427 F.

3d 108

Frederick FEDDERSEN, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.
Carolyn S. GARVEY, Esq.; and Douglas, Leonard & Garvey,
P.A., Defendants, Appellees.
No. 05-1305.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard September 14, 2005.
Decided October 26, 2005.

Steven M. Latici, with whom McKean, Mattson & Latici, P.A., was on
brief, for appellant.
Peter F. Kearns, for appellees.
Before LIPEZ and HOWARD, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, * Judge.
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Frederick Feddersen brought this malpractice action against the defendants, a

lawyer and law firm that represented him during divorce proceedings. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of
limitations grounds. Feddersen appealed. We affirm.

I.
2

We review the record submitted for summary judgment in the light most
favorable to Feddersen. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128
(1st Cir.2004). In 1993, Feddersen, having retained the defendants to represent
him, filed for divorce from his then-wife, Shelly Cannon Feddersen
("Cannon"). Although Feddersen and Cannon had entered into a prenuptial
agreement before their 1988 marriage, their divorce proceedings were lengthy
and complex. Under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, Cannon was
entitled to "twenty-five percent of the net book value of FMT corporation" a
closely-held corporation that was Feddersen's principal asset "calculated as
of the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the filing of the libel for

divorce." In the Matter of Feddersen and Feddersen, No.2001-642, slip op. 1

(N.H.2003). The parties' efforts to determine the net book value of FMT
constituted both a major issue in the divorce and the basis of this case.
3

During the pendency of the divorce, FMT was prosecuting two patent
infringement claims, both related to technology used in plastic bottles
manufacturing. By 1994, the first claim, against a company known as "Nessei,"
had resulted in a judgment in favor of FMT for $3.4 million, which had been
confirmed on appeal. The second claim, against a company called "Constar,"
was at an earlier stage of litigation. Feddersen, through the defendants,
informed Cannon of the net value of the Nessei settlement and of the existence
of the Constar litigation. In December 1994, as discussions on the divorce
neared completion, Feddersen offered Cannon the chance to share in any
proceeds of the Constar lawsuit in exchange for her contribution to FMT's legal
fees in the case. Cannon declined Feddersen's offer and stipulated that she
would waive any interest in the Constar case in exchange for a lump sum
property settlement. Subsequently, Cannon and Feddersen stipulated to a
property settlement of $600,000. Because FMT's assets had been depleted by
the two patent litigations, the parties agreed that their stipulation would be filed
in escrow with the court until the money from the Nessei case was received, at
which time Cannon would be paid and the case would proceed to a final
hearing.

By early 1995, the Constar case had been referred to a special master, who, in
February 1995, found in favor of FMT and recommended a judgment of $30
million. Feddersen and counsel for FMT expected a lengthy and costly appeal,
but Constar settled for $11 million in April 1995. FMT received its first
payment of $5 million from Constar in May 1995, well before any payment was
received from Nessei.1

Neither Feddersen nor the defendants informed Cannon or her lawyers of the
developments in the Constar case. Instead, on June 1, 1995, the defendants sent
the New Hampshire court and Cannon's lawyers a letter stating that the awaited
"contingency," meaning the receipt of funds sufficient to satisfy the property
settlement in the divorce stipulation, had occurred. Cannon and her lawyers
assumed that the money from Nessei had been delivered.

For a final hearing, the defendants prepared for Feddersen an affidavit of his
current financial standing, which was submitted to the court in accordance with
former New Hampshire Superior Court Rule 158.2 In the affidavit, Feddersen
certified that the value of his interest in FMT corporation was "[$]1,440,000
[b]ased on book value 12/31/92," and that his income was $150,000 per year. A

final divorce decree, incorporating the $600,000 property settlement, entered on

July 13, 1995.
7

In late 1998, Cannon petitioned for additional child support payments from
Feddersen. Trial was scheduled for March 1999, and discovery commenced. In
reviewing Feddersen's tax returns, Cannon's lawyer, Patricia Murphy, learned
that Feddersen's income for 1995 had been nearly $4 million, not the $150,000
he had sworn to in the affidavit prepared by the defendants. Murphy and
Cannon soon learned about the Constar settlement. By this time, Feddersen had
retained a new lawyer, Steven Grill. Murphy told Grill that she was thinking
about moving to set aside the 1995 property settlement on the grounds of
fraud.3

Grill explored Murphy's theory and determined that Feddersen had "a problem"
because of the discrepancy between his financial affidavit and his actual
income and assets. He told Feddersen as much in a March 26, 1999 letter and
status report, going so far as to warn his client that if Cannon "pursues a fraud
claim, you may be very hard pressed to prove that she actually had all the
details regarding the Constar case at the time the Permanent Stipulation was
negotiated and agreed to," and that "there is a strong possibility that the
Affidavit would not be considered a `current' affidavit as required by New
Hampshire law." Grill "strongly recommend[ed]" to Feddersen that he try to
settle Cannon's claims and avoid litigation of "a complicated and potentially
very dangerous issue."

