Pentagon Papers Part IV B 3
Pentagon Papers Part IV B 3
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NND Project Number : NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
IV. B. 3.
Th~ United States decided, shortly after the Geneva Accords and
during the period of French withdrawal from Indo-Chi na, to give mil it ary
assistance and advice to the newly proclaimed Republ ic of Vi etnam. It
might as eas ily have decided not to undertake this effort to prevent
South Vi etnam from fall ing to communism.
The available record does not i nd ic ate any rebutt a l of the JCS's
appraisal of th e situation. What it does in d i cate is that the U.S.
decid ed to gamb l e with very 1 imited resources becaus e the potenti a l gains
seemed we ll worth a limit ed risk. III cannot guarantee th at Vietnam will
r ema i n free, even with our aid," General J. Lawton Co11 ins report ed to
the National Security Council, "But I know that without our a id Vi etnam
will surely be lo st to Communism."
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was instr umenta l in dec iding
for pol itica1 reasons to und e rtake a mod es t program of mil i tary advice
aimed at producing po l i t ica1 stabi1 ity. Once l aunched, howeve r, the
program of adv ice and assistance came to be dominated by conve ntiona l .
milit ary conceptions. In sur ing int erna l stab ility i s a "1 esser in cluded
capabi1 i tyll of armed force, th e r eason i ng went; the principal purpose of
such a force is to protect the territorial int ~gr ity of the nation.
It seemed for a vJh i l e that the gambl e aga inst l ong odd s had
succeeded. The Vi et Minh were quiescent; the Republ ic of Vi etnam
Armed Forces (RV NAF ) were markedly better armed and trained than
th ey were when the U. S. effort began (at which t ime they were un -
armed arid untrained), and President Ngo Di nh Diem showed a r emarkab l e
ab i l i ty to put down factions threatening GVN stab i l ity and to maintain
himse lf i n office.
U.S. adv i sors i n Vi etnam - and U.S. mil it ary and c ivil i an theor i sts
in o ther p l aces, as we ll -- formu l ated dur i ng th i s per iod a r ud imentary
doctr i ne of counter i nsurgent warfare. In r esponse to Prem ier Khrushchev ' s
e ndorsement of " wars of nat iona l 1 i be rat ion " t hey proposed to he l p free
wor l d nat ions save t hemse l ves from commun i sm by a ser ies of seque nt ia l
act ions that dea l t wi th the symptoms of soc ial revo l ut ion ( t he i nsurgenc y)
a s we ll as it s causes ( the f rustrat ion of expec t at ions for soc i a l j ust i ce ).
Th us , at a l most the same t ime that the U.S. began i ts adv i sory bu il d-
up i n South Vietnam i n l ate 196 1, mil i tary and c i v il i an pract i t ioners
f ound t hemse l ves i n possess ion of a s imp l e, apparent l y l og i ca l , out l i ne
s ketch of a method by wh i ch to count e r the co~nun i st-cap t ured i nsurgency.
Phys i ca l secur i ty from the acts of the i nsurgents was a necessar y but not
a suff i c ient cond i t ion f or success. In add iti on t o secur ity the Vietnamese
government had to establ i sh the serv i ces wh i ch wou l d lin k i t i n c l ass i c
t erms of l eg i t imacy to i ts subjects. We wou l d fi ght fi re wi t h f i re and we
wou l d f ight i t wi th water , too.
The dec i s ions made by th e Ken ned y Adm i n i strat i on from mi d- 196 1 onwa rd,
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The object, as the U.S. advisors saw it, was to have a workable
nation a l plan upon which to base the entire US GVN effort.
After Diem1s fall there was a brief per iod of optimism bas ed on the
expect at ion that the new mil i tary regime in Saigon would be more recep -
tive to U.S. advice than i ts predecessor had been. By the summe r of 1964,
when the dec isi on was made to expand the advisory effort again, this
opt imist ic hope had found e red on th e fact of continued VC victo r i es and
in stabi l i ty within the GVN.
Th ere were at this time several steps wh i ch the U.S. could have
t aken to in crease i ts ass i stance to the GVN. Carrying the war to
Hanoi was one; introd uc ing U.S. combat forces was another. Ne i ther
app ea l ed much, however, i n terms of help i ng the South Vietnamese to
win the i r war. Both were anathema i n the midst of President ia l e l ec-
ti on year pol iti cs. Bombing was discussed and p l ans l aid, but no
act i on taken. Troop commitments were not even discussed -- at least
in the wr i tt e n record of proposals and dec i s ions. Rather, a numbe r of
pall iative mea sures to help the GVN economy and RVNAF were adopted and
the advisory effort was expanded.
The 1964 expans ion of th e adv i sory effort cons i sted of th e beef i ng -
up of the batta l ion advisory teams and the establ ishment of district
( sub-sector) t eams. Thus, a new dimens ion of Amer i can p,-esence was
add ed and th e density of U.S, adv i sors i n operat i ona l un i ts was i ncreased.
There i s nothing i n th e ava il ab le record to suggest e i ther a cha ll enge to
the old, unstated assumption th at more U.S. adv i sors wou l d l ead to in-
cr eased performance or any change in the assumed expectat ions of U.S.
pol icymakers had changed. The determ inat i on rema i ned to advise rath er
than to command, to deve l op Vi etnamese l eadersh i p rather th an to supp l ant
i t, and to i nduce the GVN to take the steps necessar y to pac ify i ts own
di ss i dent elements.
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NND P roject Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
When the bui ld -up of U.S. comba t forces got underway th e build - up
of U.S. adv i sors had a lr eady been essent ial ly comp l eted . Being an
adv i sor i n th e field had been the ~Jst challenging assignment a U.S.
soldi er could seek ; being wi th a U,S. unit in combat now became the
aim of most. The ad visory effort sank i nto relative obscur i ty as the
att ent io n of pol i cymakers (and of the press and publ ic ) focu sed on th e
U.S . force deploymen ts, on building the base complexes from which U.S .
mi l it a ry might could project it se l f into the countrys i de, and in ex-
plor i ng the new relationships and new opportunities occasioned by the
comm itment of U.S. land forc es to the As ian mainland.
PACIFICATION REE~PHASIZED
Thi s d i v i s ion of effort threw most U.S. adv i sors in to pac ifi cat ion
wi th ARVN un i ts as we ll as i n the prov i nce and d i str ict adv i sory t eams .
It a l so threw the U.S. mil i tary adv i sors i nto c l oser contact -- and
compet i t ion and conf l i ct -- wi th the growing numbe r of adv i sors on c i v il
f unct ions (many of whom were U.S. mi l i tary men on Ill oanll) repre sent i ng
t he CIA, AID, and USIA. The quest ion was ra i sed of the opt ima l interna l
U. S. organ i zat i on to support th e Vi e tna mese pac i f i cat ion program.
The resu l t of a drawn - out, occas iona ll y acr imon ious debate on th i s
q uest ion was an i nterm ixed c i v i l -m i l i tary organizat ion embrac i ng th e
ent i re pac i f i cat ion effort, headed by a c i v il ian of ambassador ia l rank
under COMUSMAC V1s d i rect ion. Ca l l ed Ci v il Ope rat ions and Revo l ut ionary
Deve l opmen t Support ( CORDS), i t r ep l aced a b ili near syst em i n wh i ch
RF/P F ADVISORS
The ques tion debated was wheth e r this new dime nsion of th e U.S.
advi so ry effort should be structured to give cont inuing adv ice to RF
comp an i es and PF platoons or shou ld be constituted on a mobile training
basi s. The dec i s i on was to form mobile teams for both t act ic a l and
logi st ica l support training. Advisors were detached from their parent
U.S. combat units and detailed to these duties pending the manpowe r
accounting ch a nge which wou ld transfer th ese ind ividu a ls to MACV
advisory control and r ep lace th em in U.S. units with newly deployed
fill e rs.
AVOID ED ISSU ES
This was the situation when th e VC/NVA l aunc hed a mass i ve series
of attacks against urb an population centers and surround ing pacifica-
tion program forc es during th e 1968 l una r new yea r (Tet) offensive.
In the confused aftermath of this radica l chang e i n VC/NVA strategy
th e U.S. announced i n Washington it s intent ion to give ren ewed attention
to modernizing RVNAF so that a larg er shar e of the war effort could be
turned back to the Vi etnamese. This pol i cy dec i s ion, following as it
did an unprecedented six-year period of U.S. attempts to wage counter-
in surgent war by proxy, constitu ted an adequate reason to r eexam in e the
exp er ience of the past and to exp lor e more fully some diffi~ult ques tions
which have been consistently avoided in th e desire to ass ist South Vi e tnam.
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The most basic of these questions i s whether the U.S. can in any
way serve as a makewe igh t sufficient to change the continuing unfavor-
abl e trend of the war i n South Vietnam? Can i t, that i s, overcome the
apparent fact that the Viet Cong have "captured" th e Vietname se
nationa l ist movement wh il e the GVN has become the refuge of Vietnamese
who were a ll ied wi th the French in the battle aga in st the i ndependence
6f their nation? Attempts to answer th i s quest ion are compl icated, of
cours e, by the difficult i ssue of Vi et Cong alleg iance to and control
by Communist Ch i na. But th i s i s the nature of the s i tuat ion. The i ssue
of whether the U.S. can energ i ze the GVN has been too l ong submerged by
r epeGted assert io ns that i t must do so.
A part of any tentat i ve answer to thi s fund amenta l quest ion will
turn on the i ssue of how the U.S. might better promote a more adequate
pace of GVN reform and improved RVNAF effect i veness to cope wi th th e
VC!NVA threat. (A related quest ion, of COUI-se, i s whethe r reform and
i ncreas e d effect i veness can proceed s imu l taneous ly . ) Asking this ques-
tion would open for examinat ion two aspects of the adv i sory program that
have come to be treated by reflexive respons e: where are adv i sors needed
and what should be th e r e lDt ionsh i p of the adv i sor to th e adv i sed?
The cont i nuing U.S. unstated assumpt ion has been that more advisors
somehow equate to better performance. This can be traced in the success-
ive expans i ons of th e mil itary adv i sory effort -- fir st to th e prov i nces
and down to batta l ion l eve l wi th in ARVN, th en to the distr icts, and most
r ecent ly to the param il itary forc es wit hin RVNAF. It may be th at l arge
numbers of adv i sors are, in f act , th e best way to infl uence events but
one cannot reach such a conclusion val idly without first ask i ng the
quest ion.
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IV. B. 3.
CHRONOLOOY
22 Oct 5~- Msg, State to Saigon 1679 Set in motion " crash program"
t o improve RVN forces.
20 Jcm 55 Memo, Gen. J. Law"Gon Vietnam might be " saved " i-Jitll
Collins for SecState, U. S. aid; would be "lost " i'lithout
Report on Vietnam for the it.
National Security Council
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25 Oct 61 Msg, Saigon 537, General Propo sed sendjng 6-8000 troops
Taylor to Iwitc HOtlSe, under guis e of lI flood relief. lI
State, Defense, JCS;
Msg, Baguio 005, 1 Nov 61,
Eyes Only for the Presi-·
dent from General Taylor
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23 Jul 62 Record of 6th Secretary McNamara plan for phased I·Ti t::-
of Defense Conference drawal of U.S. forces, based on
optimistic 1962 expecta/cions.
12 May 6)+ Dra~t Memo f'or the USOM 25% understrength, half'
Record, Lt. Col. S. B. thi s shortage in rural affairs
Berry, Jr., Mil. Asst. staff' .
to SecDef', n.d., U.S.
Embassy Brief'in.g, Saigon .
