Judith and Sidney Swartz Director

and Professor of Politics

Shai Feldman
Associate Director
Kristina Cherniahivsky
Charles (Corky) Goodman Professor
of Middle East History and
Associate Director for Research
Naghmeh Sohrabi
Senior Fellow
Abdel Monem Said Aly, PhD
Goldman Senior Fellow
Khalil Shikaki, PhD
Myra and Robert Kraft Professor
of Arab Politics
Eva Bellin
Henry J. Leir Professor of the
Economics of the Middle East
Nader Habibi
Sylvia K. Hassenfeld Professor
of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
Kanan Makiya
Rene and Lester Crown Professor
of Modern Middle East Studies
Pascal Menoret
Neubauer Junior Research Fellow
Richard A. Nielsen, PhD
Junior Research Fellows
Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, PhD
Hikmet Kocamaner, PhD
David Siddhartha Patel, PhD
Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux

June 2016
No. 100

From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of

Being Iraqs Prime Minister
Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee

n April 30 and May 20, 2016, protesters, including

supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, breached the heavily
fortified Green Zone in Baghdad that houses Iraqs Parliament
as well as the prime ministers office. Challenging the Iraqi
prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, and demanding reforms,
the protesters were eventually confronted by security forces,
leaving several dead.1
Haider al-Abadi headed the new government that was voted into power by the
parliament in September 2014. This new government was hailed by the United
States; by Iraqs most powerful Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; by the
prominent cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and by most Kurdish and Sunni parties. The
only voiced objections came from the former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki,
and his associates. Ending Malikis prime ministership became a necessity for
all those parties, who saw him as a divisive figure with a legacy of exclusivist
and authoritarian policies. The United States had played an important role
in forcing Maliki out of office despite his sweeping victory in the April 2014
general election.2 U.S. officials, including President Obama, had criticized
Maliki for following policies that undermined the achievements of 2008, when
cooperation between U.S. forces, the Iraqi government, and local Sunni fighters
helped create a proper framework to undercut al-Qaeda in Iraq. Likewise,
Iraqi parties that had been critical of Malikis authoritarian tendencies hoped
that Abadi would abide by power-sharing agreements and govern in a more
inclusive mode. The new prime minister promised to do so in his governmental
program, announcing ambitious plans for national reconciliation, for improving

relations between Iraqi communities, and for reforming state institutions.

This Brief reviews Abadis premiership so far and seeks to answer the following
questions: How much has Abadis governance differed fromor resembled
Malikis? And has the transition from Maliki to Abadi led to any significant
change in Iraqs political dynamics? The Brief argues that, despite improvements
in his style of governing, Abadi could not make a significant alteration
regarding major political issues, especially those pertaining to relations with
the Kurish and the Sunni groups, constitutional reforms and political and
security arrangements in the war against ISIS. The necessary conclusion is that
Iraqs main problems are systemic and related to the way the whole political
system is structured. A Shia prime minister like Abadi needs to command a
broad constituency that is loyal to and supportive of him in order to make the
concessions and compromises that a new political compact would require.
Abadi, although armed with good intentions and the desire to make a difference,
lacks such a constituency and, as a result, has not been able to make those
changes.

The Dawa Party and Intra-Shia Rivalries

To understand why Abadi has not yet been able to deliver the changes he
promised, one needs first to look at the dynamics shaping intra-Shia politics.
As a result of those dynamics, Abadi lost the support of his electoral bloc, State
of Law (SOL), without securing genuine support from alternative Shia forces.
Consequently, the main challenge to his prime ministership came from within
his Shia base, leaving him in a weak position from which he was unlikely to be
able to institute essential reforms at the national level.

Dr. Harith Hasan AlQarawee is a Junior

Research Fellow at the
Crown Center where he is
working on a book titled
Shiism and State in Iraq:
Authority, Identity and
Politics.

