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Carl Velleca v. Superintendent, M.C.I., Walpole, 523 F.2d 1040, 1st Cir. (1975)
Carl Velleca v. Superintendent, M.C.I., Walpole, 523 F.2d 1040, 1st Cir. (1975)
2d 1040
26, 1973, the district court dismissed the habeas petition on the merits.1
Petitioner then filed notice of appeal. After disposition of interim motions to
consolidate with a companion case, this court issued an order granting leave to
the district court "to entertain and act on a motion for a full evidentiary hearing"
and retained appellate jurisdiction. We were not fully aware of the limited, nonevidentiary nature of the magistrate's hearing, and in any event felt it prudent to
allow the district court to verify that its decision rested altogether upon its own
independent judgment, not upon a magistrate's assessment. O'Shea v. United
States, 491 F.2d 774, 778 (1st Cir. 1974); See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S.
461, 473, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 41 L.Ed.2d 879 (1974).
3
Petitioner-appellant also raises on appeal the fact that the district court did not
have available the trial transcript from the state court. We note that the absence
of the record of state court proceedings might be troublesome in certain cases.
This lack would generally affect the ability of the district court to make an
independent assessment of whether the "state factual determinations (are) . . .
fairly supported by the record," Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316, 83 S.Ct.
745, 758, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). However, under the circumstances of the
present case, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) and the principles of Townsend Would
appear to permit the federal district court to rely on the state court opinion in
lieu of holding its own hearing. The extensive opinion of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts covering all of appellant's assignments of error clearly
places this case among those where "the state court proceedings were full and
fair" and the federal habeas court need not hold its own hearing. Farmer v.
Caldwell, 476 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir.),2 Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868, 94 S.Ct. 178,
38 L.Ed.2d 117 (1973). While 2254(d) does not require a district court to
accept as true a state appellate court's factual statements, Thomas v. Craven,
473 F.2d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir. 1973), nevertheless the statute does establish a
presumption that the determinations made by a state court are correct unless a
petitioner can establish or it shall appear that the "merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the State court." 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Further, the
Supreme Court has recently held that there are certain cases where "it can
scarcely be doubted from (the state court's) written opinion that (a petitioner's)
factual contentions were resolved against him" and where "the opinion of the
state . . . court met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1)." LaVallee v.
Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 692, 695, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 1204, 35 L.Ed.2d 637
(1973). Appellant's case clearly falls within this class. The opinion of the
Supreme Judicial Court amply considered his claims of procedural irregularities
and his claim of a due process violation as a result of his being shackled during
trial. Specifically, with regard to the trial court's exercise of discretion in
shackling appellant, the opinion indicated that the Supreme Judicial Court had
a "fair knowledge and understanding of all the factual matters on which the
decision (was) based"; that the "trial court was advised by officers in position to
know the facts", Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1973);
and that there was no abuse of discretion.
5
Affirmed.
The panel consisted of Simpson and Clark, JJ. and Aldrich, Senior Circuit
Judge, sitting by designation