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CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
_____________________________________________________________________ 6
________________________________________________________ 6-15
2.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ROAD TUNNEL ____________ 8
2.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE TO TUNNEL STRUCTURES ________________________________ 10
2.2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT ____________________________________________________________ 10
2.2.2 RISK ANALYSIS ________________________________________________________________ 11
2.2.3 COMPUTATIONAL FLUID DYNAMICS (CFD) AND FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS (FEA) _______________ 12
2.2.4 ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT____________________________________________ 14
2.2.5 RISK REDUCTION MEASURES _____________________________________________________ 14
4. SPALLING CONCRETE
___________________________________________________________ 32-36
___________________________________________ 37
6. TYPES OF TUNNEL
_________________________________________________________________ 38
______________________________________ 54-58
1. INTRODUCTION
Fires in tunnels are a major hazard to human life. Tunnel fires also cause costly damage to surrounding
infrastructure. Limited escape facilities and difficulties encountered by intervention forces in gaining
access to the tunnel fire call for extensive safety arrangements which must be complementary and
mutually coordinated.
Tunnels and underground transport facilities are important means of communication, not only in terms
of shorter journey times but increasingly out of consideration for the local population and the
environment. Generally speaking, important underground transport links are expected to be available
without any restrictions and to operate smoothly round the clock. Interruptions due to accidents,
technical malfunctions or maintenance work quickly cause traffic jams and delays, and figure in
transport policy statistics as economic losses.
Rising traffic densities and the growing demand for underground communication links result in a higher
probability of accidents, injuries and damage. Added to this are other factors which increase the
potential hazards of traffic tunnels:
the increasing length of modern tunnels
the transportation of hazardous materials
two-way traffic (with undivided carriageways)
higher fire loads due to growing traffic volumes and higher loading capacities
mechanical defects in motor vehicles
When considering tunnels, it is usually in relation to road and rail infrastructure. However, use of the
word tunnels can be slightly misleading, as the following information can apply equally to pedestrian
walkways, underground rail stations, underground car parks etc...in fact to any concrete structure.
Although this document refers to tunnels throughout, all information also applies to underground spaces
of any description.
It is usually assumed that because a structure is constructed using concrete, that it is inherently fire
resistant, and therefore requires no additional fire protection measures to be taken. Unfortunately,
experience over the years has shown that this is not necessarily the case and consideration must be
given to the performance and behaviour of concrete structures under fire conditions. In addition, where
tunnels and underground spaces are concerned, consideration must also be given to the provision of
services protection, e.g. smoke extraction systems, protection to cables and wiring providing power to
emergency equipment.
This handbook is intended to provide some background into the behaviour of concrete under fire
conditions, to show proven methods of protecting structures against fire, and of providing protection to
services within tunnels and underground spaces.
As an example, outlined below are some of the tunnel fires which have occurred during the 1990s and
earlier this decade, and the resultant death toll. TABLE 2 on pages 16-23 gives an extensive overview of
tunnel fire history.
TABLE 1: CASUALTIES IN TUNNEL FIRES
Location
Casualties
Location
Casualties
Bosnia
35
34
8
16
700
31
5
5
155
It should be noted that after the fire in the Channel Tunnel, the only thing standing between total loss
and a situation where effective repair could be carried out was the thin grout layer between the concrete
structure and the water bearing rock layer, so severe was the spalling of the concrete. A very slim margin
to rely on, but a risk which could easily have been alleviated had the correct passive fire protection
systems been included, complementing the active systems that were installed.
Thirdly, there is the economic damage caused as a result of the failure of a tunnel. This economic cost
is not related solely to the repair or rebuilding of the structure; more usually it is the knock-on impact of
loss to business and traffic diversions etc. which result in the largest costs.
A prime example is the Channel Tunnel fire. Economic damage was estimated to be over twice the cost
of the actual tunnel repairs. The direct repairs to the tunnel cost an estimated 87 million while the
additional costs in lost business, replacement of infrastructure, materials (e.g. lorries, train carriages etc)
together with the impact of the tunnel closure on other, unrelated businesses brought the economic loss
alone to some 215 million.
FIGURE 1: EXAMPLES OF FIRE DAMAGE
Using Mont Blanc Tunnel as a comparison
for a simple road tunnel, the differences are
not so marked, with the cost of repair being
estimated at approximately 206 million and
the economic cost at some 250 million.
However, the socioeconomic impact has to
be considered on a wider basis rather than
simply the tunnel itself. The estimates of the
effects on the local Italian economy around
the area of the Mont Blanc Tunnel were
estimated at 1.75 billion. Therefore, in any
risk analysis, the socioeconomic costs
need to be accurately identified and
carefully assessed.
This standardisation process led to the introduction of the EU Directive in 2004 in a document titled
10
PROBABILITY
DENSITY
10
HRR (MW)
Probability
Years
0.325
3.08
15
0.056
17.92
25
0.056
17.79
50
0.068
14.60
100
0.023
42.92
100
1000
0.1
0.01
y = 2.4105x-1.5968
0.001
0.0001
11
2.2.3 COMPUTATIONAL FLUID DYNAMICS (CFD) AND FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS (FEA)
Following risk analysis, if it is concluded that the probability and magnitude of the fire risk may result
in consequential structural damage, an assessment of this consequential damage needs to be
undertaken. IEB Consulting Ltd and TNO/Efectis have pioneered the coupling of Computational
Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and Finite Element Analysis (FEA) to assess the structural damage resulting
from the output of the risk analysis.
Coupling of these two design tools allows individual structural components to be assessed in detail
with fires located at various locations across tunnel cross sections.
FIGURE 3: FIRES AND TEMPERATURES LOCATED AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS ACROSS TUNNEL CROSS SECTIONS
rating
Sepa
wall
er
ld
rd
Ha
u
ho
Fire
The CFD component develops the temperature constraints at the boundary of the structure for a
fire at any location in a tunnel important for wide tunnels formed from many structural
components.
Cross section x = 0.000m
1150C
1200C
1250C
1200C
1300C
1200C
1350C
1250C
1350C
1400C
1300C
1350C
1400C
1450C
1150C
1050C
1000C
1100C
1200C
The FEA component allows detailed time dependent failure analysis to be assessed for all
components forming the structure and allows detailed assessment up to the point at which the
structure is no longer self supporting and failure mechanism begins. For complex structures such
as cut & cover tunnels, this is crucial to determine the weakest element.
12
For complex structures such as cut & cover and immersed tube tunnels, specific failure criteria can
be derived for individual structural components.
This CFD & FEA approach has recently been accepted by the European tunnel community as
current best practice in assessing structural resilience of tunnels and was recently presented at a
symposium on catastrophic fires in tunnels.
FIGURE 4: STRUCTURAL BEAM FOR TUNNEL SYSTEM
Real beam
Subdivided beam
Mechanical model
13
and
Output from the CFD & FEA analysis will set the design constraints for either solution and may even
be a combination of both types in order to provide the best and cost effective approach for any
specific tunnel. The recent acquisition of Cafco International by Promat assures flexibility in
achieving the best solution.
14
CONCLUSION
Existing EU Legislation & Current Best Practice (PIARC) requires tunnel stakeholders to assess
structural risks in their particular tunnel. Current experience suggests that all stakeholders should
assess these structural risks by the use of risk assessments. However, risk assessments do not fully
assess the complete understanding of the risk and therefore consequential analysis is required.
The suite of Design Tools developed by IEB Consulting Ltd and TNO/Efectis, allows Promat
International to assist stakeholders to appreciate their obligations regarding Legislative Requirements &
Best Practice.
These tools will also allow Promat to work through team integration with stakeholders in assessing the
probability, magnitude, consequence, economic and environmental impact of the fire risk for any type
of tunnel.
These Design Tools include:
Quantified Risk Assessments,
CFD & FEA Analysis,
Economic & Environmental Impact Analysis, and
Design of Risk Reduction Solutions.
They will enable stakeholders to fully assess, through a Risk Management process, compliance with the
EU Directive and engage in current best practice.
15
Country
Year
Tunnel
Length
Vehicle where
fire occurred
Most possible
cause of fire
Afghanistan
1982
Mazar-e-SharifKabul Salang
2,700m
Gas tanker
explosion
Not
available
Australia
2007
Burnley
Melbourne
3,400m
Car/truck collision
Fire due to
collision
1 hour
Cars and
trucks
Not available
Austria
2002
Tauern
Salzburg
6,400m
Lorry
Faulty engine
Not
available
Not
available
Severe smoke
production
Austria
2001
Gleinalm
A 9 near Graz
8,320m
Coach
Short circuit
>1 hour
1 coach
Severe smoke
production over 3km
Austria
2001
Gleinalm
A 9 near Graz
8,320m
Swedish tourist
coach
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Austria
2001
Gleinalm
A 9 near Graz
8,320m
Coach
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Austria
2001
Gleinalm
A 9 near Graz
8,320m
Car
Front collision
lorry-car
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Austria
2001
Tauern
Salzburg
6,400m
Cars
Head on collision
of two cars
Not
available
2 cars
Not available
Austria
2000
Kitzsteinhorn
Kaprun
funicular tunnel
3,300m
Passenger train
Not
available
1 train
Austria
2000
Tauern
Salzburg
6,400m
HGV
Not available
hour
1 HGV
Not available
Austria
1999
Tauern A10
Salzburg
Spittal
6,400m
Lorry loaded
with paint
Austria
1995
Pfander
6,719m
Collision
Austria
1989
Brenner
200m
Dangerous goods
exploded during
construction
Austria
1987
Tanzenberg
2,400m
Austria
1986
Herzogberg
Austria
1984
Azerbaijan
Not
Severe damage to
available
structure
Front-rear collision
16 lorries,
15 hours
4 cars and 2 lorries
24 cars
Serious damage
1 hour
1 lorry, 1
van, 1 car
Serious damage
Dangerous goods
7 hours
Not
available
Not available
Car
Not
available
1 car
Significant damage to
tunnel structure and
dense smoke
2,000m
HGV
Overheated brakes
Not
available
1 HGV
1 HGV
Felbertauern
5,000m
Coach
Overheated brakes
>1 hour
1 coach
Damage to tunnel
lining >100m
1995
Baku
Not
available
Railway/metro train
Electrical fault
at rail car
Not
available
1 train
Severe smoke
production
Belgium
2004
Kinkempois
600m
HGV
Not available
Not
available
1 HGV
Closed for
several days
Belgium
1987
Brussels
Underground
Not
available
Station fire
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Dense smoke
Canada
2000
Montreal
Metro
Not
available
Cable fire
Cable
6 hours
Not
available
Electrical system,
severe smoke
production
Canada
2000
Toronto
Metro
Not
available
Railway/metro train
Not available
Not
available
1 train
Line closed
for 24 hours
Canada
1997
Toronto
Metro
Not
available
Train
Not
Rubber matting under
the track caught fire available
Rubber
matting
Severe smoke
production
16
Consequences
Duration
of fire Damaged Structures and
vehicles
installations
Country
Year
Tunnel
Length
Vehicle where
fire occurred
Most possible
cause of fire
Canada
1976
Christie Street
Metro Montreal
Not
available
Station fire
Arson attack
Not
available
Not
available
Damage
>$3 million
Canada
1974
Rosemont
Metro Montreal
Not
available
Train fire
Short circuit
