Osprey Warrior 145 Ottoman Infantryman 1914 18
Osprey Warrior 145 Ottoman Infantryman 1914 18
INFANTRYMAN
1914-18
WARRIOR 145
OTTOMAN
INFANTRYMAN
1914-18
DAVID N I C O L L E
Series
editors
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHRONOLOGY
ENLISTMENT
11
TRAINING
16
DAILY LIFE
22
28
34
LIFE ON CAMPAIGN
38
49
58
BIBLIOGRAPHY
60
GLOSSARY
61
INDEX
64
OTTOMAN INFANTRYMAN
1914-1918
INTRODUCTION
The Ottoman Empire's involvement in World War I, when it allied itself with
Germany and the other Central Powers against its traditional ally, Britain,
can be traced back beyond the 'Young Turk' revolution of 1908. However,
that event brought to power a group of enthusiastic patriots, mainly military
officers, who, when they failed to receive the support they expected from
Britain and France, turned to Germany and her allies.
The remarkable resilience of the Ottoman
I
Army in World War I can also be traced back to
the Young Turk Revolution. Political and social
changes that followed this event had a major
impact upon the Ottoman Army, not least upon
its recruitment, while new military laws were
designed to modernize all aspects of the Ottoman
military. Improvements were clearly needed, as
the Ottoman Empire faced a daunting array of
i
threats, not only from traditional rivals like
Russia but also from old friends like Britain and
France. Though the new Ottoman Government
tried to cultivate good relations with all its
neighbours, to give itself time to modernize and
strengthen, the Great Powers had already agreed
to divide the Ottoman state into 'spheres of
influence'. An Anglo-Russian entente in 1907 led
the Ottomans to fear that their traditional ally,
Great Britain, would no longer help them against
the ever-threatening Russians.
All this strengthened the hands of those who
argued in favour of closer links with Imperial
Germany, which had been providing military
advice and aid since 1883. Five years later
Germany had also won a contract to build
a new railway to Baghdad (the so-called Berlin
to Baghdad Railway) which, though never
completed, came to be seen as a strategic threat to
Brirish domination in India and the Indian Ocean.
CHRONOLOGY
1914
2 August
3 August
10-11 August
and Breslau
enter
Ottoman waters.
September
2 8 - 2 9 October
1 November
2 November
3 November
11 November
22 November
Gallipoli
p. 189.
(Manchester, 2004)
6 December
8 December
1915
15 January
2 - 3 February
19 February
February-March
4 March
18 March
25 April
May
June
July
6 August
September
November
2 2 - 2 5 November
7 December
1 9 - 2 0 December
1916
8 - 9 January
14 January
15 February
April
29 April
6 May
May-June
27 June
July
4 August
27 August
18 September
3 November
1917
6 January
25 February
1 0 - 1 1 March
1 6 - 2 7 March
1 7 - 1 9 April
August
6 September
17 October
2 9 October
31 October
16 November
25 November
7 December
8 December
18 December
RUSSIA
CHINA- u
AFGHANISTAN.^ .
%
\
I
Cairo*
ALGERIA
(French)
EGYPT
LIBYA
(Saudis)
Medina
'Ghat
*
BAHRAIN (British)
QATAR
ARABIA
(Italian)
/ '
KUWAIT (British)
(Rashids)
7""~
S
Mecca i
v.
(Idrisids)
ERITREA
Khartoumi
FRENCH
EQUATORIAL
AFRICA
Sana
(Italian)
>
;
S DARFUR
>
X-^'f
\ VSOMALILAND;
SOMALILAND\;
\ (British)
(French)
>\
%X
/
Addis. _
ETHIOPIA
/* "SOMALI LAND
TOGOLAND
(German)
CAMEROON
(German)
(Italian)
N
.A
^? /'
\ /V
BELGIAN CONGO
- UGANDA'j
s
KENYA
I.
*Aden
SUDAN
S3
Neutral states
Russian zone of influence in Persia
British zone of influence in Persia
Zones of conflict (fronts) within Ottoman
territory
Area of anti-Ottoman uprisings or unrest
Areas of pro-Ottoman or Ottoman
supported revolts within Entente and
neutral territory
28 December
1918
January-April
19 February
2 1 February
9 March
2 6 - 3 1 March
British cross the river Jordan but are forced back after battle
of Amman.
2 6 April
30 April
3 May
28 June
14 July
August
14 September
17 September
19 September
1 October
2 October
25 October
30 October
10
3 November
10 November
17 November
1919
January
April
ENLISTMENT
As part of his efforts at military reform, Sultan Abdul Hamid II ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 0 9 )
tried extending conscription fairly to all Muslim men within the Ottoman
Empire, though retaining traditional exemptions allowed to the inhabitants
of Istanbul, Albania, Najd, Hejaz, Tripoli, Benghazi, and the Middle Eastern
nomadic tribes who were beyond Ottoman control anyway. Higher education
and religious students were similarly exempted. By this time a steady flow of
Muslim refugees from territory lost by the Ottoman Empire was another
major source of highly motivated recruits.
In 1908, however, the new Young Turk government introduced laws that
compelled non-Muslim Ottoman citizens to be conscripted into the army.
This contravened the Islamic shariah law upon which the Ottoman Sultanate
was supposedly based and, for the first time, non-Muslims had to bear an
equal burden in national defence. Only a handful of specific exemptions
remained, one being mentioned in the memoirs of a young Armenian, Bedros
Sharian, who was called up in 1914. He recalled that; Tn the beginning of the
and
12
war the licensed teachers and preachers were exempt from military service.'
In fact Sharian was arrested as a draft dodger because he had managed to
find employment as a teacher after the mobilization call (Pye, 1938, p. 33).
The normal enlistment age was 2 0 , though men as young as 18 were
allowed to join as volunteers if they had parental permission. Enlistment was
usually in late summer and in 1914 took place during the brief period of
Ottoman neutrality. Once these young men completed their period of service
they would return to civilian life, though remaining in the reserve. Those
called up during World War I were not released until the conflict was over,
while reserves were called to the colours as required. The oldest group was
known as the Miistahfiz, consisting of men in the final seven years of their
military obligation.
Ottoman mobilization was, however, slow and reflected events as they
unfolded. These problems were made worse by the fact that the Ottoman
Army was currently in the midst of a major restructuring of units while its
high command were rebuilding divisional and corps headquarters destroyed
during the First Balkan War. Given these difficulties the government's decision
to remain neutral for nearly two months must have been a great relief to
the army and even then Ottoman mobilization was not complete until
early November.
Men were summoned in regional Military Inspectorates, having to sign
up wherever they happened to be at the time. In most cases, however, the
system resulted in Ottoman Army Groups having a distinct local character;
the First Inspectorate mainly recruiting from Turkish-speaking western
Anatolia and what remained of Ottoman possessions in Europe; the Second
recruiting from other parts of Anatolia, mostly Turks, Kurds, and Armenians;
the Third recruiting Arabs, Kurds, Turks, and Armenians; the Fourth
recruiting the settled Arab and Kurdish populations of the Tigris valley and
Iraq. Other recruitment areas were almost entirely Arab and did not always
form Inspectorates.
It soon became clear that the Ottoman Empire could not endure a
prolonged war unless resources of both men and material were used with care.