The opinions and findings expressed

in this Brief belong to the author
exclusively and do not reflect those of the
Crown Center or Brandeis University.
2

Since the formation of Iraqs transitional government led by Ibrahim al-Jaafari

in 2005, Dawa, a Shia party, has occupied the prime ministership. The early
decision to award this position to Dawa was a compromise between the then
two largest Shia groups, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by
the Hakim family, and the Muqtada al-Sadr movement. The two groups and
their leading families had fiercely competed and clashed both politically and
militarily. This led various Shia groups to conclude that selecting a Dawa
member as prime minister was the minimum requirement for securing unity in
the Shia alliance, given that the party was the smallest among the three groups
contesting for power in Iraq. Similar calculations led to the appointment of
Maliki to the position in 2006, especially after the Kurdish alliance refused
to agree to a new full term for Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who was accused of having
engaged in a unilateral style of leadership.
During his first two years in office, Maliki appeared to be very weak and was
largely ineffective. His constituency in the parliament comprised only a handful
of Dawa MPs. He was constantly complaining that he had no real power
over his government and that ministers and other state officials followed the
instructions of their parties rather than his directives. In this context, Maliki
seems to have concluded that his survival required a loyal political bloc rather
than a deal between ISCI, Sadrists, the Kurdish alliance, and the Sunni coalition,
none of whom had any interest in empowering him.
The political scene began to change significantly in 2008, especially following
the Maliki-led military operation in Basra, which forced Sadrs militia to
withdraw from Iraqs only port city and the source of about 70 percent of its oil
production.

Additionally, the formation of the Awakening Groups,

which helped downgrade al-Qaeda in Sunni areas and
reduced sectarian violence in Baghdad, had further
strengthened Maliki and reconstructed his image as a
strong and determined leader.

In August 2014, the Shia Alliance accepted the nomination

of Abadi to be the new prime minister, and the Iraqi
president, Fuad Masum, asked him to form a new
government, notwithstanding Malikis objections.

Building on those successes, Maliki formed State of Law

(SOL), a Dawa-led coalition which emerged as the largest
and most popular Shia coalition in both the provincial
election of 2009 and the general election of 2010. He
subsequently became more confident in making his own
decisions, pursuing a more aggressive approach, and
acting in a more authoritarian way, in particular seeking
to consolidate his personal power over state institutions.
Although he could not acquire full control, he was heading
in that direction, especially after his sweeping victory in
the general election of April 2014.

Abadis Prime Ministership:

Undoing Maliki

This explains why the Muqtada al-Sadr movement and

ISCI decided to overcome their history of hostility and
work together to counter the threat caused by Malikis
increasing popularity and his consolidation of power.
But it was only when Mosul, the second largest Iraqi city,
fell to ISIS, and several units of the Iraqi army collapsed,
that new conditions for challenging Maliki began to
materialize. The United States blamed Maliki and his
policies for intensifying the sectarian divide that had
created a suitable environment for ISIS to recruit and
mobilize and to acquire territory. U.S. officials concluded
that it was necessary to have a less divisive prime minister
in order to advance the war against ISIS.3
The most powerful Shia cleric in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, also
favored removing Maliki. Additionally, several senior
Dawa members, including Abadi, thought that Malikis
insistence on staying in office for a third term would
jeopardize the partys chances of maintaining the prime
ministership. At the end, Maliki was left with only one
major backer: Iran. Despite Irans backing, however, the
party could not ignore Sistanis will. In the end, Sistanis
position and the United States desire to see a new prime
minister put enough pressure on Iran so that it withdrew
its support for Maliki.4
Shia religious authorities and major groups, particularly
the Sadr movement and ISCI, hoped that Abadi would be
less authoritarian and more willing to share power. Their
long-term objective was to undermine Malikis influence
within state institutions and the military, which, as prime
minister and commander-in-chief, he had managed to
solidify by appointing his loyalists to key senior positions.
In the end, Dawa and other State of Law (SOL) leaders
were emboldened to propose a new candidate for the
position.

Despite the broad support that existed for replacing

Maliki, Iraqi political parties have been less interested in
installing an effective prime minister and enabling him to
succeed. Undoing Maliki was the main objective, even if
the price was to move back to the 2006 conditions, with
a weak prime minister amidst a chaotic political scene.
Abadi had to choose between fighting the influential
networks that Maliki had embedded within state
institutions, or allying with the latter in order to secure
the support of SOL, which was still led by the previous
prime minister. The conflict between Abadis need to be
different from Maliki and his desire not to be at the mercy
of other political groups helps explain his hesitation and
indecisiveness, as well as some of his political ventures.
When Abadi came to office, the main challenge he faced
was to prove that he was different from Maliki. He spent
his first months in office trying to distance himself from
the latters legacy by adopting a more institutionally
based and inclusive style of leadership, building better
relations with Parliament and exhibiting a higher level
of administrative professionalism. Specifically, Abadi
took three significant steps toward reversing Malikis
leadership style. The first was to eliminate the position of
commander in chief, which Maliki had used to circumvent
the Ministry of Defense and make military decisions in
isolation from the formal chain of command. This was
seen as a necessary step toward restructuring the Iraqi
army according to professional standards, especially
as it was followed by replacing most of the military
commanders that had served under Maliki with new
ones.5
Secondly, Abadis government agreed on the cabinet bylaw: a set of rules governing the meetings of the Council
of Ministers in such a way as to organize its decisionmaking process. Non-Dawa parties had often argued that
the absence of this by-law had helped Maliki concentrate
the governments powers in his office. This measure was
intended, at least theoretically, to make the operations
of the government a collective responsibility, rather than
concentrating it in Abadis own person.6

