Professional Documents
Culture Documents
United States v. Conley, 156 F.3d 78, 1st Cir. (1998)
United States v. Conley, 156 F.3d 78, 1st Cir. (1998)
3d 78
J. Bradford Coffey, with whom Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell was on brief,
for appellant.
Jennifer Zacks, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Donald K.
Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief, for the United States.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, WELLFORD, * Senior Circuit Judge,
and SELYA, Circuit Judge.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
2
During the summer of 1995, postal inspectors received information that sizable
quantities of marijuana were being shipped from San Diego, California, to
central Massachusetts. When the postal inspectors launched an investigation, a
series of packages addressed to one Richard Simms at 5 Valley St., Webster,
Massachusetts, aroused their suspicions; Simms did not live at 5 Valley St. and
the packages bore apocryphal return addresses. To further their probe, the
postal inspectors monitored the delivery of one such package to the Valley St.
address. An individual named Jeffry Taberski signed for it on October 19,
1995.
3
Taberski told the lawmen that he worked for "Kevin C." as a receiver of
shipments. He also informed them that, shortly before his arrest, he had advised
"Kevin" of the package's imminent arrival and had been told that "Kevin"
would retrieve it the next day (November 8, 1995).
Postal inspectors Michael Blanchard and William Kezer returned to 5 Valley St.
on November 8. At around 8:30 a.m., the appellant arrived. Blanchard
confronted him at the door to the apartment. When the appellant identified
himself as Kevin Conley, Blanchard asked him to step inside and proceeded to
arrest him. A brief exchange followed, during which Blanchard searched the
appellant, unearthing $500 in cash. The appellant identified the cash as his and
asked Blanchard why he had been detained. Blanchard replied that he had been
arrested for drug trafficking. After this colloquy, Blanchard read the appellant
his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
him "what is going on" and "what have you guys got on me, what's this all
about?" Blanchard reminded the appellant that he had requested an attorney and
that this circumstance prevented the postal inspectors from entering into a
dialogue with him. When Conley nonetheless persisted, Blanchard stated that if
he (Blanchard) were to speak further, the appellant could not reply. Conley
readily agreed to this condition.
8
Blanchard then limned the facts, mentioning other packages sent to other
addresses. When he stated that a "Mr. Kubiak" had received some of these
bundles, the appellant blurted out that he had used Kubiak in marijuana deals.
Blanchard continued his recital, remarking that the postal inspectors knew the
marijuana originated from the San Diego area but did not know the source. The
appellant again interjected, this time recounting that he had lived in southern
California for a spell and that it was quite easy to obtain marijuana there.
In due season, a federal grand jury indicted the appellant for possession with
intent to distribute marijuana on nine separate occasions and conspiracy to
commit that substantive offense. In advance of trial, the appellant moved to
suppress in gross the incriminating statements that he had made at the time of
his arrest. Judge Woodlock heard evidence and took the motion under
advisement. He later refused to suppress the challenged statements and the
government introduced some of them at trial (over the appellant's renewed
objection).
10
The prosecution's case against the appellant was very strong, consisting of the
inculpatory statements, the postal inspectors' observations, testimony from
Taberski and Kellie Wright (who swore that her boyfriend, John Womack, had
sent marijuana through the mail from San Diego to names and addresses in
Massachusetts specified by the appellant), and considerable documentary
evidence (e.g., mail tracking slips, telephone bills, and records of money
transfers that Conley had made by wire to Womack and Taberski). Conley's
defense centered around his claim that he was an innocent dupe who had done
nothing more than allow Kubiak and Taberski to use his telephone. The jury
returned a split decision, finding the appellant guilty on the conspiracy count
but acquitting him on the nine substantive counts.
11
12
In the appellant's view, the lower court should have suppressed his
incriminating statements because those statements were obtained without
proper deference to his request for counsel. This argument draws its essence
from Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378
(1981), a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court held that, once a
suspect who is in custody invokes his right to confer with an attorney,
continuing to interrogate him offends the Constitution. See id. at 484-85, 101
S.Ct. 1880. The government replies that no Edwards violation occurred for two
reasons: first, the inspectors did not interrogate the appellant after he invoked
his right to counsel, and, moreover, the appellant himself initiated the pivotal
conversations.1 In sifting through these contentions, we review the district
court's findings of fact for clear error, while affording de novo review to the
court's ultimate legal and constitutional conclusions. See United States v.
Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 565 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d
971, 975 (1st Cir.1994).
13
We begin with constitutional bedrock. Absent special advisories by the police-including advice about the right to remain silent and the right to consult with
counsel--the Fifth Amendment renders inadmissable most statements obtained
by law enforcement officers during custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602. An arrest is the classic example of Miranda 's
conception of custody, see id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and the appellant's arrest is
not disputed here.2 The critical question, then, is whether the challenged
statements were the product of interrogation, as that word is understood in
constitutional jurisprudence. If not, no constitutional violation occurred; but if
so, we must consider whether such interrogation transpired only after the
appellant reinitiated the discussion. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct.
1880 (stating that once an accused "expresse[s] his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further conversations with the police ") (emphasis supplied).