Unfortunately, the Ottoman Army did not have a system of substantial reserve
units and, unlike their allies, the Ottomans could not rapidly field reserve
corps made up of reserve divisions. Instead, when they needed more combat
infantry formations, they simply created more regular divisions. There were
some exceptions, of course, and the term
muretteb appears to have been applied to
various kinds of scratch or mixed forces not
in the permanent Army structure. In fact,
many Ottoman troops found themselves
forming part of mixed and occasionally
exotic formations; one such being a small
force of Turkish volunteers and Kurdish
irregulars, which seized Tabriz in northwestern Iran following a sudden Russian
withdrawal in the winter of 1 9 1 4 - 1 5 .
Their success was then exploited by the
36th, which was itself strengthened by
new formations of Frontier Guards and
jandarma,
many of whom had valuable
local knowledge.
Recruiting v o l u n t e e r s for t h e
j i h a d n e a r T i b e r i u s in a u t u m n
1914. T h e P a l e s t i n i a n s h a d
long been amongst the
m o s t loyal A r a b p o p u l a t i o n s
of t h e O t t o m a n Empire.
(Library of Congress)
Gallipoli
Ottoman
Pine)
Fasih 5th
Army
13
TRAINING
16
Under the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, particularly promising
officers were often the objects of suspicion. Fear of facilitating a military
coup also meant that no large-scale manoeuvres were held for many years.
The Sultan's fears were justified, for after a brief period of constitutional
monarchy following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and a failed counterrevolution, Abdul Hamid was forced to abdicate in favour of his easy-going
brother, Mehmed V. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Army was still seriously lacking
in both training and capable senior officers to carry out the new government's
ambitious programme of military modernization under new military laws passed
in 1909. Meanwhile, the reserves were reorganized and given more training,
with the army's medical and veterinary services being similarly upgraded.
As far as infantry were concerned, the Ottoman Army's tactical principles
came ever closer to those of Germany, which had in fact provided advisors
for many years. The same was true of staff procedures, the organization of
marches, the extent of frontages in attack or defence, and tactical instructions
for all units. Indeed, the Ottoman Army's rules and regulations were mostly
translated word-for-word from German. Even so,
outside observers reported that the impact of this
intensive German influence was more obvious in
Europe than in Asia - at least until after the
catastrophic First Balkan War.
Recent studies of the Ottoman Army during
World War I suggest that its main strengths were at
the upper and lower extremes of the ranking
structure. In other words its highly trained General
Staff were competent and aggressive while its
I
rank-and-file were as tough and tenacious as they
I
had been throughout Ottoman history. In contrast,
the middle ranks remained the weakest links.
I
Above all, the Ottomans, unlike most European
17
Local knowledge was one thing, general levels of education were quite
another. These were very varied, not only between officers and other ranks,
but within the Ottoman officer corps, between men from urban and rural
backgrounds, and from different regions of the sprawling Ottoman state. The
American diplomat Einstein found that some Ottoman elite families, though
patriotic and willing to fight, considered the way their sons were treated under
training quite unacceptable. In his diary entry for 9 June 1915 he noted; 'S. Bey
called, indignant over his son's treatment in the cadet school, and expressing
his readiness to do anything to get him out of it. The boy is quartered in filthy
surroundings, without running water or decent food, and ordered about by
hectoring sergeants.' The sophisticated Western European culture of some
Ottoman officers is also apparent in Mehmed Fasih's Gallipoli diary, where he
mentioned that in his dugout he used to read the mid-18th century French
book Manon Lescault, 'a novel of which I'm very fond'. Written by Antoine
Francois Prevost, this rather scandalous tale provided the basis for several
operas, perhaps the most famous being by Puccini. Men like Mehmed Fasih
were clearly a world apart from the bloodthirsty Turks and crazed religious
fanatics beloved of Western propaganda.
This did not, however, mean that all Ottoman infantry officers were
adequately trained or educated. One man captured early in 1915 informed his
British interrogators that 'Officers were trained for six and a half hours per day
in barracks'. Some German officers were even more critical, Hans Kannengiesser
being unable to hide his own racial prejudice when he wrote his memoirs of the
Gallipoli Campaign; 'There were many who had been raised from the troops
without having attended any training schools, and there were actually company
commanders who could neither read nor write and were therefore not really
Effendis... I have also found company commanders who were negroes.
Noticeably small was the number of officers who could read a map correctly.'
Kannengiesser criticized the Ottoman officer corps for other reasons as well,
including what he regarded as a lack of initiative. This he ascribed to the
fact that senior field officers were constantly looking over the shoulders
of their juniors and rarely allowed them any independence. However, this
was not always the case, as Kannengiesser admitted; T don't mean to say
that all the officers were like this. There were quite a large number who
were independent and acted independently,
and who were full of initiative and ideas.'
(Kannengiesser, 1927, p. 86)
The Germans also had reservations about
an Ottoman tradition of training recruits far
from their home regions. Many new training
schools for infantry riflemen and NCOs
had been opened, though their facilities
were often limited. There were also huge
differences in the standards of training
available on different fronts. In general, basic
training for ordinary soldiers was based upon
extremely severe discipline, initial instruction
focusing upon individual skills and then
moving on to training as small units.
Because munitions were so limited, each
soldier was usually issued with from 20 to 30
rifle rounds per year. Consequently, many
British account of
Ottoman infantry
training
British knowledge of the
Ottoman Army's training
programme during the
early part of World War I
relied to a great extent upon
information from prisoners.
One such interrogation was
described in the British
Handbook of the Turkish
Army; 'The prisoner, an
officer, was for six weeks
attached to a depot at Ali
Aghlu. Each battalion there
was composed of four officers
and from 200 to 250 men. The
men were trained for about
twenty-five days in physical
drill and marching and then
received rifles... German
inspectors visited the depot
twice a week. The men were
mostly Turks of from twentyone to forty-five years of
age... The maximum as at the
Ali Oghlu depot, was 1,200,
the number of men being
trained afterwards falling
to 600. Most men had about
twenty-five to thirty days'
training before being drafted
into line units, those who had
received previous military
training being first selected.'
Anon, Handbook of the Turkish
Army, Eighth Provision Edition
(Cairo, 1916) p. 123.
19
men arrived at the front with minimal skill. Within one division committed
to the vital Gallipoli campaign, Hans Kannengiesser recorded that there were
3,701 'so-called trained troops', plus 4 4 0 trained and 2,734 untrained
recruits. He further complained that there should have been plenty of time to
get men properly trained in reserve regiments. These reported their training
progress to Divisional HQ every day and, in Kannengiesser's opinion, such
messages sometimes contained 'unbelievable nonsense'. For example, one
battalion listed as one day's work; 'Sights correction and bayonet fighting',
and on another day, 'Head right and turn left'.
Liman von Sanders raised the training standards of the men under his
command, especially those who would shortly face the full force of the AngloFrench assault upon the Dardanelles. They and the troops who expected a
comparable Russian assault upon the Bosphorus had undertaken almost
constant route marches, sham fighting, and alarm exercises. Though the
lessons subsequently learned at Gallipoli were incorporated into the Ottoman
infantry's training programmes, Sanders himself noted that from August 1916
onwards the need to train large numbers of raw recruits meant that exercises
of company formation or larger were no longer possible.