Thirdly, Abadi reversed his predecessors policies

by accepting more decentralization. He withdrew
Malikis objection to a parliamentary amendment that
transferred some of the federal governments authority
to the provinces.7 He further extended this policy when
he declared his first reforms package on August 9, 2015,
abolishing four ministries and transferring their authority
either to other ministries or to the provinces.8
What Abadi could not significantly change, however, was
the dysfunctionality of Iraqi institutions in addressing
major political issues. It is important to note that
Abadis government was established as a national unity
government, based on a political agreement among
major Iraqi parties. The agreement stipulated that the
government should be based on a real partnership and
should seek to achieve national reconciliation. Accordingly,
the government was to work within six months to
propose an amnesty law, to reform the de-Baathification
law (officially called the Accountability and Justice Law),
to amend Iraqs anti-terrorism law, and to expedite the
processing of detainees cases. (These were mostly Sunni
demands.)
Moreover, the agreement stated that likewise within
six months, the government would ban any military
formations outside the state (this was referring
particularly to the powerful Shia militias); restructure
Iraqi military forces by making them more professional
and inclusive; regulate the operation of anti-terrorism
units and intelligence bodies; and establish new security
frameworks for the provinces. Additionally, within three
months, the government would complete the formation of
the National Guards: an arrangement initially proposed
by the U.S. to integrate Sunni tribal and local fighters in
the security apparatus and give them more responsibility
for defending their areas. The agreement also included
other provisions instructing the government to reform
the administration, activate anti-corruption measures,
decentralize governance, and resolve disputes with the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).9
None of these deadlines have been met, however; once in
office, Abadi lacked the leverage to establish the consensus
needed to legislate and implement them. The Shia alliance
itself was deeply divided. Maliki and his allies, mostly
Iranian-backed groups such as the Badr organization and
Asaib Ahl al-Hak (AAH), did not trust Abadi, thereby
depriving him of the support of his own coalition, SOL.
Sadr, Hakim, and other groups that had supported
removing Maliki wanted Abadi to focus on dismantling
Malikis network of influence within state institutions
and were less interested in enabling him to be an effective
leader.
4

Meanwhile, the Dawa Party was split between Abadis

and Malikis allies and was therefore not in a position
to develop an active approach to confronting all these
challenges.

The Difficulty of Making a Difference

Politicians in a weak position cannot make strong and
sustainable dealsand this is an important lesson that can
be learned from the Iraqi experience. Lacking a broad and
committed constituency, Abadi could not reform relations
with other communities, nor set forth a clear vision for
post-ISIS Iraq.

The Kurds
Relations with the Kurds have continued to be
problematic since Malikis second term and seem headed
in the direction of more tension. Baghdad and Erbil, the
capital of Kurdistan, disagreed on the share of the Iraqi
budget and on how to manage Iraqs and Kurdistans
oil resources. The KRG has been complaining since the
rise of tension with Malikis government, particularly
during his second term (2010-2014), that it has not been
receiving the stipulated 17 percent of the federal budget,
including expenditures on the regions security forces,
the Peshmerga.10 This percentage was established by the
interim government of Ayad Allawi and was meant to
reflect the population of areas under the KRG, although
many Arab politicians questioned the accuracy of this
percentage, given that Iraq had not conducted a reliable
census since 1987 and that a considerable number of Kurds
live outside such areas controlled by the KRG, including
Kirkuk and Diyala. For its part, Baghdad protested against
the contracts that the KRG had unilaterally signed with
international oil companies (IOCs) to invest in its oil
fields and export production without the approval of
the federal government. The two sides offered different
interpretations of the constitutional provisions addressing
the management and exportation of oil and whether that
was an exclusive authority of the federal government or
one shared withor that could be unilaterally assumed
bythe region.11
Abadi and his minister of oil, Adil Abd al-Mahdi, tried
to negotiate a new deal to resolve those disputes with
the KRG. In November 2014, the two sides reached a
temporary agreement, albeit one that could not stand for
a long time, especially once oil prices plummeted and the
two sides started to look for ways to compensate for their
shrinking resources. Currently, there is no functional
arrangement governing relations between Baghdad and
Erbil.

