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Brooksville Vs Hernando County Feb 2016
Brooksville Vs Hernando County Feb 2016
CITY OF BROOKSVILLE,
Respondent.
_______________________/
AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, HERNANDO COUNTY (the County), by and through its
undersigned counsel and pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.100, seeks certiorari review of
five ordinances passed by Respondent, CITY OF BROOKSVILLE (the City).1
I.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A.
Page 1 of 39
B.
municipality in exchange for the provision of utility services constitutes the required
grant of an agency with an interest so as to make the power-of-attorney irrevocable.
D.
is constitutionally valid, where the enclaves residents are predominately AfricanAmerican as a result of the municipalitys since-repealed de jure racial segregation.
II.
that were adopted by the City on December 7, 2015, and Ordinance 862 that was
adopted by the City on December 21, 2015 (collectively the Annexation
Ordinances). Jurisdiction is vested in this Court by Article V, Section 5(b) of the
Florida Constitution, Fla. Stat. 171.081, and Fla. R. App. P. 9.100. The County is
a party affected because it is the governmental unit with jurisdiction over the area to
be annexed, and thus, has standing to bring this action.2
City of Tampa v. Hillsborough County, 504 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2nd DCA
1986); City of Sunrise v. Broward County, 473 So. 2d 1387, 1389 (Fla. 4th DCA
1985).
2
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III.
On Figure 1, the property annexed in Ordinance No. 854 is in red; the property
annexed in Ordinance No. 855 is in pink; the property annexed in Ordinance No. 857
is in yellow; the property annexed in Ordinance No. 859 is in purple; and the property
annexed in Ordinance No. 862 is in blue. The Citys territory is cross-hatched.
Figure 1 was created by using the GIS mapping services at
https://www.hernandocountygis-fl.us/publicmapgallery/, last visited January 25,
2016.
3
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IV.
Article 8, Section 2(c) of the Florida Constitution vests the Legislature with the
exclusive power over municipal annexations.4 The Legislature may share its power
with municipalities by general or special law.5
In the Municipal Annexation and Contraction Act (the Annexation Act),6 the
Legislature sets the procedures by which municipalities can alter the extent of their
own borders.7 Municipalities must act in strict accord with the Annexation Act,8
as it expressly preempts municipalities from annexing territory by any other means.9
E.g., North Ridge Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So. 2d 461,
464 (Fla. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1062 (1980).
4
Fla. Const. Art. 8, 2(c). See also Fla. Stat. 166.021(3)(a) (excluding
from municipal home rule powers [t]he subjects of annexation, merger, and
exercise of extraterritorial power . . . .).
5
Codified as Fla. Stat. Ch. 171. See also SCA Servs. of Florida, Inc. v. City
of Tallahassee, 418 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
6
Pinellas County v. City of Largo, 964 So. 2d 847, 849 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2007).
Smith v. Ayres, 174 So. 2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1965). See also McGeary v. Dade
County, 342 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); Town of Mangonia Park v.
Homan, 118 So. 2d 585, 588 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1960).
8
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INVOLUNTARY ANNEXATIONS
10
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Second, the city council must provide a copy of the report to the board of
county commissioners of the county wherein the city is located at least 15 days in
advance of the councils first scheduled hearing on the proposed annexation
ordinance. The Annexation Act cautions that the failure to timely file the report with
the county may be the basis for a cause of action invalidating the annexation.12
Third, [t]he governing body of the municipality shall, not less than 10 days
prior to the date set for the first public hearing [on the proposed annexation
ordinance], mail a written notice to each person who resides or owns property within
the area proposed to be annexed. The notice must describe the annexation proposal,
the time and place for each public hearing to be held regarding the annexation, and
the place or places within the municipality where the proposed ordinance may be
inspected by the public.13
Once a municipality satisfies the prerequisites, it can then proceed to consider
an annexation ordinance.
