Campbell v. AT&T Communications of California (No. 06-3596) Riordan v. Verizon Communications, Inc. (No. 06

Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 155 Filed 02/01/2007 Page 1 of 39
1 Elizabeth J. Cabraser (State Bar No. 083151)

Barry R. Himmelstein (State Bar No. 157736)
2 Michael W. Sobol (State Bar No. 194857)
Eric B. Fastiff (State Bar No. 182260)
3 Allison S. Elgart (State Bar No. 241901)
LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
4 275 Battery Street, 30th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
5 Telephone: (415) 956-1000
Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
6
Interim Class Counsel for MCI Class
7
[Additional Counsel Appear On Signature Page ]
8
9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
(San Francisco Division)
12
13
IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY MDL Docket No. 06-1791 (VRW)
14 AGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS
RECORDS LITIGATION CLASS PLAINTIFFS’ CONSOLIDATED
15 ___________________________________ RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE WHY RULINGS ON HEPTING
16 THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: MOTIONS TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT
APPLY
17 All Class Actions Against MCI, Verizon,
Sprint, BellSouth, Cingular, and Date: February 9, 2007
18 Transworld Defendants Time: 2:00 p.m.
Courtroom: 6, 17th Floor
19 Campbell v. AT&T Communications of Judge: Hon. Vaughn R. Walker
California (No. 06-3596); Riordan v.
20 Verizon Communications, Inc. (No. 06-
3574)
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
593911.2 CLASS PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO OSC