In the same letter, Grill reacted angrily to news that Feddersen had put Charles
Douglas of the defendant law firm on notice of Cannon's potential fraud claim.
"My main concern," Grill wrote, "is that having been alerted to the potential
problem... Douglas may attempt to protect himself against any potential
malpractice claim."

10

Shortly after receiving the March 26 letter, Feddersen terminated his

relationship with Grill (who later noted that he and Feddersen had not been
"seeing eye-to-eye on a number of strategic and judgmental matters").
Feddersen retained, as new counsel, Matthew Cairns and Garry Lane.
Feddersen's initial April 14, 1999 meeting with Cairns and Lane was recorded
at Feddersen's request. At that meeting, Feddersen revealed to Cairns and Lane
that he had called Carolyn Garvey, a named defendant in this case along with
Douglas and their law firm. According to Feddersen, Garvey had denied that
anything about the 1995 settlement was improper. Feddersen also told Cairns
and Lane that, according to Grill, Garvey and her partners would "be fixing all
the documents up now to cover their ass for malpractice."

11

Citing the Shafmaster case, see supra n. 3, Cannon moved, on May 14, 1999, to
set aside the 1995 property settlement. At the recommendation of the marital
master handling the case, settlement negotiations commenced. Through Cairns
and Lane, Feddersen sought to resolve Cannon's claims by offering her a
substantial share in the potential proceeds of a third patent infringement case,
then ongoing, with a company called "Aoki." Ultimately, negotiations were
unsuccessful, and the matter proceeded to a hearing. On September 5, 2001, the
marital master set aside the property settlement. His decision was affirmed by
the New Hampshire Supreme Court on March 19, 2003. In the Matter of
Feddersen and Feddersen, No.2001-642 (N.H.2003). Feddersen then paid $1.3
million to settle all remaining issues with Cannon.

12

Invoking 28 U.S.C. 1332, Feddersen filed the current suit in the district court
on July 29, 2003. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that Feddersen had exceeded the three year statute of limitations for legal
malpractice actions provided by N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. 508:4.4 The district court
granted the defendants' motion, and this appeal followed.

II.
13

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, based on the record as it

stood at the time of the district court's order. Cordero-Soto v. Island Fin., Inc.,
418 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir.2005). We will affirm summary judgment if the
record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rathbun v. Autozone,
Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A "material"
fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law....
Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986).
A. The Discovery Rule

14

In this diversity action the governing law is, of course, the law of New
Hampshire. Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 13 (1st
Cir.2004). New Hampshire law provides that "the statute of limitations for a
malpractice action is three years." Furbush v. McKittrick, 149 N.H. 426, 821
A.2d 1126, 1129 (2003) (applying discovery rule to legal malpractice case);
N.H. R.S.A. 508:4. When a suit is initiated more than three years after the act
or omission alleged to constitute malpractice, "the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that an exception applies to toll the statute of limitations such that his
malpractice claim would be timely filed." Furbush, 821 A.2d at 1129. One

such exception is the discovery rule:

15

when the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not
discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act
or omission, the action shall be commenced within 3 years of the time the
plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission
complained of.

16

N.H. R.S.A. 508:4. Feddersen contends that the discovery rule tolled the
statute of limitations until at least the date that the marital master set aside the
property settlement. The defendants argue, and the district court concluded, that
the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations only until the spring or
summer of 1999, by which time Feddersen knew that Cannon had initiated
proceedings to set aside the property settlement and that the acts or omissions
of the defendant were causing him harm.

