Roper v. Simmons
Roper v. Simmons
Syllabus
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States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books;
and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—
provide sufficient evidence that today society views juveniles, in the
words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as “categorically
less culpable than the average criminal,” 536 U. S., at 316. The evi-
dence of such consensus is similar, and in some respects parallel, to
the evidence in Atkins: 30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty,
including 12 that have rejected it altogether and 18 that maintain it
but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles
from its reach. Moreover, even in the 20 States without a formal
prohibition, the execution of juveniles is infrequent. Although, by
contrast to Atkins, the rate of change in reducing the incidence of the
juvenile death penalty, or in taking specific steps to abolish it, has
been less dramatic, the difference between this case and Atkins in
that respect is counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the
change toward abolition. Indeed, the slower pace here may be ex-
plained by the simple fact that the impropriety of executing juveniles
between 16 and 18 years old gained wide recognition earlier than the
impropriety of executing the mentally retarded. Pp. 10–13.
(2) Rejection of the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile of-
fenders under 18 is required by the Eighth Amendment. Capital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit “a narrow
category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme culpability
makes them “the most deserving of execution.” Atkins, 536 U. S. at
319. Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders. Juveniles’ susceptibility to im-
mature and irresponsible behavior means “their irresponsible con-
duct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815, 835. Their own vulnerability and com-
parative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean ju-
veniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to
escape negative influences in their whole environment. See Stanford,
supra, at 395. The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous
crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved
character. The Thompson plurality recognized the import of these
characteristics with respect to juveniles under 16. 487 U. S., at 833–
838. The same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders under 18.
Once juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident that
neither of the two penological justifications for the death penalty—
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders,
e.g., Atkins, 536 U. S., at 319—provides adequate justification for im-
posing that penalty on juveniles. Although the Court cannot deny or
4 ROPER v. SIMMONS
Syllabus
overlook the brutal crimes too many juvenile offenders have commit-
ted, it disagrees with petitioner’s contention that, given the Court’s
own insistence on individualized consideration in capital sentencing,
it is arbitrary and unnecessary to adopt a categorical rule barring
imposition of the death penalty on an offender under 18. An unac-
ceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of
any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s ob-
jective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should
require a sentence less severe than death. When a juvenile commits
a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most
basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his poten-
tial to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity. While
drawing the line at 18 is subject to the objections always raised
against categorical rules, that is the point where society draws the
line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood and the age
at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest. Stanford should
be deemed no longer controlling on this issue. Pp. 14–21.
(c) The overwhelming weight of international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected
and significant confirmation for the Court’s determination that the
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18. See,
e.g., Thompson, supra, at 830–831, and n. 31. The United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction
to the juvenile penalty. It does not lessen fidelity to the Constitution
or pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples underscores
the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of free-
dom. Pp. 21–25.
112 S. W. 3d 397, affirmed.
No. 03–633
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B
A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the
death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now
hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment.
Because the death penalty is the most severe punish-
ment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special
force. Thompson, 487 U. S., at 856 (O’CONNOR, J., concur-
ring in judgment). Capital punishment must be limited to
those offenders who commit “a narrow category of the
most serious crimes” and whose extreme culpability makes
them “the most deserving of execution.” Atkins, supra, at
319. This principle is implemented throughout the capital
sentencing process. States must give narrow and precise
definition to the aggravating factors that can result in a
capital sentence. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 428–
429 (1980) (plurality opinion). In any capital case a de-
fendant has wide latitude to raise as a mitigating factor
“any aspect of [his or her] character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof-
fers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110–112 (1982); see also
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 359–362 (1993) (summa-
rizing the Court’s jurisprudence after Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), with respect to a sen-
tencer’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors). There are a number of crimes that beyond question
are severe in absolute terms, yet the death penalty may
not be imposed for their commission. Coker v. Georgia,
433 U. S. 584 (1977) (rape of an adult woman); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982) (felony murder where defen-
dant did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill). The
death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes of
offenders, such as juveniles under 16, the insane, and the
mentally retarded, no matter how heinous the crime.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, supra; Ford v. Wainwright, 477
Cite as: 543 U. S. ____ (2005) 15
* * *
During the past year, decisions by the highest courts of Kansas and
New York invalidated provisions in those States’ death penalty stat-
utes. State v. Marsh, ___ Kan. ___, 102 P. 3d 445 (2004) (invalidating
provision that required imposition of the death penalty if aggravating
and mitigating circumstances were found to be in equal balance);
People v. LaValle, 3 N. Y. 3d 88, 817 N. E. 2d 341 (2004) (invalidating
mandatory requirement to instruct the jury that, in the case of jury
deadlock as to the appropriate sentence in a capital case, the defendant
would receive a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility
after serving a minimum of 20 to 25 years). Due to these decisions, it
would appear that in these States the death penalty remains on the
books, but that as a practical matter it might not be imposed on anyone
until there is a change of course in these decisions, or until the respec-
28 ROPER v. SIMMONS
tive state legislatures remedy the problems the courts have identified.
Marsh, supra, at ___, ___, 102 p. 3d, at 452, 464; LaValle, supra, at 99,
817 N. E 2d, at 344.
* * *
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of age.”
32 ROPER v. SIMMONS
No. 03–633
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(1800)).
4 ROPER v. SIMMONS
(1999); Iowa Code §232.45 (2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 15, §3101(4)
(West 2003); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, §74 (West 2003); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §764.27 (West 2000); Minn. Stat. §260B.125 (2002);
N. D. Cent. Code §27–20–34 (Lexis Supp. 2003); R. I. Gen. Laws §14–1–
7 (Lexis 2002); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 33, §5516 (Lexis 2001); W. Va. Code
§49–5–10 (Lexis 2004); Wis. Stat. §938.18 (2003–2004); see also Na-
tional Center for Juvenile Justice, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as
Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws 1
(Oct. 2003). The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction without a
death penalty that specifically exempts under-18 offenders from its
harshest sanction—life imprisonment without parole. See D. C. Code
§22–2104 (West 2001).