The KRG keeps accusing Baghdad of penalizing its

population by delaying stipend payments to Kurdish
government employees. The region continued exporting oil
from its fields and from Kirkuk, which had been subjected
to the de facto control of Kurdish forces; but the resources
generated from those exports are still less than what the
region secures from its share of the federal budget.12
Expressing disappointment with Baghdads attitude,
KRG president Masoud Barzani threatened to organize a
referendum on the independence of Kurdistan. Conversely,
Baghdad accused the KRG of acting as an independent
state with its own autonomous foreign, security, and
economic policies. The federal government argued that
it was within its exclusive powers to export oil and to
make agreements with foreign countries and companies.
According to a senior Iraqi official, if Kurdistan wants to
split from Iraq, nobody will prevent it from doing so.13

Sunni Arabs
Another important issue that Abadi failed to resolve was
relations with Sunni Arabs. Abadi was aware that his
predecessor had been repeatedly accused of pursuing
exclusivist sectarian policies, and he tried to avoid
such accusations. Indeed, the political agreement that
established the government made it a requirement to pass
new laws and measures to address sectarian tensions.
For example, the National Guards law was suggested as
a mechanism whereby security apparatuses would be
decentralized and local Sunni fighters motivated to secure
their areas by giving them governmental guarantees and
adding them to a sustainable formal payroll system.
Abadi could not get major parties to agree on a single
version of this law, however. Most Shia parties, including
his own SOL, were suspicious that the law would end
up creating a Sunni military force that would be paid by
the government but whose loyalty would lie somewhere
else. Accordingly, those parties proposed formalizing
the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs), which were
predominantly irregular Shia forces, and integrating Sunni
fighters into its formations. Pressure from the Shia alliance
forced Abadi to go with this option.
Initially, Maliki attempted to use his leverage within
powerful groups in the PMFs, such as Badr and AAH, to
weaken Abadis authority. Before leaving office, he issued
a decree turning the PMFs into a formal body organized
and funded by the state. Confronting that reality and in
order not to antagonize the PMFs, Abadi instructed his
ministers to deal with the PMFs as an official body under
his authority as commander in chief.14

Currently, the government plans to integrate some

thirty to forty thousand Sunni fighters in the PMFs, and
intends to propose a law organizing them as a military
body composed of about one hundred twenty thousand
members and affiliated with the Ministry of Defense.15
There is a common belief, however, that the PMFs still
largely function as an autonomous force and that Abadis
control over their actions is limited if not nominal, his
ability to act as an effective commander in chief thereby
compromised by the presence of these powerful armed
forces on the ground. In addition, many Sunni politicians
accused PMFs of acting as a sectarian organization and
committing crimes against Sunni civilians.16
Abadi also failed to coordinate more effectively with Sunni
tribal and local forces fighting against ISIS, which was seen
as a necessary step for defeating the terrorist groups and
preparing for post-ISIS challenges. But his hands were tied
by the pressure exerted by Shia parties and militias not to
transfer significant military responsibilities to untrusted
Sunni fighters. If we add to this the deep divisions
within Sunni communities, it becomes clear that the
conditions for establishing unified and inclusive security
arrangements are not yet in place. Abadis lack of leverage
here has prevented him from making a big difference even if
he had the will to do so.

Abadis Reforming Agenda, and His Lack

of a Constituency
Abadis government, like the previous governments of Iraq,
is a national unity government. Positions are distributed
between different parties based on the number of each
partys parliamentary seats. Ministers follow their partys
instructions even when it comes to micro-management
issues such as appointments and contracting.
This power-sharing arrangement is usually referred to by
Iraqis as muhassessa (apportionment). Its downside is that
the prime minister cannot fully control his government or
make sure that it is united behind a specific agenda. Maliki
dealt with this problem by creating parallel bodies and
staffing them with his loyalists, and by issuing directives
to appoint under-ministerial senior staff in an acting
capacity. He thereby created a kind of shadow state that
circumvented constitutional limitations.17 Abadi has
sometimes resorted to similar methods in order to give
himself more leeway in making decisions, but this has
infuriated other parties, who then see him as another
Maliki. We are not consulted, and we know about his
decisions through media, noted one Shia official.18