17

Under New Hampshire law, the discovery rule operates to toll the statute of
limitations in a legal malpractice case only until "the plaintiff could reasonably
discern that he suffered some harm caused by the defendant's conduct."
Furbush, 821 A.2d at 1130. It does not matter that "the plaintiff may not have
understood the full extent of the harm that would result" from the defendant's
malpractice. Id. "[T]he discovery rule is not intended to toll the statute of
limitations until the full extent of the plaintiff's injury has manifested itself." Id.
Also, the plaintiff does not have to know that the defendant actually was
negligent. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can
"reasonably discern that he suffered some harm caused by the defendant's
conduct," id., for the purpose of the discovery rule, as soon as he begins
"incurring legal fees" to defend himself against the consequences of a
defendant's actions, Pichowicz v. Watson Ins. Agency, Inc., 146 N.H. 166, 768
A.2d 1048, 1049 (2001). The discovery rule, then, does not necessarily allow a
plaintiff to postpone a malpractice suit until a court has confirmed the
defendant's negligence.

18

As the district court recognized, Feddersen knew enough by the summer of

1999 that he "could reasonably discern that he suffered some harm caused by
the defendant's conduct." Furbush, 821 A.2d at 1130. By that time, Feddersen
had paid legal fees to two additional law firms in order to begin defending
himself against the consequences of what he now alleges was the defendants'
malpractice. Feddersen had been told in no uncertain terms by one of his
lawyers that "he had a serious problem because of the Shafmaster issue arising
from the affidavit prepared by [the defendants]." That same lawyer had told

Feddersen, both orally and in writing, that he had a "potential malpractice

claim" against the defendants. With all of this information at his disposal,
Feddersen could not reasonably have doubted that his additional legal fees and
prospective settlement expenses had been caused by the defendants'
representation of him. At this point, Feddersen was not entitled to close his eyes
and ignore his potential claim against the defendants.
19

Feddersen contends that, given the defendants' assurances that they had done
nothing wrong, it was "reasonable" for him to believe that his legal expenses
were caused "by a very motivated ex-wife" rather than by the defendants'
malpractice, until a court ruled in Cannon's favor. This argument reflects both
misapprehension of the applicable standard and disingenuousness.

20

It is not material for purposes of the discovery rule whether Feddersen knew or
reasonably should have known in 1999 that the 1995 property settlement would
be set aside on account of the defendants' failure to comply with the law, or that
the defendants had been negligent. It was enough that Feddersen knew that he
was paying attorneys' fees (to a different lawyer) to defend acts of the
defendants that had been at least arguably negligent, and that there was a
likelihood expressed in Feddersen's willingness to settle the case for a
substantial sum that eventually he would have to pay monetary damages to
Cannon as well.5

21

Feddersen was a sophisticated businessman who had won substantial awards in

lawsuits. His own lawyer explicitly warned him not to trust the defendants'
assurances because the defendants could be expected using Feddersen's own
1999 words to "cover their ass for malpractice." He understood that his
exposure to Cannon's claim was serious enough to warrant a significant offer in
settlement. In short, the evidence does not allow an inference that Feddersen
"reasonably relied" on the defendants' denials of any negligence.
B. Continuing Representation

22

Feddersen contends that the "continuing representation doctrine" precluded

application of the discovery rule until 2001. In jurisdictions where it applies,
that doctrine, which "recognizes that a person seeking professional assistance
has a right to repose confidence in the professional's ability and good faith,"
Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46, 436 N.E.2d 496, 500
(1982), "tolls the statute of limitations `while the defendant attorney [in a
malpractice case] continues to represent the plaintiff,'" Rosen Const. Ventures,
Inc. v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 364 F.3d 399, 406

(1st Cir.2004) (quoting Cantu v. St. Paul Cos., 401 Mass. 53, 514 N.E.2d 666,
669 (1987)).
23

First, Feddersen's continuing representation argument fails because New

Hampshire has not adopted the doctrine. In another case involving a legal
malpractice plaintiff who was forced to retain counsel to defend himself from
the consequences of a defendant attorney's likely malpractice, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court specifically "decline[d] to adopt" the continuing
representation rule. Coyle v. Battles, 147 N.H. 98, 782 A.2d 902, 906 (2001).
This case is in federal court on diversity grounds. While Feddersen no doubt
had good reasons to initiate his suit in federal court, he cannot expect us to
adopt a new rule of state law that the state's highest court refused to adopt only
four years ago, in a case similar to this one. "We have warned, time and again,
that litigants who reject a state forum in order to bring suit in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction cannot expect that new trails will be blazed." Ryan
v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 744 (1st Cir.1990).