The Annexation Act requires that [p]rior to the adoption of the ordinance of
annexation, the [municipalitys] governing body shall hold at least two advertised
public hearings. The first public hearing shall be on a weekday at least 7 days after
12
13
the day that the first advertisement is published. The second public hearing shall be
held on a weekday at least 5 days after the day that the second advertisement is
published.14
The annexation ordinance must then be approved by the affected areas voters
in referendum held within thirty days. Voter approval is not required, however, if no
registered voters live in the territory to be annexed.15 Also, no referendum is required
if non-voters (e.g., residents of other states, corporations, etc.) own more than seventy
percent of the total area to be annexed, and the owners of more than fifty percent of
the land in the area consent to the annexation, provided that the city council receives
the consents before it adopts the annexation ordinance.
C.
VOLUNTARY ANNEXATIONS
14
15
Id.
16
17
18
19
Id.
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allows the passage of vehicular traffic to that unincorporated area only through the
municipality.20
Second, the parcel must be contiguous to the municipalitys pre-annexation
boundaries.21 In other words, the area to be annexed must share a substantial part of
one of its boundaries with a pre-annexation boundary of the municipality.22
D.
20
21
22
County of Volusia, 925 So. 2d at 344 (Such annexation defeats the basic
concept of a municipal corporation of unity and compactness.).
23
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owner to submit a petition for voluntary annexation before agreeing to provide utility
services to the property.24 This because municipal utilities have the discretion, but
not an obligation, to provide extraterritorial services.25 The municipality can even
combine the agreement to provide utility services and a petition for voluntary
annexation into a single document.26 If the parcel to be served is not yet able to
satisfy the compactness and contiguity requirements, a municipality can include in
a preannexation agreement a provision requiring the property owner to submit a
petition for voluntary annexation at such time that the parcel satisfies the
requirements, enforceable by injunction.27
The provisions of a preannexation agreement, however, are subordinate to
those of the Annexation Act. In other words, the existence of a preannexation
agreement between a municipality and a property owner does not permit a
Allen's Creek Properties, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 679 So. 2d 1172, 1176
(Fla. 1996) (Because Clearwater has no duty to provide services to the
unincorporated land within its service area, we conclude that the City may
condition upon annexation the landowner's receipt of sewer services.).
24
26
County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340, 345 (Fla. 5th DCA
2006).
Generally Fla. Stat. 180.19(1) (allowing extraterritorial service upon
such terms and conditions as may be agreed between such municipalities, and the
owners or association of owners of such outside lots or lands.).
27
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In a Utility Service Agreement dated May 2, 1995, the City agreed to provide
extraterritorial sewer services to St. Anthony the Abbot Catholic Church in
exchange for the property owner, the Diocese of St. Petersburg (the
Diocese), agreeing to appoint the City . . . as its irrevocable attorney in fact
County of Volusia, 925 So. 2d at 344 (Such annexation defeats the basic
concept of a municipal corporation of unity and compactness.);City of Ormond
Beach v. City of Daytona Beach, 794 So. 2d 660, 661, n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
rehearing denied; SCA Servs. of Florida, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 418 So. 2d
1148, 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
28
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with absolute and specific authority to execute and file any and all such
petitions for voluntary annexation into the City of Brooksville.29
On November 28, 2000, the City entered into a Utility Service Agreement with
Grace World Outreach Church, Inc. (Grace World),30 that contained nearly
identical annexation/power-of-attorney provisions as those to which the
Diocese had agreed five years earlier.31
On August 29, 2002, the City entered into another Utility Service Agreement
with
The City entered into yet another Utility Service Agreement, on November 19,
2010, with the Hernando County Housing Authority. The Utility Service
Agreement contained the Citys standard annexation/power-of-attorney
provisions.33
29
31
32
33
Finally, the City obtained its fifth power-of-attorney from Samuel and Kellie
Griffin (collectively the Griffins) in 2008. The Griffins own a parcel of real
property, located on the west side of Mildred Avenue, that is improved with a
single-family home.34 On September 19, 2008, the Griffins executed an
Irrevocable Power of Attorney appointing the City as their attorney-in-fact.
