:

. .
MACV Dir 10··12
I-IEr\C8 U·1"\l{rj~}~ 11S

UNITED STATES MILITA..F:Y A:SSIS'fANCE CO?VElfAl\'"D, vLETNAM
APe San FrZll;cisco 96222
28 Nfay 1967
NUIvlJ3El~ 10-12 '" (MACCORDS)
1. -PURPOSE.
- - _ _ __ ____ To "-orovide for the ·int2 bcr ration of Civil Operations
and Revolutionary D2veJ.opment Suppo:,t acti.vities within IvfACV.
2. GENERAL.
-----...-
a. To provide for single mana~er direction of all US civil/mjJ.i.~
tary Revolutionary Development activities in the Republic of Vietnam, re-
s ponsibility h,,'.s been assigned to COlvIUSl'vIACV. .
b. The position of I;2puty for Civil Operations and Hevolution?l'y'

De veloprnent Support to COlVlUSl",IACV is est?~blishecl and carries the per··
sOI~al ra nk of Ambassador. The D2puty for Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Sn~pOl't to COlvIUSi\1ACV assists CO~\'IUS MA CV in discharging·
his responsibilities in the field of mHitary 2.nd civIlia.n support to the G\TN'~
Hevolutiona:r y Development I)To~ram. Sl)(~cjnc(llly, he is charged by COMUS~·
MACV with SUperviSillg the formuhtion and execution of all plans ) poliCies
and programs, military and ci.vilia n, w:lich support the GV~IS Hevolutional'Y
Developrnent progran, and related progl·<lrns.
c. All act:biUes and fu nctions of the former Office of Ci vil Opera-

tio ns (OCO) and the MACV Di.rectol'c:..te for Revolutionary D2velopment (RD)
Support ar.e combined in the (,Wce of the Assistant Chief of Staif for Civil
Operations and Revolutionary D8velopment Support (CORDS ).
d. T'ne Assi.stant Chief of Staff for Civil Open_tions and Hevo-

lut.lonary D.:;velOl)ment Support I s assIgned functions as follows:
(1) l...(lvises COMUSIvlf. CV, }\:IACV staJf ·elements and all US

civili8,1l agencies on 2.11 aspec.ts of US cj:vil/ military support for the Govern-.
ment of Vietnam ' s RD I'>rogr-!1.m.
76
'1
l-/iACV Dh' 10··12

28 f!:ay 1967
(2) In CO:;i'..L!~~~:O~l \-liL:, GO':22';;:n02nt 0: Vietnam authorities ,

d8VC-]OpS j oj.n~ and combi:'8d P~~::3, po:~.:;. es) COl"'C:2ptS 2.nd :pl'ogr(~n,s COll-
c el';:i;"~.?·
... ) lJS civi1/'·'1;1;t
... .... .,.1 .... ..",,
J.. ..... ...... .!.. . .i,,) ;. L "'r.·.·
~ .'1 · ve",...·"o".:. • . 1"LiO,,""':
lou .... ·.·.1r., T, V.i.
.ll.,-,"...... "'"" l .......... J
J ..
T' ....",...,10"'n)"'nt
vA j!J.4 v
..;J ....... \ •
(4) Provides c.ci.ViC2 2.nci '.SSiSL2.l1Ce to the Government of

Vietnarl1 , including tl1e IV'iinist:.:y of R8voluti0l12.ry I::;velopment, the R81)1.loUC
of Vietn.:'lm ATmE:cl :Forces Joint G~mer<~l Staff and other GVN agenci.es on US
dvil/r:1jJit;~ry su'ppol't fo:c Revolution:::.ry :C:::velopment including. US advisory
and 106istic2_1 snpport. .
(5) D8velops requirements for military and civIl assets

(US and GVN) to support Revolutionary :Cevelopr';lent.
(6) Serves 2.S tl1e cont2.ct Doint with s ~)onsoring agencies for
R D progT?ms. lvlaintClins l:.:ocison Witll sp~nsorin::>; ag2r:.cies i n l'epresenling
_ t'1eir inte:ccsts ill civil non-RD progl'?J'r:s and activW.es i n the field. Main-
tains direct operational comm1.lniC2.tio;ls with field elements for these pro-
gr2.ms .
. (7 ) I s responsible for !):':'O(;'l'arn coordination with the VariOi..iS

"1 ag;encj.es in the phnr0.ng .2.nd
~·.nSSlOn ClVl
'Ui " ;. <>iD1111ernent2.l:io:1 of nOll- RD .... .
d acu.v:t·~ ..
ties as they impinge upon or 2iiect RD,·~'eJ?.ted 2.CC7.vities . . .
. . .. . (8) Provides )/iA.CV focal point for econo,Dic "lClrf<='cre to

'. i nclude popul ation and resourCes conteol, and for c ivi.::: 8.ctlon by US f orcc~ .
. .. c .... 1-0<' ') 11 ~1· '''1' 1 /'·n ; ii·1.'·a··'y

(9) E v ahl') \,.'-'o.J J. PD
\..
( ....... _
~(lr·tivities
....
\,. . . . . .
i ncluding pro~
~ .. ~J.~_
visio:l of secu:rity for RD by US/PVT.\lA/G\(;.,"f, military fOl'ces and reports on

p rogress, shtus and probJ.erns of RD SU)'Ol't.
(10) Acts on aU RD SUPP01' t po:'icy matters pertaining to sub-

or cJin?_tc eChelons.
(11) Dire c ts ac'('Tl· cO·'-'y

'" , \ hJ..... ),,,,
• C;; 1"tiOll"·)'1·
J.C..., ,. ;roC;
.1oJ . _. ~!....
v'i th GVN on RD and RD ..
I
r elated matters .
3. IMPLEMENTATION...
------._._-
. a. I ntegration and consoliclatiO!l of OCO anclRD Support activities
will be accomplished ?,t all levels : lIe~.c:' ua.rtcl's -:vrA.CV, r egion/ CTZ , pro\'-
i nGe and elis t,'.ic t. . A
77
Ilr
M.ACV Dil' 10-12

28 1'/1ay 19G7
·b. Org2,nizatio!1 fo:: CO::-LDS \vill CO;ltO:'ln ge:!l<2l':llly to the schematic

o!'("I"an;:~~~tio
• b ,: .~':~l
- '...cli.::w"an1 c",.,t·!·,,~l'r.."t
".:>A ......
... \,.;l.L\,;..\.
!'. "" i""
"L
c ............l .lc ..
i-
,. a110\;7)· ""· for c1i fierences i'l Ll)e
: ... ) , • • .1.. 0 . ........... . , .
SlLUa GOl:'::; If! the V:U'lOUS regioDs/CTZ;s, rx:: ovbces and chstncts.
c. Additiona lly , in. (: svcloi.)il~6 cl8t:lileeI o~~g:lnizations and functions

at e~ch level, force commanders/senior aclvism:s will be guide d by U:8 f01-
I Gwir.g pl'incipbs:
(1) Regi.on/CTZ.
. . .' . (a) The OCO ~:egio~ial director will be desi.gnate d the · .. .

D2puty fo r Civil Operations and Revolutiona:::y D.:;velopment Support to the.
force cOlYJrr1ander/serJor advisor . As such ,_ he will be charge d with super··
vising the fOl'1rlUlation and excc'l.:.tion of all military 8-neI civilian plans, poli-
cies 2.nd progr8.ms which support the GVN's RD program t o include civic
action performed by US units.
(b ) For clll li"}ait2J.'S rejecting to HVNAF rrlilitary support

f or Revolutionary D2ve lopm en~, the G<2puty senior ,Hlvisor will operate unclel'
the supervision of the Deputy for CORDS.
(c ) Tne deputy CCO regional di.rector wiU be c:esignatcd

the Assistant D2PUty for Civil O:::erations 2.nd Revolutj.01l2.ry D8velopment
Sup)ort or the Assist2.nt Chief of St.3if, COB])3 . rn this capacity , he will.
head an inte£,:ratecl eivH/ mHitary staff wh:leh parallel.s , ~l.S appropriate , the
1:IiACY COHDS organizc.tiori. Further , he will direct heac::"lll:?. .l'ters··based
RD-relatc d etnel non-RD technicc'..l programs .
. (d) Except for psychological oper2.tions and i ntelligence ,

those elements of the staffs of the force cOl:'1 n1and2r/senior advisor and depui.y
s enior advi.sor eng2.ge~1 primarily in RD Suppox,t activities wi.ll be integrated
i nto the staff of the Assistant D3puty for Civil Operatior.s and RevoluLional'Y
D2velopmei1t Support or the As s ist?nt Chief of Stc>Jf , CORDS. At a later da te ,
aiter on going studies 2.re completed, further guicla:1ce 1118.Y be issued if .
needed for the integration of civil and rnilitary intelligence and psychological
warfare function s which repres8nt special cases,
(2) Province.
(a ) At province , an j.ntegJ'atecl provincial advisory team

c omposed of Uw cun:ent CCO proYi.nciaJ. team a.nd MACV sector adviso r y
team will be org8.nize c1.
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1
II?
MACV Dir 10-1.2

28 J.f..;lY J967
(l" ) "1"'''2' n-'\"

i) II..; .:", .."-:-~;.,,
.J ., V
11 . ............ _ ,... ,. L~.0v"
1 1. ..... t.....1J.~ \"i~l
....... c'~·ntir;UG
v to C2..1'1· 'Y.. out
all ft!::c~io;)s cu:cren;lJ" 1;·">-:',('0"'''',''(; ', '" ,., ,,(',.,,;,; ,~(') l~1.~ 01l""\!(:ol~
... ................ ~ -_..... ... 1._........... ' ihc province Tel')"
... I,. 1:' ........ . ..I. ........... \... •
r cscll(';l.tLv(! ]';-:2.y OI'ganizG, with the 8.:.1,::'01'2.1 of tj18 t2pdy 101' R8volutior~;;,ry
~2VC:· ()l)D'~cnt Su~))ort at regio:1/CTz} f'.is .?21'sormel and functions as he s ees
fit.
(c ) ...A. s ....i ]'(>'l'" . ,~h~

. ::;:, '-' tnam ...... .. .. . . . e{-, cesiO'
:,:, n."'}ed
.......
\,., tl~e Senior Provincial
~ ~
) .. dvisol' , will h:; assigned to C?,Cl1 proi·~r;,-;.e. The sell.i,Ol' provinciC'J advisor
will be chosen by the D.eputy 10l' COR:!::,;':; 2.1;,d the force commander Iseniol'
advisor ) wiLl} the Concurrence of the ~2Dtlty CORDS to COMUSMACV, on U18
basis of seclU'Hy in the province} Ci.iril-~ilitary balanCe in the RD effort ar.d
qualific ations and experience of the cL':;e::.: oeo senior provincial ad\isor
and }.'lACV sector advisor. T:lC in(:iV;'C:C~J.l not selC'c~ccl will servo as t.he
other ' s deputy as well as being his p~'i;-:cipal advisor for civil op2J:'ations or
military st:pport as the c?,se may be .
(d) The J~'O\inC0 ~ '2 ;l io~' ?clvisor will recoive operational

dir8ction Il'orn and report tl,:':01.1Q·j; the 0?;)dy fo::- C()~DS to the force com,·
manc;8r / senio1' acIvisor. The milii<-ll'Y element 01 the provincIal team will
r eceive lo~;i si.:tcal and ac1minlstrath-e SUP1)0:rt from the division advj.sory
t eam.
(e ) Vlhere RVK"'4::'~ U:1its 2_1'e att2,ched to t'le province

c hief for d.irect snpport of RD, aclv5.s0~' S to t;les e units win C01':.18 under U1e
oper?"tional conteol of the serLi..or p~~o\'i:;ce advi.sor .
(f ) The senior D::'ovi;cce8.Qvisor will serve as the Viet-

namese province cl;,ief1s princip?,12~hr:so:c. Howevcr ) technicalaQv"icc ,
military or civil, showd conti!1l:2 to be gi.ven to thc province c hi8i or his
r ep~'2s,~nt.au.ve by the most C1u2~liiied n ;'::l'i;;)81' of the p1'ovinci::tl team. In all
c ases ) the 8en5.0,-, province advlso~~ 111''':'St be aware of the (),clvice gi.ven and
will set thE: poliCies to which advice will corJonn.
(3) District.
(a) At disu'ict an integrated CJsb:ict aclvJsory team

composed of the current l'ifA\;V SUb-S8CtO:C te2.m a;l d oeo cJ5str5.ct repre~
s eni8.t:ivc will be ol'g~rj7.,ed. . ' ,
(b) The nevI dist.rIct team wi.ll b3 responsible for civi1/

• _r . . jCl G~·iNT
mHit81'Y advice t·o •·U....... \ (1ic'h' ~,,,,,;· O~'···~l·.'r'
_~_:.. ':lLD.'O ~,....,..
'l C''',u 11'01' t J1e impJ emcmtation
&,...;.u\.-.o.J • .....,l. AOl...... .......j,(,
r
' • •
of aU US C~VjJ an.d mnita:ry._ sup;:;o~,tPJ.'C2'J'~~rDS at crstdct.
79
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Sec ti on 3.3
NND Proj ect Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
Jt.ACV Dir 10-12

L' 8 1v1<1.Y 1967
. (c ) A sil'~l~~ !:::~;-;':',: chici , C:2si:~n:i.ted Sedor Dist.:::icL Ad-

viso?' will k; assig:12d to e;-tCii CS~l'~cL '2},2 seri.Ol' cU.stl' ici. acivisor will be
ChG!';211 by the sO,lio!" p!'o'/ince ac>:~so;' '·,:·iLl tl~8 concurrence of the D2i.~:":~ Y
C Or~D.3 to tile force COnl]}~anc::;j-/::;c;·;:i.o.:' ~~ci\'iso!' o;'~ the basIs of secul'ity i:1
t he c;i:3h-ict, civil-milHa).'y b;:l;~;:(;C i:, t;.. c: RD c-fIo:'~ <1.:td ClUcdific2,tions ~ncl
CXl~c::::ience of the C1.:rTer:t ceo c:istrict l':2?J:'esent.1.t.ivc and i·lACV sub-sector
:-l-UViS01'. ':i 'he j.ncUvicual not selected v;ill ·serv8 as the other ' s c1epd")' ?S well
as being his princi.pal aclvi.sor for civil Ol;ej'ations or milit.1.l'Y support 3.S tile
c ase may be. . .
(d) Where no Cleo cJ. str ict rl;presentaUve is present,

the I'!"J..P.. CV sub"sector team will beC0n12 the cUstrict Civil Open.lions and
Revolutionary Development s'C2_ff and the st:b"$cctor advisor wi ll be desig "
nated senior district 8.dvisor.
(4) The ra crfZ o~'ganiz(,tioYl for Civ:il Operations and Hevo,·

h :tioY':<1.l'Y D:;velo;HDclit SU]POl'C w.iJl CuL~OLTn genel' 2Jly to tile schematic organi-
zatior:al d.iagT<tl11 attached ,~t Lm:2x B .
(5) For the t.i.me bei.lig there will be no change i n the p:teser,t
I V CTZ organi.zation. Xmplementb:; inst:n:c.tio;1s fo:.: L1e IV CTZ organization
f or Civil 02,J2ration.s and Revolutiona.ry :L2yelop:J1ent SUPP01'C will be pl:ovidscl
at 2. later date.
(6) Force comrMcnc81's/se;-ior 2c:visors will r evise their

organizations and red.raft thei:::- stateme:-:ts of functions to c omply with the
guici? ncc se t m.:t in this directive, 1~,e revisions will be iOl'w?raed to this
heaa;,uarters for ?pprova l by 15 JU;1 67 . .
/
4. ADMINlSTRATTVE AND l.OGISrneS SUPPORT.
a. For the tin18 being, t'1ere will be no change in administrative

ancllogistics support. Civi.lian elements o~ the btegrated organization win
co ntinue t o be Sllp~')oJ.'ted (fu:1ds , p3rsom:"81, 2.l":d other requL' emE:nts) by their
r espec tive agencies , i. e ., Embassy, AID} JUSPAO, USIA. and OSA,
b. It i.s i ntended that?. c ontinubg- effor t be undertaken toward

logi stic and administ.rative economy thr01..!g;h consoUciaUon and cross·,
&ervicing of appropriate sup;;o:::t ac·tivities .
St2.te :031)artment 1\,rSG Dr.rG 09230 'iZ May H) 67 (e ).
80
"'1
,~ r
/
MACV U.r 10-12

.. 28 M~y 1867
· ---~F' O-l·~-:·.~··;(··)·. :~:'.·~~,",:(~-:_:-/sn'\;(~~· .~ dv; so .. ·1

- _. ,_.-.. :
C 1.... ••• ,-,
D;;-~t;:--;~"or-:;c I Deputy For

C O"",,",Y' . , ,]
••• • •
-."
---l~ -:~~·~···~~~:=;--I~-~ ,,---~~~..