23 May 6l.j· Msg, CINCPAC to JCS MACV opposed to " flooding " RVN
23041813,Vietnamese Civ:il with U.S. personnel; pref'erred
Guard and Self' Def'ense build-up on selective basis,
Corps cha,llenged " encadrement."
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25 May 61~ Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6473, JCS pla,n for 6 Mobile Train:i.ng
Vietnamese Civil Guard and 1'eams in each province a,nd
Self Defense Corps training center, 70 advisors to
each critical province , increase
of 1000 personnel.
27 May 64 Msg, Co.MUSMACV to CINCPAC Gen. Harkins disputed the value
LI.259 , 2700~5 ~ . of U.S. conducted training for
CG/ SDC and of Mobile Training
Teams ; proposed advisors be used
at district level for operations ;
accepted ..1000 man increase .
27 May 64 Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, CINCPAC agreed >vUh COMUSlflACV
27 08 0 53, Vietnamese ,md outlined specifi c advisory
CG and SDC build -up reco~nended: 956 per-
sonnel by end CY 65.
27 May 64 Msg, White House to Gen. Harkins reg.ue sted to
Saigon (Personal for return to U.S.
Gen. Paul Harkins )
28 May 64 Msg, Saigon to State 2338 USOM desire for gradual, not
r apid , build·-up; need for effec-
tive local administration and.
securUy.
30 May- 6J+ JCSM-464-64 , Pilot Program One of two JCS proposa ls sub-
f or Provision of Advisory mitted to McNamara outlining
Assistance to Paramili ta,ry pil ot program f or advisory buil d-
Forces in Seven Provinces up : temas in 49 districts over
6 month period, 300 advisors .
30 May 6 L~ J CSM-465-6~ , U.S. Advisory Second proposal - Broader
Assistance to the Viet- advisory increase program:
namese Civil Guard and 1000 personnel for all 239
Sel f-Defense Corps. di stricts over 1 l~ years .
30 May 64 J CSM-466-64 , Provision of JCS opposed extending U.S.
U. S. Advi sors to Company advisors t o company l evel,
Level Withi n Vietnamese b ecause of i ncreased casualties,
Regular Ground Forces l anguage problems, ARVN opposi-
tion .
7 Aug 61~ Memo, SecDef for CJCS, McNamara directed the,t accel-
Additional Support for erated deplo;Ylnent be completed
Republic of VietnaID_ on by end of September.
an Accelere;ted Basis.
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15 Dec 65 Lodge memorandum for Lodge spe cified that GVN pacif~~a
Gen. Lansdale; MACV tion effort was primarily civiLan,
Command Hist.ory consequently on U,S. side the
t wo civilian agencjes, USAID al:j
CAS, should b e generating suppc::.'t
agencj.es .
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28 Jan 67 Deputy SecDef Cyrus Vance Vance sent McNaughton vers ion
letter to W. vf. Rostow' to Rostow as Defense Depart-
ment reply to his memor8.ndDIIl.
No NSAlI1 was ever promul g8.ted .
15 May 67 Embassy Saigon msg. 25839 First meeting of Komer 1'7i th Ky.
Ky decl ined to pl ace GVN RD efforts
under JGS.
28 May 67 State Department msg MACV .' ssued directive i'Tith instruc-
DTG 09230~.g ; MACV Dir tions on nevi RD organizational
10-12 , 28 May 1967. a rrangements .
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30 Aug 67 DASD(SA) Memo for the Amb. Komer complained that the
SecDef CORDS a,dvisory element I s actu.al
strength I'T aS seriously below'
authorization due to bu.r ea,ucra"t::.c
delays.
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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
Declassified per Execut ive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
IV. B. 3.
INTRODUCTION............. lit ............ lit .. II ....... II 0 •• " .......... " ...... " .... " 1
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APPENDICES
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IV. B. 3.
I]\J"""T RODUCTIO~~
This U.S, military advisory buildup did not mark the first UoS.
attempt i,o conduct " a dvisory '<Tarfare ll in the post--Horld War II era.
The first such attempt "I'las in Greece. l'~or did i t marlt the initia,l U,S.
program ajmed at creating a, modern mili te,ry force from meager beginnings
in a foreign nation. The first attempt of this kind was made in the
Republic of Korea. Whe,t i t did ma,rk "I'las the first sustained U. S, effort
to advise foreign national forces enge,gEe: in combatting what the communists
have termed a II"Tar of national liberatio:'l, II a struggle "('Thich took the form
of a civil wnr with external assistance to both a,ntagonists and in which
winning the adherence of the population -.:a.s at l east a,s central an is sue
as \'las the tide of military battle. Th:j s h8,s been the first sustaj.ned
U,S. advisory effort to be concerned in c. major "(·ray with ll pe,cificaUon
by proxy. 1I
The main study is divided into t"TO uarts . Part One describes briefly
the U.S. advisory effort in RVN from 195 h through 1960. I t sets the stage,
as it "Tere, for the more comprehensive e:;.:amina tion of the advisory buildup
from 1961 through 1967 in Pa,rt T1'!O. ( The latter year marIts roughly the
final period for ",hich informat ion is available at this writing, not any
necessary end to the general process described . ) The sunrrnary and a,nalysis
",hich accompanies this study constitutes in effect Part Three of the study.
It assesses the U.S. advjsory effort in terms of expectations and develop-
ments a,nd examines pers:i_stent issues thr oughout th e period under discus sion.
Finally, the gro"l<Tth of the U.S. military 8,dvisory effort and related data
The development of the U. S. mili to,ry advisory effort from 195 1j -1959
is presented in another document in the present series.* The purpose of
the initial part of the present study is not to replo"VT the sa,me :furrOi·;rs
but to higblight the lega,cy of this earlier period as it affected the
l ater advisory buildup. Although the U.S. attempt to conduct revolutionary
warfe,re by proxy may be said to have begun in 1961, i t did not proceed
entirely free of the inheritance from earlier situa;tions, attitudes, and
actions.
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PART ONE
The gamble consisted in making available to the GVN t hat material support
a nd advice which would enable it to assure i t s Oim viability. Much of
the military equipment "las already in RVN, the residue of eo,rlier efforts
to support the French war against the Viet Minh. The framework for mi li -
t ary advice was present, too, in the form of MAAG Indochina ",hich had
assisted (and attempted to influence -- generally uXlsuccessfully ) the
French struggl e.
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.•. LT7he Joint Chiefs of Staff cons ider the,t th e Unit ed States
should not participate in the tra ining of Vietnamese forces in
Indochina . However, if it is considered that politica l con-
siderations are overriding , the Joint Chiefs of Staff ,vould
a gree to the assignment of a tra ining mi ssion to lf1AAG, Saigon ,
with safeguards against French interference with the US
t raining effort. §}
MAAG Vietnam \,ms by 1960 still Clui te small in si ze, though it loomed
ever larger in imports,nce. (It was the only U. S. HAAG con@anded by a
Lieutenant General; all of the other If.tAA.G Chiefs were officers of lesser
rank.) It was essentially city-bound, training center and Saigon-
oriented, devoted to technical-tactical training and high level per-
suasion aimed at :i.nflnenc:ing RVNAF organization. The personnel limita-
tions imposed upon it resulted in highly centralized advice. But through
its efforts a,nd material support this MAAG assisted :Ln the creation of a
sizeable (1 110,000 man) conventional army and of small naval and cdr
forces of approximately 5,000 men each.
The U. S. MAAG was also conc.:erned ,.,i th the establishment and tra,ining
of paramilitary forces, but it vms not as directly concerned as i t was
wi th the cree,tion of conventional forces in ARVN. The Civil Guard ( CG )
and Self Defense Corps (SDC ) ",ere at va,rious times under the control of
t he Ministry of the Interior or directly under President Diem. In the
f ield they "l'Tere invaria,bly under the direction of the Province Chiefs.
The U. S, civilian advisors who had been called in to give assistance
"l'l i th police and internal security matters tended to favor makj.ng these
paramilitary forces less military per se and more police intelligence-
minded. MAAG tended to favor maldng them more consciously milita,ry and
t erritorially oriented in order to free ARVN for mobile, offensive opera-
tions rather than tying its forces dOlm in static defense dut:Les. 13/
By 1960, when Civil Guard training was P8,S sed to HAAG control , neither
course of action had been follo,{ed consistent l y but it ,{as highly probable
t hat MAAG I s v iews would henceforth prevail. Thus, Cluestions of l ocal
physical secu.l'ity "l'TOuld a.lmost inescapably b e decided with reference to
t he effect tbey ,wuld have on the functions of ARVN, i tself created vlith
an eye to external defense. This may be said to be an awlnmrd structure
f rom vlhich to launch an effort aimed primar i ly at internal security. It
vms, hoy/ever, the structure that existed.
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This last point reflected GeneTal McGarr r s appa,I'ently very real con-
cern that ARVN vIas becoming incapable to meet interne,l (as l'lell as
external) threats posed by the VC in conventional troop formations. As
the VC becs,me stronger and formed larger regular units -- as distinct
fX'om guerrilla bands - the differences between conventional and u.ncon-
ventional we,rfare seemed to disappear. The problem, as Iv1AAG vie'\'Ted i t ,
b ecame one of gua.rding against a spectrum of dangers by means of a short
run emphasis on meeting the internal challenge in both its conventional
and unconventional ( guerrilla ) form. In this vie\·r ARVN should become
the conventional offensive and mobile defensive force, the CG should be
the static force in support of pacification efforts. The two should be
under a common chain of cor!11:.rls,nd, it vIas argued in the CIP, as should the
logistical orge.nization for their support. Such a conlllon chain of COll-
mand did not exist in 1960-1 961 :
Poor organization, then, ''las seen as the principal roadblock i n the viay
of organi zing the military and paramili te,ry forces of South Vietnam into
an effective combination. Only through a single chaj_n of command could
ARVN be freed to take the offensive, the CG be built up to cope uith
l ocal guerrillas , cmd the GV.N pJ_ace itself in a position to start devel-
oping useful intelligence a, field 'I'Thich Vias j udged to have been, thus
far, a notable faiJ_ure. ?:J.I
THE SUPFDRTING OPERATIONAl, PIAN
The Geogra,phically Phased National Plan l aid out the priority areas
fo r this coordinated effort under a single chain of command. A three
phase sequence of actions (preparat,ion, military action to clear and
secure, and combined action to establish civilian politica,l control and
consolidate intelligence and security programs ) would take place, sequen-
tially, in each of these priority areas. The process would be repeated
in expa nding spheres as successive areas became pacified. ~
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PART T~\TO
By the end of 1961, the U.S. had decided to double its military
e,dvisory effort j n South Vietne,m by establishing advisory teams at the
province ( sector ) level and '\vithin ARVN ' s batte,lions. The decision to
t ake this step '\Vas one of a large number of decisions designed to "buy
time" in RVN so that GVN could mobilize its resources and s'\Ving over from
the defensive to the offensive. All of the major participa,nts e,ppear
to have agreed that the situation in RVN wa,s bad and becoming worse, that
additional U. S. actions vlere needed if South Vietnam vTaS to be saved, and
t hat the iss ue 1'n3,S of sufficient importance in terms of U.S. interest to
j ustify doing iV'hatever 'Ims necessary. The Cluest ion was vlhat should be
done, not if anything could be done. Defeat was too catastrophj c an outco~:;e
to b ear examination. Mor:eover, decisions about Vietnam in 1961 were, until
t he very end of the year, made in th e she,dow of' more pressing emergencies--
the Berlin crisis and events in Laos. ·x- It is most import ant to recognize
thi s relative l ack of centrality if one is to understand the appa,rently
i ncomplete process by 'Vlhich decis ions on Vietnam were reached. Moreover,
the .d.~mens:ions of the Vietne,mese problem vlere clear and agreed to by all.