The Griffins granted the City the power to do a voluntary annexation by the
City of [their] property at such time that the City of Brooksville shall in its sole
discretion petition to annex the . . . property into the City of Brooksville.35
2.
In 2015, the City petitioned itself to annex the properties as the attorney-in-fact
for the owners. The City Manager, T. Jennene Norman-Vacha, signed each of the
petitions. None of the actual property owners signed the petition. Further, the record
contains no evidence that the City provided any notice to the property owners that the
City Manager had petitioned the City for voluntary annexation.
34
35
3.
(App. at Tabs 1-4, pp. 1-68; Tab 7, pp. 96-98; Tab 8, pp. 103-104, 107188; Tab 10, pp. 276-283; Tab 11, pp. 286-304, line 19)
36
37
(App. at Tab 5, pp. 69-91; Tab 8, p. 106, 219-241; Tab 9, p. 244, 246-275;
Tab 11, p. 304, line 24p. 307, line 5; Tab 12, pp. 309-311)
38
Page 14 of 39
B.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
1.
State v. Love, 126 So. 374, 377 (Fla. 1930) ([I]t might also be proper to
observe that the rule is that statutes in derogation of state sovereignty are to be
strictly construed.)
39
40
Town of Mangonia Park v. Homan, 118 So. 2d 585, 588 (Fla. 2nd DCA
1960).
See Smith v. Ayres, 174 So. 2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1965); Magnolia Park, 118
So.2d at 588.
41
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2.
Since Sections 171.0413 and 171.044 both concern the same topic, municipal
annexation, they must be interpreted in pari materia.42 The Court must therefore
construe the statutes together, and compare each to the other, in such a manner as to
preserve the force of both without destroying their evident intent, assuming that a
compatible construction is possible.43
With regard to Sections 171.0413 and 171.044, each statute contains a
reciprocal reference to the other. On one hand, Section 171.0413(4) states, Except
as otherwise provided in this law, the annexation procedure as set forth in this section
shall constitute a uniform method for the adoption of an ordinance of annexation....
On the other hand, Fla. Stat. 171.044(4) provides that [t]he method of annexation
provided by this section shall be supplemental to any other procedure provided by
general or special law....
McGeary v. Dade County, 342 So. 2d 549, 550-51 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977)
(holding former voluntary and involuntary annexation statutes must be interpreted
in pari materia).
42
43
Id at 551.
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See Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1957); Cragin v. Ocean &
Lake Realty Co., 133 So. 569 (Fla. 1931).
44
Therrell v. Smith, 168 So. 389 (Fla. 1936); State v. Nourse, 340 So.2d 966
(Fla. 3 DCA 1976).
45
rd
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3.
In this case, the City petitioned itself for the annexations as the attorney-in-fact
for the property owners. The City Manager signed the annexation petitions. The City
Councils agendas refer to the annexations as being city initiated. The City Planner
opened the public hearings on the then-proposed Annexation Ordinances as being
city initiated. In fact, the City did not even notify the property owners of the
annexations. Thus, the Annexation Ordinances can only be classified as voluntary
if Section 171.044 can be construed to allow a municipality to submit an annexation
petition to itself as the agent a the property owner.
The Florida Supreme Court has consistently held, [w]hen the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning . . . the
statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.46 Accordingly, the task of
interpreting Section 171.044 begins with the language of the statute, construed in
Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc.,
v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931). See also State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.
1973) (Where the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and
unambiguous, then there is no necessity for any construction or interpretation of
the statute, and the courts need only give effect to the plain meaning of its
terms.).
46
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accord with its ordinary or natural meaning and with a view to [its] place in the
overall statutory scheme.47
When enacting Section 171.044, the Legislature delineated separate roles to be
played by (1) the petitioning property owner, and (2) the annexing municipality. The
voluntary annexation process begins when [t]he owner or owners of real property
in an unincorporated area of a county . . . petition the governing body of [a]
municipality that said property be annexed to the municipality.48 In turn, the
municipality can only consider enacting an annexation ordinance after a
determination by the governing body of the municipality that the petition bears the
signatures of all owners of property in the area proposed to be annexed.....49 The
Legislatures decision not to define owner or owners does not create an
ambiguity in those roles. In everyday speech, people know that an owner is [t]he
person in whom is vested the ownership, dominion, or title of property; [the]
proprietor.50
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). See also Graham County
Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010)
(Courts have a duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.)
