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Azubuko v. Motor Vehicles, 95 F.3d 1146, 1st Cir. (1996)
Azubuko v. Motor Vehicles, 95 F.3d 1146, 1st Cir. (1996)
3d 1146
PER CURIAM
1
Appellant asserts that his driver's license was suspended by the Registrar of
Motor Vehicles without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Supreme Court addressed the
question in what circumstances a hearing is required prior to the suspension of a
driver's license. Georgia law provided for the suspension of an uninsured
motorist's driver's license when that driver was involved in an automobile
accident and could not post security to cover the amount of damages claimed
by others in the accident report. Although a hearing was conducted prior to the
suspension, the uninsured motorist could not raise the issue of fault. Thus, such
a motorist was required to post security or lose his or her license even though he
or she might not have been responsible for the accident.
3
The Court held that once a state granted a driver's license, it could not take it
away without due process of law. Id. at 539. It then held that since fault was an
important factor in the decision to suspend a license, due process required a
predeprivation hearing which considered whether there was a reasonable
probability of judgments against the driver in the amounts claimed. Id. at 54041.
In the case before us, appellant's license was suspended after a trial in which
appellant was found liable for the damages resulting from the automobile
accident in which he was involved. Thus, unlike Bell--where there was no
predeprivation hearing regarding liability--appellant received a full, judicial
adjudication regarding fault before his license was suspended for failing to pay
the judgment rendered at the trial. Moreover, M.G.L.c. 90, 22A provides for
another, administrative hearing prior to the actual suspension. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found constitutional a statutory scheme similar
22A even though it did not provide for an administrative predeprivation
hearing. See Tomai-Minogue v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 770 F.2d
1228, 1230 (4th Cir.1985). Thus, 22A itself appears to provide all that due
process requires.
Appellant also claims that the suspension of his license impaired his
fundamental right to travel and violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We reject both challenges. See Ross v. Gunaris, 395
F.Supp. 623, 627-28 (D.Mass.1975) ( 22A does not impede the right to travel
because it limits only one method of transportation, nor does it deny equal
protection of the law to those unable to satisfy a property damage judgment).
For these reasons, appellant's claims, as set forth in both his complaint and
amended complaint, are based on "indisputably meritless theor[ies]." See
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). As a result, the district court
appropriately dismissed the action.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. In so ruling, we decide only the
appeal from district court case No. 95-CV-10763. No notice of appeal was ever
docketed in No. 95-CV-11661 and, thus, the later case is not before us.