MDL DOCKET NO. 06-1791 (VRW)
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1
II. THE MASTER COMPLAINTS ..............................................................................2
4
A. The Common, Federal Claims .....................................................................3
5 B. The State Law Claims ..................................................................................4
6 III. THE FACTUAL RECORD .....................................................................................7
A. Publicly Disclosed Information About the NSA Surveillance
7 Program That Was Before The Court in Hepting ........................................7
8 B. Statements By Members of Congress Who Have Been Briefed on
the Call Records Program ............................................................................9
9 C. Additional Public Disclosures Not Discussed in Hepting .........................14
10 IV. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, THE COURT’S RULINGS ON THE STATE
SECRETS ISSUES IN HEPTING ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE HERE .......17
11 A. The Categorical Totten/Tenet Bar Does Not Apply...................................19
12 B. The Very Subject Matter of the Actions is Not a State Secret...................20
C. Dismissal on Evidentiary Grounds Would Be Premature..........................20
13
D. The Existence or Non-Existence of a Certification Is Not a State
14 Secret..........................................................................................................21
E. The Statutory Privileges Do Not Warrant Dismissal.................................21
15
V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONFIRMS THAT THE RECORDS
16 PROGRAM IS NOT A SECRET ..........................................................................22
A. The Court’s Ruling in Hepting ..................................................................22
17
B. The Existence of The Records Program Has Been Acknowledged
18 by Nineteen Members of Congress Briefed on the Program by the
NSA............................................................................................................23
19 C. Verizon Has Tacitly Admitted That MCI Participated in the
Records Program........................................................................................27
20
D. Discovery Concerning the Existence of Any Certifications
21 Concerning the Records Program Received by Verizon and/or
BellSouth Must Be Permitted ....................................................................28
22 E. The Wholesale Violation of Federal Privacy Laws Cannot Be a
“State Secret”.............................................................................................29
23
VI. THE COURT’S RULINGS ON AT&T’S MOTION TO DISMISS ARE
24 EQUALLY APPLICABLE HERE ........................................................................30
A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Pursue Their Claims ......................................30
25
B. Plaintiffs Have Alleged the Absence of a Certification.............................31
26 C. Defendants Have No Common Law Immunity .........................................32
27 D. Defendants Have No Qualified Immunity .................................................33
VII. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................34
28
- i-
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page
3
CASES
4
Ballard v. Equifax Check Services, Inc.,
5 158 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2001)......................................................................................4
Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Group,
6 185 F.R.D. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ...............................................................................................4
7 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ...........................................passim
Hope v. Pelzer,
8 536 U.S. 730 (2002) .................................................................................................................33
9 Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ......................................................................24
Tenet v. Doe,
10 544 U.S. 1 (2005) .....................................................................................................................19
11 Terkel v. AT&T Corp.,
441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ................................................................................passim
12 Totten v. United States,
92 U.S. 105 (1876) ...................................................................................................................19
13
United States v. United States District Court,
14 407 U.S. 297 (1972) .................................................................................................................33
STATUTES
15
18 U.S.C. § 2511............................................................................................................................32
16 18 U.S.C. § 2518............................................................................................................................32
17 18 U.S.C. § 2520............................................................................................................................31
18 U.S.C. § 2703............................................................................................................................32
18
28 U.S.C. § 1407..............................................................................................................................1
19 50 U.S.C. § 402 note .....................................................................................................................21
20 50 U.S.C. § 403..............................................................................................................................22
RULES
21
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 104(a) .......................................................................................22
22 TREATISES
23 Manual For Complex Litigation, Fourth (2004) .............................................................................1
24
25
26
27
28
- ii -
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 This multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) proceeding includes cases brought by and on
3 behalf of customers and subscribers of the largest telecommunications carriers in the United
4 States, including the three primary long distance carriers, AT&T, MCI, and Sprint, 1 as well as
5 “Baby Bells” Verizon and BellSouth, a number of wireless carriers, and their respective affiliates.
6 In each case, Plaintiffs 2 allege that the defendant carriers, acting at the request of the National
7 Security Agency (“NSA”), have unlawfully given the federal government access to: (1) the
8 domestic and international telephone calls of their customers, including Plaintiffs (the “content ”
9 claims); and (2) records of the date, time, number dialed, and duration of those calls (the
10 “records” claims).
11 In Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“Hepting”), the
12 Court denied the government’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on the state
13 secrets privilege, and denied AT&T Corp.’s (“AT&T’s”) motion to dismiss based on lack of
14 standing, failure to plead the absence of a certification, common law immunity, and qualified
15 immunity. On November 22, 2006, the Court issued Pretrial Order No. 1, requiring, inter alia,
16 “[a]ll parties to SHOW CAUSE in writing why the Hepting order should not apply to all cases
17 and claims to which the government asserts the state secrets privilege” (the “OSC”). 3 Plaintiffs
18 take issue with but one of the Court’s many rulings in Hepting: that “unlike the program
19 monitoring communication content, the general contours and even the existence of the
20 communication records program remain unclear.” Id. at 997.
21
1
In 2003, AT&T received 30.0% of all long distance toll service revenues, MCI received 20.8%,
22 and Sprint, 8.2%; AT&T had residential long distance market share of 31.7%, MCI 13.0%, and
Sprint 7.1%. Federal Communications Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology Division,
23 Wireline Competition Bureau, Trends in Telephone Service (June 21, 2005), Tables 9.6, 9.7
(available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
24 State_Link/IAD/trend605.pdf).
2
25 Unless otherwise noted, “Plaintiffs” and “Defendants” refer to the named plaintiffs and
defendants in the coordinated actions generally.
3
26 The OSC is well within the statutory mandate of an MDL transferee judge to “promote the just
and efficient conduct” of coordinated actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). Indeed, the “Bible” on MDL
27 proceedings, the Federal Judicial Center’s Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth (2004),
expressly directs that “[o]rdinarily, it is advisable to order that . . . rulings on common issues—for
28 example, on the statute of limitations—shall be deemed to have been made in the tag-along
action[s] without the need for separate motions and orders . . . .” Id. at § 20.132, p. 222-23.
593911.2 -1- CLASS PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO OSC
1 The existence and general contours of the records program have been
2 acknowledged by numerous members of the Congressional intelligence oversight committees
3 briefed on the program by the NSA, and at least one carrier, Verizon, has tacitly admitted the
4 participation of its newly-acquired subsidiary, MCI, in the records program. Accordingly, the
5 records program is no longer a secret, and Plaintiffs should be permitted discovery on their
6 records claims.
7 II. THE MASTER COMPLAINTS
8 Pursuant to Pretrial Order No. 1 (Dkt. No. 79), Plaintiffs’ List of Interim Class
9 Counsel for Each Defendant Category (Dkt. No. 88), and the Court’s Order Resetting Deadlines
10 (Dkt. No. 112), on January 16, 2007, Plaintiffs filed five master complaints (collectively, the
11 “Master Complaints”) against the various defendant groups as follows: (1) Master Consolidated
12 Complaint Against MCI Defendants4 and Verizon Defendants 5 (Dkt. No. 125, “MCI/Verizo n
13 Master Compl. ”); (2) Master Consolidated Complaint Against Defendants Sprint Nextel
14 Corporation, Sprint Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership, Nextel Communications, Inc., Embarq
15 Corporation, UCOM, Inc., U.S. Telecom, Inc., Utelcom, Inc., and Does 1-100 for Damages,
16 Declaratory and Equitable Relief (Dkt. No. 124, “Sprint Master Compl. ”); (3) Master
17 Consolidated Complaint Against Defendant “BellSouth”6 for Damages, Declaratory and
18 Equitable Relief (Dkt. No. 126, “BellSouth Master Compl.”); (4) Master Consolidated Complaint
19 Against Defendants Transworld Network Corp., Comcast Telecommunications, Inc., T-Mobile
20 USA, Inc., and McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc., for Damages, Declaratory and
21 Equitable Relief (Dkt. No. 125, “Transworld Master Compl. ”); and (5) Master Consolidated
22
4
Defendants MCI Communications Services, Inc. and MCI, LLC.
23 5
Defendants Verizon Communications, Inc., Verizon California, Inc., Verizon Delaware, Inc.,
24 Verizon Florida, Inc., Verizon Maryland Inc., Verizon New England, Inc., Verizon New Jersey,
Inc., Verizon New York, Inc., Verizon North, Inc., Verizon Northwest, Inc., Verizon
25 Pennsylvania, Inc., Verizon South, Inc., Verizon Virginia, Inc., Verizon Washington, D.C., Inc.,
Verizon West Virginia, Inc., GTE Corporation, GTE Southwest Incorporates, Contel of the
26 South, Inc., Verizon Federal, Inc., Bell Atlantic Communications, Inc., Verizon Select Services,
Inc., NYNEX Long Distance Company, Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., Cellco
27 Partnership, NYNEX Corporation, GTE Wireless, Inc., GTE Wireless of the South, Inc., NYNEX
PCS, Inc., and Verizon Wireless of the East LP.
6
28 Defendants BellSouth, BellSouth Communications, LLC, BellSouth Corp., BellSouth
Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and AT&T Southeast.
593911.2
-2- CLASS PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO OSC
1 Complaint Against Defendants AT&T Mobility LLC (f/k/a Cingular Wireless, L.L.C.), Cingular
2 Wireless Corp., and New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. for Damages, Declaratory and
3 Equitable Relief (Dkt. No. 121, “Cingular Master Compl.”). 7
4 The facts and claims alleged, and their substantial overlap with the facts and
5 claims alleged in Hepting, are summarized below.
6 A. The Common, Federal Claims
7 Like the Hepting complaint, the Master Complaints assert federal constitutional
8 and statutory claims for violations of:
9 (1) The First and Fourth Amendments to the United States
Constitution (acting as agents or instruments of the government) by
10 illegally intercepting, disclosing, divulging and/or using plaintiffs’
communications; 8
11
(2) Section 109 of Title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
12 Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1809, by engaging in illegal
electronic surveillance of plaintiffs’ communications under color of
13 law;9
14 (3) Section 802 of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, as amended by section 101 of Title I of the
15 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18
U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d) and (3)(a), by illegally
16 intercepting, disclosing, using and/or divulging plaintiffs’
communications; 10
17
(4) Section 705 of Title VII of the Communications Act of 1934, as
18 amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605, by unauthorized divulgence and/or
publication of plaintiffs’ communications;11
19
(5) Section 201 of Title II of the ECPA (“Stored Communications
20 Act”), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1) and (a)(2), by illegally
divulging the contents of plaintiffs’ communications; 12
21
(6) Section 201 of the Stored Communications Act, as amended by