The British assessment of the Ottoman infantry was that they were welltrained and steady but slow in movement, especially in attack, and that they
were little used to scouting or reconnaissance. The men were, it was
suggested, generally moderate or poor shots though the British did admit that
Ottoman snipers had been 'efficient' during the Gallipoli campaign. Other
British and French sources suggest that Ottoman marksmanship was
generally superior to that of the Allies, especially that of recent British recruits
in the so-called 'Kitchener's Army'. Hans Kannengiesser again provides
specific detailed information, writing that in the summer of 1915; 'Shooting
ranges were also prepared, and we actually found supplies of German ring
targets with the head of a Prussian infantryman stuck on. The results were
awful! A German range NCO would have had a tummy-ache, but finally
the Turks shot quite well. When a bull's eye was reported I used to satisfy
myself personally that the report was correct.'
20
BELOW LEFT
Ottoman infantry in Galicia
practising an assault under fire.
By this time they had been
trained to attack in more open
formation than had been used
in Gallipoli. (Orses and Ozgelik
collection)
BELOW
The 'Army of Islam' included
Ottoman troops and local
Muslim volunteers in the
Caucasus, here operating
a heavy mortar in 1918.
(Askeri Miizesi, Istanbul)
DAILY LIFE
All sources, from friend and foe, agree that the life of the ordinary Ottoman
soldier was harsher than that of other participants in World War I. Similarly,
Mebmetgik, or 'Little Mehmet' as he was affectionately known, was one of the
toughest soldiers of his day. Almost always badly clothed and badly fed,
there were many occasions when units which had been equipped to serve
in Palestine or Iraq suddenly found themselves sent to the Caucasus front in
winter. Here, and often elsewhere, problems of transport and communications
meant that only a third of standard rations could be issued, and these were
limited enough in the first place. Resulting deaths from exposure, hunger, and
disease were appalling. Even in the Middle East, specifically in Syria, men lived
on half rations for months on end while the food itself was a thin gruel of
flour and water which even the resilient Ottoman infantryman eventually
found it impossible to stomach. Because conditions were no better behind the
front, food supplies often got eaten by men along the supply lines.
One desperate report from Syria, written late in 1917, summed up the
situation; 'The food situation in the Fourth Army is so dreadful that only 350
grams of flour can be given to men and 2.5 kilograms of forage to animals.
If communications are not improved it is doubtful whether we can go on.'
(Hussein Hussnu Emir quoted in Emin, 1930, pp. 2 5 0 - 5 1 ) Field officers
22
normally lived little better than their men, though there could be occasional
treats, as Mehmed Fasih noted in his Gallipoli diary on 21 October 1915;
'Delegation of Syrian literati visit Regimental H Q with a gift of Damascus
baklava for the officers. Each of us received a slice.'
Troops normally carried two days' rations in their packs, or if necessary
three days', but during the Ottoman assault across the Sinai Peninsula in
January 1915 each man carried rations for five days. Food production in the
Ottoman Empire had suffered a serious blow in 1914 when mobilization
meant that much of the harvest had not been gathered. Famines soon followed
and British Army intelligence observed in a note to its Handbook
on the
Turkish Army that; 'In war the soldier has little to eat; his rations are 1 li lbs
per day of bread with vegetables or rice. Meat is seldom given, and pay is
seldom forthcoming.'
Foreign officers serving with the Ottoman Army during World War I
were often horrified by the soldiers' diet. Kannengiesser, for example,
described it as 'eternal bulgar, or bakla, or fasulia (beans)'. This German
officer described how small donkeys, laded with pannikins or old petrol
cans, brought food to men in the frontline, each container covered with cloth
to prevent the food spilling. The food itself, he thought, had the sickening
smell of old cart grease, though the men seemed content enough. 'This is no
real war,' they joked to each other, 'we get something to eat every day.' When
asked if they had any complaints, they would shout out individually or in
unison, 'Eji Bey,' or later, 'Eji Pasha!' - meaning 'No complaint, Bey' or 'No
complaint, Pasha'. Whether they said this with an eye on their own Ottoman
officers or NCOs is not recorded. Hans Kannengiesser then described the
men under his command seated with eight men around a tin tray eating their
meal as a group; 'Each threw a piece of bread into the soup and calmly
and dignified, each without haste, recovered it with his spoon. I have never
seen a battle for food, no matter how great the hunger.' (Kannengiesser,
1927, pp. 1 4 8 - 4 9 )
Though the quality of food was poor even on better-supplied fronts, some
comments by Western observers reflect a prejudice against what was, in
essence, a healthy Turco-Middle Eastern diet. Einstein, who was based
in Istanbul throughout much of the Gallipoli campaign, wrote of the largely
Arab troops based at Yenikoy just north of the city on 16 July 1915; 'They
are so raw that it will take time before they are fit even to man trenches.
We passed them in the evening carrying their pilaff in japanned iron washbasins - our dogs would hardly eat it, but it was their sole dinner.'
l
Diary
Fasih 5th
Ottoman
Army
'Allah bujuk, Allemano bujuk* (God is Great, Germany is great), as they did
when the British battleship Queen Elizabeth was sunk within sight of the
Gallipoli Peninsula, would become rare.
Even as some Germans themselves recognized, cooperation was made
more difficult because most Central Power advisors failed to understand the
Ottoman or Muslim way of doing things. Worse still, they showed scant
respect for the Empire's Islamic heritage and many German officers made it
clear that they regarded themselves as superior to both Turks and Arabs,
officers or otherwise. On the other side, younger Ottoman officers with
Turkish nationalist feelings resented being treated like second-class soldiers in
their own army. Things came to a climax with the creation of the Yildirim
Army Corps in 1917. Originally intended to retake Iraq from the invading
British, it was envisaged as an almost entirely Turkish force in which Germans
would be confined to the senior ranks. Such a structure of command was,
however, rejected by the Ottomans and the operation was delayed. Then
came a British breakthrough in Palestine, which resulted in the Yildirim Army
Corps, now largely officered by Turks, being sent to that front in a doomed
attempt to retrieve the situation.
A youthful mulazimisani
(2nd
28
29
kaymakam;
(archaic);
imami;
30
(44)
miralay;
(45)
mulazimi
sani; (46)
taburimami.
mulazimi
ordu
muftusu;
evvel;
(47)
(50) alay
yuzbasi;
muftusu;
(48)
(51)
kolagasi
alay
Poor-quality footwear
The problem of the Ottoman
Army's inferior footwear was
noted by Lt. Col. Fahrettin
Altay when he wrote to his
father from the Gallipoli front
on 2 September 1915; 'The
hopes of the British have
collapsed. Will they bring up
fresh troops, perhaps Italian,
and land them on the old
beaches - or elsewhere? We
are used to it and let them
come if they like. In one
respect it helps our soldiers,
who strip all the British dead
of their boots, and now have
fine British boots on their own
feet.' Quoted by P. Liddle,
Men of Gallipoli: The
Dardanelles
and
Experience
August
January
Gallipoli
1914 to
pp. 210-211.
32
Of course, the Ottoman Army was not entirely dependent upon its allies,
though local production largely focused upon the manufacture of uniforms.