Elus:i ve solutions had to b e sought i n t he interstices, as it were , of the
poli cyn~kers ' limited time.
Lack of intelligence
Lack of initiative
-x- This period is described more fully in a volume in the pres ent series,
IV. B.l., Evolut ion of the 1;\Tar : The Kennedy Programs, 1961.
But various individu8,ls and groups \'lOuld stress the importance of different
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s hortcomings and propose quite different methods of "persuading GVN to
overcome them.
The prevalent military vievv, a.s already sugge sted in the surmnary
explanation of the ClP and the Geographically Phased P18,n, Vias that organ'-
i zat:i.onal reform Emd national planning Ivere prerequisites to effective
action. If these could be achieved, the military foresai'l a pacification
process vlhich would proceed from the provision of physical secLU'i ty in the
rural areas t hrough the esta,blishment (or reestablishment) of civilian
polit ical administr8,tion to a state of political stability. The first nut
to crack \-las that of military security. poli tica,l anal ysts, including those
of the Depa,rtment of State, emphasized the need for the Diem government to
liberalize it se l f, to attract dissident groups at least i nto a l oyal active
opposition and a,way from indj fferenc:e and disaffection. In tbi s vie,,, the
h eart of the matter vla,s essentia,lly political , rather tha,n military.
The deteriorating situation was one reason 'why the military security
argument quickly gained the as cendancy. Another reason 'i'TaS the military ' s
recognition that, while s ecur ity was an i mportant precondition , political,
economic, and social reforms ,',ere necessary to the realization of viability
within South Vietna,m . Thus, s ecurity was recognized as a means to a poli t-
iC8,1 end . The process outlined in .M.AAG ' s Geographica lly Phased Plan, des-
crib ed e8,rlier, gave recognition to this fact. This process would shortly
beeome kno\m as the " pa cifi cation process, " wide ly accepted throughout
important p18,ces in the U. S. Government ( specifi.cally to i n clu.de vhat is
u sually r eferred to euphemistically as "the highest level " ) and still
widely accepted 8,t this 'IH' i ting (1968 ) .
Not only should the U,S. depend on advisors vTho earn the trust of
their counterpe.rts , Lansdale argued , it should depend-on-them to get the
job done \-Ji thout coercion and threats. Leverage should b e the product
of persuasion and trust, not the result of control over funds arid
materiel:
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Under this proposal the siz.e of HAAG Vietnam "Tould be increased from
685 to 2285, not including the Special Forces or training comma,nds
mentioned above or the 100 man increase already proposed to advise the
20,000 men "Thich were to be added to RVNAF. lj}j
President Kennedy did not p ermit the Gilpatric Task Force recommenda-
tions to commit him to action. Rather, he us e d them in an attempt to
demonstrate th e U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The proof of this contention
is in NSAM 52, which records the President I s decisions. Only about lLf
p ersonnel were to b e assigned, for instance, j n U.S . Army civic action
mobile training teams to assj.st ARVN with health, welfare, and public
works proj ects . Although it "las decid ed to deploy the Specie,l Forces
group of L,OO men to Tourane fJ5a Nani/, this was in support of a CIA-
directed effort which could be kept l argely covert. Increased aerial
surveillance assistance required only 6 u. S. personnel. The establish-
ment of a Combe,t Development and Test Center in RVN r equired only 4
addi tiona l U. S. personnel. 49/ The pOint is not hO'\v much was done but,
in retro spect, hOH firmly the probable lines of f uture actions had been
drawn as a result of what it had been agreed not to do.
But discussions are one thing; firm commitments are quite a·nother.
The range of alternatives that President Kennedy was ,villing to consider
seems clear. What he was willing to do vTaS quite another matter:-D:O.IeSs
he vTas most unlike other poli ticicms and unless the many personal accounts
of his style are completely erroneous he ,vas willing to do \vhat he believed
h e had to do -- and events in mid-l96l did not force action even though
the"drill" that the Admin:i.stration went through was i nstrumental in
defining the probable responses when events did force action.
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of both the JCS and Rostow p8.pers. 59/ A Special Na tiona.l Intelligence
Estimate i'leighcd in with a hard. lc:~~ e.:' this rash of proposals. §!}j
The President's react ion, on 11 Oc:ober, ,·ms to decide to send General
Taylor on a mission to South Vietr.e.:'l to examine several alterne.tive
courses of action:
-l(. Volume IV. B. , Evolution of the ~'~e.r: Kennedy PrograD~ and Co~i tments ,
1961 (TS).
Taylor had already received President Diem ' s assura,nces that he favored
the deployment of U. S. forces for this pm·pose. §J}
General 1'aylor was most explicit that the purpose of the proposed
troop deployments and the new "limit ed partnership" "las to buy time for
the Vietnamese so that they could marshall their considerable resources
and assume the offensive against the VC. As mentioned above , this ,vould
r equire i nterns,l reform in GVN. The limited partnership would contri-
bute to b oth of these interacting objectives:
Given the decision not to send troop units , then , the general thrusts
of U. S. 8,ctions were determined - - but the specifics Ivere not. Just how
did Taylor ' s "limited partnership, " for instance, propose to influence
GVN ' s attitudes and organization, to develop initiative matched by compe-
tence, and to insure that the Vi etnamese w'ould assume successfully the
responsibility for winning the struggl e which it was s aid only they could
win? How "Tas this expanded U. S. effort to be organi zed? From whence
..Tould come the new junior partner s of the firm? vma t would be the ir
preparation , their instructions, their duties?
(,, '{I
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satisfying in terms of suggesting that the U.S. entered into its expanded
effort at the beginning of 1962 with its eyes ,-ride open and fully avrare
of just what it 'vas doing. The available record indicates that the U.S.
hopefully assumed that ma,terial aid and good intentions vTould be adequate
to the task, tha t a, la,rger U,S. presence would spur the Vietnamese to
effective action without incurring the stigma of a U.S. "takeover, " and
that the increa,se in assista,nee ,-rould be - - in and of itself -- accepted
as an adequate quid pro quo for the desired reforms within GVN.
-----
GVN orgcmizationa l reform vTOuld be realized, NASM 111 suggested, by
getting Diem to agree to clean up his lines of authority in excha,nge for
the U.S. commitment to the limited partnership. One section of the docu-
ment is a list of approved U.S. actions; another sets forth the expected
improvements to be accomplished by GVN. 68/ Ambassador Noltin~ was
instructed "Lo use the sUbstance of thesedecisions in talks to secure
Diem ' s approval. He found Diem despondent that the U.S. asked so much in
r eturn for so little, played into the hands of those "Tho claimed undue
American infringement upon Vi etnamese sovereignty, and placed him in a
posi tion where he feared even to make kno"lm to his own cabinet the Ameri-
can expectat:lons. 69/ Unless the U.S. Vlere to suspend its increased aid,
and at the very t:ilne it Ivas just gearing up to provide it, Diem had made
it clear at the beginning that he would govern South Vietnam in his way
and that the U.S. had no choice but to support him wholeheartedly, get out;
or find an acceptable alternative to him. The U.S., in turn, had refused
to consider "Lhe last two of these alternatives. It was stuck ,-rith sup-
porting him, at l east for the time being.
But the U.S. approach was only partially framed to secure Diem ' s
acc eptance. There was a parallel suggestion that the existence of U,S.
advisors in the field, working hand-in-hand in a counterpart relationship
with Vietnamese, would reform GVN from the bottom up. This line of policy
was neither spelled out in detail nor thought out in terms of operationa l
i mplications, risks, and costs . But it clearly existed :
Thus, the U.S. addressed the critical l everage i ssue as the expected
product of its mm Vlillingness to incre8,se it s participation i n the
counterinsurgency effort. It did so, moreover, vlithout any conscious
examination of the question beyond stating it s expectations. There was
no plan to make the provision of additional assistance contingent upon
GVN actions, only a statement that GVN e,ctions vrere expected. There
was no willingness, in fact, to consider the conscious exercise of l everage;
the situation vla,S too critical, the avail El,bl e time too short , the i ssue
too i mportant.
The effect of this avoidance of hard choices -- for good and under-
standable reasons, but avoidance nonetheless -- was to place a very l arge
burden on the b enefits to be realized by a,n expansion of the advj.sory
effort. The l anguage of General Taylor I S report is r eminiscent of Le,nsdale I 13
earli er proposa,ls for an unstructured, flexible advisory effort comprising
totally committed , carefully sel ected individuals Ivho v10uld earn the respect
and cooperation of the Vi etnamese . Lo,nsdale had r enevred these proposals
at the time the Taylor Report uas prepared . J.}) But when it vms suggested
t o the GVN tha t the U.S. would erpect to share in decisions the Vietnamese
reaction l ed the U. S. almost inunediately to modify this expectation. Th e
origina l communication on the subject to Ambassador Nolting stated that
" . .. we would expect to share in the dec ision-making process in the p olitical,
economic and military fields as they affected th e s ecurity si tua,tion" as
compared to t he earlier arrangement of "act i ng in an advisory ca,paci ty
onl y . II 72/ By early Decemb er insistence on this point vlaS quickly dropped
i n f avor of a vie"iv which suggested that close collaborat ion would produce
automatic unanimity:
The " close partnershi p " envisaged by General Taylor -- and endorsed
by President Kennedy -- suggested something a,kin to the " total commitment "
ivhich General Lansdale had earlier urged as one criterion in selecting
advisors for South Vietnam. ~[,his, in turn, implied at the very mlnl-
mun a period of long exposure to the operational problem (and personal-
ities) with which these advisors would deal. In the event, i t vTaS
decided to expand both the military a.nd sector (provincial military )
advisory efforts ,'li thout any such long term exposure. These questions
were settled in detail when Secretary McNamara met in mid-January 1962 at
Honolulu Hith the principal managers of the U.S. effort. It was decided
to establish battalion level military advisory teams within ARVN, each
to consist of either 5 (infantry batta1:Lon) or 3 (artillery battalion)
personnel. Each province (sector) ,\Tould receive 3 u. S. advisors, one
officer and 2 enlisted intelligence specialists. The Civil Guard would
be tra.ined in a series of 6 training centers by 120 advisors (20 in ea,ch
center) plus 12 mobile teams of 3 men each. The SDC I'lould be trained in
30 centers. 74/ Secretary McNamara made it clear that he wanted these
deployments completed as quickly as possible. He suggested that if an
ARVN unit was not prepared to receive :Lts advisors the designated indiv-
iduals be sent to RVN a,nd placed temporarily with another unit to gain
experience. 75/ He agreed that temporary duty assignments to Vietnam
vlere generally undesirable and asked the JCS to address the question of
optimum tour length for advisors. 76/
what vTould be involved and the benefits to b e expected. Thi s i'TO,S due i n
l arge pa,rt to the fact that it was a decision made almost offhandedly i n
the shadow' of a larger issue, the deployment of U. S. combat forces t o RVN .
When it was decided not to send the combat forces it Ivas a foregone con-
clusion that more advisors i'Tould be sent. This was consistent with the
U.S. desire in l ate 1961 to demonstrate it s commitment to South Vietnam
and apparently compatible vri th the oft-expressed belief that only the
South Vietnamese could bring their struggle to a sa,tisfactory conclus:Lol1.
The first, and most obvious, "Tas the expectation that a,n increas ed
U. S. military pre s ence with tactical units and a,t training centers would
l ead to improved technical-tactica l competence within ARVN . The assumption
which underlay this expe ctation vIas that the teaching of bas ic milita,ry
skills "Tas prob ably a suffici.ent (rather than mere l y ne cessary ) condition
to enable ARVl'-T to b egin to operate more effectively - - and more energetically
and aggress ively. Earlier experience i n Greece and Korea would have seemed
to valida,te this expectat ion vri thin rea sonable l imits.