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Canada
1971
Henri Bourassa
Montreal
Not
available
Train fire
Not
available
1 train
Not available
China
1998
Gueizhou
Guiyang/
Chansha
800m
Train
Exploding gas
canisters
Not
available
1 train
Tunnel collapsed
Denmark
1994
Great Belt
Korsor during
construction
Not
available
Tunnel boring
machine
Not
Explosion at TBM due
to leaking hydraulic oil available
1 TBM
Severe damage
to tunnel lining
France
2004
Dullin
Chambery
1,500m
Coach
Engine
compartment
1 hour
1 coach
Not available
France
2003
Cret dEau
4,000m
Train
Sleeper carriage
Not
available
1 train
Not available
France
2003
Mornay
2,600m
Train
Passenger
carriage
5 hours
1 train
multiple
cars
Not available
France
2002
A86 Versailles
Under
construction
Not
available
Cargo train
Engine exploded
6 hours
1 cargo
train
Not available
France
2000
Toulon
1,850m
Construction vehicle
Collision of two
construction vehicles
17
4 hours construction
Not available
vehicles
France
1994
Castellar
570m
HGV carrying
waste paper
Not
available
1 HGV
Not available
France
1986
LArme
Nice
1,105m
Braking after
high speed
Not
available
1 lorry,
4 cars
Equipment
destroyed
France
1985
Paris Metro
Not
available
Station fire
Rubbish fire
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
France
1983
Frejus
12,900m
Gearbox fire
2 hours
1 HGV
Severe damage
to tunnel lining
over 200m
France
1979
Paris Metro
Not
available
Train fire
Short circuit
Not
available
1 train
Heavy smoke
France
1977
Paris Metro
Not
available
Station fire
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
France
1976
Crossing
BP-A6 Paris
430m
High Speed
4 hours
1 lorry
Serious damage
over 150m
France
1976
Porte
dItalie B6
430m
Engine fire
1 hour
France
1975
Chteau de
Vincennes
Metro
Not
available
Train
Short circuit
under car fire
Not
available
France
1973
Porte dItalie
Metro
430m
Railway carriage
Arson attack
Not
1 carriage
available
Not available
France
1972
Vierzy
Not
available
Passenger train
Tunnel collapse
Not
available
1 train
Not available
France
1971
Crozet
Not
available
Collision and
derailment
Not
available
2 trains
Not available
Not
Tunnel lining
available destroyed over 150m
1 train
Not available
Country
Year
Tunnel
Length
Vehicle where
fire occurred
Most possible
cause of fire
France
1971
Paris Metro
Not
available
Train fire
Arson attack
Not
available
1 train
Not available
France
1921
Batignolles
1,000m
Passenger train
Collision with
stationary train
Not
available
2 trains
Not available
France
1903
Couronnes
Metro Paris
Not
available
Train fire
Electrical fault
Not
available
2 trains
Not available
France
1842
Mendon
Not
available
Train fire
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
France/Italy
2004
Frejus
12,900m
HGV
1 HGV
Not available
France/Italy
1999
Mont Blanc
11,600m
>53
hours
23 lorries, 10
cars, 1 motorcycle etc
Serious damage,
tunnel reopens
France/Italy
1990
Mont Blanc
11,600m
Lorry with
20 tons cotton
Motor
Not
available
1 lorry
Equipment
destroyed
France/Italy
1988
Mont Blanc
11,600m
HGV
Not available
Not
available
1 HGV
Not available
France/Italy
1981
Mont Blanc
11,600m
HGV
Engine fire
Not
available
1 HGV
Not available
France/Italy
1978
Mont Blanc
11,600m
HGV
Not available
Not
available
1 HGV
Dense smoke
France/Italy
1974
Mont Blanc
11,600m
Lorry
Motor
15
minutes
Not
available
Dense smoke
France/UK
1996
Channel
Tunnel
51,000m
HGV carrier
Polystyrene boxes
7 hours
Germany
2001
Dusseldorf
U Bahn
Not
available
Railway/metro train
Train roof
caught fire
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Germany
2001
Not
available
Train
Arc lamp
Not
available
Not
available
Severe smoke
production
Germany
2000
Berlin
U Bahn
Not
available
Train
Not available
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Germany
2000
Saukopf
Weinheim
2,700m
Car
Not available
Not
available
1 car
Not available
Germany
1999
Candid
Munchen
252m
Car
Car engine
Not
available
1 car
Not available
Germany
1999
Leinebush
Gttingen
Not
available
High speed
cargo train
Ball bearings
overheated and
train derailed
>12
hours
1 train
Not available
Germany
1991
Bonn
U Bahn
Not
available
Train
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Germany
1984
Landungsbruken U Bahn
Not
available
Station fire
Arson attack
Not
available
Not
available
Severe damage
$3 million
Germany
1983
Hauptbahnhof
U Bahn Munich
Not
available
Train
Electrical fire
Not
available
Not
available
Damage
>$2 million
Germany
1981
Ramersdorf
U Bahn Bonn
Not
available
Station fire
Technical fault
Not
available
Not
available
Damage
$0.5 million
18
Consequences
Duration
of fire Damaged Structures and
vehicles
installations
Country
Year
Tunnel
Length
Vehicle where
fire occurred
Most possible
cause of fire
Germany
1980
Altora U Bahn
Hamburg
Not
available
Train
Arson attack
Not
available
Not
available
Damage
$5 million
Germany
1978
Hansaring
U Bahn
Cologne
Not
available
Train fire
Not available
Not
available
1 train
Damage
$1.2 million
Germany
1977
Berlin
U Bahn
Not
available
Station fire
Fire during
construction
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Germany
1972
Alexanderplatz
U Bahn
East Berlin
Not
available
Train fire
Derailment
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Germany
1968
Moorfleet
Hamburg
243m
Overheated
brakes
1 hour
30 min
Not
available
Severe concrete
spalling over 34m
Hong Kong
2000
Cross
Harbour
1,800m
Car
Not available
hour
1 car
Not available
Italy
2001
Prapontin
A32 TorinoBardonecchia
4,409m
Romanian truck,
loaded with beets
Mechanical
problem
Not
available
Not
available
Italy
1999
Salerno
Railway
9,000m
Passenger train
1 train
Not available
Italy
1997
Exilles rail
Susa
2,100m
Train transporting
cars
5 hours
13 freight
wagons,
156 cars
Concrete spalling
Italy
1997
Prapontin
A32 TorinoBardonecchia
4,409m
HGV
Overheated
brakes
4 hours
1 HGV
Explosive spalling
of concrete lining
Italy
1996
Isola Delle
Femmine
Palermo
148m
1 tanker,
1 bus,
18 cars
Serious damage,
tunnel closed for
2 days
Italy
1993
Serra Ripoli
BologneFlorence
442m
Collision
2 hours
30 min
5 lorries,
11 cars
Little damage
Italy
1984
San
Benedetto
18,500m
Cars
Bomb attack
>2 hours
Cars
Severe damage
to structure
Italy
1983
Pecorile Galleria
Gnes Savone
662m
Front-rear collision
Not
available
10 cars
Little damage
Japan
1980
Kajiwara
740m
1 hour
30 min
One 4 ton
truck, one
10 ton truck
Serious damage
over 280m
Japan
1980
Sakai
459m
Truck
Collision
Japan
1979
Shitzuoka
Nihonzaka
2,045m
4 lorries, 2 cars
Front-rear collision
Japan
1972
Hokoriku
Fukui
Not
available
Passenger train
Japan
1967
Suzaka
244m
Engine fire
>11
hours
13 trucks
Not available
Mexico
1985
Mexico City
Underground
Not
available
Metro car
Not available
Not
available
1 metro
car
Not available
Mexico
1975
Mexico City
Underground
Not
available
Train
Train collision
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Netherlands
2001
Schiphol
Airport
Not
available
Not available
Electrical
connection box
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
19
1 truck,
3 hours 10 vehicles
168
hours
127 lorries,
46 cars
Not
2
available carriages
Not available
Serious damage
over 1100m
Not available
Country
Year
Tunnel
Length
Vehicle where
fire occurred
Most possible
cause of fire
Netherlands
1999
Amsterdam
Underground
Not
available
Railway/metro train
Train section
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Netherlands
1978
Velsen
770m
Front-rear collision
1 hour
30 min
4 lorries,
2 cars
Serious damage
over 30m
New
Zealand
2002
Homer
Milford
1,200m
Coach
Engine
compartment
Not
available
1 coach
Not available
Norway
2003
Floyfjell
Bergen
3,100m
Car
Not
available
1 car
Tunnel lining
ignited
Norway
2000
Laerdal
24,500m
Coach
Not available
Not
available
1 coach
Not available
Norway
2000
Oslofjord
Not
available
Truck
Not available
Not
available
1 truck
Not available
Norway
2000
Rotsethhorn
1,200m
Car
Collision
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Norway
2000
Seljestad E134
DrammenHaugesund
1,272m
Front-rear collision
Norway
1999
Oslofjord
Not
available
Not available
Explosion during
construction
started fire
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Norway
1996
Ekeberg
1,500m
Bus
Engine fire
2 hours
1 bus
Not available
Norway
1995
Hitra
5,600m
Mobile crane
Overheated
engine
2 hours
1 crane
Not available
Norway
1993
Hovden
Hyanger
1,290m
Motorcycle, 2 cars
Front-rear collision
hour
1 motorcycle,
2 cars
111m insulation
material destroyed
Norway
1993
Vardo
Not
available
Car
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Norway
1990
Rldal
4,656m
V W transporter
with trailer
Engine fire
50
minutes
Not
available
Little damage
Portugal
1976
Lisbon
Underground
Not
available
Train
Electrical fire
Not
available
1 train
Damage over
$1.8 million
Russia
1991
Moscow
Underground
Not
available
Train
Electrical fire
under train
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Russia
1987
Moscow
Underground
Not
available
Train
Train
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Russia
1981
Okyabrskaya
Underground
Moscow
Not
available
Station fire
Short circuit
Not
available
Not
available
Damage
$250,000
Russia
1974
Moscow
Underground
Not
available
Station fire
Electrical fault
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Slovenia
2004
Trojane
2,900m
Not available
Diesel powered
air compressor
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Slovenia
2003
Golovec
Ljubljana
700m
Coach
Not available
Not
available
1 coach
Not available
Slovenia
2003
Locica
800m
HGV
Not available
Not
available
1 HGV
Not available
1 lorry,
Serious damage
45
6 cars, 1
over 1600m, tunnel
minutes motorcycle closed for day
20
Country
Year
Tunnel
Length
Vehicle where
fire occurred
Most possible
cause of fire
South Africa
1994
Huguenot
3,914m
Bus with
45 passengers
Electrical fault
in gearbox
South Korea
2003
Daegu Jungangno
Underground
Station
400m
Train
Spain
2003
Guadarrama
Rail
30,000m
Train
Train accident
Spain
1975
Guadarrama
3,300m
Spain
1944
Torre
Not
available
Sweden
1960
Stockholm
Underground
Sweden
1955
Switzerland
Switzerland
Consequences
Duration
of fire Damaged Structures and
vehicles
installations
1 coach
Serious damage
closed for 4 days
6 carriage
trains
Severe damage
to concrete
5 hours
1 train
Not available
2 hours
45 min
1 tanker
Severe damage to
tunnel structure and
toxic smoke
Train fire
>24
hours
Multiple
trains
Not available
Not
available
Train fire
Short circuit
Not
available
1 train
carriage
Not available
Not available
Not
available
Train fire
Overheating
Not
available
1 train
carriage
Not available
2001
St. Gotthard
A2
16,918m
Lorry
Front collision of
2 lorries
>48
hours
1997
St. Gotthard
A2
16,918m
Car transporter
Overheated
engine
3 hours transporter,
1 hour
13 lorries,
Collapse of over
4 vans, 250m of tunnel lining,
6 cars
closed for 2 months
1 car
Slight damage
8 cars
Switzerland
1997
St. Gotthard
A2
16,918m
Bus
Overheated
engine
20
minutes
1 bus
Not available
Switzerland
1994
St. Gotthard
A2
16,918m
HGV
2 hours
1 HGV carrying
750 bicycles in
carton boxes
Switzerland
1991
Hirschengraben
Zurich
1,300m
Train
Train car
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Switzerland
1987
Gumefens
Berne
343m
1 lorry
Front-rear collision
2 hours
2 lorries,
1 van
Slight damage
Switzerland
1984
St. Gotthard
A2
16,900m
HGV
Rolls of plastic
hour
1 HGV
Damage to
tunnel facilities
Switzerland
1976
San
Bernardino
6,600m
Bus
Not
available
1 bus
Not available
Switzerland
1972
Ltschberg
Not
available
Fire during
construction work
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Switzerland
1941
St. Gotthard
Giorinco
Not
available
Train fire
Derailment
Not
available
1 train
Not available
Switzerland
1932
Gtschtunnel
Not
available
Train fire
Train collision
Not
available
2 trains
Not available
Switzerland
1926
Riekentunnel
Not
available
Goods train
Not
available
1 goods
train
Dense smoke
Switzerland
1969
Simplon
19,800m
Passenger train
Rear carriage
caught fire
Not
available
1 train
Not available
UK
1994
Kingsway
Liverpool
2,000m
Bus
1 hour
1 bus
Minor damage
to tunnel
UK
1987
Kings Cross
Underground
Station
Not
available
Wooden escalator
6 hours
Not
available
Train station
21
Country
Year
Tunnel
Length
Vehicle where
fire occurred
Most possible
cause of fire
UK
1984
Oxford Circus
Underground
Not
available
Equipment
Equipment in
maintenance tunnel
UK
1984
Summit
2,600m
Derailment
Consequences
Duration
of fire Damaged Structures and
vehicles
installations
Not
available
Not
available
Equipment
destroyed
1 diesel
Severe damage
to structure
72 hours locomotive,
13 tankers
UK
1982
Picadilly Line
London
Underground
Not
available
Cable fire
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
UK
1981
London
Underground
Not
available
Station fire
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Severe damage
UK
1976
Finsbury Park
Underground
Not
available
Train
Cable fire
Not
available
1 train
Not available