I. .... ~l
I,
.(...; ~ .. .......
CO ~ 1)5
_)J.. -"_
I
----.-1'
... •
--.~
---1"- C h1C::r 0. StzcU
'
-- ._-. . [ ___ J -b
[ .:."-----'- - - _
I
. ~
I
C
G
Force}
.
. 1 SLeel. f'1
en~.!~
\;
/\ -
v
,,-- -
~
.
"
I\,
(
- _.-
·\sst Chief of Staff
__C_
for
ORDS
____
-
\/_
""
\
\/_
1\
Dep u.ty Serlior
Advisor
_ __ (Military
____ )_
. ~_L;]
Mgmt . )
Support
-_ ]
[
..
US
. . \l \ .,
,~~_~~_. - - - F, - - '\
_x··x-x- C ool'dination.· -Military and CORDS mc:tters .

_ 0 - 0 - 0·· O pcration2.\. Conb:pJ~whc:'l. _\lni~ _assign2cl on
RD direct support m.issio:'l..
81
I.';>' TOP SECRET - Sensitive
RVNAF'S ROLE IN PACIFICATION
It has already b een noted that the U.S. gradually came to espouse
a division of effort betl"een U.S. forces and RVNAF in I"hich the former
would concentrate on defeating the main forces of the insurgents in the
unpopulated areas I'Thile RVNAF concentrated on securing pacification
operations in the populated areas.
General Westmoreland first informed Washington of his intention to

f olloi" this general division of effort in late August 1966. But his
emphasis was one of degree, h e made clear, rather than of mutually
exclusive categories:
..• Our strategy will be one of a genera,l offensive 'i'Tith

maximura practical support to area and population security in
further support of Revolutionary Development .
'l'he essential tasks of Revolutionary Development and

nation building cannot be accomplished if enemy w~in forces
can gain access to the population centers and destroy our
efforts. US, Free World Forces, with their mobility and in
coordination ivi th RVNAF, must take the fight to the enemy by
attacking his main forces and invading his base areas. Our
ability to do this is Dnproving steadily. Maximum emphasis
will be given to the u se of long ra,nge patrols and other means
to find the enemy and locate his bases. Forces and bases thus
discovered will be subjected to either ground attack or quick
r eaction B-52 and tactical air strikes . When feasible B-52
strikes will be followed by ground forces to search the area .
Sustained ground combat operations l"ill maintain pressure on
t he enemy.
The growing strength of US/Free World forc es l"ill

provide the shield that "Jill permit ARVN to shift its weight
of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to direct sup-
port of Revolutionary Development . Also, I visualize that a
significant number of the US/Fre e World ma.neuver battalions
will be committed to tactical ar eas of responsibility (TAOR )
mis sions . These missions encompass base security and at the
same time support Revolutionary Development by spreading
secur i ty radially from the bases to protect more of the popu-
l ation. Saturation patrolling, civic action, and close associ-
ation with ARVN , regional and popular forces to bolster their
combat effectiveness q.re muong the tasks of the ground force
elements . At the same time ARVN troops will be available i f
r equired to reinforce offensive operations and to serve as
r eaction forces for outlying security posts and government
centers under attack. Our strategy will i nclude opening,
constructing and using roads, as well as a start toward opening

NND Project Numbe r: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
, ..
~.
and reconstructing the national railroad. The priority

effort of ARVN forces vdll be in direct support of the
Revolutionary Development prog::.'e.ID '; i n many instances, the
province chief v7ill exercise ouerational control over these
uni ts. This fact not'lvi thstandiClg the ARVN division struc-
t ure must be maintained and it is essentie.l that the division
commander enthusiastically SUP:90rt Revolutionary Develop-
ment. Our highly capable US D=-vision Comrnanders, v7ho are
closely associated '\'lith corres:9onding ARVN commanders, are
in a position to influence the~:l to do ,'That is required .
We intend to employ all forces to get the best

results mea.sured, among other things , in terms of population
secured,; territory cleared of enemy influence ,; VC/ NVA bases
eliminated,; and enemy guerrillas, local forces , and main
forces destroyed.
Barring unforeseen cha~lge in enemy strategy, I

vi sualize that our strategy for South Vietnam will remain
essentially the same throughout 1967 . 169/
General Westmoreland had e.lready reached agl'eement v7ith General Vien,

Chief of the Joint General Staff (JGS), to reorient ARVN to pacification
support. General Tillson, MACV J-3, had briefed the Mission Council in
Saigon on the general plan:
In the 1967 campaign plan, He propose to assign ARVN the

primary mission of providing direct support to RD and US/FVI
Forces the primary mission of destroying VC/r:..TVA me,in forces
and base areas. Agreement has been reached b etlveen General
Westmoreland and General Vien that , in I, II, and III Corps
areas, ARVN will devote at least 50% of i ts effort directly
in support of the RD program. In IV Corps, 'I'There there are
no US forces, it was agreed that ARVN might have to devote
up to 75% of its effort to offensive operations ..•. 170/
General Taylor , nO'l-7 serving as a personal advisor to President

Johnson , immediately recognized the importance of this communicat ion.
A considered r esponse shoul d be sent to COMLJSMACV, he advised the Presi -
dent, l est General Westmoreland regard silence as tacit consent for his
proposed strategy. Taylor was enthusiastic about the expressed intent to
r eemphasize revolutionary development (pacification) , seeing in it the
b est hope for bringing the I'lar to a speedier conclu si on. But he 'vas
une8.sy about futv..re charges that the U.S, had taken over the main war
and was sustaining l arger nmnbers of casualties than RVNAF. He was also
concerned about involvi ng any U.S. troops i n pacification -- suggesting
that U,S, displacement of GVN l eadership Hould, i n the l ong run, be
counterproductive. 171/
------
TOP ,SECRET - Sensitive
Ambassador Lodge, on the other hc:md, Ivaxed ecstatic over the

involvement of U.S. units in pacification work. The crux of the prob-
l em, he argued, was security. To promote security U.S. units should be
u sed in a kind of advisory function. They 1<Tould energize ARVN by exa.mple:
To meet this need we must make more U.S. troops avail-

able to help out in pacification operations as we move to
concentrate ARVN effort in this "Tork. U. S. forces would be
the catalyst; ivould lead by example; and l,yould work "Ii th the
Vietne~ese on the ' buddy ' system. They would be the 10 per-
cent of the total force of men under arms (90 percent of 'whom
lvould be Vietnamese) which Ivould get the whole thing moving
faster.
Thi s has been done on a sme,ll scale already by elements

of the U.S. Marines, 1st and 25th U.S. Infantry Divisions, and
the Koreans. He think it can be made to Ivork and the gains
under such a program, \'Thile not flashy', would hopefully be
solid. Everything depends on whether we can change ARVN habits.
Experi already made indicate that U.S. casualties would be
few. 172/
General Te,ylor ' s doubts about the benefits of involving U. S. troop

units in pacification carried some weight in He,shington. State was later
to signal Saigon to go slol-7 on U.S. participation:
He understand General Hestmoreland plans use of limited

numb er of US forces in buddy system principle to guide and
motivate RD/ P. However, we heNe serious doubts about any
further involvement US troops beyond that •••• He fear this vTould
t empt Vietnamese to leave this 1<TOrk more and more to us and we
b elieve pacification, with its intimate contact with population,
more appropriate for Vietnamese forces , who must after all as
arm of GVN establish constructive relations Ivi th population.
Hence we believe there should be no thought of US taking sub-
st~ntie,l share of pacification. The urgent need is to begin
effectively pressing ARVN. 17~
THE 1967 COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN
The upshot of these exchanges, which illustrate the wide acceptance

in U.S. Cluarters of the proposed division of effort between U.S. forces
and RVNAF , 'vas that the MACV / JGS Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 (AB 142),
published 7 November 1966, r eflected "prime,ry missions " for US/ F1'INAF and
RVNAF and implied that few U.S. forces would be comraitted directly' to the
pacification effort. The exact number of such forces was not specified ;
it was left to COMUSMACV ' s discretion within the restraints already sug-
gested by Washington. The JOGS did agree, however , to keep 53 ARVN battalions
in support of revolutionary development during 1967. In addition, 230-odd
RF companies and over 800 RF platoons ''Tere to support the pacification
program.

Conceptually, the re gular ARVN units "Jere to conduct the more

difficult clea ring oper a tions a,nd then turn over responsibility for
the " securing pha se" to the RF/ PF outfits. All of this wa,s outlined
in considerable detail in the Combined Ca,mpaign Plan, ¥ri th specific
assignments to certain kinds of units for each phase of the pacification
effort. 1~e pertinent sections of AB 142 follow:
\\ 20 (0) lillvrl REGUJ.J.!i.R FORCESg
PHI~--~EGUI.AR FORGES
~o:.1"~::~~"'n"';i,,",-~~ ~1.~~~~~~~~~~r=~"''':JC.&..~~~;':iC:T_-:<1
.. .
10 Condu.ct ope:cC':t:.ions to clear VC/rWA

main fO :i.'C8 unit.s from provln..cialp:d.. orlty
arer,s and other critical e.reas in cccordanco
lllth eS-0ab:tisL eel p:tovlnc1al. Fill plal1Bo
. .
20 Conduct!) 1.n conjlUlctlon .rlt.h prov.Ln ...

cial mlJJ..tary fo rces and ct'l711 intelligonce
and police elements ,9 operat1.ons to destroy
va guerrillas anc1 infrast.ru.ctu.re in spec:l.f:i.ed
h amlet or vlJ,lage fl.l'ea8 in e.ceordance loTi th
established pro~inciaJ. nD pl2.n ~ 0
Securlng !~1s~=i!lJi.~~_~~.P.P2J';t"£X".@-~~ty;t~.L~§.:l·
3" Conciuc t~ in conjunction rrlth pro'"
vincia.1 mill tf'.I'Y fo~rces and civil ;'nt91J.iL~
genee and polic e elem8nt.s,p opere.tions to
destroy va gl\ol'rll1as and infl'astJ."'Uct,urq
llhen provincial forces aTD t UQdeqnut, e foI'
. thi s task o .

I _~ TOP SECRET - Sensitive
,.
40 Provido p in c on juDct:ton uith p:covil1=

cial mj.li tary forces and Hat.ional PoJ.icop
local a:;.'8a seeur). ty and seclU'i"i:,y for the
populut.:ton and GVN c adre eloments iTnen pro=
v:l.ncial fo rcoD a:ce ~Ln a.d o quD:L8 for this t as!{o
.'
~ ,.....,..,....c.,."... . . -~~=-;,.-:c .-:;v~ ~~I~~..--=>1 _____ ~~-~--~........~-
Do'Volopin3
50 Pro1f"ld8;J in conj"lmc t i on 'rrlth pro~

vip..:::ic0. milHx('y forcos Mel NntioneJ. PoHcG.?
J.oc al ElT'oa secu:rit,y and s8curH,y" fO l' "\:,ha popu ....
lation v.nd GVN Cv.d.re oTcrc.ent,s Hhen p:;:-'ov.l.noinJ.
fo:rc es £tZ'8 i.nr.dcqunte £O l' this t aslc c
1:~~.J:.~1!L§...;v~~~S:~~~1.1£~~Ij; of.L]Q. v.c::~iYl;s~g

6 0 Conduct. mili -Cary PS11)P 1.n Buppo:rt of
RD Elct1.vltj.GS ulth emphasis on op8 rations i n
onppo:ct. of the Chieu Hoi programo -
. ,I ' Con cJ.1.1e J0p i n c ooX'a:ma-c,:l.on
~}
I" .
. . ,. .1,,
liJ_ '
'c,n sec A-
vOL·
command8TS ,s> m:111t.c.J.'y civlc cc'c.ion t.o help i l:tn
the cuppod; of the psople foZ' tho gO'9'e:N~T'1 ent,
. ui th emph 2.siD on tho P:,'OP0l' beb n vlo:!''' ['11<1 dis""
oipl:i.ne of t:roops 0
80Assist' s ec tor oOi11.IT'..9.ndoi. s in the

4
TDb
cruiting and t :cain:!.ng of RF/ FF 0
90 Cond'L1.o t offensivQ search and destr oy

operv.tions :;?,gainst veltrl]i. Il'.2.in fo:cces to pre ""'
ven-t theil' incu.rsi on into a:ceua u ndClj:,golng Rn o
lO~ Proyi de ele;:18uts 101' reserve/z:c3.ction

fo :r;::e3 1.n s upr:-o r t of !llj.J.i t.~n';r f.orces in [>,:C82.3
Ulld.Jrgoi.ng RD~
.'
86

{ , '/,
'
. "
3¢ (0) US/nnti.1i' c
"
1-0
Conduct combined and unilateral
oporati.ons to clear VC/ NVA main forces f rorri
provincial priority a:coas and othor cri tic",l
areas in accoL'danco uith oBGablishod p:\~ovln~
c:tal RD plans o !
2 .Conduct combinod op orat.ions '1n con~

(>
j unctlon i·rlth }lRVN and/or prov1.ncial lJ111i~

t ary forcos and pollcE! elements, operations
to dostl'oy VG guc:crillas and i nfras t ruc tl1.1'O
in spocificd h2.mlet or village a1'82..S in
accordance uith establishod pTOvincinl RD
plans 0
h11 Ph[l,~eB ~!: }r:~_~E.9:~~·epO!~~ of~.Jj)~,!},vllie_~~

