Frank A. Niro, Jr. v. United States of America, Edward M. Glynn v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 1st Cir. (1968)
Frank A. Niro, Jr. v. United States of America, Edward M. Glynn v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 1st Cir. (1968)
2d 535
Defendants, Niro and Glynn, appeal from convictions under 18 U.S.C. 659 for
knowing possession of stolen goods that had been transported in interstate
commerce. Their primary contention is that the district court erred in denying
motions to suppress evidence (hereinafter referred to in the singular).
During the evening of September 19, 1966, agents of the FBI commenced
surveillance of a garage in Franklin, Massachusetts. The building, roughly 200
feet long and 50 feet wide, originally a carbarn and then a shop or garage, was
owned by one Wise. Wise had discontinued active operation and in April 1966
leased the back 50 feet to Niro. Wise at all material times employed a part-time
caretaker, Ford, who had a key, and whose duties, to Niro's knowledge included
periodic inspection of the entire interior of the building. In May, Ford observed
Niro and others, accompanied by a man subsequently identified as Glynn, erect
a partition which, when the sliding door was closed, separated the Niro portion
from the rest of the building. The Niro portion had a separate entrance.
3
When the FBI commenced the surveillance they had probable cause to believe
the following facts. On September 13, a tractor trailer, description fully known,
loaded with vodka and gin was hijacked in Madison, Connecticut. Through a
known reliable informant, 1 the hijackers were reported to be Glynn and one
Pineau. On September 16, a tractor trailer, description known, loaded with
whiskey was hijacked by three men in West Warwick, Rhode Island. The
evening of September 19, Ford reported to the local police, and then to the
FBE, that both tractor trailers and a quantity of whiskey were in Niro's portion
of the garage, and identified a picture of Glynn. The surveillance then began.
Near noon on September 20, two cars believed to be used by Niro and Glynn
were seen to enter the rear of the building. At this point the FBI force was
increased to twelve men, in three or four cars. A group of three, using a key
supplied by Ford, entered the front door. Niro, who had heard the cars and had
run to the front portion to see what was happening, was arrested by the door.
Glynn, and others not presently involved, were arrested immediately thereafter.
The evidence, due to the absence of a chart used at the trial, is not clear, but
apparently Glynn, too, was in Wise's retained portion of the premises. One of
the tractor trailers protruded through the open doorway in the partition.
Through this doorway cartons of whiskey could be seen. Having secured all the
occupants, the FBI moved into Niro's portion of the building, where they found,
also, the vodka and gin. They thereupon seized the liquor and the tractor
trailers.
Prior to trial defendants sought to suppress the evidence seized at the garage.
The testimony taken revealed the foregoing facts. It further revealed that no
warrant for the arrest of any person, or for a search of any kind, had been issued
or, so far as appeared, had been sought, at the time of the entry and arrests. The
court denied the motion without opinion.
Next, the government contends that the seizure was lawful. First it says that
Ford's authority was sufficient to allow the agents to enter the building. On the
assumption that the entry was not inimical to Wise we may accept, for present
The government contends that the additional element necessary was present
and that the entry on Niro's portion was justified as an incident of the lawful
arrest of Niro and Glynn. In support it says, 'It is apparent that probable cause
existed for the arrests.' With this statement we quite concur. However, there is
a further difficulty. We cannot accept the government's contention that this was
not a case 'where there was clear evidence of probable cause to make the arrests
(substantially) prior to the time they were made.' Quite to the contrary, the
arresting officer testified as follows.
11
Q. 'Now, you had had all of the information that was available to you with
regard to this arrest, and with regard to this search and seizure, on the evening
of September 19th had you not?'
12
A. 'Yes, sir.'
13
14
In the light of the unexplained neglect to obtain a warrant, this case fits squarely
within Trupiano v. United States, 1948, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed.
19663. There government agents learned, over a period of time, of the operation
of an illicit still. After a lengthy surveillance they descended upon the premises,
arrested one Antoniole, who could be seen from outside actively operating the
still, and on the basis of the arrest searched the premises and seized the
contents. Although they had long had sufficient knowledge and opportunity to
seek warrants for arrest and seizure, the officers had sought none. A divided
court, although viewing the arrest of Antoniole while engaged in committing a
felony as lawful, held that the failure to obtain a search warrant when there had
been full opportunity to have done so, invalidated what would otherwise have
been a search justified by the arrest. Shortly thereafter the court reached a
similar result in McDonald v. United States, 1948, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191,
93 L.Ed. 153, for which it relied upon Trupiano and an earlier case.4
15
Two years later the Court decided United States v. Rabinowitz, 1950, 339 U.S.