UK
1975
Goodge Street
London
Underground
Not
available
Cross passage
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
UK
1975
Moorgate
London
Underground
Not
available
Train
Derailment, train
hitting wall
Not
available
1 train
Not available
UK
1960
Redbridge
London
Underground
Not
available
Train fire
Arcing in
receptacle box
Not
available
1 train
Dense smoke
UK
1958
Holland Park
London
Underground
Not
available
Train fire
Arcing in
receptacle box
Not
available
1 train
Dense smoke
UK
1949
Penmanshiel
Not
available
Train fire
Not available
Not
available
1 train
Not available
UK
1945
London
Underground
Not
available
Train fire
Collision
Not
available
2 trains
Not available
UK
1905
London
Underground
Not
available
Train fire
Not available
Not
available
1 train
Not available
UK
1866
Welwyn
North
Not
available
Goods train
Collision
Not
available
3 trains
Not available
USA
2007
San Francisco
McArthur
bridge
Not
available
Petrol tanker
Caught fire
Not
available
1 tanker
Bridge deck
collapsed
USA
2002
Ted Williams
2,600m
Coach
Electrical
compartment
Not
available
1 coach
Severe smoke
production
USA
2001
Howard street
Baltimore
2,253m
Cargo train
Emergency
brakes
12 hours
60 train cars, 8
carrying hydrochloric acid
Not available
USA
2000
Not
available
Train
Electrical supply
>2 hours
1 train
Not available
USA
1999
Not
available
Rubbish fire
Electrical cabling
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
USA
1996
Washington
DC Subway
Not
available
Railway/metro train
Short circuit on a
carriage led to
explosion and fire
Not
available
1 train
Not available
USA
1992
Not
available
Not available
Electrical fire
on the track
Not
available
Not
available
Dense smoke
USA
1992
Not
available
Metro car
Not
available
1 metro
car
Not available
USA
1990
Los Angeles
Subway
Not
available
Timber supports
during construction
Timber supports
Not
available
Not
available
45m of tunnel
collapsed
22
Consequences
Duration
of fire Damaged Structures and
vehicles
installations
Country
Year
Tunnel
Length
Vehicle where
fire occurred
Most possible
cause of fire
USA
1990
Not
available
Cable fire
Cable
Not
available
USA
1985
Grand Central
Station
New York
Not
available
Station fire
Arson attack
Not
available
Not
Severe damage to
available station, $3 million
USA
1984
Not
available
Subway car
Not
available
1 metro
car
Not available
USA
1984
Not
available
Subway car
Cable fire
Not
available
2 trains
Dense smoke
USA
1982
Caldecott
1,028m
2h
40min
3 lorries,
1 coach,
4 cars
Serious damage
over 580m
USA
1982
Not
available
Train
Not available
6 hours
4
carriages
Not available
USA
1982
Washington
DC Subway
Not
available
Train
Derailment
Not
available
1 train
Not available
USA
1981
Not
available
Train
Fault in current
collectors led to
explosion
hour
1 train
Not available
USA
1979
Eric Street
Subway
Philadelphia
Not
available
Train fire
Transformer fire
Not
available
1 train
Not available
USA
1979
Not
available
Station fire
Discarded cigarette
ignited oil spillage
on the track
Not
available
Not
available
Dense smoke
USA
1979
San Francisco
Subway
Not
available
Train fire
Short circuit
Not
available
1 train
Severe smoke
production
USA
1978
Baltimore
Harbour
Freeway
Not
available
Collision
USA
1975
Blue
Mountain
1,300m
USA
1975
Boston
Subway
Not
available
USA
1975
USA
1974
USA
1 train
Dense smoke
1 truck, 1
Not
fuel tanker,
available
1 HGV
Not available
Engine fire
Not
available
1 truck
Not available
Subway car
Broken catenary
led to a fire
Not
available
1 metro
car
Not available
Not
available
Technical fault
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
Chesapeake
Bay
Not
available
HGV carrying
190 litre fuel tank
Exploding tyre
4 hours
1 HGV
Not available
1974
Congress
New York
Not
available
Goods train
Derailment
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
USA
1971
Sylmar
8,000m
Not available
Not
available
Not
available
Not available
USA
1970
Not
available
Train fire
Not available
Not
available
1 train
Not available
USA
1970
Wallace
1,000m
Truck fire
USA
1949
Holland tunnel
New York
2,550m
4 hours
Yugoslavia
1971
Wranduk
Zenica
1,500m
Train fire
Engine fire
Not
available
23
Not
1 camper
available
truck
Not available
Not available
30 min
60 min
90 min
120 min
150 min
180 min
24
Time
(minutes)
Furnace
temperature (C)
Time
(minutes)
Furnace
temperature (C)
20
90
1006
576
120
1049
10
678
150
1082
15
738
180
1110
20
781
210
1133
30
842
240
1153
45
902
300
1186
60
945
360
1214
Although the Cellulosic curve has been in use for many years, it soon became apparent that the burning
rates for certain materials, e.g. petrol gas, chemicals etc, were well in excess of the rate at which for
instance, timber would burn. As such there was a need for an alternative exposure for the purpose of
carrying out tests on structures and materials used within the petrochemical industry. Thus the
hydrocarbon curve was developed. Initially, this time/temperature curve was developed separately by
various gas and oil companies. All had slight differences.However, today, the curve as detailed in FIGURE
5 reflects the relationship between time and temperature generally used in contemporary testing.
The hydrocarbon curve is applicable where small petroleum type fires might occur, e.g. car fuel tanks,
petrol or oil tankers, certain chemical tankers. In fact, although the hydrocarbon curve is based on a
standardised type fire, there are numerous types of fire associated with petrochemical fuels, some of
which are detailed below:
CLOUD FIRE A transient fire resulting form the ignition of a cloud of gas or vapour and not subject to
significant flame acceleration via the effects of confinement or turbulence. It can therefore only
occur after a relatively slow release of hydrocarbon and in an open, free space.
FIREBALL The rapid turbulent combustion of fuel as an expanding, usually rising ball of flame. It is
more intense than a cloud fire and can be close to an explosion.
BLEVE A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion which results from the sudden failure of a vessel
containing a pressurised liquid at a temperature well above its normal (atmospheric ) boiling point,
e.g. a LPG tanker.
POOL FIRE A turbulent diffusion fire burning above a horizontal pool of vapourising fuel under conditions
where the fuel vapour of gas has zero or little initial momentum. A burning pool fire is extremely difficult
to control. It may accompany a jet fire where burning liquid is spilling from the jet stream.
RUNNING FIRE A fire from a burning liquid which flows by gravity over surfaces, such as following the
slope or camber of a road tunnel.
JET/SPRAY FIRE A turbulent diffusion flame resulting from the combustion of a fuel continuously
released with some significant momentum in a particular direction.
TABLE 4: POTENTIAL FIRE DURATION
Fire types
Potential duration
Cellulosic fire
Hours
Cloud fire
Seconds
Fireball/BLEVE
Seconds
Pool fire
Hours
Running fire
Hours
Spray fire
Hours
Jet fire
Hours
Hydrocarbon fires
Furnace
temperature (C)
Time
(minutes)
Furnace
temperature (C)
887
60
1100
948
90
1100
10
1034
120
1100
30
1098
120+
1100
Furnace
temperature (C)
Time
(minutes)
Furnace
temperature (C)
1047
60
1300
1120
90
1300
10
1222
120
1300
30
1297
1300
Time
(minutes)
Furnace
temperature (C)
15
1200
30
1200
140
15
PROJECT
In total, four tests were performed on a fire in a semi-trailer set-up. In three tests mixtures of different
cellulose and plastic materials were used to simulate the fire load, and in one test a real commodity
consisting of furniture and fixtures was used. In all tests the mass ratio was approximately 80% cellulose to
20% plastic. A polyester tarpaulin covered the cargo. The commodities are described in more detail below.
TABLE 9: COMMODITIES
USED AS FUEL IN
THE FOUR TESTS
The reason for using
furniture is that in the
past a test was carried
out (e.g. EUREKA 499
project)
with
similar
materials and a very high
ventilation rate of 6m/s at
the start of the test. This
particular test provides a
good point of comparison
between the data from
the Runehamar tests
and the EUREKA tests.
The commodities were
placed on particle board
in a storage rack system
(see FIGURES 6, 7 and 8
below) to simulate a
semi-trailer measuring
10450mm by 2900mm.
The total height was
4500mm. The height of
the platform from the floor
was 1100mm.
TEST #
Target
Total
weight
Theoretical
calorific
energy
Mass
ratio of
plastic
32 wood
pallets and
6 PE pallets
10,911kg
240GJ
18%
20 wood
pallets and
20 PUR
mattresses
6,853kg
129GJ
18%
Upholstered
sofa and
arm rest
8,500kg
152GJ
18%
(tyres not
included)
4 wood pallets
and 40 cartons
with PS cups
(1,800 cups)
3,120kg
67GJ
19%
27
PROJECT
FIGURE 9: SET-UP FOR TEST #4 (PLASTIC CUPS IN CARDBOARD BOXES ON WOOD PALLETS)
TEST #1
TEST #2
TEST #3
TEST #4
The test fire was located 560m from the west entrance and the wind direction in the tunnel was from east
to west. The cross-section of the tunnel at the site of the test fire is shown in FIGURE 10. Two small ignition
sources, consisting of fibreboard cubes soaked with heptane, were placed within the lowest wood pallets
(adjacent to the flue between the two pallets) on the upstream end of the semi-trailer set-up. The tarpaulin
was lifted away during the ignition process. Directly after ignition the tarpaulin was replaced. At a distance
of 15m from the downstream side of the test site there was a target consisting of one stack of the same
materials combination as used in the
FIGURE 10: CROSS SECTION OF THE TUNNEL AT THE TEST LOCATION
main test. This target was used to
ascertain fire spread due to radiation
and convection.
The materials used in the tests (see
FIGURE 11) were chosen to give
different fire development and
maximum heat release rates. TEST #1
with wood pallets and plastic pallets
had the highest total energy content
and gave the highest maximum heat
release rate (see FIGURE 12A). The large
amount of combustible material
also gave a longer period of elevated
gas temperatures, with the highest
maximum temperature of 1365C.
In FIGURE 12B the gas temperature near the ceiling in
TEST #1 (at 10m from the heat source) is compared to
four different standard fire curves. It can be seen that
the increase in gas temperature in the test with wood
pallets and plastic pallets is very rapid and almost
exactly follows the hydrocarbon-curve for about
three minutes. The temperature then increases even
further and more rapidly than the hydrocarbon curve.
It instead follows the RWS curve, again almost
exactly, apart from the slight time variations and for a
period around 20 minutes after ignition where the
measured temperature is higher than the peak of the
RWS curve which is 1350C.
FIGURE 11 (above):
OVERVIEW OF FIRE
DEVELOPMENT
AFTER FIVE MINUTES
Traffic type
Fire exposure
period
Representative
nominal fire curve
Pedestrian
None
None (negligible)
Bicycle
2 minutes
None (negligible)
Hay wagon
90-120 minutes
Hydrocarbon
Car (5-10MW)
30-60 minutes
Cellulosic/Hydrocarbon
Container/shuttle
Hydrocarbon/RABT
HGV/lorry (200MW)
RWS
120 minutes
RWS and/or
Hydrocarbon
Tanker (300MW)
240 minutes
Bus (50MW)
90-120 minutes
Hydrocarbon
120 minutes
RWS/Hydrocarbon
Train
120 minutes
RWS
240 minutes
Hydrocarbon
29
3.5.3 GRADIENT
A gradient or slope of the tunnel influences the so-called Chimney Effect. If the tunnel has no
gradient the heat and smoke will spread through the tunnel in the same direction as the ventilation
direction. Where a low ventilation speed exists, the heat will build up at the location of the fire,
leading to an increase in temperature.
With a gradient of 5%, for example, the heat and smoke will climb upwards. If the ventilation goes
in the same direction, the heat will be taken from the fire location more rapidly, reducing temperature
development at the fire source.
3.5.4 CROSS SECTIONAL AREA
A fire in a large tunnel will build up less heat as opposed to a fire in a tunnel with a smaller cross
sectional area. In a large tunnel, the volume of air that needs to be heated is greater and also the
surface area of the walls and ceilings is larger, and are therefore able to absorb more heat.
3.5.5 TIME/DURATION OF THE FIRE
Depending on the volume and type of combustible materials involved in the fire, duration will be
influenced, along with the temperature rise in the first minutes of ignition.
The illustrations at left depict the major difference between fires where heat can dissipate, as in
most buildings, and those in tunnels where the heat is trapped and creates a chimney effect.
If all the above parameters are known, a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) calculation can be
made, demonstrating an understanding of temperature development in certain fire scenarios. This can
be combined with a finite element analysis (FEA) in order to ascertain temperatures on elements of
the structure.