,
30 .Conduct othe:t COIilb'ln8d ba'vt,f1.1ion
and smaller tl.ni t o p81:nt,io ns ,rith RV1UU? to
accompl:l.sh spoclf:i.c RD t 2.8ks in areas \mdoY''''
go:1.ng cloai'ing, sccl.lring s and developing
as approp:t'latco
40 Co nduc G; in coo rdinatl on 1-nth

sector a.nd subsector commanders , mi:U.te.r'J
civic p.cHtm t.o help 'till!. th:; SUppOl>C, OJ.
tho people fO T th e go v~rnment 1-nth emphasis
to enSUI'd that, credi t is gi VDn to th e GVIJ"
5.. .Assist sector COillJi12nctOrS in t.h o
t raining of RF/ PFo
Related
~.......-..-
t asks~
.. _ _ _ .... _ _ - . . . J
..
Conduct combi ned and unilatcra1
6.
offensive search and destroy o pera~ions
e.gainst VC/WIA tl'.ain fo rces to prevent, theL.·
i ncl1.:csion ).nto are2,S undergoine RD •
87
(n;"",...·/ 0
..
~~~'":'f";'..t~U&-:r~~~~.::=.~,=--:r:::;o-..¥~:.~-.:--==--=r"""-::>~..:;. .!~..,;;;;-.::<. 4~~\:!"'~~~.w'~~t..~~·'Y.'::"~,"::·;'!~,!"';-';·""'1
FfL1Sl?, RErJIOl~1,1.J r OfQ""J . . 1

~~-:"":':::'~Y-~~~L '<Z'C!""~'''''-I~~~~~~>~''-'1'"':.'r'';"~.~~::-';:'''_~::=''::'::'--';-:'~~~";"~''''''fXf'.t'~o;r.e~j'~~~<:::o.~.~."::'~~~::;.-.
"'0
G
lin;l'~';, b . \",F
~ /'; "" wl.. tJ v%t
, T[' 1"" •.,c,,,,,'"\ ,vj'14 J'''1 0 :J ~ . l;n~Jl~
\ I~ t.J ~.~~ \:..?\,. .. :-' ... .1~..... \. H_~ . . .. lf(..... _ ...
J '
1.'()3ll1c(o.:" Z6~'O'JfJ : t o clo,J"(':;;'oJ' VG (Jtl,8:';'X'.n :U.3 ' e:-;:d

tn.fl>2.o'(,~>~".C ';::U:fO"
I=.,.~-=.;..--==-=-~ "'-':--=='_~~'.c~"';"'~-=7"'~-" ......<"'~=~,oc=,-,-=,-.~-~.==~",?~,~.
(i o '....~;"O-;7-i'<"~
c;r ...... 'jrv
A~
' nl
.,.1 \:0_ .•_ "'- f'.~,~":-rl..... ~v'~r
V c .. _ ;.1 ..... .; ' ......
{'''7' '0','"
v,-~u ~ "V ... "" J
P Ftl.lc;t5,oi1 ~~:c\ C''7:Jc$:/ r!, C ~'/Si\) o1'.:~::m·6D iD

h ~3:.1.-1':dj m:d V~>3.1 D ~P a:rc::;J \:i!J~f"O j(7 Q~10 $"nc:.
nr' ''c'''v
J ......''''(''"l r ,'\ <;>
\,..:.'Q. r - J ~ .. J oaJ 'V ~ ~'.~, " ).:.J
~ &..!..... " "\.'''_ ~
~l _-!oo
'r .
60 ' AO D 1 D ~ 07;:1 en'.?.) "1c:::;Jnt:J t. ti p OJ'c>

£ 0 2;;'1 CCO!1o:-ilo n~!..ti DO-o~ ~1~ (~71010r.~:1cm:1J ~~~~O C~
j CC'(' :J e
'fCJ 'A2r(l,oi !JGt i 02."1.1 PoJj.o·') 1.!1 v~~uC>

:I,ct~.oll v_!.;d l '':):; o m 'c."::J c O>1tZ'ol o:r:.rJlo:~ t ·o L::Q..:n=
t :x1n 1:::.:] cn.d ci"t':cx' {8G p~ot.:.:r& IF.lD1iO [!-:~? :)"1:,:"·0
88
PrfASE }OOJ.ONi\1 FORCES
, 90 Ass1.st. mm civil cadie eJ.cnlento {()

ol'ganiz8 and train peop1e I s seH'~defcnso
forc8s ~
DcvolopiEg \0 0 Cont-i Due task_l 4 end ;; unt~J. >;·6r~
ltcved hy National Police or ot,her autho!'~ .
ized provincial po',de's forces Hhich nlr'ly
be estabJJ,sh ed"
110 Provide elements fOl' 1'8SOl""VO/i."8"

C'.ct1.on fo:('ces to count::n' the X'(;l"Gm."n of vel
NVA !"I1cd.n 0 1' i T:regl1.1n.r fO:(0(,)3 into 8'1'03S
undergoing develop:Lngo
120 Continue task 60

130 Con'c,"lnu,J task '1 8S t1CC8ssa:t'Yo
bo Popul~!' Forces (PF)

. .I
.--;~;-·I-~;;'G-;~-'---·~~~
~~~r~ ..,.~. ---=o:.:;or-~7::""'-=-::"_._C:b="~""""~'~':';;"~~~_~____
'-:-'-.::a.::::-oaM"I>oc1~~~1.o~~-"~--;,n~~.......~~·:-
Sec1J.:ril1g 10 Prov:J.cle loc[l.l secur:U:.y fo Z' the popuc>

lation mel. GVN' civil cadra olemsnts ~.n h~n~'
1 ct end village areas 0
20 Assist RF to provlde local are".

secu.:d.-c.y.
30 Ass:ts'~
GVN d.vE cadre elements to
perf01"Tl1 eco;'lomic 2.nd sod.fl.l develop.nsnt
projects o
,:
he Assist ~lational Police in popu..1E.tioi1
and resources control c.nd/ or to malntatn 1-:-.'7
and o;:cier and p!.·otec·~ p'cblio safe'~yo ~
I
~h'S.L~=:ft~~:.... ~ ~L"'-:"'-'~~_""""":~"""'~~'~""~CI.~~~-J"r:c: .... --'~')b,.,...;;c:.~~~........~......,.~ ... """,~" .......,..",
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3,3
::;---I--~;;-~~~"-
';:'\-"';"~"'~·_~:"':1,r(-cc:~~_~t....--~~ . _ ..... ~oz;.ooo,...:....-~---~"1.-,, ~~,·~e--~
50 Asslst GVN e'lvH ca.dre elements to

organize and train people's self~d8fens8
.
fo rces 0
6" Continue '\"us!w 'I and 2 tmtD. rB~

1ieved by Jlationa1 Police or etheX' f\uthor <>
1.zed pr ovincial po).icc fO;(C8D "ohich mJ.y b o
establ:lshed o
70 Cont,:tm.19 task 3 (I
Co Na'c.iomu Police Foreesc
10 Develep and H19.intain 1.11fol'1.!.ant, 11::ts

and othorlntelligenc(l nets o
20 'SuppIy in'l:,elligenc8 ·to rdllt;al']
ferc cs o
3 0 Participate ulth TiliH t ary fo rces ill
'O perations to destroy VC gn~)lT.l.l1Ds and :L,'1 v
f rastru.c tu.:re9
ho .ASSl2.I! l8 custody of m:d intel:':LogatEl

va SUSDDA '~ S
,. '-:'"' lJ - f)
Secu1'1ng
.6 0 Inltiats popu..lrition and rasO\.U'C03

cont1"ol~
90
70 HG.in'c, 2.tn lc.~7 ond order e.nd prot.ect

public s a..fetyc
8 0 Ass·ts)c,; u:tthin ·capab1J.lti es:> rnjJJ".,

tary forces t.o pJ20Ticie loc al 8:<'8.:1 Docurit,y .
and 88CUl'''tt.y for -un3 p0p·L1.1at,ion nndm71i .
c c.d1"e 0101118n ts 0
Do'Volopi113 90 l·bin:i;.~·tin populrre,j.oil QIld 1"GSOUXCD:.J

con'b'ol o
10 0 Con'i:.int.:.8 t nsk~ 1;1 2.9 h lli"1c1 7 fibovo 0
110 Prevent the reo:('g&rrlzat,ion of th8

VC ·jnl'i'2.structlJ.l'eo
120 P:('event and conh'ol rio"tD Md cat:;)""

tage of pub=~ic s8cu:dtyo
130 Rel'leve m1.J:1.t.ary forces~ "hen cc..?o.~
ble.? and Pl'oTl.de local 2.:('<::a s8(;11.::-1'lJy a:'ld
security fo !' the popul.8.tion and GVl'l C2..c1.1'.3
elemen ts ~
91
LEVERA.GE AND SOVEREIGN'I'Y
The decision to effect a divi s j.on of effort betvreen RVNAF and

US/YWMAF suggests hovr far U. S. policymakers were willing to go (perhaps
"determined" would be more accurate) to carve out an area for independent
GVN conduct of at least some major phase of the "mr. It suggests, too,
their relative dissatisfaction with RVNAF improvement during the years
in which the U. S. advisory effort had been directed tOl-rard such improve-
ment. The question remained l'lhether U. S. influence could be brought
effectively to bear through example and persuasion or should be back-
stopped by more direct measures -_ by the use of a range of negative
measures gathered under the rubric of "leverage. "
General Taylor ' s recommendations at the b eginning of the U,S.

advisory build-up in 1961, it vlill be remember ed, emphasized a "limited
partnership" in which U.S. Q,dvisors would actually work alongside their
Vi etnamese counterpa rts instead of merely "advising them at arm ' s length."
By means of this closer working relationship in the field rather than
just in various headquarters, Taylor had suggested, RVNAF effectiveness
would become the product of mutually shared goals pursued through mutually
shared experiences . Conscious adoption of an alternative cour se , th~
u se of leverage, Ivould have changed the relationship from one of nomJ_nal
"partnership" to one of de facto U.S. leadership -- bordering in some
instances on U.S. command. This, in turn , \<Tould have been a very real
infringement of Vietnamese sovereignty and an admission that the GVN
could not manage adequately its own affairs . It ",ould have undercut
Vietnamese independence in both a legal sense and in terms of GVN com-
petence.
When the Diem regime did not respond as it had been expected (or
hoped ) it would, and after Diem ' s government Ivas overturned, the U. S.
again refused conSCiously to adopt leverage procedures to compel improved
performance . First with General Minh, then with General Khanh, the hope
was that improved receptivity (as compared to the most recent past exper -
ience) on the part of the GVN vlould permit the carrot to work effectively
without the stick. The period just ended in mid-1965 when U.S. troops
were committed to South Vietnam marked another occasion to examine the
putative advantages and disadvantages of the use of l everage.
Generally speaking, Hashington policymakers (less so in the State

Department ), vlere prone to suggest the use of leverage in the abstract.
The U.S. Mission and MACV tended to oppose such proposals . Field
advisors vrere , as a group, most favorably disposed toward the use ~f
l everage . Those whose dealings included establishing a clo se worklng
r elationship with GVN (to include RVNAF ) officials found that the threat
of leverage was a stumbling block to such a relationship . Some also

!.L
found that the price of acceptance without levere,ge was the virtual
absence of influence. Robert Shaplen summarized this phenomenon in
a pessimistic 1965 evaluation of the U.S. advisory effort :
The advisory program, while it had been a tribute to

the politeness of both pe,rties, had faHed in its primary
aim of persuading the Vietnamese officers to get their
men out into the countryside and to stay there, if neces-
sary, day and night, for \'1eeks on en'dTn order to beat the
Communists at their own game. This vieVl of the failure of
American efforts at persuasion was privately expressed to
me by most of the advisers I spoke Hith during my trip
through the vi te,l plateau area, and it Has rei.nforced by
Hhat advisers from other battle areas told me. The con-
sensus Has that the system Has inherently anomalous and
unHorkable in that it reflected the American predilection
for trying to get a difficult and probably impossible job
done in vThat a British friend of mine described as 1I your
typical nice American vlB,y. 17Lr/11
Having rejected proposals for a combined command (pre sumably under

U.S. l eadership ) and for the ence,drement of U.S. troops Hith RVNAF
units, the U. S. Has left -- in late 1965 -- with the continuing and
perplexing issue of Hhether or not to adopt the use of l everage in some
comprehensive and planned manner . Earlier decisions had been to avoid
the issue by si.de-stepping it. But the isolated occasions on which its
use had been attempted did little to substantiate the argument that
cries of neocolonialism vTere simply the price one had to pay for short
run effectiveness. Indeed, some backfires tended to have the opposite
effect. Ambassador Taylor, for instance, had had a disastrous experi-
ence in trying to use the U.S. decision to commence bombing North Vietnam
as a lever to get GVN reform in December 1964. The net outcome vTas a
violent r eaction by General Khanh vTho very nearly had Taylor thrown
out of the country as personna non grata . In the end, it was Khanh who
Hent, but the political turmoil that this produced in the first months
of 1965, Hhen the course of the war ''las taking a dramatic turn against
the GVN, convinced Taylor that such attempts should not be lnade again
at the national level. * It vlaS at this time that the 1I troika sign-off 1l
Has abandoned because of claims that it stifled GVN development. Then
in lat e 1965 USOM began to have second thoughts on the wisdom of aban-
doning control of its resources in the field and proposed a restoration
of the troika sign-off. The Mission Council endorsed the plan 8,nd had
already launched discussions VIi th the GVN Hhen the State Department
obj ected to the idea, insisting that it vTould undermine U. S. efforts
to make the Vietn8Jnese more independent and effective. 175/ There
the matter died.
-* See Task Force Paper, Evol ution of the War: US / GVN Relations , 196 3-67 2-
Part I, pp. 54·-59 .

NND Proj ect Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
In a related effort to overcome delays in the Vietnamese pacifica-

tion program, MACV acceded to its advisors ' recow~endations and, in
October, created a separate contingency fund of 50,000 piasters for
each subsector advisor to be used for urgent projects. Sector advisors
were also given access to special funds. The program was highly suc-
cessf'ul and toward the end of the year consideration "las given to
permanent establishment of such revolving funds. 176/ The plan was
abandoned , however, after the four-month trial period due to the strong
opposition of the GVN Minister for RD, General Thang, who contended
such funds were undermining the legitimate efforts of his organization
to meet urgent provj.nce needs. They would encourage, he said, Vietnamese
dependence on the U.S. 177/
But USOM did experiment successfully with one nevT form of direct,
selective leverage in the late summer of 1965. The Province Chief of
Binh Tuy Province, Lt Colonel Chi, ,,,as accused of misusing some $250,000
in AID funds. When USOM pres sure on the GVN for his removal produced no
results, aid to the province was suspended on September 23, and USOM
field personnel were withdrawn. In spite of Chi ' s friendship with the
Defense Minister and Deputy Premier (General Co ) Premj.er Ky removed him
six vleeks later. Aid to the province then resumed, but Ambassador Lodge
made it clear to the Mission Council that he dise,pproved of the action
and did not want it repeated (particularly the press coverage ) . 178/
As already indicated, both Ambassadors Taylor (after his experience

in December 1964 ) and Lodge preferred not to force the GVN or attempt
to use high-level pressure to reach solutions '-le felt necessary . The
fragility of the political arrangements in Saigon at any point in time
seemed to dictate against any U,S. action that might precipitate coups
or disruption from elements even less disposed to be cooperative than
the current group, whoever they might be . In this vie,,,, the successive
Ambassadors were strongly supported by the State Department. 179/ The
one consistent Washington advocate for an increased use of leverage was
Secretary McNamara. 180/ But the Secretary of Defense ' s views did not
prevail in this issue as they did in so many others . The overall U. S.
approach to advice in South Vietnam continued to be dominated by the
f elt U.S. need to avoid undercutting governmental stability . U.S . sup-
port vIaS figuratively regarded as a rug which if pulled out from under
t he GVN would cause it to fa l l, not as a lever vlhose use might spur
i ncreased effectiveness .
THE INCONCLUSIVE DEBATE OVER LEVERAGE
This persistent U.S. avoidance of the planned use of l everage was,

until about 1966, paralleled by an equally persistent avoidance of any
candid examination of the "Thole pandora ' s box which was conjured up by
the mere mention of the subject . But during 1966 , and continuing into
1967 and beyond, there vlere repeated attempts by l Oi-ler echelons within
t he policymaking apparatus to promote an interne,l examination of the issue.