The decision just examined to increase the U.S. advisory effort was
preceded by a series of marginal increases in the U. S. m:Lli te,ry strength
in Vi etnam. (Actual " in- country" strengths are available for only a fevT
months during the earl y build-up period so it will fr equentl y be necessary
to use authorization figur es and to r ealize t hat newly authorized spaces
were generally not filled until some time had passed after their establish-
ment. ) President ial decisions in April and May 1961, t aken in the l ight
of a central concern with Lcws rather than Vietnam, increased the authorized
si ze of 1VlAAG Vietnam from 685 to 785. The 100-man increas e vTaS divided
almost equally b etween t e chnical advisors and advisors for ARVN ' s tactical
tre,ining centers . 78/ In Octob er 1961 the authorized strength '\vas
increased a,gain, to972 , of vThich 948 spaces were for U. S. Army personne l;
603 of these 948 spaces were act ually filled by the end of November . 12/
Corps 63 380
Regiments 15 0 134
-)(- Volume IV . B. Evolution of the War: The Stre.tegic HE;mlet Program, 1961-
1963 (l'S ).
33 -TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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What happened during 1962 - 1963 is th8,t only the second of these
developments actually occurred to any significant degree. The U.S.
provided helicopter companies for rapid ta,ctical transport, small arms
and automatic weapons for increased firepol'Tel', and tactical air and
artillery support to assure ARVN firepower superiority over the insurgents.
There were complaints -- as there have been ever since -- that individual
weapons Ivere too heavy for the Vietnamese , that one helicopter company
for each Corps area \\Tas too little, e,nd that supporting air and artillery
were an inducement to rely on indiscriminate firepower as a substitute
for aggressiveness. But the basic tools were provided.
The other develop!Eents did not take place. Training of the CG a,nd SDC
was speeded up at Secretary MCNamara ' s insistence in order to get a more
effective pl"otective force quickly in being. Even by cutting the course
of instruction in half it req"l).ired the remainder of CY 1962 to give a
b e,sic familiarization course to even the hulk of the CG ,,!.no. SDC. GVN vlas
not eager to put weapons into SDC hands, fe a:dng that the \\Tea pons might
..dnd up in the possession of the VC. '§]/ In the event, both forces emerged
as something much less effective than had been expected. The strategic
hamlets which they were to protect proliferated in quantity in an uncontrolled
manner and varied widely in quaHty. It never really became possible for
ARVN to free itself from static defensive duties.
Even if it had become po ssible for ARV?~ to be cut loos e from static
duties it is questionable that it could have ris en to U.S. expectations .
The period in question is one in \'Thich the Hgo fami l y felt itself con-
strained constant ly to playoff the military against the provincial officials
(who controlled the CG e.nd SDC) in order to foresta ll attempts at a coup
0. ' etat. Military leaders seemed inclined to rely increasingly on firepolver
as a substitute for aggressive maneuver . Rosy reports from the provinces
made it unappealing to sustain casualties engaging an enemy who we,s said
to have a lr eady been driven from the area . 84/ The all-too-common result
was that ARVN did not improve as the U. S. had expected i t ,vould . U. S.
advisors became frustrated and embittered. Even rare opportunities for
dec i sive engagement on the ground vlere a lloi'7e d to pass or were mishe,ndled.
The debacle at Ap Ba,c , i n , 1962, stands as a la,ndmark of this
conti nued impotence.
The central problem in this regard was the,t the U. S. had neither
a firm grasp on reliable indicators to determine how the war was pro-
gressing nor a willingness to accept claims that :i.t was not going well.
The second of these tendencies was attributable to the approach vlhich
finally emerged from the decisions follol'ling the Taylor mission: The
U.S . would support Diem unstintingly and expect, in return , meaningful
reforms and improvements I'Ti thin GVN. But it was caught in a dilemma,
when the expected reforms did not take place. To continue to support
Diem Ivithout reforms meant quite simply that he, not we, lvould determine
th e cours e of the counter insurgent effort and that the steps h e took to
assure his continuance in power would continue to take priority over all
els e. To deny him support in any of a variety of w'ays would erode his
power without a viable alterna,tive in sight. The tendency may not have
been precisely to II sink or svTim with Ngo Dinh Diem, II as Homer Bigart
phrased it, but it came very close to this.
The inability to knovl just ho,y things were going presented an even
more difficult pro·blem. The tendency was to use forces retrained or
newly equipped, stra,tegic ha,mlets constructed, and trends in VC activity,
as indicators of the progress of the v7ar. But training does not neces-
sarily equal effectiveness, the number of hamlets constructed does not
tell one of the loyalty of their populations, and enemy attacks might be
a misleading guide. Were GVN making progress in a contested area, for
i nstance, Viet Cong rea,ctions might be expected to increase ra,ther than
to diminish in frequency and i ntensity. Converse l y , the insurgents v70uld
have no good reason to attack populated area,s ,'1hich they had already
succeeded in penetrating and over which they had establ ished effective
de facto control. Q§/ Data and observations could b e variously inter-
preted -- so va,riously, :Ln fact, that President Kennedy Ivas l ed to ask
t wo observers just returned from Vietnam l'1ho gave him divergent reports,
lI you two did visit the same country, didn l t yoU? 1I §])
-x- Volume IV.B . 4., Evolution of the l<Tar: Phased Withdralyal of U.S. Forc~
1962-196l~ (TS).
While the U. S. gro:ped for a better vTay to determine how the counter-
i nsurgent effort was going and debated hOvT ( or if' ) to exercise l evere,ge
against Diem, it was overtaken by events. The 1963 Buddhist crisis in
RVN 1-TaS met by increasingly re:pressive measures by the GVN. These
develo:pments finally led the U,S. to reassess its su:pport for Diem and to
consider other non-comImmist alternatives to his leadership. ·x- On
1 November 1963 Diem was overthrown by a mill te,ry coup d l eta t. The
:pacification effort organized around the Stre,tegic Ham1et P.cogram died
with him; the advisory effort "\V·as left untouched in terms of size e,nd
scope. To the extent that Diem and h is family vTere the one s preventing
ARVN from mee ting the ex:pe cte,tions of late 1961, it 1-TaS reasoned, nOH vTaS
t he time for the military e,dvisory system to begin to function more
effectively. To the extent that ARVN commanders in the field had been
unres:ponsive to U.S. advice because of indifference and op:position in the
Gia Long Palace, i t was ho:ped the difficulties of the :p8,st might be
r ectified by the new mi l itary regime.
-x- See Volu.me IV . B. i n the present series , Evol ution of the Wa· 1'he
Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May- November 1963 (TS).
:... ,"~'
The initial U.S. reaction to the Diem coup was thus one of modest
optimism. Even given the U. S. disappointment e,t the death of the Ngo
brothers the fact remained that the nel-7 regim.e in the Saigon saddle
vlaS expected to be more responsive to U.S. advice than the previous
government had been. It was necesse,ry that GVN programs be redirected
i nto more realistic channels , that the efficiency of operations be
increased, that additional steps be taken to seal the infiltration
routes through Laos, and that the U.S. reaffirm its commitment to GVN
in a credible way. The key to success--the pacification process--had
already been discover ed; the task was one of skillful, sustained execu-
tion.
Each of these points was addressed by Nationa,l Security Action
Memorandu.m 273, approved 26 November 1963. The immediate cause for
NSAM 273 "ivas the assassination of President Kennedy four da,ys earlier;
newly-installed President Joln1son needed to reaffirm or modify the policy
lines pu~sued by his predecessor. President Johnson quickly chose to
reaffirm the Kennedy policies. Emphasis should be placed, the document
stated, on the Mekong Delta e,rea, but not only in military terms. Polit-
ical, economic, social, educational, and informational activities must
also be pushed: "We should seek to tu.rn the tide not only of battle
but of belief . ••• " §§). Military operations should be initiated, under
close political control, up to within fifty kilometers inside of Laos.
U.S, assistance progra,ms should be maintained at levels at l east equal
to those under the Diem government so that the new GVN would not be
t empted to regard the U.S, as seeking to disengage. ~
A further buildup in U.S. advisors was not the major product of this
determined commitment. Ra ther, there i'TaS in 1 96~ a growing conviction
that only by 'consciously expanding the 'i'Tar -- by "going North!! in order
to punish and dissuade the DRV from support of the i nsurgency -- could
the deteriorating situation be arrested and reversed. Governmental
stability in South Vietnam and the reduction, if not the elimination, of
pr essures from the north came to be regarded as desiderata \'lhich would
t urn upon actions outside RVN rathe~ than within it . The decisions to
expa,nd the U. S. advisory effort were overshadowed by plans to carry the
war to the DRV.*
NSAM 288
* The sensitive files of the Secretary of Defense for the period under
di scussion consist in l arge part of .deta,iled plans to bring increasing
military pressure against DRV under careful political control and under
" scenarios" which woul d ensure adeCluate domestic and foreign support
for these actions.
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 11
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7I TOP SECRET - Sensitive
The dark picture painted in NSAM 288 in March had become even darker
by May 1964. Secretary McNamara visited Saigon on 12 and 13 May t o inquire
i nto progress in the " oilspot " national pa,cification program. What he
l earned could scarcely be called encouraging. A fo l low-on conference
was scheduled for 1 June in Honolulu and the planning wheels began to
turn - or , more acc1)~~ately, t he wheels bega,n to churn -- for there was
barely tvlO weeks I time in which to. propose and coordinate U. S. actions
acceptable to t he GVN vlhich might reverse the downward spiral of events ,
and "going North " vTas not yet feasible in terms of domestic U.S. politics.
Other facts were more easily ascertainable. Since the Diem coup,
for instance, only 5 of RVN ' s 42 provinces had not experienced a change
in Province Chief. Change is, of course, inescapable in the aftermath
of a coup, but by 8 May 15 provinces were under their third chief since
1 November 1964, 7 had their fourth, and 2 provinces were governed by
the fifth officer since the Diem government fell. Instability in a,dmin-
istra/cion was accompanied by a marked GVN decline in number s of population
controlled and a comparable increase in VC population control. These
trends Here reflected in the official estims,tes (themse lves suspect of
being overly optimistic) of control in the rural villages:
(" "
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TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Thus, the general attitude among the U.S . agencies in Saigon was to
go slowly, to avoid the danger, as it vias frequ ently expressed, of "strewing
Americans allover the countryside. " Secretary McNamara a,ppa,rently had
other thoughts a,fter his May visit in Sa,igon. The available record does
not reflect that he directed an expansion of the advisory effort -- but the
J'oint Staff vl'as almost immediately hard at work examining which of several
l evels of increase Hou~d be most desirable. The available record leaves
little doubt that the Secretary of Defense wanted it made clear that he
would approve any reasonable proposals for personnel, ma,teriel, or funds.
Those sections of NSAM 288 which dealt with recommendations for South
Vietnam ha,d concentrated on programs which vTould assist GVN to mobilize
its resources. By May it was clear that the hoped-for actions had not
t aken effect. The obvious conclusion -- given the importance which the
U.S, attached to success in South Vietnam -- was that additional steps
must be ta,ken to halt the deterioration i n the countryside.
