Badmington Neil Theorizing Posthumanism
Badmington Neil Theorizing Posthumanism
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THEORIZING
POSTHUMANISM
Neil Badmington
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THEORIZINGPOSTHUMANISMI 11
made its neck stronger than ever" (1955, 203). Apocalyptic accounts
of the end of "Man," it seems to me, ignore humanism's capacity for
regeneration and, quite literally, recapitulation. In the approach to
posthumanism on which I want to insist, the glorious moment of
Herculean victory cannot yet come, for humanism continues to raise
its head(s).
N. Katherine Hayles has, of course, done much to reveal the
dangers of what might be called apocalyptic or complacent posthumanism.2 This, in fact, is precisely where How We BecamePosthuman
commences:
This book began with a roboticist's dream that struck me as a nightmare. I was reading Hans Moravec's Mind Children:TheFutureof Robot
and Human Intelligence,enjoying the ingenious variety of his robots,
when I happened upon the passage where he argues it will soon be possible to download human consciousness into a computer.To illustrate,he
invents a fantasy scenario in which a robot surgeon purees the human
brain in a kind of cranial liposuction, reading the information in each
molecular layer as it is stripped away and transferringthe information
into a computer. At the end of the operation, the cranial cavity is empty,
and the patient, now inhabiting the metallic body of the computer, wakens to find his consciousness exactly the same as it was before.
How, I asked myself, was it possible for someone of Moravec's
obvious intelligence to believe that mind could be separated from body?
Even assuming such a separation was possible, how could anyone think
that consciousness in an entirely different medium would remain unchanged, as if it had no connection with embodiment? Shocked into
awareness, I began to notice he was far from alone. (1999, 1)
Moravec, Hayles concludes, "is not abandoning the autonomous liberal subject but is expanding its prerogatives into the realm of the
posthuman" (287), for the seemingly posthumanist desire to download consciousness into a gleaming digital environment is itself
downloaded from the distinctly humanist matrix of Cartesian dualism. Humanism survives the apparent apocalypse and, more worryingly, fools many into thinking that it has perished. Rumors of its
death are greatly exaggerated.3
Moravec's fatally seductive narrative does not, of course, "exhaust
the meanings of the posthuman" (Hayles 1999, 283), and How We Became Posthuman offers an admirably nuanced approach that seeks to
avoid the "lethal ... grafting of the posthuman onto a liberal humanist
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view of the self" (286-87). What remains to haunt the book, however,
is the possibility that humanism will haunt or taint posthumanism,
and it is precisely this problem that will concern me here-a problem
of what remains, a problem of remains.4 If Hayles's project is to imagine a posthumanism that does not fall into the kind of trap that
ensnares Moravec, mine is slightly different (though not unrelated),
involving instead an attention to what of humanism itself persists,
insists, and ultimately desists.5I want, in short, to ask an apparently
straightforward question, with deliberately Leninist overtones: if
traces of humanism find their way into even the most apocalyptic
accounts of the posthumanist condition, what is to be done?
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THEORIZINGPOSTHUMANISM | 13
in my house, my TRS-80. You made a great choice." Perhaps predictably, however, most responses were hostile. "An abomination,"
fumed Andrew Rubin of Los Angeles. "You blew it," sighed Joseph
A. Lacey of Redding, California. "The Man of the Year has no soul,"
declared the more metaphysically inclined Shakti Saran of Allston,
Massachusetts, while Ohio's Joseph Hoelscher finally understood the
real meaning of the box office success of the year: "Your cover relegates man to a papier-mache dummy and glorifies a machine. No
wonder ET wanted to go home."8
These irate readers need not have worried too much about
"Man." "He" was still alive, still in the picture. Quite literally, in fact,
as I realized several months after submitting the manuscript of Posthumanism to the publishers. In my haste to draw attention to the
obvious headline and the presence of the computer at the center
of the picture, I had overlooked the significance of the somewhat
pathetic anthropomorphic figure that sat to the left, looking on.9
Here, in the margins of the image, another side of the story began to
emerge. Why, if the computer has "moved in," should there be a
human witness? What might such an onlooker reveal about the
apparent apocalypse? If technology has truly sped "us" outside and
beyond the space of humanism, why is "Man" still at "our" side? If
"Man" is present at "his" own funeral, how can "he" possibly be
dead? What looks on lives on. The end of "Man" was suddenly in
doubt. I had come up against the problem of what to do with human
remains.