Those who made such proposals "rere in favor of some kind of authorized,
premeditated use of leverage, of course, else they would not have pushed
for an examination of this hitherto avoided topic .
When operational groups -- as distinct from policymakers who

could defer 'vhen to implement -- urged the adoption of leverage measures
the recommendations tended to be summarily struck dOlm. In 1966, for
instance, an inquiry by the ~ffiCV staff into the poor performance records
of the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions -- both stationed near Saigon --
concluded that if other measures failed to improve these units, COMUSMACV
should withdraw· U. S. advisors and Military Assistance Program (MAP ) sup-
port. General Westmoreland deleted from the study the recommendation for
the withdrawal of MAP support. He further directed that sanctions against
ARVN be avoided. The U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions were instructed
to assist the two ARVN divisions and to increase their o"\m participation
in pacification operations in Binh Duong and Hau Nghia Provinces. 181/
It was clear that the time was not ripe for action; there \<I'as no agreed
basis upon which action might be taken.
But another Army staff effort, the PROVN Study referred to ea.rlier,
set out to rectify this omission. Commissioned in mid-1965 by Army Chief
of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, the PROVN group "\vas charged "d th
1t developing new sources of action to be taken in South Vietnam by the
United States and its allies, which will, in conjunction with current
actions, modified as necessary, lead in due time to successful accomplish-
ment of U. S. aims and obj ecti ves. If After eight months of intensive effort
this select group of middle ranking officers produced a comprehensive
argument calline; for emphasis on the pacificatj.on effort . A radical
decentralization of U.S. and GVN directive authority was held to be
necessary for this purpose . And to make sure that national plans were
t urned into concrete a.ctions at the operating l evel , PROVN called for the
calculated use of leverage :
The situation in South Vietnam has seriously deteri-

orated. 1966 may well be the last cbance to ensure eventual
success. ' Victory' can only be achieved through bringing
t he individual Vietnamese, typically a rural pea.sant , to
support willingl y the GVN. The critical act ions are those
that occur at the village , district , and provincial l evels .
This is \vhere the "rar must be fought ; this is \vhere tbat
war and the object \vhich lies beyond it must be won . · The
following are the most important specific actions required
no"\v :
Concentrate U.S. operations on the provi ncial level

to include the del egation of command authority over
U. S. operations to the Senior U. S. Representative at
the provincial l evel .

Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US/GVN

combined effort to solidify and extend GVN influence.
Authorize more direct U.S. involvement in GVN affairs

at those administrative levels adeCluate to ensure the
accomplishment of critical programs.
Delegate to the U.S. Ambassador uneCluivoca l authority

as the sole manager of all U.S. activities, resources,
and personnel in-country.
Direct the Ambassador to develop a single i ntegrated

plan for achievhlg U. S. obj ectives in SVN. 182/
The PROVN Study proposed that l everage be employed at .all levels

within GVN to achieve U.S. objectives. Noting that past uses had been
haphazard, it recommended the employment of a "continuum from subtle
interpersonal persuasion to ,,,i thdrawal of U. S. support" following U. S. -
GVN agre ement on specific programs. The South Vietnamese would, in
short, be avIare that leverage ",ould be employed if they failed to live
up to agreed obligations. 183/
After an initial period during "Thich no discussion of the PROVN

S~udy ,,:as permitted outside the Army staff, the study fina lly received
wlde dlstribution. Secretary McNamara was bri efed on it, as were the
Joi nt Chiefs of Staff. MACV's comments were also solicited. The care-
fully worded reply from Saigon stated succinctly the case against the
use of leverage .
MACV is jn co~;plete e,grecment ,·rith PROVH po s ition that

immediate nnd. substantially iDcre:8,sed. UDitecl states d.ired~
i nvolvemCDt in GVN 8,ctivities in form of cODstructive in-
fluence and. mani-pulation is essential to 2vchievement of U . S.
objectives in Vi~tr:.am . FROVH emuhasi7.es that " levere.ge
must origina te in terns of refer~nce established by govern-
·ment agreement ," a.nc1 " leverage, in all its implicatioDs ,
must be 'unc1crstoocl by the Vietnamese if it is to becor~,e an
effective tool. " The di;:ect involvc'G1ent 8.ne1 levera.g e 8n- .
v isioned. b~T I'ROVN could. range from skillful diplomatic press-
ure to U . S. unilate~ca l execution of critical l,rograms .
lfiACV consid.e rs that there is a great danger the,t the extent
of involvement envisioned. could b e come too gree.t. A govern-
ment sensitive to its iL'.age as champ ion of natior'.a l sov-
ereignty profotUlclly affected by the :prcs sure of milit8.!l7 J
minorities ; c.nd. lli'1sure of its tenure ancl_ legitiLlac:y ,·r ill

, ,I)
I < ,
r esent too great involvement by U.S. Excessive U. S. in-

volvement may d.efec~t ob j ecti ves of U. S. Dolicy : dcveloD!:;cnt
or" free, inclcpe~dent 'non-coDmunist natio~ . PROVH properly
r ecognizes th8,t success can only be attained, through support
of Vietnamese people, ,.;ith support coming fror:! the gras~
roo ts up. Insensitive U.S. actions can e<.'l,sily d,efeat
efforts to accompliSh this . U. S. !J1.B,nipulations could, easily
b ecome an American takeover justified, by U. S. CO['lpulsion
to "get the job done . II Such t endencies must b e resisted, .
It must be r ealized, that there are substantial d,ifficult5.es
and, dangers inherent in i molementing t1:.is or any similc,r
p:rogra.J!l. 184/ • ,
NO DECISION AS A DECISION
Events rema,ined stuck on this fundamental disagreement . The subj ect

of l everage came, during 1967, to be discussed more fully, but there was
no real authoritative decision to employ it or to reject its use under
all circUIllstances. Thus, vlhen CORDS completed its first maj or study of
pacification programs (Project TAKEOFF) in June 1967, i t included some
candid discussion of the need for some kind of leverage . Entitled "U.S.
Influence -- The Necessity, Feasibility and Desirability of Asserting
Great er Leverage, " the analysis proceeded from problem to alternative
cours es of action:
A. Necessity of Leverage.
1. The most crucial problem in achieving the goals and

objectives of the RD.program is that the programs must be
carried out by the Vietnamese . Present US influence on Viet-
namese performa,nce is dependent upon our ability to persuade ,
cajole , suggest, or plead. Political and practical consider-
a,tions usually have argued against developing any systematic
u se of the various l evers of pOi'i'er at our dispo sal. The
potential reaction of the Vi etnamese may become even greater
now that they appear to be reass erting themselves and when
the question of sovereignty is an increasingly sensitive one .
2 . HOvlever, the factors of corruption, antique adminis -

trative financial procedure s and regulations, and widespread
l ack of leadership probably can be overcome in the short run
only i f the US increases its influence on Vietnamese performance.
The increasing magnitude of corruption and its da,mage to any
program make the need for developing and applying a system of
leverage which forc es the Vi etnamese to take US views i nto
account greater now than ever before . Even the best conc eived
and executed RD program will result in failure in terms of
gaining the allegiance of the people so long as such extensive
corruption prevails . 185/

/ .. (
The study argued that leverage was feasible either at the national
l evel with the GVN leadership in the classic lIoriental ll style or on
a more systematic basis to be applied through the control of resources
at all levels down to province and district. The study concluded:
D. Courses of Action. US influence over key deci-

sions must be attained as quickly as possible. We recom-
mend the " orienta l " approach. However, should the other
alternative of more open exercise of power be sel ected,
the system would have to include US control of resources.
As a tactical measure , such control could be associated
initially with the i ntroduction of additional resources.
The introduction of greater US control and the proc edur es
that would be necessary to ensure an adequate US voice in
the decision-making process should be ti ed to the "New Team"
and the new US organiza,tion for RD. For that reason, too
long a delay "Tould be unfortunate. 186/
Whether or not Komer approved this recommendation, it did not figure

in the presentations of pacification given to Secretary McNa,mara during
hi s 7-8 July visit t o Vietnam . The Saigon policyTnakers were simply not
prepared to come dOlm on one agreed line of conduct in this cont ent ious
area. This tendency was exhibited later in the summer of 1967 when a
long study on leverage produced in Ambassador Komer ' s old White House
staff office by two staff members, Dr. Hans Heymann and LTC Volney
Warner , was forwarded from State to Saigon :
In anticipat ing the US/ GVN relationship in the post -

election period, it is generally agreed that the US should
find ways to exercise l everage "d th the Vi etnamese govern-
ment which are more commensurate in degree with the importance
of the US effort to South Vietnam' s survival and 'I'lhich reflect
the climate of growing restiveness in t he US .... In its impatience
to get results and make progress , the US has increasingl y
r esorted to unilateral programs and action with inadequate
conSUl tation with the Vietnamese . On the other hand, the
indi scriminate and careless exercise of US l everage could
undermine the self-respect of the Vietnamese govermnent in
its OvlD eyes and in the eyes of the South Vi etnamese people .
To b e effective , US l everage must be exercised i~ the

context of a relationship of mutual respect and confldence ,
and in ways commensurate vlith the obj ective sought . It must
also b e backed by credibl e sanctions. 187/
Might n~t the post-election period, State suggested, be a proper time

to cons lder such a new emphasis on the u se of l everage . Ambassador
Komer, w'ho had been ardent in his advocacy of l everage while '\'lOrking
as a Presidential assistant replied in tempered l anguage which reflected
the chastening effect of se~eral months on t he firing line in Saigon :

All of the above forms of leverage, and yet others, could

be use :ful at the proper time and in an appropriate way. But
they must be applied with discretion, and always in such manner
as to keep the GVN foremost in the picture presented to it s ovm
people and the world at large .... The exercise of leverage in a
persona l manner and hidden from the public view is likely to
be most effective, while of the more operat ional means estab-
lishment of comb ined organizat ion under a JCRR-type concept ,
to include joint control of resources, would be most desirable.
In sum, we ' re gradually applying more leverage in Pacification,
but wish to do so in ways that lea st risk creating more trouble
than constructive results. 188/
What Komer really meant - - as his oplnlons expressed in a time frame

l ater than that embraced by the present inquiry would make clear -- was
the necessity to reserve the use of leverage for those few occs,s ions in
which all else had failed, in which copious records detailing the failure
had be en accumulated over time, and in which the proven offender could
be severed from responsibility after his shortcomings were presented
behind the scenes to his superiors. Thus, the GVN would serve as execu-
tioner, the U.S. as observer-recorder. Leverage would be a last resort
rather than a continuing tool. The product of the intermittent debate
on leverage was not so much a decision pro or con as it vIas a decision
to resort to leverage when all else had failed. In this sens e it dodged
the difficult choices.
GROPING TOWARD BETTER INFORMATION
One of the programs that came under Komer ' s jurisdiction after he
took over CORDS was the controversial Hamlet Evaluation System (RES ).
Secretary McNamara had requested, during his October 1966 visit to Vietnam,
the development of some ADP system for evaluating the status of rural
security on an on-going basis -- data which would make possible compara-
tive judgments of progress over time. In November , he sent Mr . George Allen
and Colonel Carter Clark to Saigon with a propo sal . ~~CV revised their
suggested system and recommended it to the Mission Council which endorsed
i t on 13 December. MACV described the new system to CINCPAC in January
1967:
RES provides a fully autom.ated procedure for evaluating
hamlet Revolutionary Development progress and establishes a
hamlet level data base. Data input for RES is provided by
MACV subsector advisors and di st rict representatives, where
aSSigned , who evaluate all hs,mlets not under VC control.
They record their asse ssments in terms of 18 entries on a
hamlet evaluation worksheet utilizing six factors , each with
three indicators. Also, eight problem areas are eval uated. 189/

f ifO
The system operated throughout the year as something of a barometer

for the entire pacification effort. It a l so became one of the focal
points of cr it i cism of the excessive reliance on statistical measures
of progress, a critici sm favored by the press in particular. Never-
theless, it 1\TaS the most systematic attempt to compare result s over
t ime ever used in the assessment of rural security in Vietnam. As
such i t i s a u se:ft.J.l indicator. The following tables give summary data
fr om RES for 1967. 190/ The first table sho\vs population distribution
according to security and development factors. The second table depicts
the distribution of hamlets according to different measures of security.