Then, in a significant passage, the reply from the field asked in blunt
language just what the intended purpoGe \-1as for the proposed expansion
of the advisory effort. The rtvmite Star Teams rt used in Laos, the message
noted, had the purpose and effect of establishing U.S. control over foreign
forces:
Although this direct question i,;ras never ansi'iiered, the JCS I initial
proposal for encadrement v;ras quie tly dropped. The U. S. might ,-r1.sh to be
in a position to control elements or all of RVNAF but it would not con-
sciously follow 8,ny scheme explicitly a:i.med at such control. Instead,
the JCS countered with a plan for six Mobile Training Teams in each
province ba,cked up by a, Trcdning Center Team and a small Provincial Training
Detachment. This proposal i>lould put an addi tiona,l 70 U. S. training advisors
in each selected province in an effort to improve the l evel of effective~
ness of the paramilitary forces. Its recommendation vlas that the U. S.
military advisory effort should be increased by 1000 personnel, enough to
provide this new dimension of advice in the fourteen critical provinces
which had experienced so much recent instability. 1 07/
This JCS proposal for Mobile Training Teams for the RVNAF paramilitary
forc es was tied to an explicit statement of how best to organize this
effort without any mention of how much influence or leverage the U.S. would
or cou~d exert through this expanded system. The problem vlas treated as
one in the development of technical proficiency'; the issue of the extent
of U.S. control was largely ignored- -though surely not forgott en:
a. General
(1) An underlying principle in the oil-spot concept
is accordance of maximum flexibility to province officials in
solving individual province problems which vary widely from
province to province. This study recognizes that principle
and outlines a plan for assigmnent of additional US instructor
and training resources to the province to provide the training
and advice needed to improve the effectiveness of the provincial
paramilitary forces.
COMUSMACV and CINCPAC were asked to comment I'd thin two days on this
study which had been fI • • • considered at the highest levels, where initial
rea ction h8,s been favorable . fI 109/ The ir repli es , in which the theater
commander supported his nominal subordinate in Sa igon, contested the value
of U. S. -conducted training for RVN:.~ pa.ramili tary forces, pr opos ed th8,t
advisor s be used at the district l evel to assist in operations , accepted
the 1,000-man magnitude , but stretc~ed out t he t arget date 18 months --
thereby proposing a gradualistic approach without candi dly saying so.
General Harkins devoted most of his r eply to the question of training
t eams :
{
...'
• I
, ,
CINCPAC informed the JCS tha,t he agreed 'w ith COMUSI!1A.CV's arguments and
quoted the telecon referred to above to explain the course of action pre-
ferred by the military commanders in the field:
The J"CS, given the very few days remalnlng until Secretary McNamara
was to meet in Honolulu with COMUSMACV and Ambassador Lodge, did not
attempt to reconcile the time-phasing and eventual size of the proposed
advisory effort at district l evel. Rather , it submitted to the Secretary,
just prior to his departure for the conference, t¥10 separate memoranda:
~De laid out a prospective program for district advisors throughout RVN;
the other outlined a pilot program at the district level. The purpose
of both outline advisory efforts vTas the sa,me -- "improving the effective-
ness of these paramilitary units in the Vietnamese pacification plant! --
but the rate of advisor buildup differed.
In the proposed Itpilot program, " for instance, the conc ept envisaged
the phased estabJ_isbment of teams in 49 districts of seven key provinces
during a six-month p er iod. This would require approximately 300 addi-
tional advisors. 112/ The broader progrs,m called for s,n additional 1,000
advisory personnel, phs,sed over a period of l-It years, to cover all 239
districts by the end of CY 1965. 113/ The more comprehensive progrsffi
estimated that 63 districts ( compared to 49 districts in the It pilot
program") vTould be manned by the end of CY 1964. Both were represented
as suitable ba,ses for the Secretary ' s impending discussions in Honolulu.
Both were hurriedly dra;vm up alternative schemes for expanding the
advisory effort to district level. Both, moreover, incorporated the
arguments of COMUSMACV: concentration on operations rather than training
and a time-phased buildup with due attention to existing secusity con-
ditions and interpreter availability. The point was also made that the
total number of additional personnel vlOu1d necessarily include a support
slice of approximately 35%. IlJ+/
". ... 1
At any rate, it was a new COMUSMACV \'Tho cabled on 25 J1)11e his pro-
posals for the buildup discussed at the beginning of the month in Honolulu.
In sum, he asked for 900 additional advisors for battalions and districts,
suggested a small increase at province level, and noted that " significant"
nmnbers of personnel would be needed for administrative cmd logistical
support of the ne'l'1 advisors. He also suggested, in the emphasized portion
of the message quoted below', that many of the distr i ct advisory teams
could complete their work and be moved to new areas for pacification
wi thin a year: '
2. RECA~ITULATION OF REQUIREMENTS
Capts/Lts
E5/4 E6
123 Inf Bns (Incl 4 Marine) 123 123
29 Arty Bns (Incl 1 Marine ) 29 58
14 Ml13 Troops, Armd CA Sqdns 14 14
45 District Adv Teams (P"riority province ) 90 90 45
68 District Adv Teams (Other provinces ) 136 136 68
255 363 308
TOTA.L, adjusted for 13 districts teeJns now' in place, 900 (242
officers; 658 enlisted).
The rate of the build-up was a much more complicated ma,tter , not
b ecause of the additional battalion advisors and the new district
advisors but because the numbers represented solely by the a.dditional
advisors quickly became a relatively small percenta.ge of the total U. S.
build-up -- all of which was justifi ed as contributing to the GVN pacifi-
cation plan and a sizeable portion of which was specifically earmarked to
provide administrative and logistical support to the newly arriving
advisors. By mid-July COMUSMACV was recommending 4200 personnel in
addi tion to the 926 battalion and district advisors, at l ea.st two more
helicopter companies, one Caribou company, and numerous major items of
equipment as part of the required build-up. 122/ The i ncreased a.dvisory
effort was identified as the cause of this large i ncrease:
had a,sked for almost ~200 p ersonnel by 1 December 196~ and the balance
( comprising only Special Forces units) of the ~·772 total increa,se by
1 February 1965. 12~ Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to study the
feasibility of accelerating the build-up so that it vlOuld be completed
by 30 September. The JCS replied that the advisory personnel could be
made available this quickly but that several support units -- particu-
l arly aviation lmits -- could not reach South Vietnam by 30 September
without ca,using extreme difficulties and the degradation of tests of
the airmobile concept then in progress. 126/ The Secretary of Defense
directed on 7 August that the accelerated deployment, except for certa,in
critical aviation items and jeeps, be completed by the end of September.
He further directed that COMUSMACV be queried as to his ability to absorb
these personnel and units by that date. 127/ .
Faced with this reply from the individual responsibl e for ma,naging
t he U.S. contribution to the advisory and support effort, Secretary
McNamara cancelled the accelerated deployment. The military services
were instructed to deploy personnel and l.mi ts to South Vietnam in accordance
with General Westmoreland I s initial recommendation fOI'lo[arded to Washington.
a month earlier, in mid-July. 129/
TOTAL 1065 13 0/
This expa,nsion, and the rate at ,vhich it was to proceed, was the product
of what may be termed "tacit bargaining ll between Ivashington and Saigon.
Washington typically asswued the initiative in proposing increases and in
reconmending that they- be accomplished as quickly- as possible. The
dominant concern Ivas the fear that the countryside was being l ost to the
VC and that the impending U.S. moves to exert direct military- pressure
against DRV might come too la,t e unless the pacification program could be
vitali zed. U.S, officials in Saigon tended to prefer to expand gradually-
and to insure that adequate support fa,cilities were in place before addi-
tional advisors were deployed to the field. The product of desires driven
by- political awareness of impending failure, on one hand, and desires
driven by managerial a\'Jareness of operational concIi tions, on the other,
was an advisory incr ease almost precisely of the magnitude and rate pre-
ferred by the managers in the field.
By the end of CY 1964 all 113 teams vTere actually deployed. Their
total strength at that time Has 532 a,s against the authorized total
strength of 565. -)(- By January 1965 the number of district advisors
assigned exceeded the number authorized. These teams I-[ere deployed, it
vrill be recalled, in the ex-pectation that by some time in 1965 a sub-
stantial number of them vwuld have ,.wrked themselves out of a job and
be available for reassignment to new areas. This expectation was, to
put it mildly, not validated by events.
-x- The discrepancy between the 553 additional authoriza,tion a,nd the total
district advisor authorization of 565 is accounted for by the transfer
of some of the spaces involved in the initial e:A'Ilerimental program at
district level. 565 is the correct tota,l -- 113 teams of 5 men each.
Of
within the armed forces, the very real possibility of a complete ARVN
collapse could not be excluded. COMUSMACV summarized the situation in
his 7 June cable to CINCPAC:
If anything, Westmoreland ' s assessment may have been too generous. The
next week the Viet Cong launched an attack on the new Special Forces
camp and adjoining district headquarters at Dong Zoai on the northwest
corner of War Zone D. ARVN forces ,'Tere committed piecemeal to the
engagement and successively chewed up by more than tw'o regiments of
enemy troops. The battle lasted for five days cmd marked some of the
b itterest fighting of the war to that date . The VC summer offensive
continued una,bated through June and July. On 25 June, the long expected
offensive in the central highlands began vThen a district headquarters at
Tou Morong in Kontum Province vms overrun, reportedly by an NVA regiment
reinforced with local guerrillas. Other remote district capitals came
under attack in the following "Teeks and by 7 July a total of six had been
abandoned or overrun.
Far from finding many of its advisory teams finishing their ta,sk
and moving on to ne"l areas or to new units , the U.S. found i tself in
The U.S. build-up continued during the spring and early swmner ,
particularly as a result of ARVN reverses in combat . By the end of July
there were 18 US/ FW combat maneuver battalions deployed in South Viet-
nam. In the same message in which he advised of the halt in ARVN
NEW FOSSIBII,ITIES
-)(- See Task Force Pape'r Iv.c.6., Phase One in the Build-Up of U.S. Forces :
The Debate, March-July 1965.
By November, the effort rea. achieved such results that it Vias brought
to the attention of the CG III MAF . Later that month an agreement was
r eached between the I Corps Commander and the CG III MAF permitting the
integrat ion of Marine squads into PF platoons in the DaNang area to
improve their effectiveness and stiffen their combat performance. The
basic unit of the nevI venture '1<10,13 the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) formed
by adding a Marine Rifle Squad of 14 men plus a Navy corpsman to a PF
platoon (32-38 authorized strength ). The PF platoon retained its own
organization and the int egrated Marines advised the entire unit, living
with it, sharing its food, conducting combined patrols, and training
counterparts. At the end of 1965 , there were seven such Combined Action
Platoons, but the success of the experiment in enhancing PF performance
and extending security prompted a r apid expansion during the next year~
The Marines have continued to press for expansion of this program and to
see in it an effective method by which to produce incr ee,sed performance in
PF units. Critics have noted tha t the Marine advisors quickly become
de facto leaders of the CAPs and argued that a higher level of current
p erformance is purchased at the cost of stultifying the development of
South Vietnamese lea dership. No general consensus has developed on the
relative merits of this assumed trade - off.
1:- ,
! _' I TOP SECRET - Sensitive
.,.,.... ,
On the U.S. side, where his suggestions had the force of orders,
General lilestmorela,nd took one step to integrate the U.S. combat a,nd
advisory functions. The Commanding General,· III Marine Amphibious
Force, the senior U.S. officer in the area, WB,S designated on 7 August
as the Senior Advisor to the ARVN I CTZ Commander. The former U.S.
Senior Advisor became th e Deputy Senior Advisor under CG, III MAF,
although no further integration of the advisory structure into the
U. S. chain of command wa,s attempted. This pattern was soon extended
to the other two Corps a,reas "\\There major U.S. units vTere operating.