47
48
49
50
1987 Fla. Op. Attorney Gen. 143 (1987). (App. at Tab 20, pp. 336-337)
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4.
In this case, the City cannot even pretend that it complied with the prerequisites
for an involuntary annexation, to wit:
The City neither obtained the advance consent of the property owners, as
required by Section 171.0413(5) and (6), nor did it hold a referendum as
required by Section 171.0413(1).
The City did not mail a written notice to each person who resides or owns
property within the area proposed to be annexed within 10 days prior to the
date set for the first public hearings on the Annexation Ordinances as required
by Section 171.0413(1).
The City did not prepare a report setting forth the plans to provide urban
services to any area to be annexed, as required by Section 171.042(1).
The City did not file a copy of the urban services report with the Board of
County Commissioners at least 15 days prior to beginning the process for the
annexations, as required by Section 171.042(2), even though the statute states
that the [f]ailure to timely file the report as required in this subsection may be
the basis for a cause of action invalidating the annexation.
Page 21 of 39
53
inhabitants-that is, a body of people collected or gathered together in one mass, not
separated into distinct masses, and having a community of interest because residents
of the same place, not different places. So, as to territorial extent, the idea of a city
is one of unity, not of plurality; of compactness or contiguity, not separation or
segregation.54
Though the Annexation Act does not define the word pocket, the Fifth DCA
has defined the word to mean a small isolated area of land.55 The Fifth DCA, in a
later case, clarified that the smallness of a parcel is relative to, and necessarily
dependent upon, the size and configuration of the parcel and the surrounding
municipal property.56 The statutory requirement that pockets not be created by
annexations was intended to insure that no vestiges of unincorporated property be left
in a sea of incorporated property.57
City of Sunrise v. Broward County, 473 So.2d 1387, 1388 (Fla. 4th DCA
1985) (Emphasis in Original) quoting 1977 Op. Attorney Gen. Fla. 077-18,
(February 18, 1977) at 38. See also City of Center Hill v. McBryde, 952 So. 2d
599, 602, n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (quoting City of Sunrise).
54
55
City of Sanford v. Seminole County, 538 So. 2d 113, 115 (Fla. 5th DCA
56
1989).
Page 23 of 39
While the Annexation Act also lacks a definition for finger areas in serpentine
patterns, the Fifth DCA has interpreted the phrase to mean projections of
unincorporated land that are winding or turning one way and another.58
B.
Using the Fifth DCAs definition, the Citys annexation of the Griffins parcel
thus creates or greatly exacerbates a pocket. It leaves an area of unincorporated land,
consisting of approximately 95.7 acres and approximately 100 individual parcels,
within the Citys borders, as shown on Figure 2 below.59
Figure 2
58
City of Sanford v. Seminole County, 538 So. 2d 113, 115 (Fla. 5th DCA
1989).
Figure 2 was created by using the GIS mapping services at
https://www.hernandocountygis-fl.us/publicmapgallery/, last visited January 25,
2016.
59
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On Figure 2, the crosshatched areas are within the Citys borders; the Griffins parcel
is yellow; and the pockets created by the annexation are shown in buff.
C.
In Ordinance Nos. 854, 855, and 859, the City annexed the properties owned
by the Grace World Outreach Church, the Diocese of St. Petersburg, and the
Hernando County Housing Authority respectfully, as shown in Figure 3 below.60
Figure 3
On Figure 3, the crosshatched areas are within the Citys borders, the Griffinss parcel
is yellow, the Housing Authoritys parcel is purple, the Grace Worlds parcel is red,
and the Dioceses parcel is shown in pink.
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In Figure 4, the crosshatched areas are within the Citys borders and the finger is
shown in white. At its widest point, the enclaves aperture is less than a mile wide.