22 section 212 of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a)(3), by illegally divulging records concerning plaintiffs’
23
24 7
The operative complaint in Hepting (Hepting Dkt. No. 8) has been designated the lead
25 complaint for the AT&T defendant group. See Transcript, Nov. 17, 2006 Case Management
Conference, at 79:6-17.
8
26 See Sixth Claim for Relief in each of the Master Complaints.
9
See Fifth Claim for Relief in each of the Master Complaints.
27 10
See Third Claim for Relief in each of the Master Complaints.
11
28 See Fourth Claim for Relief in each of the Master Complaints.
12
See First Claim for Relief in each of the Master Complaints.
593911.2
1 communications to a governmental entity[;] 13 and
2 (7) California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal Bus & Prof Code
§§ 17200 et seq., by engaging in unfair, unlawful and deceptive
3 business practices. 14
4 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978-79 (listing claims asserted in Hepting).
5 B. The State Law Claims
6 In addition to the claims asserted in Hepting, the Master Complaints assert several
7 claims for relief arising under state law, specifically: (1) violation of the surveillance statutes of
8 all States and the District of Columbia;15 (2) violation of the consumer protection statutes of all
9 States and the District of Columbia, based, inter alia, on Defendants’ violation of their own
10 13
See Second Claim for Relief in each of the Master Complaints.
14
11 See Tenth Claim for Relief, MCI/Verizon Master Compl.; Ninth Claim for Relief, BellSouth
Master Compl.; Ninth Claim for Relief, Transworld Master Compl.; Twenty-Third Claim for
12 Relief, ¶ 265(e), Cingular Master Compl. This claim alleges, inter alia, that Defendants engaged
in unlawful business practices by violating the Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, et seq., as
13 well as 47 U.S.C. § 222(c), which requires Defendants to maintain the confidentiality of customer
proprietary network information. While neither of these federal statutes provide for a private
14 right of action, it is well-settled that violations of such federal statutes remain actionable as
“unlawful business practices” in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. See Diaz v.
15 Allstate Ins. Group, 185 F.R.D. 581, 594 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Under California law, a private
plaintiff may bring action under unfair competition statute to redress any unlawful business
16 practice, including those that do not otherwise permit a private right of action”) (citation omitted);
Ballard v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1176 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (violation
17 of virtually any federal law may constitute unlawful business practice actionable under Cal.
Unfair Competition Law).
15
18 Ala. Code §§ 13A-11-30, 13A-11-31; Alaska Stat. § 42.20.310; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
3005; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-60-120; Cal. Penal Code § 630 et seq.; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-9-301,
19 18-9-303; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570d; Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 2402; D.C. Code §§ 23-541, 23-
542; Fla. Stat. §§ 934.01-03; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-62 et seq.; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-42, 803-
20 48 (2005); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6702; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-1, -2; Ind. Code § 35-33.5-1 et
seq.; Iowa Code § 727.8; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-4001, 21-4002; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 526.010-
21 .020; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:1303; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15, §§ 709-710; Md. Code Ann.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402 et seq.; § 10-4A-4B et seq.; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99; Mich.
22 Comp. Laws § 750.539 et seq.; Minn. Stat. §§ 626A.01, .02; Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-501 et
seq.; Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 392.170, .350, 542.402, .418; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213; Neb. Rev.
23 Stat. § 86-290; Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.610-.620; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 570-A:1, -A:2; N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:156A-1 et seq.; N.M. Stat. § 30-12-1; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 250.00, .05; N.C. Gen. Stat.
24 § 15A-287; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-15-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.51 et seq.; Okla. Stat.
tit. 13, § 176.1 et seq.; Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 165.540, .543; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5701 et seq.; R.I. Gen.
25 Laws § 11-35-21; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-30-20, -30; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 23A-35A-1, 23A-
35A-20; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-601; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 16.02 et seq.; Tex. Code Crim.
26 Proc. art. 18.20 § 16(a); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-1 et seq.; Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-61, -62;
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030; W. Va. Code § 62-1D-1 et seq.; Wis. Stat. §§ 968.27, .31; Wyo.
27 Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-701, -702. See Seventh Claim for Relief in MCI/Verizon, BellSouth, and
Transworld Master Complaints; Seventh and Eleventh Claims for Relief, Sprint Master Compl.;
28 Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Twentieth, and Twenty-Second Claims for Relief, Cingular
Master Compl.
593911.2
1 privacy policies, which falsely assured customers that Defendants would not divulge their
2 customers’ communications or records except as required by law;16 and (3) common law breach
3 of contract, based on the violation of Defendants’ privacy policies. 17 The BellSouth, Sprint, and
4 Cingular Master Complaints also assert breach of warranty claims. 18 The BellSouth Master
5 Complaint also asserts claims for violation of the right of privacy under the California
6 Constitution19 and violation of Cal. Penal Code § 11149.4. 20 The Cingular Master Complaint also
7 asserts claims for relief for: (1) violation of the Hawaii Constitution, Article I, Section 6; 21 (2)
8 violation of the New Jersey Constitution; 22 (3) malicious misrepresentation; 23 (4) invasion of
9 privacy under New Jersey law; 24 (5) violations of the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and
10 Notice Act; 25 (6) violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-7 and 2C:21-17.3; 26 and (7) invasion of privacy
11
16
Ala. Code § 8-19-1 et seq.; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1522 et seq.; Ark. Code § 4-88-101 et seq.;
12 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105 et seq.; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-
110b et seq.; 6 Del. Code § 2511 et seq.; D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3901 et seq.; Fla. Stat. § 501.201
13 et seq.; Ga. Stat. § 10-1-392 et seq.; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480 et seq.; Idaho Code § 48-601 et seq.;
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505.1 et seq.; Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5 et seq.; Iowa Code § 714.16 et seq.;
14 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-623 et seq.; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.1 10 et seq.; La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1401 et
seq.; 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207 et seq.; Massachusetts General Laws Ch. 93A et seq.; Md.
15 Com. Law Code § 13-101 et seq.; Mich. Stat. § 445.901 et seq.; Minn. Stat. § 8.31 et seq.; Miss.
Code Ann. § 75-24-1 et seq.; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.010 et seq.; Mont. Code § 30-14-101 et seq.;
16 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1601 et seq.; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0903 et seq.; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 358-A:1
et seq.; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:8-1 et seq.; N.M. Stat. § 57-12-1 et seq; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 et
17 seq.; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1.1 et seq.; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-15-01 et seq.; Ohio Rev. Stat. §
1345.01 et seq.; Okla. Stat. 15 § 751 et seq.; Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605 et seq.; 73 Pa. Stat. § 201-1
18 et seq.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-1 et seq.; S.C. Code Laws § 39-5-10 et seq.; S.D. Code Laws §
37-241 et seq.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq.; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.41 et seq.;
19 Utah Code § 13-11-1 et seq.; 9 Vt. Stat. § 2451 et seq.; Va. Code § 59.1-196 et seq.; Wash. Rev.
Code § 19.86.010 et seq.; W. Va. Code § 46A-6-101 et seq.; Wis. Stat. § 100.18 et seq.; and Wyo.
20 Stat. Ann. § 40-12-101 et seq. See Eighth Claim for Relief in Master Complaints. The Sprint
Master Complaint asserts a claim for relief under the Kentucky consumer protection statute only.
21 17
See Ninth Claim for Relief, MCI/Verizon Master Compl.; Fourteenth Claim for Relief,
22 BellSouth Master Compl.; Ninth Claim for Relief, Sprint Master Compl.; Tenth Claim for Relief,
Transworld Master Compl.; Twenty-Fourth Claim for Relief, Cingular Master Compl.
18
23 See Fifteenth Claim for Relief, BellSouth Master Compl.; Tenth Claim for Relief, Sprint
Master Compl.; Twenty-Fifth Claim for Relief, Cingular Master Compl.
24 19
See BellSouth Master Compl., Eighth Claim for Relief.
20
See id., Tenth Claim for Relief.
25 21
See Cingular Master Compl., Tenth Claim for Relief.
22
26 See id., Thirteenth Claim for Relief.
23
See id., Fourteenth Claim for Relief.
27 24
See id., Fifteenth Claim for Relief.
25
28 See id., Seventeenth Claim for Relief.
26
See id., Eighteenth and Nineteenth Claims for Relief.
593911.2
1 under Texas law. 27 The Campbell 28 and Riordan 29 cases, which the Court has declined to
2 remand, assert only non-class claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the California
3 Constitution and California Public Utilities Code Section 2891 against several AT&T defendants
4 and a Verizon defendant, respectively. These non-class claims are proceeding in parallel with the
5 Master Complaints.
6 While litigation of these state law claims, and the defenses thereto, will no doubt
7 be controlled or impacted by the Court’s rulings in Hepting, these claims have not yet been
8 asserted in Hepting 30 or addressed by the Court. Because the Court’s rulings on the state secrets
9 issues should apply equally to Plaintiffs’ state and federal claims, Plaintiffs respectfully suggest
10 that the Court’s rulings on the state secrets issues in connection with the OSC apply to Plaintiffs’
11 state law claims as well.
12 However, Plaintiffs believe that litigation of the legal elements and defenses of
13 their state law claims should be deferred for the time being, as (1) the declaratory relief,
14 injunctive relief, and statutory damages available on Class Plaintiffs’ federal statutory and
15 constitutional claims may provide sufficient redress for the ir injuries; (2) the scope of discovery
16 on the federal and state law claims appears to be the same; and (3) litigation of the elements and
17 defenses particular to state law claims at this time might bog the case down in a complex and
18 unnecessary battle over federal preemption and the elements of over 100 state statutes and the
19 defenses thereto. To avoid premature and/or unnecessary litigation over these issues, Plaintiffs
20 respectfully suggest that Defendants not be required to plead in response to Plaintiffs’ state law
21 claims, pending further order of the Court. 31
22
23
27
See id., Twenty-First Claim for Relief.
24 28
Campbell v. AT&T Communications of California, C-06-3596 VRW.
29
Riordan v. Verizon Communications, Inc., C-06-3574 VRW.
25 30
As noted above, Hepting has been determined to be the lead case against the AT&T
26 Defendants. AT&T Interim Class Counsel anticipate either amending or consolidating the
multiple cases against AT&T when the Hepting appeal is complete, and will likely add some or
27 all of the state law claims raised in the Master Complaints at that time.
31
Plaintiffs cannot anticipate all of the circumstances which might make it appropriate for
28 litigation of their state law claims to move forward, and so would oppose a stay pending
resolution of their federal claims.
593911.2
1 III. THE FACTUAL RECORD
2 The government has repeatedly acknowledged the similarity of the factual
3 allegations made in Hepting and the instant cases. See, e.g., Joint Case Management Conference
4 Statement (“Joint CMC Stmt.,” Dkt. No. 61-1) at 7:14-16 (“The transferred cases raise allegations
5 similar to those raised in Hepting and Terkel concerning the interception of communications and
6 the production of call record information”). Much of the material relied on by the Court in
7 Hepting concerned plaintiffs’ content claims. That information, and the conclusions drawn from
8 it by the Court, are equally applicable here. The Court also had before it certain information
9 concerning the call records program. But the Master Complaints, and additional information
10 from members of Congress of which the Court may take judicial notice, go considerably further.
11 This additional information, including on the record statements by three members of the Senate
12 Select Committee on Intelligence who had been briefed on the call records program by the
13 Executive branch, unequivocally confirm the existence of the call records program, and two of its
14 participants — AT&T and MCI. The relevant factual material is summarized below.
15 A. Publicly Disclosed Information About the NSA Surveillance Program That