100
f'OPULAT'lnN DJ\TA
TOTAL scrR E - CnUN TKYW IDE
THRUUGH DF C ~MElEI{ ,1 967
~ OPUL J\T ION (~ THO USA NDS
1967 NF.T CHIINGE

MARCH JUN~ S EP TEM~ER DE C E~UFR ~I AR - ..J2.U;..
POPULATION WEIGHTED INDlX* 2 • 33 ? • f,2 ;> • 5 0 .~ I, . 71
SECU I{F: J G'JUt)
A "MI, L ETS 31)0 . 9 4 69 .4 646.1} 6'14.9 39 f , . 0
tl tiJ\l~ LET S 2 tl61 .9 )121) .7 3 4B9 . 7 )I. III • "I 619 . 1,
Z
C HAMLETS 4 221 . H 'doO.5 404 /,.2 I,? 79 . I ':>7 . 3
..JON - HM'lL E T ' 3210 , 1 3277 • ." 3D5.1 30 '59 .', J ~rJ...,-L ~O
~'):,)
a'"'O~;-'"
rUTA L 10'>94.7 112 <;5 . ') (65. 6% ) 11315 . 8 (66 . 5%) 11'>1', • 7 (67 . crj,,) 9?() . 0
.C U I~ TE!> TI:: OJ PUOR
o HAMLUS 27.3 ',.7
41)0 . 0
1976.·2 7 013 "r.2 21 ';7. (,
11 A . (,
71} . 1
161 • I, 8
~.
()
('11
~
_.
'"
::J
E HAMLETS 482.:3 317. 2
o Z('!I
**UTH r.R HA:~ U:TS .0 152 .• 3 91.7 68 . 3 6').3 "'CJ r- Q.,
N:.JN -H AiJ, LET 2 7', . 0 290. 8 237. f, 2f,1 . 6 iO .1, 3 ""0
(17. 910 )
Cf)
O"~
TOT AL 29C1<) . 7 2 R 21 • 6 (16.4%) 27 ':> ~ • 5 (16 .270) 2BOfl . 1 (16.3%) 1 8 1 .6 i:rj
V':" Cl;1~TR.OLL l:.ll (') .~• ><
tr:1
vC HJ\'~LtTS 2955 . 8 2923 .7 21}09 . '; 274 8 : 4 207.4 G5 Z('1I
I-' NON - HJ~;"LlT 1 () b • " 1 b I, • 7 1 3 I, • 1 \ 17 • C; n 'I •q 8 zg
o ti :::;.
I-' T U T ,\L 31 ',2 . ? (18 . 8~J -"On7 . I , ().8.Q)b)?'1!.,-2:.i.)-.:J..JL.3JJ ?H!2"0-'-""_.(~6.~.'i'/',L _"._ - ??..1 '-'-~ 0\('11
<
rurAL PUPULi\TlCJ-j 1 (, ., 3 6 • b 1 ( 1 hi, • 9 1 .( 0 1 2 • 'J 1 .( 1 II :> • 'r "" I. 1 Cf) ijo
>- ...,
(!)
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~ ZN
(!) ~.O\
tic/)
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ti~
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8
o N!-'"
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'· ··· l !.'. ~(:O;\E FOR POP'JLA.TION IN H:'MLETS R/ITED A=5.El=4,C=3,D=?,[,=1,VC=O •
•, . · .·,-lV:·~ ·.J t.1Ll) i\A" ,L~ rS - IIKLUiH:. S AIIANDUNED,PLANNEIl .
--..:
',j
' -,
\
HAML~T ~ATA
TOTAL SCCRE - COUNTRYWIDE
TH~OUG H DECEM RER,1967
NU~RER OF HAML~TS
1967. NET CHfl NG E

r~A R CH J UNE SEPTE"' OER D~CE "1f\ER MAR - I)E C
SECURE I GOOD
A HAMLETS 99 1 6& 2 13 231 132
:3 HA ;J,L ET S 163 9 ,1776 19 0 2 1 809 l -iO
C HAr",L ETS 313 8 32 45 .3 13 7 3300 I h2
TOTAL 4 8 76 5189 5252 511.0 4 (,', Z
CONTES TE IJ/POOR
o HArl, LCTS 2348 2156 2206 2? 30 l In
So
"dg
E HAI-l LETS 599 5 28 '. (l1 445 J 54 a '";-
,**OTH ER rlM~ LETS
TOTAL
o
2 9 47
6 B6
33 70
7 13
3 402
8 ;> 5
3?00
13 7-5_
553 1-3
()
(D
~
_.
'-'-.
'"
:=l
vC HMI LETS 4 26 2 39 7 8 19 8 7 31182 3 80
o
'lj
Z('!)
,- Q.
TOT i'lL HA:"LETS 12085 12 517 1 2641 1 27 22 637 "(f).
3 v
cr~
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x
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~
f\)
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(1)
t30
0:3-
~
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. ~
f-' . OJ,....
c+ '< w
.. U1
f-' .
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··~a ~-EVAL0ATED ~I\MLETS- INCLUDES ABANDONED,PLANNED.

In February 1968 an analysis of 1967 pacification-RI D r esults as

revealed in the RES was published by OSD Systems Analysis.
Hamlet Evaluation System (RES ) reports for CY 1967

indicate that pacification progressed slowly during the
fir st half of 1967, and lost ground in the second half.
Most (60%) of the 1967 gain results from accounting type
changes to the RES system, not from pacification progress;
hamlet additions and deletions, and revised population
estimates accounted for half of the January-June increa,se
and all of the June-December increase. In the area that
r eally counts--VC-D-E hamlets rising to A-B-C ratings--we
actually suffered a net loss of 10,100 people between June
and December 1967. The enemy ' s offensive appears to have
killed the revolutionary development program, as currently
conc eived. Recent reports state that to a large extent,
the VC now control the country-side. ?::..CfJJ
Written in the pessimistic atmosphere of the 1968 post-Tet period this

vi ew may over-emphasize negative factors. Ambassador Komer wrote a
stinging dissent that appeared in the next monthly issue of the Systems
Analysis Southeast Asia Analysis Report. 1921 Statistical analysis
aside, pacification clearly failed to make the significant strides
that the President had hoped for in 1967. It certainly did not initia,te
any Revolutionary Development likely to transform the qualify of life
f or the Vietnamese farmer Or to alter fundamentally the course of the
war.
Concurrently vlith attempts to improve information on the security

programs, MACV exhibited increased interest in 1967 in improving RVNAF
effectiveness . Early in the year it was decided to undertake an extensive,
unit-by-unit effectiveness evaluation. Units judged to be superfluous or
consistently below standard were to be cut off from U. S. support. 192/
Decisions on support withdrawal "lere to be made semi-annually as new
evaluations ,,,ere received . MACV explained to CINCPAC that the revie'l'l
would include:
.. . all VNAF, VNN, VNMC, ARVN tactical and logistical

units, and RF'/ pF units in the current projected FY 68 force
structure . The methodology for the evaluation includes:
identification of the credibility and feasibility of current
plans of RVNAF officials to guarantee increased effectiveness ;
study of unit performance trends during the past six months;
determination of availability of necessary plans to train
personnel in the required skills; and evaluation of the degree
of cOlnmand interest at all l evel s for i mprovement of the
i neffective or non-productive units . Considering these
factors, units are categorized as improvement probable,
doubtful, or unlikely . For those units categorized as

Declassified per Exec uti ve O rder 13526, Sectio n 3.3
NND Project Num ber: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
improvement doubtful or unlikely, justification for continued

military assistance will be requir ed or action will be initi-
ated to reduce the FY 68 Military Assistance Program. 194/
The first review ( completed in March ) cut two margi nal navy vessels
from the li st of U. S. supported units, but only '\'larned JGS of the un8.ccept-
able effectiveness of two marginal ranger battalions and an armored cavalry
squadron. The June review, '\'lhile producing recorrunendations from U . S.
advisor s that aid be suspended in several cases, again r esulted only in
warnings and threats . Ther e vTaS no suspension of U. S. support.
RVNAF EFF~CTIVENESS
Quantitative efforts to rate RVNAF effectiveness continued in the

field, at ~~CV, and in Washington throughout the year with no clear
agreement on what set of s tatisU.cal indicators best portrayed RVNAF
performance and potential. During 1966 MACV had relied on a minimum
present for duty strength as a means of evaluating ARVN battalion effec-
ti veness. This method permitted wi de fluctuations and vras unreliable.
The 1967 statistics on RVNAF desertions revealed an improving ability of
units to hold their men. MACV soon began to use this trend 8.S an indi-
cator of effectiveness. In May, for instance, COMUSMACV noted with
satisfaction the marked reduction of January and February 1967 des ertions
compared to desertions in the same period in 1966. The average improve -
ment for this period ~las about 50 percent:
Desertions/ Rates (per 1000 assigned ) 195/
January February
1966 9,25 1/ 16.0 14,110/2~ . 3
1967 5,900 / 9.6 5,860/ 9.6

In the same message, MACV noted Vlith satisfaction recent aggressive
actions by the JGS to correct the i111acceptably high incidence of deser-
tions, including the singling out of three regime nts for special warning
on their excessive desertion rat e . Year-end statistics compiled by OSD
Systems Analysis indicate that the figures quot ed by MACV in May erred
on the optimistic side somevlhat by undercounting RF desertions in both
months by about 1,000. Nevertheless, the trend to vlhich MACV was pointing
..las confirmed during the rest of the year . After rising slightly to
8,127 in March , RVNAF desertion rates l eveled off at be-Gvleen about 6,000 -
7,000 per month for the remainder of 1967. l~/ Thus, 1967 produced only
80,912 desertions compared with 117,740 in 19 6, an overall reduction of
almost one-third. 197/ (It also should be noted in passing, that VC/ NVA
desertions reached a peak in March and thereafter fell off sharply. )

TOP SECRET - Sec}siti ve
At the Pentagon, Systems Anal~-sis sought measures of RVNAF effec-

tiveness in a comparison behreen t:-_e performances of Vietna~mese and
American units in selected categor~es: VC/ NVA KIA ratios, battalion
days of operations, days of enemy contact , nurnber of operations , weapons
l oss ra,tios, etc. Summarizing the results of some of these statistical
studies, Systems Analysis stated i~ September 1967 :
Per man, Vietnamese forces v[ere about half as effective

as U.S. forces in killing VC/I-:'VA during the eleven months
(Aug 66 through Jun 67 ) for vltich detailed data are avail-
able. Effecti venes s differs iddely among Vietna,mese D-YJ.i ts
of the same type and betvreen U::1i ts in differing parts of
the country. Poor l eadership is the key reason for i neffic-
iency in most cases. 198/
The N'lACV staff rebutted many of the ' premises on w'hich the statistical
comparisons had been based and again revealed the difficulty in develop-
ing meaningful statistical measures vri th respect to anything Vietna,mese .
Their most tellj_ng criticism of the Systems Analysis compari son of U. S.
and Vietnamese units was the follo,.;ing:
( a ) It is generally accepted that US maneuver battalions

have a combat effectiveness ratio of about 3:1 to RVNAF maneu-
ver battalions due to their greater unit firepower and depth
of combat support/ combat service support forces ; R\mAF also
l acks the mobility assets available to US units.
(b ) Approximately one-third of the RVNAF maneuver

battalions are committed to direct support of Revolutionary
Development , a mission ivhich constrains the overall poten-
tial to find, fix, and fight the enemy forces . In this
analysis an RVNAF unit that is 45 percent as effective as
US units which have three times the RVNAF combat effective-
ness would appear to be doing very well. In fact, anything
over 33 percent woul d reflect superior performance. 192/
But here again one can be misled. One reason that ARVN vTas given t he
R/D support mission in the first place was its demonstrated inability
to engage effectively and destroy the enemy main force. R/D "TaS regarded
as a residual a,nd semi-passive role more sui ted to ARVN capab ilities.
And so the statistical argurnents r aged , partisans marshall ing vThatever
statistics they could to defend vThat in most cases were their o"m pre-
conceived notions .
All of this is not to imply that Clualitative estimat es , diagnoses,

pr escriptions , and prognosis were lacking in 1967. At the Guam Conference
wi th the President, General Abrams I appointment as the nevi Deputy COMUS-
MACV had been announced along vli th the others already mentioned and his
r esponsibility for overseeing the U. S. advisory effort "Ti th RVNAF re-
emphasized. Upon return to Saigon prior to hi s own departure , Lodge

TOP SECRE'L' - Sensitive
sent a message to the President st~essing the importance of R~w\F:
MACV ' s success (which mea~s the success of the United

States and of all of us) vlill ... Hilly-nilly, be judged not
so much on the brilliant performa,nce of the U. S. troops as
on its success in getting AP.v__ :, RF and PF Cluickly to function
as a first-class counter t error , counter-guerrilla force. 200/
Lodge concluded vli th a glo,ving endorsement of Abrams as the man to see

t hat RVNAF did become an effective force. There is ample evidence that
Abrams did work with great energy to do just that.
In mid··June, after Abrams ' first Cluarterly revievl of RVNAF, Bunker

included a report on actions to iEprove R~F in his weekly report to
t he President:
A) Improving the leadership 2,nd enhancing the personnel

effectiveness of the ARVr/RF/ PF through such things as
i mprovement in the alvardi:r:g of com.missions and promotions ,
selection procedures, training of officer candidates , the
introduction of an effective personnel management and
accounting system, tighte::1ing up on discipline, improve-
ment in the treatment of veterans in order to clear the
rolls of those incapable of further active duty and an
expanded advisory effort to support properly the Revolu-
ti onary Development program ;
B) To improve motivation and morale through more eCluitable

pay scal es , i mprovement in rations, and revitalization of
the dependent housing progrm1;
c) Improvement in the command structure and eCluipment of the

Regional/ popular Forces ahd a revised motivation and i ndoc-
trination program to reflect the role of the PF soldier in
Revolut ionary Development ;
D) A comprehensive training efrort to improve intelligence and

reconnaissance operations and to i mprove the combat effec-
t iveness of battalions; training of ARVN/ RF/ PF for support
of Revolutionary Developme nt particularly in providing
s ecurity and support to the civil population;
E) Experimentation ,vi th various forms of integrated US/ RVNAF

operations •.. {discussed alreadi7 ;
F) Inst ituti on of Cluarterly r eviews at vlhich t ime progress is

measured against objectives, probl ems discovered and deci-
sions taken. First of these revievrs "las held last month . 201/

NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date : 2011
In May, General Abrams established a Program Review and Analysis

System for RVNAF Progress. This was essentially an internal MACV
effort to examine the problems facing RVNAF in order that MACV might
structure its advisory assistance to make the most headway against
these problems. The first published review, covering the January-June
1967 period, appeared in September. Like many similar efforts it was
a long catalogue of RVNAF deficiencies by U.S. standards. 202/ The
benefits of these reviews Here supposed to be reaped as they were brought
to bear during the quarterly RVNAF self-review called for in the Com-
bined Campaign Plan. There is no available information as to how effec-
t ively this has worked in practice. This plethora of programs and
activities through which we sought either to improve the effectiveness of
RVNAF directly Or to promote it indirectly by improving the lot. and life
of the soldier received a full-blown exposition during Secretary McNamara ' s
trip to Saigon in July. 203/ With respect to improving RVNAF morale --
in addition to the pay scale adjustments, improved rations, and provision
of dependent housing -- the U.S. has helped the South Vietnamese develop
a miniature U.S. style Commissary/PX system.
The leadership problem received very detailed attention by MACV during

the course of 1967. Prior to the Secretary ' s departure for Vietnam,
Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis,
sent McNamara a memo that :flatly stated, "There are a number of reasons
for the ineffectiveness of many of the RVNAF units, particularly ARVN
combat battalions, but the primary one is the quantity and quality of
the leadership. " 204/ After itemizing the contributing factors to this
deficiency', he recommended that the Secretary query MA.CV in detail on
l eadership problems during his visit. In the briefings for Secretary
McNamara in July, fourteen different MACV/ JGS actions or programs were
cited as Hays in which this problem W8.S being addressed. These ranged
from better officer career management to regular merit promotion proced-
ures and the publication of leadership materials . 205/ One example of
the lengths to Hhich He have gone in efforts to remedy the leadership
deficit in RVNAF is the replication in South Vietnam of the UoS. elite
officer schooling system -- a four-year Vietnamese Military Academy,
enlarged Command and General Staff College , and, most recently, a National
Defense College.
THE LATEST EXPANSION OF ADVISORS
COMUSMACV faced difficul t choices in determining whether he wished

to emphasize more U.S. advisors for RVNAF - - or advisors for neH functions
or to stress a build-up of the number of UoS . combat forces in-country.
RVNAF strength had increased by 152% from 1960 to 1966, going up by over
100 , 000 in the 18 months preceding the beginning of 1967. The table belo\.,T
shows the growth and distribution of RVNAF over the 1965-1967 period. The
slight decline in forces from January to April 1967, reflects efforts to
weed out absentee personnel still being carried on padded unit rolls.