The latter changes ·were made at the insistence of the ARVN Corps
Commcmders vlho felt that they vTOuld suffer a loss of prestige i f they
were " advised" by anyone other than the senior U.S. officer in the .
zone. Thus, on 21 October, the cormnander of Hq, Field Force, Vietnam
(FFORCEV), with operational control of all U.S. units in II Corps,
was also named II Corps Senior Advisor. On 1 December, CG, 1st Infantry
Division was named III Corps Senior Advisor, fol101·ring the pattern
already established. No such arrangement "\"as made, however, in IV Corps
since the U.S. he,d no major units deployed there. 1~8/ Later, when
U.S. force deployments had led to the establishment of another FFORCEV
h eadquarters, ea,ch ARVN Corps Commander vms advised by a U.S. Lieutenant
General "Tith equivalent U. S. responsibilities and aU. S. general officer
was appointed Senior Advisor in the Delta, area, vThich had no U.S. combat
maneuver units.
* See Task Force Paper IV . C., Evolution of the War : US/ GVN Relations,
1963-67, Part I , pp. 5Lf-59 .
abandoned, however, after the four-month trial period due to the strong
opposition of the GVN Minister for RD, General Thang, who contended that
such funds were undermining the legitimate efforts of his organization
to meet urgent province needs; it would encourage Vietnamese dependence
on the U,S, 152/
We would avoid gl vlng the impr ess ion of asking for ne1iT
agreements or imposing conditions for our increa.se AID .. , .
We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be
r ejected or to require prolonged debate . 155/
The idea of a special combined US/ GVN effort to secure the critical
area ringing Saigon ,vas first advanced by Ambassador Lodge in July 1964,
at the Honolulu Conference . His concern with the problem vlent back to
l ate 1963 when the re-appraisals of the war following Diem ' s overthrow
r evealed a dangerous deterioration in the III Corps area. A special
USOM report on Long An Province had particul8,rly troubled the Ambassa,dor.
In July 1964, as he was returning from his first tour in Vietnam, he
proposed a special effort in eight provinces (Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Hau
Nghia , Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Vinh Long, and Quang Ngia ) , all but
one of which was near Saigon. The proposal was picked up by Ambassador
Taylor and the program set in motion during the S1.UD1ner of 1964. The
r?
, '
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
By the end of 1965, the prapa sal for Hop Tac programs in I, II, and
IV Corps had refined itself into the scheme for National Priority Areas
that became the focus of attention in 1966. Hap Tac itself, i n the
Saigon vicinity, continued on intO' 1966 to be finally phased out at the
end of the year and r eplaced by the III Carps R/ D Council and a U.S.
military effort to protect the capital known as Operation FAIRFAX.
As a test case for the ever popular oil blot theory of pacifica-
tion, Hop Tac left much to be desired. It did, hOlvever, point up some
of the difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to implement this
appealingly simple--and perhaps simplistic--concept. The oil blot theory,
like all abstract analogies, emphasizes the similarity between phenomena
and ignores the differences. The important similarity of the pacification
problem to the oil blot is the expressed goal of progressively extending
the secure zone until it embraces the entire country. Unlike a blank
piece of paper, however, the enviromnent in which pacification must take
place is neither neutral nor passive; and unlike the oil blot, the
pacification forces are not impervious. Moreover, implicit in the theory
is. the notion that the secure a,rea, like the oil blot, \vill expand in all
dir ections simulta,neously, at roughly the same speed, and tha,t expansion
is irreversible and irrevocable. Further, the analogy fails to take into
account unique problems of terrain or variances in government and insurgent
strength in different areas. One need not belabor the point; the concept
is fine as a theory, but not as a program design. In fairness, it must
be said that the idea does focu s the need for concentra,tion of resources
in priority areas. All this notwithstanding, III Corps was less than the
optimum pla,ce to test such a program. It contains several longtime Viet
Cong strongholds and base areas and is extraordinarily sensitive to polit-
i cal changes in Saigon (28 of 31 district chiefs were replaced during the
lifetime of Hop Tac ) .
The most important reason for the failure of Hop Tac, however, was
the lack of South Vietnamese support for it. From its inception to its
demise, it was an American idea, plan, and program. While the GVN adopted
it, established a high-leve l council. to supervise it, and committed some
troops and other resources to it, this was seen as a way of appeasing the
Americans. The South Vietnamese never accorded Hop Tac a high priority
in their own thinking. Moreover, its l ow status vIas further emphasized
by the massive U.S. force build-up. As this U.S. build-up became rela-
t ively routinized, however, the issue of pacification reasserted itself . *
When it did so, the primary U. S. concern came to focus on the issue of ho'\v
b est to organi ze the military, paramilitary, a,nd civilian advisory efforts.
Since even the civilian advisors in the field were military personnel on
loan in many instances, the account of the military advisory build-up
decisions became essentially an account of organizing advice for pacifica-
tion.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
to the civil side of support for pacific8,t ion. Wlether the coordinator-
in-chi ef emerged as a persuader or a director it vTaS cle,3,r that his
charge had to embrace both military and civil advisors. (In this respect
I1 civill1 is more accurate than I1 c ivilian l1 , for 8, sizeable number of the
civil advisory duties had devolved upon active duty military officers
who were 1110aned l1 to other agencies for this purpose.)
-x- Task Force Paper, Evolution of the War: Reemphasis on Pacifica tio n, 1965-
1967.
I f ,(
I'
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
The first of these reorganizat ions, that Vlhich created OCO, ·was
quite literally forced upon Ambassador Lodge. Particularly in viel," of
the fact that OCO was to be given only a 90-120 day trial to produce
identifiable results, he vlas not eager to undergo the turmoil and lost
motion of one major reorganization only as a prelude to yet another
reorgani zation. He wanted to retain as much non-military flavor to the
pacification effort as possible -- regarding it as complementary to
military programs, yet separate from them. Military security activities
were, in his view, essentially the negative precondition to pacification
activities which were the positive acts leading the GVN to vitalize
i tself at the same time the,t it developed real ties to its olm people. 168/
......
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
for which his division had responsibility. Thus, while civil lines
of authority went directly from corps level (the region ) to province,
the military advisory chain added an additional link at division .
Sector advisors under this arrangement fou,,'1.d themselves \vorking under
a military officer ,.;hose advisory responsibilities ,.;ere a,ctually mili-
tary whereas theirs ,.;ere only partly (and sometimes only nominally )
milite,ry.
. .
MACV Dir 10··12
28 Nfay 1967
NUIvlJ3El~ 10-12 '" (MACCORDS)
1. -PURPOSE.
- - _ _ __ ____ To "-orovide for the ·int2 bcr ration of Civil Operations
and Revolutionary D2veJ.opment Suppo:,t acti.vities within IvfACV.
2. GENERAL.
-----...-
a. To provide for single mana~er direction of all US civil/mjJ.i.~
tary Revolutionary Development activities in the Republic of Vietnam, re-
s ponsibility h,,'.s been assigned to COlvIUSl'vIACV. .
76
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 2011
'1
(6) Serves 2.S tl1e cont2.ct Doint with s ~)onsoring agencies for
R D progT?ms. lvlaintClins l:.:ocison Witll sp~nsorin::>; ag2r:.cies i n l'epresenling
_ t'1eir inte:ccsts ill civil non-RD progl'?J'r:s and activW.es i n the field. Main-
tains direct operational comm1.lniC2.tio;ls with field elements for these pro-
gr2.ms .
r elated matters .
3. IMPLEMENTATION...
------._._-
. a. I ntegration and consoliclatiO!l of OCO anclRD Support activities
will be accomplished ?,t all levels : lIe~.c:' ua.rtcl's -:vrA.CV, r egion/ CTZ , pro\'-
i nGe and elis t,'.ic t. . A
77
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
Ilr
SlLUa GOl:'::; If! the V:U'lOUS regioDs/CTZ;s, rx:: ovbces and chstncts.
(1) Regi.on/CTZ.
(2) Province.
II?
r cscll(';l.tLv(! ]';-:2.y OI'ganizG, with the 8.:.1,::'01'2.1 of tj18 t2pdy 101' R8volutior~;;,ry
~2VC:· ()l)D'~cnt Su~))ort at regio:1/CTz} f'.is .?21'sormel and functions as he s ees
fit.
) .. dvisol' , will h:; assigned to C?,Cl1 proi·~r;,-;.e. The sell.i,Ol' provinciC'J advisor
will be chosen by the D.eputy 10l' COR:!::,;':; 2.1;,d the force commander Iseniol'
advisor ) wiLl} the Concurrence of the ~2Dtlty CORDS to COMUSMACV, on U18
basis of seclU'Hy in the province} Ci.iril-~ilitary balanCe in the RD effort ar.d
qualific ations and experience of the cL':;e::.: oeo senior provincial ad\isor
and }.'lACV sector advisor. T:lC in(:iV;'C:C~J.l not selC'c~ccl will servo as t.he
other ' s deputy as well as being his p~'i;-:cipal advisor for civil op2J:'ations or
military st:pport as the c?,se may be .
(3) District.
79
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Sec ti on 3.3
NND Proj ect Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
(5) For the t.i.me bei.lig there will be no change i n the p:teser,t
I V CTZ organi.zation. Xmplementb:; inst:n:c.tio;1s fo:.: L1e IV CTZ organization
f or Civil 02,J2ration.s and Revolutiona.ry :L2yelop:J1ent SUPP01'C will be pl:ovidscl
at 2. later date.
80
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
"'1
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81
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
It has already b een noted that the U.S. gradually came to espouse
a division of effort betl"een U.S. forces and RVNAF in I"hich the former
would concentrate on defeating the main forces of the insurgents in the
unpopulated areas I'Thile RVNAF concentrated on securing pacification
operations in the populated areas.
, ..
~.
------
TOP ,SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
PHI~--~EGUI.AR FORGES
~o:.1"~::~~"'n"';i,,",-~~ ~1.~~~~~~~~~~r=~"''':JC.&..~~~;':iC:T_-:<1
.. .
Securlng !~1s~=i!lJi.~~_~~.P.P2J';t"£X".@-~~ty;t~.L~§.:l·
3" Conciuc t~ in conjunction rrlth pro'"
vincia.1 mill tf'.I'Y fo~rces and civil ;'nt91J.iL~
genee and polic e elem8nt.s,p opere.tions to
destroy va gl\ol'rll1as and infl'astJ."'Uct,urq
llhen provincial forces aTD t UQdeqnut, e foI'
. thi s task o .
,.
Do'Volopin3
.'
86
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
. "
3¢ (0) US/nnti.1i' c
"
1-0
Conduct combined and unilateral
oporati.ons to clear VC/ NVA main forces f rorri
provincial priority a:coas and othor cri tic",l
areas in accoL'danco uith oBGablishod p:\~ovln~
c:tal RD plans o !
Related
~.......-..-
t asks~
.. _ _ _ .... _ _ - . . . J
..
Conduct combi ned and unilatcra1
6.
offensive search and destroy o pera~ions
e.gainst VC/WIA tl'.ain fo rces to prevent, theL.·
i ncl1.:csion ).nto are2,S undergoine RD •
87
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
(n;"",...·/ 0
..
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88
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
.--;~;-·I-~;;'G-;~-'---·~~~
~~~r~ ..,.~. ---=o:.:;or-~7::""'-=-::"_._C:b="~""""~'~':';;"~~~_~____
'-:-'-.::a.::::-oaM"I>oc1~~~1.o~~-"~--;,n~~.......~~·:-
30 Ass:ts'~
GVN d.vE cadre elements to
perf01"Tl1 eco;'lomic 2.nd sod.fl.l develop.nsnt
projects o
,:
he Assist ~lational Police in popu..1E.tioi1
and resources control c.nd/ or to malntatn 1-:-.'7
and o;:cier and p!.·otec·~ p'cblio safe'~yo ~
I
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NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
::;---I--~;;-~~~"-
';:'\-"';"~"'~·_~:"':1,r(-cc:~~_~t....--~~ . _ ..... ~oz;.ooo,...:....-~---~"1.-,, ~~,·~e--~
70 Cont,:tm.19 task 3 (I
f rastru.c tu.:re9
Secu1'1ng
90
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number : NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
91
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD D ate: 2011
When the Diem regime did not respond as it had been expected (or
hoped ) it would, and after Diem ' s government Ivas overturned, the U. S.
again refused conSCiously to adopt leverage procedures to compel improved
performance . First with General Minh, then with General Khanh, the hope
was that improved receptivity (as compared to the most recent past exper -
ience) on the part of the GVN vlould permit the carrot to work effectively
without the stick. The period just ended in mid-1965 when U.S. troops
were committed to South Vietnam marked another occasion to examine the
putative advantages and disadvantages of the use of l everage.