Was Before The Court in Hepting
16
In Hepting, the Court catalogued the information that had been made public about
17
“at least two different types of alleged NSA surveillance programs ” (439 F. Supp. 2d at 986), all
18
of which is included in the Master Complaints:32
19
• The confirmation by both the President and the Attorney General of the
20 existence of the “terrorist surveillance program” first reported by the New
York Times on December 16, 2005, the scope of the program, and the
21 mechanism by which the program is authorized and reviewed. 33
22 • The May 11, 2006 revelations by USA Today that BellSouth Corp.,
Verizon Communications, Inc and AT&T were providing telephone
23 calling records of tens of millions of Americans to the NSA, which the
NSA uses “to analyze calling patterns in an effort to detect terrorist
24
32
25 See MCI/Verizon Master Compl., ¶¶ 138-41, 149-51, 153; BellSouth Master Compl., ¶¶ 38-41,
50-52, 55; Sprint Master Compl., ¶¶ 18-21, 30-32, 35; Transworld Master Compl., ¶¶ 21-24, 32-
26 34, 36; Cingular Master Compl., ¶¶ 26-29, 38-40, 43. Out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiffs
are submitting copies of the documents from which these allegations were drawn as exhibits to
27 the Declaration of Barry Himmelstein and Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Class
Plaintiffs’ Response to Order to Show Cause Why Rulings on Hepting Motions to Dismiss
28 Should Not Apply (“Himmelstein Decl.”).
33
Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 986-87. See also Himmelstein Decl., Exhs. A, B, and C.
593911.2
1 activity. ”34
2 • The release of a statement by the Attorney for Qwest Communications’

former CEO, Joseph Nacchio, which detailed how he had been asked to
3 participate in the call records program (thereby confirming its existence),
but declined to do so because of the government ’s unwillingness to provide
4 Qwest with legal process:
5 In the Fall of 2001 * * * while Mr. Nacchio was

Chairman and CEO of Qwest and was serving
6 pursuant to the President’s appointment as the
Chairman of the National Security
7 Telecommunications Advisory Committee, Qwest
was approached to permit the Government access to
8 the private telephone records of Qwest customers.
9 Mr. Nacchio made inquiry as to whether a warrant or

other legal process had been secured in support of
10 that request. When he learned that no such
authority had been granted and that there was a
11 disinclination on the part of the authorities to use
any legal process, including the Special Court which
12 had been established to handle such matters, Mr.
Nacchio concluded that these requests violated the
13 privacy requirements of the Telecommications [sic]
Act. Accordingly, Mr. Nacchio issued instructions
14 to refuse to comply with these requests. These
requests continued throughout Mr. Nacchio’s tenure
15 and until his departure in June of 2002. 35
16 • The public statements made by defendants BellSouth and Verizon denying

their involvement in the call records program. 36 The BellSouth statement
17 read in relevant part:
18 As a result of media reports that BellSouth provided massive

amounts of customer calling information under a contract with the
19 NSA, the Company conducted an internal review to determine the
facts. Based on our review to date, we have confirmed no such
20 contract exists and we have not provided bulk customer calling
records to the NSA. 37
21
Verizon stated, in relevant part:
22
One of the most glaring and repeated falsehoods in the media
23 reporting is the assertion that, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks,
Verizon was approached by NSA and entered into an arrangement
24 to provide the NSA with data from its customers’ domestic calls.
25 This is false. From the time of the 9/11 attacks until just four
26
34
Id. at 988. See also Himmelstein Decl., Exh. K at 1.
27 35
Id. See also Himmelstein Decl., Exh. N.
36
28 Id. at 988.
37
Id. See also Himmelstein Decl., Exh. Q.
593911.2
1 months ago, Verizon had three major businesses- its wireline phone
business, its wireless company and its directory publishing
2 business. It also had its own Internet Service Provider and long-
distance businesses. Contrary to the media reports, Verizon was
3 not asked by NSA to provide, nor did Verizon provide, customer
phone records from any of these businesses, or any call data from
4 those records. None of these companies-wireless or wireline-
provided customer records or call data. 38
5
• Although not quoted by the Court in Hepting, Verizon’s statement went on
6 to say:
7 Verizon cannot and will not confirm or deny whether it has any
relationship to the classified NSA program. Verizon always stands
8 ready, however, to help protect the country from terrorist attack.
We owe this duty to our fellow citizens. We also ha ve a duty, that
9 we have always fulfilled, to protect the privacy of our customers.
The two are not in conflict. When asked for help, we will always
10 make sure that any assistance is authorized by law and that our
customers’ privacy is safeguarded. 39
11
• Unlike defendants BellSouth and Verizon, neither AT&T nor the
12 government has confirmed or denied the existence of a program of
providing telephone calling records to the NSA. 40
13
B. Statements By Members of Congress Who Have Been Briefed on the Call
14 Records Program
15 While the Court in Hepting concluded that it did not have enough publicly
16 available information either from the government or the carriers to permit discovery to go
17 forward on the call records program, additional, authoritative information further confirming the
18 existence of the call records program is now available. First, members of Congress who have
19 been briefed extensively about the surveillance programs by the Administration have confirmed
20 its existence. Among them are at least three members of the Senate Select Committee on
21 Intelligence, all of whom have gone on the record confirming the existence of the records
22 program.
23 Shortly after the May 11, 2006 USA Today report on the records program, the
24 Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Kansas Senator Pat Roberts, was specifically
25 38
Id. at 988-89 (emphasis added).
39
26 News Release, Verizon Issues Statement on NSA Media Coverage (May 16, 2006), available at
http://newscenter.verizon.com/ proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=93450 (Himmelstein Decl.,
27 Exh. R). Verizon’s statement bears striking resemblance to several AT&T statements relied upon
by the Court in Hepting, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 992, indicating that, when asked, Verizon will
28 provide assistance to the government if it believes the request to be lawful.
40
Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
593911.2
1 asked about that program on the National Public Radio news program, “All Things Considered.”
2 In discussing the program, Senator Roberts expla ined how he and members of his Committee had
3 detailed knowledge of the program:
4 [Melissa] BLOCK: Let me clarify, because it seems we’re talking
about two different programs. One of which does involve
5 monitoring. It involves domestic calls to numbers overseas back
and forth. The other has to do with the collection of phone records,
6 which did not involve monitoring.
7 Regardless, I wanted to ask you about a comment from your
colleague Republican Senator Arlen Specter, who made the point
8 over the weekend that there has been no meaningful Congressional
oversight of these programs. Do you agree?
9
Senator ROBERTS: No, I don’t. Arlen has not been read into the
10 operational details of the program. I have ever since the inception
of the program, along with Senator Rockefeller and along with our
11 two counterparts in the House and along with the leadership. If you
attend these briefings, and there have been many of them, and you
12 ask tough questions and you get the answers that you want back, or
if you don’t, you go back and you ask another question and you
13 make sure of it, I don’t know what part of oversight that is not.
14 Basically, that was expanded so that we had a seven member
subcommittee. We’ve had, what, three or four hearings, numerous
15 briefings. We’ve actually gone out and seen the program at work.
We visited with the people who run it. I don’t know of any
16 program that is more scrutinized than this one, so we have had
oversight. Senator Specter has not been read into the operational
17 details and so I think that is his concern.
18 BLOCK: You’re saying that you are read into it. I’m curious then
if you’re saying that you have had oversight directly of the program
19 as has been reported, under which the NSA has collected millions
of phone records of domestic calls.
20
Senator ROBERTS: Well, basically, if you want to get into that,
21 we’re talking about business records. We’re not, you know, we’re
not listening to anybody. This isn’t a situation where if I call you,
22 you call me, or if I call home or whatever, that that conversation is
being listened to.
23
BLOCK: But those records are being kept and turned over to the
24 government?
25 Senator ROBERTS: I really can’t comment on the details of the
program. I can just tell you that basically what we have is a very
26 highly minimized military capability to detect and deter and stop
terrorist attacks and that’s precisely what it does. 41
27
41
28 Senate Intelligence Chair Readies For Hayden Hearings, NPR All Things Considered, May 17,
2006 (Himmelstein Decl., Exh. T at 2) (emphasis added).
593911.2
- 10 - CLASS PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO OSC
1 On May 16, 2006, CBS News reported that Senator “Roberts tells [CBS News
2 correspondent Gloria] Borger that the NSA was looking at the phone calls collected during the
3 surveillance, but he said not at the content, just at the pattern of phone calls.”42
4 Similarly, the same day that USA Today ran its initial story about the call records
5 program, Senator Kit Bond, another member of the same subcommittee of the Senate Intelligence
6 Committee, also confirmed that he had been briefed on the existence of the call records program,
7 this time on PBS’ The News Hour with Jim Lehrer:
8 JIM LEHRER: Senator Bond, how do you respond to that – you’re
a member – first of all, let me ask you directly. You’re a member
9 of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Did you know about this?
10 SEN. KIT BOND, R-Mo.: Yes. I’m a member of the
subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee that’s been thoroughly
11 briefed on this program and other programs.
12 ***
13 Now, to move on to the points, number one, my colleague, Senator
Leahy, is a good lawyer, and I believe that he knows, as any lawyer
14 should know, that business records are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.
15
The case of Smith v. Maryland in 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court
16 said that the government could continue to use phone records, who
called from where to where, at what time, for what length, for
17 intelligence and criminal investigations without a warrant.
18 This has been going on, and this has been gone on long before the
president's program started. . . .
19
JIM LEHRER: Excuse me, Senator Leahy, and let me just ask just
20 one follow-up question to Senator Bond so we understand what this
is about.
21
What these are, are records. And nobody then -- now, these are --
22 but there are tens of millions of records that are in this database,
right? And they say somebody, Billy Bob called Sammy Sue or
23 whatever, and that’s all it says, and then they go and try to match
them with other people?
24
SEN. KIT BOND: First, let me say that I’m not commenting on in
25 any way any of the allegations made in the news story today. I can
tell you about the president’s program.
26
The president’s program uses information collected from phone
27 companies. The phone companies keep their records. They have a
28
42
Congress To Be Briefed On NSA, CBS News, May 16, 2006 (Himmelstein Decl., Exh. W), p. 1.
593911.2
1 record. And it shows what telephone number called what other