The circle of blame that characterized Malikis terms

has been repeated: The prime minister blames parties for
focusing on their narrow interests and thereby placing
hurdles in his way; the parties, in turn, criticize him for
attempting to pursue a unilateral and exclusivist policy
or, alternatively, for being uncertain about what he wants.
In the words of a senior Shia politician, Abadi does not
know exactly what he wants... in the morning we agree
with him on something, just to hear that he changed his
mind in the evening.19

Lacking a clear vision, though, on how to proceed with

his reforms after having raised public expectations, Abadi
again started clashing with other parties. He did not have
full support even from his own coalition and therefore
found it difficult to promote his brand as a reformer while
having to deal with a parliament in which he had almost no
constituency. This is what impelled Abadi to declare that
he would form a government of technocrats to proceed
with his reforms and stop parties from hindering his
agenda.22

Complicating things further for Abadi is that the

organizing doctrine behind the Iraqi polity today is one
based on communal representation: Politicians are largely
seen as representatives of their communities rather than
as constituting a broader national base. They are expected
to remain loyal to their sub-national constituencies, which
extends to adopting uncompromising and unrealistic
positions with respect to relations with other communities.
The prime minister is constrained both by the need to
secure the support of his own community and by the
inflexibility shown by leaders of other communities.

This was a dangerous gamble, however, because Abadi

was intent on depriving parties of their leverage in
state institutions without possessing the tools to do so
constitutionally. Unable to achieve his goal, Abadi paved
the way for a more powerful figure, Muqtada al-Sadr, to
jump in, assume the leadership of the protest movement,
and demand an independent government of technocrats.
Abadi might have thought that he could make use of Sadrs
ability to organize massive protests in order to place more
pressure on other partiesbut this also meant that he
himself would become a captive of Sadrs ambition to
dominate Shia politics.

Abadi was not as lucky as Maliki, who ruled Iraq at a

time when oil prices (which account for 95 percent of the
governmental budget) reached unprecedented heights.
Oil prices started to fall dramatically a few months after
Abadis inauguration as prime minister, and the resulting
shrinking resources placed unprecedented pressure on
him. In a political culture whose alliances are largely
shaped by patronage, Abadi found it difficult to expand
his political and popular base. Maliki effectively employed
patronage to attract allies and neutralize some of his
opponents; Abadi seemed to lack both the skills and the
resources to act similarly.
Moreover, besides needing to decrease unnecessary
expenditures, the government had to deal with a wave of
popular protests that began during the summer of 2015.
Reacting to these challenges, Abadi tried to reposition
himself as a reformer. He announced three reform
packages, including one that abolished the positions
of his deputies and vice-presidents.20 Abadi may have
thought that he could exploit the pressure coming from
the increasingly discontented public to build a support
base and force other parties to give him more freedom.
Initially, he did manage to gain some concessions from
the parties: Stunned by the unexpected wave of protests,
the parliament gave him full support to implement his
reforms, on condition that those reforms did not violate the
constitution.21

Abadis gamble led to further instability, especially after

the storming of the Iraqi parliament by Sadrist protesters
in an attempt to force MPs to approve the technocrats
government.23 The political process seemed to be heading
toward a more dangerous path, with radical tendencies
growing among the public and institutions crumbling on
account of political tension. In his risky attempts to create
a constituency, he destabilized his government, lost the
support of most parties and jeopardized his political career.

Conclusions
Abadis experience as Iraqs prime minister teaches us an
important lesson: Changing the prime minister without
changing the paradigm of and formula for governance in
Iraq has not yielded significant results. The ethno-sectarian
paradigm now prevailing in Iraq will keep limiting the
prime ministers room for maneuver, while depriving him
of the leverage necessary to initiate major reforms. The
prime ministers political effectiveness depends on his
ability to create a consensus around his policies, or else to
impose his own options if a consensus cannot be achieved.
This is why both Maliki and Abadi sought ways to build
autonomous political constituencies. Maliki did this by
exploiting sectarianism and patronage to consolidate his
support base within his Shia community, which in the
end further polarized Iraqi politics and made it difficult to
bridge the gap between communities.