Before the war, cotton cloth manufacturing averaged 1,000 tons a year,
including what came from new factories. Nevertheless, 50 times more had
to be imported. The loss of European territory during the First Balkan War
was particularly serious because so much of the state's limited industrial
production had been in these regions, so by 1914 Ottoman factories were
almost entirely confined to Istanbul, a few parts of western Anatolia, and the
Black Sea coast.
Although traditional Ottoman shoe-making crafts had collapsed in the
face of European and American imports during the 19th century, there had
recently been a significant revival so that, by the outbreak of war in 1914,
there was little importation except for the high fashion market (Quataert,
1 9 9 4 , pp. 9 0 3 - 0 4 ) . On the other hand the quality of local production,
especially of military boots, would prove to be a great disappointment.
Supposedly of brown leather, the soldier's ankle boots were worn with khaki
puttees, though reservists were sometimes seen wearing traditional 'country
shoes' with puttees, and by the summer of 1917 even some officers were not
supplied with proper boots.
It also became necessary for the Ottoman Army to import uniforms
manufactured by their allies, with unpredictable results where the appearance
of Ottoman soldiers was concerned. When the Armenian conscript Bedros
Sharian tried to surrender to the British in Palestine in 1917, for example, his
captors refused to believe that he was an Ottoman soldier, still less a Christian,
because his uniform was made in Germany (Pye, 1938, pp. 1 3 1 - 4 3 ) .
Weaponry was almost entirely German in design and origin, though the
Ottoman Mehmetgik was usually only issued with the most basic kit, Mauser
rifles, German pattern bayonets, and swords. Most officers bought their own
side arms, usually European pistols of commercial design, though some
obtained Mauser machine pistols. A shortage of weaponry was already
apparent in 1915, when Einstein noted that troops were no longer properly
armed nor equipped. These problems steadily became more serious, Liman
von Sanders complaining in a telegram to the Ottoman Ministry of War on
14 March 1916 that a depot regiment he recently inspected had a strength of
8,000 men but only 1,050 rifles. Furthermore, these were of differing
patterns, there were no cartridge boxes, and many soldiers who did have rifles
were without side arms or bayonets.
According to British intelligence, at the
outbreak of war the Ottoman Army had about
5 0 0 , 0 0 0 Mauser rifles of 7.65 mm calibre, plus
some 200,000 of 9.5mm calibre. In addition it had
around 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 Martini-Henry and MartiniPeabody rifles, many probably dating from the
war of 1 8 7 7 - 7 8 . There was also a reserve stock
of archaic Remington and Winchester rifles,
though with little ammunition. Consequently
it was not surprising that many of the troops in
Syria and in other interior provinces were armed
with extraordinarily varied weapons, including
Martinis which had been modified to use the
same calibre ammunition as the Mausers,
along with Martini-Henrys, Martini-Peabodys,
mektepiharbiye
military
fought between 22 and 25 November 1915, close to the ruins of the pre-lslamic Sassanian imperial
capital of Ctesiphon, now Salman Pak, near Baghdad in Iraq. It would be followed by a British
retreat and the surrender of a British army at Kut al-Amara in southern Iraq. In this illustration the
kaymakam
(major) in
erler
(privates). However, this event is not shown as one of the Ottoman Army's characteristic flagsmedals ceremonies where commemorative ribbons would be formally attached to a military
banner. Instead, the men are relaxing or helping medical personnel and local irregulars unload
wounded men from camel litters, the 'desert ambulances' of World War I. While this unexpected
sequence of successes raised Ottoman morale, it also resulted in a substantial number of British
and Indian prisoners of war, which the Ottoman Empire was ill equipped to look after.
BELOW
Disciplinary punishment in the
Ottoman Army was much as it
had been for centuries. These
troops were accompanying
a German mountain artillery
unit as it made its way through
south-eastern Anatolia.
(Orses and Ozgelik collection)
BELOW RIGHT
The bayraktar
or
soncaktar
standard-bearer of an Ottoman
regiment in 1915, almost
certainly posed during the
Gallipoli campaign. The fact
that at least one of the men
wears a turban rather than an
enveriye hat suggests that this
was one of the mixed Turkish
and Arab units which defended
the peninsula, (from Harbi
Mecmuasi'War
Magazine',
36
Ottoman tenacity in
battle
The steadfastness of Ottoman
infantrymen was of course
appreciated by their
commanders. A letter from
Kiazim Karabekir, the
commander of troops
defending the Iraqi village of
Muhammad Abdul Hassan in
January 1917, was found on
the body of a soldier who was
killed when this place
eventually fell to the British. It
stated that; The steadfastness
of the troops... in spite of
bloody losses, is above all
praise. The Corps Commander
kisses the eyes of all ranks and
thanks them.' Quoted by A. J .
Barker, The Neglected War,
Mesopotamia
1914-1918
37
Similarly, the high morale of Arab troops during the Gallipoli campaign
has almost been written out of the story by military historians, both Turkish
and British. Yet Syrian infantry officers featured prominently in Mehmed
Fasih's Gallipoli diary, though even he also noted how the morale of the largely
Arab 47th Regiment was sapped by huge casualties and too much time spent
in the line. Mustafa Kemal's exhortation to his Turkish troops before leading
them into attack on 25 April 1915 is, of course, famous; T do not expect you
to attack, I order you to die. In the time which passes until we die, other
troops and commanders can come forward and take our places.' After the
war Mustafa Kemal himself said of the Ottoman victory over the invaders on
the Gallipoli Peninsula; 'The greatest monument is Mehmetc.ik himself, the
name Mehmetgik or 'Little Mehmet' being the affectionate Turkish equivalent
to the British 'Tommy Atkins' or the American 'Doughboy'.
It is also worth noting that the Arabs still regard the Turks as better
soldiers than the British, knowing the former as Abu Shuja'a (the 'Father of
Courage'), and the latter as Abu Alf Midfah ('the Father of a Thousand
Guns'). The proud spirit of Turkish forces even at the very end of the war was
summed up in a reply that Mustafa Kemal's chief staff officer made to
the British demand that Aleppo be surrendered on 23 October 1918; 'The
Commander of the Turkish Garrison of Aleppo does not find it necessary to
reply to your note.' The city fell three days later.
LIFE ON CAMPAIGN
An Ottoman infantryman's experience of life on campaign necessarily
reflected the unit to which he was attached and the front to which he was
sent. Once the army had been mobilized, however, the fact that he had been
part of the Nizam Active Army, the Ihtiyat Active Reserve or Miistahfiz
Territorial Reserve made little difference, except that it reflected his age and
thus the likelihood of him seeing frontline combat, though by the end of the
war young and old alike were being thrown into battle.
At the start of the war the Ottoman Army consisted of 36 divisions, to which
nine more could be added on mobilization, but the slow and cumbersome
Ottoman system of mobilization led to a considerable movement of troops.