However, tunnels are designed to cope with several fire scenarios which makes it unfeasible to derive
a time-temperature curve from each fire scenario.
The above implies that the Heat Release Rate is an important parameter for fire safety design in tunnels,
in fact, amongst other items, ventilation systems are designed using Heat Release Rate data.
For the design of passive fire protection systems such as the protection of the structural lining, however,
the Heat Release Rate data cannot and should not be utilised as the sole determining factor.
Top:
HEAT IN A BUILDING
DISSIPATES
Bottom:
HEAT TRAPPED
IN A TUNNEL CREATES
A CHIMNEY EFFECT
30
Netherlands
USA
RWS
1998-CVBR1161 (rev. 1)
NFPA 502
Road
Fire curve
RWS
Construction
method
Immersed,
cut and
cover (C&C)
Bored or
drilled
Road
RWS
Immersed,
cut and
cover (C&C)
Bored or
drilled
Concrete type
Cast in
place
Prefabricated
Cast in
place
Prefabricated
N0: none
CETU
Road
T interface <380C
T rebar <250C at
25mm concrete cover
No spalling
T interface <380C
T rebar <250C at
25mm concrete cover
No spalling
T interface <380C
Temperature criteria
Any
Any
T rebar <250C
T unexposed face
<60C
RABT
Road
Any
Any
T rebar <300C
ZTV/EBA
Rail
RABT-60/90+110
Any
Any
T rebar <300C
Germany
T1: T rebar average
<200C, max. <250C
T1: T interface average
<330C, max. <380C
Italy
UNI 11076
All
RWS
Any
Any
T interface <350C
Austria
OVBB
Any
RWS, 3 hours
Any
Any
Singapore
LTAS
Road,
KPE Tunnel
RWS
Immersed
Cast in place
L > 1500m;
RABT 120+110
GB 50016
Hazardous
goods
China
GB 50016
Nonhazardous
goods
31
Road,
Palm Jumeirah
Tunnel
T interface <380C
T rebar <250C
RABT: T interface <380C
Any
Any
L 500m;
HC, 2 hours
L > 3000m;
RABT 120+110
Any
Any
RWS
UAE, Dubai
T rebar <250C at
40mm concrete cover
Cast in place
T interface <380C
T rebar <250C
4. SPALLING CONCRETE
Spalling is an umbrella term, covering different damage phenomena that may occur to a concrete
structure during fire. These phenomena are caused by different mechanisms: pore pressure, thermal
gradient, internal thermal micro-cracking, cracking around reinforcement bars and strength loss
due to chemical transitions. In different combinations of these mechanisms, possible spalling
phenomena include violent spalling, progressive gradual spalling, explosive spalling, corner spalling and
post cooling spalling.
Spalling of concrete during fire causes serious damage to concrete structures, with significant economic
costs and risk to human life. New developments in concrete technology such as improved grain size
distribution and the application of extra fine particles have resulted in concrete types with improved
durability, strength and workability. However, these high performance concrete types have been shown
to be more susceptible to spalling during fire than ordinary concrete types. The problem of spalling in
buildings has been known for decades and further highlighted by recent intense tunnel fires in Europe.
As a consequence of severe damage due to spalling and the non-operational time of tunnels after a fire,
the fire resistance of newly developed concrete types has been called into question.
32
Pose pressure
due to
evaporation of
moisture
Violent spalling
Internal cracking
Cracking
due to different due to different
Compression
thermal
due to thermal thermal expansion
of aggregatedeformation of
gradient
cement paste
concrete-steel
Explosive
spalling
Corner spalling
Post-cooling
spalling
33
Sloughing off
Strength loss
due to chemical
transitions
TABLE 12:
IMPORTANT RELATIONS
BETWEEN MECHANISMS AND
SPALLING PHENOMENA
4. SPALLING CONCRETE
Such spalling may impair performance by exposing the reinforcement or tendons to the fire or by
reducing the cross-sectional area of concrete. Concrete types made from limestone aggregates are less
susceptible to spalling than concrete made from aggregates containing a higher proportion of silica, e.g.
flint, quartz and granites, due to their permeability. Concrete made from manufactured lightweight
aggregates suffer a lesser degree of spalling. The use of high strength concrete has been introduced as
it can reduce the necessary thickness required to obtain a certain structural performance. However,
high strength concrete is particularly prone to very severe spalling when exposed to fire. As the
thickness of the concrete has already been reduced due to its higher strength, the effects of spalling
are even more severe than usual.
The latest investigations into alternative methods of protecting concrete against spalling show that the
incorporation of fine denier engineered fibres of polypropylene or steel into concrete will when added
in specific volumes and distributed uniformly reduce the risk of tensile forces causing explosive failure
to the parent concrete when exposed to the most rigorous fire. This is achieved by a series of pressure
relief pores occuring upon exposure to heat can reduce the effects of spalling.
The addition of polypropylene or steel fibres to the concrete require an increased amount of plasticiser,
the addition of air entraining agents in order to stabilise the concrete and retardants to prolong the
concretes opening time during its application. Results from fire research tests showed that for both
macro synthetic and steel fibre reinforced concrete, the addition of polypropylene or steel fibres, with a
recipe adjusted for this addition, spalling caused by fire can be minimised. It was also found that the
addition of polypropylene or steel fibres alone is not enough to minimise spalling as is often presumed.
It should be noted very clearly that the precise concrete recipe and the amount of polypropylene or steel
fibres is of great importance.
Based on the opinions of a number of researchers, the use of polypropylene or steel fibres for any
specific project should be carefully considered, and the specific concrete mix being used in the project
subjected to fire testing to ensure the proposed type, dimension and quantity of fibres will provide the
requisite fire performance.
It should also be noted that the majority of testing up to the present time on the performance of
concrete with the addition of polypropylene fibres has been to the standard ISO cellulosic curve, with a
small number of tests performed to the standard Hydrocarbon curve (1100C) and the RWS curve
(1350C). In addition consideration must be given to the fact that not all polypropylene or steel fibres
can be considered equal. The best fibres are those manufactured to a dimension and tolerance and
from new materials specifically for the task at hand. Testing has shown that the use of recycled plastic
as polypropylene fibres has less effect than purpose-made materials. Care should therefore be taken to
ensure claims for the performance of any particular polypropylene or steel fibres are substantiated by
adequate evidence of their performance under rapid growth, high temperature fire.
TABLE 13: FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN COMPARING PROMATECT-H OR PROMATECT-T BOARDS
TO POLYPROPYLENE FIBRES (PPF) FOR FIRE PROTECTION OF CONCRETE STRUCTURES
Item
No insulation at all.
At 300C the bond between rebars and concrete will be significantly reduced.
Avoid spalling
Until now all tests with PP fibres have shown spalling of the concrete
specimen. PPF do not stop structural damage occurring due to high
temperatures (micro cracks can occur at 150C).
PPF reduces compressive strength leading to brittle failure. PPF will also cause
reduced pull out strength of anchors under fire conditions due to melted fibres.
PPF tunnels require larger cross sections, bigger TBMs, more tubing
segments, bigger volumes of excavated soil etc. Sacrificial linings, containing
PPF can be over 250mm thick.
Quality control of
the fire protective system
35
PP fibres
4. SPALLING CONCRETE
4.5 CRITERIA FOR THE FIRE RESISTANCE OF CONCRETE
Unprotected concrete with a moisture content of over 3% of the mass will suffer surface spalling in a
fire, probably after 5-30 minutes. It is also possible for aggregates in the concrete (e.g. quartz) to have
undesirable effects on its behaviour in a fire.
VALUE
The criteria for fire resistance has been drawn up by a number of official bodies. The Dutch RWS
standard suggests that, as a rule of thumb in the case of loadbearing members, account should be
taken only of cores whose temperature is less than 500C. At the tensions at which reinforcing steel is
commonly used today, steel starts to flow at 500C. In statistically determinate structures this leads to
failure. In statistically indeterminate
structures re-distribution of the
FIGURE 14: INFLUENCE OF TEMPERATURE ON CONCRETE
moments is often possible, so that
a higher temperature of the reInfluence of elevated temperatures on concrete and steel
inforcing steel need not necessarily
lead to failure.
1.2
1.0
New steel
Compressive stress concrete
0.8
Fresh concrete
0.6
0.4
0.2
0C
30C
55C
200C
300C
400C
500C
600C
700C
800C
TEMPERATURE
There is a high risk of failure due to the temperature of the steel in the concrete in columns with a high
reinforcement level under high loads. For this reason, the (non-normative) tables give a critical steel
temperature of 500C for ordinary concrete and steel and 400C for tension steel. In the Netherlands,
Rijkswaterstaat specifies for tunnels a maximum permissible concrete surface temperature of 380C.
This maximum was set not because of any perception that concrete fails at that temperature but
because it is assumed that in practice this is a temperature at which there is only a very small probability
of damage to concrete. This requirement also implies that the temperature of the underlying
reinforcement remains low, so that its strength is unimpaired.
The design of the tunnel section has an effect on fire induced collapse.
Rectangular tunnels were typically constructed using a grade C30/35 concrete. Nowadays
C40/45 is commonly used.
Failure of rectangular structures is usually due to the premature development of sagging plastic
moment caused by elevated temperatures of the concrete and the reinforcement.
FIGURE 15:
SPALLING OF CONCRETE
AFTER ACTUAL FIRE
Rectangular structures suffer from less spalling than circular tunnels and have limited
compression loads.
Circular tunnels were constructed from segmented reinforced concrete sections typically use a
C50 grade concrete or higher.
After completion, reinforcement in circular tunnels is more or less obsolete, only required to assist
handling during installation.
The reinforcement in circular tunnels is not required to take tension forces in sagging moment
because the concrete is typically in compression.
The higher strength concrete (C50) suffers a higher percentage and depth of spalling due to fine
fillers such as lime stone and fly ash, the reinforcement will however help retard the effect of
explosive spalling.
The depth of spalling under fire conditions is an average 100% deeper on these types of
circular tunnels.
FIGURE 16:
REINFORCEMENT
TEMPERATURES
36
37
6. TYPES OF TUNNEL
6.1 BORED TUNNELS USING CONCRETE SEGMENTS
A bored tunnel refers to a construction method for tunnels which involves digging a tube-like passage
through the earth. It usually refers to tunnelling through rock, as blast tunnelling is not widely used these
days. Bored tunnels are created using a full face boring machine which has cutting teeth at its front. It
creates the tunnel opening while passing waste material through to the rear. Many types of tunnel boring
cut small sections which are progressively enlarged. A full face tunnel boring machine (TBM) cuts the
complete cross section of the tunnel in one pass.
The TBM consists of a long machine with a circular cutting head that rotates against the face of the
tunnel. Attached to the cutting head is a series of steel alloy disk cutters that gouge out the rock on the
face as the machine rotates. The cutting head is pushed forward by hydraulic power. TBMs provide
several advantages over drilling and blasting. The tunnel can be bored to the exact size desired, with
smooth walls, thus eliminating the condition called overbreak, which results when explosives tear away
too much rock.
The use of TBMs also eliminates blasting accidents, noise, and earth shocks. Workers need not be
concerned with fumes or noxious gases and can clear away broken rock without stopping for blasting
intervals. A TBM can advance about 76 metres (about 250 feet) a day, depending on the diameter of
the tunnel and the type of rock being bored. Despite these advantages, TBMs have some drawbacks.
They are very costly and the cutting head must be the same diameter as that required for the tunnel.
Often the TBM is part of a long train of machines. At the rear are stored circular concrete sections,
which are installed as the TBM moves along the route, thus the tunnel is simultaneously lined as it
is drilled.
38
7. FIXINGS
Where daily use of a road or rail tunnel involves high traffic loads, the demands placed on means of
attachment will be more onerous. Traffic passing through a tunnel causes high suction loads on ceilings
due to the displacement of air by vehicles. This suction load depends on the type of vehicle (e.g. car,
train or tram) and the headroom. The value often taken is 100kg/m2. The weight of the cladding and the
number of attachment points can be determined by means of a load simulation for traffic passing
through a tunnel. The manufacturer of the pertinent cladding material should provide reports which
show the exact types of fixing methods employed, and the loads from suction etc. that the systems are
designed and tested to take. Attention needs also be paid to the material from which the fixings are
manufactured (zinc galvanised steel, stainless steel) and the condition of the concrete itself.