telephone number.43
2
Former Senate Majority Leader William Frist, who, as part of the Senate
3
leadership and as an ex officio member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was briefed on the
4
call records program, also confirmed the existence of the program to CNN’s Wolf Blitzer:
5
BLITZER: Let’s talk about the surveillance program here in the
6 United States since 9/11. USA Today reported a bombshell this
week. Let me read to you from the article on Thursday.
7
“The National Security Agency has been secretly collecting the
8 phone call records of tens of millions of Americans using data
provided by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth. The NSA program
9 reaches into homes and businesses across the nation by amassing
information about the calls of ordinary Americans, most of whom
10 aren’t suspected of any crime. With access to records of billions of
domestic calls, the NSA has gained a secret window into the
11 communications habits of millions of Americans.”
12 Are you comfortable with this program?
13 FRIST: Absolutely. Absolutely. I am one of the people who are

briefed…
14
BLITZER: You’ve known about this for years.
15
FRIST: I’ve known about the program. I am absolutely convinced
16 that you, your family, our families are safer because of this
particular program. 44
17
The substance of each of these interviews is alleged in each of the Master Complaints. 45
18
In a May 16, 2006 White House Press Briefing, in response to a question whether
19
the records program “has been fully briefed to members in the United States Congress,” White
20
House Press Secretary Tony Snow responded that “all intelligence matters conducted by the
21
National Security Agency — and we’ve said this many times — have been fully briefed to a
22
handful of members of the Senate Intelligence and House Intelligence Committees and to the
23
24
25 43
PBS Online NewsHour, NSA Wire Tapping Program Revealed, May 11, 2006 (Himmelstein
Decl., Exh. L at 4-5) (emphasis added).
26 44
CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, May 14, 2006 (Himmelstein Decl., Exh. P at 13)
27 (emphasis added).
45
See MCI/Verizon Master Compl., ¶¶ 154-56; BellSouth Master Compl., ¶¶ 56-58; Sprint
28 Master Compl., ¶¶ 36-38; Transworld Master Compl., ¶¶ 37-38; Cingular Master Compl., ¶¶ 44-
46.
593911.2
1 leadership.”46
2 In a May 17, 2006 letter to then Speaker of the House of Representatives the Hon.
3 Dennis J. Hastert, the Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte, provided a list “of
4 the dates, locations, and names of members of Congress who attended briefings on the Terrorist
5 Surveillance Program,” expressly stating that “this information can be made available in an
6 unclassified format,” and that “[t]he briefings typically occurred at the White House prior to
7 December 17, 2005. After December 17, the briefings occurred at the Capitol, NSA, or the White
8 House.” Himmelstein Decl., Exh. Y. Consistent with Senator Roberts’ interview, the attached
9 list confirms that the Senator was briefed on the program on ten such occasions over a period of
10 more than three years. See id. (29-Jan-03, 17-Jul-03, 0-Mar-04, 3-Feb-05, 14-Sep-05, 11-Jan-06,
11 20-Jan-06, 11-Feb-06, 9-Mar-06, 13-Mar-06). The same list confirms that Senator Bond was
12 briefed on the program twice in March 2006, and that Senator Frist was briefed on the program in
13 March 2004 and January 2006. Id. As noted by Senator Bond in his interview, Senator Spector’s
14 name does not appear on the list. Id.
15 The same day, at a White House Press Briefing, Mr. Snow explained that while
16 such briefings had previously been limited, the full membership of the Intelligence Committees
17 would be briefed on the “the entire scope of NSA surveillance,” and not merely the contents
18 program that the President had publicly acknowledged:
19 First: Who is doing the briefings in the National Security Agency?
That is already out and about now, but it's General Keith
20 Alexander; the NSA Director is doing the briefings on the Hill.
21 ***
22 Q Okay, but the briefing is the full Senate --
23 MR. SNOW: The full Senate Intelligence Committee and the full
House Intelligence Committee -- the full Senate [Intelligence
24 Committee] today.
25 Q This seems to be a bit of a departure from what we were
previously led to believe. What's behind "the more, the merrier"?
26
MR. SNOW: What's behind -- how about "the more, the better
27
46
28 Press Briefing by Tony Snow, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 16, 2006
(Himmelstein Decl., Exh. X) at 1.
593911.2
1 informed"? As Senator Roberts said earlier today, he thought it was

an uncomfortable situation in which you would have seven
2 members fully briefed on the program as they're getting ready to do
confirmation hearings, and eight members not briefed. There was a
3 strong sense that everybody needed to be read into the program to
do what they needed, in his opinion, to do to have a full and
4 appropriate confirmation hearing for General Hayden. And we
agreed with him.
5
***
6
Q Can I go back to the NSA briefings that are going on May 17,
7 2006? Is the briefing going to be limited to the program that the
President has publicly acknowledged? Or is it going to be the entire
8 scope of NSA surveillance? Will the people who are briefed get the
full picture of what is going on?
9
MR. SNOW: Permit me to turn to my trustworthy assistants.
10
MS. PERINO: Full terrorist surveillance program.
11
MR. SNOW: Full terrorist surveillance program.
12
Press Briefing by Tony Snow, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 17, 2006
13
(Himmelstein Decl., Exh. Z), at 1-2, 8.
14
Following these briefings, on June 30, 2006, USA Today reported that:
15
Nineteen lawmakers who had been briefed on the program verified
16 that the NSA has built a database that includes records of
Americans' domestic phone calls. The program collected records of
17 the numbers dialed and the length of calls, sources have said, but
did not involve listening to the calls or recording their content.
18
• Five members of the intelligence committees said the y were told
19 by senior intelligence officials that AT&T participated in the NSA
domestic calls program.
20
***
21
• [Four lawmakers] said MCI, the long-distance carrier that Verizon
22 acquired in January, did provide call records to the government.
23 Himmelstein Decl., Exh. V at 1-2. See BellSouth Master Compl., ¶ 60; Sprint Master Compl., ¶
24 40; Transworld Master Compl., ¶ 40; Cingular Master Compl., ¶ 48.
25 C. Additional Public Disclosures Not Discussed in Hepting
26 The Master Complaints contain further public disclosures regarding the existence
27 and operation of the government’s surveillance programs, including the call records program.
28 These disclosures provide added detail about the programs:
593911.2
1 On December 24, 2005, The New York Times reported in an article

entitled, “Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report”47
2 that:
3 The National Security Agency has traced and analyzed large

volumes of telephone and Internet communications flowing
4 into and out of the United States as part of the
eavesdropping program that President Bush approved after
5 the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks to hunt for evidence of terrorist
activity, according to current and former government
6 officials. The volume of information harvested from
telecommunication data and voice networks, without court-
7 approved warrants, is much larger than the White House has
acknowledged, the officials said. It was collected by
8 tapping directly into some of the American
telecommunication system’s main arteries, they said.
9
The officials said that as part of the program, “the N.S.A.
10 has gained the cooperation of American telecommunications
companies to obtain backdoor access to streams of domestic
11 and international communications,” and that the program is
a “large data- mining operation, ” in which N.S.A.
12 technicians have combed through large volumes of phone
and Internet traffic in search of patterns that might point to
13 terrorism suspects. In addition, the article reports, “[s]everal
officials said that after President Bush’s order authorizing
14 the N.S.A. program, senior government officials arranged
with officials of some of the nation’s largest
15 telecommunications companies to gain access to switches
that act as gateways at the borders between the United
16 States’ communication networks and international
networks.”
17
In a January 3, 2006 article entitled, “Tinker, Tailor, Miner, Spy”
18 (available at
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2133564), 48
19 Slate.com reported:
20 The agency [the NSA] used to search the transmissions it

monitors for key words, such as names and phone numbers,
21 which are supplied by other intelligence agencies that want
to track certain individuals. But now the NSA appears to be
22 vacuuming up all data, generally without a particular phone
line, name, or e- mail address as a target. Reportedly, the
23 agency is analyzing the length of a call, the time it was
placed, and the origin and destination of electronic
24 transmissions.
25 In a January 17, 2006 article, “Spy Agency Data After Sept. 11 Led
F.B.I. to Dead Ends,”49 The New York Times stated that officials
26 who were briefed on the N.S.A. program said that:
27 47
Himmelstein Decl., Exh. D at 1-2.
48
28 Himmelstein Decl., Exh. E at 2.
49
Himmelstein Decl., Exh. F at 2-3.
593911.2
1 the agency collected much of the data passed on to the

F.B.I. as tips by tracing phone numbers in the United States
2 called by suspects overseas, and then by following the
domestic numbers to other numbers called. In other cases,
3 lists of phone numbers appeared to result from the agency’s
computerized scanning of communications coming into and
4 going out of the country for names and keywords that might
be of interest.
5
A January 20, 2006 article in the National Journal, “NSA Spy
6 Program Hinges On State-of-the-Art Technology, ”50 reported that:
7 Officials with some of the nation’s leading

telecommunications companies have said they gave the
8 NSA access to their switches, the hubs through which
enormous volumes of phone and e- mail traffic pass every
9 day, to aid the agency’s effort to determine exactly whom
suspected Qaeda figures were calling in the United States
10 and abroad and who else was calling those numbers. The
NSA used the intercepts to construct webs of potentia lly
11 interrelated persons.
12 In a January 21, 2006 article in Bloomberg News entitled