!.L
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
found that the price of acceptance without levere,ge was the virtual
absence of influence. Robert Shaplen summarized this phenomenon in
a pessimistic 1965 evaluation of the U.S. advisory effort :
-* See Task Force Paper, Evol ution of the War: US / GVN Relations , 196 3-67 2-
Part I, pp. 54·-59 .
But USOM did experiment successfully with one nevT form of direct,
selective leverage in the late summer of 1965. The Province Chief of
Binh Tuy Province, Lt Colonel Chi, ,,,as accused of misusing some $250,000
in AID funds. When USOM pres sure on the GVN for his removal produced no
results, aid to the province was suspended on September 23, and USOM
field personnel were withdrawn. In spite of Chi ' s friendship with the
Defense Minister and Deputy Premier (General Co ) Premj.er Ky removed him
six vleeks later. Aid to the province then resumed, but Ambassador Lodge
made it clear to the Mission Council that he dise,pproved of the action
and did not want it repeated (particularly the press coverage ) . 178/
Those who made such proposals "rere in favor of some kind of authorized,
premeditated use of leverage, of course, else they would not have pushed
for an examination of this hitherto avoided topic .
But another Army staff effort, the PROVN Study referred to ea.rlier,
set out to rectify this omission. Commissioned in mid-1965 by Army Chief
of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, the PROVN group "\vas charged "d th
1t developing new sources of action to be taken in South Vietnam by the
United States and its allies, which will, in conjunction with current
actions, modified as necessary, lead in due time to successful accomplish-
ment of U. S. aims and obj ecti ves. If After eight months of intensive effort
this select group of middle ranking officers produced a comprehensive
argument calline; for emphasis on the pacificatj.on effort . A radical
decentralization of U.S. and GVN directive authority was held to be
necessary for this purpose . And to make sure that national plans were
t urned into concrete a.ctions at the operating l evel , PROVN called for the
calculated use of leverage :
, ,I)
I < ,
NO DECISION AS A DECISION
A. Necessity of Leverage.
/ .. (
The study argued that leverage was feasible either at the national
l evel with the GVN leadership in the classic lIoriental ll style or on
a more systematic basis to be applied through the control of resources
at all levels down to province and district. The study concluded:
One of the programs that came under Komer ' s jurisdiction after he
took over CORDS was the controversial Hamlet Evaluation System (RES ).
Secretary McNamara had requested, during his October 1966 visit to Vietnam,
the development of some ADP system for evaluating the status of rural
security on an on-going basis -- data which would make possible compara-
tive judgments of progress over time. In November , he sent Mr . George Allen
and Colonel Carter Clark to Saigon with a propo sal . ~~CV revised their
suggested system and recommended it to the Mission Council which endorsed
i t on 13 December. MACV described the new system to CINCPAC in January
1967:
RES provides a fully autom.ated procedure for evaluating
hamlet Revolutionary Development progress and establishes a
hamlet level data base. Data input for RES is provided by
MACV subsector advisors and di st rict representatives, where
aSSigned , who evaluate all hs,mlets not under VC control.
They record their asse ssments in terms of 18 entries on a
hamlet evaluation worksheet utilizing six factors , each with
three indicators. Also, eight problem areas are eval uated. 189/
f ifO
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8
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HAML~T ~ATA
TOTAL SCCRE - COUNTRYWIDE
TH~OUG H DECEM RER,1967
NU~RER OF HAML~TS
~
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The first review ( completed in March ) cut two margi nal navy vessels
from the li st of U. S. supported units, but only '\'larned JGS of the un8.ccept-
able effectiveness of two marginal ranger battalions and an armored cavalry
squadron. The June review, '\'lhile producing recorrunendations from U . S.
advisor s that aid be suspended in several cases, again r esulted only in
warnings and threats . Ther e vTaS no suspension of U. S. support.
RVNAF EFF~CTIVENESS
January February
The N'lACV staff rebutted many of the ' premises on w'hich the statistical
comparisons had been based and again revealed the difficulty in develop-
ing meaningful statistical measures vri th respect to anything Vietna,mese .
Their most tellj_ng criticism of the Systems Analysis compari son of U. S.
and Vietnamese units was the follo,.;ing:
But here again one can be misled. One reason that ARVN vTas given t he
R/D support mission in the first place was its demonstrated inability
to engage effectively and destroy the enemy main force. R/D "TaS regarded
as a residual a,nd semi-passive role more sui ted to ARVN capab ilities.
And so the statistical argurnents r aged , partisans marshall ing vThatever
statistics they could to defend vThat in most cases were their o"m pre-
conceived notions .
RVNAF STRENGTHS
1 Jul 65 1 J.an 66 1 Jul 66 1 Jan 67 30 Apr 67
RVNAF
ARMY 234,139 267,877 276,473 283,898 283,200
NAVY 9,037 1~· , 559 16,380 17,349 16,000
MARINES 6,842 7,380 6,848 7,049 7,100
AIR FORCE 12,081 12,778 13,895 14,647 15,600
REGIONAL FORCES 1 0 7,652 132,221 141,447 149, 84).j 142,018
POPULAR FORCE 149, 02 9 136,398 137 ,689 15 0 , 096 142,491
Sub Total 518,780 571,213 592,73 2 622,883 606,405
PARA-MILITARY
National Polj.ce 42,700 52 ,3 00 5Lf,600 58,3 00 63,1+57
CIDG 21,700 28,~. 00 30,lfOO 34,700 31,477
Armed Cmbt Youth 39,000 39,600 22,800 20,000 19,930
Total 6 2 5,800 691,5 00 700 ,5 00 73 5,900 721,269 206/
In March, two days before the Guam Conference vIaS to meet, General Westmore-
l and sent an i mportant c8,ble to CINCPAC requesting an tl optimum force " increase,
above and beyond the approved Deployment Program 4, of 4-2/ 3 U. S. divisions
(201,250 personnel spaces ), or a "minimum essential force " of an additional
2-~/3 U.S. divisions' ( 8~,100 spaces ). 20 7/ The optimum forc e wO~~d have
r alsed total U.S. manpov'Ter in Vietnam to over 670 , 000 troops. Thls reCluest
was to kick off (after Guam, I'There it was not specifically addressed )
another prolonged internal administration debate and review of forces in
Vietnam ,.vhich \'TOuld eventually culminate i n Secretary MCNamara ' s July trip
t o Saigon and the subsequent decision to adopt deployment Program 5 , raising
t otal authorized strength to 525,000. COMUSM.A.CV ' s orientation tow'ard
RVNAF's role in the war is clearly revealed in this message :
Without going into detail on the debate and decision on Program 5, from
the advisory standpoint the important development vlas COMUSMA.CV I s view
of RVNAF. In March, RVNAF had been regarded almost as a residual, but
by September, when the ambitious U.S. force proposals had been rejected
i n favor of only a modest increase of about 45,000 COMUSMACV reasserted
t he importance of RVNAF and asked for a major increase in its authorized
strength. Slowly, then, the realization that there was a ceiling on the
numb er of U.S. forces which could be deployed without calling up re serves
turned everyone 1s attention once again to RVNAF.
:,'
TOP' SECRET - Sensitive
' ,.
30 6 828
51? 51'1
h93 1;.93
29
59 7 1 6'7
Di v-j.f :l.OnS OJ») t: 2-':t,h S],)3c.i..o.1 266
Z Oll e DJ.lct S~tril-'O). "lO, 11 86).
98 ].2 11(;
/. ;/
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TOP SECRET - Sensitive
The large RF/ FF' advisory element in this reg,uest included spaces for
824 RF Company Advisory Teams of b ·,'O men each and 119 Company Training
Teams of five men each. Before returning to l!fashington, the Secretary
gave planning authorization for a U,S, augmentation not to exceed
525,000 spaces, but fulfilling \-)estmoreland t s louer alternative by
civilianizing an additional 10,000 military spaces . 212/ A month
l ater, after approval by President Johnson, this ne"T force level was
promulgated as Program #5. 21 3/ The final detaj.led troop list for
Program #5 submitted by the JCS on September 15 contained, in addition
to the regular advisory spaces already nientioned, a 666 -man Special
Forces augmentation to perform advisor-like functions with their Viet-
namese counterparts. 211+/
Even before the Program #5 troop list "laS completed by MACV and
submi tted by the JCS, however, Ambassador Komer W8,S complaining that
the CORDS advisory element actual strength I'Tas seriously below its
authorization and that bureaucratic delays had forestalled even the
deployment of the 100 priority advisors requested in July. 21 5/ The
following day, OSD Systems Analysis advised Secretary McNamara that the
shortfall in the actual strength of the overall advisory complement was
a longstanding problem. In March, the advisory program had been under-
strength 600 men while MACV hea,dquarters exceeded its authorization by
473. In response to Systems Analysis prodding this discrepancy had been
partially rectified, but as late as July the adv:Lsory staff was still
short 237 while MACV had an overage of 130. Systems Analysis further
advised the Secretary that while total strength authorizations had been
made, MACV t s delay in submitting detailed lists of grades and specialties
of de sired personnel had, in turn, engendered delays at this end in
filling the billets. Moreover, the requirement that advisors receive
preliminary Stateside background and language training further delayed
the actual deployments. Only priority requests could be filled very
r apidly, and these necessarily could only constitute a small percentage
of the total.
Advisory Logist ics Teanls (MALTs) to support the RF/ PF. Altogether,
the conference produced some fift~r-odd recommendations from 'I'lhi ch a
30 -point package was fOr'i'larded to CO)"ruSHACV.
Meanwhile, on September 28, tte JCS had fonTarded with their endorse-
ment the .MACV-CINCPAC recommendation on RVNAF force increases, of which
the RF/ PF component \'las the l argest . 217/ Requested vTas an increase
in FY 68 RVNAF' authorized strength from 622,153 to 685,739, a net of
63,586. Of this number, 47,839 we~e RF/PF spaces, and only 15,747 were
for the regular forces (of which IL'Nl'Tts share 'I·Tas 14,966 ) . To achieve
these higher levels, .MACV propose d the reduction of the draft age from
20 to 18 and the extension of tour s of duty for active RVNAF personnel.
The advisory support for these ne'l" Vietna.mese forces had already been
provided for by Program #5. In their concluding paragraph, the JCS took
note of a MACV request, to be cons idered separately, for an FY 1969 RVNAF
authorized strength of 763,953, a further increase of 78,204 over the
newly proposed FY 1968 level. Of these nevT troops, 69 , 000 were to go
to RF/ PF ( including some draftees) and only 9,000 to ARVN. Secretary
McNamara approved these requested FY 1968 augmenta,tions for RVNAF against
the recommendation of his Systems Analyst , Alain Enthoven , 'I'lho vlOuld
have authorized only half of the request pending better j ustification. 218/
But the JCS were informed that a judgr:lent on the proposed FY 1969 increase
would be reserved until the military had responded to a series of questions
relating to equipment availability, officer supply, costs , and distribu-
tion of the neVI forces between ARV~i and RF/ PF . .
