Morales-Narvaez v. Rossello, 65 F.3d 160, 1st Cir. (1995)
Morales-Narvaez v. Rossello, 65 F.3d 160, 1st Cir. (1995)
3d 160
Vannessa Ramirez, Asst. Sol. Gen., Dept. of Justice, with whom Pedro A.
Delgado-Hernandez, Sol. Gen., Jose L. Nieto and Dominguez & Totti, were on
brief for appellees.
This case concerns the transfers of the appellants from their positions in the
Contracts Office within the Office of the Governor of Puerto Rico to positions
in another department of the Office of the Governor. The appellants, claiming
that the transfers improperly were based on their political associations and
violated their procedural due process rights, moved for a preliminary injunction
returning them to their original positions. The district court, without conducting
a hearing, denied the motion, concluding that they failed to show both a
likelihood of success on the merits and a threat of irreparable harm, and that the
harm caused by denying the motion would not outweigh the potential harm to
the government of Puerto Rico if the motion were denied. 852 F.Supp. 104,
115-16 (D.P.R.1994). Appellants argue (1) that the district court abused its
discretion and legally erred by denying the preliminary injunction, and (2) that
the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing before
determining the motion. We conclude that the sparse record did not support a
preliminary injunction. We do not reach appellants' other argument because the
We briefly summarize the uncontested facts. Appellants, Arnaldo MoralesNarvaez ("Morales"), Rosa Ortega-Torres ("Ortega"), and Isabel MartinezCamacho ("Martinez"), were employed in the Contracts Office at the Executive
Mansion of the Governor of Puerto Rico. Morales was employed as a contract
analyst, and Ortega and Martinez were employed as secretaries. The three
appellants were supporters of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP").
In November 1992, the New Progressive Party ("NPP") defeated the PDP in the
general election. The NPP administration, and the appellee NPP administration
officials, assumed office in January 1993. In March 1993, appellants were
notified that they were being transferred from the Contracts Office to another
division of the Office of the Governor, known as Programa RED ("RED").
Appellants commenced this action under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985, and 1986.
In support of their claims under Sec. 1983, appellants asserted they were
transferred because of their association with PDP, in violation of their rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. They further asserted that the circumstances of their transfers violated
their procedural due process rights. Appellants moved the court for a
preliminary injunction, seeking return to their former positions. Briefs and
supporting documents were filed in support of their motion. Appellees in turn
filed opposing memoranda and supporting documents.
The district court issued its Opinion and Order on May 16, 1994, denying
appellants' motion. The court's determination was based primarily on its
conclusion that appellants failed to show both a likelihood of success on the
merits of their claims and a threat of irreparable harm. See 852 F.Supp. at 11012, 114-15.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Sec. 1983 Claims
10
Furthermore, the district court noted how the absence of evidence on the job
descriptions in particular made difficult the determination of the issues relating
to the appellants' claim for a preliminary injunction. It said: "[t]he absence in
the record of detailed job descriptions hampers our ability to explore the details
of the [appellants'] duties," 852 F.Supp. at 109; "the question remains whether
the contract analyst position as newly reconstituted is a career position[;]
[a]gain, neither party has addressed this issue," id. at 110 (emphasis omitted);
"the proper inquiry is whether the position in question places an employee
intrinsically, not incidentally, in a confidential position[;] ... [the court was not
provided with] job descriptions detailing [appellants'] duties and responsibilities
to allow [it] to determine if they involved partisan political concerns so that
political affiliation would be an appropriate job requirement," id. at 111.
12
13
Appellants' other argument is that the district court should have afforded them
an evidentiary hearing before making its determination. We do not reach this
issue because we believe that the interests of justice do not justify remanding
the case for an evidentiary hearing. The papers supporting and opposing the
preliminary injunction had been filed by October 22, 1993, the district court
issued its order on May 16, 1994, and fifteen months have passed in the
interim. Because the judge ordered expedited discovery, such discovery should
have taken place by now and the matter should be at or near trial on the merits.
14
The district court determined that appellants' claims under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1985
and 1986 were without merit, and that appellants were therefore unable to show
a likelihood of success on the merits as to those claims. See 852 F.Supp. at 11415. Appellants do not contest this determination, and it is affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
16
Judge Lynch replaces Senior Circuit Judge Campbell who has recused himself
and has taken no part in the consideration of this case. Judge Lynch has
participated in the decision based upon the briefs, record, and a recording of the
oral argument
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