Angela Calderon Nieves v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 775 F.2d 12, 1st Cir. (1985)
Angela Calderon Nieves v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 775 F.2d 12, 1st Cir. (1985)
Angela Calderon Nieves v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 775 F.2d 12, 1st Cir. (1985)
2d 12
11 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 170
requirement, and that she satisfied the criteria of a listed impairment, notably
mental retardation, see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Sec.
12.05(C). Upon its own motion review, the Appeals Council reversed the
decision of the ALJ and found that the claimant had not established the
existence of a severe impairment. The Council's action became the Secretary's
final decision. Claimant brought a civil action in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which found no substantial evidence to
support the Secretary's decision. The district court held that the claimant had a
severe impairment (chronic cervico-lumbosacral myositis) and that such
impairment prevented her from performing her past relevant work. The case
was remanded to the Secretary to determine whether the claimant's impairment
satisfied the criteria of a listed impairment and, if not, whether there were other
jobs the claimant could perform.
3
On remand, after a supplemental hearing, the ALJ found that claimant had
severe impairments (severe chronic cervico-dorsal myositis and depressive
neurosis) but that she did not meet the criteria of any of the listed impairments.
The ALJ concluded that, although claimant could not perform the full range of
sedentary work due to her impairments, she could perform a number of jobs
that appeared in significant numbers in her geographical area. The decision and
findings of the ALJ were adopted by the Appeals Council, which became the
final decision of the Secretary. The district court affirmed the Secretary's
finding of no disability, and claimant appeals to this Court.
Claimant contends that she meets one of the listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (1984), which details "impairments which are
considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity".
20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1525(a). Additionally, claimant argues that the Secretary's
decision that claimant could do other work is not supported by substantial
evidence. We do not need to reach this latter issue, because we find that the
claimant satisfied the requirements of a listed impairment. Under 20 C.F.R.
Sec. 404.1520(a) & (d), if the claimant meets a listed impairment, the Secretary
is required to find a claimant disabled and not consider whether he or she could
perform other work.
Claimant asserts that she meets the requirements of Listing 12.05(C), which
establishes disability if one has an:
In its decision reversing the ALJ's finding of disability, the Appeals Council
noted that the I.Q. scores in evidence "if accurate, would be so limiting that the
claimant would never have been able to perform her prior work as seamstress".
The Council pointed out that the record reflected "fairly regular work activity in
the decade preceding the alleged date of disability onset". The discrediting of
the I.Q. scores was improper for several reasons. First, the Secretary is simply
not at liberty to substitute her own opinions of an individual's health for
uncontroverted medical evidence.4 This evidence was the only medical
evidence before the ALJ on this point. Second, courts do not engage in further
inquiry as to the first (I.Q.) requirement of Listing 12.05(C) once they find that
the claimant's I.Q. was below 70.5 Third, the Secretary is incorrect in reasoning
that the I.Q. score, if accurate, would have prohibited the claimant from ever
working. That an I.Q. of 63 is only a mild form of retardation follows from the
regulations. Before requiring a finding of disability for a person with an I.Q.
between 60 and 69, the Listings require evidence of another impairment.
Compare Listing 12.05(B) (an I.Q. of 59 or less itself suffices to establish
disability). Additionally, claimant acknowledges that the record reflects fairly
regular work activity in the decade preceding the date of disability onset. She
became unable to continue working only after she developed severe chronic
myositis; the combination of the physical and mental impairments significantly
limited her work-related functions.
10
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with
instructions to remand to the Secretary for the payment of benefits to the
claimant from May 22, 1978, for such period as she continues to be disabled.8
20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520 (1984). See Cunningham v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 911,
913 (D.C.Cir.1985)
Claimant's I.Q. scores were based on the WAIS test, which is specifically
prescribed by the regulations. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Sec.
12.00(B)
Part A of the listings, which applies to adults, mandates that the lowest I.Q.
score is to be used in determining whether an adult claimant meets the listing.
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Sec. 12.00(B)(4). See Diaz v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 746 F.2d 921, 923 (1st Cir.1984)
See e.g., Carrillo Marin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 758 F.2d
14, 16, (1st Cir.1985); Suarez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 740
F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir.1984)
See, e.g., Cunningham v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 911, 913 (D.C.1985); Edwards by
Edwards v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513, 1515 (11th Cir.1985); Adams v. Heckler,
742 F.2d 1321, 1322 (11th Cir.1984); Kennedy v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 168, 172
(4th Cir.1984); Smith v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 312, 318 (8th Cir.1984); Townsend
v. Heckler, 581 F.Supp. 157, 159 (W.D.Va.1983); Wright v. Schweiker, 556
F.Supp. 468, 476 (M.D.Tenn.1983)
A claimant satisfies the second half of the Sec. 12.05(C) test if he or she has a
severe impairment under Sec. 404.1520(c). See Edwards v. Heckler, 736 F.2d
625, 630 (11th Cir.1984)
See Suarez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 740 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
Cir.1984)