RVNAF STRENGTHS
1 Jul 65 1 J.an 66 1 Jul 66 1 Jan 67 30 Apr 67
RVNAF
ARMY 234,139 267,877 276,473 283,898 283,200
NAVY 9,037 1~· , 559 16,380 17,349 16,000
MARINES 6,842 7,380 6,848 7,049 7,100
AIR FORCE 12,081 12,778 13,895 14,647 15,600
REGIONAL FORCES 1 0 7,652 132,221 141,447 149, 84).j 142,018
POPULAR FORCE 149, 02 9 136,398 137 ,689 15 0 , 096 142,491
Sub Total 518,780 571,213 592,73 2 622,883 606,405
PARA-MILITARY
National Polj.ce 42,700 52 ,3 00 5Lf,600 58,3 00 63,1+57
CIDG 21,700 28,~. 00 30,lfOO 34,700 31,477
Armed Cmbt Youth 39,000 39,600 22,800 20,000 19,930
Total 6 2 5,800 691,5 00 700 ,5 00 73 5,900 721,269 206/
In March, two days before the Guam Conference vIaS to meet, General Westmore-
l and sent an i mportant c8,ble to CINCPAC requesting an tl optimum force " increase,
above and beyond the approved Deployment Program 4, of 4-2/ 3 U. S. divisions
(201,250 personnel spaces ), or a "minimum essential force " of an additional
2-~/3 U.S. divisions' ( 8~,100 spaces ). 20 7/ The optimum forc e wO~~d have
r alsed total U.S. manpov'Ter in Vietnam to over 670 , 000 troops. Thls reCluest
was to kick off (after Guam, I'There it was not specifically addressed )
another prolonged internal administration debate and review of forces in
Vietnam ,.vhich \'TOuld eventually culminate i n Secretary MCNamara ' s July trip
t o Saigon and the subsequent decision to adopt deployment Program 5 , raising
t otal authorized strength to 525,000. COMUSM.A.CV ' s orientation tow'ard
RVNAF's role in the war is clearly revealed in this message :
Whereas deployment of additional US force s in FY 68 will

obvia t .e the requirement for a maj or expansion of the RVNAF,
selective increases will be necessary to optimize combat
effectiveness . Regul ar forces proposed for FY 68 total
328 ,322 , an increase of 6,367 spaces over the FY 67 authorization.
As US, Free World and RVNAF operations are expanded , additional '
areas will be made available for the conduct of Revolutionary
Development operations. Based on experience gained thus far,
an increase of 50,000 RF/ PF spaces will be required to provide
a planning figure of 350,000 spaces for this force. The
increase will accommodate necessary support of Revol utionary
Development and concomitantly, vTill be compatible ,.vith
r equirements incident to implementation of the constabulary
concept. 208/

Without going into detail on the debate and decision on Program 5, from
the advisory standpoint the important development vlas COMUSMA.CV I s view
of RVNAF. In March, RVNAF had been regarded almost as a residual, but
by September, when the ambitious U.S. force proposals had been rejected
i n favor of only a modest increase of about 45,000 COMUSMACV reasserted
t he importance of RVNAF and asked for a major increase in its authorized
strength. Slowly, then, the realization that there was a ceiling on the
numb er of U.S. forces which could be deployed without calling up re serves
turned everyone 1s attention once again to RVNAF.
The one significant increase proposed in the MACV message cited

above v18,s the increase of 50,000 in RF/ PF. This vias not to be imrnedi-
ately forthcoming. In May 1967, Secretary McNamara imposed a temporary
c eiling on RVNAF at the level authorized for end FY 66 to prevent further
i nflation in South Vietnam and to 8,rrest some of the balance of payments
i mbalance stemming from U. S. Vietnam spending . 209/ Subseg_uently,
CI NCPAC was authorized to make adjustments among the various components
within that limit, thereby permitting augmentation of RF/ PF at the expense
of ARVN .
The question of additional U. S. troops had refined itself considerabl~T
by the time the Secretary went to Saigon in July. Of the two force increa.se
proposals presented by MACV at that time, the first was merely a restate-
ment of the old IIminimmn essential force ll ,\<Thich would have brought total
U. S. troops to 571,071 (2-1/ 3 division force equivalents ); the second pro-
posal was a much smaller request for an authorized strength of 535,390
(1-1/3 division force equivalents ) . 210/ Both of these proposals con-
t ained a request for 2,577 additional advisors -- primar ily to support the
anticipated expansion of RF/ PF and to flesh out the sector and sub-sector
advisory teams supporting the pacification effort. The follo,\<Ting table
shows the breakdown of the 1967 advisory increases, including the r equest
presented to McNamara in July and subsequently approved .

:,'
TOP' SECRET - Sensitive
' ,.
I~ C~I ) 11 .sUPPL·:·.D~n ?AJ':' DN.i.'/l .'3~ ;~;Sl' f ,

>::>l!YJJTG'i' ; ' ]' :lC Lf Rc.c;'~2)i.:L.'!c(~ hh'":i.~.:O~.T n(;~lu~j. ):(:::lc:::rtc (u)
Jn~th RC(J.u5.1'C:cJ. JldcJ.-·on:J r

:!.~.!l-_9..7. Y cl.?_J~I_; __!.~PJ2_.r:(L_-:"", ..;[::·!L.J?1
26;; 23 8
30 6 828
51? 51'1
h93 1;.93
29
59 7 1 6'7
Di v-j.f :l.OnS OJ») t: 2-':t,h S],)3c.i..o.1 266
Z Oll e DJ.lct S~tril-'O). "lO, 11 86).
98 ].2 11(;
613 120 590

130 ··12 118
31 21 '
Popnl.<>.r Po:cc c 'fl'i:'. inin.[; Csntol';:) 122 109
10'! 107
' . .
5 (:) (;1.,0 1' AdviE30J.' ~.' c : -:'T\S (P:cov1nco )
. 56 31.:-1 92 l,3h2
'137 2... 0 .J,
~ " ,. 6 J,h06
D
J\C[j.l " on"
"'~. l ..}?O.f ."C0
2, ?JJ
P'· " ·i.O:l.'·,!. Fo:cc ·J Cc'clp,':t (Co;'r·,rOJ:Lc:J.
f:;:~;n C:U)~;) . . 122
_._----.. -
10 ,l:J 'l 211/

NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
/. ;/
."
The large RF/ FF' advisory element in this reg,uest included spaces for
824 RF Company Advisory Teams of b ·,'O men each and 119 Company Training
Teams of five men each. Before returning to l!fashington, the Secretary
gave planning authorization for a U,S, augmentation not to exceed
525,000 spaces, but fulfilling \-)estmoreland t s louer alternative by
civilianizing an additional 10,000 military spaces . 212/ A month
l ater, after approval by President Johnson, this ne"T force level was
promulgated as Program #5. 21 3/ The final detaj.led troop list for
Program #5 submitted by the JCS on September 15 contained, in addition
to the regular advisory spaces already nientioned, a 666 -man Special
Forces augmentation to perform advisor-like functions with their Viet-
namese counterparts. 211+/
Even before the Program #5 troop list "laS completed by MACV and
submi tted by the JCS, however, Ambassador Komer W8,S complaining that
the CORDS advisory element actual strength I'Tas seriously below its
authorization and that bureaucratic delays had forestalled even the
deployment of the 100 priority advisors requested in July. 21 5/ The
following day, OSD Systems Analysis advised Secretary McNamara that the
shortfall in the actual strength of the overall advisory complement was
a longstanding problem. In March, the advisory program had been under-
strength 600 men while MACV hea,dquarters exceeded its authorization by
473. In response to Systems Analysis prodding this discrepancy had been
partially rectified, but as late as July the adv:Lsory staff was still
short 237 while MACV had an overage of 130. Systems Analysis further
advised the Secretary that while total strength authorizations had been
made, MACV t s delay in submitting detailed lists of grades and specialties
of de sired personnel had, in turn, engendered delays at this end in
filling the billets. Moreover, the requirement that advisors receive
preliminary Stateside background and language training further delayed
the actual deployments. Only priority requests could be filled very
r apidly, and these necessarily could only constitute a small percentage
of the total.
In order to study the problems presented by the anticipated expan-

sion of RF/ PF and to plan for the significant expansion of the U.S.
advisory effort to these forces, t~CV convened a conference on RF/ PF
matters on 26 October for all interested elements of MACV and USARV . 216/
The conference recommended a complete reorientation of the advisory con-
cept for RF/ PF, Rather than assigning teams to RF companies and PF
platoons on a permanent basis, the conferees recommended the establish-
ment of 354 seven-man Mobile Advisory Teams (MA.Ts ) to be u sed on a
rotating basis under the direction of t he Province Advisor to whom they
would be assigned, Further, the conference recommended the deployment
of an Engineer Advisor to each province, an S-l advisor to all provinces
without one, increasing the Administrative and Direct Support Logistics
(ADSL ) companies from three to seven, and cre8,ting 7 seven-man Mobile
ill TOP SECRET - Sensitive

NND P roject Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
Advisory Logist ics Teanls (MALTs) to support the RF/ PF. Altogether,
the conference produced some fift~r-odd recommendations from 'I'lhi ch a
30 -point package was fOr'i'larded to CO)"ruSHACV.
On 15 December , General Hestr:.ore1e,nd gave his a,pproval to the nevT

system which was to be phased in d·'J.ring 1968, the first half by the end
of March and the rest by the end of that year. By the end of December
1967, .MACV vms recommending a furtter increase of 366 advisors for the
FY 1969 program, primarily for district level intelligence slots .
Meanwhile, on September 28, tte JCS had fonTarded with their endorse-
ment the .MACV-CINCPAC recommendation on RVNAF force increases, of which
the RF/ PF component \'las the l argest . 217/ Requested vTas an increase
in FY 68 RVNAF' authorized strength from 622,153 to 685,739, a net of
63,586. Of this number, 47,839 we~e RF/PF spaces, and only 15,747 were
for the regular forces (of which IL'Nl'Tts share 'I·Tas 14,966 ) . To achieve
these higher levels, .MACV propose d the reduction of the draft age from
20 to 18 and the extension of tour s of duty for active RVNAF personnel.
The advisory support for these ne'l" Vietna.mese forces had already been
provided for by Program #5. In their concluding paragraph, the JCS took
note of a MACV request, to be cons idered separately, for an FY 1969 RVNAF
authorized strength of 763,953, a further increase of 78,204 over the
newly proposed FY 1968 level. Of these nevT troops, 69 , 000 were to go
to RF/ PF ( including some draftees) and only 9,000 to ARVN. Secretary
McNamara approved these requested FY 1968 augmenta,tions for RVNAF against
the recommendation of his Systems Analyst , Alain Enthoven , 'I'lho vlOuld
have authorized only half of the request pending better j ustification. 218/
But the JCS were informed that a judgr:lent on the proposed FY 1969 increase
would be reserved until the military had responded to a series of questions
relating to equipment availability, officer supply, costs , and distribu-
tion of the neVI forces between ARV~i and RF/ PF . .
Thus , by the fall of 1967, t'l'70 factors were pushing U. S. leaders

t oward increasing the size and role of RVNAF in the "Tar - - a step which
would increase the importance of the U.S . as advisor rather t han combatant:
(l ) the approaching ceiling on U. S. forces deployable to Vietnam without
mobilization (political ly unpalatable in an election year ); and (2 ) a
growing U. S. Congressional and public clamor for a l arger South Viet-
namese contribution to the war and assumption of burdens .
This vms essential ly the situation that existed when , on 31 January

1968, the VC/ NVA launched a series of major attad:s on South Vietnamese
population centers . This radical change i n enemy tact i cs challenged
t he efficacy of the division of effort between U,S . fo rces and RVNAF,
shook U. S. public support for the 'I'Tar, and marked the beginning of a
new, uncharted phase in t he history of UoS. attempts to advise the govern-
ment and armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam .

I
1~"
r. .''..
FOOTNOTES
1. Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy,

Politics and Defense Budgets (New York, Columbia University Press,
1962); Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear vleapons and Foreign Policy (New
York, hlblished for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1957).
2. Memo, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, for SecState , 20 January 1955,
Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council (1'S).
3· Memo, JCS for SecDef, 19 October 1954, Development and Training of

Indigenous Forces in Indochina (TS).
4. Memo, JCS for SecDef, 22 September 1954, Retention and Developmen.!
of Forces in Indochina (TS).
5· Memo, JCS for SecDef, 17 November 1954 , Indochina (TS ) .

6. Memo, JCS for SecDef, 19 October 1954, op. cit.
7· See letter, J. F. Dulles (SecState ) to Charles E. Wilson (SecDef ),

11 October 1954 (1'S).
8. Msg, State to Saigon 1679, 22 October 1951~ (TS ).
80, . Memo, SecDef to JCS, 26 October 1954 ( TS ).
9· The similarities and differences are depicted graphically in Vol. IV .A . ,

this series, pp. 27-29 .
10 . Memo for SecDef , 9 December 1955, Raising US Military Personnel Ceiling

i n MAAG Vietnam (S ) .
11 . See memo, Director CIA for SecState , 16 December 1955 (S) .
12 . Memo, JCS for SecDef, 21 January 1955, . Reconsideration of pS Military

Program in Southeast ~ (TS ).
13· John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger ,
1962 ), pp . 64-70 ; Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam : Nati,on Unde~
Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19b3), pp . 163-67 .
14 . The President I s Cormnittee to Study the United States Military Assistance

Program, Report, Volume II , passim.
15· Ibid., Vol ume III (Classified Studies ), Study No . 4 by the Committee
Staff , "Mirror Imaging, " pp. 115-147 .

/;,-:
16 . Ibid., Volume III (Cla,ssified Studies), Study No.2 by the Institute

for Defense Analyses, "The Role of the Military in Promoting Internal -
Security in Underdeveloped Areas, II pp. 33-34 .
17· U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 10 June 1960 , Study on
Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (S), p.' 10.
18. Ibid., p. 13.
19· The plan is contained as an inclosure to message, Saigon to State 276,

4 January 1961, Counter Insurgency Plan for South Viet-Nam (S), Cited
hereafter as CIP.
20. MAAG, Vietnam, 15 September 1961, Ge.o,graphically Phased National Level

Plan for Counterinsurgency (S). Cited hereafter as Geogra,phically
Phased Plan.
21. CIP, pp. 4-5 .
22. Ibid . , p . 5.
23· Ibid., pp. 7-8.
24. Geographically Phased Plan , pp. A-l - A-7.
25. Message, Saigon to State 2525 , 27 February 1960 (S).
26. Message, Saigon to State 3036, 23 April 1960 (S).
27· Messa,ge, State-Defense-ICA-CAS to Saigon 28" 7 July 1959 (S).
28. See Message, Saigon to State 212 , 24 July 1959 (S); Saigon to State
2446, 18 February 1960 (C); CINCPAC Command History, 1960 , pp. 162-63
(TS/ NF ) .
29 · Enclosure to SM-1394-61, 19 December 1961, Project BEEF-UP (TS )
30 . Adapted from Re ort on GBneral Taylor ' s Mission to South Vietnam ,

3 November 19 1, looseleaf TS, Section on Summary and Conclusions .
Cited hereafter as Taylor Re~.
31. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RFE-3, 1 November

1961 , Communist Threat Mounts in South Vietnam (S), p . 5.
32 . NIE 50-61, 28 March 1961, Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia (S), p. 7.
33. RFE-3, 1 November 1961, Ope cit ., p. 4; Briefing Paper, n.d., The
North Vietna,mese Role intheOrigin , Direction, and Support ofllie
War in South Vietnam (s), p. iv.