Thus the men of the VI Corps based near Aleppo in northern Syria were soon
moved to Istanbul to join the First Army. The Second Army, which had
previously been a largely nominal formation, was similarly assembled on the
ARABIA, 1916
The Arab Revolt erupted on 27 June 1916 when the sharif (senior religious authority) of Mecca
proclaimed his independence. Arab irregular forces then attacked the vulnerable railway line
between Syria and Arabia, eventually severing it altogether. Nevertheless, the Ottoman
Government was determined to defend its remaining possessions in the Arabian Peninsula,
it being seen as politically and psychologically impossible to abandon Islam's second holiest
city of Medina, so a small garrison held out even after the war had officially ended. The majority
of Ottoman troops involved on various secondary fronts in Arabia were themselves Arabs rather
than Turks. Photographic evidence also shows that religiously motivated volunteers, such as
those mustered in Istanbul at the start of the conflict, served in Syria, perhaps in defence of the
Damascus to Hejaz railway. A raid by Lawrence of Arabia's 'Arab Army' is illustrated here, with a
yuzbashi
(captain) giving orders to a zabitvekili
(junior 'officer on probation') and a boshgavush
(sergeant-major) of the fedai (Muslim volunteer, literally 'self-sacrificer). Nearby a
taburimam
(battalion chaplain) is supporting a wounded alaymuftu
(regimental chaplain).
Plentiful ammunition
Commenting on the Gallipoli
campaign, a senior German
officer, Hans Kannengiesser,
maintained that; Two factors
considerably increased the
resistance of the asker
in Gallipoli
40
Asiatic side of the Bosphorus while the Third Army hurried to assemble around
Erzurum, ready to face an anticipated Russian onslaught. The Fourth Army was
not created until after hostilities began, it being assembled in Syria and Palestine
with its HQ in Damascus.
Other armies, numbered sixth to ninth, were formed during the course of
World War I, though some of them were little more than nominal structures
with a staff and very few troops. This multiplicity of armies was criticized by
the Germans, who maintained that it required too many staff officers and
support facilities that could be better used elsewhere. Movement of troops
also resulted in the creation of muretteb composite divisions, which did not
form part of the permanent Army structure. Even as late as July 1918, Enver
Pasha, the Minister of War, created an entirely new Army to be known as the
'Army of Islam'. Built around a few well-equipped Ottoman Turkish units, it
was intended to attract recruits from amongst the Muslim peoples of the
Caucasus region. Meanwhile, Enver's agents tried to establish links with the
Pahlevi family in Iran where Reza Shah Pahlavi, the father of the last Shah of
Iran (overthrown in 1979) commanded the Persian Cossack Brigade, the
country's only really effective military unit.
Reality did not always match theory and this was frequently the case where
unit sizes were concerned. An infantry company was, for example, supposed
to consist of a captain, a lieutenant, two 2nd lieutenants, a sergeant-major, an
assistant sergeant-major, six sergeants, a musketry sergeant, a musketry
corporal, four stretcher-bearers with an ambulance, 18 corporals, a corporal
storekeeper, three officers' servants, four buglers, a shoemaker, a tailor,
a water-carrier, a cook, and 2 1 6 men. In fact, some infantry companies
had only 20 men. Each infantry division was supposed to consist of three
regiments, each of three battalions and one machine-gun company, plus a field
artillery regiment of two companies, one squadron of cavalry, a pioneer
company, and a sanitary company, with a total strength of around 10,000 to
12,000 men. Einstein noted on 24 May 1915 that even when a well-equipped
infantry regiment with a machine-gun section passed though on its way to the
Gallipoli front; 'as usual they were under-officered. Never more than two to
the company of about 2 0 0 men, nor do the officers look keen.'
Official Ottoman records show that, during the course of the war, the
Ottoman Empire mobilized 2,873,000 men, including those in the jandarma
and the Navy. Large as this figure was, Ottoman forces were often spread
thinly over a huge area. Their enemies
sometimes assumed that the apparent
destruction of a regional Army meant that
they could press ahead with confidence.
The British made this mistake in Iraq and
for a year and half before the British
eventually took Baghdad, a supposedly
shattered Ottoman Army of merely
5 0 , 0 0 0 men held up an invading force
nearly ten times larger than itself.
Later in the war the Fifth Army, which
was supposed to defend the Dardanelles
and western Anatolia from further enemy
assaults, was weak in almost all arms,
having only a third of its supposed
artillery, virtually no transport, and almost
fflrr
During World War I the Ottoman Army campaigned in a great variety of geographical conditions.
Partly as a result, and partly in response to the Army's increasingly inadequate level of equipment,
the Ottomans raised a small number of specialized and elite units. These included ski troops who
served in eastern Turkey and the Caucasus mountains, here represented by a gavush (sergeant)
and an er (private) in fully enveloping snow-camouflage cloaks. They were based upon German
and Austrian Alpine troops but, for reasons that remain unknown, were nevertheless sometimes
armed with old-fashioned Martini rifles. These were converted to accept the same ammunition
as the Mauser rifles issued to most frontline Ottoman infantry. In contrast to such ski patrols, most
Ottoman troops on the Caucasus front spent much of the war poorly clothed, often unfed and
with inadequate support, holding barely defensible positions. This was particularly true during the
winters when the Ottoman Empire's rudimentary transport and communications systems could
not cope with cold, mud, lashing rain, and often deep snow.
42
suffered less from thirst than from cold; consequently the columns rested by
day and marched by night. These were minor triumphs, done without the
modern facilities the British required when they subsequently crossed Sinai.
The first Ottoman offensive against the Russians was not as well
organized. Launched during the depths of winter at the end of 1914 it proved
catastrophic, resulting in huge casualties, massive losses of equipment, a
precipitous withdrawal, and a blow to morale that took years to restore.
Paradoxically, this disaster was accompanied by the Ottoman Army's first
expedition into strictly 'foreign' territory - British-occupied Egypt still being
nominally Ottoman in Ottoman eyes. While the Third Army undertook its illconceived winter offensive in the Caucasus, a much smaller force of Ottoman
troops and Kurdish irregulars rapidly overran the Urmia area of neighbouring
north-western Iran where the panic-stricken occupying Russians fell back
before them. Despite setbacks, Ottoman forces were still operating in Iran at
the end of the war.
Unlike their position within Iran, Ottoman forces operating beyond eastern
Thrace (which was all that remained of Ottoman territory within Europe) were
under the overall command of their allies. The most important was the Ottoman
45
46
XV
(G Alii CIA)
HUNGARY
J\
0 MANIA,
CO/*
~JE[0iarest
Sofia
^(MTAQEDONIA)
alomka
'
Nominally Ottoman Cyprus, Egypt and the AngloEgyptian Sudan, under British occupation before the
war; Ottoman authority abrogated by Britain when
the Ottoman Empire entered the war as an ally of the
Central Powers at the end of October 1914
* ~ (THRACE)
(THRAf
V
^OAftPAfetELLES)
^P
anbul
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
Iv,
Cairo
EGYPT
(HIJAZ)
b Medina
(YEMEN)
| 2 |
j IV |
| Y |
Army of Islam
]
August 1914
December 1916
September 1918
i.KUWAIT
BAHRAIN
QATAR
47
supplies. In fact, the hospitals had a total of 37,000 medical beds, of which
14,000 were in Istanbul (Erickson, 2 0 0 1 , pp. 7 - 8 ) . There were also significant
variations in the medical support enjoyed by different units, the men of X V
Corps in Galicia being cared for in the same manner as their German
colleagues. Elsewhere, Ottoman troops suffered enormous casualties from
diseases of which malaria was the most rife with 4 6 1 , 7 9 9 recorded cases,
though with only 23,351 deaths. There were about 147,000 cases of dysentery
and with a significantly higher death date of around 4 0 , 0 0 0 fatalities. The
figures for intermittent fever were approximately 103,000 cases with some
4,000 deaths, 93,000 cases of typhus with 26,000 deaths, and about 2 7 , 0 0 0
cases of syphilis but with only 150 recorded deaths (Emin 1930, p. 2 5 3 ) .
