Gorczakoski v. Equal Employment, 1 F.3d 1231, 1st Cir. (1993)
Gorczakoski v. Equal Employment, 1 F.3d 1231, 1st Cir. (1993)
3d 1231
NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be
cited only in related cases.
I. No. 93-1101
2
In May 1988, plaintiff was terminated from her long-time position as ticket
agent with Eastern Air Lines, Inc. (Eastern). She thereafter filed charges against
Eastern with both the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
(MCAD) and the EEOC, alleging discrimination on account of sex, national
origin and handicap. In August 1991, following an investigation, an MCAD
commissioner found a lack of probable cause to support plaintiff's allegations.
That determination was affirmed on administrative appeal the following month.
Likewise, the EEOC's Boston Area Director issued a determination letter on
May 14, 1992, finding that plaintiff's allegations were unsupported and advising
her of her right to file a private action against Eastern.
Plaintiff responded by filing the instant suit for damages, not against Eastern,
but against the EEOC itself.1 She alleged that the EEOC handled her charge of
discrimination in a deficient manner-particularly by failing to conduct an
independent investigation and failing to monitor the MCAD. The district court
granted the EEOC's unopposed motion to dismiss, determining that plaintiff
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This
determination was plainly correct.
dissatisfied with the EEOC's handling of their charge." Hall v. EEOC, 456 F.
Supp. 695, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (quoted in Ward, 719 F.2d at 314).
5
As mentioned, plaintiff has filed claims directly against Eastern, but they are
subject to the automatic stay arising from Eastern's bankruptcy petition. Absent
interim relief from the bankruptcy court, pursuit of those claims must await the
lifting of the stay.2
Plaintiff then filed the instant suit against the OCR, claiming that it had failed
to conduct an adequate investigation. She subsequently amended her complaint
to include the DPW as a defendant, challenging the propriety of its decision to
deny her benefits. The district court dismissed the action against both
defendants, and plaintiff has appealed.
The dismissal of the claims against the OCR need not detain us long. For many
of the same reasons discussed above in connection with the EEOC, as well as
those enumerated in an earlier appeal brought by plaintiff against the OCR's
counterpart in another federal agency, see Gorczakoski v. U.S. Department of
Labor, No. 92-2189 (1st Cir. May 4, 1993), we find no arguable basis for
subjecting the OCR to liability as a result of any alleged improprieties in its
processing of plaintiff's claim. As there is no reason to believe that plaintiff
could remedy this defect in her complaint against the OCR "through more
specific pleading," Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992),
dismissal thereof as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) was not an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (complaint
is frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact"); Watson
With regard to plaintiff's claims against the DPW, the district court granted an
unopposed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that any
attempt to gain judicial review of the DPW's denial of benefits must be pursued
in state court under the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, Mass.
G.L. c. 30A, Sec. 14. We perceive no error in the district court's ruling.
10
We need not reach, and therefore do not decide, whether the filing of the
complaint against Eastern was itself violative of the automatic stay. Likewise,
we do not decide whether the pendency of the claims against Eastern renders
the district court order non-final, such that (absent a Rule 54(b) certification)
appellate jurisdiction would be lacking. To the extent that those claims are
without legal effect, see, e.g., Easley v. Pettibone Michigan Corp., 990 F.2d
905, 908 (6th Cir. 1993) ("by operation of the automatic stay, the
commencement of plaintiffs' action, whether void or voidable, did not take
place until the stay was lifted"), it would seem that our jurisdiction would be
unaffected. Yet we bypass the matter, taking refuge in the "familiar principle
that where an appeal presents a difficult jurisdictional issue, yet the substantive
merits underlying the issue are facilely resolved in favor of the party
challenging jurisdiction, the jurisdictional inquiry may be avoided." Kotler v.
American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on other
grounds, 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992); accord, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v.
Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 8 n.5 (1st Cir. 1991)