Page 26 of 39
VI.
owner, the record contains no evidence that the power-of-attorney that the Griffins
executed in favor of the City was still valid at the time the City petitioned itself for
the annexation of their parcel.
Under Florida law, an irrevocable power-of-attorney is an agency coupled
with an interest. To constitute an agency coupled with an interest, the agents
interest must be in the property itself upon which the power is to operate and not
merely an interest in the exercise of the power or that which is to be produced by the
exercise of the power.62 As the Florida Supreme Court has held, an interest, not
amounting to a property or estate . . . but still an interest in the continued existence
of the power or authority to act . . . secured by contract, based upon a consideration
moving from the agent to the principal, and not merely for the purpose of earning a
salary or commission by the exercise of the power, but because the agent has parted
with value, at the principal's request or with his assent, looking to the exercise of the
Bowling v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 135 So. 541, 544 (Fla. 1931);
Peacock v. American Agronomics Corp., 422 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1982);
Morton v. Morton, 307 So. 2d 835, 839 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975); Robinson v. Sax, 115
So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1959).
62
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63
64
65
contains no evidence that the City still served as the Griffins attorney-in-fact at the
time of the annexation.
VII. ARGUMENT #4 - THE CITYS PATTERN OF ANNEXATION IN
SOUTH BROOKSVILLE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST THE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN RESIDENTS OF SOUTH BROOKSVILLE
A.
The City, like most southern cities, has a history of legally-mandated racial
segregation. Originally, the City legislated this de jure racial discrimination by
approving plats with racially-restrictive covenants. For example, the City approved
a plat for the Bell Terrace subdivision in 1925 that included the covenant, No
land, or any interest therein, in the Bell Terrace sub-division [sic] shall by any person
or corporation be sold or resold, conveyed, leased, or rented to, or in any way be
occupied or acquired by persons not wholly of the Caucasian race, except that the
foregoing does not apply to bonafide servants employed and living with families of
the Caucasian race residing in Bell Terrace.66
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In 1948, the City enacted a zoning law that prohibited any person of the negro
race from living in the City.67
There is more than a hint of defiance in the Citys actions. The United States
Supreme Court struck down racially-discriminatory zoning laws as unconstitutional
in 1917,68 and held that the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was
unconstitutional in 1948.69
As a result of the Citys actions, all of its African-American residents were
forced to move into South Brooksville. The area became known as the Sub[s] . . .
[which is] short for Negro Subdivisions all-black enclaves created by deed
restrictions and a city zoning law.70
The City ignored the needs of South Brooksville for decades. Flooding was
endemic, causing roadside ditches to overflow, yards to flood, and septic drain fields
E.g., Dan DeWitt, Joseph "Joe" E. Johnston Jr., Former Legislator and
Hernando School Board Attorney, Dies at 86, TAMPA BAY TIMES, May 28, 2009
(For the city, Johnston said in a 1998 interview, he wrote the 1948 zoning law
that segregated white and black residents into separate neighborhoods.). (App. at
Tab 13, p. 314)
67
68
69
See Dan DeWitt, Its Time to Make Good on Promises Made to South
Brooksville, TAMPA BAY TIMES, January 17, 2009; Dan DeWitt, A Good Flood
Control Plan for South Brooksville Needs More Explaining, TAMPA BAY TIMES,
February 7, 2014. (App. at Tab 17, pp. 327-329)
70
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to become inundated with storm water. Additionally, the Subs had inadequate water
lines and an insufficient number of fire hydrants.71 The NAACP sued the City in
federal court to force the City in 1973 to provide the Subs with public
improvements.72 The City, though it subsequently received a federal grant, did not
provide any improvements. In 1981, the City received a $2.3 million federal grant
to build infrastructure in the Subs, but this money was divvied up between white
contractors who made few lasting improvements. [A] Brooksville City Council
member . . . literally laughed in the faces of black residents in 1987 when they asked
where all the money had gone.73
While the City has long-since repealed this de jure segregation, South
Brooksvilles population remains predominately African-American.
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B.
74
75
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1190 (11th Cir. 1999).