REFERENCES:
Therefore, before any choice of fixing can be made, consideration has to be given to three important
elements. The likely corrosion to which the anchors may be subject, the crack width if any, and the
compressive strength of the concrete.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Pure austenite
+ Mn + N - Mo - Ni
1.4529
Pure austenite
+ Mo + N
1.4539
+ Cr + Ni - N
- Ni - Mo
1.4439
Pure austenite
1.4462
+ Mo + N
1.4571
+ Ti
1.4401
1.4571
+ Ti
1.4301
0
200
300
500
STRENGTH
Using a specific application and the results of long term exposure test and laboratory trials, this
section attempts to show how safe and sustained material concepts can be used for fixing
engineering in tunnel construction.
39
(8)-(12)
1.4565
CLASS
When exposed to extreme ambient conditions,however, it has been seen that even stainless or
non rusting steel grades can rust or corrode, with a relatively minor tension existing, for instance,
as intrinsic tension in the actual material, normally sufficient to trigger tension crack corrosion.
Ambient atmospheres with corrosion-inducing pollutant are often seen in industrial surroundings, in
the chemical industry, in multi-storey car parks, indoor swimming pools, in chimneys and in tunnels.
In indoor swimming pools, it is mainly the high chloride concentration,(10) and (11) while other specialised
applications are also exposed to high pollutant concentrations which constitute a substantial
corrosion hazard by forming some highly aggressive condensate.(12) Selecting the right kind of
material is often difficult for aggressive atmospheres such as these, with planners having to rely on
field tests and/or on adapted special tests to determine the expected corrosion behaviour of the
various materials in these applications.
FIGURE 17:
ALLOY STRUCTURE AND STRENGTH
PROPERTIES OF STAINLESS STEELS
7. FIXINGS
TABLE 14: EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BUILDING SUPERVISION APPROVAL DIBT Z-30.3-6
NOTES:
Under DIN EN 10088-1 or
SEW 400.
(2)
A = Austenite;
F = Ferrite;
FA = Ferrite-austenite.
(3)
Only for blank metallic surfaces. In the event of potential contact corrosion, the
less noble metal is at risk.
(4)
(5)
REFERENCES:
Continued from page 39
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Corrosion
Steel grade(1)
W-No.
Microstructure(2)
X2CrNi12
1.4003
X6Cr17
1.4016
X5CrNi18-10
1.4301
X2CrNi18-9
1.4307
X3CrNiCu18-9-4
1.4567
X6CrNiTi18-10
1.4541
Brief designation
X2CrNiN18-7
1.4318
X5CrNiMo17-12-2
1.4401
X2CrNiMo17-12-2
1.4404
X3CrNiCuMo17-11-3-2
1.4578
X6CrNiMoTi17-12-2
1.4571
X2CrNiMoN17-13-5
1.4439
X2CrNiMoN22-5-3
1.4462
FA
X1NiCrMoCu25-20-5
1.4539
X2CrNiMnMoNbN25-18-5-4
1.4565
X1NiCrMoCuN25-20-7
1.4529
X1CrNiMoCuN20-18-7
1.4547
Resistance
class(3)
I/low
II/moderate
Accessible constructions,
with negligible chloride and
sulphur dioxide content, no
industrial atmosphere.
III/medium
IV/strong
TYPE OF CORROSION
(1)
Tension crack
corrosion
Localised
corrosion
(pitting)
Area
corrosion
1.4401
1.4462
1.4539
1.4529
1.4565
MATERIAL NO.
FIGURE 18 at left
shows clearly that the
resistance of the
materials rises in line
with the corrosion class
(FIGURE 17 on page 39).
These tests also
showed a good
correlation between the
corrosion behaviour
and the so-called
effective sum which
can be calculated from
the composition of
the alloy using the
following equatio:
W = %Cr + 3.3
%Mo + 30 %N
40
A purely qualitative classification of the corrosive intensity judged by the appearance of the
specimen after long-term exposure clearly shows the correlation between the effective sum of the
steel and its corrosion resistance (FIGURE 19, below right). The relative classification between no
corrosion attack (stage 0 in FIGURE 19) and a very strong corrosion attack (stage 12 in FIGURE 19)
demonstrates that the attack with higher effective sum is a great deal lower.
FIGURE 19:
RELATIVE CLASSIFICATION OF THE CORROSION
AFTER LONG-TERM EXPOSURE AS FACTOR OF
THE EFFECTIVE SUM OF THE STEEL GRADES
CORROSION CLASS
(relative unit)
14
50%
45%
12
40%
10
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
1.4401
1.4462
1.4539
1.4529
1.4565
MATERIAL NO.
2nd test series (70% relative humidity)
4th test series (35% relative humidity)
Effective sum of the steel composition
FIGURE 20:
TENSION CRACK
CORROSION IN 1.4401
TEMPERATURE
Relative humidity
100%
40C
80%
30C
60%
20C
40%
10C
0C
0 hour
TIME
1 hour
2 hours
3 hours
4 hours
5 hours
Relative humidity
Temperature
20%
6 hours
To quantify the corrosion, the round material specimens were cleaned in a light pickling solution
which removed the loose, porous and flaky corrosion layers, such that only the attack of the
localised corrosion (pitting) remained. The depth of corrosion was then measured using a
measuring microscope, with the median value of 5 different pitting points (if available) in the round
specimens determined. The results of these measurements are shown in FIGURE 27 for all materials
tested.
The high-alloy materials 1.4529 and 1.4565 also remain corrosion-immune in this test and therefore
showed the highest resistance under exposure to pollutant gases in road tunnels. All of the results
correlate well in total with the results of the exposure tests in road tunnels and with empirical data.
Among the alpine tunnels, the strongest corrosive effects were found in the Mont Blanc and the
Gotthard tunnel where the resistance of the materials 1.4529 and 1.4565 was also demonstrated,
whereas the other high-alloy steels such as duplex 1.4462 showed localised corrosion.
FIGURE 21:
SELECTIVE CORROSION
IN 1.4462
FIGURE 22:
TENSION CRACK
CORROSION IN 1.4439
FIGURE 23:
LOCALISED PITTING
CORROSION IN 1.4539
FIGURE 24:
BEGINNING TENSION CRACK
CORROSION IN 1.4539
FIGURE 25:
MODERATE TOUGH
CORROSION IN 1.4529
41
EFFECTIVE SUM
7. FIXINGS
S2
(ppm) max.
NO
(ppm) max.
NO
(ppm) max.
>20
14
45
30
45
22
43
FIGURE 27 A
7
FIGURE 27:
BEHAVIOUR
OF STAINLESS 6
STEELS IN THE
POLLUTANT
5
GAS TEST
H2S
(ppm) max.
Chloride
content
2.0
Max. 2.5%
13
5%
30
13
5%
14
2.3
2.5%
30
11
Inside
Outside
B
3
1
1.4003
FIGURE 27 B
1.4301
1.4301
1.4571
1.4439
1.4565
1.4529
SUMMARY
In principle, stainless steel should be used for fixing elements only if it has the appropriate corrosion
resistance. The long service life of such stainless steel grades can help prevent major financial
losses caused by corrosion. The corrosion resistance of stainless steels is a typical and systeminherent property and depends to a large extent on the various system parameters. The system
parameters coming to bear in the corrosive effects acting in road tunnels (FIGURE 28 below) are
subject to wide-ranging scatter, which is certainly one reason why the empirical values of the
various tunnels differ so widely. Consequently, the views regarding the use of material grades and
qualities in road tunnels differ equally widely. Unlike in structural steel, the process of corrosion in
stainless steel does not show as rusting off with the resulting reduction in the cross section, but
by way of a selective corrosion occurring after a short period of time. Stainless steel for fixing
elements in road tunnels should therefore always be selected in compliance with the regulations in
the German General Building Supervision Approval Z-30.3-6 which will ensure that the
requirements involving the use of these high grade materials are met.
DEPTH OF CORROSION
FIGURE 28: MAXIMUM DEPTH OF PITTING CORROSION IN m OF THE ROUND MATERIAL SPECIMENS
IN THE LABORATORY POLLUTANT GAS TEST
70
FIGURE 27 C
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
MATERIAL NO.
1.4003
1.4104
1.4305
1.4541
1.4301
1.4571
1.4404
1.4404
1.4435
1.4462
1.4462
1.4565
1.4529
42
FIGURE 27 D
43
FIGURE 30:
FIXED STRIP OF PLYWOOD SERVES AS A
DATUM FOR THE FIRST ROW OF BOARDS
FIGURE 32:
BOARDS CUT TO AN ANGLE AT THE HAUNCHES
FIGURE 31:
BOARD JOINTS ARE SIMPLY ABUTTED,
NO SPECIAL TREATMENT REQUIRED
44
The locations of the screws are marked on the boards, using a template and a spray can of
paint (FIGURE 33).
FIGURE 33:
PRE-MARKED SCREW
LOCATIONS ON THE BOARDS
FIGURE 34:
FIRST LAYER ON
REINFORCEMENT INSTALLED,
PRIOR TO SCREW INSERTION
1250mm
50mm 288mm
287mm
287mm
288mm 50mm
FIGURE 37:
SCREW INSTALLED AND PROTECTED
BY REINFORCEMENT
343mm 50mm
343mm
The number of screws should be in the region of 12 screws per m2. In order to ensure the same fire
performance in practice, the exact same set-up as during the fire test should always be followed,
including fixing materials.
343mm
The screw pattern of a full size board of 2500mm x 1250mm, as detailed in FIGURE 38 for example,
has an average of 12.8 screws per m2.
342mm
The majority of the boards are laid on the formwork in their standard full size dimension. Some
panels will have to be cut to size in order to cover the whole surface of the formwork and to connect
to the walls and construction joints. Where cut to size panels are used, the following criteria should
be followed:
The minimum quantity of screws should be 12 screws per m2.
343mm
The distance from the edge of the boards should be a minimum of 50mm.
343mm
The screws for cut pieces should be evenly distributed over the surface of the panel. In other
words, the spacing distances in X and Y direction should be optimised and be as close
as possible.
50mm 343mm
For example, a screw pattern on a cut to size panel of 1675mm x 1090mm in which all criteria are
followed, the surface area of the panel is 1.83m2 which means that the minimum member of screws
should be 22.
45
2500mm
FIGURE 35:
PRINCIPLES OF
SCREW INSERTION
FIGURE 40:
EXTRACTED FORMWORK
The PROMATECT-H boards can span the 90mm distance, depending on the expected load.
At this location, care should be taken with the vibrating action during pouring of the concrete.
Extraction of the formwork is much easier as it will not get jammed between the walls.
As the PROMATECT forms a barrier, there is no adhesion between the concrete and the
formwork, it is easy to extract the formwork and it remains clean (FIGURE 40 at left).
EASE OF INSTALLATION
Joints between boards only have to be butt jointed. No special treatment (e.g. fillers or
mastic) is necessary from a fire performance point of view. The cement water will not run
through the joints. Where gaps of more than 1mm occur, mastic can be used to seal the gap
in order to prevent water from the cement leaking through the gap, causing unsightly stains.
Vertical wall panels can also be installed using the lost formwork system.
Curves in the tunnel can easily be dealt with by cutting the boards on the formwork at an
angle to accommodate the curve.
FIGURE 41:
OPENING OF MANHOLES
Openings in the PROMATECT lining for manholes (FIGURE 41 at left) and end-walls can easily
be made by installing phenol coated formwork instead. After striking the formwork, standard
size PROMATECT boards will close the opening by post fixing the board into the opening.
See SECTION 8.2 on pages 47 to 53.
PROMATECT-H boards provide a heavy duty floor surface. The abrasion resistance is such
that the surface can withstand the exposure to people walking and working on top of it, even
in wet conditions. Also, the weight of bundles of reinforcement steel and pallets of materials
will not cause any damage to the boards. This assumes the PROMATECT boards are
adequately supported by the formwork.
Rapid installation method. Installation rates for the PROMATECT boards of 150m2 per man
per day have been reported on European tunnel projects.
The installation of the system does not interfere with other construction activities.
Extensive Promat expertise is available with this system in immersed and cut and cover tunnels.
FIGURE 42:
ANCHOR SYSTEM
FOR JET-FANS
46
The system and the installation method are similar to the PROMATECT-H system as described in
SECTION 8.1.1, with the following additional advantages:
The very high thermal performance of PROMATECT-T boards is unmatched. Therefore the
thickness of the fire protective layer can be reduced and the interface temperature on the
concrete surface will be even lower, thus providing a higher level of structural safety.
The PROMATECT-T boards can be supplied with red coloured X-marks at the location of
the insertion of the screws, on the reverse side of the board. For standard board dimensions
of 2500mm x 1200mm, the boards can be supplied with 5 rows of eight X-marks. The
tolerance on the location of the X-mark is 10 mm.
2
1
Half size boards of 1250mm x 1200mm can be supplied for the ease of handling.
PROMATECT-T boards are cut to tight tolerances in the factory, suitable for application in
a lost formwork system.
The PROMATECT-T lost formwork system is the most competitive lost formwork system in
the market capable of withstanding the Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) fire exposure.