“Lawmaker Queries Microsoft, Other Companies on NSA
13 Wiretaps,”51 Daniel Berninger, a senior analyst at Tier 1 Research
in Plymouth, Minnesota, said,
14
in the past, the NSA ha s gotten permission from phone
15 companies to gain access to so-called switches, high-
powered computers into which phone traffic flows and is
16 redirected, at 600 locations across the nation. . . . From these
corporate relationships, the NSA can get the content of calls
17 and records on their date, time, length, origin and
destination.
18
On February 5, 2006, an article appearing in the Washington Post
19 entitled “Surveillance Net Yields Few Suspects”52 stated that
officials said “[s]urveillance takes place in several stages . . . the
20 earliest by machine. Computer-controlled systems collect and sift
basic information about hundreds of thousands of faxes, e- mails
21 and telephone calls into and out of the United States before
selecting the ones for scrutiny by human eyes and hears.
22 Successive stages of filtering grow more intrusive as artificial
intelligence systems rank voice and data traffic in order of likeliest
23 interest to human analysts.” The article continues, “[f]or years,
including in public testimony by Hayden, the agency [the NSA] has
24 acknowledged use of automated equipment to analyze the contents
and guide analysts to the most important ones. According to one
25 knowledgeable source, the warrantless program also uses those
methods. That is significant . . . because this kind of filtering
26 intrudes into content, and machines ‘listen’ to more Americans than
27 50
Himmelstein Decl., Exh. G at 2.
51
28 Himmelstein Decl., Exh. H at 1.
52
Himmelstein Decl., Exh. I at 1, 5.
593911.2
1 humans do.”
2 On February 6, 2006, in an article entitled “Telecoms let NSA spy

on calls,”53 the nationwide newspaper USA Today reported that
3 “[t]he National Security Agency has secured the cooperation of
large telecommunications companies, including AT&T, MCI and
4 Sprint, in its efforts to eavesdrop without warrants on international
calls by suspected terrorists, according to seven
5 telecommunications executives.” The article acknowledged that
The New York Times had previously reported that the
6 telecommunications companies had been cooperating with the
government but had not revealed the names of the companies
7 involved. In addition, it stated that long-distance carriers AT&T,
MCI, and Sprint “all own ‘gateway’ switches capable of routing
8 calls to points around the globe,” and that “[t]elecommunications
executives say MCI, AT&T, and Sprint grant the access to their
9 systems without warrants or court orders. Instead, they are
cooperating on the basis of oral requests from senior government
10 officials.”
11 ***
12 On May 29, 2006, Seymour Hersh reported in The New Yorker in

an article entitled “Listening In”54 that a security consultant
13 working with a major telecommunications carrier “told me that his
client set up a top-secret high-speed circuit between its main
14 computer complex and Quantico, Virginia, the site of a
government- intelligence computer center. This link provided direct
15 access to the carrier’s network core – the critical area of its system,
where all its data are stored. ‘What the companies are doing is
16 worse than turning over records,’ the consultant said. ‘They’re
providing total access to all the data.’”
17
MCI/Verizon Master Compl., ¶¶ 142-48, 157. See also BellSouth Master Compl., ¶¶ 42-49, 59;
18
Sprint Master Compl., ¶¶ 22-29, 39; Transworld Master Compl., ¶¶ 25-31, 39; Cingular Master
19
Compl., ¶¶ 30-37, 47.
20
IV. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, THE COURT’S RULINGS ON THE STATE SECRETS
21 ISSUES IN HEPTING ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE HERE
22 In Hepting, the United States moved to intervene in order to assert the state secrets
23 privilege, and moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on the privilege. While the
24 government has not as yet intervened in any of the cases made part of this MDL proceeding other
25 than Hepting and Terkel, 55 it has stated that if the other cases are not stayed, “the Government
26
53
Himmelstein Decl., Exh. J at 1-2.
27 54
Himmelstein Decl., Exh. U at 1.
55
28 Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Terkel”) (N.D. Ill. Case No. 06-
C-2837).
593911.2
1 expects to assert the state secrets privilege in all the cases currently transferred.” Joint CMC
2 Stmt., at 26:15-16. To avoid unnecessary litigation over the propriety of intervention, Plaintiffs
3 are willing to stipulate to intervention by the government in each of the cases for the limited
4 purpose of asserting the state secrets privilege.
5 In Hepting, the Court agreed that “that the government has satisfied the three
6 threshold requirements for properly asserting the state secrets privilege: (1) the head of the
7 relevant department, Director of National Intelligence John D Negroponte (2) has lodged a formal
8 claim of privilege (3) after personally considering the matter. Moreover, the Director of the NSA,
9 Lieutenant General Keith B Alexander, has filed a declaration supporting Director Negroponte’s
10 assertion of the privilege.” Id. at 993 (citations omitted). While the government may choose not
11 to re-submit these declarations in response to the Court’s order to show cause, the unclassified
12 versions of the declarations remain part of the record in this multidistrict litigation proceeding,
13 and the government has expressly confirmed that “[t]his MDL proceeding presents the same state
14 secrets privilege issues that previously have been raised by the United States in the Hepting and
15 Terkel actions.” Joint CMC Stmt. at 15:10-12. Indeed, the government has complained that it
16 would be a “burdensome undertaking” to require it to relitigate the state secrets issues (id. at
17 22:19). As with intervention, Plaintiffs are willing to spare the government this effort, and will
18 stipulate that both the public and non-public versions of the declarations submitted by the
19 government in connection with the motions to dismiss in Hepting may be considered by the Court
20 in ruling on its order to show cause. 56
21 In Hepting, the government argued that the state secrets privilege required
22 dismissal of the action or granting summary judgment for AT&T on numerous grounds, including
23 that:
24 (1) the very subject matter of this case is a state secret; (2)
plaintiffs cannot make a prima facie case for their claims without
25 classified evidence and (3) the privilege effectively deprives AT&T
of information necessary to raise valid defenses.
26
Id. at 985. The Court also considered whether the Hepting claims were barred by the categorical
27
56
28 By so stipulating, Plaintiffs do not waive the right to seek to have the declarations or portions
thereof unsealed.
593911.2
1 Totten/Tenet bar. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1
2 (2005). Each of these arguments is addressed separately below. 57
3 A. The Categorical Totten/Tenet Bar Does Not Apply
4 As the Supreme Court recently observed, the “categorical Totten bar” is limited to
5 “the distinct class of cases that depend upon clandestine spy relationships.” Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9.
6 As this Court observed in Hepting, in distinguishing these cases:
7 Totten and Tenet are not on point to the extent they hold that former
spies cannot enforce agreements with the government because the
8 parties implicitly agreed that such suits would be barred. The
implicit notion in Totten was one of equitable estoppel: one who
9 agrees to conduct covert operations impliedly agrees not to reveal
the agreement even if the agreement is breached. But AT&T, the
10 alleged spy, is not the plaintiff here. In this case, plaintiffs made no
agreement with the government and are not bound by any implied
11 covenant of secrecy.
12 ***
13 The court’s conclusion here follows the path set in Halkin v. Helms
and Ellsberg v. Mitchell, the two cases most factually similar to the
14 present. The Halkin and Ellsberg courts did not preclude suit
because of a Totten-based implied covenant of silence. . . . [T]he
15 court sees no reason to apply the Totten bar here.
16 Id. at 991, 993. Accord Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 907 (distinguishing Totten and Tenet on same
17 grounds).
18 The Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to Defendants. Plaintiffs, and the
19 members of the classes they seek to represent, are the objects of the alleged espionage, not its
20 agents. They “made no agreement with the government and are not bound by any implied
21 covenant of secrecy. ” 439 F. Supp. 2d at 991. On the contrary, Plaintiffs were assured by
22 Defendants via their respective privacy policies that the confidentiality of Plaintiffs’
23 communications and records would be maintained inviolate, except as required by law. 58 If
24
57
25 As set forth above, Plaintiffs are willing to defer litigation on the elements of their state law
claims. However, the Court’s rulings in Hepting on the state secrets issue and federal statutory
26 privileges are equally applicable to Plaintiffs’ state law claims, which are based on common
factual allegations. Accordingly, the Court’s rulings on these issues should apply to the state law
27 claims asserted in the Master Complaints, Campbell, and Riordan.
58
See MCI/Verizon Master Compl., ¶¶ 179-81, 268, 274; BellSouth Master Compl., ¶¶ 203, 208,
28 213; Sprint Master Compl., ¶¶ 140, 144, 149; Transworld Master Compl., ¶¶ 174, 179; Cingular
Master Compl., ¶¶ 211, 229-30, 237, 265, 269, 274.
593911.2
1 Plaintiffs had any expectations arising out of their contractual relationships with their carriers, it
2 was that their carriers would abide by these policies and obey the law, not engineer their
3 wholesale violation. Accordingly, the categorical Totten/Tenet bar does not apply.
4 B. The Very Subject Matter of the Actions is Not a State Secret
5 As the Court noted, “no case dismissed because its ‘very subject matter’ was a
6 state secret involved ongoing, widespread violations of individual constitutional rights, as
7 plaintiffs allege here.” Id. at 993. Plaintiffs hasten to add that they are unaware of any case
8 dismissed on state secret grounds which involved anything remotely approaching the widespread
9 violations of federal privacy statutes alleged here, which define the permissible bounds of
10 behavior for telecommunications carriers. By contrast, the Court noted that “most cases in which
11 the ‘very subject matter’ was a state secret involved classified details about either a highly
12 technical invention or a covert espionage relationship.” Id. (citations omitted). As in Hepting,
13 these cases involve neither, and “focus[] only on whether [Defendants] intercepted and disclosed
14 communications or communications records to the government.” Id. at 994. As the Court held in
15 Hepting, given the “significant amounts of information about the government’s monitoring of
16 communications content” already in the public record (see Part III.A., supra), “the very subject
17 matter of this action is hardly a secret,” and the actions should not be dismissed on that ground.
18 Id.59
19 C. Dismissal on Evidentiary Grounds Would Be Premature
20 In Hepting, the Court held that it would be “premature” to “decide at this time
21 whether this case should be dismissed on the ground that the government’s state secrets assertion
22 will preclude evidence necessary for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case or for AT&T to
23 raise a valid defense to the claims.” 439 F. Supp. 2d at 994. In so holding, the Court noted its
24 subsequent finding that “Plaintiffs appear to be entitled to at least some discovery,” and followed
25 the approach taken in other cases of “allow[ing] them to proceed to discovery sufficiently to
26 assess the state secrets privilege in light of the facts.” Id. Just as “[t]he government has not
27
59
28 See also, Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 908 (finding that “the very subject matter of this lawsuit is
not necessarily a state secret”).
593911.2
1 shown why that should not be the course of this litigation [Hepting]” (id.), there is no reason to
2 depart from the Court’s holding here.
3 D. The Existence or Non-Existence of a Certification Is Not a State Secret
4 In Hepting, the government argued that “the issue whether AT&T received a
5 certification authorizing its assistance to the government is a state secret.” Id. at 995. The Court
6 held that, given that the government had admitted monitoring international-domestic
7 communications where it suspects that one party to the communication is affiliated with al Qaeda:
8 revealing whether AT&T has received a certification to assist in
monitoring communication content should not reveal any new
9 information that would assist a terrorist and adversely affect
national security. And if the government has not been truthful, the
10 state secrets privilege should not serve as a shield for its false
public statements.
11
Id. at 996. The disclosures found dispositive by the Court are not carrier-specific, and apply
12
equally to all Defendants. Accordingly, the court’s conclusion “that the state secrets privilege
13
will not prevent AT&T from asserting a certification-based defense, as appropriate, regarding
14
allegations that it assisted the government in monitoring communication content,” is equally
15
applicable here. 60
16
Indeed, the government's recent submission (Dkt. 127) stating that “any electronic
17
surveillance that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) will now be
18
conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,” eliminates any
19
secrecy concerning the existence or non-existence of a certification, and makes it appropriate for
20
the Court to proceed under 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f), which requires that the Court “shall,
21
notwithstanding any other law, . . . review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such
22
other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the
23
surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and conducted.”
24
E. The Statutory Privileges Do Not Warrant Dismissal
25
Finally, in Hepting, the government argued that dismissal was required by two
26
“statutory privileges,” 50 U.S.C. § 402 note, §6, which protects “information with respect to the
27
60
28 The issue of whether the existence of the records program remains a genuine “secret” is
addressed in Part V, infra.
593911.2
1 activities” of the NSA, and 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1), which requires the Director of National
2 Intelligence to “protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” Id. at
3 998. The Court rejected this argument, because “[n]either of these provisions by their terms
4 requires the court to dismiss this action and it would be premature for the court to do so at this
5 time.” Id. 61 As the Court’s holding is based on its interpretation of these statutes, not on facts
6 unique to AT&T, the Court’s holding is equally applicable here.
7 V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONFIRMS THAT THE RECORDS PROGRAM
IS NOT A SECRET
8
A. The Court’s Ruling in Hepting
9
In determining whether the existence of the records program is a secret for
10
purposes of the state secrets privilege, the Court noted that it “may rely upon reliable public
11
evidence that might otherwise be inadmissible at trial because it does not comply with the
12
technical requirements of the rules of evidence.” 439 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (citing Fed. R. Evid.
13
104(a)). The Court reiterated that it would consider only “publicly reported information that
14
possesses substantial indicia of reliability.” Id. at 990. Accord Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 913
15
(“the focus should be on information that bears persuasive indication of reliability”). Applying
16
this standard, the Court declined to “rely on media reports about the alleged NSA programs
17
because their reliability is unclear,” in light of conflicting reports regarding the involvement of
18
Verizon and BellSouth in the records program. Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 991. The Court also
19
declined to consider the Klein declaration in making its determination because “the inferences
20
Klein draws have been disputed,” and expressed concern that considering it “would invite
21
attempts to undermine the privilege by mere assertions of knowledge by an interested party. ” Id.
22
23
61
24 In Terkel, the Court expressed concern that if “section 6 is taken to its to its logical conclusion,
it would allow the federal government to conceal information regarding blatantly illegal or
25 unconstitutional activities simply by assigning these activities to the NSA or claiming they
implicated informa tion about the NSA’s functions,” and was “hard-pressed to read section 6 as
26 essentially trumping every other Congressional enactment and Constitutional provision.” 441 F.
Supp. 2d at 905. Plaintiffs concur wholeheartedly with this wise judicial pronouncement. With
27 respect to § 403-1(i)(1), the Court observed that “the plaintiffs have sued only AT&T and are
seeking discovery only from that entity, not the Director of National Intelligence, the NSA, or any
28 governmental agency. Under these circumstances, section [403-1(i)(1)] does not by itself bar
prosecution of this case.” Id. at 906.
593911.2
1 at 990. 62
2 Having eliminated the only other proffered sources of information, in making its
3 determination, the Court considered “only public admissions or denials by the government,
4 AT&T and other telecommunications companies, which are the parties indisputably situated to
5 disclose whether and to what extent the alleged programs exist.” Id.
6 Considering this limited set of information, the Court concluded that:
7 despite many public reports on the matter, the government has
neither confirmed nor denied whether it monitors communication
8 records and has never publicly disclosed whether the NSA program
reported by USA Today on May 11, 2006, actually exists.
9 Although BellSouth, Verizon and Qwest have denied participating
in this program, AT&T has neither confirmed nor denied its
10 involvement. Hence, unlike the program monitoring
communication content, the general contours and even the existence
11 of the alleged communication records program remain unclear.
12 Id. at 997. However, the Court stressed that:
13 While this case has been pending, the government and
telecommunications companies have made substantial public
14 disclosures on the alleged NSA programs. It is conceivable that
these entities might disclose, either deliberately or accidentally,
15 other pertinent information about the communication records
program as this litigation proceeds. The court recognizes such
16 disclosures might make this program’s existence or non-existence
no longer a secret. Accordingly, while the court presently declines
17 to permit any discovery regarding the alleged communication
records program, if appropriate, plaintiffs can request that the court
18 revisit this issue in the future.
19 Id. at 997-98. The additional disclosures highlighted below fully warrant such revisitation.
20 B. The Existence of The Records Program Has Been Acknowledged by Nineteen
Members of Congress Briefed on the Program by the NSA
21
While the May 11, 2006 USA Today story reporting the existence of the records
22
program may have contained inaccuracies regarding the participants in the program, rendering its
23
“reliability unclear,” those inaccuracies have been corrected. As a result of the discussions,
24
briefings, and disclosures generated by that article, what emerges is a coherent and consistent
25
story bearing “substantial indicia of reliability.” These disclosures leave no reasonable doubt that
26
62
27 Plaintiffs do not concede that Mr. Klein is an “interested party,” or that the inferences drawn by
the Hepting plaintiffs can reasonably be disputed, but as the Klein declaration is not directly at
28 issue with respect to Defendants other than AT&T, Plaintiffs need not take issue with either point
here.
593911.2
1 the records program exists, and that at a minimum, AT&T and Verizon’s recently-acquired
2 subsidiary, MCI, gave the NSA access to customer call records.
3 Within days following publication of the May 11 story, which reported that Qwest
4 Communications had refused to participate in the program, the former CEO of Qwest — a person
5 “indisputably situated to disclose whether and to what extent the alleged programs exist” —
6 issued a statement publicly confirming that he was repeatedly requested “to permit the
7 Government access to the private telephone records of Qwest customers” without “a warrant or
8 other legal process,” but refused to comply because he “concluded that these requests violated the
9 privacy requirements of the Telecommications [sic] Act.” Himmelstein Decl., Exh. N.
10 Within a week following publication of the May 11 story, the Chairman of the
11 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, another of its members, and the Senate Majority Leader
12 were interviewed concerning the story on NPR, PBS, and CNN, respectively, confirmed that they
13 had been extensively briefed on the records program, establishing their knowledge; and
14 confirmed its existence, although they declined to discuss its details. The Director of National
15 Intelligence confirmed publicly and in writing that each of these Senators had been briefed
16 repeatedly on the NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program, and that such briefings had taken place
17 at the White House, at the Capitol, and at the itself NSA, as Senator Roberts had described. See
18 Part III.B., supra. Compare Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (complaining that there was no way
19 for the Court to determine whether the cited media reports were “based on information from
20 persons who would have reliable knowledge about the existence or non-existence of the activity
21 alleged”).
22 Significantly, the public statements of Senators Bond and Roberts were not before
23 the Courts in Hepting or Terkel. The fact that these Senators oversaw the program from The
24 Capitol rather than The White House makes them no less statements by informed and credible
25 government officials possessing “substantial indicia of reliability.” See Jabara v. Kelley, 75
26 F.R.D. 475, 493 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (in view of report of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
27 disclosing name of federal agency “that has admittedly intercepted plaintiff's personal
28 communications without prior court approval,” it “would be a farce to conclude that the name of
593911.2
1 this other federal agency remains a military or state secret”). Considered in conjunction with
2 additional published reports confirming the existence of the records program, the public status of
3 the program can no longer reasonably be disputed.
4 Beginning on May 17, 2006, the Director of the NSA, Lt. General Keith B.
5 Alexander, briefed the full membership of the Intelligence Committees on the “full” scope of
6 NSA surveillance activities. Himmelstein Decl., Exh. Z, at 1-2, 8. Following these briefings, on
7 June 30, 2006, with its journalistic integrity under attack by Verizon and BellSouth, who had
8 denied participation in the records program, USA Today “set the record straight” in an article
9 entitled “Lawmakers: NSA database incomplete” (the “June 30 article”). 63 In a sidebar, “A Note
10 To Our Readers,” the paper acknowledged the controversy, explaining that:
11 USA TODAY continued to pursue details of the database, speaking
with dozens of sources in the telecommunications, intelligence and
12 legislative communities, including interviews with members of
Congress who have been briefed by senior intelligence officials on
13 the domestic calls program.
14 In the adjoining article, USA TODAY reports that five members of
the congressional intelligence committees said they had been told in
15 secret briefings that BellSouth did not turn over call records to the
NSA, three lawmakers said they had been told that Verizon had not
16 participated in the NSA database, and four said that Verizon’s
subsidiary MCI did turn over records to the NSA.
17
Himmelstein Decl., Exh. V at 1-2. The article also reported that nineteen members of the Senate
18
and House Intelligence Committees who had been briefed on the records program confirmed its
19
existence:
20
Members of the House and Senate intelligence committees confirm
21 that the National Security Agency has compiled a massive database
of domestic phone call records. But some lawmakers also say that
22 cooperation by the nation’s telecommunication companies was not
as extensive as first reported by USA TODAY on May 11.
23
Several lawmakers, briefed in secret by intelligence officials about
24 the program after the story was published, described a call records
25
63
The Hepting plaintiffs filed their opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss on June 8,
26 2006 (see Hepting Dkt. No. 181), three weeks before publication of the June 30 article, and the
motion was argued on June 23, 2006, one week before publication of the article. While the
27 Hepting plaintiffs moved to supplement the record with the article (Dkt. No. 299), that motion
was never ruled upon, and the sole reference to the article in Hepting is the statement that
28 “BellSouth and Verizon’s denials have been at least somewhat substantiated in later reports.” 439
F. Supp. 2d at 989.
593911.2
1 database that is enormous but incomplete. Most asked that they not
be identified by name, and many offered only limited responses to
2 questions, citing national security concerns.
3 In the May 11 article that revealed the database, USA TODAY