77
discrimination, as an otherwise neutral state action does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause just because it has a disproportionate impact on a racial minority.
Instead, courts must adhere to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose.78
A court looks at four factors when determining whether a discriminatory intent
exists: (1) the nature and magnitude of the disparity created by the challenged action;
(2) foreseeability of the consequences of the defendants actions; (3) legislative and
administrative history of the decision-making process; and (4) knowledge, in that a
defendant's actions would be known to have caused the disparity or discriminatory
impact which resulted from their conduct.79
In consideration of these four factors, several other concepts rooted in civil
rights jurisprudence interplay. First, a claimant need not prove that a racial purpose
was the sole, dominant, or even the primary purpose for a challenged action, but only
that it has been a motivating factor in the decision.80 Discriminatory intent is
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Burton, 178 F.3d at 1189;
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (11th Cir. 1983).
78
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 26569; Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d
982, 98788 (11th Cir. 1986); Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1186-89.
79
80
In this case, each of the four factors supports a finding that the four annexation
ordinances were enacted with a discriminatory intent.
Disparate Impact: In proving discriminatory intent, a good starting point is
whether the challenged act bears more heavily on one race than another.84 While an
official act is not necessarily unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact, the Supreme Court has nevertheless recognized that
81
82
Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1185 citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224
(1971).
E.g., Washington, 426 U.S. at 241 (This is not to say that the necessary
discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute
...); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
83
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
70 (1980).
84
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Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. See also Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 266 (Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation
appears neutral on its face.).
85
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495, n. 13 (1977) (Disparity ...
sufficiently large over a period of time makes it unlikely that it [was] due solely
to chance or accident.).
86
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Columbus Board of Ed. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979). See also
United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. den.,
443 U.S. 915 (1979).
87
88
Burton, 178 F.3d at 1190; Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1186; Ammons, 783 F.2d
at 988 (11th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County., Ala., 706 F.2d 1103, 1107 (11th Cir.) aff'd 464 U.S. 1005 (1983).
89
90
United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 332-33 (1952).
Page 36 of 39
invidious purposes.91 Between the Citys racially-restrictive plats and the 1948 de
jure segregation ordinance, the Citys history of racial discrimination is clear and
persuasive in this case. The past discriminatory actions of the City illuminate and
explain the evolution of the Citys borders and a separate, segregated AfricanAmerican residential community.
Knowledge of Discriminatory Effects: The factor of knowledge, while
perhaps difficult to disentangle from the two prior factors, supports a finding of
intentional discrimination. Anyone could foresee that the donut hole would be the
result of the Citys annexation policies.
Although none of these four factors are necessarily independently conclusive,
the totality of the relevant facts supports a finding that the Annexation Ordinances
represent the continuation of a course of conduct which inescapably evidences
discriminatory intent and which is the cause for continued exclusion of South
Brooksville from the Citys territory.
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. See also Ammons, 783 F.2d at 988
([I]n tracing the history and development of Dade City, particularly with respect
to race relations, for its connection to present discrimination in the provisions of
the contested municipal services, the district court correctly relied upon a large
body of constitutional jurisprudence which recognizes that the historical context of
a challenged activity may constitute relevant evidence of intentional
discrimination.); Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1186.
91
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, and the
Appendix thereto, has been filed with the Courts ePortal system, which will provide
an email copy of the same to all counsel of record on February 12, 2016, and that a
true and correct copy of the foregoing shall be formally served upon the City of
Brooksville should this Court enter an Order to Show Cause.
/s/ Jon A. Jouben
Jon A. Jouben, Esq. (FBN: 149561)
[email protected]
Garth Coller, Esq. (FBN: 374849)
[email protected]
Randall B. Griffiths, Esq. (FBN 768091)
[email protected]
Alt. E-Mails: [email protected]
[email protected]
20 N. Main Street, Suite 462
Brooksville, FL 34601
352-754-4122 / 352-754-4001 Fax
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this brief complies with the font requirements of
Fla. R. App. P. 9.100.
/s/ Jon A. Jouben
cc:
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