PROMATECT-H or PROMATECT-T
boards fixed to the underside of the
concrete
Steel reinforcement
47
FIGURE 43 (above) :
POST INSTALLATION OF
SINGLE LAYER PROMATECT BOARDS
FIGURE 45:
APPLICATION OF CURVED
PROMATECT-T TO CAST IRON
TUNNEL LINING SECTIONS
IN CLYDE TUNNEL,
GLASGOW, SCOTLAND
Bolts used in the installation of PROMATECT boards should be used in conjunction with washers
of a minimum of 20mm diameter, or should have their own integral washer, to prevent the heads of
the bolts being driven into the surface of the boards. Note that washers should be manufactured of
the same material type as the bolts to ensure that corrosion does not occur.
Care should be taken when drilling holes into the concrete to avoid the positions of the
reinforcement within the concrete. The PROMATECT-H boards should, as far as is possible, be
properly supported when drilling takes place to ensure the rear face of the boards do not blow at
the exit point of the drill bit.
Minimum requirements for anchors used to secure PROMATECT boards:
M6 in diameter.
Made of stainless steel of 316 grade or higher.
Appropriate length to secure the panel thickness (see SECTION 7 on pages 39-43).
Minimum 40mm anchor depth penetration into the concrete.
Expansion action of the anchorage shall be within the concrete and not within the
PROMATECT panel.
Supplied with a nut and washer head to facilitate removal of the PROMATECT panels
where required.
Suitable for use in tension zone of concrete (cracked concrete).
Suitable for use where anchors will be subject to positive and negative pressure fluctuation
(dynamic loads).
For corrosion resistance of fixings, please refer to SECTION 7.
8.2.3 STEEL FRAMING
Tests have been carried out on systems for both horizontal and vertical applications where
the PROMATECT-H or PROMATECT-T boards have been fixed to a steel sub-frame. The
type of steel used as the framing is of course dependent upon environmental conditions of the
tunnel but would generally be of a grade of stainless steel consistent with the corrosion
resistance requirements.
The steel frame for horizontal applications is generally designed with a number of considerations in
mind. For example, is the frame fixed directly to the concrete structure or is it a free span across
the width of the tunnel (see SECTION 8.2.6 on pages 51 and 52). The frame could consist of either
zed sections or top hat (omega) sections positioned at nominal 600mm or 625mm centres fixed
directly onto the concrete soffit or it could consist of steel channels or hollow sections if it is to span
across the tunnel. In either case, the fixing of the steel frame would be subject to the exact same
considerations as for the direct fixing of PROMATECT board (see above SECTIONS 7 & 8.2.2).
48
Fixing type, centres and depth into the substrate depends upon the type of framing system and is
subject to the fire performance requirement and substantiation by fire test reports. Please consult
Promat for details pertinent to any specific installation.
It is not possible to provide a definitive statement on the types of steel framing for vertical wall
systems, as these are again dependent on a number of factors, e.g. the fire performance
requirement of the system etc. Consideration must be paid to the same factors affecting horizontal
applications, with both orientations required to resist the effects of wind loading and suction
induced by the passage of traffic.
The framing systems employed tend to be designed on a project by project basis because the
section size of the framing is determined by the effects of suction forces, as well as the height of
the construction, and the need for protection to any services that may be located behind the lining
system. Thus the dimensions and shape of the steel supporting section are determined by the
section modulus required to be capable of resisting the compressive loads, bending moments and
other forces which may be imposed on the wall lining.
8.2.4 INSTALLATION OF PROMATECT-H OR PROMATECT-T BOARDS
A) PREPARATION OF BOARDS
Wherever possible, PROMATECT-H or PROMATECT-T boards should be processed and made
ready for installation when delivered to installation site. The preparation works should be carried out
in a suitably equipped workshop either at an off site location or, if the conditions permit, at an on
site location. However, provision for remedial work should be made available at the installation site
should there be necessity to make changes to dimensions and edges.
FIGURE 46:
PANEL LIFTING HOIST
49
The designer of the suspended steel frame has two options for the horizontal
load bearing members:
1) The use of C, Z or omega profiles;
2) The use of a trapezoidal steel decking.
Typically the design of such a suspended steel frame is conducted by a local
structural engineer. The PROMATECT boards are screwed from below to
the suspended steel frame, either the profiles or the trapezoidal steel sheets.
Fire tests have shown that when exposed to an RWS fire curve, for example,
the temperature of the steel frame can still reach some 300C. At this
temperature the steel frame in the fire test maintained its mechanical stability.
Due to this elevated temperature, the thermal expansion of the steel
members could potentially introduce gaps between boards possibly causing
thermal leaks.
In order to address this issue, protective membrane systems are equipped
with cover strips at the joints. These cover strips can be installed either
behind or in front of the boards. If the latter option is chosen, the advantage
is that no intermediate strips are required and the installation rate can be
increased.
B) THERMAL DATA
Fire tests have been conducted on both systems as described above, i.e.
a frame with profiles and a frame with the trapezoidal steel decking. In both
situations the PROMATECT-T boards have been attached from below,
using cover strips at the joints.
During these fire tests temperature recordings have been taken on the
following locations on and within the system:
1) Reverse side of the PROMATECT board;
2) Reverse side of the trapezoidal steel sheet or on the C-profiles;
3) HEA 350 I-profile, which was supporting the concrete slab, simulating a large steel beam;
4) Lattice girder, which was supporting the concrete slab, simulating a light weight steel
support member;
5) The surface of the concrete;
6) Air temperature in the cavity of the system.
The temperature development on these individual members are available from the Promat Technical
Department. The elevated temperatures on the steel members, as mentioned under 2, 3 and 4 are
of particular interest to the structural engineer designing the suspended steel frame. Based on the
mechanical load, the span, the loading system, the required safety factor and the maximum
temperature, the required steel dimensions can be calculated.
The temperature on the concrete surface, as mentioned in 5 (above), is of interest to address the
reaction of the concrete when exposed to these elevated temperatures. In accordance with the
RWS standard, for example, the maximum allowed temperature on the concrete surface is 380C,
for cast-in-place concrete, which is often applied in such tunnels. If in a particular project the
temperature on the concrete is set at a certain maximum, Promat can advise on the required
material thickness of the PROMATECT-T boards, in order to meet the design criteria.
50
Finally, the air temperature in the cavity of the system can be used to analyse if the maximum
allowable temperature on services is exceeded.
Critical electrical cables for example, are regularly installed behind the protective membrane. Such
cables can be feeding jet fans, emergency lighting and other power operated systems that should
maintain full functionality when exposed to fire. In the design of a protective membrane it should be
determined if the maximum allowable temperature on such services is exceeded.
It should be noted that the maximum failure criteria for the structural members discussed here can
vary widely. As stated above, cast-in-place concrete is perceived to be safe below 380C, whereas
loadbearing structural steel beams are able to withstand elevated temperatures up to 550C,
depending on the mechanical load, the span, the loading system and the required safety factor.
Fire test results have shown that the maximum recorded temperatures on the steel members and
the concrete surface are in line with their respective maximum failure criteria.
Non fire rated cables however can only take some 130-160C. It could therefore be a more
economical option to design the fire resistance of the protective membrane such that the
suspended steel frame, the steel or concrete beams and the concrete slab are sufficiently protected
and to protect the cable trays separately.
8.2.6 SUSPENDED CEILINGS, ESCAPE ROUTES
Typically in circular tunnels the tunnel roof space can be utilised to create an escape route above
the tunnel tube by means of constructing a suspended ceiling
system. The frequent lack of space to provide a means of
egress alongside the tunnel tube means this method is
n
becoming more commonly used in this type of
actio
oute
extr
tunnel.
e
pe r
k
a
n
o
c
o
i
m
s
t
S sec
E ion
duct
sect
The escape door leading to the stairwell
should be fire resistant to prevent fire
spreading into the escape route. The
spread of smoke and toxic gases into
the escape route will also be
prevented. The spread of smoke
and toxic gasses into any escape
route should be prevented. To
achieve this, the escape route
area is pressurised with fresh air,
creating an over pressure to the
surrounding atmosphere.
The area above the road deck
can be used for escape route
purposes only or it can also be
combined
with
a
smoke
extraction duct. In the latter, a fire
resistant wall separates the escape
route area (fresh air) from the smoke
extraction duct. This wall requires fire
resistance because in the event of fire it
will be exposed to fire temperatures
through the hatches in the smoke extraction
plenum system.
Tunnel s
e
ction
51
FIGURE 49:
PRINCIPLES OF ESCAPE ROUTE
FOR CIRCULAR TUNNELS
The steel frame should be designed so that it can adequately cope with:
The dynamic load cycles coming from passing traffic.
The additional weight of the the PROMATECT boards, taking into account the potential
additional weight of water which may be absorbed into the boards.
The elevated temperatures in case of fire and still retain its load bearing function
Typically the design of such a suspended steel frame is conducted by a local structural engineer.
Apart from its structural integrity in case of fire, an escape route ceiling has an additional thermal
criterion in that the maximum allowable temperature on the non-exposed face of the specimen, i.e.
the temperature on the floor, should not exceed a certain tenability level. The French tunnel fire
safety standard provides guidance to address this. The maximum allowable absolute temperature
on the floor is set at 60C. This is not a temperature rise above ambient but an absolute maximum.
Promat has designed escape route ceiling systems for use in tunnels and have fire tested a number
of different configurations, using PROMATECT boards.
A) SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The escape route ceiling system is constructed using a trapezoidal steel sheet as the load bearing
layer. From below, PROMATECT-T boards are screwed to Z-profiles and are combined with high
density mineral wool thus providing the required thermal insulation of the system. On top of the
trapezoidal steel decking a metal grid is positioned to provide for a flat, unobstructed surface to
walk upon (FIGURE 50 below). The system described above satisfies the thermal requirement of 60C
on the floor surface as mentioned above.
An additional PROMATECT board can be
applied between the trapezoidal steel sheet and
the metal grid to obtain even lower temperatures
on the floor surface.
B) THERMAL DATA
During the fire tests temperature recordings
have been taken at the following locations on
and within the system:
1) Reverse side of the
PROMATECT board;
2) The Z-profiles;
3) The trapezoidal steel sheet;
4) On top of the metal grid
(criterion failure <60C).
The elevated temperatures on the steel
members, as listed under 2 and 3 are of
particular interest to the structural engineer
FIGURE 50: LOADBEARING CEILING CONSTRUCTION
when designing the steel frame. Based on the
mechanical load, the span, the loading system,
the required safety factor and the maximum temperature, the required steel dimensions can
be obtained.
The temperature development on these individual members are available from Promat.
The elevated steel temperatures on the trapezoidal steel sheet and the Z-profiles will cause thermal
expansion of the steel members and could potentially introduce gaps between the boards in case
a single layer of PROMATECT boards is installed. However, for thermal insulation reasons the
escape route ceiling system is equipped with a double layer of PROMATECT boards which are
installed with staggered joints. Therefore the cover strips as discussed in the SECTION 8.2.5 on
page 50 regarding single layer PROMATECT protective membranes are not required on double
layer PROMATECT escape route ceiling systems.
52
FIGURE 51:
SECTION THROUGH
FLAT CONCRETE SLAB
53
FIGURE 52:
SECTION THROUGH CURVED CONCRETE SECTIONS
in
ht
g
Li
oke
(Smtem)
s
n
s
-fa sy
Jet tract
ex
sure
s enclo
Servicetion system)
etec
ssive d
(Pa
Signal systems
Fire extinguisher
(Active detection system)
54
However, it is not a simple matter of installing ventilation or extract fans and assuming these will perform
the necessary services. Significant research (some 98 tests) carried out in the early 1990s in the
Memorial Tunnel, USA provided some valuable data on the performance of ventilation systems. These
included through natural, semi transverse, fully transverse and longitudinal ventilation systems. Similarly,
fire loads ranged through 10, 20, 50 to 100MW in severity. A few sprinkler/deluge systems were also
tested during this programme.
More recently, a series of tests carried out in the new Benelux tunnel in the Netherlands also focused
on the effects of ventilation on smoke layering and sprinklers water dispersion.
FIGURE 54:
EFFECTS OF AIR FLOW
ON CAR FIRE
In tunnels with longitudinal ventilation systems, the ventilation can have a marked effect on the HRR of
the fire. Investigation and experimentation have shown that longitudinal ventilation within a tunnel can
cause different types of fire to behave in very different ways. The HRR of fires in heavy goods vehicles
in particular can be greatly enhanced, even with low rates of ventilation, whereas the HRR of a car under
the exact same conditions could be greatly reduced. There is no simple method of calculating the
complex relationships between ventilation speeds and increases in heat release rates.