24

Second, even if we applied the continuing representation doctrine (as it is

defined in the Massachusetts cases to which Feddersen refers us), we would not
resolve this appeal in Feddersen's favor. "The continuing representation
doctrine ... has no application ... where the client actually knows that he
suffered appreciable harm as a result of his attorney's conduct. If the client has
such knowledge, then there is no `innocent reliance which the continued
representation doctrine seeks to protect.'" Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244, 763
N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (2002) (quoting Cantu, 514 N.E.2d at 669). Here, as noted,
Feddersen knew that he had been harmed by the defendants; he did not rely
"innocently" on their assurances to the contrary.
C. Inconsistent Positions in Litigation

25

Feddersen argues that the district court's ruling "placed [him] in the untenable
position of having to file a malpractice action against his former attorney [at a
time when doing so would have] compromise[d] his ability to defend the
underlying case" brought by Cannon. There are cases in other jurisdictions that
support this argument. See Clark v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 34 P.3d 209, 21718 (Utah 2001) (allowing tolling of malpractice action against accountant until
conclusion of underlying litigation); Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821
S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1991) (same). There are also cases that reject it. See
Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 29-30 (Tenn.1995) and cases cited therein.

26

We view Feddersen's contention as again foreclosed by the New Hampshire

authorities. In at least two cases, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has
refused to toll the statute of limitations in a professional liability action while
the plaintiff-client sought to defend the professional's advice in collateral
litigation. In Draper v. Brennan, 142 N.H. 780, 713 A.2d 373 (1998), the New
Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the reasoning in Hughes and the
proposition that a plaintiff should be able to postpone a legal malpractice action
until the conclusion of an appeal in the underlying litigation. Id. at 377-78. In
Pichowicz, the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to toll the statute of
limitations in a professional malpractice suit (against an insurance agent) until
the conclusion of trial on the underlying claim. 768 A.2d at 1049. To the extent
that Feddersen seeks to limit or challenge these holdings, he has chosen the
wrong forum.
27

Moreover, we do not think that Feddersen would have been injured by

commencing his malpractice action while Cannon's suit against him was
pending. If Feddersen had brought suit against the defendants in 1999, he could
have asked the district court to hold the action in repose until the conclusion of
the Cannon case. We think it likely that the court would have granted the
motion. See Currie v. Group Ins. Comm'n, 290 F.3d 1, 9-13 (1st Cir.2002)
(discussing doctrines pursuant to which federal courts may stay cases pending
outcome of related state court litigation raising complex issue of state law). See
also Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1055-58 (Colo.2004) (collecting cases and
adopting "two-track" approach, by which malpractice action is filed during
pendency of underlying litigation and then stayed until resolution of the
underlying case). We also think it likely that Feddersen could have resisted any
effort by Cannon to use the existence of a malpractice suit against him in her
underlying case. Feddersen has not suggested how evidence of the malpractice
suit could have been introduced at trial on Cannon's claim, nor why the judge
hearing the matter would have held any such evidence against him. See Carvell,
900 S.W.2d at 30 (holding that judicial estoppel doctrine did not apply when
malpractice action was filed during pendency of related litigation).

III.
28

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs are taxed against the
Appellant.

29

So ordered.

Notes:

Chief Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by

designation

Payment from Nessei did not arrive until January 1996. The record does not
indicate the reasons for the delay

At the time of the proceedings, New Hampshire Superior Court Rule 158,
which was repealed in 2001, provided, in pertinent part, that the parties to a
divorce submit current financial affidavitsSee N.H. Superior Court Rules 19798 (2001) (current version of the same rule).

Cannon's lawyer relied onShafmaster v. Shafmaster, 138 N.H. 460, 642 A.2d
1361 (1994). The Shafmaster court concluded that in a divorce case, "once
financial information was requested and provided, the defendant had an
ongoing obligation to provide current and accurate financial information." Id. at
1365. New Hampshire Superior Court Rule 158, the Shafmaster court
concluded, incorporates this continuing obligation. Id. at 1366. The Shafmaster
decision included a warning that the provisions of Rule 158 would be deemed
"mandatory and may not be waived by parties or the court." Id. The Shafmaster
decision was announced more than a year before the defendants submitted
Feddersen's Rule 158 affidavit.

The defendants' earlier motion to dismiss on the same grounds was denied

For similar reasons, we are not swayed by Feddersen's reliance on the

defendants' delay in reporting Feddersen's malpractice claim to their insurance
company. (The defendants did not notify their insurer until 2003.) This evidence
does not tend to show that Feddersen's own delay was reasonable. Very likely,
the defendants expected Feddersen to file a suit against them before he did. But
even the most generous inference in favor of Feddersen from evidence that the
defendants did not report such a suit to their insurance carrier until 2003 cannot
undue the uncontested evidence as to what Feddersen actually knew in 1999