Elkin v. Metropolitan, 470 F.3d 22, 1st Cir. (2006)
Elkin v. Metropolitan, 470 F.3d 22, 1st Cir. (2006)
3d 22
Stephen F. Gordon, with whom Peter J. Haley, Leslie F. Su, and Gordon
Haley LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Edward Foye, with whom Todd & Weld LLP and Marc Alpert were on
brief, for appellees.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and
LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
As a general rule, parties may appeal from a final decision, order, or judgment
rendered by a court, but not simply from statements or findings contained in the
body of such a decision, order, or judgment. This appeal contradicts that general
rule. Consequently, we dismiss it for want of appellate jurisdiction.
On March 8, 2000, the debtor, Yury Shkolnikov, drove a rented van into a
median barrier in Clark County, Nevada. Eight of the van's passengers were
killed and five were injured, apparently because Shkolnikov fell asleep at the
On November 17, 2003, the claimants, qua creditors, brought a motion in the
bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic stay and for an assignment of
rights. The motion described in detail the asset that the creditors sought to have
assignedShkolnikov's rights against his liability insurance carrier
(Metropolitan). Without opposition, the bankruptcy court granted the motion on
December 3, 2003.
Simultaneous with the filing of the motion, the creditors, for whatever reason,
brought an adversary proceeding against Shkolnikov to compel an assignment
of the same rights. The bankruptcy court, acting sua sponte, dismissed the
adversary proceeding on February 13, 2004. The creditors appealed.
During the pendency of the appeal, the creditors agreed to purchase whatever
rights Shkolnikov might have against Metropolitan from the trustee in
bankruptcy rather than attempting to obtain them through continued
prosecution of the adversary proceeding. However, when the trustee gave
notice of his intention to sell the asset, Metropolitan objected. The trustee
appeared at the hearing before the bankruptcy court and said, in essence, that
he thought there was no merit to the creditors' putative claims against
Metropolitan but that, as a fiduciary, he saw no reason to pass up an
opportunity to sell the asset (and, thus, enrich the bankruptcy estate). The
bankruptcy court nonetheless denied the motion to sell, stating that it would be
"an abuse of . . . power[ ]" to grant the motion in light of the trustee's
representations.
The creditors moved for reconsideration and, when the court denied that
motion, they appealed. On February 2, 2006, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
(the BAP) dismissed the appeal. See In re Shkolnikov, 337 B.R. 1 (1st
Cir.BAP2006). The BAP did not dwell on the denial of the motion to sell but,
rather, focused on the December 3, 2003 order granting the creditors' earlier
motion. The BAP interpreted that order as assigning to the creditors "all rights
the Debtor and/or Debtor's estate may have pursuant to Chapters 93A and 176D
of Massachusetts and/or bad faith law, and/or common or statutory law of any
applicable jurisdiction against [Metropolitan] and any other individual or
entity" with respect to the accident. Id. at 3 (quoting 2003 order) (alteration in
BAP opinion). The BAP then stated:
When the bankruptcy court granted the appellants' motion seeking relief from
stay and assignment of Shkolnikov's rights against Metropolitan (and others), its
order conveyed to them the very rights that were the subject of the trustee's sale
motion. That order is final and binding on all parties, including Metropolitan.
The court's refusal to authorize conveyance of the same rights to them a second
time aggrieved the appellants not at all. Accordingly, they lack standing. . . .
There is no right to redundant relief.
10
Id. at 4-5 (citations and footnote omitted). Accordingly, the BAP dismissed the
creditors' appeal for lack of standing.
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findings to be erroneous.1 See id. That proposition captures the essence of this
case: Metropolitan, though successful in defending against the creditors' appeal
to the BAP, takes umbrage with the BAP's statements about the 2003 order.
That sort of dissatisfaction, without more, cannot confer a right to appeal upon
a successful litigant. See, e.g., Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918, 924 (7th
Cir.1992) (explaining that "a winner cannot appeal a judgment merely because
there are passages in the court's opinion that displease him").
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Notes:
1
We are advised that Metropolitan has pending, before the district court, an
appeal from the denial of a motion for relief from the 2003 order