reported that its sources said AT&T, BellSouth and Verizon had
4 agreed to provide the NSA with call records.
5 AT&T, which is the nation’s largest telecommunications company,

providing service to tens of millions of Americans, hasn’t
6 confirmed or denied its participation with the database. BellSouth
and Verizon have denied that they contracted with the NSA to turn
7 over phone records. On May 12, an attorney for former Qwest
CEO Joseph Nacchio confirmed the USA TODAY report that
8 Qwest had declined to participate in the NSA program.
9 Most members of the intelligence committees wouldn’t discuss

which companies cooperated with the NSA. However, several did
10 offer more information about the program’s breadth and scope,
confirming some elements of USA TODAY’s report and
11 contradicting others:
12 • Nineteen lawmakers who had been briefed on the program

verified that the NSA has built a database that includes records of
13 Americans’ domestic phone calls. The program collected records
of the numbers dialed and the length of calls, sources have said, but
14 did not involve listening to the calls or recording their content.
15 • Five members of the intelligence committees said they were told

by senior intelligence officials that AT&T participated in the NSA
16 domestic calls program.
17 ***
18 • Five members of the intelligence committees said they were told

that BellSouth did not turn over domestic call records to the NSA.
19
***
20
• Three lawmakers said that they had been told that Verizon did not
21 turn over call records to the NSA. However, those three and
another lawmaker said MCI, the long-distance carrier that Verizon
22 acquired in January, did provide call records to the government.
23 Himmelstein Decl., Exh. V at 1-2 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs respectfully submit that
24 confirmation by nineteen members of Congress briefed on the program by the NSA, reported by a
25 reputable national newspaper that had an unusually strong interest in ensuring the accuracy of its
26 reporting, bears “substantial indicia of reliability, ” even if the members are not identified by
27 name, especially when considered in conjunction with “on-the-record” confirmations by three
28 members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Nacchio statement buttresses this conclusion
593911.2
1 even further.
2 In Hepting, the Court declined to “estimate the risk tolerances of terrorists in
3 making their communications and hence eschew[ed] the attempt to weigh the value of the
4 information. ” 439 F. Supp. 2d at 990. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that in determining whether
5 the existence of the records program, and the identity of the participating carriers, remains a
6 “secret” for purposes of the state secrets privilege, the Court must assume that potential terrorists
7 possess at least a modicum of common sense. Common sense requires potential terrorists to
8 assume that the records program exists, and that AT&T and MCI have provided their customers’
9 call detail records to the NSA. Accordingly, the program, and the participation of these carriers,
10 is no longer a “secret,” and Plaintiffs should be permitted discovery on their records claims. 64
11 C. Verizon Has Tacitly Admitted That MCI Participated in the Records
Program
12
Verizon’s purported “denials,” like BellSouth’s, are fully consistent with the June
13
30 article. Verizon’s carefully worded, May 16, 2006 “denial” bears repeating:
14
From the time of the 9/11 attacks until just four months ago,
15 Verizon had three major businesses-its wireline phone business, its
wireless company and its directory publishing business. It also had
16 its own Internet Service Provider and long-distance businesses.
Contrary to the media reports, Verizon was not asked by NSA to
17 provide, nor did Verizon provide, customer phone records from any
of these businesses, or any call data from those records. None of
18 these companies-wireless or wireline-provided customer records or
call data. 65
19
On May 16, 2006, USA Today reported that:
20
Verizon’s [May 16, 2006] statement does not mention MCI, the
21 long-distance carrier the company bought in January. Before the
sale, Verizon sold long-distance under its own brand. Asked to
22 elaborate on what role MCI had, or is having, in the NSA program,
spokesman Peter Thonis said the statement was about Verizon, not
23 MCI.
24 MCI/Verizon Master Compl., ¶ 162; Himmelstein Decl., Exh. S at 2 (emphasis added). Taken
25 together, these two statements — vehemently denying Verizon’s own participation in the
26
64
27 If the Court agrees that the additional information justifies discovery concerning the records
claims against the other carriers, discovery concerning those claims against AT&T should be
28 permitted as well.
65
Id. at 988-89 (emphasis added).
593911.2
1 program, but refusing to deny the participation of its newly-acquired subsidiary, MCI — amount
2 to a tacit admission that MCI did in fact participate in the program. Cf. Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d
3 at 997-98 (“It is conceivable that [the telecommunications companies] might disclose, either
4 deliberately or accidentally, other pertinent information about the communication records
5 program” that might make the program’s “existence or non-existence no longer a secret”)
6 (emphasis added). This inescapable conclusion is reinforced by another press release issued by
7 Verizon the day after the May 11 story was published, entitled “Verizon Issues Statement on
8 NSA and Privacy Protection”:
9 Verizon will provide customer information to a government
agency only where authorized by law for appropriately-
10 defined and focused purposes. . . . Verizon does not, and
will not, provide any government agency unfettered access
11 to our customer records or provide information to the
government under circumstances that would allow a fishing
12 expedition.
13 In January 2006, Verizon acquired MCI, and we are
ensuring that Verizon’s policies are implemented at that
14 entity and that all its activities fully comply with law.
15 MCI/Verizon Master Compl., ¶ 160; Himmelstein Decl., Exh. M (emphasis added). Read in
16 conjunction with Verizon’s May 16 statements, the clear implication of this dichotomous
17 statement is that while Verizon did not provide the government with access to its customers’
18 records, the same could not be said for MCI.
19 D. Discovery Concerning the Existence of Any Certifications Concerning the
Records Program Received by Verizon and/or BellSouth Must Be Permitted
20
The fact that Verizon and BellSouth have issued denials concerning the call
21
records program is significant for another reason. In Hepting, the Court noted that “[i]mportantly,
22
the public denials by these telecommunications companies undercut the government and AT&T’s
23
contention that revealing AT&T’s involvement or lack thereof in the [records] program would
24
disclose a state secret.” Hepting, 439 F. Supp.2d at 997. The Court’s observation is even more
25
apt here. Given that Verizon and BellSouth have voluntarily issued public denials via press
26
release, it would be anomalous to hold that Plaintiffs are precluded from requiring these
27
defendants to respond under oath to carefully tailored requests for admissions and interrogatories
28
593911.2
1 concerning the accuracy of their statements. As the Court held with respect to the government ’s
2 admissions concerning the content program:
3 Based on these public disclosures, the court cannot conclude that
the existence of a certification regarding the “communication
4 content ” program is a state secret. If the government’s public
disclosures have been truthful, revealing whether AT&T has
5 received a certification to assist in monitoring communication
content should not reveal any new information that would assist a
6 terrorist and adversely affect national security. And if the
government has not been truthful, the state secrets privilege should
7 not serve as a shield for its false public statements. In short, the
government has opened the door for judicial inquiry by publicly
8 confirming and denying material information about its monitoring
of communication content.
9
Id. at 996. Consistent with this holding, discovery concerning the existence of any certifications
10
concerning the records program received by Verizon and/or BellSouth must be permitted.
11
E. The Wholesale Violation of Federal Privacy Laws Cannot Be a “State Secret”
12
Finally, Plaintiffs join in the Hepting plaintiffs’ argument that “Congress, through
13
various statutes, has limited the state secrets privilege in the context of electronic surveillance and
14
has abrogated the privilege regarding the existence of a government certification. ” 439 F. Supp.
15
2d at 998. Congress has enacted, and the President has signed into law, numerous statutes whose
16
sole purpose is to prevent the government from intruding on the privacy of its citizens. Plaintiffs
17
respectfully submit that the who lesale violation of these laws cannot be allowed to continue
18
merely because the violations have occurred in secret. If it is a secret, it is not a secret that the
19
law countenances be kept; it is a secret that must come out, or the rights conferred by these
20
statutes — and the Fourth Amendment — become meaningless.
21
In Hepting, the Court “decline[d] to address these issues presently, particularly
22
because the issues might very well be obviated by future public disclosures by the government
23
and AT&T, ” but stated that “[i]f necessary, the court may revisit these arguments at a later stage
24
of this litigation. ” Id. at 998. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that if confirmation of the existence
25
of the program by 19 informed members of Congress is not sufficient to obviate these issues, it is
26
time for the Court to address them.
27
28
593911.2
1 VI. THE COURT’S RULINGS ON AT&T’S MOTION TO DISMISS ARE EQUALLY

APPLICABLE HERE
2
A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Pursue Their Claims
3
In Hepting, AT&T argued that plaintiffs had “not sufficiently alleged injury- in-
4
fact” to establish standing under the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the U.S.
5
Constitution, and that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their federal statutory claims “‘because
6
the FAC alleges no facts suggesting that their statutory rights have been violated’ and ‘the FAC
7
alleges nothing to suggest that the named plaintiffs were themselves subject to surveillance.’” Id.
8
at 1000 (emphasis in original). The Court rejected these arguments, and held that plaintiffs had
9
established both Article III standing and standing to pursue their federal statutory claims, on
10
grounds equally applicable here:
11
AT&T ignores that the gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that
12 AT&T has created a dragnet that collects the content and records of
its customers’ communications. The court cannot see how any one
13 plaintiff will have failed to demonstrate injury- in- fact if that
plaintiff effectively demonstrates that all class members have so
14 suffered. . . . As long as the named plaintiffs were, as they allege,
AT&T customers during the relevant time period, the alleged
15 dragnet would have imparted a concrete injury on each of them. [¶]
This conclusion is not altered simply because the alleged injury is
16 widely shared among AT&T customers.
17 Id. at 1000. The only other court to examine the standing issue reached the same conclusion. See
18 Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (allegations based on media reports “that the government intends
19 to collect and analyze all domestic telephone records, that AT&T has already released large
20 quantities of records, and that federal intelligence gathering agencies have focused on their efforts
21 on large metropolitan areas like Chicago . . . sufficiently alleged that [plaintiffs] are suffering a
22 particularized injury for which they can seek relief, ” and claimed “ongoing violation of
23 [plaintiffs’] statutory rights under section 2702(a)(3) . . . in itself is sufficient to establish
24 standing”).
25 In Hepting, AT&T further argued “that the state secrets privilege bars plaintiffs
26 from establishing standing.” 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. The Court rejected this argument as well,
27 on grounds equally applicable here:
28 [A]s described above, the state secrets privilege will not prevent
593911.2
1 plaintiffs from receiving at least some evidence tending to establish

the factual predicate for the injury- in- fact underlying their claims
2 directed at AT&T’s alleged involvement in the monitoring of
communication content. And the court recognizes that additional
3 facts might very well be revealed during, but not as a direct
consequence of, this litigation that obviate many of the secrecy
4 concerns currently at issue regarding the alleged communication
records program. Hence, it is unclear whether the privilege would
5 necessarily block AT&T from revealing information about its
participation, if any, in that alleged program.
6
Id. at 1001 (internal citations omitted).
7
B. Plaintiffs Have Alleged the Absence of a Certification
8
In Hepting, AT&T argued that “telecommunications providers are immune from
9
suit if they receive a government certification [under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) or 18 U.S.C. §
10
2703(e)] authorizing them to conduct electronic surveillance,” and “that plaintiffs have the burden
11
to plead affirmatively that AT&T lacks such a certification and that plaintiffs have failed to do so
12
here, thereby making dismissal appropriate.” Id. at 1001 (citation omitted). The Court rejected
13
this argument, finding that:
14
[T]he court need not decide whether plaintiffs must plead
15 affirmatively the absence of a certification because the present
complaint, liberally construed, alleges that AT&T acted outside the
16 scope of any government certification it might have received.
17 ***
18 Plaintiffs contend that the phrase “occurred without judicial or other