49
allotted positions. Enemy gunfire was largely focused upon the Ottomans'
advanced skirmishing line where the shore was shrouded with thick smoke.
Many frontline positions and communications trenches were levelled and as
Major Mahmut put it; 'Foxholes, meant to protect lives, became tombs.'
While those closest to the enemy opened fire, those behind them knelt in their
shallow foxholes; 'With dead and dismembered comrades at their side,
without worrying about being outnumbered or the nature of the enemy's
fire, our men waited for the moment when they could use their weapons,
occasionally raising their heads above breastworks, to check if that time had
come.' (Fasih, 2 0 0 1 , pp. 8-9)
As often happens in such circumstances, the heroism of one man came to
represent that of many. The individual in question was a qavush (sergeant)
named Yahya who was part of the 12th Company of the 2nd Battalion of
the 26th Infantry Regiment, defending two low hills named Ay Tepe and
Gozciibaba Tepe. They dominated what the Allies called V Beach and formed
a single fortified strongpoint. Late in the afternoon of that day the Ottoman
Remembering a fallen
comrade
Mehmed Fasih thought that
he had become hardened to
the horrors of war, but on 5
November 1915 the death of
a young sergeant, avush
Nuri, showed that he was not.
Determined to perform his
last duty towards a soldier
whom he liked so much, Fasih
caught up with the stretcherbearers and the young
sergeant's comrades;
'Obtained permission of
Medical Corps to bury him in
the officers' plot in the olive
grove at Karaburun gully. Pick
a spot under a fine olive tree,
on the rim of the gully, and
have the men dig his grave.
We place his body in the
grave so his head will be
under the branches of the
tree, while his feet point
towards the opposite slope of
the gully... As I gaze at his
face, my sorrow overwhelms
so that when I throw into the
grave the first handful of
earth, I breakdown... After
the last shovel of earth, I
conduct our religious rites. As
I recite the opening verse of
the Koran, with all the
compassion, conviction and
eloquence I can muster, I
again find it most difficult to
control myself... Feel like
writing an epitaph for Nuri.
Here is what I came up with:
To all wanderers who may
come this way! Should you
remember the defence of
Bloody Ridge by the 47th
Regiment, do not forget
Sergeant Nuri, from the 5th
Company. He was one of the
Regiment's most worthy
soldiers. On the morning of 5
November 1915, death
beckoned him and, in
response to God's call,
though he was pure and
innocent, he flew away to join
his ancestors.' Mehmed Fasih
(tr. H. B. Danishman), Gallipoli
1915: Bloody Ridge (Lone
Diary ofLt. Mehmed
Imperial
Ottoman
Pine)
Fasih 5th
Army
52
positions were attacked by Irish troops, (^avush Yahya and his five squads of
infantry on Gozcubaba Tepe facing a substantial enemy column. Yahya's officer
fell and so the gavush found himself in charge. His men beat back a number of
Irish attacks but the enemy seized neighbouring Ay Tepe and attempted to
outflank Yahya's defences. Subsequently hailed as 'intelligent and heroic',
C]avush Yahya clearly had a flair for tactics and reacted immediately, leading a
bayonet attack which at least temporarily restored the situation. The British
later brought up heavy machine guns, which enfiladed the Ottoman defences
and enabled them to take Gozcubaba Tepe. Nevertheless, the heroic sergeant
had delayed the enemy long enough for reinforcements to be brought up, an
achievement commemorated by a memorial on the site.
Other distinctive features of Ottoman battlefield tactics recorded by their
enemies were the use of what British soldiers regarded as 'weird' bugle calls and,
in contrast, their silent pre-dawn attacks during which the officers went ahead
then raised their riding whips as a sign for the men to charge - but only shouting
their battle-cry of 'Allahu Akbar* or 'Allah" once inside the enemy's trenches. The
determination of Ottoman infantry was noted by French as well as British
witnesses, a captured Foreign Legion soldier recording how they broke through
the French wire three times and forced their way into the Legion's trenches
where the French fought back with rifle butts while the 'Turks' drew knives
from their boots or belts (Kannengiesser, 1927, pp. 132-133).
Death could come any day in the trenches, the horrific reality of this being
described by Mehmed Fasih in his diary entry of 27 October 1915. That day
a group of agitated soldiers approached to tell him that a soldier named
Mahmud Can had been badly wounded. Fasih ran to the position and cut
off the injured man's boots, trousers, and socks. After Mahmud Can's foot
and arm were bandaged he was sent to the rear. Fasih and his captain then
went to inspect the machine-gun position where the soldier had been hit. This
was at the end of a path where the gun was fired through a narrow slit. An
enemy shell had come through this small opening, causing carnage amongst
the machine gun crew. Six were killed, fragments of their bodies intermingled,
their faces unrecognizable. The young Ottoman officer then quoted a famous
Turkish poem;
Graves, graves, lie open throughout the World,
Lightning has blighted the rose gardens,
Soldiers, soldiers, have become corpses,
Heroes are now carrion for wild beasts.
Comrades of the dead had intended to carry off their friends for burial but
this was impossible. Instead, medics collected the pieces.
Stories about 'Turkish barbarity' were common currency during World
War I and some were based upon reality in the heat of battle. In Istanbul,
Einstein spoke to an Australian prisoner who had been wounded during a
bayonet charge. He had survived by feigning death but most of his wounded
comrades were killed. The Australian was eventually pulled into a trench
by an Ottoman officer who first stripped him of everything useful, and then
gave him a pair of boots; 'Three times his few belongings were taken from
him, and as often new ones given, for the Turks are extraordinary in this.
One moment they will murder wantonly, and the next surprise everyone
by their kindness.'
Many of the dead lay for months in no man's land. At first, the British
commander, Hamilton, refused the request for a truce to bury the dead but
one was eventually arranged. One of those who had to collect the dead was
Bedros Sharian, an Armenian Ottoman soldier. As an educated man he
was also called upon to interpret, which resulted in Sharian being accused
of passing information to the enemy. Acquitted by a court marshal,
he nevertheless admitted in his memoirs that he wanted to desert to the British
but found no opportunity to do so (Pye, 1938, pp. 7 6 - 9 9 ) .
The patience of wounded Ottoman troops was almost as famous as their
courage. Fahrettin Altay was a kaymakam
(lieutenant-colonel) during the
Gallipoli campaign and in a letter written in May 1915 he wrote that, at one
time, 4,000 wounded were assembled around his position. Most were sent to
the field hospital at Maidos until this came under
fire from the enemy fleet. Injured troops normally
went to hospitals in Istanbul, including one known
as the 'English Hospital', which was visited by
Einstein early that same month. He was told that
at least 10,000 wounded had arrived within the
last ten days and more were arriving. Most were
Arabs from V Corps, recruited in the Aleppo
region of northern Syria and largely suffering from
bullet wounds. Men sent to the 'Russian Hospital'
had all reportedly suffered bayonet wounds; 'The
men are docile as lambs - like good children, the
doctor said - few people when left to themselves
are as submissive as the Turk.'