Margins. Remains. The inside and the outside. Death. This
already sounds a lot like the work of Jacques Derrida, a theorist
whose work I want to bring to bear on the question of posthumanism. Although he was writing at the same time and in the same
city as explicitly antihumanist thinkers like Lacan, Foucault, and
Althusser,? Derrida took a somewhat different approach, arguing
that, simply because thought always takes place within a certain tradition, thought itself is bound to bear some trace of that tradition.
No one can think (himself or herself) entirely without. In "The Ends
of Man," an essay first published in 1968, he turned his attention to
the manner in which some of his contemporaries were conducting
their "questioning of humanism" (1982, 117) by "affirming an absolute break and absolute difference" from established anthropocentric
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Alone, however, this is still not enough, and Derrida goes on to suggest that there is no "simple and unique" (135) choice to be made
between the two methods of challenging humanism. A "new writing," he concludes, "must weave and interlace the two motifs"
(135),14and the apocalyptic desire to leap wholly beyond needs to be
married to the recognition that "[t]he outside bears with the inside
a relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple exteriority" (1976,
35). This, in short, "amounts to saying that it is necessary to speak
several languages and produce several texts at once" (1982, 135).15
The ease of speed and the speed of ease had found themselves called
into question.
Given the unfashionable status of antihumanist theory at the present moment, it would be easy to argue that "we" do not really need
Derrida to tell "us," in an essay written some time ago, that the antihumanists were somewhat wide of the mark. Their moment, the story
so often goes, has passed. Why would cultural critics interested in
posthumanism want to bother with Derrida's dense and difficult prose
when they have the thrilling, far newer work of Donna J. Haraway,
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THEORIZINGPOSTHUMANISM | 15
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that expose how humanism is forever rewriting itself as posthumanism. Repetition, that is to say, can be a form of questioning: to restate
is not always to reinstate. And while there may be a fine line between
insurrection and resurrection, the risk, I think, must be measured
against the alternative, for, as Hayles shows so well, there is nothing
more terrifying than a posthumanism that claims to be terminating
"Man" while actually extending "his" term in office.
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THEORIZINGPOSTHUMANISM | 17
or nature is solely to think, and who, in order to exist, does not require
any place, or depend on any material thing. So much so that this "I,"
that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from
the body. (Descartes 1988, Discourseon theMethod,36)23
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1 NEIL BADMINGTON
and even utters some regarding the bodily actions that cause certain
changes in its organs, for instance if you touch it in one spot it asks what
you want to say to it; if in another, it cries out that you are hurting it,
and so on; but not that it arranges them [the words] diversely to
respond to the meaning of everything said in its presence, as even the
most stupid [hebetes]of men are capable of doing. Secondly, even
though they might do some things as well as or even better than we do
them, they would inevitably fail in others, through which we would
discover that they were acting not through understanding [connaissance]
but only from the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a
universal instrument which can be of use in all kinds of situations, these
organs need some particular disposition for each particular action;
hence it is impossible to conceive that there would be enough of them in
a machine to make it act in all the occurrences of life in the way in which
our reason makes us act. (44-45)25
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20
[ NEIL BADMINGTON
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THEORIZINGPOSTHUMANISM | 21
allow the patient time to become more conversant with this resistance
with which he has now become acquainted, to workthroughit, to overcome it, by continuing, in defiance of it, the analytic work according to
the fundamental rule of analysis. Only when the resistance is at its
height can the analyst, working in common with his patient, discover
the repressed instinctual impulses which are feeding the resistance;and
it is this kind of experience which convinces the patient of the existence
and power of such impulses. The doctor has nothing else to do than to
wait, and let things take their course, a course which cannot be avoided
nor always hastened. (Freud 1953-74, 155; emphasis in original)
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Notes
Earlier versions of this paper were given at the University of Warwick, the University of Oxford, and at the Third Crossroads in Cultural Studies Conference,
University of Birmingham, in 2000. I owe special thanks to my copanelists in
Birmingham,particularlyBartSimon. lain Morland and Julia Thomas generously
commented on previous drafts.