) .,~ /
;--.. '..,.~
34. Memo, General Lansdale for SecDef, 17 January 1961, Vietnam (S), p. 1 ~
35· Ibid., p. 3.
36. Ibid., p. 11.
37· Ibid., p. 4.
38. Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution , Rev. Ed. , (New York: Harper and
Row, 1966), pp. 148-149 .
39· Memo, WWR /Walt w. Rosto~ to the President, 12 April 1961, no
subject (S).
40. Memo, 19 April 1961, Vi etnam (S) .

41. Memo, SecDef for DepSecDef, 20 April 1961, no subject (S) .
42 . Memo , DepSecDef for President, 27 April 1961, Program of Action for
Vietnam (TS).
43. Ibid.
44 . Memo LState Departmenil to Members of Task Force on Vietnam, 3 May 1961 ( TS:
45. NSAM 52 , 11 May 1961 (TS).

46. Memo , President for Heads of Execut ive Departments and Agencies, 29 May
1961 , Respons ibilities of Chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions,
forwarding l etter of 27 May to ea'ch Ameri car.l. Ambassador abroad,
Federal Register , Vol. 26, Nr. 22, 17 November 1961, p. 10749 (F.R.
Doc. 61 -11012) .
47. Memo , R.L. Gilpatric for Presidential Task Force , 1 May 1961 ' (TS ).
48. Ibid.
49. NSAM 52, 11 May 1961 .
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Msg, Saigon to State 1743, 15 l·:ay 1961.
53· Memo, Vic e President Johnson for President Kennedy , 23 May 1961.
54. Ltr, President Diem to Pr esident Ken.nedy, 9 June 1961. (Emphasis added. )
55· Ibid.

56 . Memo, BG Lansdale for DepSecDef , 18 May 1961, Vietnam.

57. Msg, Saigon to State 421, 1 October 1961.
58 . JCSM 717-61.
59. Study, Concept of Intervention in South Vietnam z.. n . d. , discussed at
NSC meeting, 11 October 1961.
60. SNIE 10-3-61, 10 October 1961, Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
SEATO Undertakings in South Vietnam (TS)
61. Memo for Record, Ros\'le l l Gilpatric, 11 October 1961.
62. Taylor Report , Evaluations and Conclusions, pp . 2-3·
63. Ibid., pp. 6-9.

64. Msg , Saigon 537 , General Taylor to White House , State , Defense , JCS ,
25 October 1961 (TS/ Eyes only) (Emphasis added ); See also Msg, Baguio 005,
1 November 1961, Eyes Only for the President from General Tayl or (TS ) .
65. Msg, Saigon to State 536, 25 October 1961 (TS ).
66. Taylor Report, p . 9.
67. Ibid ., p . 11.
68. NSAM I ll , 22 November 1961 , First Phase of Vi etnam Program (TS ).
69. Msg, Saigon to State 687 , 22 November 1961 (,S); Msg, Saigon to State 708 ,
25 November 1961 (S) .
70. Taylor Report, 0p . cit ., pp. 9-10. (Emphasis added. )
71. Ibid ., Appendix G (Unconventional Warfare ), Memo , BG Lansdal e for

General Tayl or , n.d. , "Summary of Recommendati ons ." (S).
72. Msg , State to Saigon 619, 14 November 1961.
73. Msg, State to Saigon 693 , December 1961.

74. Hq CI NCPAC , 16 January 1962 , Re cord of Second Secretary of Defense
Conference (TS ) , pp . 4-1 - 4-4 .
75. Ibid., p. 4-4.
76. I b id ., pp. 4-5 - 4-6 .

77. DF , Distribution Division , DC SPER , DA t o Mult i ple Addressees , 5 October
1961, Improvement of Personnel Cont i nuity and Effectiveness in Short
Tour Overseas Areas (S) .

NND P roject Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
78. Study, ODCSOPS, DA for Chief of Staff, U.S, Army, 15 September 1965,
Time Phased Build-up of Unit Advisory Effor·t in RVN (S ). Cited
hereafter as Time Phased Advisory Build-up.
79. Ibid.
80 . Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82 . Ibid .
83. US CINCPAC, Command History, 1962 (TS ) , pp. 173-75.
84. David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York, Random House,
1965 ) .
85. Record of 6th Secretary of Defense Conference, 23 July 1962 (TS), p. 2-1.
86. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New' York: Praeger ,
1966 ) , p. 136.
87 . Roger Hilsman , To Move a Nation (Garden City : Doubleday , 1967 ) , p. 502 .
88. NSAM 273, 26 November 1963 (TS ).

89. Ibid.
90 . Ibid.
91 . NSAM 288, 17 March 1964, Implementation of South Vietnam Programs.

92 . Ibid.
93 . Ibid .
94 . Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96 . Memo , DIA for SecDef, 17 April 1964 , Status of the Vietnamese Hamlet
Survey ( TS ).
97 · Briefing Book, Miscellaneous Messages, Status Reports , and Recommenda-

t ions for Secretary McNamara, n . d. LMay 196~7 (TS ).
98 . Ibid. , Reports on Critical Provinces .
99 · Briefing Paper , Briefing Book for McNaughton , Saigon LMay 196~,

7 March 196L~, Establishment of Critical District Advisory Tea~ (C ).
100. Ibid.

/ l~-~,'j
i ......... j
101. Msg, Saigon to State 2338, 28 £1ay 1964 (S) .
102. Draft Memo for Record, Lt Col S. B. Berry, Jr., {Mil Asst to Se cDetl,
n.d., U.S. Embassy Briefing, Saigon, 12 Ma,y 196~ .
103· Msg, JCS to COMUSMACV 64~8, 22 May 1964, Vietnamese Civil Guard and
Self Defense Corps (S).
10l~. Ibid . '
105· Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 230418z Kay 1964, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self
Defense . Corps
.........
(S) .
106. Ibid.
107· Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6473, 25 j·:ay 196~, Vietna,mese Civil Guard and
Self Defens e Corps (S).
108 . Ibid . (Emphas is added .)
109. Ibid.
110. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 4259, 270045~ May 1964 (S). (Emphasis a,dded. )
111. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 270805Z J.:ay 1964, Vietnamese CG and SDC (S).
112. JCSM-464-61~, 30 May 1964, Pilot P.cogre,)'!l for Provision of Advisory

Assistance to Paramilitary Fo~ces in Seven Provinces (S).
113· JCSM-465-6l~ , 30 May 1964, U.S. Advisory Assistance to the Vietnamese

Civil Guard and Self Defense Cor-os (S).
114 . Ibid.
115· JCSM-466-64, 30 May 196~, Provision of U. S. Advisors to Company

Level Within Vietnamese Re&ular Ground Forces (S) .
116 . Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS , ~~C J32 5380 , 25 June 1964 , Extension of U.S.
Advisory Assistance (S).
117. Ibid .
118. Msg , White House to Saigon (Personal f or General Paul Harkins ) ,

27 May 1964 (C).
119· Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS , MAC J32 5380, ~. cit . (Emphasis added .)
120. Memo , DepSecDef for CJCS, 22 April 1964 (u ).

j l/)
, (;> ,
121. See, for example, the papers in Secretary of Defense files, Vietnam
381 (16 January 1961.~ ) for July-September 1964.
122. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, MACJ-316180, 17 July 1964, Support

~CJ.uirements for Extension of U.S. Advisory Program (S).
123. Ibid.
124. JCSM-665 -64 , 4· August 1961.~, Add itional Support in RVN on Accelerated
Basis (S).
125. Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, MAC Jl 704.4, 28 July 1964, Pe.r sonnel Augmenta-
tion (S).
126. JCSM-665-64 , 9.J2. cit.

127. Memo, SecDef for CJCS, 7 August 1964, Additional Support for Republic
of Vietnam on an Accelerated Basis (8).
128. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC , MAC J3 7738, 11 August 1964., Additional
Support RVN (S).
129. Msg, JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF et al, JCS 7953, 15 August 1964, Additional
Support in RVN (S).
130. Msg, COMUSV~CV to JCS, MAC Jl 7044, £P. cit.
131. MACV Msg 19118, ~. cit.
132. MACV Military Report, 19-26 .June 1965.
133. MACV Comnland History, op. cit., p. 60.

134. v~CV "Commander's Estimate of the . Situation," 26 March 1965 .
135. 1965 MACV Command History, ~. ~., p. 58.
136. JCSM 417-65, 27 May 1965.
137· Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 June 1965.
138. Msg, MACV to CINCPAC and JCS 19118 , 7 June 1965 .
139· Dod Message 151233Z April 1965 (TS).

140. Department of State message 233 2 , 15 April 1965 , 3:46 p.m. (TS -NODIS ).
141. 1965 MACV Comnland History, pp. 81-82 .
142. JCS message 0936, 16 Mar ch 1965 (T8J

!'/ ' /
'
143. COMUSMACV Message 1566, 21 March 1965 (TS).
14·4·. JCS Message, 142228g May 1965.

145. COMUSMACV Message, 21 May 1965, Combined Comma.nd; COMUSM.ACV Message
17292, 240603Z May 1965; Msg, Saigon to State 3855, 24 May 1965.
146. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 3027, 260332Z May 1965 (TS).
147. 1965 MACV Command History, p. 101.
148. 1965 MACV Command History, pp. 98-99.

149. Memo, Vincent Puritano to James P. Gra.nt, tlJoint Provincial Sign-Off
Authority, tI with attachment , 25 Sep 65 . (Both officials were with
AID, Vietnam Section.)
15 0 . State Department message 1039, October 16, 1965; Saigon message 1324,
October 18, 1965.
151. 1965 MACV Command History, p. 240 .
152. Puritano Memorandum , op.cit .

153. New York Times, October 5, 7, 8 and November 26 , 1965; Mission Council
Action Memorandum No . 15, Octob er 7, 1965 ·
154. Saigon Airgram A-66 , July 27 , 1965 .
155 . Saigon Message 266, July 25, 1965.

156. Saigon Message 290, 28 July 1965 ; Saigon message 364, 3 August 1965.
157. Defense Department message 009164, Joint State/Defense Message,

15 April 1965 (TS-NODIS ).
158 . Memo, .SecDef for the President, 20 July 1965 ·

159. Draft Memo , SecDef for the President, 3 November 1965 (TS).
160 . 1964 MACV Command Histo~y, p. 68.

161. Mission Council Minutes, September 15, 1965 .

r
., ,I
/ ' ?
162 . President Johnson's final statement to Honol ulu Conference ,

Plenary Documents , 9 February 1966.
163. Mission Council Minutes, 28 Feb ruary 1966 . (Emphas i s added. )
164 . 1965 MACV Command History, p. 245 ; Memo, M.A.CJ3 , Rural Construction
~ (S).
165 · Memo, Ambassador Lodge to General Lansdale, 15 December 1965,

Roles of Different U,S, Agencies in the Three Phases of Rural
Recon struction, i. e., Military Clearing, Pacification , and
Development (C) ; quoted in 1965 MACV Command History , pp. 245-46 .
166 . Memo, Robert W. Komer , 7 August 1966, Giving a NevT Thrust to

Pacification. (Emphasis in original. )
167. A similar plan was , however, espoused by an i nfluentie.l study by

a select group of officers on the Department of t he Army General
Staff . See Study, Program for the Pacifi cat ion and Long-Term
Devel opment of Sout~etnam (Short Title: PROVN), March 1966.
Cited hereafter as PROVN Study .
168 . Lodge ' s definitions do not agree with thi s expl anati on but i t i s a
fair oversimplification of his views .
169. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC (Info to White House, State, SecDef, JCS,
and CIA), 26 August 1966 , Concept of Military Operations in_ South
Vi etnam (TS ).
170. MajGen JCF Tills on (J -3, Y.iA.CV ) , Briefing to Mission Council, 8 Aug 66 .
17l. Memo, General Maxwell D. Taylor to President , 30 August 1966 , Concept

of Military o-perations in South Viet-Nam (TS).
172. Msg , State to Lodge 83699 , 12 November 1966 (Emphasis added .)
173· MACV/ JGS Combined Campaign Plan , 1967 (AB 142), 7 November 1966 ,
pp . 193-205 .
174. Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New : Harper and Row, 1965 ),
pp. 329-330.
175· State Department message 1039 , October 16 , 1965 ; Saigon message

13 2 4, Octob er 18, 1965 .
176. MACV Command History, 1965 , Ope cit ., p. 240.
177 · Puritano Memorandum , Op e cit.

121
178. New York Times, October 5, 7, 8 and November 26, 1965; Mission
Council Action Memorandum No. 15, October 7, 1965.
179. For a review of this entire period, see Task Force Paper IV.C.,
Evolution of the War: US!GVN Relations, 1963-67, Part II, pp. 1-10.
180 . See, for example: Memo, SecDef for President, 20 July 1965; Draft
Memo, SecDef for President, 3 November 1965.
181. 1966 MACV Command History, p. 465·

182. PROVN Study, op . cit., Summa,ry statement, pp. 1-2.
183. Ibid., p. 67.
184 . Msg, MACJ33 18244, 12 May 1966 .

185 . Study, MAC V, ACofS CORDS, 17 June 1967 , Project TAl<EOFF, vol. II,
p. XI-l.
186. Ibid., p. XI-4 .
187. Msg, State to Saigon 30023, 31 August 1967 .
188 . Msg, Saigon to State 7113, 19 September 1967 .
189 . Msg, MACV to CINCPAC 02149, 18 January 1967 .

190. SEA Hamlet Evaluation System Data Book, through December 1967 ,
pp . 1-1 and 1-4 ; OASD/SA, SEA Programs Directorate.
191. "Pacification Slowdown, " Southeast Asia Analysis Report, February
1968, prepared by OASD! SA SEA Programs Directorate, p. 46 .
192 . "Ambassador Komer Rebuts our February Pacifica,tion Article ,"

Southeast Asia Analysis Report, March 1968 , pp. 33-34 .
193 . Msg, MACV 00949, 9 January 1967 .
194 . Msg, MACV to CINCPAC 15064 , 7 May 1967 .
195 . Ibid .
196 . Southeast Asia Statistical Tables, OASD! SA SEA Programs Directorate,
Table 4A (as of January 1968) .
197 . Ibid.
198 . Southeast Asia Analysis Report, August 1967 , prepared by OASD(SA)
SEA Programs Directorate, (S)~ p. 26 .