3 See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, §74 (West 2003); N. D. Cent.
which changed the wording from “cruel or unusual” to “cruel and un-
usual,” Fla. Const., Art. I, §17 (2003). See Commentary to 1998 Amend-
ment, 25B Fla. Stat. Ann., p. 180 (West 2004). This was a response to a
Florida Supreme Court ruling that “cruel or unusual” excluded the death
penalty for a defendant who committed murder when he was younger
than 17. See Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1999). By adopting
the federal constitutional language, Florida voters effectively adopted our
8 ROPER v. SIMMONS
no reason to disagree with th[e] judgment [of the state legislatures] for
purposes of construing and applying the Eighth Amendment”); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he legislative
rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own
judgment”).
10 ROPER v. SIMMONS
assuring them that they could “get away with it” because
they were minors. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112
S. W. 3d 397, 419 (Mo. 2003) (Price, J., dissenting). This
fact may have influenced the jury’s decision to impose
capital punishment despite Simmons’ age. Because the
Court refuses to entertain the possibility that its own
unsubstantiated generalization about juveniles could be
wrong, it ignores this evidence entirely.
III
Though the views of our own citizens are essentially
irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, the views of other
countries and the so-called international community take
center stage.
The Court begins by noting that “Article 37 of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
[1577 U. N. T. S. 3, 28 I. L. M. 1448, 1468–1470, entered
into force Sept. 2, 1990], which every country in the world
has ratified save for the United States and Somalia, con-
tains an express prohibition on capital punishment for
crimes committed by juveniles under 18.” Ante, at 22
(emphasis added). The Court also discusses the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
December 19, 1966, 999 U. N. T. S. 175, ante, at 13, 22,
which the Senate ratified only subject to a reservation
that reads:
“The United States reserves the right, subject to its
Constitutional restraints, to impose capital punish-
ment on any person (other than a pregnant woman)
duly convicted under existing or future laws permit-
ting the imposition of capital punishment, including
such punishment for crime committed by persons be-
low eighteen years of age.” Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102–23, (1992).
Cite as: 543 U. S. ____ (2005) 17
Unless the Court has added to its arsenal the power to join
and ratify treaties on behalf of the United States, I cannot
see how this evidence favors, rather than refutes, its
position. That the Senate and the President—those actors
our Constitution empowers to enter into treaties, see Art.
II, §2—have declined to join and ratify treaties prohibiting
execution of under-18 offenders can only suggest that our
country has either not reached a national consensus on the
question, or has reached a consensus contrary to what the
Court announces. That the reservation to the ICCPR was
made in 1992 does not suggest otherwise, since the reser-
vation still remains in place today. It is also worth noting
that, in addition to barring the execution of under-18
offenders, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child prohibits punishing them with life in prison with-
out the possibility of release. If we are truly going to get in
line with the international community, then the Court’s
reassurance that the death penalty is really not needed,
since “the punishment of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction,” ante, at 18,
gives little comfort.
It is interesting that whereas the Court is not content to
accept what the States of our Federal Union say, but
insists on inquiring into what they do (specifically,
whether they in fact apply the juvenile death penalty that
their laws allow), the Court is quite willing to believe that
every foreign nation—of whatever tyrannical political
makeup and with however subservient or incompetent a
court system—in fact adheres to a rule of no death penalty
for offenders under 18. Nor does the Court inquire into
how many of the countries that have the death penalty,
but have forsworn (on paper at least) imposing that pen-
alty on offenders under 18, have what no State of this
country can constitutionally have: a mandatory death
penalty for certain crimes, with no possibility of mitigation
by the sentencing authority, for youth or any other reason.
18 ROPER v. SIMMONS
The Court responds that “[i]t does not lessen our fidelity
to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowl-
edge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental
rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores
the centrality of those same rights within our own heri-
tage of freedom.” Ante, at 24–25. To begin with, I do not
believe that approval by “other nations and peoples”
should buttress our commitment to American principles
any more than (what should logically follow) disapproval
by “other nations and peoples” should weaken that com-
mitment. More importantly, however, the Court’s state-
ment flatly misdescribes what is going on here. Foreign
sources are cited today, not to underscore our “fidelity” to
the Constitution, our “pride in its origins,” and “our own
[American] heritage.” To the contrary, they are cited to set
aside the centuries-old American practice—a practice still
engaged in by a large majority of the relevant States—of
——————
cial character,” in that it “draws its meaning directly from the maturing
values of civilized society.” Ante, at 19. Nothing in the text reflects
such a distinctive character—and we have certainly applied the “ma-
turing values” rationale to give brave new meaning to other provisions
of the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 571–573
(2003); United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 532–534 (1996); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 847–850 (1992).
JUSTICE O’CONNOR asserts that an international consensus can at least
“serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine
American consensus.” Ante, at 19. Surely not unless it can also
demonstrate the unreasonableness of such a consensus. Either Amer-
ica’s principles are its own, or they follow the world; one cannot have it
both ways. Finally, JUSTICE O’CONNOR finds it unnecessary to consult
foreign law in the present case because there is “no . . . domestic con-
sensus” to be confirmed. Ibid. But since she believes that the Justices
can announce their own requirements of “moral proportionality” despite
the absence of consensus, why would foreign law not be relevant to that
judgment? If foreign law is powerful enough to supplant the judgment
of the American people, surely it is powerful enough to change a per-
sonal assessment of moral proportionality.
Cite as: 543 U. S. ____ (2005) 23