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United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.: Nos. 85-1105, 85-1106 and 85-1152
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.: Nos. 85-1105, 85-1106 and 85-1152
2d 75
public auction of certain real property under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(h). Eva
Abdallah, widow of the debtor, filed various objections and a request for a jury
trial, alleging that as tenant by the entirety with her deceased spouse, she alone
now had title to the parcels in question, clear of the bankruptcy proceeding.
3
The bankruptcy court, 39 B.R. 384, held that upon the death of the debtor, full
title in the tenancy by the entirety properly vested in the widow and
accordingly there was nothing upon which Section 363(h) could operate. The
decision rendered all further consideration under that section moot. The
petitioners appealed to the district court, which upheld the decision in part,
arriving at the same result regarding the nature of a valid tenancy by the
entirety, but basing its ruling upon federal rather than state law. Confronted
with serious allegations that the debtor and his wife created the tenancy by the
entirety to defraud his creditors, the court remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing to determine the real parties in interest.
Appellants' core issue on appeal is whether 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363 authorizes the
sale of real estate in which the nondebtor spouse claims an interest as a tenant
by the entirety, after the death of the debtor, where, but for the bankruptcy
proceeding, the full title would immediately vest in the surviving spouse. We
find that the appeal of this issue is premature. The decision of the district court
on an appeal from a bankruptcy judge's final order is not itself final if the
district court's decision remands the case to the bankruptcy court for significant
further proceedings. Under those circumstances, the district court's decision is
not automatically appealable to the court of appeals. Matter of Riggsby, 745
F.2d 1153, 1156 (7th Cir.1984). See also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 158(d).
Still unresolved here, is the validity of the creation of the tenancy by the
entirety. If the trial court finds that it was created to defraud creditors and that
the complete title rests in the debtor's estate, any pronouncement we might now
make on the tenancy by the entirety vis-a-vis the bankruptcy proceedings
would be rendered academic.
Appellee points out that two appellants, creditor Donahue & Donahue and
Trustee Roffman, failed to file timely notices of appeal from the bankruptcy
court to the district court, see Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) and (c). Compliance
with this requirement is both mandatory and jurisdictional U.S.M. Corp. v.
G.K.N. Fasteners Ltd., 578 F.2d 21, 22 (1st Cir.1978). Untimely notice of
appeal deprives the district court of jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy
court's order. Matter of Ramsey, 612 F.2d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.1980). While
this may have had no practical effect over the district court's review of the
order, this court's jurisdiction can only be based on a proper exercise of
jurisdiction by the court below. Id. We, therefore, are without jurisdiction over
those appellants' appeals on these issues.
8
The appeals of Donahue & Donahue, No. 85-1105 and Allen H. Roffman, No.
85-1152, are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The order of the district court as
to these two appellants is hereby vacated and the case is remanded so that said
court may dismiss their appeals from the bankruptcy court. The appeal of
Richard Drury, No. 85-1106, is dismissed without prejudice because the district
court's order was not final.
Creditors Drury and Donahue & Donahue joined the motion some time later
Appellants argue that under the doctrine of Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598
(1982), reference back to the bankruptcy court would constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of power to a non-article III judge
Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the property of both the debtor and
his wife was placed in state court receivership. Appellants argue that Mrs.
Abdallah does not have standing to object to the sale, especially since the state
court receiver has given his consent