Ventilation can also affect the spread of fire along a tunnel. For example, during the Mont Blanc disaster,
fire spread rapidly from the source of the fire to cars situated some 290m away.
As can be seen from FIGURE 54, the effect of the ventilation results in the fire moving horizontally instead
of mainly vertically. As a result of this action, any vehicles positioned down wind of the fire could possibly
catch alight themselves. The top picture shows the effects of a neutral air flow, the lower picture shows
the effects of a ventilation speed of 2m/second.
While the effects of natural and longitudinal ventilation in tunnels has been subject to some
experimentation, the effects on tunnel fires from semi or fully transverse ventilation is at present less
well known.
In tunnels, there are a number of ways for providing the extract systems. In general however, these can be
categorised in two basic concepts. The first and by far the most common is the construction of a plenum
within the tunnel roof space, either from concrete, or by building a soffit from PROMATECT boards.
FIGURE 55:
SMOKE EXTRACTION PLENUMS
Such a plenum can either be constructed out of concrete or steel. Regardless of the
selected construction method, the structural integrity of this plenum during fire is of
utmost importance as the ventilation philosophy is depending on it. In case the
plenum (or part of it) collapses during the event of fire, the intended smoke
management approach will be lost. All possible major implications are the usual result,
not to mention the hampering effect they would have on emergency response teams.
A smoke extraction plenum of this nature gets exposed to tunnel fire temperatures
from both sides, i.e. from below but also from the top because hot gases are pulled
into the duct. Temperature exposure will be equally high from both sides, especially at
the location of the hatches near the fire source.
Regardless of the selected construction method, such a plenum system therefore
requires thermal protection from both sides, not only from below.
Where a plenum is to be constructed out of concrete, please refer to SECTION 8 in this
manual outlining concrete protection.
The other option is to construct the plenum using a steel frame, spanning from wall to wall, with
intermediate hanger rods if mechanically required. As described above, such a frame requires thermal
protection from below and from above. The hanger rods also require thermal protection in order to
prevent elongation due to thermal expansion, which has the potential to cause unwanted deflection and
sagging of the plenum.
55
56
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The following points are some of the factors which should be considered when determining the correct
specification to ensure the cable duct system provides the required fire performance.
1) APPLICABLE TIME-TEMPERATURE CURVE
2) MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TEMPERATURE ON THE SPECIFIC CABLE(S)
Non fire rated cables can generally operate in temperatures of approximately 130-150C for
short periods of time. However, such increases in cable temperatures do increase the electrical
resistance of the cable. The former temperatures are regularly used as the performance design
criteria for fire rated cable protection systems in tunnels. It should be noted that the majority of
fibre optic cables begin to break down once exposed to temperatures in the range of 50-80C.
FIGURE 56:
SERVICE TUNNEL
Promat can offer the designs and systems required to construct such safe areas for all types and
durations of fire exposure. Please contact Promat for further details.
58
10. FAQs
1) SHOULD VERTICAL TUNNEL WALLS BE PROTECTED AS WELL?
This depends on the assessment of the risk by the relevant authorities and fire consultants. In many tunnels up to
1m of the wall down from the tunnel soffit requires fire protection. Recent research (Runehamar) suggests that walls
do need some degree of protection.
2) WHICH IS THE BEST PROTECTION METHOD TO MINIMISE SERVICING REQUIREMENTS AFTER THE TUNNEL IS COMPLETED
POST CLADDING IS EASIER TO REMOVE, WHILE LOST SHUTTERING IS MORE DIFFICULT?
Promat has over 32 years of experience detailing and providing fire protection systems to tunnel applications. To
date there has not been a requirement to totally remove PROMATECT boards for servicing. It is true that post
cladding facilitates ease in retrieval.
3) HOW ARE THE CRACKS IN THE CONCRETE DURING FIXING OF PROTECTION MATERIAL TREATED?
Cracks in concrete pose no problem to the PROMATECT boards. If cracks in the concrete need to be repaired,
the boards can be removed, or drilled through to gain access to the concrete for grouting repairs.
4) DOES PROMATECT PROTECTION INHIBIT REGULAR INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES OF THE TUNNEL,
ESPECIALLY FOR WATER SEEPAGE AND CONCRETE SPALLING?
Water seepage is expected especially in sub-sea tunnels such as those in the Netherlands. For example,
Westerschelde Tunnel has a 12m water column. PROMATECT can be soaked by water seepage but the boards
are unaffected by water. Wet spots are therefore visible and hence do not inhibit inspection.
5) HOW ABOUT REBAR CARBONISATION? HOW WOULD A PROMATECT LINING AFFECT TREATMENT OF THIS PROBLEM IN TUNNELS?
The concrete cover should be designed for addressing this aspect, although the PROMATECT lining shields the
concrete from direct contact of aggressive car pollution. An examination of a nine year old PROMATECT board
cladding to Velser Tunnel in the Netherlands showed negligible loss of strength. No rebar carbonisation was visible
in the concrete.
6) WHAT IS THE EXPERIENCE OF SUCH REPAIRS IN OTHER PROTECTED TUNNELS?
The worst case scenario is the PROMATECT panel has to be removed to allow access for concrete repair. This is
quite easily achieved.
7) HOW WILL PROTECTION MATERIAL REACT TO CHEMICALS IN WATER SEEPAGE?
PROMATECT boards are inert and will not have adverse reaction to chemicals in the water.
8) HOW WILL PROTECTION MATERIAL REACT TO ALTERNATING PRESSURE FROM VEHICULAR TRAFFIC?
A test has been carried out in Germanys iBMB subjecting PROMATECT specimens of alternating pressures, three
times more cycles than normally encountered in vehicular tunnels. No displacement of the system occurred.
9) HOW DO WE BUILD IN MAINTENANCE AND SERVICE PROCEDURE FOR PROMATECT AFTER PROTECTED TUNNEL IS OPERATIONAL?
PROMATECT boards require little or no maintenance, other than a visual inspection.
10) HOW DOES FIXING OF SERVICES AND LIGHTING TO A PROTECTED CONCRETE SOFFIT AFFECT FIRE PERFORMANCE
OF THE CONCRETE?
Drilling through the panels does not adversely affect the performance of the system, assuming of course that the
installer does not go too far and drills holes everywhere. Tests have been carried out to both RWS and Hydrocarbon
curves where services have been bolted through the PROMATECT (simulated in the tests by suspending weights
from expansion bolts) and the performance of the system is consistent between these tests and the standard tests
where no penetrations have been made. Of course, all services should be supported directly from the concrete and
the installer should not rely on fixing any services only to the PROMATECT boards.
11) HOW DO WE ENSURE THE SCREWS OR BOLTS REMAIN IN SITU?
If PROMATECT is used as permanent shuttering, screws are embedded within the concrete and thus cannot fall
out. If the bolts used for fixing using the post installation method described in SECTION 8, are not tight, the board
will fall as the support is removed.Tests have been carried out to show that even without the screws, a section of
board used as shuttering has very high adhesion to the concrete and will not fall away. Tests on fully soaked boards
have been carried out to simulate the effects on suction and to ascertain whether the bolt heads and washers
would pull through the board. Tests were carried out on 15mm, 20mm, 25mm and 30mm showed that very high
loads are required to pull the fixings through the boards. The average pull through strength measured for a 25mm
board, fully immersed in water for 72 hours prior to test, was a pull through load of 1884N for a 6mm diameter
expansion bolt and 1271N for a 5mm diameter screw.
12) WHAT HAPPENS IF THERE ARE ANY POST INSTALLATION GAPS BETWEEN THE PROMATECT BOARDS?
This depends on the size of the gaps. Panels have been tested where gaps of 3mm were deliberately left between
the panels in an attempt to simulate poor installation. No adverse affects were recorded in these tests.
59
11.1 FIT
FIT is the abbreviation for European Thematic Network on Fire in Tunnels. FIT provides a European
platform for dissemination of information of up-to-date knowledge and research on Fire & Tunnels. FIT
represents 33 members from 12 European Countries.
To optimise benefits of the knowledge throughout Europe from real fire accidents, testing and research
there are many benefits to using all available information via a European Thematic Network. The
following main objectives have been identified for the FIT Thematic Network:
1) The network dissemination of RTD and design results obtained in European and National RTD
projects. The aim is to optimise research efforts, to reach critical mass and to enhance impact
at a European level by combining the results of the different projects.
2) FIT will establish a set of consultable databases with essential knowledge on fire in tunnels.
3) Realise recommendations on design fires for tunnels.
4) To develop European consensus for fire safe design on the basis of existing national regulation,
guidelines, code of practices and safety requirements.
5) Define best practices for tunnel authorities and fire emergency services on prevention and
training, accident management and fire emergency operations.
11.2 DARTS
DARTS is an RTD-project on Durable and Reliable Tunnel Structures.
The project was conducted during 2001-2004 by a partnership of eight European companies. The
DARTS-project is performed with financial support of European Communities under the Fifth
Framework Programme, Competitive and Sustainable Growth Programme (GROWTH 2000).
The objective of the DARTS-project is to develop operational methods and supporting practical tools
for the best proactive decision-making process for selecting in each individual case, the cost optimal
tunnel type and construction procedures regarding environmental conditions, technical qualities, safety
precautions and long service life.
DARTS is developed for the main current types of tunnels: rock tunnels, bored tunnels, NATM tunnels,
immersed tunnels and cut and cover tunnels.
11.3 UPTUN
UPTUN is the acronym for Cost effective, Sustainable and Innovative Upgrading Methods for Fire Safety
in Existing Tunnels, a European RTD-project funded by the European Commission in FP5.
The main UPTUN project objectives are:
1) To develop innovative technologies where appropriate and relevant, comparing to and
assessing existing technologies for tunnel application. Focus is on technologies in areas of
detection and monitoring, mitigating measures, influencing human response, and protection
against structural damage.
2) To develop, demonstrate and promote procedures for rational safety level evaluation, including
decision support models and knowledge transfer.
60
In order to achieve these objectives overall, a strong European consortium was needed, covering all
relevant expertise, with sufficient mass and impact to ensure adoption of UPTUN deliverables
throughout Europe. The consortium was built around prominent tunnel safety institutes in Europe,
balancing owners, industry, research and other stakeholders on the one hand with the (tunnel) member
states on the other.
The UPTUN consortium consists of 41 members from 13 different EU member states, one EEA member
state and three accession countries. The distribution of the input to the project was well balanced over
the eastern, northern, southern and western EU member states.
The project was specifically targeted at ensuring a pan European approach towards improvement of
fire safety in European tunnels. This will enable European tunnel operators and regulators to benefit
from economies of scale resulting from a European approach and also create additional added-value
for the community.
Among others, a full scale fire test in the Runehamar tunnel in Norway was conducted in the framework
of UPTUN.
11.4 SIRTAKI
SIRTAKI Safety Improvement in Road & rail Tunnels using Advanced ICT and Knowledge Intensive
DSS is a IST Project supported by the Commission of the European Communities in the framework
of the Key Action I of IST Programme.
The strategic goal of SIRTAKI is the development and assessment of an advanced tunnel
management system that specifically tackles safety issues and emergencies and integration within
overall network management.
A multidisciplinary consortium with representation from all participating members, including local
authorities, system providers and research institutions from eight different European countries, has
implemented numerous SIRTAKI initiatives over 36 months from September 2001.
61
Description
Neutral designation
Material class
Class 0
900kg/m3 (nominal)
Thermal conductivity ()
Alkalinity
Nominal pH 12
20 (tabulated value)
Moisture content
Air-dried, approximately 7%
Maximum 0.55g/cm3
Surface condition of
standard boards
Biological
Inorganic material that will not rot and not attrack pests.
Flexural strength, F
Tensile strength, T
Compressive strength
(perpendicular to surface of board)
All physical and mechanical property values are averages based on standard production and tested
according to internal procedures. The typical values are given for guidance. The figures can change
dependent on the test methods used. If a particular value is of prime importance or a specification,
please consult Promat Technical Department.
62
Description
Neutral designation
Material class
Class 0
900kg/m3 (nominal)
Thermal conductivity ()
Alkalinity
Nominal pH 10
5 (typical value)
Maximum 0.6g/cm3
Surface condition of
standard boards
Biological
Inorganic material that will not rot and not attrack pests.
Flexural strength, F
Tensile strength, T
Compressive strength
(perpendicular to surface of board)
All physical and mechanical property values are averages based on standard production and tested
according to internal procedures. The typical values are given for guidance. The figures can change
dependent on the test methods used. If a particular value is of prime importance or a specification,
please consult Promat Technical Department.