14
To the extent that the appellant accuses Blanchard and Kezer of not respecting
his request for an attorney, the record belies his claim. Although the appellant's
comments on the subject of whether he wanted an attorney were elliptical, the
postal inspectors exercised commendable restraint and chose to treat them as a
request for legal representation. At that moment, they not only declined to
question Conley further, but also advised him of their position. This conduct
fully satisfies the strictures of Miranda and Edwards.
15
The appellant next posits that Inspector Blanchard's comments regarding the
facts of the case and the strength of the evidence constituted proscribed
17
The statements that Blanchard made after that disclaimer, objectively viewed,
were not reasonably likely to elicit a response from the appellant; indeed,
Blanchard explicitly told the appellant not to reply. A law enforcement officer's
mere description of the evidence and of potential charges against a suspect, in
direct response to the suspect's importuning, hardly can be classified as
interrogatory. See, e.g., United States v. Trimble, 986 F.2d 394, 401 (10th
Cir.1993); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir.1992); United
States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir.1989). Furthermore, as we read
the record, the appellant's remarks during the course of Blanchard's narrative
appear to have been spontaneous utterances, uncoerced by any vestige either of
artifice or of official interrogation. Edwards does not bar the introduction into
evidence of spontaneous utterances merely because the utterances occur
subsequent to the accused's invocation of his right to counsel. See, e.g.,
Shedelbower v. Estelle, 885 F.2d 570, 573-74 (9th Cir.1989); United States v.
De La Luz Gallegos, 738 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir.1984).
18
19
In a rather lame effort to avoid the force of these precedents, the appellant
suggests that another event--the postal inspectors' discussion about searching
We need not paint the lily. The record amply supports a finding that the
appellant was not subjected to any interrogation after he invoked his right to
counsel, and that he, not the postal inspectors, initiated the discussions which
followed that request. That being so, the district court properly admitted the
challenged statements into evidence. See Shedelbower, 885 F.2d at 573-74; De
La Luz Gallegos, 738 F.2d at 381.
21
As a last gasp, the appellant argues that, even if there is no Edwards violation,
there is a Miranda violation because Blanchard interrogated him before the
postal inspectors administered the requisite warnings. To be specific, he
asseverates that the question concerning the ownership of the money found in
his wallet was asked in violation of Miranda and thus tainted all subsequent
admissions. In this respect, the appellant relies on Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018
(9th Cir.1995), in which the defendant, who had not yet received Miranda
warnings, identified his signature, thus incriminating himself and opening the
door to further queries regarding the crimes at issue. See id. at 1021.
22
23
posed, had an impermissibly coercive effect. Indeed, the record reveals quite
clearly that the appellant's subsequent statements about his involvement in the
marijuana enterprise were entirely voluntary. Thus, this assignment of error
falters. See id. at 314-16, 105 S.Ct. 1285.
III. THE SENTENCE
24
The appellant protests two upward adjustments fashioned by the district court
in shaping the GSR. We address the two adjustments separately, mindful that
appellate tribunals review a sentencing court's factual determinations under a
deferential standard and uphold those determinations unless they are clearly
erroneous. See United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 701 (1st Cir.1992).
Questions of law, of course, engender plenary review. See id.
A. Drug Quantity.
25
26
Under the sentencing guidelines, drug quantity bears a direct correlation to the
GSR (and, therefore, to the length of a defendant's sentence). See United States
v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196-97 (1st Cir.1993). Here, Judge Woodlock
credited statements made by the appellant's supplier, Womack, and included as
part of the appellant's relevant conduct, USSG 1B1.3 (1995), the quantities of
marijuana contained in thirteen packages shipped by Womack at the appellant's
express instruction (eight of which were mailed to the 5 Valley St. address).
The judge then added the amounts of marijuana contained in two parcels that
had been sent to Kubiak. On this basis, the judge held the appellant responsible
for 91.3 kilograms of marijuana.
27
28
The appellant makes two related arguments, but neither of them need occupy us
for long. First, he claims that he should not be brought to book for a number of
the transactions because he was not the prime mover in this transcontinental
marijuana-by-mail scheme and had no involvement in most of its iterations.
This claim boils down to a credibility call, pure and simple. It is settled beyond
cavil that, in the sentencing phase of a criminal case, credibility choices are
within the exclusive province of the district judge. See, e.g., Sepulveda, 15 F.3d
at 1198; St. Cyr, 977 F.2d at 706. Here, Judge Woodlock certainly did not
exceed his authority in finding the appellant to be less believable than Taberski,
Womack, and Wright, and concluding that the appellant bore responsibility for
a broad array of misconduct.
29
32
We need go no further. The record reveals, without serious question, that the
appellant was fairly tried and lawfully convicted, based in part on incriminating
(but voluntary) statements that he made at the time of his arrest. He was then
sentenced in full accord with the applicable guidelines.
34
Affirmed.
We note, moreover, that the prosecution did not introduce at trial the statements
that Conley made at this juncture. Rather, the defense elicited them on crossexamination. Hence, the appellant has no basis to complain about the
admission of this evidence. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602
The judge's determination is particularly hard to fault as the judge had the
benefit of Womack's version of the events during the sentencing phase--an