199· Southeast Asia Analysis ReTort, November 1967, prepared by OASD(SA)

SEA Programs Directorate, S), p. 16. .
200. Embassy Saigon message 21226, EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT from
Lodge, March 25, 1967 (TS-NODIS).
201. Embassy Saigon message 28095, For the President from Bunker ,
June 14, 1967 (S-NODIS).
202. Review' and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress, MACV-J341, 16 Sep 67 (S).
203. IlMACV J - 3 Q,uality Improvement of RVNAF II and "MACV J -1 RVNAF Personnel

Status,1I in Briefings Given the Secretary of Defense, Saigon, South
Vietnam, July 7 and 8, 1967 (TS) compiled by OASD(SA) SEA Programs
Directorate, pp. 163-170, pp. 249-279.
204. ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,

4 July 1967, Subject: Improvement in RVNAF Force Effectiveness (S).
205· Ibid., pp. 257-259.
206. Briefings for the Secretary of Defense, op. cit., p. 249.
207. MACV message 09101, Westmoreland sends, 18 Mar 67 (TS).
208. Ibid.
209. JCSM-530-67, 28 Sep 67, Subject: Increase in FY 1968 RVlmF Force

Level, (S); contains a review of the year's actions to that date.
210. Briefings for the Secretary of Defens~, op. cit., pp. 171-176.
211. MAC-J311, Supplemental Data Sheet A, dated 22 Oct 67, Subject:

MACV Recognized Advisory Requirements (U).
212. ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven, Memorandum for Record, July 13, 1967 ,
Subject: Fallout from Secretary of Defense Trip to South Vietnam,
(TS-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY Dr. Heyman); Q,nd OASD(SA) General Purpose
Forces, W. K. Brehm, Memorandum for the Record, Subj ect: SEA
Deployments (TS), July 14, 1967.
213. ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Mili-
t ary Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, 14 Aug 67, Subject: Southeast
Asia Deployment Program #5 (TS); refers to SecDef deci sion memoran-
dum, 10 Aug 67.
214. JCSM 505-67, 15 Sep 67, Subject: U.S. Force Deployments Vietnam
(Refined Troop List) (TS).
215· OASD(SA ) Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 30 Aug 67 ( S-

EYES ONLY).
j 123 TOP SECRET - Sensitive

216. Information in the paragraph is from "I nformation on MATs (Mobile

Advi sory Teams ) and MALTs (Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams ),"
8 May 68, working paper prepared by the ACofS MA, MACV .
217. JCSM 530-67, 28 Sep 67, Subject: Increase in FY 68 RVNAF Force
Level (S).
218. . Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Chairman of the J oj nt Chiefs

of Staff , 7 Oct 67, Subj ect: Increase in FY 68 RVNAF Force
Level ( S) and attached OASD(SA) Memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense, 5 Oct 67 (s ).

,
\ APPEJ\1])IX I
U. S. Advisory Effort __- Manpower y
Hq MACV Hq MAAG USA Section USN Section USMC Section USAF Section Total
Date Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth As gnd Auth As gnd Auth Asgnd
Jun 1956-Jun 1959 459 ~/ 170 22 34 335
April 196~ 54 530 41 73 685
z
November 1961 89 454 53 74 746 z
O~
'"CIrt>c..
...,
June 1962 216 206 172 169 2658 2409 123 119 21 21 211 216 3401 3138 ~. ~
~
() '"_ .
..... :::J
December 1962 335 291 141 164 2586 2466 143 123 19 17 261 219 3485 3280 zrt>
::: c..
June 1963 354 330 142 171 2585 2598 143 135 15 14 271 232 3510 3480 I~
1m
3
O'~
~
:: tri
-0
...,
M. Z~
oz8::!.
0
f-'
December 1963 339 321 225 169 2493 2582 143 140 17 14 245 388 3462 3614 !::d
M
f\) 8 0\ <
VI w~
June 1964 921 910 2276 1854 135 130 19 15 229 411 3580 3320 wO
f- ...,
0\0-
m . ~
tJj ...,
December 1964 1072 1107 3067 3135 215 216 20 29 305 306 4619 4793 I~ '<
. . fw-
\-' .
c+ z~
~ ,0\
June 1965 1820 1820 5054 3573 466 471 30 29 422 340 7792 6233 I~' O[fJ
o~
_.
(])
December 1965 2482 2030 5409 4452 1516 617 32 391

~
33 499 9938 7523 .....

~
0
::l
NW
8 Ow
0
f-cJ
June 1966 2535 . 2527 5446 5341 710 718 38 35 505 502 9234 9123 f-
f-
m
M
0 December 1966 2571 2636 5394 4575 465 467 38 32 493 488 8961 9123
g:j
8 June 1967 2797 2831 5607 5380 479 485 39 37 493 494 9415 9227
m
(]) December 1967 3067 3268 5811 5995 475 479 39 35 464 477 9856 10254
::::s
rn
\-' . '-
c+
\-' .
<:
(])
11 Data on Assigned manpower not available prior to June 1962
~/ Includes 350 men in TERM
Source : 1956-1961 data,ODCSOPS (OPS OD), 15 September 1965; 1961-1967 data, MACV Monthly Strength Report ,
ReS CINCPAC 531~·
,
\\
\
0 AP~ _ .JIX II eJ '--
"-
'>:)
Distribution of U.S. Army Field Advisory Effort

(End of Period)
Capital
CorEs Hq ARVN Units Ranger Armor Airborne District Sectors
Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd
CY 1956 0 65 0 4 1 0 0
1957 5 65 0 4 1 0 0
1958 10 . 61 0 4 1 0 0
1959 15 61 0 4 1 0 0 z
1960
1961
15
100
61
92
7
18
4
4
1
4
0
0
0
37
So
'i:J ~
"' !2
1962 380 605 36 4 33 0 117 [2. e;
1963 380 785 33 20 26 4 235 ~
eD
() _.
Vl
:=l
z~
1964 370 422 956 967 101 77 42 39 39 27 14 21 l~47 469 ,- Q.
1965 791 871 1466 1368 108 117 113 8 39 35 52 43 757 627
f-3
0 3 '0
cr~
I-cJ eD .
1966 788 777 1371 1213 127 118 115 122 7 8 85 78 711 576 :: tTJ
1967 1009 965 1348 1535 106 120 103 6 8 53 67 838 982
t:r.l
z~
77 t:xj
S~
('2
f-' 1968 978 892 1734 1384 93 86 85 100 7 6 68 62 1434 1042 fg

f\)
0\<
f-3 weD
0\ wO
>- "'
0\0-
• eD
t:r.l
OJ"'
Sub sectors
I!
'<
RF Units PF Units RFLPF Units Other Total .. >-
w
Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Z~
~ 00\
f-' .
dCIJ
CY 1956 0 0 0 5 53 128 I~ da
~ _.
1957 0 0 0 5 48 128 ~
~
0
:::l
f-3 1958 0 0 0 5 47 128 t0

Ow
W
0
I-cJ 1959 0 0 0 5 42 128 >-
>-
t:r.l
t<j
1960 0 0 0 3 37 128
('2 1961 0 0 0 3 8 266
sa
f-3
1962 0 3 0 3 1405 2586
1963 0 3 0 55 1041 2582
1964 541 512 45 55 79 69 54 58 463 517 3151 3233
t:r.l
(j) 1965 851 633 63 39 91 82 87 75 662 555 5080 4453
::::s
rn
f-' .
1966 1025 789 59 51 88 72 84 69 1031 751 5491 4624
c+
f-' .
1967 1160 1238 66 76 99 88 57 56 1035 802 5854 6040
<l
(j)
1968 1259 1056 55 55 74 68 54 27 3182 1172 9023 5950
Source: ODCSOPS (OPS OD), 15 September 1965, MACV Monthly Strength Report, RCS CINCPAC 5314
APPENDIX III
r - - - - - - · - - - -·- - · - · - - ·- ----·-·-------· - - . - - -- -- - - - - -----.----.- .-.. ----------,,--.
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
FISCAL YEAR
-Total Cost of RVN Ann)' Regiona l Flirces ajJd

Popul~r Force s
(I n Mill ions of dollars)
C] Popul a r Forc cs l:22d Rcgional Forces rmill RYtl/\ rl11 'l
127
I
;/
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
FISCAL YEAR
Distributi on of US Financial R0sour~c!' in 'Support of' RVr~ Arm)"

Henioi)GI ForcE.-s, aild Popular Forces
(Co sl in millions of dollars)
Lf{] RVN Arm)' ~ Reg ional Forc es [ ] Popular Force s
~ US Suppor: of FNN Budget ~ //,ilitory Assistance Funds
128
' ,' ·a""

c'. (}~ : I I'. " ~'.·'., I<r""PJ'
.. , '.1 1 ~ \ r..
11/ .\i~ llL)! L~t \l I. 1 '-'Q L
Ii
$317.0
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
FISCAL YEAR
Distribution of RVt~ ArfflY Financiol Resources in $u Pl1Qrt of

RVN Army, f~c£Jioi1(j1 Forces, and F'opu!m r=orces
(Cos! in millions of do !l o rs)
[::~ Popular Forces ~ Regio ;1c l Forces rEm RVI-4 Army
129
NND Project Number : NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
AP PENDIX~VI~ ____________________________ ~
M
.....
o
N
V)
.~ ..
'1'1
'b~
'~'i
co
C>
I
"
V)
'J'
I
"
~
'0 '
.~ .
" .
:}:::
:-:;.::.::
}fC:.
{}::
~ <,,-
o-~
,- >
I
Z lL LL Z u. l L Z LL LL Z lL lL Z lL LL Z ll. l L Z ll_ lL Z lL LL Z lL LL Z LL lL
> 0:: £L >0::0... > 0:: 0.. >n::£L > 0:: £L > 0:: £L >0::0.. >0::0.. > O::£L >O::£L
- • -" 0:: -- - -- -0:: - 0:: ---
0:: 0:: 0:: 0::
« « « « 0::
«
0::
«
0::
« « « «
FY 1958 FY 1959 FY 1960 FY 1961 FY 1962 FY 1963 FY 1964 FY 1965 FY 1966 FY 1967
Annual. Pet Capita Costs for ~Vi'~ Army,

RcgioflOl Forces a nd Populor forces
~ ~ Pay & Allowances [TIll Materiel & Maintenance [J Oth e r
r
130
-,
NND Project Number : NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
I'/:)
APPENDIX VII
.,.
/"
.,
100%
100%
100%
..[)j Ptr ibuti on of US Army Advisors By /-\ss ignm cilt
~ Corps Hq and HqUnits and Capita l Military R~gian lliillJ Divisions

~ Sector and Sub se ctor ~ Army training in sta ll ations
o Oth e r non-divisional c lements Dill Regiona l and Popular Fo rces
131
' ..
I'll,!
. I
APPENDIX VI II
RVNAF TOTAL STRENGTH

(End of Per iod in 000)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

RVNAF Total Strength
Regular 148.0 179.3 218.8 216.0 250.0 302.6 322·9 342.9
Regional 55.2 66.6 77.0 85·9 96 .0 132. 2 149.9 151. LJ.
Popular 44.5 60.1 99·5 95 · 5 168.3 136.4 150.1 148.8
-- -
Subtotal 247.7 306.0 395·3 397.4 51 LI·.3 571.2 622.9 643.1
CrDG 15·0 18.0 21. 5 28.4 34.7 38·3
Armed Combat Youth
·5
10.0 15·0 40.0 90.7 4~· .5 39.6 20.0 n.a.
National Police 16.7 16.7 16.9 19·7 31.4 52·3 58 .3 73.4
Grand Total 274.4 338.2 467.2 525 .8 611.7 691.5 735·9 754.8
t:=
= = = =
Source: Table lA, OSD(SA) Statistical Tables, July 1968 .
132
APPENDIX IX
DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. FIELD ADVISORS BY ASSIGNMENT

(End of .r Y)
Corps Combat Sector Training

Hqs a/ Units pJ Subsector RFjPF Installations Other ~/ Total
--
Number
FY 6"4 333 745 375 116 138 113 1,820
FY 65 463 1,145 1,000 218 123 548 3,497
FY 66 961 1,543 1,495 25 0 230 692 5,171
FY 67 966 1,735 1,913 195 245 678 5,73 2
FY 68 960 1,570 2,098 150 182 990 5,95 0
Percent
FYb'4 18% 41% 21% 6% 8% 6% 100%
FY 65 13 28 6 4 16 100
33 13 100
FY 66 19 30 29 5 4
FY 67 17 30 4 4 12 100
33 100
FY 68 !!./ 16 26 35 3 3 17
~ Includes Capital Military District Advisors.
£/ Include s ARVN divisions, regiments, battalions, ranger, airborne, and

armor units.
£/ Includes MAT, . intelligence , and logistic units.
!!./ May 1968.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.

IV.B Evolution of the War (26 Vols.)

TI-m ADVJSO~Y 3iJILD-UP, 1961·-67

Sec TIef Con

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

IV. B. 3. THE ADVISORY BUILD- UPI 1961-67

SU MMARY AND ANALYSIS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were pessimistic. Th e creat ion of a

THE AMERICAN GAMBLE

It was such a conventional f orce that the small USMAAG attempt ed to

i TOP SECRET - Sensitive

TOP SECR~T - Sensitive

forc e oriented primarily toward conventional defense. The l ater

This period of apparent stabi li ty dis appeared , however , i n th e

But the U.S. mi l i tary advisors i n Vietnam had l earned -- or at

THE LIMITED PARTN ERSHIP

i i TOP SECRET· Sens i t i ve

TOP SECRET - Sens i t ive

culmin at i ng in the expans ion of the U.S. advisory effort following

Th e "1 imit ed partnership" which Genera l Taylor proposed -- and which

Th e expectation among U.S. pol i cymakers -- record ed in NSAM 111 --

COMMITMENT AND EXP ECTATIO N

Th e available r ecord i s a lmost totally de void of any expl ic at ion

iii TOP SECRET - Sensitive

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

(much l ess any debate) on these questions. General Taylor's report of

I~ i s necessary to surmise the expectations i n the pol icymakers

Increased i nf l uence can, of course, be ga i ned i n many ways. U.S.

PACIFICATION AND STRATEGIC HAMLETS

The process of counter i ng i nsurgency, most commonly ca ll ed pac i f i -

iv TOP SECRET - Sens i t i ve

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Th e Stra teg ic Hamlet Program soon became the unifying vehicle

ANOTH ER ROUND OF INCREASES

NSAM 288 had, in March I 96l.j·, stated U.S. objectives in Vietnam in

We seek an in dependent non - Communist South Vi etnam.

v TOP SECRET - Sens i tive

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

If we cannot save South Vietnam, the NSAM continued i n a c l assic

ADVISORS TEMPORARILY FORGOTTEN

Th e expans ion to district l eve l placed U.S. mil it ar y adv i sors

Still the situation continue d to dete riorat e . Politica l in s ta-

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

A number of meas ures wh i ch wou ld have changed mate r i a ll y th e U.S.

As th e bui l d-up of U.S. combat forces reac hed a l eve l perm i tt i ng

vii TOP SECRET - Se ns i tive

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

mil i tary advisors were controll ed throuah a military chain of comma nd

The cr eat ion of CORDS affected on ly th e organ i za tional context of

This pattern was repeated in 1967 wh e n an in crease of over 2,000

viii TOP SECRET - Se ns itive

TOP SECR ET - Sensitive

Th e r e l at ionsh i p of adv i sor t o adv i sed has gone through r ecurrent

Finally, and closely rel ated to any examination of th e l everage

ix TO P SECRET - Sens itive

TOP SECRET - Sens i tive

adequate to make security feasible? This chicken-and-egg argument

Seeking answers to any of these questions i s a difficult, frus -

x TOP SECRET - Sensitive

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

THE ADVISORY BUII,D-UP, 1961 67

Geneva Cease-fire Accord Ended fighting betvleen Viet

Memo, JCS for SecDef, U.S. resources could better be

26 Oct 54 Memo, SecDef to JCS J CS to prepare long range