63
Country
City/Location
Project
Type of tunnel
2008-2009
2007-2008
Germany
Limburg
Schiedetunnel
Road tunnel
Germany
Frankfurt am Main
Theatertunnel
Road tunnel
2007
Australia
Brisbane
INB1 Tunnel
Busway
2007
China
Suzhou
Road tunnel
2007
France
Monaco
Monaco Tunnel
Road tunnel
2007
Germany
Dsseldorf
Werstener Tunnel
Road tunnel
2007
Germany
Hamburg
S-Bahn-Tunnel, Flughafen
Suburban railway
2007
Germany
Berlin
Bundesplatztunnel
Road tunnel
2007
Germany
Wattkopf-Tunnel
Road tunnel
2007
UK
Glasgow
Clyde Tunnel
Road tunnel
2007
Abu Dhabi
Road tunnel
2007
Dubai
Road tunnel
2006-2007
Australia
Sydney
Rail tunnel
2006
France
Paris
Road tunnel
2006
Germany
Hamburg
U-Bahn-Tunnel (U 4) Gnsemarkt
Underground railway
2006
Singapore
Road tunnel
2006
Spain
Madrid
PIO XII
Road tunnel
2005-2006
Australia
Sydney
Road tunnel
2005
Austria
Vienna
Absberg Tunnel
Road tunnel
2005
China
Nanjing
Road tunnel
2005
France
73 Novalaise
Tunnel de IEpine
Road tunnel
2005
France/Italy
Frejus
Frejus Tunnel
Road tunnel
2005
Italy
Tindari
Galleria Tindari
Rail tunnel
2005
Italy
Lecco
Lecco Tunnel
Road tunnel
2005
Germany
Stuttgart
Messetunnel
Road tunnel
2005
Netherlands
Abcoude
Aquaduct Abcoude
Rail tunnel
2005
Netherlands
Roermond
Roer Tunnel
Road tunnel
2004-2005
Australia
Sydney
Road tunnel
2004
China
Shanghai
Road tunnel
2004
France
09 Foix
Tunnel de Foix
Road tunnel
2004
France
34 Lodve
Tunnel de la Vierge
Road tunnel
2004
France
66 Porta Hospitalet
Tunnel de Puymorens
Road tunnel
2004
France
73 Moutier
Tunnel de Siaix
Road tunnel
2004
Germany
Hornberg (Schwarzwald)
Hornberg-Tunnel (B 33)
Road tunnel
2003-2007
France
73 Chambry
Road tunnel
2003-2005
France/Italy
Frejus
Frejus Tunnel
Road tunnel
2003-2004
France
A40 Nantua
Tunnel de Chamoise
Road tunnel
2003
Australia
Sydney
Road tunnel
2003
Australia
Brisbane
INB3 Tunnel
Service tunnel
2003
China
Huangzhou
Road tunnel
2003
France
Toulouse
Road tunnel
2003
Netherlands
Terneuzen
Westerschelde Tunnel
Road tunnel
2003
Sweden
Gothenburg
Gotha Tunnel
Road tunnel
2002
Germany
Freiburg
Schtzenallee-Tunnel (B 31)
Road tunnel
64
65
Year
Country
City/Location
Project
Type of tunnel
2002
Australia
2002
Austria
Sydney
M5 Tunnel
Road tunnel
Vienna
Train station
2002
2002
Austria
Vienna
Train station
China
Nanjing, Jiangsu
Road tunnel
2002
Denmark
Copenhagen
Metro tunnel
2002
France
Toulon
Toulon Tunnel
Road tunnel
2002
France
46 Valroufie
Tunnel de Constans
Road tunnel
2002
France
46 Pinsac
Tunnel de Terregay
Road tunnel
2002
Japan
Tokyo
Road tunnel
2002
Netherlands
Amsterdam
Road tunnel
2002
Netherlands
Rotterdam
Caland Tunnel
Road tunnel
2002
Netherlands
Roelofarendsveen
Rail tunnel
2002
Netherlands
Rotterdam
Rail tunnel
2002
Netherlands
Dordrecht
Kil Tunnel
Road tunnel
2002
Netherlands
Voorburg
Seitwende
Road tunnel
2001
Australia
Sydney
Eastern Distributor
Road tunnel
2001
China
Ningbo, Zhejiang
Road tunnel
2001
France
74 Chamonix
Road tunnel
2001
Germany
Hamburg
Road tunnel
2001
Germany
Hamburg
Road tunnel
2001
Japan
Tokyo
Rinkaidoro
Road tunnel
2001
Netherlands
Rotterdam
1e Benelux Tunnel
2001
Netherlands
Rotterdam
2e Benelux Tunnel
Road tunnel
2001
Netherlands
Enkhuizen
Naviduct Enkhuizen
2001
Netherlands
Oud Alblas
Sophiatunnel
Underground route
2000-2001
Germany
Hamburg
Road tunnel
2000
Australia
Melbourne
Burnley Tunnel
Road tunnel
2000
France
73 Saint Michel de
Maurienne
Tunnel dOrelle
Road tunnel
2000
Germany
Hamburg
Road tunnel
2000
Germany
Hamburg
Road tunnel
2000
Netherlands
Leidschendam
Tramway route
1999
Germany
Hamburg
Krohnstiegtunnel
Road tunnel
1999
Germany
Freiburg
Schtzenalleetunnel
Road tunnel
1999
Japan
Tokyo
Dainikouro
Road tunnel
1999
Netherlands
Rotterdam
2e Beneluxtunnel
1999
Netherlands
Rotterdam
Botlektunnel
1999
Netherlands
Amsterdam
Ij-tunnel
1999
Netherlands
Leidschendam
Seitwendetunnel
Road tunnel
1999
Netherlands
Zeeland
Westerscheldetunnel
1998
Australia
Perth
Road tunnel
1998
Switzerland
Grellingen
Eggflue-Tunnel
Road tunnel
1997
China
Hong Kong
Road tunnel
1997
Germany
Bad Godesberg
Road tunnel
Country
City/Location
Project
Type of tunnel
1997
Netherlands
Alphen/Rhine
Aquaduct Alphen
Road tunnel
1997
Netherlands
Delft
Aquaduct Delft
Tramway route
1997
Netherlands
Amsterdam
Schiphol (kaagbaan)
1997
Netherlands
Schiphol
Schipholtunnel
Road tunnel
1996
Netherlands
Akrum
Aquaduct Akrum
Road tunnel
1995
Singapore
Marina Centre
Underground
parking facility
1994
Belgium
Brussels
Belliard Tunnel
Road tunnel
1994
Germany
Hamburg
Elbtunnel
Road tunnel
1994
UK
London
Leicester Square
Electricity substation
1994
Italy
Mont Blanc
Mont-Blanc-Tunnel
Road tunnel
1994
Malaysia
Shah Alam
Road tunnel
1994
Netherlands
Barendrecht
Heineoordtunnel
1994
Netherlands
Velsen
Wijkertunnel
1993
China
(formerly UK)
Hong Kong
Underground
parking facility
1993
UK
Wadham
Service tunnel
1993
Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur
Denmark House
Underground
parking facility
1993
Malaysia
Shah Alam
Underground
parking facility
1993
Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur
Underground
parking facility
1993
Netherlands
Schiphol
Schipholtunnel 2
1993
Netherlands
Ijmuiden
Wijkertunnel
1993
Singapore
Orchard
Underground
parking facility
1992-1998
China
Hong Kong
Underground stations
1992
China
(formerly UK)
Hong Kong
Route 5
Road tunnel
1992
Germany
Munich
Suburban railway
1992
UK
London
Underground station
1992
UK
London
Eurostar Waterloo
1992
Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur
Underground
parking facility
1992
Netherlands
Grouw
Aquaduct Grouw
Road tunnel
1992
Netherlands
Schiphol
Schipholtunnel
1991
Belgium
Antwerp
Bevrijdingstunnel
Road tunnel
1991
Netherlands
Zeeland
Vlaketunnel
1990
Belgium
Antwerp
Beveren Tunnel
Road tunnel
1990
Belgium
Zelzate
Road tunnel
1990
Belgium
Antwerp
Liefkenshoek Tunnel
Road tunnel
1990
Belgium
Antwerp
Tijsmans Tunnel
Road tunnel
1990
China
(formerly UK)
Hong Kong
Pacific Place
66
Year
Country
City/Location
Project
Type of tunnel
1990
UK
London
Underground station
1990
Netherlands
Barendrecht
Heineoordtunnel
1990
Netherlands
Velsen
Velsertunnel
1989-1992
Singapore
Singapore
MRTC
Underground stations
1989
Australia
Sydney
Road tunnel
1989
Belgium
Brussels
Leopold II Tunnel
Road tunnel
1989
China
(formerly UK)
Hong Kong
Road tunnel
1989
China
(formerly UK)
Hong Kong
1989
Germany
Bad Ems
Ems Tunnel
Road tunnel
1989
Netherlands
Schiphol
Schipholtunnel
Road tunnel
1989
Netherlands
Schiphol
Schipholtunnel
1989
Netherlands
Road tunnel
1989
Netherlands
Amsterdam
Zeeburgertunnel
Road tunnel
1989
USA
Boston
Road tunnel
1988
Belgium
Antwerp
Kennedy Tunnel
Road tunnel
1988
UK
Medway
Service tunnel
1987
China
(formerly UK)
Hong Kong
Road tunnel
1987
Netherlands
Schiphol
Schipholtunnel
1987
Switzerland
Genf
Suburban railway
Suburban railway
1986
Belgium
Antwerp
Road tunnel
1986
Netherlands
Schiphol
Schipholtunnel
1985
Belgium
Brussels
Rogier Tunnel
Road tunnel
1982
Belgium
Brugge
Tunnel t Zand
Road tunnel
1981
Belgium
Antwerp
Craeybeckx
Road tunnel
1980
Germany
Berlin
Schlangenberger
Road tunnel
1980
Switzerland
St. Gotthard
Gotthard Tunnel
Road tunnel
1975
Germany
Hamburg
Elbtunnel
Road tunnel
1963
UK
Dartford
Dartford Tunnel
Road tunnel
The information contained within this table is believed to be accurate at the time of preparation of this document. Latest and
complete information on this worlwide tunnel project reference can be obtained from www.promat-tunnel.com.
67
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SPAIN
Promat Ibrica S.A.
C/ Velazquez, 41 - 2 Planta
28001 Madrid
Tel:
+34-91 781 1550
Fax: +34-91 575 1597
Email: [email protected]
www.promat.es
SWITZERLAND
Promat AG
Stationsstrasse 1
8545 Rickenbach-Sulz
Tel:
+41-52 320 9400
Fax: +41-52 320 9402
Email: [email protected]
www.promat.ch
ITALY
Promat S.p.A.
Corso Paganini 39/3
16125 Genova
Tel:
+39-010 248 8411
Fax: +39-010 213 768
Email: [email protected]
www.promat.it
MALAYSIA
Promat International (Asia Pacific) Ltd.
Unit 19-02-01, Level 2 PNB Damansara
No.19 Lorong Dungun, Damansara Heights
50490 Kuala Lumpur
Tel:
+60-3 2095 5111
Fax: +60-3 2095 6111
Email: [email protected]
www.promat-ap.com
Promat (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.
Unit 19-02-01, Level 2 PNB Damansara
No.19 Lorong Dungun, Damansara Heights
50490 Kuala Lumpur
Tel:
+60-3 2095 8555
Fax: +60-3 2095 2111
Email: [email protected]
www.promat-ap.com
CZECH REPUBLIC
NETHERLANDS
Promat s.r.o.
Ckalova 22/784
16000 Praha 6 - Bubenec
Tel:
+420-2 2439 0811
Fax: +420-2 3333 3576
Email: [email protected]
www.promatpraha.cz
Promat B.V.
Zonnebaan 36
3542 EE Utrecht
Tel:
+31-30 241 0770
Fax: +31-30 241 0771
Email: [email protected]
www.promat.nl
1. Promats policy is one of continuous development. We therefore reserve the right to change designs and specifications without prior notice.
2. All products are subject to our Terms and Conditions of sale, copies of which are available upon request.
3. This publication and information, illustrations etc. contained herein are provided in good faith and does not accept responsibility for any ommissions or
misinterpretations of any of the information. This publication has no statutory authority, and therefore approved documents or the appropriate Building
Regulations must be consulted in all instances.
UNITED KINGDOM
Promat UK Ltd.
The Sterling Centre
Eastern Road, Bracknell
RG12 2TD Berkshire
Tel:
+44-1344 381 300
Fax: +44-1344 381 301
Email: [email protected]
www.promat.co.uk
VIETNAM
Promat International (Asia Pacific) Ltd.
(Vietnam Representative Office)
Room 606 Giay Viet Plaza
180-182 Ly Chinh Thang Street
Ward 9, District 3
Hochiminh City
Tel:
+84-8 931 5964
Fax: +84-8 931 5964
Email: [email protected]
www.promat-ap.com