I
1~"
r. .''..
FOOTNOTES
13· John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger ,
1962 ), pp . 64-70 ; Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam : Nati,on Unde~
Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19b3), pp . 163-67 .
15· Ibid., Vol ume III (Classified Studies ), Study No . 4 by the Committee
Staff , "Mirror Imaging, " pp. 115-147 .
/;,-:
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
17· U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 10 June 1960 , Study on
Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (S), p.' 10.
22. Ibid . , p . 5.
28. See Message, Saigon to State 212 , 24 July 1959 (S); Saigon to State
2446, 18 February 1960 (C); CINCPAC Command History, 1960 , pp. 162-63
(TS/ NF ) .
33. RFE-3, 1 November 1961, Ope cit ., p. 4; Briefing Paper, n.d., The
North Vietna,mese Role intheOrigin , Direction, and Support ofllie
War in South Vietnam (s), p. iv.
) .,~ /
;--.. '..,.~
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
34. Memo, General Lansdale for SecDef, 17 January 1961, Vietnam (S), p. 1 ~
35· Ibid., p. 3.
37· Ibid., p. 4.
38. Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution , Rev. Ed. , (New York: Harper and
Row, 1966), pp. 148-149 .
39· Memo, WWR /Walt w. Rosto~ to the President, 12 April 1961, no
subject (S).
43. Ibid.
44 . Memo LState Departmenil to Members of Task Force on Vietnam, 3 May 1961 ( TS:
47. Memo , R.L. Gilpatric for Presidential Task Force , 1 May 1961 ' (TS ).
48. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
53· Memo, Vic e President Johnson for President Kennedy , 23 May 1961.
54. Ltr, President Diem to Pr esident Ken.nedy, 9 June 1961. (Emphasis added. )
55· Ibid.
58 . JCSM 717-61.
59. Study, Concept of Intervention in South Vietnam z.. n . d. , discussed at
NSC meeting, 11 October 1961.
60. SNIE 10-3-61, 10 October 1961, Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
SEATO Undertakings in South Vietnam (TS)
69. Msg, Saigon to State 687 , 22 November 1961 (,S); Msg, Saigon to State 708 ,
25 November 1961 (S) .
70. Taylor Report, 0p . cit ., pp. 9-10. (Emphasis added. )
78. Study, ODCSOPS, DA for Chief of Staff, U.S, Army, 15 September 1965,
Time Phased Build-up of Unit Advisory Effor·t in RVN (S ). Cited
hereafter as Time Phased Advisory Build-up.
79. Ibid.
80 . Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82 . Ibid .
84. David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York, Random House,
1965 ) .
85. Record of 6th Secretary of Defense Conference, 23 July 1962 (TS), p. 2-1.
86. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New' York: Praeger ,
1966 ) , p. 136.
90 . Ibid.
93 . Ibid .
94 . Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96 . Memo , DIA for SecDef, 17 April 1964 , Status of the Vietnamese Hamlet
Survey ( TS ).
/ l~-~,'j
i ......... j
102. Draft Memo for Record, Lt Col S. B. Berry, Jr., {Mil Asst to Se cDetl,
n.d., U.S. Embassy Briefing, Saigon, 12 Ma,y 196~ .
103· Msg, JCS to COMUSMACV 64~8, 22 May 1964, Vietnamese Civil Guard and
Self Defense Corps (S).
10l~. Ibid . '
105· Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 230418z Kay 1964, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self
Defense . Corps
.........
(S) .
106. Ibid.
107· Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6473, 25 j·:ay 196~, Vietna,mese Civil Guard and
Self Defens e Corps (S).
109. Ibid.
110. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 4259, 270045~ May 1964 (S). (Emphasis a,dded. )
111. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 270805Z J.:ay 1964, Vietnamese CG and SDC (S).
116 . Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS , ~~C J32 5380 , 25 June 1964 , Extension of U.S.
Advisory Assistance (S).
117. Ibid .
119· Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS , MAC J32 5380, ~. cit . (Emphasis added .)
j l/)
, (;> ,
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
121. See, for example, the papers in Secretary of Defense files, Vietnam
381 (16 January 1961.~ ) for July-September 1964.
123. Ibid.
124. JCSM-665 -64 , 4· August 1961.~, Add itional Support in RVN on Accelerated
Basis (S).
125. Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, MAC Jl 704.4, 28 July 1964, Pe.r sonnel Augmenta-
tion (S).
!'/ ' /
'
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
r
., ,I
/ ' ?
164 . 1965 MACV Command History, p. 245 ; Memo, M.A.CJ3 , Rural Construction
~ (S).
168 . Lodge ' s definitions do not agree with thi s expl anati on but i t i s a
fair oversimplification of his views .
169. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC (Info to White House, State, SecDef, JCS,
and CIA), 26 August 1966 , Concept of Military Operations in_ South
Vi etnam (TS ).
170. MajGen JCF Tills on (J -3, Y.iA.CV ) , Briefing to Mission Council, 8 Aug 66 .
173· MACV/ JGS Combined Campaign Plan , 1967 (AB 142), 7 November 1966 ,
pp . 193-205 .
174. Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New : Harper and Row, 1965 ),
pp. 329-330.
178. New York Times, October 5, 7, 8 and November 26, 1965; Mission
Council Action Memorandum No. 15, October 7, 1965.
179. For a review of this entire period, see Task Force Paper IV.C.,
Evolution of the War: US!GVN Relations, 1963-67, Part II, pp. 1-10.
180 . See, for example: Memo, SecDef for President, 20 July 1965; Draft
Memo, SecDef for President, 3 November 1965.
195 . Ibid .
196 . Southeast Asia Statistical Tables, OASD! SA SEA Programs Directorate,
Table 4A (as of January 1968) .
197 . Ibid.
198 . Southeast Asia Analysis Report, August 1967 , prepared by OASD(SA)
SEA Programs Directorate, (S)~ p. 26 .
201. Embassy Saigon message 28095, For the President from Bunker ,
June 14, 1967 (S-NODIS).
202. Review' and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress, MACV-J341, 16 Sep 67 (S).
208. Ibid.
210. Briefings for the Secretary of Defens~, op. cit., pp. 171-176.
212. ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven, Memorandum for Record, July 13, 1967 ,
Subject: Fallout from Secretary of Defense Trip to South Vietnam,
(TS-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY Dr. Heyman); Q,nd OASD(SA) General Purpose
Forces, W. K. Brehm, Memorandum for the Record, Subj ect: SEA
Deployments (TS), July 14, 1967.
213. ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Mili-
t ary Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, 14 Aug 67, Subject: Southeast
Asia Deployment Program #5 (TS); refers to SecDef deci sion memoran-
dum, 10 Aug 67.
214. JCSM 505-67, 15 Sep 67, Subject: U.S. Force Deployments Vietnam
(Refined Troop List) (TS).
\ APPEJ\1])IX I
U. S. Advisory Effort __- Manpower y
Hq MACV Hq MAAG USA Section USN Section USMC Section USAF Section Total
Date Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth As gnd Auth As gnd Auth Asgnd
Jun 1956-Jun 1959 459 ~/ 170 22 34 335
April 196~ 54 530 41 73 685
z
November 1961 89 454 53 74 746 z
O~
'"CIrt>c..
...,
June 1962 216 206 172 169 2658 2409 123 119 21 21 211 216 3401 3138 ~. ~
~
() '"_ .
..... :::J
December 1962 335 291 141 164 2586 2466 143 123 19 17 261 219 3485 3280 zrt>
::: c..
June 1963 354 330 142 171 2585 2598 143 135 15 14 271 232 3510 3480 I~
1m
3
O'~
~
:: tri
-0
...,
M. Z~
oz8::!.
0
f-'
December 1963 339 321 225 169 2493 2582 143 140 17 14 245 388 3462 3614 !::d
M
f\) 8 0\ <
VI w~
June 1964 921 910 2276 1854 135 130 19 15 229 411 3580 3320 wO
f- ...,
0\0-
m . ~
tJj ...,
December 1964 1072 1107 3067 3135 215 216 20 29 305 306 4619 4793 I~ '<
. . fw-
\-' .
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~ ,0\
June 1965 1820 1820 5054 3573 466 471 30 29 422 340 7792 6233 I~' O[fJ
o~
_.
(])
m
M
0 December 1966 2571 2636 5394 4575 465 467 38 32 493 488 8961 9123
g:j
8 June 1967 2797 2831 5607 5380 479 485 39 37 493 494 9415 9227
m
(]) December 1967 3067 3268 5811 5995 475 479 39 35 464 477 9856 10254
::::s
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11 Data on Assigned manpower not available prior to June 1962
~/ Includes 350 men in TERM
Source : 1956-1961 data,ODCSOPS (OPS OD), 15 September 1965; 1961-1967 data, MACV Monthly Strength Report ,
ReS CINCPAC 531~·
,
\\
\
0 AP~ _ .JIX II eJ '--
"-
'>:)
CY 1956 0 65 0 4 1 0 0
1957 5 65 0 4 1 0 0
1958 10 . 61 0 4 1 0 0
1959 15 61 0 4 1 0 0 z
1960
1961
15
100
61
92
7
18
4
4
1
4
0
0
0
37
So
'i:J ~
"' !2
1962 380 605 36 4 33 0 117 [2. e;
1963 380 785 33 20 26 4 235 ~
eD
() _.
Vl
:=l
z~
1964 370 422 956 967 101 77 42 39 39 27 14 21 l~47 469 ,- Q.
1965 791 871 1466 1368 108 117 113 8 39 35 52 43 757 627
f-3
0 3 '0
cr~
I-cJ eD .
1966 788 777 1371 1213 127 118 115 122 7 8 85 78 711 576 :: tTJ
1967 1009 965 1348 1535 106 120 103 6 8 53 67 838 982
t:r.l
z~
77 t:xj
S~
('2
t:r.l
t<j
1960 0 0 0 3 37 128
('2 1961 0 0 0 3 8 266
sa
f-3
1962 0 3 0 3 1405 2586
1963 0 3 0 55 1041 2582
1964 541 512 45 55 79 69 54 58 463 517 3151 3233
t:r.l
(j) 1965 851 633 63 39 91 82 87 75 662 555 5080 4453
::::s
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f-' .
1966 1025 789 59 51 88 72 84 69 1031 751 5491 4624
c+
f-' .
1967 1160 1238 66 76 99 88 57 56 1035 802 5854 6040
<l
(j)
1968 1259 1056 55 55 74 68 54 27 3182 1172 9023 5950
Source: ODCSOPS (OPS OD), 15 September 1965, MACV Monthly Strength Report, RCS CINCPAC 5314
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
APPENDIX III
r - - - - - - · - - - -·- - · - · - - ·- ----·-·-------· - - . - - -- -- - - - - -----.----.- .-.. ----------,,--.
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
FISCAL YEAR
127
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
I
;/
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
FISCAL YEAR
128
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
Ii
$317.0
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
FISCAL YEAR
129
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number : NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
AP PENDIX~VI~ ____________________________ ~
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- • -" 0:: -- - -- -0:: - 0:: ---
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FY 1958 FY 1959 FY 1960 FY 1961 FY 1962 FY 1963 FY 1964 FY 1965 FY 1966 FY 1967
r
130
-,
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number : NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
I'/:)
APPENDIX VII
.,.
/"
.,
100%
100%
100%
131
' ..
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
I'll,!
. I
APPENDIX VI II
132
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
APPENDIX IX
Percent
FYb'4 18% 41% 21% 6% 8% 6% 100%
FY 65 13 28 6 4 16 100
33 13 100
FY 66 19 30 29 5 4
FY 67 17 30 4 4 12 100
33 100
FY 68 !!./ 16 26 35 3 3 17