53
PALESTINE-SYRIA, 1918
In 1917 the Ottoman Army assembled the Yildirim (Lightning) Army Group. It was intended to roll
back the British advance in Iraq and then hopefully take advantage of the Russian Revolution to
carve out a new Turkish Empire in the heart of Asia. In fact, the collapse of Ottoman resistance
around Gaza in southern Palestine meant that the Yildirim Army Group was rushed to Syria where
it helped slow the British advance until late 1918. Relatively well equipped as it was, including
some of the few Ottoman hucum tabur 'assault units' to be issued with a modified version of
the German steel helmet, the Yildirim and other Ottoman forces in Palestine and Syria were
now hugely outnumbered, outgunned, out-supplied, and had minimal air cover.
The inset illustrations show some of the personal weapons and machine guns used by
Ottoman infantry during World War I: (1) 7.65mm Mauser M1893, the standard infantry rifle
of the Ottoman infantry during the First World War. (2) German Maxim Commercial Model 1909,
7.65mm with light 'commercial' tripod, the most widely used machine gun in the Ottoman Army
during the First World War.
54
The fate of Ottoman soldiers who were taken prisoner differed enormously
depending upon where they were captured. Those who fell into British or
French hands could expect relatively humane treatment, though a Frenchman
named Jean Pierre Bory who was aboard a troopship that carried POWs
recalled that while the handful of Ottoman officers were accommodated in
cabins, several hundred ordinary Ottoman soldiers were thrust into the hold
with a large barrel of water from which to drink and dress their wounds
(Liddle, 1976, p. 139).
The Red Crescent Society exchanged records of prisoners through the Red
Cross Headquarters in Switzerland, while also channelling correspondence and
care packages. It was also an intermediary for the inspection of POW camps
and any exchange or repatriation of prisoners (Emin, 1930, pp. 255-56).
With around 120,000 Ottoman military prisoners in British hands alone,
the Ottoman Red Crescent was in no position to offer very much assistance but
around 100,000 packages were sent to Ottoman POWs each year.
Ottoman soldiers who fell into Russian hands had little chance of survival.
Few returned home, and did so with appalling stories of neglect and massacre.
Some reappeared after the Russian Revolution, trudging homewards through
the Balkans and Georgia or turning up at various Russian and Ukrainian
seaports. In fact, 1,457 officers and 17,715 men were at one time reported
alive in Russian camps, some having been caged with German POWs near
Moscow. Yet of these known prisoners, only 2,260 ever reached home, along
with 6,750 soldiers and 2,250 civilians whose fate had previously been
unknown (Erickson, 2 0 0 1 , p. 189).
57
Diplomat's
Dardanelles
April-September
U L U S A L
DESTANIMIZIN
K U R T U L U S
KAHRAMANLARI...
Smaller and more specialized museums can be found in the area of Ottoman
Turkey's most significant victory during World War I, the defence of the
Dardanelles. A harp muzesi (war museum) is located in the fascinating little
port-town of Gallipoli itself. Further down the peninsula the early Ottoman
castle at Kilitbahir contains another interesting collection of artefacts, either
found on battlefields or donated by veterans or their families. A third collection
of objects dating from World War I, as well as an interactive display, can be
found a short ferry-ride away in the fortress at Canakkale. Other Ottoman
military objects from World War I can be found in various other museums,
some in Syria, but have not been assembled into specific displays.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Anon.), Handbook
of the Turkish Army, Eighth Provision Edition (Cairo, 1916;
reprinted London, 1996)
De Nogales, R., Four Years Beneath the Crescent (London, 1926)
Einstein, L., Inside Constantinople:
A Diplomat's Diary during the Dardanelles
Expedition on April-September
1915 (London, 1917)
Emin, A. (Yalman), Turkey in the World War (Newhaven, 1930)
Erickson, E. J . , Gallipoli and the Middle East 1914-1918
(London, 2008)
Erickson, E. J . , Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in World War I
(Westport, 2 0 0 1 )
Fasih, M . (tr. H. B. Danishman), Gallipoli 191S: Bloody Ridge (Lone Pine) Diary
of Lt. Mehmed Fasih 5th Imperial Ottoman Army Gallipoli 1915 (Istanbul,
2001)
Heydemarck, H., (tr. C. W. Sykes), War Flying in Macedonia (London, 1930)
Kannengeisser, H., The Campaign in Gallipoli (London, 1927)
Kazemzadeh, E , The Struggle for Transcaucasia,
1914-1921
(New York, 1951)
Kressenstein, Kress von, Mit den Turken zum Suezkanal (Berlin, 1938)
Larcher, M . , La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1926)
Liddle, P., Men of Gallipoli: The Dardanelles and Gallipoli Experience
August
1914 to January 1916 (London, 1976)
Macleod, J . , Reconsidering
Gallipoli (Manchester, 2004)
M c Carthy, J . , The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire (London, 2 0 0 1 )
Murphy, C. C. R., Soldiers of the Prophet (London, 1927)
Orses, T., and N. Oz^elik, I. Diinya Savashi'nda Turk Askeri Kiyafetleri (Istanbul,
2007)
Pye, E., Prisoner of War 31,163 Bedros M. Sharian (New York, 1938)
Quataert, D., 'Part IV, The Age of Reforms 1 8 1 2 - 1 9 1 4 ' , in H. Inalcik and D.
Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman
Empire
1300-1914
(Cambridge, 1994)
Sanders, O. Liman von, Five Years in Turkey (Annapolis, 1920)
Skander Beg, 'The Battles of Salt, Aman and Jordan from Turkish Sources', Journal
of the Royal United Services Institute, 69 (1924) pp. 3 3 4 - 3 4 3 and pp. 4 8 8 - 4 9 8
Sonyel, S., The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia (Ankara, 2000)
Toynbee, A. J . , The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (London, 1923)
GLOSSARY
Alay
Regiment
Alay emini
Regimental paymaster
Alay kdtibi
Regimental secretary
Asker
Soldier
Aspiranti
Basbgavush
Sergeant major
Basbqavusb
muavini
Basblik
Military hat
Bayraktar
Colour- or standard-bearer
Bey
Binbasbi
Major
Boliig
Company (army)
Boliig emini
Cavusb
Sergeant
Cerrah
Surgeon
Effendi
Enveriye
Erkdnibarbiye
Military staff
Esvap emini
Quartermaster
Fedai
Ferik
Firka
Division
Gonullii
Volunteer
Havan
Mortar
Hoca
Hucum Tabur
Assault battalion
Ibtiyat
Reserve, reservist
Imam
Itfaiye
Jandarma
Kabalak
Kagni
Two-wheeled ox-cart
Kalpak
Kaymakam
Lieutenant-colonel
Keffiyeh
Arab headcloth
Kol
Column
Kolagasi
Kolordu
Army corps
Kumbarasi
Liva
Maresciali
Mehmetgik
Mektepi harbiye
Military school
Miralay
Colonel
Molla
Muezzin
Muftii
Mulazimi evvel
Lieutenant
Mulazimi sani
Muretteb
Second lieutenant
Composite unit, usually of divisional size, or scratch force
not forming part of the permanent Army structure
Mustahfiz
Territorial army
Mushur
Field marshal
Nefer
Private
Nisbanci
Rifleman, marksman
Nizam
Onbashi
Corporal
Ordu
mufettisblik
Pasha
Piyade askeri
Infantry
Redif
Sancaktar
Standard bearer
Seybulislam
Tabip
Medical officer
Tabur
Battalion
Takaut
Timarci
Tufekgi
Armourer
Vali
Governor (civil)
Yuzbasbi
Captain
Zabit vekili
Zaptiye
Pre-reform gendarmerie
INDEX
References to illustrations are s h o w n
in b o l d
Abdul H a m i d II, Sultan 1 1 , 1 6
accommodation 2 3 , 2 5 , 2 6 , 32
aircraft 2 2 , 2 5
shooting at 2 0
al-Sin 18
Ali Sa'id Pasha 4 5
Altay, Lt. C o l . Fahrettin 3 2 , 4 5 , 5 3
a p p e a r a n c e and uniforms A ( 2 7 ) , 2 8 - 3 2 ,
29, B ( 3 1 ) , 59
Arab troops 14, 1 6 , 2 1 , 2 8 , 3 7 - 3 8 ,
53,57
A r a b i a n front D ( 3 9 ) , 4 5 , 4 8
Armenians 1 4 - 1 5 , 3 7
atrocities 5 3
belief and belonging 3 4 - 3 8
Berlin to B a g h d a d R a i l w a y 4
c a m p a i g n life 3 8 - 4 9
c a m p a i g n overview 4 2 - 4 9 , 4 7
casualties 5 7
C a u c a s u s front 4 1 , 4 2 , E ( 4 3 ) , 4 4 ,
44, 48, 56, 58
C e m a l Pasha 3 6 , 3 7
Circassians 1 4
communications 2 4 , 4 8
C t e s i p h o n , battle o f ( 1 9 1 5 ) 1 8 , C ( 3 5 )
daily life 2 2 - 2 6
Damascus 3 3 , 3 6 , 53
De Nogales, R. 33
dead: t r e a t m e n t o f 5 2 - 6 3 , 5 8
Deedes, C a p t a i n W y n d h a m 5 4
discipline 3 6
D o g a n Efendi, 2 n d Lt. 4 9
Einstein, Lewis
on medical care 5 3 , 5 4
on O t t o m a n A r m y 1 9 , 2 3 , 2 9 ,
32, 40
on truce to bury dead 5 8
on w a r as jihad 3 4
enlistment 1 1 - 1 6 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 5
Enver Pasha 2 8 , 4 0 , 4 1
epaulettes B ( 3 1 )
equipment 2 9 - 3 0 , 4 2
Fahri Pasha
36
Fasih, 2 n d Lt. M e h m e d
education 1 9
on ethnic m i x o f a r m y 13
on fallen c o m r a d e 5 2 - 5 3
fighting at Gallipoli 2 5 , 4 9 - 5 1 , F ( 5 1 )
Gallipoli
a c c o m m o d a t i o n and shelters 2 3 , 2 6 , 3 2
air p o w e r 2 5
battle r i b b o n s 5 9
campaign conditions 1 8 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 3 3 ,
36, 38, 45-46
defences 1 7 - 1 8 , 1 7 , 5 4 , 5 7
experience o f fighting at 2 5 , 4 9 - 5 2 ,
F ( 5 1 ) , 52
morale 3 7 , 3 8
museums 5 9
prisoners o f w a r 5 4
soldiers at 1 3 , 3 8 , 4 4
tactics 2 1
truce to bury dead 5 8
w e a p o n s and equipment 3 3 , 4 2
gas, poison 2 1 , 3 3
gas m a s k s 1 9 , 3 3
G e o r g i a n Volunteer Legion 1 6
Germany
influence on O t t o m a n A r m y 1 6 , 2 1 ,
22,25-6
links with O t t o m a n Empire 4
logistical support for O t t o m a n Empire
28,32
G r e e k O r t h o d o x Christians 1 5
Arab 2 8 , 3 0 , 4 1 , 5 0
civilian 1 1
enviriye
30, 33, 44, 48, 50, 59
helmets 5 3
turbans 3 6
headquarters entrances 3 0
heliographs 2 4
insignia and patches B ( 3 1 )
18,21,30,
Islamic dervish b r o t h e r h o o d s 1 2 , 1 7 , 3 6
Itfaiye (Istanbul Fire Brigade) 1 3 , 3 7
jandarma
Jews 15
Laz
water
14
leave 4 1
Libya
45,45
Fortress Area C o m m a n d s
M e h m e d V, Sultan 1 6
musicians 2 5 , C ( 3 5 ) , 5 3
Muslim troops, non-Ottoman
64
multi-ethnic nature 1 2 , 1 3 - 1 5
reserves 12
size 4 0 - 4 1
Kannengiesser, H a n s 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 0 , 2 3 ,
24, 25, 29, 40
K e m a l , M u s t a f a (Ataturk) 3 8 , 4 1
Kurds 1 4 , 15
M a c e d o n i a n front 2 0 , 4 5
M a h m u t Bey, M a j . 4 9 - 5 0
mail 4 1 , 4 8
Manisia 2 4
medical care 2 5 , A ( 2 6 ) , C ( 3 5 ) , 4 0 , 4 1 ,
48-49, 53-54
Medina 2 9 , 3 6
Galicia B ( 3 1 ) , 3 2 , 4 4 - 4 5 , 4 9 , 5 3
appearance 4 , 1 9 , 2 8 , 3 3 , C ( 3 5 ) ,
41,45,49
education and training 19
shortage 1 6 - 1 7
weapons 3 2 , 33
organization 3 8 - 4 0
O t t o m a n Army
foreign recruits 1 5 - 1 6
infantry capabilities and tenacity
20,37
12-13
on life at Gallipoli 1 8 , 2 3 , 3 3 ,
3 6 , 3 8 , 46
yearning for sweetheart 3 7
fedais
13
Fekri Pasha 2 9
food 2 2 - 2 4 , 3 2 , 4 2 , 4 8
footwear 3 2
17
officers
railways D ( 3 9 )
Red Crescent Society 5 4 , 5 6
relief w o r k 5 7
religion 3 4 - 3 7 , 3 7 , D ( 3 9 )
Reza Shah Pahlavi 4 0
H a m i l t o n , General 5 , 5 3
headgear 3 0
nationalism 5 , 3 4
Nestorians 15
15-16
24
weapons 3 2 - 3 3 , F (51)
ammunition 2 9 , 4 0
artillery 2 1 , 2 4
bayonets F ( 5 1 )
daggers F ( 5 1 )
hand grenades 4 6 , F ( 5 1 )
machine guns 3 3 , G ( 5 5 )
makeshift 4 6 , F ( 5 1 )
pistols 3 3
rifles 2 9 , 3 2 - 3 3 , E ( 4 3 ) , G ( 5 5 )
women 13, A (27), 54
Yildirim Army Corps 2 6 , G ( 5 5 )
Young Turk revolution 4 - 5
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OTTOMAN
INFANTRYMAN
1914-18
Following the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the Ottoman Empire undertook
a massive military retraining programme. Although many histories have
derided the Ottoman Army as a poor fighting force, this was more often
due to poor leadership and logistics than the quality of their troops.
The typical Ottoman soldier, the
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CAN $22.00
IS B N 978-1-84603-506-7
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