He became the most powerful and popular Shia politician, but the price was losing credibility among Sunnis and Kurds,
while alarming his Shia rivals. Abadi tried to create a constituency by trying to be a reformer. The April 30 protesters
focused their criticism on muhassessa: power-sharing agreements that made state institutions resemble the fiefdoms
of powerful parties. Abadi hoped that the pressure from the street might ease the parties grip over ministries and
governmental bodies, which in turn could help him pursue his agenda more smoothly. Lacking a parliamentary bloc that
supported him, however, Abadi relied on that pressure, and on extra-constitutional forces, such as the Shia religious
authority and Sadrs movement, to compel parties to accept reforms that limited their powers. This put him in the
awkward position of needing the support of the very forces that he sought to undermine. The outcome was contradictory
policies, and choices that lacked clarity and decisiveness.
What Abadi wanted was to be a more effective prime minister, but the means of achieving this became as problematic
as those adopted by his predecessor. As the country faces the difficult economic challenge resulting from the decline in
oil prices, along with a fierce and costly war against ISIS, Abadis indecisiveness and lack of leverage could cost him his
office, or at least keep him as an ineffectual leader waiting to be replaced after the next election. In the end, the prime
minister has managed neither to assert his image as a reformer, nor to keep the support of major political groups, which
he needs to facilitate his effective performance. Additionally, the storming of Parliament by Sadrist protesters left Abadi
in the awkward position of not deciding where to stand. In the increasingly polarized Iraqi political climate, Abadi,
indecisive and lacking the tools to implement solutions to Iraqs problems, might be the next victim of the countrys
dysfunctional system.

Endnotes
1

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Loveday Morris and Mustafa Salim. Iraqi Security Forces Use Live Fire to Break up Protests in Green Zone, Washington Post,
May 20,2016.
Nouri al-Maliki Forced from Post as Iraqs Political Turmoil Deepens, The Guardian, August 12, 2014.
Jay Solomon and Carol E. Lee, U.S. Signals Iraqs Maliki Should Go, Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2014.
On June 25, 2014, members of the Dawa leadership wrote a letter to Sistani asking his advice regarding the negotiations to form
a new government. Sistani replied in very explicit terms, reflecting his status: I believe it is necessary to choose a new prime
minister who has broad national acceptance and can work with political leaders of other Iraqi communities to save the country
from the dangers of terrorism, sectarian war and partition. Details are published on Sistanis website [in Arabic] (accessed on
March 30, 2016).
For further details, see Ahmed Ali, Iraqs Prime Minister Reshuffles the Security Commanders, Institute for the Study of War,
November 13, 2014, and David D. Kirkpatrick, In Shake-Up, Iraqi Premier Replaces 36 Commanders, New York Times, November
12, 2014.
The General Secretary of Council of Ministers, The By-law of the Council of Ministers (accessed on April 4, 2016).
Buratha News Agency, The Amendments on the Governorates Law, [in Arabic] (accessed on April 4, 2016).
Prime Minister Office, the First Reforms Package Presented by the Prime Minister to the Exceptional Session of the Council of
Ministers, [in Arabic] (accessed on April 4, 2016).
The Text of the Political agreement between Political Blocks Participating in the Government, Iraq Press, (accessed on March
30, 2016) [in Arabic].
Kurdistan Government Blasts Baghdad Over Budget Freeze, Rudaw, March 3, 2014 (accessed by June 9, 2016).
Ben Holland, Are Kurdistans Oil Contracts Constitutional? (Energy in the Middle East, 2012) (accessed on March 30, 2016).
Denise Natali, How Independent Is the Iraqi-Kurdish Pipeline to Turkey? Almonitor, November 4, 2013, and Ed Butler, Iraqi
Kurdistans Battle with Baghdad over Oil Revenues, BBC News, April 10, 2015.
Authors meeting at the Atlantic Councils Future of Iraq Task Force, Iraq, March 2016.
AIN News, The Cabinet Links PMFs to Abadis Office, [in Arabic] (accessed on March 30, 2016).
Authors meeting with Iraqi senior officials at the Atlantic Councils Future of Iraq Task Force, Baghdad, March 2016.
Authors meeting with Sunni officials and activists at the Atlantic Councils Future of Iraq Task Force, Baghdad, March 2016.
Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012).
In a conversation with the author, Baghdad, March 2016.
Authors meeting at the Atlantic Councils Future of Iraq Task Force, March 2016.
Iraq Press Agency, Iraq Press Publishes the Package of reforms voted on by Parliament (accessed on March 30, 2016).
Parliament Votes to Support Abadis Reforms, Al-Mashriq, November 2, 2015.
Zalmay Khalilzad, Haider al-Abadis Dangerous Gamble, New York Times, April 12, 2016.
Iraqi Shia Protesters Storm Baghdad Parliament, BBC News (accessed on April 30, 2016).
*Weblinks are available in the online version at
www.brandeis.edu/crown

From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being

Iraqs Prime Minister
Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee
Recent Middle East Briefs:
Available on the Crown Center website: www.brandeis.edu/crown
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8