1. See Derrida (1984), "Ofan Apocalyptic Tone."For a related discussion of
the problems of apocalypse, see Derrida (1984), "No Apocalypse, Not Now."
2. I take the latter to be the counterpart,the terrible twin, to what Jill Didur
usefully names in her contribution to this volume, criticalposthumanism.
3. Laura Bartlettand Thomas B. Byers reach similar conclusions about The
Matrix in their timely contribution to this issue. For a related point, see Wolfe
(1999).
4. For a somewhat different approach to the problem of what remains in
the apparently posthumanist moment, see Botting (1999). While my account will
call upon Derrida and Lyotardin an attempt to question the assumptions of some
contemporary versions of posthumanism, Botting enlists Jacques Lacan to tell a
fascinating story about the return or the resilience of the Real in these allegedly
hyperreal times.
5. I take the question of what desistsfrom Lacoue-Labarthe(1998).
6. Time,January3, 1983, 3.
7. Well, almost. Deep within the issue in question (26-27), the editors-in
what was surely a desperate attempt to shore up humanism-listed several
human "runners-up":Menachem Begin, Paul A. Volcker,and MargaretThatcher.
I resist the temptation to interpret the choice of the latter as yet another instance
of humanism merrily siding with the inhuman.
8. Letters page, Time,January24, 1983.
9. I owe thanks to MarjorieGarber and Rainer Emig for pushing me, in a
seminar on posthumanism at Cardiff University in 1999, to think further about
this figure.
10. For a fine account of how these and other thinkers addressed the
demands of antihumanism, see Soper (1986).
11. Translation modified. For the original French wording, see Derrida
(1972, 162).
12. Sartrewas, of course, quite happy for his philosophy to be described as
humanist. See, in particular,L'existentialisme
est un humanisme(1946), a title translated for some inexplicable reason as Existentialismand Humanism(1997).
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24 | NEILBADMINGTON
21. I have modified the translation here in order to preserve the more familiar rendering of Descartes's most famous phrase. For the original French wording, see Descartes (1984, 100).
22. The two terms, as John Cottingham (1992, 236) has pointed out, are synonymous in Cartesian thought.
23. Translation modified. For the original French wording, see Descartes
(1984, 100-102).
24. I briefly alluded to this particular moment in Descartes's text in my
introduction to Posthumanism(2000, 3-4), but lacked the space in that context to
work through the complexities and, moreover, the contradictions of Descartes's
position.
25. Translation modified. For the original French wording, see Descartes
(1984, 134-35).
26. This wonderful phrase was suggested to me by Catherine Belsey.
27. I am by no means the first person to play on this virtual homonym. See,
for instance, Zizek (1993, 12) and McCarron(1995, 264).
28. I owe this sentence, or something like it, to BartSimon.
29. Derrida, of course, makes several appearances-some "real," some
"fake"-in Danielewski's book.
30. See, for instance, Habermas (1981).
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THEORIZINGPOSTHUMANISM | 25
31. Since this essay was written, lain Chambers has published Cultureafter
Humanism:History,Culture,Subjectivity(2001), a wonderful book that also works
with (and through) the theories of Lyotardand Freud in an attempt to rethink the
relationship between humanism and posthumanism.
32. I take this beautiful phrase from de Certeau (1988, 2).
33. For more on Derrida's remarkablepatience, see Easthope (2002, 140).
34. I thank Malcolm Bull for encouraging me to "work through" this aspect
of my argument in more detail.
35. I am thinking here of the now archaicuse of the term to mean, in phrases
such as "Send me good speed," prosperity or success. Posthumanist cultural criticism needs, I think, to remember and repeat this very obsolescence.
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