56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653. In that case a court of appeals had condemned a
search on the ground of neglected opportunity to obtain a warrant. A divided
court reversed. The test, it said, was the reasonableness of the search viewed
'under all the circumstances.' The Court stated,
16
'To the extent that Trupiano v. United States 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92
L.Ed. 1663, requires a search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability
of procuring it rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful
arrest, that case is overruled. The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion
in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances-- the total atmosphere of the
case.' 339 U.S. at 66, 70 S.Ct. at 435.
17
While the Court said that the 'practicability of procuring a search warrant' was
no longer determinative, and that to that extent Trupiano was overruled, it did
not say that such omission was not a circumstance to be considered. Although it
itemized the particular circumstances it found relevant, it did so only in the
context of determining whether there was probable cause, not to explain the
departure from Trupiano. Unfortunately, it failed to provide any standard for
determining what was overall reasonableness. After nearly twenty years, the
lower courts still lack illumination. For a recent discussion see The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 69, 117-121 (1967).
18
The present case does not fit Rabinowitz.5 It substantially fits Trupiano.
Accordingly, the question comes whether Trupiano stands today entirely
abandoned. While we cannot speak with certainty, we think it does not.6 We
find it noteworthy that the Court, while not mentioning Trupiano, continues to
cite the similar case of McDonald v. United States, with approval. See Katz v.
United States, (12/18/67) 389 U.S. 347, n. 19, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576;
Camara v. Municipal Court, 1967, 387 U.S. 523, 529, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18
L.Ed.2d 930. The Court continues to stress the desirability of obtaining a search
warrant when it is reasonably practicable to do so. See, e.g., Katz v. United
States, supra. If no penalty will ever attach to a failure to seek a warrant, as
distinguished from the officers making their own, correct, determination of
probable cause, warrants will never be sought, at least when the search is
expected to be accompanied by an arrest.
19
We think it proper to say that while that failure to obtain a warrant when one
could readily have been had is not of necessity fatal to a search or seizure
concomitant with an arrest the nature ot which had been fully anticipated, it will
be fatal unless there are at least some countervailing factors. We need not
define such circumstances. In the case at bar we find none. We hold that the
government cannot rely upon an expected arrest to seize stolen goods, the
presence of which it long had probable cause to know of, simply to avoid the
inconvenience of obtaining a search warrant. Cf. United States v. James, 6 Cir.,
1967, 378 F.2d 88; United States v. Harris, 6 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 739, 741 and
cases there collected.
20
21
22
We deal with no other point not merely because of the importance, as we view
it, of this one, but because the defendants have presented no other matter of any
consequence. In our opinion the only error committed at the trial was the
refusal to permit defendants access to Ford's grand jury testimony for the
purpose of cross-examination. This refusal was not in accord with our view of
Dennis v. United States, 1966, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973, as
we held, subsequent to the instant trial, in Schlinsky v. United States, 1 Cir.,
1967, 379 F.2d 735, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920, 88 S.Ct. 236, 19 L.Ed.2d 265.
However, Ford's testimony in chief was of no substantial materiality to any
issue in the trial as distinguished from the motion to suppress. We have decided
that motion in defendants' favor. There was, accordingly, no prejudice.
23
The judgments of conviction are vacated, the jury verdicts set aside, and the
orders denying the motions to suppress revoked. The action is remanded to the
District Court with instructions to grant the motions to suppress and to take
such further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.
Even as to Wise's retained portion, where some of the liquor still in the truck
assertedly was, the fact that the partition was built with a door large enough to
permit trucks to extend into Wise's part, the nature of Wise's use, or, rather
nonuse of the part, and the failure of Ford, whose broad authority the
government vouches for in another connection, to object over a period of time,
would seem to show at least an unrevoked license to enter Wise's portion of the
building
The first two matters listed by the Court in Rabinowitz demonstrate the
distinction. '(1) The search and seizure were incident to a valid arrest,' the arrest
itslef being predicated upon a warrant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 1963,
371 U.S. 471, 480 n. 8, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. This meant that at least
some independent determination of probable cause had been made by a
magistrate. '(2) The place of the search was a business room to which the
public, including the officers, was invited.' 339 U.S. at 64, 70 S.Ct. at 434
For expressions of similar opinion, see, e.g., Clay v. United States, 5 Cir., 1956,
239 F.2d 196, 204; Smith v. United States, 1958, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 48, 254
F.2d 751, 766-767 (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937, 78 S.Ct.
1388, 2 L.Ed.2d 1552. See also Arwine v. Bannan, 6 Cir., 1965, 346 F.2d 458,
465-467, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 882, 86 S.Ct. 175, 15 L.Ed.2d 123