lawful autho rization” means that AT&T acted without a warrant or
19 a certification. . . . [¶] . . . [P]aragraph 81 could be reasonably
interpreted as alleging just that.
20
***
21
In sum, even if plaintiffs were required to plead affirmatively that
22 AT&T did not receive a certification authorizing its alleged actions,
plaintiffs’ complaint can fairly be interpreted as alleging just that.
23
Id. at 1002-03.66
24
As set forth above, in Hepting, the dispute focused on whether or not plaintiffs
25
26
66
Plaintiffs respectfully disagree with the Court’s suggestion that “a lack of certification is an
27 element of a Title III claim” under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (id. at 1002), as opposed to an affirmative
defense, and incorporate by reference the Hepting plaintiffs’ briefing and argument on this issue
28 as if fully set forth herein. However, as it is equally unnecessary to resolve this issue here,
Plaintiffs will not burden the Court with such unnecessary and/or duplicative briefing.
593911.2
1 had implicitly alleged that AT&T had not received a certification under either 18 U.S.C. §
2 2511(2)(a)(ii) or 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e). Here, Plaintiffs have expressly alleged the absence of any
3 such certification. 67 Because the Hepting plaintiffs’ implicit allegation was sufficient to pass
4 muster, a fortiori, Plaintiffs’ explicit allegations that Defendants did not receive certifications also
5 suffice.
6 C. Defendants Have No Common Law Immunity
7 In Hepting, AT&T argued that “the complaint should be dismissed because it
8 failed to plead the absence of an absolute common law immunity to which AT&T claims to be
9 entitled.” Id. at 1003. The Court rejected this argument as well, concluding that:
10 [E]ven if a common law immunity existed decades ago, applying it
presently would undermine the carefully crafted scheme of claims
11 and defenses that Congress established in subsequently enacted
statutes. For example, all of the cases cited by AT&T as applying
12 the common law “immunity” were filed before the certification
provision of FISA went into effect. That provision protects a
13 telecommunications provider from suit if it obtains from the
Attorney General or other authorized government official a written
14 certification “that no warrant or court order is required by law, that
all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified
15 assistance is required.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B). Because the
common law “immunity” appears to overlap considerably with the
16 protections afforded under the certification provision, the court
would in essence be nullifying the procedural requirements of that
17 statutory provision by applying the common law “immunity” here.
And given the shallow doctrinal roots of immunity for
18 communications carriers at the time Congress enacted the statutes
in play here, there is simply no reason to presume that a common
19 law immunity is available simply because Congress has not
expressed a contrary intent.
20
Id. at 1005-06 (citations omitted).
21
The Court’s holding that recognizing a common law immunity for
22
telecommunications carriers “would undermine the carefully crafted scheme of claims and
23
defenses that Congress established in subsequently enacted statutes” is a pure conclusion of law,
24
and is therefore equally applicable here.
25
67
26 See MCI/Verizon Master Compl., ¶ 209 (“Defendant has not been provided with a certification
in writing by a person specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) or by the Attorney General of the United
27 States meeting the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B), i.e., a certification that no
warrant or court order authorizing the disclosures is required by law, and that all statutory
28 requirements have been met.”); Bellsouth Master Compl., ¶ 109 (same); Sprint Master Compl., ¶
81 (same); Transworld Master Compl., ¶ 96 (same); Cingular Master Compl., ¶ 97 (same).
593911.2
1 D. Defendants Have No Qualified Immunity
2 In Hepting, AT&T argued that “it is entitled to qualified immunity. ” Id. at 1006.
3 After reviewing at length the history and purposes of the qualified immunity doctrine, the Court
4 concluded that:
5 AT&T’s concerns, while relevant, do not warrant extending

qualified immunity here because the purposes of that immunity are
6 already well served by the certification provision of 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(a)(ii).
7
More fundamentally, “[w]hen Congress itself provides for a defense
8 to its own cause of action, it is hardly open to the federal court to
graft common law defenses on top of those Congress creates.”
9 Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that
qualified immunity could not be asserted against a claim under Title
10 III). . . .
11 [T]he statutes in this case set forth comprehensive, free-standing

liability schemes, complete with statutory defenses, many of which
12 specifically contemplate liability on the part of telecommunications
providers such as AT&T. . . . It can hardly be said that Congress
13 did not contemplate that carriers might be liable for cooperating
with the government when such cooperation did not conform to the
14 requirements of the act.
15 In sum, neither the history of judicially created immunities for

telecommunications carriers nor the purposes of qualified immunity
16 justify allowing AT&T to claim the benefit of the doctrine in this
case.
17
Id. at 1008-09. The Court’s reasoning, as well as its conclusion, is equally applicable here, as it
18
depends not on allegations unique to AT&T, but on an analysis of statutory framework.
19
The Court further held that:
20
AT&T is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to
21 plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, at least not at this stage of the
proceedings. Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim alleges that AT&T
22 provides the government with direct and indiscriminate access to
the domestic communications of AT&T customers. . . .
23 Accordingly, AT&T’s alleged actions here violate the constitutional
rights clearly established in Keith.68 Moreover, because “the very
24 action in question has previously been held unlawful, ” AT&T
cannot seriously contend that a reasonable entity in its position
25 could have believed that the alleged domestic dragnet was legal.
[¶] Accordingly, the court DENIES AT&T’s instant motion to
26 dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.
27 Id. at 1009-10 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
28
68
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
593911.2
1 As in Hepting, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants have provided the federal
2 government with “indiscriminate access to the domestic communications ” of their customers, as
3 well as records pertaining to those communications. Accordingly, as in Hepting, Defendants are
4 not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim.
5 VII. CONCLUSION
6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court’s rulings in Hepting should apply to the cases
7 brought against the other Defendants, except the Court should find that the existence of the
8 records program, and AT&T’s and MCI’s participation in the program, is no longer a secret, and
9 permit discovery on Plaintiffs’ records claims.
10
Dated: February 1, 2007 Respectfully submitted,
11
LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN &
12 BERNSTEIN, LLP
13
14 By: \s\ Barry R. Himmelstein

15 Barry R. Himmelstein
Interim Class Counsel for MCI Class
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
593911.2
1 Ronald L. Motley Gary E. Mason

Jodi W. Flowers Nicholas A. Migliaccio
2 Don Migliori THE MASON LAW FIRM, P.C.
Vincent Parrett (State Bar No. 237563) 1225 19th Street, NW
3 Justin B. Kaplan Suite 500
MOTLEY RICE, LLC Washington, DC 20038
4 28 Bridgeside Boulevard Telephone: (202) 429-2290
P.O. Box 1792 Facsimile: (202) 429-2294
5 Mount Pleasant, SC 29465
Telephone: (843) 216-9000 John C. Whitfield
6 Facsimile: (843) 216-9027 WHITFIELD & COX PSC
29 East Center ST.
7 Interim Class Counsel For Verizon Class Madisonville, KY 42431
and Transworld Class Telephone: (270) 821-0656
8 Facsimile: (270) 825-1163
Clinton A. Krislov
9 W. Joel Vander Vliet Interim Class Couns el for Sprint Class
KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
10 20 North Wacker Drive R. James George, Jr.
Suite 1350 Douglas Brothers
11 Chicago, IL 60606 GEORGE & BROTHERS, L.L.P.
Telephone: (312) 606-0500 1100 Norwood Tower
12 Facsimile: (312) 606-0207 114 W. 7th Street
Austin, TX 78701
13 BRUCE I. AFRAN, ESQ. Telephone: (512) 495-1400
10 Braeburn Drive Facsimile: (512) 499-0094
14 Princeton, NJ 08540
Telephone: (609) 924-2075 Interim Class Counsel For Cingular Class
15
Carl J. Mayer Ann Brick (State Ba r No. 65296)
16 MAYER LAW GROUP Nicole A. Ozer (State Bar No. 228643)
66 Witherspoon Street, Suite 414 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
17 Princeton, NJ 08542 FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN
Telepho ne: (609) 921-8025 CALIFORNIA
18 Facsimile: (609) 921-6964 39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
19 Val Patrick Exnicios Telephone: (415) 621-2493
LISKA, EXNICIOS & NUNGESSER Facsimile: (415) 255-8437
20 ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
One Calan Place, Suite 2290 Laurence F. Pulgram (State Bar No. 115163)
21 365 Canal Street Mitchell Zimmerman (State Bar No. 88456)
New Orleans, LA 70130 Jennifer L. Kelly (State Bar No. 193416)
22 Telephone: (504) 410-9611 Saina Shamilov (State Bar No. 215636)
Telephone: (504) 410-9937 Candace Morey (State Bar No. 233081)
23 FENWICK & WEST LLP
Steven E. Schwarz 555 California Street
24 THE LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN E. San Francisco, CA 94104
SCHWARZ, ESQ. Telephone: (415) 875-2300
25 2461 W. Foster Ave., #1W Facsimile: (415) 281-1350
Chicago, IL 60625
26 Telephone: (773) 837-6134 Attorneys for Plaintiffs in Campbell v. ATT
Facsimile: (773) 837-6134 Communications of California, C-06-3596
27 VRW, and Riordan v. Verizon
Interim Class Counsel for Bellsouth Class Communications, Inc., C-06-3574 VRW
28
593911.2
1 Pursuant to General Order 45, Part X-B, the filer attests that concurrence in the
2 filing of this document has been obtained from Jodi W. Flowers, Clinton A. Krislov, Val Patrick
3 Exnicios, Steven E. Schwarz, Bruce I. Afran, Carl J. Mayer, Gary E. Mason, John C. Whitfield,
4 R. James George, Jr., Ann Brick, and Laurence F. Pulgram.
5
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12
13
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593911.2

Campbell v. AT&T Communications of California (No. 06-3596) Riordan v. Verizon Communications, Inc. (No. 06

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Campbell v. AT&T Communications of California (No. 06-3596) Riordan v. Verizon Communications, Inc. (No. 06

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Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 155 Filed 02/01/2007 Page 1 of 39

1 Elizabeth J. Cabraser (State Bar No. 083151)

593911.2 CLASS PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO OSC

2 This multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) proceeding includes cases brought by and on

20 communication records program remain unclear.” Id. at 997.

1 communications to a governmental entity[;] 13 and

4 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978-79 (listing claims asserted in Hepting).

5 B. The State Law Claims

1 III. THE FACTUAL RECORD

2 The government has repeatedly acknowledged the similarity of the factual

15 A. Publicly Disclosed Information About the NSA Surveillance Program That

2 • The release of a statement by the Attorney for Qwest Communications’

5 In the Fall of 2001 * * * while Mr. Nacchio was

9 Mr. Nacchio made inquiry as to whether a warrant or

16 • The public statements made by defendants BellSouth and Verizon denying

18 As a result of media reports that BellSouth provided massive

1 record. And it shows what telephone number called what other

12 Are you comfortable with this program?

13 FRIST: Absolutely. Absolutely. I am one of the people who are

1 informed"? As Senator Roberts said earlier today, he thought it was

24 40; Transworld Master Compl., ¶ 40; Cingular Master Compl., ¶ 48.

25 C. Additional Public Disclosures Not Discussed in Hepting

28 These disclosures provide added detail about the programs:

1 On December 24, 2005, The New York Times reported in an article

3 The National Security Agency has traced and analyzed large

20 The agency [the NSA] used to search the transmissions it

1 the agency collected much of the data passed on to the

7 Officials with some of the nation’s leading

12 In a January 21, 2006 article in Bloomberg News entitled

2 On February 6, 2006, in an article entitled “Telecoms let NSA spy

12 On May 29, 2006, Seymour Hersh reported in The New Yorker in

3 In the May 11 article that revealed the database, USA TODAY

5 AT&T, which is the nation’s largest telecommunications company,

9 Most members of the intelligence committees wouldn’t discuss

12 • Nineteen lawmakers who had been briefed on the program

15 • Five members of the intelligence committees said they were told

18 • Five members of the intelligence committees said they were told

27 name, especially when considered in conjunction with “on-the-record” confirmations by three

1 VI. THE COURT’S RULINGS ON AT&T’S MOTION TO DISMISS ARE EQUALLY

23 [plaintiffs’] statutory rights under section 2702(a)(3) . . . in itself is sufficient to establish

27 on grounds equally applicable here:

1 plaintiffs from receiving at least some evidence tending to establish

18 Plaintiffs contend that the phrase “occurred without judicial or other

1 D. Defendants Have No Qualified Immunity

5 AT&T’s concerns, while relevant, do not warrant extending

11 [T]he statutes in this case set forth comprehensive, free-standing

15 In sum, neither the history of judicially created immunities for

14 By: \s\ Barry R. Himmelstein

1 Ronald L. Motley Gary E. Mason

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