Carlena Stallworth Blair v. The National Construction Company of The South, Inc. and Florida First National Bank of Pensacola, 611 F.2d 80, 1st Cir. (1980)
Carlena Stallworth Blair v. The National Construction Company of The South, Inc. and Florida First National Bank of Pensacola, 611 F.2d 80, 1st Cir. (1980)
2d 80
renovations to her home. After these discussions, she signed two contracts: one
entitled "National Construction Company of the South, Inc. . . . Retail
Installment Contract" (Contract A) and another entitled "Retail Installment
Contract and Note" (Contract B). The two contracts described different
materials and labor to be supplied and had different financing terms.2 Included
as part of the second contract was a $600.00 payment to Mrs. Blair "for extra
work on home." As security for the work and loan, Mrs. Blair executed a
mortgage on her property and signed a right of recision form. The second
contract was subsequently assigned to the Florida First National Bank.3
3
Following a few days' work on the house, Mrs. Blair signed a "certificate of
completion" and soon thereafter received a $600.00 check. In September, she
wrote the appellees here informing them that the improvements had been done
in an unworkmanlike manner constituting a breach of the contract. She
demanded payment of sums to which she was entitled and cancellation of
security interests. She then filed this action in federal district court, alleging
violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act, the Alabama Consumer Fraud Act,4 and
the common law,5 and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
damages.6
Once in federal court, the appellees moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds
that the court did not have jurisdiction over this action and that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. The plaintiffs moved for partial summary
judgment on one issue. The trial judge denied the motion for partial summary
judgment and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss without an opinion.
We therefore begin with the broad standard accorded motions under FRCP
Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We have
held that the proper standard for such motions is that:
(A) complaint is not subject to dismissal (for failure to state a claim) unless it
appears to a certainty that The plaintiff cannot possibly be entitled to relief
under any set of facts which could be proven in support of its allegations. Even
then, a court ordinarily should not dismiss the complaint except after affording
every opportunity to the plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief might be
granted. (Emphasis in original)
Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 456 F.2d 211, 212 (5th Cir. 1972),
Citing Byrd v. Bates, 220 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1955).
The plaintiff suggested a number of ways in which she had stated a cause of
action under the Truth-in-Lending Act. She argued that it is impermissible
under the Act to combine the disclosure of the credit sale with the disclosure
for a $600.00 consumer loan in one document. She also alleged that the Act
was violated if she signed two contracts with their respective disclosures if only
one represented the actual agreement that was made. Finally she urged that
some of the disclosures in the first contract were inaccurate.
10
Without considering all of her claims here, we think she has certainly stated a
valid cause of action sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
under the Byrd v. Bates standard. As to the contentions about the combination
of the disclosures for the work on the house with those for the loan, Mrs. Blair
has stated a cause of action. Section 1638,7 concerning one type of credit sale,
clearly contemplates a different sort of disclosure than 16398 dealing with
consumer loans. The enforcement scheme of differentiating between credit
sales and loans is carried forth in Regulation Z as promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board at 12 C.F.R. 226.8 where subsection (c) lists the items to be
disclosed in credit sales and subsection (d) lists the disclosures required for
loans. The combining of these two sorts of transactions by the use of a single
disclosure statement which does not clearly indicate that there was both a cash
loan of $600 and a credit sale was a violation of the Act.9 Allowing a creditor to
combine these disclosures under the circumstances of this case would enable it
to evade the technical requirements of the Act which this Court has held must
be strictly complied with. Cf. McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 848-49
(5th Cir. 1978); Martin v. Commercial Securities Co., Inc., 539 F.2d 521, 525
(5th Cir. 1976). A combined disclosure of the two transactions does not provide
"a meaningful disclosure of credit terms." See 15 U.S.C. 1601. Such a
truncated disclosure statement might easily confuse people uninformed in the
complicated world of credit transactions. The inclusion of a $600 cash loan to
Mrs. Blair under the designation "cash price" does not truly reflect the real
transaction.
11
Furthermore, in this case, Mrs. Blair might well have been confused by the fact
that she was given two different contracts and thus two different disclosure
statements for what may have been only one actual agreement to repair her
house. The parties never had an opportunity to develop the facts surrounding
the two contracts and how they related to the actual work done because the
case was dismissed. Title 15 1631(a) requires that disclosures be made in a
clear and conspicuous manner and Regulation Z at 12 C.F.R. 226.8(a)
We therefore reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand to the district
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.10
13
The cash price for Contract A was $5600 a down payment of $1600 with the
rest to be paid in 60 monthly installments of $100.35. Total payments were
listed as $5726.79. The cash price for Contract B was $3400, payable in 84
monthly installments of $72.89. Total payments were listed as $6122.76
Why Mrs. Blair signed two contracts is not in the record. The second contract
was identified in the corner as being from the Florida National Banks of
Florida. The contractor was identified as the National Construction Company
The common law claims included breach of the construction contract, fraud and
deceit in the entering into of the contract, and inducing the defendant to execute
an unconscionable contract
Specifically, Mrs. Blair sought to compel the defendants to comply with the
Alabama Consumer Finance Act, to prevent them from foreclosing on the
mortgage or any liens or of suing to enforce the performance of the contract,
and to rescind the contracts and other agreements pursuant to Title 5, Section
323, Code of Alabama 1940 (Supp.1973) with recovery of the finance charge,
penalties, and attorney's fees provided for under that Act, in Title 5, Section
330. She also wanted a declaratory judgment that the contracts were
unconscionable pursuant to the common law and Title 5, Section 327 Code of
Alabama 1940 (Supp.1973); and that defendant National Construction Co. had
failed to substantially perform its contract. Also sought were damages for fraud
and deceit
She also asked for a declaratory judgment that the acts and practices of the
the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification
of the property to which the security interest relates.
8
The plaintiff also argued that she was entitled to attorney's fees. Consideration
of that issue at this point in the litigation would be premature. Title 15 U.S.C.
1640(a)(3) provides that in any successful action to enforce liability under the
Truth-in-Lending Act, the defendant is liable for a "reasonable attorney's fee."
However, since the plaintiff has not prevailed on the merits, she cannot recover.
Cf. McGowan v. Credit Center of North Jackson, Inc., 546 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.
1977); Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 122 (5th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. MyersDickson Furniture Company, 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 1973)